% This file was created with JabRef 2.4. % Encoding: Cp1252 @INCOLLECTION{Musg:94, author = {Musgrave, R. A.}, title = {Progressive taxation, equity, and tax design}, booktitle = {Tax Progressivity and Income Inequality}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1994}, editor = {Slemrod, J.}, chapter = {10}, pages = {341--356}, crossref = {Slem:94}, key = {equity} } @INBOOK{Musgrave, chapter = {10}, pages = {341--356}, title = {Progressive taxation, equity, and tax design}, author = {Musgrave, Richard A.}, crossref = {Slem:94}, key = {equity}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Shef:94, author = {Sheffrin, S.M.}, title = {Perceptions of fairness in the crucible of tax policy}, booktitle = {Tax Progressivity and Income Inequality}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1994}, editor = {Slemrod, J.}, chapter = {9}, pages = {309--340}, crossref = {Slem:94}, key = {equity} } @INBOOK{Sheffrin1994, chapter = {9}, pages = {309--340}, title = {Perceptions of fairness in the crucible of tax policy}, year = {1994}, author = {Sheffrin, S.M.}, crossref = {Slem:94}, key = {equity}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{delaF:99, title = {Mathematical Models and Methods for Economists}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1999}, author = {{de la Fuente} , A.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{alBrDh:08, author = {al-Nowaihi, A. and Bradley, I. and Dhami, S.}, title = {A note on the utility function under prospect theory}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2008}, volume = {99}, pages = {337-339}, number = {6}, month = {June}, abstract = {We show that preference-homogeneity and loss-aversion are necessary and sufficient for the value function to have the power form with identical powers for gains and losses and for the probability weighting functions for gains and losses to be identical.}, key = {economic theory}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.21} } @ARTICLE{dAFeGV:96, author = {d'Aspremont, C. and Ferreira, R. and G{\'e}rard-Varet, L.-A.}, title = {On the {D}ixit-{S}tiglitz model of monopolistic competition}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1996}, volume = {86}, pages = {623-629}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{dAGe:77, author = {d'Aspremont, C. and Gevers, L.}, title = {Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1977}, volume = {44}, pages = {199-210}, key = {equity} } @BOOK{dAsGiSnSp:02, title = {Institutional and Financial Incentives for Social Insurance}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {2002}, author = {{d'A}spremont, C. and Ginsburgh, V. and Sneessens , H. and Spinnewyn, F.}, address = {Dewenter}, key = {Social insurance} } @ARTICLE{dAGV:79, author = {d'Aspremont, C. and G{\'e}rard-Varet, L.-A.}, title = {Incentives and incomplete information}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1979}, volume = {11}, pages = {25-45}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{dRRC:00, author = {{del R}{\'i}o, Coral and Ruiz-Castillo, Javier}, title = {Intermediate Inequality and Welfare}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2000}, volume = {17}, pages = {223-239}, abstract = {We introduce a new centrist or intermediate inequality concept, be- tweenthe usual relative and absolute notions, which is shown to be a variantof the a-ray invariant inequality measures in P(r)ngsten and Seidl (1997).We say that distributions x and y have the same - x; p ƒ -inequality ifthe total income di¨erence between them is allocated among the individualsas follows: 100p% preserving income shares in x and 100 - 1 {\"y} p ƒ % inequal absolute amounts. This notion can be made as operational as currentstandard methods in Shorrocks (1983).}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{null1939, title = {Inkomens- En Vermogensverdeling}, publisher = {Nederlandsch Economisch Instituut}, year = {1939}, author = {{van der Wijk}, J.}, number = {26}, address = {Haarlem}, institution = {Nederlansch Ekonomisch Institut}, key = {income distribution:theoretical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Wijk:39, title = {Inkomens- En Vermogensverdeling}, publisher = {De Erven F. Bohn, N. V.}, year = {1939}, author = {{van der Wijk}, J.}, number = {26}, series = {Nederlandsch Economisch Instituut}, address = {Haarlem}, institution = {Nederlansch Ekonomisch Institut}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @BOOK{dASt:86, title = {Goodness-of-fit techniques}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, year = {1986}, author = {d'Agostino, R. B. and Stephens, M. A.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{UnAl:04, author = {{\"U}nl{\"u}, A. and Albert, D.}, title = {The Correlational Agreement Coefficient CA(V,D)—a mathematical analysis of a descriptive goodness-of-fit measure}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2004}, volume = {48}, pages = {281-314}, key = {statistics}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @ARTICLE{No:08, author = {{\~N}opo, H.