

**A Case for Containment:
Some Possible Scenarios in the Struggle between
'Evil' Osama (and Saddam?) and 'Crusader'
George W. Bush**

Dr. Richard DeAngelis

Senior Lecturer in the School of Political and International Studies,
Flinders University
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Abstract

Two of the most important recent globalizing features of world politics have been the interacting phenomena of:

- 1) international, Islamist, fundamentalist terrorism [as one variant of quasi-“utopian”, mass, new social movement], and
- 2) the pre-emptive, hegemonic project for American foreign policy of President George W. Bush, and his “Vulcan” and Neo-conservative circles of advisers.

Both have changed the agenda and character of world politics, arguably for the worse, since the epochal events of September 11, 2001. Neither project is likely, however, to last into the near future in their present forms. Both share not only their mutual extremism in ideology and tactics but also a loose hold on the real world. Both will encounter inevitable counterbalancing resistance by other global and domestic actors and classic processes of charisma routinization in the face of the hard realities of international and political sociological diversity and complexity. Thus a successful mass *jihad* or Armageddon-like victories for Al Qaeda are very remote possibilities. That result leaves Osama or successors, instead, only a routinized, contained, and diffuse Islamist, fundamentalist, terrorist threat. On the counter-terrorist side, it is still an open question what comes next, in the immediate to mid-term future, after the US presidential elections and the probable elimination of both Saddam and Osama. A return to G. H. W. Bush Senior’s more multilateral, “New World Order”, pre-9/11, seems unrealistic. So too does his son’s more ambitious project of unilateral US hegemony. As in the decade after WWII, a mild, more benign but still quite unilateral form of US domination, mixed with some multilateral cooperation, in a new form of anti-terrorist containment, seems likely, even if John Kerry wins the next US presidential race.

The monologue of unilateralism constantly aspires to the mantle of The Chosen and of course, further dichotomises the world, inviting us, on pain of consequences, to choose between 'them' and 'us'. We must, in other words, reject the pronouncements of George Bush in the ultimatum: 'you are either with us and against the terrorists, or you are on the side of the terrorists', just as strongly as we repudiate Osama bin Laden's 'The world is now clearly divided into two—the world of the followers of Islam against that of infidels and unbelievers' ... That the United States has the capacity for technological, military and economic leadership is not in dispute; what the United States lacks is philosophical leadership and self-interrogation... Terror against Terror may be emotionally satisfying in the immediate, but who really wants to live under the permanent shadow of a new variant of... 'Mutual Assured Destruction'.

Lecture 1, "*The Changing Mask of Fear*"

The quasi-state [like Al Qaeda] commences with a position whose basic aim—a challenge to an unjust status quo—makes it difficult to separate from progressive movements of dissent... It is this quasi-state that today instills the greatest fear and, to complicate matters even more, often boasts a liberating manifesto of seductive ideals... [But it becomes] dedicated to the ... exercise of raw power, ... the silent thrill of power, ... the ecstasy of power... "Power is the precipitate of man's neurotic will to match himself with the force of Nature... [and] the various apprehensions of God...

Lecture 2, "*Power and Freedom*"

Today, the main source of the fanatic mind is—religion, and its temper, one that ironically, is grounded in the doctrine of submission, has grown increasingly arrogant, doctrinaire and violent... At stake is tolerance, and the place of dissent, [dialogue, skepticism, and dignity]. Under the theocratic, that derives its authority... from the secret spaces of Revelation, this disposition of the mind towards alternative concepts is next to impossible. ... The theocratic order derives its mandate from the unknown... [and] only a chosen few are privileged to have penetrated the working of the mind of the Unknown... Homicidal *hubris* is the ultimate hallmark of the fanatic, ... [in a world where] there are no innocents.

Lecture 5 "*I am right; you are dead*"

--Wole Soyinka, BBC *Reith Lectures*, "*The Climate of Fear*", 2004

Has 'Everything Really Changed' in A New World of Mass Terror and Evil?

More than three years have passed since the epochal September 11, 2001 attacks, in N.Y. and Washington, by carefully selected Al Qaeda suicide terrorists, [15 of 19 of Saudi nationality, presumably to destabilize the Saudi monarchy and its relations with the USA]. The substantially successful attacks targeting the World Trade Centre and (part of the) Pentagon, and, unsuccessfully, the Capitol or the White House, could have been, we know now, twice as extensive [originally including West Coast targets as well]. They traumatized a complacent and unprepared America, untouched on home soil by serious foreign attack since December 7, 1941. The events of this most recent day of "infamy" spurred on and legitimized, even they did not wholly initiate, a dramatically new and provocative US-government foreign and counter-terrorist policy. The change has potentially monumental consequences for the entire world community. The 9/11 events were explicitly and predictably, even cynically, used to justify that new policy by a sense of inevitable and necessary catharsis of justifiable retaliation in a new, black-and-white, Manichean world where "everything had changed forever", and everyone, everywhere was either for or against the messianic Bush Crusade. However, the real, gray complex world is more resistant to change than the Bush Administration once thought. While irreversible and significant change has occurred, it may happen that the "new" world resembles many of the features of the old, even the "Cold War" era of half a

century ago (Bell 2004). Should we envisage a “Back to the Future” scenario for the latest turn of this wheel of history?

