

**Sun Yat-sen
and Greater China**

Dr Felix Patrikeeff & Mr Greg de Cure
Discipline of Politics
University of Adelaide

APSA Conference
University of Adelaide
September 2004

Abstract

The 'virtual' civil war between China and Taiwan has plagued both societies since their division in 1949. It was accepted on both sides that while they each had a different interpretation of its meaning, the 'One China principle' underpinned any possible détente. Meaningful negotiations for a peaceful settlement, which began in 1993, collapsed in 1995 when Lee Teng-hui visited the United States, and the prospect for their resumption worsened in 1999 when Lee announced that any future negotiations would take place only on a 'special state-to-state' basis. He later declared (in what seemed obvious to the outside observer) that Taiwan had a new 'national identity', and should be considered 'new Taiwanese' rather than Chinese. However, overt declarations of policy that appear obvious and rational are not always in the best interests of peace. Both the Mainland, and a significant section of Lee's Kuomintang, felt that these tacit declarations of quasi-independence betrayed the principles of Sun Yat-sen, which for many has been the philosophical key which bridged the gap between China and Taiwan's competing ideologies.

With Hong Kong and Macau's reversion to formal Chinese sovereignty, and continued unrest in the peripheries, the absence of a shared, evolving ideological foundation places in doubt the quest for stability in, and a unified identity for, Greater China. This paper will argue that Sun's ideology still represents the best framework within which the fruitful reunification of Greater China can be accomplished. Sun Yat-sen Thought could serve in a dual capacity: as an acceptable rhetorical vehicle for both sides, and a substantive process for integrating -- within the form of a Federal structure -- prevailing, disparate socio-political perspectives. This structure would provide the political and social space for the recognition of the unique nature of the evolving identities of Taiwan and the already-incorporated territories of Hong Kong and Macau. Further, within such a Federal configuration the authority of the centre would be preserved, but would function within the context of a 'United States of China'. This would provide an unrivaled opportunity for Greater China to harmonize the interests of its component parts, and solidify the extent to which its development in the course of the 21st Century would be broadly based and balanced.

Introduction

Sun Yat-sen is remarkable in the political history of China for one major reason: he, like few before (or after) him, successfully blended the pursuit of modernity with traditional Chinese utopian philosophy. Indeed, it is ironic that it was Mao Zedong (driven, as Spence suggests, more by traditional Imperialism than the communist principles he espoused¹) who eventually received the credit for restoring China's national sovereignty under a single modern political heading. His successors too, while projecting a modernist perspective in the area of economic thought/outlook, have actually faltered quite badly in fashioning a political image for themselves that draws on any but the classical Chinese images of Emperor/people; power/beneficence.² Interestingly, despite the decidedly authoritarian bent of the early Kuomintang (KMT) under Chiang Kai-shek, it has been Taiwan's leaders who have demonstrated the greatest tendency to draw on the characteristics of political modernity embedded in Sun's programme. One can argue that this goes a long way in explaining the democratic success of Taiwan in the post-1949 period. In that time, the People's Republic of China (PRC), on the other hand, has lurched from crisis to crisis, zig-zagging on its path of economic development, while at the same time promoting a profound sense of political uncertainty as its leaders construct and reconstruct their individual 'Dynasties' and the 'Dynasty' of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).³ It is instructive in this respect to look to a theorist such as Sun, who has been iconized in a general context (uniformly in the Chinese world)⁴, and yet, remarkably, marginalised in terms of what his theoretical contribution can bring to this debate. Indeed, this has been the case since the early history of post-Sun China.⁵ While Sun Yat-sen studies have, since 1979, been hagiographically re-emphasised in the PRC as a method of explaining the process of reform, there are very few theorists who have successfully

1 See passim, J. Spence, *Mao*, (London: Phoenix, 2000)

2 The 'cult' of Mao that emerged from 1943 is well documented. As Spence has highlighted, Mao, after Yan'an, '...stood "as the centre" of all revolutionary history. In future, the people of China "should arm themselves with Comrade Mao Zedong's thought, and use Comrade Mao Zedong's system to liquidate [erroneous] thought in the Party."' See Spence, *ibid*, p. 110. Deng Xiaoping, through his efforts to create an almost anonymous public image, and abandon all official posts and offices, eventually consolidated his 'mythical' role too as paramount leader. As Shambaugh suggests, '...any formal office would have limited his powers. People were thus free to imagine him as being truly omnipotent, far more in command than if his powers were only assigned to a particular position or job'. See *Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Statesman*, David Shambaugh (ed), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 10. Jiang Zemin, on the other hand, actively sought to have himself included in the 'pantheon of Great Leaders'. For a discussion on this aspect of Jiang's political persona see Willy Wo-lap Lam, *The Era of Jiang Zemin*, (Singapore: Prentice Hall, 1999), pp. 38-41. Lam suggests that 'Jiang and his publicists made it beyond doubt [at internal briefings given to the media] that...the "party spirit" could be reduced to one thing: showing obeisance to the party central authorities "with comrade Zemin as its core".' Lam also refers, as an example, to the Jiangxi Party boss Wu Guanzheng's comparison of Jiang to an emperor, citing a Song Dynasty couplet Wu read to regional cadres in 1995 in efforts to shore up Jiang's position as the 'core' of the party centre: 'Perched on top of temples and halls, we worry about the people; based at the far end of oceans and lakes, we worry about the emperor'.

3 The Party's hold on power remains absolute. As Jiang stated at a 1999 meeting to commemorate Deng's reforms: China's current political system 'must not be shaken, weakened, or discarded at any time. The Western mode of political systems must never be copied'. Jiang Zemin, quoted in Harvey Feldman, 'China's Abstract Economy', *The World & I*, v15, 7/1/2000

4 see for example, Ren Zhongping, 'Great Awakening of Chinese Nation-Marking 90th Anniversary of 1911 Revolution', *People's Daily*, 9/10/2001. See also A. James Gregor & Maria Hsia Chang, 'The Thought of Sun Yat-sen in Comparative Perspective', in *Sun Yat-sen's Doctrine in the Modern World*, Chu-yuan Cheng (ed), Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1989, pp. 103-104

5 Paul Linebarger, *The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1937), p. 231

promoted his thought into a broad-ranging, living school of politico-economic transformation.⁶ In our view, this is precisely the unrealised value of Sun-ism, and to date a disappointingly little-investigated area of study.