}, title = {An extension of the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition to a continuum of comparison groups}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2008}, volume = {100}, pages = {292-296}, number = {2}, month = {August}, abstract = {This paper proposes an extension of the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition from two to a continuum of comparison groups. The proposed decomposition is then estimated for racial wage differences in urban Peru, exploiting a novel data set that allows the capturing of different degrees of mestizaje (racial mixtures).}, key = {race}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.06} } @ARTICLE{A.1984, author = {Freedman D. A. and Peters, S. C.}, title = {Some Notes on the Bootstrap in Regression Problems}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1984}, volume = {2}, pages = {406-409}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{A.1984a, author = {Freedman D. A. and Peters, S. C.}, title = {Bootstrapping and Econometric Model: Some Empirical Results}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1984}, volume = {2}, pages = {150-158}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{A.1999a, author = {Khutoretsky A.}, title = {Housing Market Short-Term Equilibriums Maximizing Linear Utility Functions}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {355-364}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Aabe:07, author = {Aaberge, Rolf}, title = {Gini's Nuclear Family}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2007}, volume = {5}, pages = {305-322}, abstract = {The purpose of this paper is to justify the use of the Gini coefficient and two close relatives for summarizing the basic information of inequality in distributions of income. To this end we employ a specific transformation of the Lorenz curve, the scaled conditional mean curve, rather than the Lorenz curve as the basic formal representation of inequality in distributions of income. The scaled conditional mean curve is shown to possess several attractive properties as an alternative interpretation of the information content of the Lorenz curve and furthermore proves to yield essential information on polarization in the population. The paper also provides asymptotic distribution results for the empirical scaled conditional mean curve and the related family of empirical measures of inequality.}, key = {Gini}, keywords = {the scaled conditional mean curve, measures of inequality, Gini coefficient, Bonferroni coefficient, measures of social welfare, principles of transfer sensitivity, estimation, asymptotic distributions.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{Aabe:00, author = {Aaberge, R.}, title = {Characterizations of {L}orenz curves and income distributions}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2000}, volume = {17}, pages = {639-653}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.19} } @TECHREPORT{Aaberge1996, author = {Aaberge, R. and Aslaksen, J.}, title = {Decomposition of the {G}ini coefficient by Income components; Various types of applications and interpretations}, institution = {Statistics Norway}, year = {1996}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {182}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Aaberge1995, author = {Aaberge, R. and Bj{\"o}rklund, A. and J{\"a}ntti, M. and Palme, M. and Pedersen, P. and Smith, P. and Wennemo, T.}, title = {Income inequality and income mobility in the Scandinavian countries compared to the {U}nited {S}tates}, institution = {Abo Akademi University, Department of Economics}, year = {1995}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {13}, address = {FIN20500 Turku, Finland}, key = {INCOME DISTRIBUTION:EMPIRICAL}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Aaberge2003, author = {Aaberge, Rolf and Bj{\"o}rklund, Anders and J{\"a}ntti, Markus and Pedersen, Peder J. and Smith, Nina and Wennemo, Tom}, title = {Income Inequality and Income Mobility in the {S}candinavian Countries Compared to the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2003}, volume = {48}, pages = {443}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AaBjJaPaPeSmWe:02, author = {Aaberge, Rolf and Bj{\"o}rklund, Anders and J{\"a}ntti, M. and Pedersen, P. J. and Smith, Nina and Wennemo, Tom}, title = {Income Inequality and Income Mobility in the {S}candinavian Countries Comparedto the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2002}, volume = {48}, pages = {443}, key = {mobility}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.19}, url = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/cgi-bin/fulltext/118911867/PDFSTART} } @ARTICLE{AaBjJaPa:00, author = {Aaberge, Rolf and Bj{\"o}rklund, Anders and J{\"a}ntti, Markus and Pedersen, Peder J. and Smith, Nina and Wennemo, Tom}, title = {Unemployment shocks and income distribution: How did the {N}ordic countries fare during their crises?