

**A Case for Convergence?
Indonesian Labour Politics, 1973-1998**

Dr Michele Ford

School of Political and International Studies, Flinders University

Refereed paper presented to the

Australasian Political Studies Association Conference

University of Adelaide

29 September - 1 October 2004

Suharto's New Order regime (1967-1998) promoted its system of Industrial Relations as an indigenous institution based on the five pillars of its state philosophy, *Pancasila* (belief in almighty God; respect for humanity; Indonesian unity; democracy guided by the principle of deliberation to reach a consensus; and the realisation of social justice). However, New Order ideas about labour institutions originated not in Indonesia itself, but in the European labour theory debates of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Unions had a double identity in New Order labour rhetoric. On one hand, they were deemed to be 'by, for and of' workers in the revisionist tradition. On the other, they were part of an organic, corporatist whole. The limits of unionism were defined by labour's place in its corporatist system of interest representation, but New Order beliefs about the institution of trade unionism were not shaped by the state's corporatist impulse alone. They were also influenced by the revisionist convictions of non-communist labour activists who continued to be involved in formal trade unionism under the New Order. The theoretical underpinnings of both these elements originated outside Indonesia.¹

Hess (1986a) has argued, after Rey, developing countries have a 'double history' of international influence and local culture, which, in the industrial relations arena, has meant that the operation of a foreign-built machinery of industrial relations is mediated by local cultural factors. This paper reverses Hess' emphasis, by positing that although the institutions of organised labour have been produced differently in different non-European contexts, the process has inevitably been informed by international conceptions of the labour union and of relationships

¹ For an account of how these ideas influenced the development of labour representation and industrial relations in the first five years of the post Suharto period (1998-2002) see Ford (2003).

between labour and the state. In short, despite its indigenist rhetoric, the New Order's system of industrial relations demonstrated at least partial convergence, not because of structural imperatives associated with patterns of economic development, but because of the history of ideas about unionism, and the historical experiences of unionism in the particular context of Indonesia.

The Theoretical Terrain

The structures of developing-country labour movements were initially heavily influenced by industrial relations models formulated in Europe and North America. Moreover, analyses of those movements were shaped by those same models: many authors of early developing-country labour literature were North Americans or Europeans who 'cast themselves in the role of advisors to the governments and industrial relations practitioners in...newly independent nations' (Hess 1997, 225). This is not to suggest that the organised labour literature has ignored the differences between Western and developing-country unionism. In fact, the difficulty in directly transferring Western labour movement theories was noted not long after the idea of the 'developing country' was invented, when Kerr and Siegel (1955) observed that European and North American labour theories were not designed to consider the labour movements of non-capitalist, pre-industrialised societies or variants of capitalism beyond that found in the liberal West. Theories of developing-country unionism proliferated following the subsequent development of the convergence model, which posited that modernising elites in developing countries seek to

emulate industrial relations systems of the developed capitalist West, in *Industrialism and Industrial Man* (Kerr et al 1960).²

Siddique (1989) has divided explanations of third world industrial relations systems into two groups: those that identify the role of the state as the primary determinant of industrial relations, and those based on cultural factors. This division is useful because it identified the primary point of difference between two major groups of developing-country industrial relations theories. The first group, which was predicated on a structural understanding of industrial relations, focused on the timing of industrialisation, industrialisation strategies and state structures. Many structuralist theories sought to explain why developing-country industrial relations systems have diverged rather than converged with those of Europe and North America. However, they were all based to a greater or lesser extent on the assumption that underpins the convergence model – that Western-style unions are the standard against which all other types of labour organisation should be measured (see for example Deyo 1989). The second group of theories are predicated on cultural interpretations of industrial relations institutions. They focused on the importance of examining the role local practice plays in industrial relations. As Mohapatra (1997) has noted, ‘culture’ was generally seen as a hindrance to the emergence of an industrial working class (and effective industrial relations systems) in the school of labour studies that emerged from the work of Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Meyers in *Industrialism and Industrial Man*. Cultural models of industrial relations have therefore presented the most direct challenge to the

² See for example Bates (1970); Frenkel (1993) and Sharma (1996).

assumptions of convergence theory.³ Yet while scholars such as Hess (1986a; 1986b) mobilised cultural explanations in order to challenge the Eurocentrism of the ‘normative picture’ presented in much of the developing-country literature, they, too, continued to see the variations on the Western model of unionism as the exclusive organisational vehicle of working-class concerns in developing countries. Scholarly accounts of Indonesian industrial relations have relied heavily on either structuralist or culturalist analyses. Structuralists, such as Hadiz (1997), have emphasised the corporatist elements of the system and the timing and impact of Indonesia’s industrialisation on labour’s ability to organise. Culturalists, including Hess (1997), have emphasised the negative effects of the dominant, patrimonial Javanese culture on the development of a strong labour movement prepared to challenge the prerogatives of management. It is argued here that whilst both local culture and corporatism were influential, it is necessary to move beyond the structuralist/culturalist dichotomy which has dominated analyses of Indonesian Industrial Relations in order to fully understand the position of unions. This requires recourse to the historical debates in which the assumptions that underpin New Order Industrial Relations were established.

The early development of the Indonesian labour movement took place under the influence of Dutch socialists. A survey of sources written before 1965 indicates that unionists and members of the major political parties drew on concepts ranging from Anarcho-syndicalism, to Catholic corporatism and early versions of *Pancasila*.⁴

³ For critiques of cultural models of industrial relations, see Dale (1995) and Fry (2001).

⁴ See for example Amin (1946) for an overview of socialism, communism, anarchism and an early version of *Pancasila* written in 1946 (*Pancasila* was first promoted by Sukarno in 1945). Amin argued that Indonesia’s ongoing struggle to achieve fully-recognised statehood required the labour movement’s cooperation with the government rather than opposition to it.

While labour theory debates amongst Indonesia's union leaders in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century were not limited to considerations of the claims and counter-claims of Lenin and the revisionists, from the early twentieth century, the most important of Western influences on educated Indonesians generally, and labour intellectuals in particular, were Leninist and revisionist (social democratic) thought.⁵

The terms of the debate between Lenin and the revisionists were set in Bernstein's *Evolutionary Socialism* and Lenin's *What is to be Done?*: should socialism be achieved through evolution, based on the growing strength of trade unions and workers' participation in parliamentary democracy? Or should revolutionary intellectuals intervene in trade unions to free workers from the shackles of trade union consciousness? Whereas Lenin (1968) saw revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat as essential pillars of scientific socialism, Bernstein argued that Marx's theory of revolution failed to take into account the heterogeneity of the proletariat and the tenuousness of the link between the experience of industrial work and a yearning for socialist production. According to Bernstein (1975, 140-141), the conditions necessary for the achievement of socialism's ethical aims could be created through the exertion of economic and political pressure within the capitalist system and 'trade union consciousness' without the involvement of a vanguard party or the necessity of revolution. Trade unions, he argued, were 'indispensable organs of democracy, and not only passing coalitions' which could 'only further simultaneously the interests of its members and the general good as long as they

⁵ Socialist, as it is used in this paper, refers to the socialist theories which underpinned labour discourse rather than a system of government.