In this paper, therefore, we look at the problem of China's continuing divided existence from a number of perspectives, integrating these into a reading of Sun's contribution to the evolution of Chinese modernity. Our conclusion is that Sun, through his symbolic value, historical importance and theoretical significance, represents the potential core for the eventual emergence of a 'United States of China'.⁷

1. Sun Yat-sen: Icon of the Revolution

At the end of the nineteenth Century, China was confronted by a set of challenges which eventually destroyed the cyclical pattern of dynastic Imperial rule which had sustained the Empire since 221 BC. The Qing, in decline and suspicious of all things foreign (paradoxically, even though they were themselves a 'foreign' invader), had been unable to re-invent themselves. For the first time in China's post-Qin history, the new alien invaders who came to challenge a weakened Dynasty had no desire to claim the Sinic emblems of power in their own name. The West did not want to rule China, merely extract its resources to fuel its Industrial Revolutions. As the power of the Qing continued to decline, the West, and later Japan, pressed the fragmenting Chinese Empire for more and more concessions, further diminishing the integrity of the Dynasty and its political system's. A growing band of Chinese revolutionaries, exposed to Western science, technology and new democratic forms of political, social and economic structure, scorned these new imperialists as they did the old, and fought to replace them. Sun thrust himself into this maelstrom, recognising early that if China was to survive modernity, it had to rid itself of all notions of Empire, and become modern. However, he faced the significant problem of nation-building within a nation that did not think of itself as one; a nation whose territorial integrity was slowly being torn apart.⁸

Sun's thinking was influenced by number of factors, both negative and positive: the occupation and rule of China by what he considered an alien and increasingly corrupt race; the unwarranted intervention and invasion by external imperialistic great powers; and the rebirth of a domestic, militaristic warlordism not seen since the Period of the Warring States. More important to his doctrine, however, were the influences of his peasant upbringing; his education and residence outside China; his exposure to a body of literature on republicanism and revolution in France, the United States and elsewhere; the

⁶ Sidney Chang & Leonard Gordon, *All under Heaven: Sun Yat-sen and his Revolutionary Thought*, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1991, pp. 154-155. See also Marie-Claire BergIre, *Sun Yat-sen*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998, pp. 1-8

⁷ The use of the term 'United States' is not meant to connote an American-inspired system, but merely a [re]union of currently disunited Chinese states.

⁸ See for example Mark Mancall, *China at the Centre: 300 years of Foreign Policy*, New York: The Free Press, 1984.

nascent reform and democratic social movements of his own country and of the West; and his understanding and appreciation for aspects of the works of Rousseau, Lincoln, Marx, Lenin and many others.⁹

Sun's plans were nationalistic and universalist,¹⁰ bold, idealistic, eclectic, but also, significantly, pragmatic. His ideas were, however, distorted badly by the historical period China faced, and the external factors which plagued all forms of Chinese political authority. In effect, therefore, his ideas never found full embodiment or uniform elaboration across the Chinese world.¹¹ Worse still, he, as did Lenin in Russia, died prematurely. In the context of a *Greater China*, this resulted in him too becoming a sacred icon, and his pronouncements ideological imprimatur rather than a widespread, living body of theory, which could be systematically drawn from and uniformly developed.¹² With his demise, he became, in effect, the spirit of the revolution, rather than its day-to-day architect.¹³

As with Lenin, after having introduced reforms and changes of a breathtaking sort,¹⁴ Sun had been hamstrung by the very conditions he sought to overcome. Further, his own pragmatism forced him to accept a functioning presidency under Yuan Shi-kai, over the pursuit of the ideals he considered central to the creation of a unified, democratic, developed Chinese nation. This skewing of the revolution at first resulted in the fragmentation of China into warlord fiefdoms, and beyond that a more stylised division of China between a pair of uncomfortable partners: the CCP on the mainland, and the KMT on the island-state of Taiwan. The irony in this is that neither side ever lost sight of, or conviction in, the primacy of the symbolism of Sun and Sun-ism. He and his ideology continued to provide the stamp of legitimacy to otherwise quite divergent political and economic lines of policy. Moreover, this legitimacy proved to be consistently suited to

9 Leonard Shihlien Hsü, *Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals*, Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1933, pp. 36-37 and Marie-Claire BergIre, *op.cit.*, p. 354. BergIre suggests that within Sun's work, 'Chinese cultural pride is mixed with Leninist anti-imperialism, Montesquieu's Laws rubs shoulders with Lincoln's precepts, and socialism in the manner of Henry George goes hand in hand with Marxism and traditional Chinese utopian thinking'.

10 BergIre also notes that Sun's critique of universalism/cosmopolitanism was not absolute. Nationalism was intended as a stage. 'By taking things one step at a time, adopting first a nationalist approach, later a universalist one, and by indefinitely deferring the latter, he thought that it should be possible to achieve that goal.' China, once saved, but as a late arrival, "would take the front seats" (Sun from Complete Works), and become a force for universal peace. See BergIre, *ibid*, pp. 369-370. While explicitly rejecting cosmopolitanism as a means, it was implicit as an end. As Linebarger suggests, Sun's 'ideal commonwealth... bears a remarkable resemblance to the world projected in the ideals of the ancient Chinese... [their] "great similarity," complete ideological harmony, and the presumable disappearance of state and law... The Chinese will, in this utopia, have struck down *might* from the high places of the world, and inaugurated an era of *the kingly way* throughout the earth. Their ancient doctrines of benevolence and peace shall have succeeded in bringing about cosmopolitanism.' See Linebarger, *op.cit.*, p. 262.

11 See L.S. Hsü, *op.cit.*, pp. 139-141 for Sun's explicit methodology of reconstruction

12 For an exposition of an iconized Lenin, see HélIne CarrIre D'Encausse, *Lenin: Revolution and Power*, London: Longman, 1982, p. 160.

13 L.S. Hsü, *op.cit.*, p. 43. According to Sun's last will and testament, he rejected being considered anything but the means to achieve liberty and equality for the Chinese people, and to do so via specific, concrete programmes of reconstruction.

14 *ibid*, pp. 111-112, Sun's 1911 Revolution gave China the status of being the first Asian republic; introduced a broad suffrage; created a hybrid framework that reflected Western ideals and Chinese realities.

both socialist and capitalist camps in the Chinese world.¹⁵ Of key importance to an understanding of this anomaly is a single dimension within this world: the need for modernisation and economic development. Significant too is that the lines of commonality, interaction and co-operation between the various 'Chinas' occur on this plane. Divisions, where they are apparent, are, by the same token, based on who commands the most appropriate vision to see out the process of modernisation, and which side, in effect, can hold itself up to be the true heir of Sun.

What is of particular value at this stage of China's distinctive evolutionary path is to emphasise that at the heart of Sun's ideology is a universalism/cosmopolitanism, and a comfortable acceptance of the hybrid in China's economy and socio-polity: the blending of modern and ancient; socialist and capitalist; traditional and progressive. If any one characteristic defines the legacy of Sun, in fact, it is the search for balance; perhaps the only feature that has been absent from the turbulent history of modern China! It is a balance, moreover, that in Sun's outlook suggested an considerable sophistication: the acceptance of what he saw as useful, modern forms of party and bureaucratic structure,¹⁶ but with an emphasis on retaining distinctively Chinese forms of hierarchical, yet meritocratic, officialdom.¹⁷ This hybridity was such that it gained for Sun the reputation of being a Communist (which he wasn't), a true Chinese nationalist (but in a quite specific form), and a moderniser. The political implications of Sun's willingness to borrow and incorporate elements he found useful were, finally, difficult to manage on the part of his official, and un-official heirs.¹⁸

The post-Sun history of China has therefore been a process of attempting to *create* balance, rather than actually achieving it through mutually recognised forms of political interaction. This has, as suggested earlier, meant that, while the 'Chinas' have been able to collaborate in the economic sphere (managing even to integrate to a significant extent the separate economies), they have fallen well short of the mark in terms of finding a suitable political common ground. The latter is essential, ultimately, if we are to see a unitary, stable Chinese polity emerge as a Greater China. The major political parties in Greater China have in fact remained polar opposites, both using, and at other times being used by, other powers, thereby creating fresh distortions in the broader scheme of relations¹⁹.