}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {102}, pages = {77-99}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.19}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3440706} } @ARTICLE{Aaberge1999, author = {Aaberge, Rolf and Bj{\"o}rklund, Anders and J{\"a}ntti, Markus and Pedersen, Peder J. and Smith, Nina and Wennemo, Tom}, title = {Unemployment shocks and income distribution: How did the {N}ordic countries fare during their crises?}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {101}, note = {forthcoming}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AaMe:98, author = {Aaberge, R. and Melby, I.}, title = {The sensitivity of income inequality to choice of equivalence scales}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1998}, volume = {44}, pages = {565-569}, abstract = {To account for the fact that a household's needs depend on its size and composition most studies on income inequality adjust the observed household incomes by equivalence scales. However, since the rationale for choosing a specific scale is rather vague the importance of testing the sensitivity of income inequality estimates to choice of equivalence scales has long been acknowledged. The sensitivity studies in the literature are restricted to equivalence scales that do not depend on the income level of the reference household which means that the effect of a rise in the household size on the scale rate does not depend on whether the household is poor or rich. By using Norwegian micro-data it is shown that the introduction of an income-dependent scale produces results that are in conflict with the widespread view of robustness of results to choice of equivalence scales.}, key = {equivalence scales}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.13}, url = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/cgi-bin/fulltext/119112856/PDFSTART} } @BOOK{Aaro:81, title = {The Value-Added Tax: Lessons from {E}urope}, publisher = {Brookings Institute}, year = {1981}, author = {Aaron, H. J.}, address = {Washington}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Abad:02, author = {Abadie, Alberto}, title = {Bootstrap Tests for Distributional Treatment Effects in Instrumental VariableModels}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {2002}, volume = {97}, pages = {284--292}, number = {457}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{Abad:95, author = {Abadir, Karim M.}, title = {A new test for nonstationarity against the stable alternative}, journal = {Econometric Theory}, year = {1995}, volume = {11}, pages = {81-104}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Abad:93, author = {Abadir, Karim M.}, title = {The limiting distribution of the autocorrelation coefficient under a unitroot}, journal = {The Annals of Statistics}, year = {1993}, volume = {21}, pages = {1058-1070}, number = {2}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{AbIrRe:00, author = {Abbink, K. and Irlenbusch, B. and Renner, E.}, title = {The Moonlighting Game. An Experimental Study on Reciprocity and Retribution}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2000}, volume = {42}, pages = {265-277}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{AbSaZa:04, author = {Abbink, K. and Sadrieh, A. and Zamir, S.}, title = {Fairness, Public Good and Emotional Aspects of Punishment Behavior}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {2004}, volume = {57}, pages = {25-57}, abstract = {We report an experiment on two treatments of an ultimatum minigame. In one treatment, responders’ reactions are hidden to proposers. We observe high rejection rates reflecting responders’ intrinsic resistance to unfairness. In the second treatment, proposers are informed, allowing for dynamic effects over eight rounds of play. The higher rejection rates can be attributed to responders’ provision of a public good: Punishment creates a group reputation for being ‘‘tough’’ and effectively ‘‘educate’’ proposers. Since rejection rates with informed proposers drop to the level of the treatment with non-informed proposers, the hypothesis of responder’s enjoyment of overt punishment is not supported.