[were] content to remain a partner [with the employer]' – be that employer a government, a capitalist or the community.

Lenin (1968) responded to these propositions in *What is to be Done?* where he argued that evolutionary socialism denied many of the tenets of Marxism, including the process of proletarianisation, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the 'antithesis in principle' between liberalism and socialism. In particular, Lenin attacked the Russian Economists' commitment to the merits of trade union consciousness – a commitment they shared with Bernstein.⁶ Lenin argued that trade union consciousness, 'the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers, and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labor legislation, etc', could never free workers from the shackles of capitalism because it had no vision for an alternative economic system.

For Lenin, the revolutionary intellectual was an outsider who developed workers' consciousness from trade union consciousness and spontaneity to revolutionary consciousness in order to overthrow capitalism and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat under the guidance of the vanguard party. For Bernstein, socialist ideals could be achieved by evolutionary, democratic means as workers gained organisational experience and the confidence and skills to participate more fully in society through their involvement in democratic trade unions. However, despite their differences, within Lenin's revolutionary vision and Bernstein's evolutionary socialism, the analysis of the role of the intellectual

⁶ Hammond (1974) identifies four themes in the Economists' position, as described by Lenin in a range of tracts: the importance and effectiveness of economic struggle; the participation of the workers in the political struggle; and the differences between conscious leadership, the economic struggle as a means of developing political consciousness, and spontaneity.

essentially reflected a single understanding: that intellectuals involved in the labour movement were inherently different from the workers they sought to mobilise.

The New Order emphasised the indigenous nature of its system of industrial relations, which suggests that that system diverged rather than converged with Western models of industrial relations and trade unionism. However, a close analysis of the theories and ideas that underpin New Order unionism suggests that in rejecting Leninism, the New Order did not abandon the terms of the debate between Lenin and the revisionists. As demonstrated in the sections that follow, when unions were 'renovated' in order to avoid repeating 'the mistakes of the past' (Sudono 1980) in the early years of the New Order, that 'renovation' was based as much on revisionist principles of social democratic unionism as on either *Pancasila* or the corporatist system of interest representation through which *Pancasila* was implemented.

The Corporatist Paradigm and its Revisionist Counterpoint

Suharto's New Order (1967-1998) had two priorities when it seized power in Indonesia in the late 1960s and destroyed the Indonesian Communist Party: safeguarding the 'State Ideology' and the Constitution of 1945, which 'had been imperilled in previous years'; and 'the rebuilding of society and the overcoming of the legacy of economic chaos that was left by the previous era' (Witoelar 1989). The 'State Ideology' to which Witoelar referred was *Pancasila*, which the New Order regime touted as an indigenous, inalienable philosophy whose authority lay beyond the realm of mere politics. In the words of the chief architect of the New Order state, Ali Moertopo (1972, 40), 'the New Order cannot be identified with *Pancasila*', rather

'*Pancasila* is the fundamental norms [sic] to be carried out by the nation and the State; the New Order is the attitude of the Indonesian people in order to apply those norms correctly'. The New Order's main purpose in emphasising the 'indigenous' values of *Pancasila* was to fundamentally reject the leftist ideology which had dominated pre-New Order Indonesia. However, as Bouchier (1996) has shown, the corporatist structure of interest representation promoted by Moertopo, under which all parts of society were restructured in order to facilitate citizens' participation in activities geared towards the achievement of national development, owed as much to Catholic social theory, including the labour doctrines described in the *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and later *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), than to any inherently Indonesian philosophy.

The corporatisation of Indonesian society was essentially completed in the period between 1971 and 1975, a period characterised by the 'politics of fusion'. In these few years, the New Order regime undertook a number of sweeping political reforms. It introduced the floating mass policy, under which Indonesians were only permitted to engage politically at election time so that they could devote their energies to development, and forced non-communist political parties to amalgamate in the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI, Indonesian Democratic Party) and the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP, United Development Party) (Reeve 1985, 323). It also formed single-vehicle corporatist bodies for labour, peasants, fishers, youth and women called 'functional groups', which were designed to be the 'backbone' of Indonesia's 'developing society' (Moertopo 1974). Moertopo (1974) argued the functional groups' structural independence from political parties was vital, because in the past there had been no differentiation between their political and functional struggles.

Moertopo's ideas were highly influential in the reorganisation of labour and the formulation of *Pancasila* Labour Relations in the early 1970s (Hadiz 1997, 88).⁷ Moertopo took a strong personal interest in shaping the institutions of New Order labour corporatism, which he believed were a key part of his wider vision for an organic, developmentalist state based on *Pancasila*. Central to Moertopo's project was the establishment of a strong, single trade union federation oriented to the 'goals and ambitions' of the nation as a whole (Moertopo 1974). This was achieved when an agreement to establish the *Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia* (FBSI, All-Indonesia Labour Federation) was signed on 20 February 1973 (Sukarno 1973, 16-19). The new union federation was to be a partner in tripartite forums and in the implementation of *Pancasila* Labour Relations. It would act both as a channel for workers' aspirations and to facilitate 'workers' participation in the tasks of the nation (*tugas-tugas nasional*)' (Moertopo 1974, 23).

As Hadiz (1997, 59-83) has carefully chronicled in his work on the origins of New Order industrial relations, the establishment of FBSI was the culmination of efforts by the military, government officials and unionists who had survived the transition to the New Order since the late 1960s. The initial proposal for the 'renovation' of the labour movement was put forward at an FES-sponsored seminar in October 1971. A few months later, in May 1972, a formal resolution was passed (*Ikrar Bersama*, Common Resolve), followed by the Declaration of Unity on 20 February 1973. FBSI's Constitution was completed by 11 March 1973 (Sukarno 1973,

⁷ In April 1975, the text of Moertopo's presentation at the Seminar on *Pancasila* Labour Relations in December 1974 – which strongly shaped the seminar's final statement – was published as part of a volume entitled *Buruh dan Tani dalam Pembangunan* (Moertopo 1975). This seminar, at which 'guiding statements' were made by the President, the Minister for Manpower and Ali Moertopo, was attended by a number of trade union figures, including Agus Sudono, Sukijat, and Sukarno. The text of the seminar decision is reproduced as an appendix in Djumaldji and Soedjono (1982). Moertopo re-presented parts of his paper at a military seminar on *Pancasila* Labour Relations in 1980, published as Moertopo (1980).