On the balance sheet, in the column of irreversible change, there have already occurred a number of key events. In the last two years, Afghanistan has been invaded, the Taliban overthrown, and Kabul and its hinterland significantly liberated and occupied, respectively by foreign troops and returned war and drug lords. The Bush Administration has introduced a panoply of more or less silly, accepted, acceptable, and effective national security measures. They range from partial but massive reorganization of several domestic governmental security bureaucracies into Homeland Security [but not, interestingly, the CIA and FBI!] to dubious initiatives restricting civil liberties or extending the definitions of acceptable torture, at home, abroad, (as in Afghanistan or Abu Ghraib), and in the limbo-like territory of Camp X, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. (Baker, *NYRB* 13 May 2004; Danner, *NYRB* June 2004; *Economist* 29 May 2004).

Last year, in early 2003, in the name of the War against Terror (WAT), the Bush Administration went one crucial, risky, unprecedented step further. First it bullied and split its traditional friends, such as Canada and Mexico, NATO allies such as Turkey, Belgium, France and Germany, and the UN. Then, almost single-handedly, it led a mini-coalition to invade and occupy Iraq, deposing and later capturing Saddam Hussein, and killing his male progeny.

But the occupation has run into a tidal wave of critics, opposition, and increasing costs, errors, and mistakes. Many were predicted and not only by the old Europeans in France or the journalists in the *NYRB*, the *New Yorker*, and the *Atlantic* but also in the media via leaks from the State Department and even the Pentagon "Brass". The warnings went either unforeseen and/or deliberately ignored by Bush, Chaney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and other "Vulcan" war planners. Currently, the White House has reversed some of its more egregious policy errors. It has recently tried belatedly to renew more friendly ties with its former allies and the UN, so far without much assurance of success (Clarke 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Hassner and Vaïsse 2003; Hersh 2004; Woodward 2004).

After all these changes, many still incomplete, a neutral observer could well think that the current world scene and US policy are still surprisingly confusing, mysterious, and much more contentious than expected, especially among American Neo-conservatives and "Vulcans" (Mann 2004).

Are the Bush administration and its supporters speaking with forked tongues (or evangelically, in multiple tongues?) Or are they simply, and irredeemably divided into warring factions and clans, contradictory, fickle and confused? Or are the disagreements a useful façade to entertain the glitterati, while political practice is often at odds with the rhetoric, and is sometimes more pragmatic than ideology might lead one to believe? Much of what has happened since 9/11 would probably have occurred under any US president. But certainly not all.

How much do we owe to the ideas and will of this particular president (Clinton June 2004). What of the main protagonists? Most observers have underestimated them both in the past; both have shown abilities to surprise, shock and awe us with unsuspected talents. Much will depend on both the hard realities of the world as it is and the goals and actions of key actors as they seek to transform it as key leaders, of terror and counter-terrorism alike. As the US presidential campaign comes to a head, some features of the current landscape still remain shrouded in the mist. But other features are gradually emerging, some positive but many negative for current US policy.

From 9/11 Attacks and the Resulting War Against Terror (WAT) to Regime Change in Iraq: Terrorist Jihad versus Pre-emptive War Doctrines

The American people are deeply divided over Iraq, George W. Bush, and his novel doctrines of unilateral, pre-emptive war. So too are an increasing number of both traditional multilateral 'idealists', and many Republicans, and foreign policy realists, including many former diplomatic and military professionals. Criticisms of the Administration, the war and the President have grown in daring and volume, whether in the media, Capitol Hill, or former White House supporters and aides, such as Paul O'Neil (Suskind 2003) or Richard Clarke, (2004) and even the Supreme Court. Interestingly, Bob Woodward's generally even-handed, neutral account (2004) of the coming of the Iraq war, which is vaunted on the Republican party

website as it shows the President as decisive and in charge, also confirms, for critics, that the Bush Administration was at least occasionally overly eager and occasionally duplicitous in its very early campaign to get Saddam--- even *before* 9/11. Once determined to see Iraq and the war against Terror as an electoral plus, the President has been forced for most of 2004 onto the defensive. He has had to defend his legitimacy, integrity, honesty, competence and decency in the face of multiple policy flip-flops in Iraq, accusations of wide-spread torture practices, a breakdown of security in occupied Iraq, and continuing isolation in world councils (Danner , *NYRB* December and June 2004; Hoffmann 2003; Krugman 2004).

Meanwhile, much of the rest of the world, both many leaders and foreign publics, (as measured by the PEW research centre) is increasingly mistrustful of the US. In many it is openly hostile, as in much of the Muslim world, especially among putative US allies such as Egypt or Indonesia (Buruma and Margalit 2004; Chaliand 2004; Hassan 2001; Pew 2004; Védrine 2003).. The US has clearly wasted the real and unaccustomed sympathy it had gained as a genuine, innocent victim in 9/11. Further, it has tarnished the respect it won by its rapid military victories in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Without (yet?) being caught in a full Vietnam-style "quagmire", the current crop of US "best and brightest" is having difficulty disengaging from the optimistic democratic and pragmatic expectations it built up in Iraq, even among the more well-disposed Kurds and the Shia. Objective geopolitical and historical factors, and especially unfriendly neighbours, make the idea of a unified, multicultural and

secular/multi-religious, wealthy, democratic and contented Iraq seem both highly desirable and most probably utopian. Nearby, the parallel initiatives on the "road to peace" in Israeli-Palestinian conflict are going nowhere or backward. US soldiers may be justifiably *Time's* "Persons of the Year", but their morale is increasingly stretched, as is public support, with almost daily body bags (secretly) returning home, and continuing allegations of torture and mistreatment of prisoners climbing the chain of command. While G.W. Bush may still enjoy a slight incumbent's advantage in re-election chances, his opponents are increasingly strong in their critiques of his foreign policy, the WAT, and the takeover of Iraq. He has even had to endure claims of direct responsibility for failures in possibly preventing the 9/11 attacks and misleading the world over his linking of the invasion of Iraq with the war against Al Qaeda, according to the staff report of the official 9/11 congressional investigation.