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {Alex}, timestamp = {2006.06.22} } @TECHREPORT{AbVoWe:03, author = {Abdellaoui, M. and Vossman, Frank and Weber, Martin}, title = {Choice based Elicitation and Decomposition of Decision Weights for Gainsand Losses under Uncertainty}, institution = {Centre for Economic Policy Research}, year = {2003}, type = {CEPR Discussion Paper}, number = {3756}, abstract = {This Paper reports the results of an experimental parameter-free elicitationand decomposition of decision weights under uncertainty. Assuming cumulativeprospect theory, utility functions were elicited for gains and losses atan individual level using the trade-off method. Then decision weights wereelicited using certainty equivalents of uncertain two-outcome prospects.Furthermore, decision weights were decomposed using observable choice insteadof invoking other empirical primitives as in the previous experimentalstudies. The choice-based elicitation of decision weights allows for aquantitative study of their characteristics, and also allows, among otherthings, to confront the sign-dependence hypothesis with observed choiceunder uncertainty. Our results confirm concavity of the utility functionin the gain domain and bounded sub-additivity of decision weights as wellas choicebased subjective probabilities. We also find evidence of sign-dependenceof decision weights.}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Abel:85, author = {Abel, A.}, title = {Precautionary saving and accidental bequests}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1985}, volume = {75}, pages = {777-791}, key = {wealth}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.01.15} } @TECHREPORT{AbBeWh:03, author = {Abel, Jaison R. and Berndt, Ernst R. and White, Alan G.}, title = {Price Indexes for Microsoft's Personal Computer Software Products}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2003}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {9966}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, abstract = {Using a unique and comprehensive data source, we measure price changes for{M}icrosoft's desktop personal computer software products during the timeperiod July 1993 through June 2001. This paper contributes to a relativelysmall literature on price measurement of pre-packaged software by incorporatingimportant channels of distribution, such as volume licensing and OriginalEquipment Manufacturer, as well as changes in product form, such as upgradesand integrated productivity suites, into matched-model price indexes. Althoughthere are differences over time periods and across products, we find thatthe prices of Microsoft's desktop operating systems and applications havegenerally been falling over this time period.}, key = {micro} } @INCOLLECTION{AbSBa:70, author = {Abel-Smith, B. and Bagley, C.}, title = {The problem of establishing equivalent standards of living for families of different composition}, booktitle = {The Concept of Poverty}, publisher = {Heinemann}, year = {1970}, editor = {Townsend, P.}, address = {London}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{AbSTo:65, title = {The Poor and the Poorest}, publisher = {Bell}, year = {1965}, author = {Abel-Smith, B. and Townsend, P.}, address = {London}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{AbCh:02, author = {Abouda, M. and Chateauneuf, A.}, title = {Characterization of Symmetrical Monotone Risk Aversion in the {RDEU} Model}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2002}, volume = {44}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{AbCh:99, author = {Abouda, M. and Chateauneuf, A.}, title = {Positivity of bid--ask spreads and symmetrical monotone risk aversion}, journal = {Cahiers de la M.S.E}, year = {1999}, volume = {86}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{AbCa:89, author = {Abowd, J. and Card, D.}, title = {On the covariance structure of earnings and hours changes}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1989}, volume = {57}, pages = {411-445}, number = {2}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{AbCa:87, author = {Abowd, J. and Card, D.}, title = {Intertemporal labor supply and long-term employment contracts}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1987}, volume = {77}, pages = {50-68}, key = {labour} } @INCOLLECTION{AbKr:98, author = {Abowd, J. M. and Kramarz, F.}, title = {Internal and External Labor Markets: An Analysis of Matched LongitudinalEmployer-Employee Data}, booktitle = {Labor Statistics Measurement Issues}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Haltiwanger, J. and Manser, M. E. and Topel, R.}, pages = {357-370}, address = {Chicago 60637}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{AbKrMa:99, author = {John M. Abowd and Francis Kramarz and David N. Margolis}, title = {High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {251-333}, number = {2}, key = {wages} } @INCOLLECTION{AbSpSt:98, author = {Abraham, K. G. and Spletzer, J. R. and Stewart, J. C.}, title = {Divergent Trends in Alternative Wage Series}, booktitle = {Labor Statistics Measurement Issues}, publisher = {The Chicago University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Haltiwanger, J. E. and Manser, M. E. and Topel, R.}, pages = {293-324}, address = {Chicago 60637}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Abra:08, author = {Abramitzky, R.