21). On 11 March 1974, FBSI and its 'component bodies' were formally recognised as the only legal union(s) in Indonesia (Sukarno 1973, 29).⁸ The formation of FBSI laid the foundations for the formal establishment of *Pancasila* Labour Relations at the National Seminar on *Pancasila* Labour Relations held in December 1974.

With the implementation of *Pancasila* Labour Relations, the government formally rejected 'foreign' models that stressed the inherently antagonistic nature of labour relations on the grounds that they were incompatible with the national character.⁹ Yet whilst the New Order drew heavily on the language of indigeneity in its efforts to downplay the differences between workers and their employers, Moertopo (1974, 32-33) himself also adopted the rhetoric of revisionism:

In the past, the Indonesian labour movement was divided and difficult to unify because of ideological differences between its leaders, who emphasised the political struggle and neglected the struggle to improve the socio-economic welfare of its members... The FBSI's struggle emphasises the socio-economic struggle to improve workers' welfare, and the achievement of better working conditions and social guarantees. In doing so, FBSI is returning (*mengembalikan*) the function of the labour movement to that of labour union rather than of political organisation.

⁸ Although the non-communist unions that had survived the post-1965 purges were never officially dissolved, in practice, with the formation of FBSI, they were reshaped into FBSI's industrial sector unions. The communist-linked *Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia* (SOBSI, All-Indonesia Central Workers' Organisation) and other left-leaning unions had been crushed in the aftermath of 1965.

⁹ The 1974 Seminar at which *Pancasila* Labour Relations was established was attended by representatives of employers, the bureaucracy, unions and universities. Guidance (*pengarahan*) was provided by the President, Moertopo and Subroto, the Minister for Manpower, Transmigration and Cooperatives. Agus Sudono was present, whilst Soekarno, whose historical work is discussed in detail below, was a discussant at the seminar. A copy of the 1974 Seminar Resolution is included in Djumaldji and Soedjono (1982).

As this quotation suggests, although Moertopo's prescription for FBSI was most certainly premised on its function in a corporatist system of labour relations within an organic corporatist state, it did not preclude accommodation of the interests of the non-communist labour leaders still active at the beginning of the New Order period.¹⁰ FBSI was described as apolitical because 'pure' unions were considered apolitical in the revisionist orthodoxy of the period. Yet whilst the rhetoric of New Order unionism focused on its socio-economic aims and its separation from Golkar, in practice, those links were strong.¹¹ Many in the central leadership were members of Golkar with no background in union affairs, including Oetojo Oesman, Sukijat and Soedarwo. Retired bureaucrats and retired members of the military were also represented at lower levels of the union (Hikam 1995; Kusyuniati 1998).

Hadiz (1997, 72) has argued, following Reeve, that FBSI's formal independence from Golkar was a result of tensions between its predecessor (Sekber Golkar) and non-communist union leaders in the late 1960s and early 1970s over the international representation of Indonesian labour.¹² However, the separation between party and union also had a revisionist ideological dimension. Moertopo's corporatist vision was tempered by contemporary revisionist and neo-revisionist ideas about unionism – concepts supported internationally by unions in the United

¹⁰ Indeed, Hadiz (1997, 35) has reported that, in the early years of the New Order (1967-1973), many labour leaders at the time were optimistic that a 'relatively independent' labor movement could be developed within the New Order framework.

¹¹ For example Sutanto, the head of the Department of Manpower's Public Relations Bureau, compared the unions of the Old Order period, which 'were only used as an instrument in political parties' struggle to achieve their interests' with the New Order period, when 'the crown of the workers' struggle is the Collective Labour Agreement' (quoted in *Merdeka* 10 October 1995) Similarly, in October 1996, Arief Soedjito, Deputy Chair of the Organisational Division of FSPSI in the Central Java branch, reminded the branch officials he was training that 'in the Declaration of 20 February 1973 it was clearly stated that SPSI's struggle is not a political struggle, but a struggle to improve workers' welfare.' If SPSI strayed from this path, he argued, it could 'trapped (*terjebak*) once more', in the patterns of the Old Order period, when workers were mobilised for political ends. (Soedjito quoted in *Suara Merdeka* 1 October 1996).

¹² Golkar was not officially a party until after the fall of Suharto, although it stood candidates in elections throughout the New Order period.

States of America and Western Europe and by the ILO, which promoted a system of tripartism based on neo-revisionist principles.

Non-communist international labour bodies, notably the ICFTU, the AFL-CIO and the German *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung* (FES, Friedrich Ebert Foundation) were influential in Indonesia at the time when the New Order's labour regime was taking shape (Hadiz 1997, 72-42). Within Indonesia, moderate socialist union leaders, the traditional proponents of revisionism, were involved in the restructuring of the labour movement. One of the most influential proponents of revisionism in Indonesia in the early 1970s was Agus Sudono, the leader of the Muslim union federation, GASBIINDO. Sudono (1979, 26), who chaired FBSI from the time of its formation in 1973 to its transformation into the unitarist SPSI in 1985, defined labour unions in revisionist terms:

A trade union is a permanent, democratic organisation that is formed voluntarily from, by and for workers, to improve the protection afforded to them in their work, to improve their working conditions through collective bargaining and their life situation, and as a means of expressing workers' opinions about issues that arise in the community.

Another clear indication of Sudono's revisionist leanings was his repeated insistence on the difference between political organisations' 'ideological, long-term, socio-political struggle' and unions' 'real, short-term, socio-economic struggle' (1977, 66; 1979, 21; see also Sudono 1981; 1997; 1999). Sudono reconciled his revisionist principles with Moertopo's corporatism by arguing that unions' socio-economic aims

could only be achieved in the developing country context if the labour movement 'commit[ed] itself to economic development and [became] a partner in such development' (1977, 41).

Both Moertopo (1974, 10-12) and Sudono (1977, 42-43) promoted a strong, united labour movement, which focused on workers' socio-economic needs and was free from political influence. However, in contrast to the European revisionists, for Moertopo, and, to a lesser extent, Sudono, the goal of strong labour unionism was not evolution towards socialism, but rather the development of a harmonious relationship between employers and employees based on the rejection of class struggle (Moertopo 1974, 13-15).

The Limits of New Order Labour Corporatism

As noted above, the accommodation of revisionist principles within the New Order's corporatist system of labour relations was achieved by a series of compromises in the initial formulation of New Order labour policy. Moertopo tempered his corporatist vision by recognising workers' collective right to pursue their own socio-economic interests. Conversely, the non-communist union leaders who survived the 1965 purges acceded to the effective dissolution of their unions and the promotion of national development as a union objective. These compromises meant that a number of important contradictions persisted in the definition of FBSI's constituency, the duties of unions and workers, and the involvement of non-worker outsiders in the labour movement. These contradictions influenced both the operation of FBSI and the terms in which opposition to FBSI was expressed.