It is already clear that the costs and the risks deliberately and unnecessarily incurred by the US administration are beginning to come home to roost: whether in controversial border and immigration controls, in hostile US court findings on treatment of detainees in Abu Ghraib prison, Baghdad or Camp X in Cuba, in Whitehouse involvement in the illegal leak of a CIA agent's name, or in the costs of corporate shenanigans in Iraq.

The Bush policies were always a very high-risk-gambler's strategy. It will be fascinating in 2004 and 2005 to see whether, having been toned down, they still pay off, or whether the French, the most courageous and determined of the USA's

international critics, were right after all. They said there was and remains another, better way, without the costs now being incurred—a more multilateral and UN friendly approach as is now, belatedly, being attempted by the Bush Administration (*L'Express* 2003; Hassner 2003; Védrine 2003).

Although known in intelligence circles, since the mid 1990s, for exceptionally bold and well-organised terrorist attacks such as those on US embassies in East Africa or against the USS Cole, Bin Laden's Al Qaeda shocked the world, as well as the USA with its September 11 strategy. The attacks were surprising, daring, bold, professional, well-planned and executed, cheap and awesome in the fanatical courage of the *kamikaze* perpetrators. Could there be a rational strategy, many asked, behind such fanaticism and terror? What are Al Qaeda's goals and the motives and capacities of its members, so disproportionate with traditional international relations conflicts and rules of the game (Castells 2004; Clarke 2004; Clinton 2004; *Economist* January 2004; Laqueur 2003).

As for George W. Bush, a born-again evangelical Baptist who gave up hell-raising as a young adult, he is a scrappily-elected President, with only a minority of the popular vote and few expectations other than to be a low-profile, 'compassionate conservative'. Unlike his father or most prior presidents, he had little foreign or military experience. For his first year he enjoyed support from barely a half of the nation, especially as he jettisoned bi-partisanship immediately and imposed his ideas and his major tax cut promise, with little compromise.

So, it was surprising when he suddenly revealed two years ago an astonishingly bold reversal of 50 years of US foreign policy by mobilizing governmental and public resources in a series of Manichean, universal, anti-terrorism “wars” in the Middle East and Central Asia (Frum 2003). They conveniently, and surely not coincidentally, also justified Presidential dominance, domestic partisan advantage, repression of dissent, US “benign” hegemony, and the new imperial doctrine of unilateral, pre-emptive strikes against old and new rogue enemies (such as Iraq and Saddam Hussein) (Goldenberg 2004). The question of motivation continues to divide observers, usually on a partisan fault line.

What is the underlying rationale for and, even more surprising, the astonishingly easy and popular acceptance of the new Bush policy, and/or lack of effective opposition? Has Bush had any success vis-à-vis international anti-US terrorists and Bin Laden (who remains uncaptured)? Is the US policy in fact working to fight terrorism, or has it, especially in Iraq, in practice been counterproductive. Has Bush, in fact, created a terrorist utopia for killing American infidels, in the Sunni triangle in Iraq where it had not previously existed, as argued by in a report by the US Army War College (DeAngelis 2004; Goldenberg 2004)? What is the probable answer to the question that still entrances the media in the US, UK and Australia: did the coalition allies misled or deliberately lied in their justifications of the invasion of Iraq, supposedly to prevent weapons of mass destructions (WMDs) being deployed by Saddam in possible alliance with Bin Laden? What consequences for the future

follow from the collapse of the legitimacy of the war arguments of the Coalition of the Willing?

Dangers of Pre-emptive War: A Critique

After recent official investigations in the USA, UK, and Australia, it is now generally agreed that the most pressing ostensible reasons for regime change in Iraq via invasion by a Coalition of the willing (e.g. WMDs and links with Osama Bin Laden) were basically unsustainable. But did Tony Blair, George W. Bush, and John Howard believe their own intelligence services? Did they either deceive, mislead, or lie (perhaps even to themselves) in their use of intelligence sources about Saddam Hussein's capacity to make, use, or lend weapons of mass destruction and about his links with Al Qaeda and Bin Laden?

This is an important debate. But unfortunately until archives are opened in thirty years and/or candid memoirs are published before then, which seems unlikely if the Iraq adventure turns sour, it may be impossible to determine how much conscious deception, or even self-deception, took place. Furthermore, this debate may not be the most important question in any event. It may, even, unfortunately lead us to ignore an even more important issue, the forest in which misleading use of intelligence for propaganda is merely a clump of trees. Even if the coalition of the willing acted in good faith and even if Iraq posed a potential long-term threat, how legitimate is the Bush Doctrine as an answer. The larger issue concerns two questions: 1) what are the advantages and risks of the new US administration's

overall unilateral, preemptive war doctrine, and 2) what are we to make of the claim that there were/are no alternative ways to fight the international terrorist threat, especially ways involving the UN and international allies, as suggested by most other permanent members of the Security Council.