15 See Philip Jaffe, 'Commentary on Chiang Kai-shek' in *China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory*, London: Dennis Dobson Ltd, 1947, pp. 329-330

16 See, for example, *Republican China: Nationalism, War, and the Rise of Communism 1911-1948*, Franz Schurmann & Orville Schell (eds), Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967, p. 89. See also J.K. Fairbank, *The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985*, London: Picador, 1988, pp. 210-211.

17 See Sun's views on the 'Great Importance of Examination', in L.S. Hsü, *op.cit.*, pp. 110-112

18 See, for example, Immanuel C.K. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, (5th edit), p. 522 on the 'implications of his actions' in incorporating Communist members within the Kuomintang.

19 For example: Lee Teng-hui's visit to US in 1995; the US's strategically 'ambiguous' two-China policy; Soviet Union's use of the PRC to represent its own interests through the Korean conflict; Taiwan's method of 'informal diplomacy' to further its own existence as a state; the use of HK as an ideological/political object in defining differences between China and the outside world, while the PRC allowed the territory's economy to develop in an relatively unhindered fashion.

Within this turbulent history, the ‘Chinas’ have carved out divergent paths. These paths have ranged from the often hard-line neo-realism of the PRC, to the longer-standing neo-liberal stance taken by Taiwan with regards its economic relations with the outside world, and its political evolution within its own borders. Both have, however, at this juncture firmly dedicated themselves to economic development and modernisation as twin goals. At the same time, both have used international institutions as foreign policy tools; an area where the differing foundations are most evident.²⁰ Hong Kong and Macau have, during this process, remained largely on the sidelines, interacting with both of the major players. In so doing, however, they too, like Taiwan, have developed quasi-independent characteristics, and therefore compounded the problem of how to *practically* facilitate the political development of a Greater China. The geopolitics have, in sum, become too complex to allow formulae used by any of the parties to act as an acceptable blueprint for resolving the one key question: Whither China?

The irony of this situation is that we have in existence examples of developmental states, each of which is vulnerable in some major way, but for very different reasons. The PRC, while having enormous geostrategic and geopolitical power, has been internationally constrained due to its reliance on a socio-political system that is often quite unstable, whereas Taiwan, although diplomatically isolated, has been able to accommodate political change in a far more organic way. This is evidenced by the important political reforms first introduced by Chiang Ching-kuo in the late 1980s. These reforms, in effect, allowed Taiwan to evolve through, as Sun directs in his programme of national reconstruction,²¹ a period of military dictatorship, to one of political tutelage, the introduction of constitutional government, and eventual complete democratic rule. While their openness to reform has allowed their economy to take full advantage of the free flow of international capital, their political isolation makes the Taiwanese vulnerable to the vagaries of other states’ strategic decisions. In the PRC, on the other hand, periods of moderate political openness have been punctuated and, as in the case of the Tiananmen events of 1989, occasionally seriously reversed by the continued restatement of the primacy of the dictatorship by a single party.²²

Thus, while Taiwan appears to have moved remarkably steadily in its replacement of authoritarianism by a more open political system, the PRC still finds it difficult to locate itself on such evolutionary political middle ground, thereby distorting a cardinal precept of Sun-ism. Perhaps the clearest indication of this is the fact that it is, even now, difficult to imagine a return to the centrality of a leader such as Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, while the PRC continues to demonstrate its tendency to elevate its supreme leaders to a status

20 see Andrew Nathan and Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress*, New York & London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997, pp. 218-219.

21 L.S. Hsü, *op.cit.*, p. 139.

22 See, for example, ‘The Tiananmen Papers’, introduced by Andrew J. Nathan, *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2001.

inappropriate to the Sun canon.

2. The core of an alternative: What is Sun-ism in a modern politico-economic context?

Sun's economic prescriptions provided very clear lines for the development of a unitary Chinese political economy. They were founded on the understanding of the importance of private enterprise, and seen more broadly as the focus for a 'national undertaking.'²³ In order to achieve this status, the Chinese economy was seen as needing a number of major reforms, including the introduction of a set of 'liberal laws'. Such laws were regarded as being the protection of private capital and enterprise, both domestic and foreign. It is interesting to reflect that at least in three components of a Greater China, such protection has been created and enjoyed by internal and external business activities (Taiwan, the HK-SAR and the Macau-SAR). The PRC's situation ostensibly changed with Deng Xiaoping's far-reaching reforms there. However, while moving partly to a Sun-ist position in this regard, the PRC nonetheless accompanied this shift with the implicit, and from time-to-time *explicit*, restatement of the primacy of the Party and (by inference) its peak leadership in all matters, including those of the political economy of China. Under this arrangement, we do see the emergence of sets of more liberal laws in the area of the economy, but with little reassurance of their durability, let alone their sanctity.²⁴ This element of uncertainty makes the creation of a comprehensive, unified economic (let alone political) base for Greater China that much more problematic.

It is unlikely that the PRC will extricate itself from its myriad of politico-economic problems in the medium term (State Owned Enterprises on their own promise a considerable degree of turbulence in the near to medium-term), leaving the notion of a common economic platform incomplete. Development in the PRC will continue, of course, to have important input from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, but currently this can only be on the *margins* of this process. A free-flowing economic environment requires a high degree of confidence, and a unanimity of rule of law, which the PRC has, to date, not been able to fully offer.²⁵ Indeed, the PRC persists in using the economic 'card' to force political outcomes, including, ironically, the return of Taiwan to a PRC 'fold'.²⁶ Until both these economic and political 'cards' are removed, the relationship between the component parts of Greater China must remain perforce an uncertain, and from time to time a fraught, one.²⁷

23 Sun Yat-sen, *The International Development of China*, London: Hutchinson, 1928, p. 14.

24 Refer to Jimmy Lai's experiences in 1989/90, Michael Yahuda, *Hong Kong: China's Challenge*, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 130.

25 See Eric W. Orts, 'The Rule of Law in China', *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, January 2001, v34, p. 43.

26 See Bruce Gilley & Maureen Pao, 'Defences Weaken', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4/10/2001, pp. 41-45.