The relative strength of *Pancasila* Industrial Relations' corporatist and revisionist elements shifted throughout the New Order period in response to the changing fortunes of particular individuals in the government, the bureaucracy, the military and the union; changes in the international political climate and Indonesia's exposure to the world economy; and the strength of domestic opposition.¹³ These shifts in the balance between corporatist and revisionist themes over time were reflected in FBSI's rhetoric and structure and practice. Initially, revisionist influences were quite strong.¹⁴ The corporatist elements in New Order labour policy were most exclusionary in the early-mid 1980s during Admiral Sudomo's tenure as Minister for Manpower; labour corporatism reached its peak in 1985 when Sudomo replaced the FBSI with the SPSI – a single, unitary trade union.¹⁵ The restructure caused considerable friction within the SPSI between those who supported it, including Imam Soedarwo, and those who did not, including Agus Sudono (Batubara 1992, 71-72). Ultimately, Sudono (who had chaired FBSI since its inception) was replaced by Soedarwo. Some other unionists left to pursue alternative avenues of labour organising. These included Saut Aritonang, one of the founders of the illegal alternative union, *Serikat Buruh Merdeka-Setia Kawan* (SMB-SK, the Solidarity Free Trade Union), and Tarmono, who, with support from Haruno and others who

¹³ See Manning (1998) for a tabular overview of labour developments from 1965-1995. For a detailed account of unionism during the New Order period, see Hadiz (1997).

¹⁴ Hadiz (1997, 23-55) reported that many labour leaders at the time were optimistic that a 'relatively independent' labour movement could be developed within the New Order framework.

¹⁵ FBSI originally had twenty-two member 'industrial unions' (*Serikat Buruh Lapangan Pekerjaan*), however the teachers' union – the only section of FBSI that represented government employees – left shortly after FBSI was formed. The twenty-one member unions that remained represented the following sectors: agricultural and plantation workers; oil gas and mining; cigarettes and tobacco; food and beverages; textiles and clothing; forestry; printing and publishing; pharmacy and chemicals; metals and ceramics; machine and equipment assembly; rubber and leather; electronics; construction; commerce, banking and insurance; tourism; maritime workers; seafarers; inland transportation; river, lake and ferry transportation; air transportation; and health. These were replaced by nine departments within the new body. They were: agriculture and plantations; metals, electronics and machines; textiles and garments; tourism, food and beverages; pharmacy and health; chemicals, energy and mining; trade, banking and insurance; construction and forestry; and, finally, transportation. See Department of Manpower (1997, 5-7).

remained in SPSI, established a labour Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), called *Yayasan Buruh Membangun* (YBM, Foundation for Labour Movement).

The trend towards exclusionary corporatism was partially reversed from the late 1980s with the appointment of Cosmas Batubara as Minister for Manpower.¹⁶ Batubara and his successor, Abdul Latief, had quite different views on unions' role within *Pancasila* Industrial Relations. However, their desire for Indonesia to be seen as a supporter of workers' rights and a full, participating member of the ILO, combined with threats to Indonesia's trade rights in the United States of America, encouraged both to adopt a more moderate approach to trade unionism than that of Sudomo. The regime's commitment to a single union formally ended in 1993, when SPSI was again restructured as a federation of industrial unions.¹⁷ A year later, under Ministerial Regulation No.01/MEN/1994, enterprise unions were allowed in workplaces where no SPSI unit existed. Yet despite these apparently significant policy shifts, the government continued to deny workers' rights to form alternative unions beyond the factory, and assert a narrow, economic definition of unionism. SPSI remained the only union permitted to participate in the tripartite committees and mechanisms that lay at the heart of *Pancasila* industrial Relations – including the

¹⁶ Cosmas Batubara, a former student activist, was Minister for Manpower between 1986 and 1993. He was replaced by Abdul Latief, a businessman who owned the famous *Sarinah* department store in Jakarta. Latief occupied the Ministry until mid-March 1993, when he was replaced just months before the fall of Suharto by Theo Sambuaga after a public uproar over the revelation that money from the *Jamsostek* program had been used to bribe members of the DPR to pass Manpower Law No.25/1997.

¹⁷ SPSI's nine departments were transformed into 14 autonomous sectors, namely Construction and Public Works; Woodworking and Forestry; Trade, Banking and Insurance; Publishing and Printing; Tourism; Food, Beverages and Cigarettes; Chemical, Energy and Mining; Metals, Electronics and Machinery; Textiles and Leather; Transportation; Seamen; Agriculture and Horticulture; Pharmacy and Health. The Department of Manpower suggested the decision to implement the change was made in 1990 at the SPSI five-year national convention and only 'reaffirmed' in 1993-94 to dispel the impression that the change was made in response to pressure from the United States of America over the GSP issue. See Department of Manpower (1997, 7-8). Indonesia was under considerable international pressure to reform its system of labour relations at this time. Of particular importance were the United States' GSP reviews. Batubara (1992, 71-72) denied that international pressure encouraged the restructure. He argued that the ongoing tension within SPSI was a more important factor in the decision to refederate SPSI.

Disputes Resolution Committee, the National Tripartite Cooperative Committee and the National Wage Council.¹⁸ It was not until after Suharto's resignation in May 1998 that legislative barriers to the operation of alternative trade unions – the cornerstone of New Order industrial relations policy – were significantly lowered.

Defining the Worker

The first of three major sites of tension between the corporatist and revisionist elements of *Pancasila* Industrial relations was located between New Order's organic definition of 'worker' and its industrial definition of 'labour union'. New Order rhetoric went to great lengths to avoid differentiation between different classes of people who contributed to the wellbeing of the organic state. Yet, at the same time, FBSI's scope was limited to private sector waged workers in mostly blue-collar occupations.

The conscious attempt to replace *buruh* (a word for worker that had come to be mired in the connotations of class conflict) with the concept of *karyawan* began during the Guided Democracy period (1957-1965), when it was promoted as a sign that the Leninist Revolution had been achieved in Indonesia. *Karyawan*, as defined by SOKSI (1964), meant 'every person who gives their constructive work (*karya*) to the

¹⁸ As in corporatist industrial relations arrangements generally, representatives from SPSI, the government and the state-sponsored peak employer body sat on each of these committees. Tripartitism was the basic tenet of the International Labour Organisation's preferred model of industrial relations. It was also a feature of corporatist systems of industrial relations. 'Tripartite' is an adjective which refers to three parties – in language of industrial relations, it refers to employers, workers/unions and the state. Similarly, bipartite (two parties) refers to employers and workers or their unions. *Pancasila* Industrial Relations incorporated both bipartite mechanisms (including communications forums and collective labour agreements) and tripartite dispute resolution committees and other mechanisms at both local and central level. For a detailed description of these mechanisms, see Ford (1999).

people'.¹⁹ In the *karyawan* society embodied in the concept of Guided Democracy there was:

No longer a basis for the relationship between labour and bosses... There is a differentiation of function between one *karyawan* and another; both give the fruits of their *karya* to Indonesian progress. The dividing line between workers and bosses is replaced with cooperation and unity (*bersatu-padunja*) based on collective deliberation and consensus (*musyawarah untuk mufakat*) between the *karyawan* who carry out the work and the *karyawan* who lead them (SOKSI 1964, 11).