A Dangerous New Doctrine

The new doctrine of the Bush team, inspired by Neo-conservative think tanks [who initiated its main outlines over a decade ago after the first Gulf war failed to overthrow Saddam], stresses the benevolence of overwhelming US power and the need for missile defense and for the flexibility to strike pre-emptively to overthrow bad regimes in rogue states, who might want or be able to help terrorists attack the US. In order to fight the new terror threat and to make America and its allies feel “safe” once again, there is no other way than absolute US supremacy, notably not only over rivals and enemies but US friends and allies as well. Older, proven Cold War traditions of containment, organised permanent alliances such as NATO, and/or joint actions by multilateral institutions are seen as too slow, complicated, and inefficient. Even old allies have proven themselves ‘traitorous’, such as the French and Germans, or unreliable such as Canada, Mexico, and even Turkey and Belgium. Although there are some precedents for aspects of the new doctrine, in its entirety, it is radical and unprecedented in its linking of US hard military power, a willingness to use it with few restraints, and an arrogant unwillingness to accept words of advice or caution, discussions with others, or alternative points of view (e.g. J. Chirac’s relevant experiences as a lieutenant in Algeria). It then becomes vulnerable and

unjustifiable, even from short-term US perspectives in fighting terror, if there are alternatives, involving lesser risks and costs, and greater effectiveness, and especially if the crucial intelligence and knowledge base on which the doctrine is built is faulty.

The current Iraq war demonstrates both points.

Democratic governments cannot mislead or lie about reasons for going to war, without endangering the moral advantages they enjoy over their enemies, and otherwise corrupting the democratic character of the polity. Even pragmatically, as we saw in Vietnam, Cambodia, Watergate, and Iran-Contra, governments are ultimately caught by the inevitable leaks. Lying then about such grave matters means they lose legitimacy and efficiency. President Nixon even had to resign to avoid impeachment, largely over his misuse of power and a loss of trust in his honesty.

In the case of new pre-emptive wars in the terrorist era, the requirements of trust, truth, accuracy and credibility are even more important, given the shadowy character of terrorists and the duplicitous and secretive nature of rogue potential state allies. It is true that a case may be made both in law and reality that pre-emption in extreme cases can be justified *in self-defense* to meet a major terrorist threat, as in September 11. However, it is crucial that any such case be transparent, free of other motives, and based on clear and immediate threats by identifiable rogue elements. There should be little feasible probability of effective, lower cost available alternatives. There must be predictable and dramatic costs if no action is taken. And therefore there must be verifiable and credible intelligence to back up these claims.

That the current Putin government in Russia, after the mass slaughter of innocents in Beslan by putative Chechen terrorists, has begun to invoke the doctrine of pre-emption also should give the world reason to doubt the wisdom of legitimating this new reason to shoot first and ask questions later.

Invading Iraq was not logically part of the WAT

Although many of the necessary moral criteria of just war were met in Afghanistan, (even if a less gung-ho military invasion may have been more effective), none have been met with respect to Iraq and its invasion and occupation. In their own interest, governments should be careful, cautious and ultra conservative in their use of unverifiable secret intelligence about both the motives and the likely and realistic capabilities of adversaries. Otherwise, we are condemned to a paranoid, self-defeating Hobbesian state of nature, where international life is nasty, brutish and short. It would be a world in which any state who feels at all threatened could start a war in "self-defense" if their intelligence sources made them the least bit frightened. The Bush Administration in particular would be well-advised to avoid the suspicion that it is not using intelligence sources carefully and wisely. Its existing credibility and effectiveness have been shaken by the failure to understand the predictable threat September 11 attacks, its politicizing of the rival secret intelligence agencies, and its cavalier overriding of dissent and unfavourable assessments when they do not suit the Defense Department or the President (Hersh 2003). The Bush team alleges a need for sweeping regime changes in many countries and the urgency of a long-term and ongoing fight against terrorism everywhere. This leads to a very long

list of hard cases, on the "axis of evil" beyond even Iraq, Iran, N. Korea, Syria, etc.

This is a huge number of problems to solve, more than most US Presidents have ever had to deal with, much less simultaneously, and increasingly without many old allies.

Pre-emptive doctrines also ironically give an incentive for rogue states to acquire WMDs as a deterrent as soon as possible to avoid being invaded too easily, as with N. Korea. If a war seems inevitable such a doctrine might even, ironically, induce a rogue state or terrorist group to strike first if it thought its demise were imminent.

Such a doctrine, therefore, if stated public ally may be counter-productive. The Bush administration seems both overly paranoid at times and yet also complacently arrogant that it can succeed against all comers acting virtually alone.

Furthermore, even if the leaders of the "coalition of the willing" prove to have been correct in their analysis and if weapons of mass destruction and/or programs for making such are, surprisingly, ultimately discovered in Iraq, it does not follow that their armed unilateral intervention and successful regime change were legitimate or wise. The question is not only was Saddam an evil tyrant, whom anyone might legitimately overthrow at any cost at any time, but rather who had the right to force regime change then and in that way?

Who guards the guardians is the ultimate question in politics. We separate branches of government as well as judge, jury and executioner roles domestically for good reason, to avoid abuse of power. We should be careful of letting the world's most powerful nation escape the virtues of checks and balances abroad, while it vaunts

them at home. It should not be able to prosecute its own cases before its own juries with its own sheriffs or friends, especially when it sees itself as a primary victim, and cannot rightly plead total innocence, absence of conflict of interests, or neutrality. A just war of pre-emption must be proportionate to the damage involved, must involve no other alternative solution, and be prosecuted without fear or favour, for non-selfish motives.

That is hardly the case with the US in its self-appointed role as world gendarme. Especially not when oil can be alleged, however implausibly at times, as a possible motive, not when bias towards Israel can be invoked as a reason for action, not when key officials in the administration have publicly been gunning for Saddam even before 9/11, and gain clear political advantage in so doing, and others have spun dreams of remaking all the middle East in a utopian vision for many years.