27 Since the handover of Hong Kong in July 1997, its premier English language paper *The South China Morning Post* has increasingly focussed on the reunification issue and its paramount nature in the Chinese world. The number and tenor of the articles indicate a certain amount of political inspiration, but the question remains as to how great a sense of reassurance the Taiwanese can gain from such a form of relentless pressure. This came about as a result of a political decision by the PRC (after Lee Teng-hui's trip to Cornell) to respond to his 'separatist' actions 'forcefully'. See Bruce Gilley, *Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New*

In his economic programme, Sun observes that '[i]t is the movement of man that makes civilization progress. China, in order to catch up with modern civilization, must move.'²⁸ It is self-evident that all 'Chinas' have made most significant strides in their internal economic development since the end of World War II, and to a great degree the paths of economic process have merged in so doing. However, Sun's dictum is as much political as it is economic at its core. Taiwan and Hong Kong have both moved in political terms, embracing a social and political openness that is most promising for the long term. They have, it may be concluded, merged with 'modern civilization' (in Sun's terms), in the sense of having created open environments within which trade, industry, social intercourse and cultural exchange has grown apace. In this respect, Sun's outlook is one, as mentioned earlier in the paper, that is characterised by a very high degree of cosmopolitanism and willingness to entertain, and incorporate, the 'new'. Both Taiwan and Hong Kong have indicated that they are very much Sun's heirs in this respect, with modernity contributing to development in a seamless, organic fashion in those two environments. Such an outlook has spilled over into Macau too, and to some degree to China's Special Economic Zones.

They have, it could therefore be argued, begun to give form to another important dictum from Sun, that of the need to '... promot[e] the recognition of China as the equal of other nations; by producing political equilibrium and economic justice in the country, [thereby] fit[ting] China for perpetual existence in the world.'²⁹ The PRC, on the other hand, has approached this in a less convincing way.³⁰ While Taiwan and Hong Kong have both approached internal political and economic change with a degree of equanimity, the PRC has often attempted to *impose* the view of China being equal to other nations (the restoration of a position of respect) as a starting point to its bilateral international relations, rather than encourage this through the demonstration of their ability to engender both political equilibrium and social justice domestically.³¹ The overall view of Greater China therefore remains one of disequilibrium, which serves neither the demands of modernity nor of traditional Chinese thought; the harmonious combination of which lie at the heart of Sun's political philosophy.

This disequilibrium has, on the Mainland, been superficially addressed by the PRC's 'One China, Two Systems' policy. However, what is considered an *intra*-national problem by the PRC (to be solved by the willing or unwilling acceptance of this internal policy of unification) is considered an *inter*-national problem by Taiwan, and one which will not be

Elite, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, p. 252.

28 Sun Yat-sen, *op.cit.*, p. 151.

29 L.S. Hsü, *op.cit.*, p. 163.

30 This imposition of China's 'place' as an equal of the other major powers is often, again pragmatically, downplayed when the occasion merits it. A key component of the PRC's negotiating position during the accession procedure to the World Trade Organisation was an insistence that it remains a developing nation, and should be treated as such. See J.B. Starr, *Understanding China: A Guide to China's Economy, History, and Political Culture*, 2nd Edition, New York: Hill & Wong, 2001, pp. 313-314.

31 See Starr, *op.cit.*, p. 313.

determined to its satisfaction until the PRC accepts that it has its own agenda and national identity. The 'two Chinas' therefore face a dilemma familiar to all national actors who participate as discrete entities in the International System. That is, how do nations, which have no trust in the intentions of other nations, create and sustain a substantive political environment within which conflict prevention becomes the norm rather than exception? And especially so when a disparity exists between the level of material power and influence each actor can deploy, and other powerful nations (which may only be tangentially involved in any particular dispute) see that dispute as threatening their own claims and interests?

For Taiwan, a resolution to its dispute with the PRC over the issue of sovereignty is made more complex by the fact that it *does* consider itself a nation;³² a nation which has been forced to find a solution largely outside the moderating framework of the modern International System, which provides mechanisms for national actors to solve their disputes without resorting to war. As such, the question of the balance of power between the two (a shifting balance exacerbated by the United States' ambiguous input into the situation) has overshadowed their similarity of interests, and worked against their finding common ground. Therefore, it is only possible to resolve the problem by creating a new domestic environment within a nascent Greater China that can find that common ground, synthesise the needs of its component parts, replace the perceived demands of national interest with common interest, and one can be seen to coincide with the interests of other external actors.

Significant problems still exist, however, in creating this kind of environment. While the official state of war between the PRC and the ROC ended in 1979, with the cessation of the 'routine and symbolic bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu,'³³ the underlying conflict did not. Since then the relationship has been tense and dangerous, but remains (as has always been the case in China) highly pragmatic, at least in economic terms. However, that pragmatism has consistently been diluted by the underlying belief that each side's interests are incompatible, and, as such, those interests can only be secured by the threat of the use of force and counter-force; a belief fostered by the historical lack of trust between the players. For the PRC, the ongoing threat of force to assert its sovereign claims over a 'wayward Province' is consistent with its belief that Taiwan is consistently moving out of its orbit, and the United States has played (and, indeed, is continuing to play) a major role in that shift. As such, the PRC believes it must retain its neo-realist stance towards Taiwan, maintain its military advantage and its own understanding of a balance of power. Taiwan, reciprocally, believes that it must expand its defensive capability, further inculcate itself within the international society of states (an inculcation made more problematic as the balance of power shifts to the PRC), and maintain the links it has built with its bilateral

32 See Charles Stafford, *Separation and Reunion in Modern China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 166-167.

33 Chong-Pin Lin, 'Beijing and Taipei: Dialectics in Post-Tiananmen Interactions', in Shambaugh (1995), *op.cit.*, p. 119.

protector in response.

Unfortunately, this PRC-Taiwan subsystem of a potential Greater China remains divided by these divergent notions of national interest, and beleaguered by the resulting distrust caused by the process of reciprocity and military escalation each has engaged in since 1949. If each side remains resolute in its convictions, the division will remain. However, if that common ground which Sun attempted to create in the early Republican period can be found afresh, and an alternative acceptable to both is negotiated cooperatively, the underlying reasons for their division will, potentially, disappear.

A realistic view, however, must prevail. The separate Chinas are not going to disappear quickly, nor, given the current strategic setting, is it likely that either the PRC or Taiwan will predominate over the other. And yet the benefits of merging in a more comprehensive, systematic fashion holds clear advantages for both the PRC and Taiwan, and, by extension, Hong Kong and Macau too. The PRC brings with it economic bulk, a huge market and a large pool of other vital resources. Taiwan, on the other hand, has an enormous depth of technological, manufacturing and corporate administrative skills. It also has a well-defined infrastructure, a large capital base and very considerable foreign currency reserves. Hong Kong has management and financial service expertise, which will be – and in important respects already is – of critical use to the two other ‘Chinas’. It is, in other words, advantageous to blend into one another, but how? Politically, this remains a minefield. Taiwan has in practical terms abandoned its intention to unify China under its aegis, but continues to evolve its own distinctive sovereign existence; the PRC presses for reunification, but on terms which are still highly dogmatic; too dogmatic,³⁴ in fact, for Taiwan to take entirely seriously. Hong Kong remains on the periphery, as it has throughout this process of engagement, but shows signs of desiring political openness of a sort that is embodied by Taiwan. Under these conditions, finding political accommodation is highly problematic.