}, title = {The Limits of Equality: Insights from the Israeli Kibbutz}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {123}, pages = {1111-1159}, number = {3}, month = {August}, abstract = {What limits the capacity of society to redistribute?What determines the structure of compensation in organizations striving for income equality? This paper addresses these questions by investigating the economic and sociological forces underlying the persistence of the Israeli kibbutzim, communities based on the principle of income equality. To do this, I exploit newly assembled data on kibbutzim and a financial crisis in the late 1980s that affected them differentially. Themain findings are that (1) productive individuals are themost likely to exit and a kibbutz’s wealth serves as a lock-in device that increases the value of staying; (2) higher wealth reduces exit and supports a high degree of income equality; and (3) ideology facilitates income equality. Using a simple model, I show that these findings are consistent with a view of the kibbutz as providing optimal insurance when members have the option of leaving. More generally, these findings contribute to an understanding of how mobility limits redistribution, and to an understanding of the determinants of the sharing rule in other types of organizations, such as professional partnerships, cooperatives, and labor-managed firms.}, key = {equality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.05} } @ARTICLE{AbSeYa:00, author = {Abrams, Eric and Sefton, Martin and Yavas, Abdullah}, title = {An experimental comparison of two search models}, journal = {Economic Theory}, year = {2000}, volume = {16}, pages = {735--749}, number = {3}, abstract = {Summary. We report an experiment designed to investigate markets with consumer search costs. In markets where buyers are matched with one seller at a time, sellers are predicted to sell at prices equal to buyers' valuations. However, we find sellers post prices that offer a more equal division of the surplus, and these prices tend to be accepted, while prices closer to the equilibrium prediction are rejected. At the other extreme, sellers are predicted to sell at a price equal to marginal cost when buyers are matched with two sellers at a time. Here, we find prices are closer to, but still significantly different from, the equilibrium prediction. Thus, our results support theoretical comparative static, but not point, predictions.}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.11.14} } @ARTICLE{AbBr:03, author = {Abreu, Dilip and Brunnermeier, Markus K.}, title = {Bubbles and Crashes}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2003}, volume = {71}, pages = {173--204}, number = {1}, abstract = {We present a model in which an asset bubble can persist despite the presence of rational arbitrageurs. The resilience of the bubble stems from the inability of arbitrageurs to temporarily coordinate their selling strategies. This synchronization problem together with the individual incentive to time the market results in the persistence of bubbles over a substantial period. Since the derived trading equilibrium is unique, our model rationalizes the existence of bubbles in a strong sense. The model also provides a natural setting in which news events, by enabling synchronization, can have a disproportionate impact relative to their intrinsic informational content.}, copyright = {Copyright © 2003 The Econometric Society}, issn = {00129682}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Jan., 2003}, publisher = {The Econometric Society} } @ARTICLE{AbGe:06, author = {Abul Naga, R.H. and Geoffard,P.Y.}, title = {Decomposition of bivariate inequality indices by attributes}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {362-367}, abstract = {We provide, for the class of relative bidimensional inequality indices, a decomposition of inequality into two univariate Atkinson–Kolm–Sen indices and a third statistic which depends on the joint distribution of resources.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{AbulN:04, author = {Abul Naga, Ramses H.}, title = {Quantity constraints, poverty lines and poverty}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2004}, volume = {2}, pages = {31-43}, abstract = {By limiting the scope for substitution between commodities, other thingsequal quantity constraints raise the cost of living. Thus, rationed familieshave higher povery lines than unconstrained ones. This heterogeneity inboth resources and poverty lines means that, in principle, bivariate dominanceresults are required to order distributions in terms of poverty.}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{AbulN:94, author = {Abul Naga, Ramses H.