There was, and is, an Alternative to Unilateral War

Even more important an issue is that there were and remain practical alternatives to unilateral pre-emptive wars, which have been deliberately obscured by US and UK propaganda, which might have achieved better outcomes at less cost. In particular the French (Védrine *Le Monde* 2003; Hassner and Vaïsse 2003) and Bill Clinton (*Time* June 21 2004) had, and still do, propose(d) an alternative, UN-based ways to contain regimes such as Iraq and to initiate actions to sustain UN decisions on a less dangerous basis.

Perhaps that is why the French have been so demonized by the Bush administration, until very recently, ever since January, 2003, when they said they would veto a

unilateral and pre-emptive war which cut off the UN inspections route to Iraq's disarmament. A French alternative would have fatally undermined the Bush strategy for a war on Iraq at the US's time and manner of choosing, regardless of justification. The Bush administration and the Blair government offered no reasoned and legitimate argument as to why war was necessary in March, and by US and UK forces alone. The French and the UN were willing to give Saddam an ultimate deadline to comply with mandated weapons inspections by Hans Blix. But Bush refused to go long and wanted war at his convenience. That is unconscionable and sets a terrible precedent, were the adventure to succeed, as it may, despite all the current difficulties.

Possible Future Scenarios--Through a Glass Darkly

One of George W. Bush's greatest, if short term, 'achievements' has been his deliberate blurring of the lines between the different groups of enemies of the US, and using the moral and emotional outrage over 9/11 to cover the sins of broader domestic and foreign policy objectives. He also tries to have his cake and eat it too, painting the conflict as a "war" when it suits him to mobilize support but seeking, in a flagrant contradiction, to deny the status of "war prisoner" to opponents caught during the conflict (so-called "illegal combatants").

Some Conceptual and Theoretical Distinctions

Thus it is necessary to separate the contingent from the essential elements and to distinguish different layers of the current conflict: The different layers may and should be separated as follows:

1. "War" on a Noun (*Terror*), even though terror is an ancient, recurring, and rational (in some contexts) tactic or strategy option, and thus unlikely ever to be totally eradicated; it is not an actor or enemy as such, and terror as a tactic has been used by both quasi-states/social movements like Al Qaeda, as well as traditional states, [including the US itself-- in its long tradition of air bombing campaigns on civilian cities going back to WWII, involving mass 'collateral damage'];
2. Actual war on actual *States* which acknowledge supporting or harbouring actually existing, International extremist Terrorists (IET), such as Al Qaeda, e.g. Afghanistan;
3. Armed Struggle pressures/War on States which are openly hostile to the USA Administration and which *might* sometime support IET, especially with WMDs, such as Iraq, even if they have not so far and are unlikely to do so easily;
4. Muscular Diplomatic Conflict with and threats against the "Axis of Evil" (e.g. Iran, N. Korea explicitly, Syria, Libya, Sudan, implicitly)
5. Verbal, Diplomatic and Economic Conflict with "Wimpish" allies (e.g. Old Europe—France, Germany, Turkey? Russia? China?)

These layers are unjustifiably but deliberately fused/confused into one dichotomous conflict or moral war—for us or against us-- by the Bush Administration. The latter layers are not only not linked the former but in most cases contradictory to the successful prosecution of the real "war" against Islamist extremists; but the latter are

in need of a legitimation that only the former can provide. In the long term, this is an unsustainable and unjustifiable combination.

What will, in fact, determine which of the possible scenarios for the future will come to fruition: a return to a mix of traditional international organization, plus some diplomacy, with only occasional /military actions, or the relative triumph of new Bush extreme doctrine. Will it be the triumph of the will of a man, a group, and a vision, or will mass organizational/party political victories, or relative socio-economic hegemony or weakness [*la longue durée*] play the most important role?

Here I assume a mix of idealist and realist assumptions and that a Franco-German and broader European view are not to be ignored.

Supply and Demand for Fanatical Islamist International Terrorism: Counter terrorism, and Future Options— Victory, Defeat, Quagmire, and/or Containment

Although the literature on terrorism (Dershowitz 2002; Dibb 2003; Garton Ash 2004; Hassan 2001; Ignatieff 2004; Laqueur 2003; Carr 2002) is often highly contested, there are certain points which seem less controversial. There are a variety of basic future scenarios about the evolution of the struggle, which are conceivable today, depending on the strength and success of the Islamist terrorists, and the wisdom or weakness of the counter-terrorist policies. Both sides have strengths and weakness, challenges and opportunities: Armageddon, continuing *Jihad*, success for the Bush hegemonic project, a return to the Bush Senior's multilateral new world order, or some form of containment and ongoing quagmire.

1. State and non-state or quasi-state terrorisms have a long history, and recur periodically, at least for a time.
2. Terrorism can "work" in the short run, but often, it also can be defeated/self defeating (*Battle of Algiers*; Robespierre's fate; the long term failures or impasses of Stalin, the Khmer Rouge, the Red Brigades, Action Directe, Baader Meinhof, PKK/Kurds, Palestinians).
3. While terrorism recurs, it can be wiped out sometimes, at some cost, in the short run, by repression, (legal and extralegal, such as systematic, torture) l, and even more by draining support and new recruits and legitimacy, [e.g. Algerian FLN in 1957; propaganda by the deed anarchists in the 19th century; airline hijacking in 1970s; Weathermen underground bombers in 1960-70s in USA]. Furthermore, in case of the Oslo peace accord negotiations, for many years, there was a marked

diminution in terrorism, just as in N. Ireland, if other political avenues are more peacefully opened and terror seems unfruitful,