The campaign to impose the concept of *karyawan* was continued with little success during the early years of the New Order, when *karyawan* was often used interchangeably with *buruh*. The differences between *buruh*, *pekerja* and *karyawan* (the three most commonly used words to describe 'workers' in the modern Indonesian language) were described in a dictionary of 'development politics' published in 1970 as follows:

Buruh are people who work with their *physical power* to receive WAGES, which are their primary source of income... *Pekerdja* is [a term for] someone who does something, regardless of whether it requires physical exertion (*buruh*) or other skills, such as a clerk or a doctor. *Karyawan* is a more polite term for every

¹⁹ SOKSI was a military initiative to balance the 'hegemony' of the PKI. It began as a labour organisation focused on the military-run plantations, but later broadened into coordinating body for a number mass organisations. Its political functions were absorbed into Sekber Golkar in 1964. For SOKSI's own account of its connections to the military and to Golkar, see Sjamsuddin (1990) For a full account of Golkar (including SOKSI's relationship to it) see Reeve (1985).

person who does positive and productive work [capitalisation and emphasis in the original] (Hakim 1970, 16).

In the same year, Moertopo signalled the New Order's intentions to eliminate *buruh* from language and social reality, declaring that 'workers and employers must go; only one class will remain, that of the *karyawan*, executing or formulating directives' (cited in Le Clerc 1972, 77). Yet Moertopo himself was inconsistent. In the text of his address to the 1974 Seminar on Industrial Relations, for example, *karyawan*, *pekerja* and *buruh* were all used (Moertopo, 1974).

Attempts to impose *karyawan* continued until 1985. For example, Iman Soepomo (a labour law academic based at the University of Indonesia) felt compelled to justify his continued use of the term *buruh* in a volume published in 1976. He explained that *buruh* was a 'precise' term which allows labour law to be formulated unambiguously. He contrasted *buruh* to *pekerja*, whose meaning 'is very broad, namely every person who performs work, both in an employment relationship as well as outside an employment relationship' and *karyawan*, which refers to 'every person who performs *karya*' (purposeful activity which includes, but is not limited to, waged work) (Soepomo 1976, 31-32). In a 1980 encyclopaedia of Indonesia, the entry for *karyawan* directed the reader to *buruh* – a strong indication of lack of general acceptance for *karyawan* (*Ensiklopedi Indonesia* 1980).

When FBSI was restructured in 1985, the attempt to eliminate class connotations in the language of labour took a new turn. The formation of the new organisation, called *Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia* (recall that FBSI was an abbreviation for *Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*), heralded the formal official

rejection of *buruh*. According to the National Tripartite Institute's official Guidebook on Industrial Relations, *pekerja* replaced *buruh* for the following reasons:

1. The term *buruh*, which is actually only an ordinary technical term that refers to labour working for other people for wages, has developed...some unhelpful connotations:
 - a. The existence of the word *buruh* means there is a word '*majikan*' [employer/boss] implying that an unequal relationship exists between *buruh* and *majikan* and that there is a polarisation [of society] into two classes with different interests.
 - b. On hearing the word *buruh* one imagines that they are a group of workers from the lower classes who work only manually (*dengan ototnya* lit. with their muscles). Consequently, those who work not only manually, such as those employed in administration, are reluctant to be called *buruh*.
 - c. Under the influence of Marxism, *buruh* were considered a class that is always exploited by the employers/bosses. *Buruh* are also considered a class that always strive to destroy the employers/bosses in their struggle.
2. The socialisation of *Pancasila* Industrial Relations requires the development of a familial atmosphere, mutual cooperation and consultation in a company. The use of the word *buruh*, which has negative connotations, does not encourage the development of a familial atmosphere, mutual cooperation and consultation in a

company. Consequently, the term *buruh* must be replaced and a term must be found that reflects the spirit of *Pancasila* Industrial Relations.

3. It is not an easy task to find a new term that meets these requirements.

Consequently, we must return to the 1945 Constitution, our basic guide. In the 1945 Constitution in the explanation of Article Two, the following is stated:

‘what are meant by groups are bodies such as cooperatives, *serikat pekerja* (workers’ unions) and other collective bodies’.

It is clear here that the 1945 Constitution uses the term ‘*pekerja*’ to mean *buruh*. Consequently, it has been agreed that the word ‘*Pekerja*’ be used as a replacement for the word ‘*Buruh*’ because it has a strong legal basis (PPHIP 1987, 45).²⁰

Unlike *karyawan*, *pekerja* quickly became accepted as the official term for workers, although its use was largely confined to government bureaucrats and union administrators. The government continued to encourage the use of *pekerja*, and emphasise its difference from *buruh*, throughout the New Order period. In later years, *pekerja* began to absorb some of the meanings originally invested in *karyawan*. In 1996, on the occasion of the celebration of Indonesian Workers’ Day, for example,

²⁰ See also the 1988 National Encyclopedia (1988, 568), which defined a number of different *buruh* (*buruh tani*, *buruh borongan*, *buruh harian*, *buruh lepas*, *buruh tetap*) but then noted, ‘Because *buruh* is often interpreted as simply a factor of production, a social problem arose, so that legal protection was required for wages, work security and other conditions so that workers are considered as human beings. Consequently, in Indonesia, the term *buruh* has been replaced with the term “*pekerja*”.’ For a critical Indonesian-language discussion of *buruh/pekerja*, see Hasan (1994).

President Suharto described the 'great difference' between *buruh* and *pekerja*. His speech was reported in the Department of Manpower newsletter as follows:

'*Buruh*' work simply to get wages from another person, without becoming spiritually involved in their work (*terlibat secara ruhaniah*). Besides that, the term '*buruh*' has connotations of being opposed to employer (*majikan*). '*Buruh*' also has connotations of just carrying out orders as a tool in the production process (*sebagai alat dalam berproduksi*).

In contrast to *buruh*, *pekerja* have a spiritual link with, and strong professional pride in, their work, in its planning, execution, supervision and control...Furthermore, *pekerja* can develop a career...because the group of *pekerja* is not limited to those who execute tasks, but includes [professional] staff and directors and company boards, which link together to work to achieve results (cited in *Majalah Tenaga Kerja* 1996, 8).