As a result of a process of ‘complex democratization’, an informal/semi-formal process is already in train in this regard.³⁵ But the results of this process have shown themselves to be painfully slow and, ultimately, indeterminate in their outcome. It is increasingly clear that the informal, and in some areas semi-formal, triangular relationship between the component parts of the ‘Chinas’ has reached the point where highly productive relations

34 As General Chi stated at the PLA’s 74th anniversary, ‘we will never renounce the use of force, nor will we allow any foreign forces to intervene in taiwan affairs...all schemes to hinder China’s reunification are doomed to fail.’ *South China Morning Post*, 2/8/2001, p. 7. While this statement suggests an unyielding position, but one which is paternally protective of Taiwan, reports that the PRC will use ‘Taiwan to conquer Taiwan’ by luring retired Taiwanese colonels to the Mainland in order to ‘batter Taiwan’s military morale’ does little to engender an environment of trust. Jason Blatt, *South China Morning Post*, 21/7/2001, p. 6.

35 F. Patrikeeff, ‘The People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong: The Crisis of Human Rights and an Emergence of “Democratisation with Chinese Characteristics”?’ in Jain, O’Leary and Patrikeeff (eds), *Crisis and Conflict in Asia*, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002. The assumption here is that through interaction, the more liberal forces present in Hong Kong and Taiwan (particularly the former), will, through the application of complex blend of largely informal pressure, change the outlook of the PRC leadership, making it become more pluralistic over time.

require a form of formal ratification. However, the continuing debate between the PRC and Taiwan over whose political system is to serve as a foundation for a 'New China' is showing itself to be more and more counterproductive. Furthermore, this hinders genuine positive input from places such as Hong Kong, which must, in effect, take sides in the contest. The gradual winning over of the PRC leadership is desirable, but does not lay down a structure within which a *number* of 'Chinas' can operate in a predictable and systematic fashion. Better, then, that this be a process of finding a more subtle potential political form for administering a complex body of a number of 'little Chinas'.

Clearly, what is required here is a way of breaking an impasse, and providing firm, but neutral, political ground for the establishment of 'One China'. Sun Yat-sen's political prescriptions, in our view, achieve precisely this. A federal structure could provide this neutral ground, guided by Sun's view that a political ideology of unification and national reconstruction can only come through an evolutionary, adaptive form.³⁶ Further, it could also point to potential future avenues of exploration for thorny questions such as the autonomous and semi-autonomous regions of the PRC and their roles in the framework of a Greater China.

3. How is a revised view to be introduced to the Chinese world?

The realities which face the PRC, Taiwan and the HK-SAR (even Macau) suggest a problematic 'merger' of the separate components. There are profound differences in levels of economic development present in this Chinese world, with the evolution of open societies and cultures at a variety of stages and in a number of distinct forms. Political development too represents a spectrum of alternatives, ranging from the multi-party to the one-party. These are also evolving, but with variations in momentum, direction and scope. To date, the difficulties here have encouraged all parties concerned to concentrate on the easier, less controversial (and more pragmatic) element of economic integration. But this does not address the high degree of mistrust and suspicion that pervades the 'Chinese world.' Patriotism through economic growth alone is unlikely to lead to a homogeneous, uniformly developed Greater China. Nor does the nebulous notion of patriotism implicit in the slogans of 'One China' substitute for carefully thought-out forms of political association/cohabitation. Each of the Chinas desires a systematically developed, stable form of political integration into a Greater China, but this has, up until now, lacked the core characteristics that each could adhere to with a sense of comfort and reassurance. Controversies such as the Li Shaomin 'spying' case in August 2001, in which a Hong Kong-based academic was arrested and tried in the PRC on charges of spying for Taiwan, reveal the deep divisions which still exist between the individual 'Chinas.'³⁷ And

³⁶ Chang & Gordon, *op.cit.*, p. 96.

³⁷ For example, see K. Poon, 'Strength Through Disunity', *Hong Kong iMail*, 9/11/2001 - Poon examines how the case revealed fundamentally incompatible views of what Hong Kong's official position should have been over the case: whether Li, a resident of Hong Kong, should have been allowed to return to the SAR, and to return to his post at the university he taught in.

while these fraught cases arise, the PRC maintains a remorseless press campaign to demonstrate the 'correctness' of its 'One-China' policy. However, divisions between, and within, the partners in such a venture do not reinforce the logic of the policy, nor does pressure represent conclusive grounds for acquiescence with any sense of reassurance. Indeed, such acquiescence would represent an act of faith, which must, of course, be based on trust.³⁸

Rather than the imposition of false lines of logic, and the PRC's oft-repeated expectation that its integration with Taiwan *must* occur in the short to medium-term, Sun's political philosophy offers the 'many Chinas' a positive foundation, through its stress on the reasons why the discrete elements of a Greater China would *want* to be involved in a project of national reconstruction, rather than be *forced* into pragmatic, politically-motivated compromise. The PRC's attempts to convince Taiwan of the need to reunite have been very much coloured by the threat of military force; a prescription which Sun saw as counter-productive, preferring the nation to devote its efforts to peaceful reconstruction once the threat of foreign imperialism was removed.³⁹ This perception of threat appears to be confirmed by the Taiwan media's own uncompromising stance on the PRC's formula for reunification. 'One Country, Two Systems' is consistently dismissed as inconclusive, and the mood in Taiwan unreceptive to dogma in place of unfettered debate:

[D]ebate, to China's leaders, still carries too many echoes of Red Guard groups yelling at their rivals through loudspeakers. Thesis, antithesis, what's next? In democracies, generally a lot of horse-trading, which results in a synthesis acceptable to most - original expectations having been trimmed. In China, however, the third step is taken to be violent upheaval; history bears this out, they may say. Better, therefore to make sure that no debate ever gets underway.⁴⁰

Little is said, or discussed, about the inculcation of a mood of national reconstruction, that might be taken up as an incentive to grow closer in political terms. Rather, each side of the Straits continues to pursue the counter-productive forms of 'megaphone diplomacy' which are historically all too familiar, and have arguably prevented the emergence of broader popular support for a Greater China. At the core of this problem is that the PRC continues to pursue a policy which will have a Greater China remain under the tutelage of the CCP. As such, the 'historic mission' of reuniting China, and bringing Taiwan back to the 'fold', has become problematically intertwined with the goal of national reconstruction in the Sun-ist sense.

38 See Cao Longzhang 'One-China Policy a Must to End Taiwan Recession', *China Daily*, 7.8.01 – this article, while systematically representing the logic of integration for Taiwan to re-emerge from its current economic doldrums, nonetheless shows a very clear lack of trust on the part of the Taiwanese authorities for the PRC's 'One China' approach, but also, and in equal measure, the PRC's view of Taiwan's 'be patient, no haste' approach.