4. Otherwise, terror can be a short-term, rational strategy for the tactically weak and/or desperate and fanatical; terrorism is not just irrational, immoral, 'evil'; International mass terrorism is only partially new, especially using new technology and weapons of mass destruction potentials, but the novelty should not be exaggerated.
5. The supply of current, contemporary, potential terrorists can be, with ups and downs, rather copious for many decades, if in part a product of disillusionment with globalized modernity, dominated by western forms and by continuing injustices/corruption, weakness of third world, Arab/Muslim governments, especially in Middle East—although a compromise in Middle East and reform of Jordan, Egypt, S. Arabia could make things better. Like similar other new social movements, if on a more extreme/violent basis, the new terrorism responds to a need and an opportunity.
6. But the cadres, militants, and organization of Al Qaeda or/and successors can and probably will be contained by repression, intelligence (using new forms of torture?), technology and reform, and especially the support base and legitimacy can be undercut by intelligent, just containment, if US and western, and Islamic moderate allies' policies are fair and efficient.

One interesting recent theoretical development is the comparison of Al Qaeda to other new social movements, including xenophobic populism, allowing the

following summary and ideal-type construction (Castells 2004; DeAngelis 2003; Stern 2004).

[Table 1 about here]

Table 1 is a composite, “ideal type”, a theoretical check-list of empirical and possibly explanatory theoretical categories and characteristics, to which individual cases may be compared for degree of fit.

It is plausible in the existing state of our knowledge of both terrorism, and xenophobic populisms as social movements, that a *combination or syndrome* of factors is theoretically useful which combine:

- (1) a critical *demand* by the Muslim street/masses for new Islamist politics, coupled with both
- (2) a relatively *vacant political space* for such politics, because of existing world conditions, state, elite choices and (mis)-behaviour, and
- (3) a plausible and organised *offer* of Islamist fundamentalism by new, seen as honest, trustworthy, charismatic, capable and organised political, terrorist, entrepreneurs.

These sweeping economic and political-sociological changes may be further illuminated by H. Kriesi’s recent, clear, innovative, and comprehensive theory of ‘new social movements’, which tries to explain *both* new right-wing and left-wing social movements in the same schema:

...[global] modernisation creates *two...structural conflicts*, [as] the basis for political mobilisation. [of *three main political actors*]:... [a conflict results] between...**middle class winners**...and...**[(1)] losers**,... [who lack appropriate professional skills and expertise in a globalising world], [and a *second conflict*]...among the ...winners...[between **(2) technocratic managerialists and (3) post-materialists**]...about the control of...work,...individual autonomy, ...and...different life projects... (*emphasis added*) [in Al Qaeda’s case, substitute Islam for post-materialism] (Kriesi in Kitschelt 1995: 404)

Compared to western new social movements, Islamist terrorism seems to fuse appeals to both partial winners and semi-losers in a third world, especially a religious, Muslim environment. The leaders and militants seem to be semi-winners and the followers and the Arab street more in the partial losers groups, but both share frustrated hopes and revulsion at, what they see as, western-origin disruptive modernity, immorality and injustice.

More empirically and concretely, one could align the main features of each social movement to allow us to compare family resemblances thus: For example:

[Table 2 about here]

There are several similarities between Fascism, xenophobic populists like the National Front and One Nation, and the Islamic extremism of Al Qaeda as an ideal type, as shown in Table 2. There are also key differences, especially on the role of violence, religion and education, as well as geography. Important similarities include:

1. a particular appeal to men; and even the well-educated are resentful;
2. relative powerlessness and frustrations, especially in world power terms, on the periphery, [in this particular case world/western, geographically peripheral base areas Middle East as a whole, N. Africa, S. E. Asia, with strong Muslim groups and networks];
3. charismatic, centralised leadership; and growing organisational durability
4. exclusionary, apocalyptic style, small, capitalist economy, authoritarian morality, policy innovation; and
5. surprisingly rapid early growth, flexibility, and adaptability.

Scenarios

Jihad and the Risks of Armageddon, from Invading Muslim Lands

In November 2001, (*Australian Options*) in the immediate aftermath of September 11,

Professor Riaz Hassan speculated that the provocation of an

Old-style militaristic response from the United States and its Western Allies...in Afghanistan are exactly what he [Bin Laden] must have hoped for, because this galvanizes support against the United States and may help...the [eventual] overthrow of the State of Saudi Arabia...and control of Arab oil.

Hassan argued that the Bush Administration was playing into the hands of its global, Islamist-terrorist enemies. By militarily invading Afghanistan, it was also potentially destabilizing and fragmenting an already unstable Pakistan and possibly, after a likely coup, providing access to its nuclear weapons to Bin Laden and his allies. In turn, such truly WMDs could be used to blackmail the US and countries like the Saudis and Israel to bring about the aims of Bin Laden's *jihad*. What are we to make of these speculations, in the light of the last two years' events, and of the Bush Administration's opposite claims that the war in Iraq is a necessary part of the war against terror?

Despite the obvious difficulties of any definitive analysis so early in the WAT, nevertheless, hard facts, fairness, and a sense of complexity imply a balance sheet neither as harsh as Hassan's nor as rosy as that of the Bush Administration. The "Armageddon" scenario has not yet eventuated when the US invaded Afghanistan.

Whether the invasion of Iraq is different is much more problematic.