In practice, however, *pekerja* was primarily used to describe the performers rather than the planners of work.²¹ Ironically, *karyawan* eventually became part of the popular lexicon, but its meaning narrowed to become a euphemism for blue-collar workers and the lower ranks of the white-collar workforce. The ongoing distinction between work of the head and work of the hand contradicted the government's rhetoric about the classless *Pancasila* society.

Workers' Obligations and Interests

²¹ On the divide between the conception and execution of work, see Braverman (1974).

The changing balance between workers' interests and their duties to society was perhaps the best illustration of the tensions between the corporatist and revisionist elements in *Pancasila* Industrial Relations. Like the conflict between *buruh* and *karyawan*, the uneasy marriage of the revisionist right to strike and the corporatist insistence that unions were a partner of management rather than an organisation of workers created internal inconsistencies within the rhetoric and practice of *Pancasila* Industrial Relations.

At the time FBSI was established, workers' interests were firmly embedded in the documents in its charter, although its promotion of those interests was constrained by the political imperatives of security and national development. In contrast, at the height of New Order labour corporatism, government rhetoric no longer recognised the discrete interests of labour and capital. Instead, it was argued – borrowing the language of Catholic corporatism – that all work was a 'service to God, to our fellow humankind, nation and state', and employees were not merely 'factors of production', but 'individual people with dignity and value'. Employers and employees had 'the same interest' in the 'progress of the company' because, with that progress, 'the welfare of all parties [could] be improved'. Strikes and lockouts were 'not compatible' with *Pancasila* Industrial Relations, and 'disagreements' were to be 'solved using deliberation to reach a consensus conducted according to the family principle' (PPHIP 1993, 12-13).

The debate about whether SPSI should be primarily a corporatist institution acting in the interests of the state or a revisionist institution acting for workers' interests within a parliamentary democracy was most clearly expressed in relation to strike actions and labour demonstrations. Kammen (1997) observed that two

apparently contradictory arguments were used by New Order officials to explain strikes. On one hand, strikes were often described as the result of a breakdown in the labour relationship or the unstable mentality of the workers. On the other, they were attributed to organised conspiracy and subversion. Kammen (1997, 464) argued that both these explanations served to deny workers' discontent: the former rejected conscious intent, while the latter displaced agency to outsiders. This argument holds true for the periods when the corporatist impulse was at its strongest, and for particular figures, including Sudomo and Suharto, who blamed strikes on companies for failing to treat workers properly, on SPSI for not adequately representing workers within the *Pancasila* Industrial Relations system, and on third parties who claimed to act for (*mengatasnamakan*) workers (*Jayakarta* 4 May 1994; *Surya* 4 May 1994; *Jakarta Post* 16 November 1995; *Kompas* 16 November 1995).²²

Strikes were effectively banned in the Sudomo years, and, as late as 1995, Suharto told SPSI delegates that striking was not an appropriate course of action (*Kompas* 16 November 1995). However, acceptance of the right to strike, along with the revisionist emphasis on workers' agency (and hence the possibility that workers' interests were not identical to those of employers), again became part of official rhetoric when Batubara became Minister for Manpower in 1986. Batubara defined the boundaries of an acceptable strike in classic revisionist terms. In 1991, he stated that a legitimate strike was one 'held purely and spontaneously by workers themselves, without any interference from other parties (*pihak lain*)' (*Suara Merdeka* 23 April 1991).

²² Suharto's statements on companies' failure to do their duty in 1994 were accompanied by a flurry of similar accusations from a wide range of sources. (see for example *Kompas* 26 May 1994; *Harian Terbit* 27 April 1994; *Harian Terbit* 4 July 1994; *Harian Terbit* 21 September 1994; *Pikiran Rakyat* 24 May 1994; *Pikiran Rakyat* 28 October 1994; *Merdeka* 21 July 1994; *Merdeka* 27 October 1994; *Suara Merdeka* 3 June 1994; *Surya* 29 April 1994). Official statements on companies' shortcomings continued in the final years of the Suharto era (see for example *Pikiran Rakyat* 19 July 1996; *Kompas* 21 April 1997).

Such strikes were different, Batubara argued, 'from workers' demonstrations of the early 1980s, which were interfered with (*dicampuri*) by other parties for personal or group interests'. Like Batubara, Soedarwo (cited in *Forum Keadilan* 10 December 1992) argued that most strikes in Indonesia in the late 1980s and early 1990s were 'economic in nature, or bread-and-butter issues (*tuntutan perut*), not political'. These were 'classical' (*klasik*) strikes, which he explained involved 'normative demands (*tuntutan normatif*), like wages, hours of work, overtime and other welfare issues'.²³ Even the military softened its stance on strikes under scrutiny from the United States in 1993-1994.²⁴ In 1993, Military Commander Hendro Priyono (cited in *Pikiran Rakyat* 11 August 1993) was reported as saying that demonstrations could be tolerated (*ditolerir*) as long as they were held purely to demand improved wages. In practice, the military's tolerance was extremely limited: strike actions were regularly greeted by military repression and a return to the rhetoric of Admiral Sudomo about strikes' incompatibility with *Pancasila* Industrial Relations.²⁵

Although strikes became generally acceptable as long as they were 'normative' and only involved SPSI,²⁶ the government's corporatist emphasis on the shared interests of employers and employees continued. Even during the rapid growth of industrial unrest in the early-mid 1990s, the harmonious nature of the employee-employer relationship under *Pancasila* Industrial Relations was constantly

²³ During the *Gajah Tunggal* strikes of 1991, Batubara and Soedarwo were quoted as saying that strikes are positive because they show increasing awareness amongst workers, and demonstrate 'to the world' that Indonesia allowed its workers to strike (*Suara Pembaruan* 22 August 1991).

²⁴ For a broad view of military policy towards civil society during this period, see Honna (1999).

²⁵ See for example, ABRI's stance on the public transport strike of September 1994 (*Merdeka* 8 September 1994).

²⁶ This development coincided with Minister for Manpower Batubara's campaign for a leadership position within the International Labour Organisation.

emphasised in official statements to the press.²⁷ For example, on the twenty-fourth anniversary of the formation of SPSI, Latief (cited in *Waspada* 22 February 1997) told his audience that ‘Unions are part of the infrastructure of *Pancasila* Industrial Relations. They are not designed for confrontation, but to assist management as a partner in running the company, which, in turn, helps improve the welfare of workers and their families’.