39 See Chang and Gordon, *op.cit.*, p.131.

40 See 'Nothing inevitable about unification', *Taipei Times*, 3 July 2001.

The PRC has, since Sun's Republican Revolution of 1911, been characterised by swings between radicalism and reaction. Political lines have been accompanied by a high degree of propaganda, disseminated downwards to the masses, helping to polarise rather than to unify China in a moderate, nation-building project. Indeed, it has long been assumed that, finally, there could be no national development without mass-mobilisation. The heart of Sun's political programme, on the other hand, accepted and indeed stressed the need for mass-mobilisation, yet expected China's rulers to imbue the populace with an equal sense of national responsibility and national ownership.⁴¹ Implicit is the notion of political moderation in the process of economic and social democratisation. The crux of Sun's view of politics is the democratic evolution of China through a number of political stages, beginning with military dictatorship, moving on to political tutelage, and, finally, a period of constitutional government.⁴² Implicit too is the idea of a *uniform* unfolding of this process throughout the Chinese world, and at a pace that is controllable by the central government (democratic centralism) until such time as provincial and local governments (down to the *xian* level) could prove themselves able to be self-governing.⁴³ History has, it may be argued, distorted the process by which this can be achieved concomitantly between disparate, and highly distinctive, political systems.

The historical vagaries of the past century have created a disjunction, leading to a situation where each of the Chinas has created its own trajectory, and each is out of synch with the others. The lack of synchronisation means that these trajectories may never meet. The choice here is whether the meeting of these paths should be achieved by the exertion of force and compulsion, or that a novel political form be devised to provide for this lack of synchronisation, but also to create a common direction. Such a form would allow each of the component parts to actively contribute to a nation-building process, simultaneously creating clear and functional paths of social, economic *and* political intercourse. Such a device, one could argue, could be found most easily in a federated *union* of states.

This line of investigation remains surprisingly underdeveloped. While the concept of federalism was heatedly debated in the 1920s and 1930s in Republican China, little recent discussion of the subject has appeared in non-Chinese studies, and little, if any, Chinese-language scholarship has filtered through to international debate.⁴⁴ The stumbling block, it might be suggested, is how '... China's unitary political traditions and culture can be

41 L.S. Hsü, *op.cit.*, pp. 384-385.

42 L.S. Hsu, *op.cit.*, p. 139 (but see also p. 140). 'At the outset of constitutional government,' Sun concluded, 'the central government would establish five separate departments to administer the five political functions [executive, legislative, judicial, examining and control].' Note too that the use of examining and control is uniquely Chinese. The importance of these concepts is that these processes separate the Chinese sphere from its Western counterparts, which are based only on the first three mentioned.

43 *Ibid*, pg. 136.

44 Shambaugh *Greater China, op.cit.*, pp. 29-30. Recently, the scholarship on this period has been vigorously critiqued by Chen Jongming's son Leslie H. Chen in a series of articles and a book on the subject of Chen's role in the Republican period, *yet it has largely been revisionist interpretation. (See, for example, Leslie H. Dingyan Chen, *Chen Jiongming and the Federalist Movement: Regional Leadership and Nation Building in Early Republican China*, Ann Arbor, MI: Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1999.)

reconciled with the demands of federalism.⁴⁵ Indeed, a recent study by Harvey Nelsen is optimistic with regard to the advantages of federalism in a Chinese context, but ultimately concludes that the obstacles posed by China's traditional centralism will be too great for the successful 'blending' of the many Chinas into a federal framework. 'China's political tradition,' Nelsen writes, 'has been one of centralization. Decentralization is associated with breakdown and chaos.'⁴⁶ However, the problem with such approaches is that they presume that the entity being discussed is *only* the PRC. From such a standpoint, it is natural to conclude that federalism is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Michael C. Davis suggests that the notion of a unitary Chinese political system is, in fact, a myth; a view that, drawing on his logic, very much holds in the PRC today.⁴⁷ The latter works with multiple legal jurisdictions and the principles of decentralization within its own borders⁴⁸, but does so while proclaiming the sanctity of the myth of the unitary system. But *should* we be referring only to the PRC, notwithstanding the fact that it is the largest administrative/political entity in the constellation of the Chinese world? A successful federal structure for China would not assume the further breaking down of this core politico-administrative entity by allowing its own regions/provinces de facto independence. Here, the issues of centralization/decentralization would indeed be too complex to negotiate. But an entity such as Taiwan, as it is at pains to point out, is synonymous neither with the PRC's political structure, nor its administrative arrangements. Hong Kong's system, through the distinctive nature of its own political past, is also hardly a 'perfect fit' in the context of the PRC's administrative structure.

In order to make a Greater China work, an overarching framework must be found in order to accommodate these entities, but this must be arrived at via the positive engagement of the latter. The 'megaphone diplomacy' involved in returning over and over again to the formulaic notions of 'One Country, One System', 'One Country, Two Systems', or 'One Country, Two Governments/Regions/Entities' will only perpetuate political bluster from all sides; a form that is wryly anticipated by Lin Yutang's observation that:

China's civil wars are always preceded by a battle of words in the form of exchange of telegrams. The public assiduously read this exchange of abusiveness or of polite recriminations or even brazen-faced lies, and decide which has a better literary style, while they appreciate fully that an ominous cloud is hanging over the horizon. This is called in Chinese 'first politeness, and then weapons.'⁴⁹

It would seem that Lin's view of the situation in the late 30s still hold true today, and, indeed, has been echoed by *inter alia* Li Fuzhong, writing in Taiwan's *Central Daily News*:

45 Shambaugh, *The Modern Chinese State*, Cambridge: C.U.P., 2000, p. 14.

46 Nelsen in Shambaugh, (2000), *op.cit.*, p. 228.

47 See Michael C. Davis, 'The Case for Chinese Federalism', *Journal of Democracy*, 10.2, 1999, pp. 124-137

48 *Ibid*, p. 126.

49 Lin Yutang, *My Country and My People*, London: William Heinemann, 1938, p. 224.

In recent years, during official encounters between the two sides of the Straits, reciting poems has become the established practice.... The recitation of poems serves to dazzle and stun the adversary... In the diplomatic tug-of-war between the two sides, Chinese officials frequently play this consummate trick. Naturally it puts psychological pressure on the Taiwanese officials.... But the China-Taiwan problem is a practical one, and one which greatly affects the interest of the Taiwanese people.⁵⁰

The application of superior 'literary styles', we would argue, is not the issue here. It is *how* the multifarious styles can be allowed to exist productively side-by-side, and to do so within a single canon. Sun was very much alive to the existence of a plethora of political styles and perspectives. His proposals, however, were designed to draw these into, and syncretise them within, the single project of nation-building and national reconstruction. This goal is as pertinent today as it was in Sun's time. It remains, in other words, the core of a *national* ideology and programme.