US and some allied troops did overthrow the Taliban government, at least in Kabul and the major Afghan cities, and has made some progress in implanting an improved, more tolerant, semi-democratic, female-friendly and progressive national

government in the capital, Kabul. Further, US military forces did successfully take control later of most of Iraq and have made some progress, although much less than expected or needed, in creating the groundwork for a post-Saddam “fully sovereign” polity, especially in Kurdish and Shia dominated areas, [although recent Shia clergy opposition to the methods of the American disengagement in June are ominous].

Still on the positive side for G.W., the infamous “Arab street” has also not revolted (yet), despite (or because of) increased tensions between their governments with the US. Surprisingly, rulers in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan are still stable. Even Pakistan has held together, (just, and despite several very near miss assassination attempts on the Head of State) and even has made progress in pacifying relations with arch-foe India.

On the other hand, the US has clearly set in motion or reinforced many of the forces of resentment and hostility that Professor Hassan and many other critics predicted (Blix 2004; Danner 2003; Doge 2003; *Economist* May 2004; *L'Express* 2003; Fukuyama 2004; Hastings 2003; Johnson 2003; Kennedy 2004; Pei and Kasper 2003; Pipes 2004; Ramesh 2003; Walzer 2004). It has thus weakened, isolated and humiliated many moderate, modernizing Muslims, and made life more difficult for all Muslim and Arab governments. In particular the foreseeable and unnecessary excesses of the US occupation of Iraq, the continuing and unnecessary splits with old allies such as Germany, Canada, Mexico, Turkey, and France, and the unnecessary and counterproductive manner in which the “war on terror” is being conducted around the world illustrate the dangers of the current Bush Administration’s personnel,

organization, mindset and set of policies, if they continue in the same way at the same pace. Global political and economic inequalities, religious conflicts, US ineptitude and arrogance, and the weakness of the international community's institutions might and could still imply the danger of an Armageddon scenario, or at least a venomous clash of civilisations. That is certainly a risk too great to justify the new Bush foreign policy, even if rogue states with WMD's were in league with international terrorists. But was Iraq so linked? And what if governments lie, and not just rogue governments?

American Hegemony

Scenario two now seems is the least likely, despite the hopes and predictions of the Neo-conservative radicals in the Pentagon and White House (Frum 2003; Frum and Perle 2004). A hegemonic USA, using all of its hard and even some of its ample soft power is still too weak, even in a uni-polar world, to dominate all other rivals taken together, except for a very short while. Already analysts predict that China, and perhaps the EU are gearing up to rival US power, at least on a regional basis. Gaps in US skill and knowledge, plus inherited attitudes in the US and abroad, mean that the more power the US uses, especially military power, the more it is likely to confirm the realist insight that power encourages countervailing resistance (Nye 2004). In particular the ignorance in the US at all levels of other countries and the unwillingness of the (anti-imperial) public ensure that, so long as there are any

democratic limits on the US governing classes, the imperial and hegemonic route will never be a stable one.

Back to the Future: A New, Post-Cold-War, World Order

A third scenario might be a return to the status quo ante, something similar to what George W.'s father tried to attain with his New World Order, of cooperating friendly powers. It seems today, also quite difficult, in part because of what the USA has done under the younger Bush and the number of bridges that have been destroyed unnecessarily. Trust in the USA will take a long time to return to the levels necessary to make cooperation work while the USA remains relatively so strong. The USA is still much too strong relative to others either to retreat into relative isolation or to treat others equally and fairly. Besides the last few years have contributed to making new enemies, to acquiring new commitments, and to making many old friends mistrustful. Remodeling international institutions and alliances will be hard. And too many Americans have died to repudiate totally the excesses of the Bush policies.

A New Détente Moderate Quagmire and Long-term Containment

More likely, if primarily both by a process of elimination and thus by default and partly by its plausibility and previous incarnation, is a more modest and moderate reformulation of the Bush policies. This reconstruction of foreign and security policies would be similar to the process by which the US created a new containment policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s, while both repudiating roll-back,

McCarthyism, and nuclear war on China on the one hand but also a policy of continued WWII friendliness and trust with Soviet Uncle Jo as urged by VP Henry Wallace (Gaddis 1982). Instead a combination of *realpolitik* (alliance with communist but anti-Stalinist Tito), ideological anti-communism but no help for Hungarian revolt, and alliances set the foundations of a long term containment strategy, which allowed for ups and downs and flexibility.

Perhaps the same will happen again, as the US and its similar placed allies separate out the hard core of Islamist terrorist enemies from the many other neutral, hostile or mildly friendly rivals that play the game of international politics. By focusing on the few real dangerous enemies and by seeking intelligently to isolate them, sometimes combat, and always contain them, but without seeking a go it alone, unilateral, preemptive hegemony, the US may be able again to construct a realistic and sustainable policy, which will do much less damage to others on this earth.