The same formulation was used by Suwanto (then Director-General of Industrial Relations and Labour Standards), at the opening of a training workshop for factory-level unions two days later on 24 February 1997 (Suwanto cited in *Merdeka* 24 February 1997). The government’s simultaneous emphasis on a conflict-free partnership between unions and management and recognition of the right to strike (in a limited form) brought with it strong echoes of tensions between Moertopo’s organic emphasis on unions as functional group organisations and the revisionists’ recognition of the right to strike when *Pancasila* Industrial Relations was first proposed.

The Limits of Politicisation

Another contradiction in New Order rhetoric that reflected the co-existence of corporatist and revisionist ideas about unions was the government’s stance on outsiders. Figures such as Suharto and Sudomo rejected the involvement of non-worker outsiders in labour unions and strikes in their defence of workplace harmony and denial of workers’ interests. The idea of the ‘non-worker outsider’ had no logical

²⁷ See for example a statement by Thoga M. Sitorus (head of the North Sumatran Regional Disputes Resolution Committee) on non-confrontational nature of *Pancasila* Industrial Relations (*Waspada* 24 June 1996).

place in the all-embracing organic corporatist concept of *karyawan* (and later *pekerja*), which made no distinction between the performers of manual and mental work. The theoretical roots of the New Order's position on non-worker outsiders did not lie in the corporatist concept of functional groups: they lay in the revisionist premise that unions should be independent from their political allies, and should pursue workers' socio-economic rather than political interests.

The major theme in the government's rhetoric about outsiders was the threat of politicisation. In 1997, at the launch of Sudono's edited volume, *Perburuhan dari Masa ke Masa*, businessman Sofyan Wanandi brought the themes of history, the politicisation of unions, *Pancasila* Industrial Relations and the effectiveness of SPSI together in a succinct statement of the concerns surrounding labour relations at the end of the New Order period (Sudono 1997). Having identified the relationship between employers and workers as 'one of mutual need' and SPSI's importance as the representative of the workers, Wanandi (cited in *Kompas* 21 April 1997) commented:

So why is the union always in a weak position? Because of the New Order government's trauma (*traumatik*) about the Old Order period. Unions were then often used as tools in the interests of political parties. So it is not surprising that the government has given unions such a very small role.

SPSI officials expressed their concerns about politicisation publicly for very different reasons. Some used the rhetoric of workers' interests to condemn labour activists outside SPSI. For example, in 1995 (the year Indonesia's first fifty years of

independence were celebrated), Bomer Pasaribu²⁸ and Imam Soedarwo²⁹ ‘urged all parties interested in the welfare of workers to reject every attempt at exploitation and manipulation made in the name of workers for goals outside the *Pancasila* Industrial Relations system, especially those that treat workers simply as a political commodity (*komoditas politik*)’ (cited in *Business News* 26 August 1995). Others, however, began to use the concepts of ‘pure’ and ‘effective’ unionism to promote increased independence for SPSI after it was restructured as a federation in 1993. By doing so, they demonstrated how the rhetoric of ‘by, of and for the workers’ could be mobilised against government interference in SPSI (*Suara Merdeka* 13 September 1993). Saralen Purba (then an official in the SPSI’s Forestry Department) publicly argued that democratisation was required for the proper functioning of SPSI. In order to achieve this, he ‘hoped’ the ‘dropping’, or insertion, of officials from third parties (*pihak ketiga*) into the SPSI leadership could be avoided in the formation of sector unions (*Pikiran Rakyat* 7 September 1993). Wilhelmus Bhoka – one of SPSI’s most vocal internal critics – put his revisionist position unequivocally:

With SPSI’s return to a federation, we hope that this institution for the representation of workers can be democratic and independent. This means SPSI is not affiliated to any political organisation, and is free from interference from outside parties (*pihak luar*) in carrying out its task of fighting for the rights and interests of its members (cited in *Pikiran Rakyat* 7 September 1993).

²⁸ Bomer Pasaribu was Secretary-General of SPSI from 1990 to 1995. He was appointed General Chair of SPSI in 1996. He was also Deputy Secretary-General of Golkar, and briefly Minister for Manpower under President Wahid.

²⁹ Imam Soedarwo was General Chair of SPSI from 1990-1995. He had previously been a member of the *Kesatuan Buruh Kerakyatan Indonesia* (KBKI), and was a founding member of the FBSI Central Board in 1973.

Bhoka later urged the government to purge SPSI's leadership of politicians, noting that almost all the central and sectoral executive officers came from SOKSI and Kosgoro.³⁰ That Bhoka's antipathy was to Golkar's corporatist political intervention in SPSI – rather than to labourist politics – was demonstrated in the immediate post-Suharto period. Within days of Suharto's resignation, Bhoka, Soedarwo and Trimurti, amongst others, formed the *Partai Pekerja Indonesia* (PPI, The Indonesian Workers' Party), one of four labour parties to eventually contest the June 1999 election.

Conclusion

Indonesia adopted an indigenist discourse of industrial relations in which the relationships between employers and employees were modelled on the principles of *Pancasila*. The New Order government's insistence that its industrial relations system was based the indigenous *Pancasila* philosophy, rather than on foreign ideologies or models, suggests that it consciously chose to diverge from Western models of industrial relations and trade unionism rather than emulate them. However, as this paper has demonstrated, Indonesian unionism was based on a combination of corporatist and revisionist theories, not on a radically different indigenous alternative to those theories. The Indonesian case suggests that unions do indeed have a 'double history' in which foreign models (and more importantly, ideas) about industrial relations and trade unionism are strongly influential in developing country contexts, even where local cultural norms of labour relations are explicitly developed.

³⁰ Imam Soedarwo had a background in Kosgoro, whilst Bomer Pasaribu came from SOKSI.

References

- Anon. 1980. *Ensiklopedi Indonesia*. Jakarta: Ichtiar Baru-Van Hove.
- — . 1988. *Ensiklopedi Nasional Indonesia*. Jakarta: Cipta Adi Pustaka.
- Amin, S. M. 1946. *Pengetahoean Politik Oentoek Rakjat*. Koetaradja: Libreria Indonesiana.
- Bates, R. 1970. "Approaches to the Study of Unions and Development." *Industrial Relations* 9: 365-378.
- Batubara, C. 1992. *Yang Terpenting Membangun Sistem*. Prisma. 21: 62-74.
- Bernstein, E. 1975 [1899]. *Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation*. New York: Schocken Books
- Bourchier, D. 1996. 'Lineages of Organicist Political Thought in Indonesia'. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Monash University.
- Braverman, H. 1974. *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Department of Manpower 1997. *The Rights [sic] to Organise in Indonesia*. Jakarta: Department of Manpower.
- Deyo, F. 1989. *Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Djumialdji, F. X. and W. Soedjono. 1982. *Perjanjian Perburuhan dan Hubungan Perburuhan Pancasila*. Jakarta: Bina Aksara.
- Frenkel, S. 1993 "Theoretical Frameworks and the Empirical Contexts of Trade Unionism," in *Organised Labor in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Comparative Study of Trade Unionism in Nine Countries*, ed. Stephen Frenkel Ithaca: International Labour