The issue of disparate national identities within a supra-national Greater China remains a highly sensitive topic, and particularly so in the PRC.⁵¹ And yet for a successful initiation of a policy of national reconstruction, the PRC must be able to de-sensitise itself in this regard and be more open-minded with regard to the conceptualisation of a workable and universally acceptable formula. First and foremost here is the realisation, and admission, that a 'Greater China' should in fact be the core, and not the PRC itself. There is considerable importance in such a distinction, as any starting point with the PRC at the core would automatically assume the primacy of the CCP in any formulation of a 'Greater China'. This would, quite clearly, remain an unacceptable principle for Taiwan, and it remains implicitly so for the Hong Kong-SAR too.⁵² Evidence of this is to be seen in the fact that the PRC government has effectively offered Taiwan greater latitude for its incorporation into a single China, providing it with the opportunity to retain considerable rights not accorded to Hong Kong in the formal handover of the latter to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. These rights have included important concessions on self-defence and foreign affairs, and yet these seemingly generous offers have been categorically dismissed by successive Taiwanese governments.⁵³ Although the PRC has consistently stressed that with Taiwan's acceptance of its 'One China' Policy, everything would become negotiable,

50 Li's article is quoted in Stafford, *op.cit.*, p. 172.

51 See, again, Shambaugh, (1995), *op.cit.*, pp. 29-30.

52 Taiwan has seemingly come close to reaching consensus with the PRC on the issue of there being a 'One China', however recent cross-strait developments have shown that 'One China, Two Interpretations' – the differing interpretations consistently being a central element of disagreement – remains an ideological impasse of major proportions. For evidence of this, see 'Debate over 1992 "One China" Consensus Rages On', *Taipei Times*, 24 October 2001 and "'1992 Consensus" Does not Sell Out Taiwan: Opposition' *China Post*, 23 October 2001.

53 Davis, *op.cit.*, p. 133.

the PRC's perspective on the starting point of substantive negotiations remains unacceptable to Taiwan.⁵⁴

It is increasingly clear, given the obvious disparity between these actors, that what is required here is a more gradual quasi-federal (or confederal) structure; a separate administrative/national entity (reminiscent in important ways of the First Republic's Senate),⁵⁵ generated by the active participation of *all* the constituent parts of a Greater China (that is, the PRC, Hong Kong-SAR, Macau-SAR and Taiwan). An entity that emerges in this way not as a product of any of the separate administrative systems, but is a distinctly new form, blended with a traditional Suni-ist perspective. A Senate-style body, with representation from the PRC, Taiwan and the SARs, which would allow political voices from both the centre and periphery to be heard, and contribute to the task of building a single nation, but on equal bases. Indeed, this body's sole purpose would be this: acting as a forum, rather than dictating the day-to-day running of the administrations of the individual 'Chinas'. Thus, Hong Kong's political arrangement with the PRC would remain, as would Macau's. However, these SARs, together with Taiwan, would have full – and equal – voice in terms of what they could individually contribute to the conceptualisation of how an entity such as Greater China would be managed. So too would the PRC, of course. Thus, such a representative forum would satisfy the spirit of Sun's idea of a Chinese nation: the acceptance of different levels of modernisation and diversity, but with each locked together in the project of building a *single* nation. Such an approach would still have at its core Sun's notion of democratic centralism; a principle which should be acceptable to the ideological perspectives of each of the component parts.

The 'CPC Central Committee's Decision on Strengthening and Improving the Building of the Party Style' (passed by the CPC's Sixth Plenum on the 26th October 2001) suggests a keen recognition that its 'version' of democratic centralism must be enhanced.

It is a must to establish and improve various concrete systems under democratic centralism.... Party congresses and committees should be brought into full play...and major issues should be discussed by the standing committees of party committees...issues concerning the general situation and having a far-reaching influence must be discussed by the plenums of Party committees.... Party committees should integrate the leadership of the party with the promotion of

54 'Cross-Strait Viewpoints: Moving Towards Reunification: If Taiwan Accepts "One China," Everything is Negotiable' *AsiaWeek*, 2 October 2000.

55 The Provinces of the First Republic were treated in a fashion similar to the states in the U.S. Members of the Senate were elected by 'Assemblies of the Provinces, and, when representing persons not under the jurisdiction of a Provincial Assembly, by Electoral Colleges.' (see Linebarger, *op.cit.*, p. 228). Sun himself spoke 'enthusiastically' to his biographer about the 'potentialities of democratic provincial home rule' up until at least 1922. It seems it was only the political infighting between himself and the Confederalists which made him temper his position. However, the Party Declaration of 1924 still stated that 'undoubtedly regional self-government is in entire accord with the spirit of democracy and is a great need of our nation'. The stipulation placed on this need was that 'true self-government can only be realized when our national independence is won.... [T]he success of the people's revolution is a prerequisite to the realization of provincial autonomy.' See Linebarger, *ibid*, p. 221.

Felix Patrikeeff and Greg de Cure: Sun Yat-sen and Greater China
democracy, the rule of law, and respect to objective laws.⁵⁶

A Senate-style forum, if it were eventually given the status of a senior Party standing committee (but with its responsibility limited to negotiating policies of coordination), would have considerable impact on Party decision-making, yet would not threaten the structure, or the centrality, of the Party in the PRC.

Ultimately, such a body may be a temporary one, but not, as in the Hong Kong-SAR's case, with the incorporation of a deadline for the life span of its current politico-administrative form.⁵⁷ Such an open-ended arrangement would suit the overarching interests of the constituent parts, but allow them to become intertwined as their goals and views discussed, debated and are increasingly harmonised. As a result, the level of trust between the component parts would ipso facto become greater. Neither should such an arrangement alienate the PRC, as it comes close to the spirit of the Hong Kong settlement, but provides a potentially acceptable basis for Taiwan's trust in such a project of nation-building. However, if, as we suggest, this framework succeeded in helping to harmonise the current politico-administrative forms of the Greater China components, it could perhaps become the structural setting for an upper chamber of the National People's Congress (a chamber which has been suggested by Andrew Nathan), with elected members representing all provinces and provincial-level units, leaving a lower chamber of the NPC elected in proportion to population.⁵⁸

Sun's doctrine of knowledge is an important theoretical guide to the evolution of Greater China. The attempts by the PRC to arrive at a resolution of the Taiwan 'problem' has at its core the need to 'do' (to press for a speedy reunification on terms which, for the moment at least, remain vague) before 'knowing' (understanding precisely what it is that constitutes the relationship). Sun's doctrine, however, intrinsically suggests that: 'to do is ... easier than to know, contrary to the old Chinese saying that to know is easier than to do.'⁵⁹ In the PRC leadership's eyes, Taiwan is procrastinating by not undertaking a swift reunification process, but this procrastination could, if examined closely, be a response that comes near to the spirit of what Sun is saying. By agreeing to treat the 'doing' as easier than the 'knowing', Taiwan feels itself at risk of what Sun himself regarded as building the edifice of a single China on a 'sheet of loose sand.'⁶⁰ If a unified Greater China is to be created, the PRC must move towards an acceptance of the idea that firm knowledge, no matter how hard the process of achieving this, is essential if the looseness is to be removed from the 'sheet of Chinese sand.' Thus, the core perspectives and

56 See 'CPC Central Committee's Decision on Strengthening and Improving the Building of the Party Style', *People's Daily*, 8/10/2001.