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<p><u>Table 1: An Ideal Typical Composite of Islamist, Mass Terrorism: Demand (I,II, III) and Supply (IV, V,VI) Factors, with empirical examples</u></p>	
<p><u>I) Facilitating Conditions: Rapid, Stressful Change</u> <i>sudden and/or accelerating globalisation rapid, disruptive socio-economic, moral and gender-role changes favouring women increasing social fragmentation and divisions, widening inequalities on global scale increasing ease of communications and popular political mobilisation rising expectations, insecurities, and anxieties</i></p>	<p><u>II) Cross-class, Mass Base: well- Educated Militants</u> <i>technically trained white-collar, but also mass appeal (across-class, age barriers); well-educated, urban, knowledgeable about-cosmopolitans, on world scale, more peripheral socio-geographically, marginal, anti-secular, pious, devout male, young adult relatively alienated or distant from established Middle East/Islamic governments and US –led world order but integrated into neighbourhood, family, clan, religious networks fear of secular, modern, global change and envy, anger and resentment towards elite(s)(above) and traitors, apostates, infidels, scapegoats</i></p>
<p><u>III) Mass Perception of Elites: As Selfish, Immoral, Modern, Untrustworthy</u> <i>selfish and corruptly well-off, parasitical arrogant, contemptuous and isolated from the ordinary people and masses indifferent, impotent and/or incompetent lying and deceitful (especially elite media)</i></p>	<p><u>IV) Leadership Style, Organisation: Charisma</u> <i>charismatic, personalised, trusted, strong leadership, use of literal Koran/Sharia law/NSM image (or at least façade) of strong, decisive, united, centralised, leadership group (despite probable underlying tensions) open to selected “ordinary” people at lower and middle levels, but fear of infiltration by spies</i></p>
<p><u>V) Islamist/ Populist Policies; Exclusionary, Demagogic, Utopian-longterm strategies</u> <i>often vague, contradictory and opportunistically flexible, but provocative, with some constant emphases: [simple, security-oriented using a strong quasi- state network] take risks calculated to eliminate modernist conflict (caused by outsiders), immorality, infidel immigration, crime, and favouritism for “sectional” and “minority” interests, e.g. Israelis, USA and stooges cleansing mass violence, propaganda by the deed, for cleansing of whole Muslim community</i></p>	<p><u>VI) Process of Development: Using New Space</u> <i>rapid internationalising change, imposed by secular, modernist, nationalist, moderate, consensual elites, opens up unoccupied political space between mass religiously conservative opinions and dominant groups, into which a charismatic leader, mass terror, and new organisation emerges, to great publicity the scandalous and surprising success of the new terrorism feeds on itself as world/USA elites persist with policies that are feared and resented by the masses, and elite attempts facilitate, seduce, use, ignore, crush, or manipulate backfire the terrorists may endure even after conditions change, as a blackmail influence world public policy agendas</i></p>

Table 2: Classic Fascism, Xenophobic Populisms, and Al Qaeda's Terrorism

Trait	Fascism	National Front	One Nation	Al Qaeda
<u>Facilitating Conditions</u>	“Unfair” Versailles Settlement, depression, civil disorder, mass unemployment, voter instability, anti-Semitism	Globalisation, reform of post-war settlement, mass unemployment, <i>voter instability, anti-EU, fear of Muslim world, sporadic anti-Semitism</i>	Globalisation, “Australian settlement” reform, mass unemployment, <i>voter volatility, anti-feminist backlash</i>	Globalisation, US hegemony Constraints, lack of reform of neo-corrupt local political-economic structures, patronage, increasing old party rivalry, anti-Semitism
<u>Mass Base</u>	Cross-class soldiers, lower middle class Bavaria, Emilia, rural and urban	Young, <i>male blue-collar</i> unemployed Midi, Alsace, cross-class, urban, industrial	<i>Male, blue-collar, reform’s losers, Queensland, Secular, semi-urban periphery</i>	Young, <i>Male</i> , Cross-class, often well-educated and close to orthodox power, but world periphery
<u>Mass Beliefs</u>	Xenophobic, resentful, anti-elitist, nationalist	Anti-Arab, <i>fearful, anti-Paris elite, scandal disgust</i>	<i>Fearful of change, Asia, resentful of Canberra /media</i>	Anti-Israel, Anti-USA/modern values, <i>Anti-Elite</i>
<u>Leader Organisation</u> <u>Suppression of Disunity</u> <u>Style</u> <u>Gender Role</u>	Charisma/Man Hitler, Mussolini centralised Night of the Long Knives, active/violent Traditional Male Warrior	Charisma/Man Le Pen <i>centralised Rivalry/split with Stirbois/Mégret, active/semi-violent</i> Traditional Male	Charisma/ (Woman) Hanson <i>centralised clique Many purges, defections defiant talk/non-violent, Male</i> Traditional Battler	Charisma/Man Osama bin Laden <i>centralised behind the scene, local actions, few purges, defections defiantly male/violent, traditional Koranic values</i>
<u>Policies</u>	Autarchy, War, Corporatist welfare Anti-Bolshevik, Anti-USA Mass Scapegoating	<i>Pro-market, Anti-immigrant, anti-state, anti-EU/USA/Israel/ Communist Welfare (French) Chauvinist</i>	<i>Pro-Small Business, Anti-Aboriginal rights, anti-Asian migrants, low tax</i> (Workers’ Welfare)	<i>Anti-USA, western armies in Muslim lands, Anti-Russian, Anti-EU/NATO/UN, pro-private capital, implementation of Sharia Law</i>
<u>Development Path</u>	Elite splits, Help from Right/Left, Mass Appeal Street fights Government, Defeat	<i>Elite failure, splits Help from Right/Left Electoral growth, Mégret split, Consolidation? Spectacular 1st ballot Presidential Elections Success</i>	Rejection of Keating and gun laws, <i>help from Howard, surprise electoral wins; crises= \$, defections, legal problems, revival (?) of party but withdrawal of leader</i>	<i>Breakdown of Elite Consensus, Help from Left/Right (USA, Saudis, Pakistan, Sudan, Afghanistan); increasingly international and ambitious use of coordinated, well-researched terror; loss of safe haven, greater threats to leader</i>

Source: on Fascism, Populisms: DeAngelis 2003; on Al Qaeda: Castells, 2004