- Ford, M. 1999. "Testing the Limits of Corporatism: Reflections on Industrial Relations Institutions and Practice in Suharto's Indonesia." *Journal of Industrial Relations* 41(3): 371-392.
- —. 2000. "Continuity and Change in Indonesian Labour Relations in the Habibie Interregnum." *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 28(2): 59-88.
- —. 2003. "NGO as Outside Intellectual: A History of Non-Goernmental Organisations' Role in the Indonesian labour Movement. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Wollongong: University of Wollongong.
- Hadiz, V. 1997. *Workers and the State in New Order Indonesia*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Hakim, A. A., P. Krissantono, et al. 1970. *Kamus Politik Pembangunan*. Djakarta: Kanisius.
- Hammond, T. 1974. *Lenin on Trade Unions and Revolution 1893-1917*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Hasan. 1994. "Sarekat Buruh Dan Perjuangannya." *Jurnal Demokrasi* 3: 29-31.
- —. 1986a. 'Unions and Economic Development: A Papua New Guinea Case Study'. Unpublished PhD Thesis, UNSW.
- Hess, M. 1986b. "How the Foreign Devils Got it Wrong: Understanding Industrial Relations in Less-Developed Countries." *Journal of Industrial Relations* 28(2): 225-23
- —. 1997. "Understanding Indonesian Industrial Relations in the 1990s." *Journal of Industrial Relations* 39(1): 33-51.

- Hikam, M. 1995. 'The State, Grass-Roots Politics and Civil Society: A Study of Social Movements Under Indonesia's New Order', Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Hawaii.
- Honna, J. 1999. 'The Military and Democratisation in Indonesia: The Developing Civil-Military Discourse During the Late Suharto Era'. Unpublished PhD Thesis, The Australian National University.
- Kammen, D. 1997. 'A Time to Strike: Industrial Strikes and Changing Class Relations in New Order Indonesia', Unpublished Phd Thesis, Cornell University.
- Kerr, C., J. T. Dunlop, et al. 1960. *Industrialism and Industrial Man*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Kerr, C. and A. Siegel. 1955. "The Structuring of the Labor Force in Industrial Society: New Dimensions and New Questions." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 8(2): 151-168.
- Kusyuniati, S. 1998. 'Strikes in 1990-1996: An Evaluation of the Dynamics of the Indonesian Labour Movement'. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Swinburne University of Technology.
- Leclerc, J. 1972. "An Ideological Problem of Indonesian Trade Unionism in the Sixties: 'Karyawan' versus 'Buruh'." *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 6(1): 76-91.
- Lenin, V. 1968 [1902] 'What is to be Done?: Burning Questions of Our Movement.' In *Lenin on Politics and Revolution: Selected Writings*, ed. James Connor, New York: Pegasus.
- Lubis, T. M. 1993. *In Search of Human Rights: Legal-Political Dilemmas of Indonesia's New Order, 1966-1990*. Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama.

- Manning, C. 1998. *Indonesian Labour in Transition: An East Asian Success Story?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mas'loed, M. 1983. 'The Indonesian Economy and Political Structure During the Early Years of the New Order, 1966-1971', Unpublished PhD Thesis, Ohio State University.
- Moertopo, A. 1972. "Some Basic Considerations in 25-year Development." *The Indonesian Quarterly* 1(1): 3-26.
- —. 1974. *Strategi Politik Nasional*. Jakarta: Jajasan Proklamasi/Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
- —. 1975. *Buruh dan Tani dalam Pembangunan*. Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- —. 1980. *Hubungan Perburuhan Pancasila Sebagai Manifestasi Falsafah Pancasila di Bidang Perburuhan. Hubungan Pemerintah, Pengusaha dan Buruh dalam Era Pembangunan I*. In Suntjojo . Jakarta: Yayasan Marga Jaya: 26-44.
- PPHIP. 1987. *Pedoman Pelaksanaan Hubungan Industrial Pancasila*. Jakarta: Yayasan Tripartit Nasional.
- PPHIP. 1993. *Pedoman Pelaksanaan Hubungan Industrial Pancasila*. Jakarta: Dirjen Bina Hubungan Ketenagakerjaan dan Pengawasan Norma Kerja, Depnaker.
- Reeve, D. 1985. *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia. (SOKSI). 1964. *SOKSI Mendjawab*. Djakarta: Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia.
- Sharma, B. 1996. *Industrial Relations in ASEAN: A Comparative Study*. Kuala Lumpur: International Law Book Services.

- Siddique, S. A. 1989. "Industrial Relations in a Third World Setting: A Possible Model." *Journal of Industrial Relations* 31(3): 385-401.
- Sjamsuddin, S., Ed. 1990. *Tri Dasawarsa SOKSI: Berjuang Menjawab Tantangan Sejarah*. Jakarta, Dep Penerangan-DPN SOKSI.
- SMERU 2002. *Industrial Relations in Jabotabek, Bandung, and Surabaya during the Freedom to Organize Era*. Jakarta, SMERU.
- Soekarno. 1984. *The Renovation of the Indonesian Labour Movement*. Bandung: Alumni.
- Soepomo, I. 1976. *Pengantar Hukum Perburuhan*. Jakarta: Djambatan.
- Sudono, A. 1977. *The Indonesian Trade Union Movement and its Policies: Selected Speeches of Agus Sudono*. Jakarta: Asian-American Free Labor Institute.
- Sudono, A. 1979. *Sejarah Kelahiran dan Perkembangan FBSI*. Jakarta: FBSI.
- Sudono, A. 1981. *FBSI Dahulu, Sekarang dan Yang Akan Datang*. Jakarta: FBSI.
- — . 1985. *30 Tahun Agus Sudono Mengabdikan Gerakan Buruh*. Jakarta: FBSI.
- — . Ed. 1997. *Perburuhan Dari Masa Ke Masa*. Jakarta: Cidesindo.
- — . 1997. 'Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Tentang Hubungan Perburuhan Pancasila'. In *Perburuhan Dari Masa Ke Masa*, ed A. Sudono. Jakarta: Cidesindo.
- — . 1999. *Pengabdian Agus Sudono*. Jakarta, Dunia Pustaka Jaya.
- Taylor, R. 1999. *Trade Unions and Transnational Industrial Relations*. Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies.
- van Langenberg, M. 1986. "Analysing Indonesia's New Order State: A Keywords Approach." *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 20(2): 1-47.
- Witoelar, R. 1989. *Political Developments in Indonesia*. Singapore: Times Academic Press.