57 The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration imposed a 50-year limit on Hong Kong in its current manifestation, see Article 3 (12).

58 See Andrew J. Nathan, 'China's Constitutionalist Option', *Journal of Democracy*, 7.4 (1996) p. 46.

59 Y.C. Wang, *Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872-1949*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), p. 353.

60 J.T. Dreyer, *China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition*, Houndmills: Macmillan, 1993, p. 68.

experiences that Sun brings to political theory are both instructive, and, at least in the case of the 'many Chinas' question, probably essential in building a Greater China.

Conclusion

It is highly unlikely that the PRC will easily shed its present political visage. Its pace of economic development, while very rapid in the past twenty years, still lags behind both Taiwan and the Hong Kong-SAR in terms of the forms of modernist subtlety that these societies have demonstrated at each stage of their economic and cultural development. Such differences are very difficult to iron out, and the question arises as to whether they *should* be ironed out in the short to medium-term. The process of political and administrative development highlighted demands gradualism, but suggests a course along which the many Chinas could move, thereby creating a common ground that is more than one of simply symbolic, pragmatic or propagandistic dimensions. This framework would organically lead to a genuine synthesis of the many facets of what Sun saw as integral to the development of a modern China. It would, in effect, mean that the Chinas would find a way of moving along a single, less tortuous line of development/evolution, and in the process renew the tenets of his philosophy, which all Chinas emblematically consider to be at the heart of their modern forms. Such a tendency would steadily remove the lines of difference within a Greater China. Would there then be any reason to maintain different interpretations of what a 'One China' is, when the latter could organically evolve from the creation of, in effect, a 'United States of China'? At the core of such an approach would be the foundations of a pluralistic and diverse China, yet one with common intentions and common goals. The logic of a quasi-federated political structure for China seems all the more compelling in this context, and Sun's core ideas all the more pertinent to its realisation.

Bibliography

- BergPire, Marie-Claire, *Sun Yat-sen*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998
- Chang, Sidney & Leonard Gordon, *All under Heaven: Sun Yat-sen and his Revolutionary Thought*, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1991
- Chen, Leslie H., *Chen Jiongming and the Federalist Movement: Regional Leadership and Nation Building in Early Republican China*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1999
- Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory*, London: Dennis Dobson Ltd, 1947
- Copeland, Dale C., 'The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism,' *International Security*, v25, Fall 2000
- 'CPC Central Committee's Decision on Strengthening and Improving the Building of the Party Style', *People's Daily*, 8/10/2001
- 'Cross-Strait Viewpoints: Moving Towards Reunification: If Taiwan Accepts "One China," Everything is Negotiable' *AsiaWeek*, 2 October 2000
- Davis, Michael C., 'The Case for Chinese Federalism', *Journal of Democracy*, 10.2, 1999
- 'Debate over 1992 "One China" Consensus Rages On', *Taipei Times*, 24 October 2001
- D'Encausse, HélPine CarrPire, *Lenin: Revolution and Power*, London & New York: Longman, 1982
- Dreyer, J.T., *China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition*, Houndmills: Macmillan, 1993
- Fairbank, J.K., *The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985*, London: Picador, 1988
- Feldmen, Harvey, 'China's Abstract Economy', *The World & I*, v15, 7 January 2000
- Gilley, Bruce, *China on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's new Elite*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998
- Gilley, Bruce & Maureen Pao, 'Defences Weaken', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 October 2001
- Hsü, Immanuel C.K., *The Rise of Modern China*, Fifth edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995
- Hsü, Leonard Shihlien, *Sun Yat-sen: His Political and Social Ideals*, Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1933
- Jain, P., G. O'Leary and F. Patrikeeff (Eds) *Crisis and conflict in Asia- local, regional and international responses* New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002
- Jones, D. Martin, *The Image of China in Western Social and Political Thought*, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001
- Lam, Willy Wo-lap, *The Era of Jiang Zemin*, Singapore: Prentice Hall, 1999
- Lin Yutang, *My Country and My People*, London: Heinemann, 1938
- Linebarger, Paul, *The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen: An Exposition of the San Min Chu I*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1937
- Lo, Carlos Wing-hung, 'Political Liberalization in the People's Republic of China: Its Linkage to the Mainland-Taiwan Reunification', *East Asia: An International Quarterly*,

v17, Winter 1999

- Mancall, Mark, *China at the Centre: 300 years of Foreign Policy*, New York: The Free Press, 1984
- Nathan, Andrew, 'China's Constitutionalist Option', *Journal of Democracy*, 7.4 (1996)
- , 'The Tiananmen Papers', *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2001
- Nathan, Andrew J. & Robert S. Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security*, New York & London: W.W. Norton, 1997
- “'1992 Consensus' Does not Sell Out Taiwan: Opposition", *China Post*, 23 October 2001
- 'Nothing inevitable about unification', *Taipei Times*, 3 July 2001
- Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989
- Orts, Eric W., 'The Rule of Law in China', *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, January 2001, v34
- Ren Zhongping, 'Great Awakening of Chinese Nation-Marking 90th Anniversary of 1911 Revolution' *People's Daily*, 9 October 2001
- Shambaugh, David (Ed.), *Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Statesman*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995
- , (Ed.) *Greater China: The Next Superpower*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995
- , *The Modern Chinese State*, (Cambridge: C.U.P., 2000)
- Schurmann Franz & Orville Schell (Eds), *Republican China: Nationalism, War, and the Rise of Communism 1911-1949*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967
- Spence, Jonathan, *Mao*, London: Phoenix, 2000
- Stafford, Charles, *Separation and Reunion in Modern China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000
- Sun Yat-sen, *The International Development of China*, London: Hutchinson, 1928
- , *San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People*, L.T. Chen (Ed.), Calcutta: Chinese Ministry of Information, 1942
- Sun Yat-sen's Doctrine in the Modern World*, Chu-yuan Cheng, (Ed.), Boulder & London: Westview Press, 1989
- Wang, Y.C., *Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872-1949*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965)
- Wells, Audrey, *The Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen: Development and Impact*, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001
- Wendt, Alexander, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999
- , 'Constructing international politics,' *International Security*, v20, Summer 1995
- Weng Song Ran *et al.*, 'Federal System: From Fantasy to Blueprint', Proposed Draft Constitution of Federal China, submitted to the San Fransisco conference organized by the 21st Century China Foundation of San Fransisco on 8 February 1994 @ <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/7288/fedconn.htm>, Retrieved August 2004
- Yahuda, Michael, *Hong Kong: China's Challenge*, London: Routledge, 1996

Yan Jiaqi, 'Towards the Federal Republic of China', @

<http://www.tibet.com/China/fedchina.html>, Retrieved August 2004