}, title = {Identifying the poor: a multiple-indicator approach}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1994}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {9}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Acem:06AS, author = {Acemoglu, Daron}, title = {A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {108}, pages = {515 - 546}, abstract = {This paper develops a simple model of economic and political institutions that lead to poor aggregate economic performance. In the model economy, groups with political power, the elite, choose policies to increase their income and to directly or indirectly transfer resources from the rest of society to themselves. The resulting equilibrium is generally inefficient because of three distinct mechanisms: (1) revenue extraction, (2) factor price manipulation and (3) political consolidation. In particular, the elite may pursue inefficient policies to extract revenue from other groups. They may do so to reduce the demand for factors coming from other groups in the economy, thus indirectly benefiting from changes in factor prices. Finally, they may try to impoverish other groups competing for political power. The elite’s preferences over inefficient policies translate into inefficient economic institutions. The notable exception to this general picture emerges when long-term investments are important, thus creating a commitment (holdup) problem, whereby equilibrium taxes and regulations are worse than the elite would like them to be from an ex ante point of view. In this case, economic institutions that provide additional security of property rights to other groups can be useful.}, key = {political economy}, keywords = {Political economy, institutions, commitment, holdup, social conflict, economic development, taxation, property rights, regulation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{Acem:02, author = {Acemoglu, D.}, title = {Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2002}, volume = {40}, pages = {7-72}, key = {income distribution} } @TECHREPORT{AcGoTs:08, author = {Acemoglu, D. and Golosov, M. and Tsyvinski, A.}, title = {Dynamic {M}irrlees taxation under political economy constraints}, institution = {Massachusetts Institute of Technology}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {08-08}, address = {Room E52-251 50 Memorial Drive Cambridge, MA 02142}, month = {February}, abstract = {We study the structure of nonlinear incentive-compatible taxes, in a dynamic economy subject to political economy and commitment problems. In contrast to existing analyses of dynamic and/or nonlinear taxation problems, we relax the assumptions that taxes are set by a benevolent government and that there is commitment to policies. Instead, in our model economy taxes are set by a self- interested politician, without any commitment power. This politician is partly controlled by the citizens via elections. The resulting environment is one of a dynamic mechanism design without commitment. We focus on the best sustainable mechanism, which is the mechanism that maximizes the ex ante utility of the citizens. Towards a full characterization of the allocations implied by the best sustainable mechanism, we ?rst prove that a version of the revelation principle applies in our environment and that attention can be restricted to direct truth-telling mechanisms. Using this result, we prove that the provision of incentives to politicians can be separated from the provision of incentives to, and from redistribution, across individuals. This also enables us to develop a method of characterizing the best sustainable mechanism as a solution to a standard dynamic mechanism design problem subject to additional political economy and commitment constraints formulated only as functions of aggregate variables. Using this formulation, we provide conditions under which distortions created by political economy and commitment problems persist or disappear in the long run. In particular, if politicians are as patient as (or more patient than) the citizens, these distortions disappear asymptotically, and they remain positive otherwise. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where the government cares both about its own consumption and the future utility of the citizens. This extension generalizes our results to environments where the key constraint is the time-inconsistency of a (partially) benevolent government.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.18} } @ARTICLE{Acemoglu1999, author = {Acemoglu, D. and Pischke, J.-S.}, title = {Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F112-F142}, key = {education,training}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AcPi:99, author = {Acemoglu, D. and Pischke, J.-S.}, title = {Beyond {B}ecker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F112-F142}, key = {education,training} } @TECHREPORT{Acha:85, author = {Acharya, S. N.}, title = {Aspects of The Black Economy in {I}ndia: Report of a Study by the {NationalInstitute of Public Finance and Policy}}, institution = {Ministry of Finance, Government of India}, year = {1985}, address = {New Delhi}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{AcMaRi:07, author = {Ackert,L.F. and Martinez-Vazquez,J. and Rider,M.}, title = {Social Preferences and Tax Policy Design: Some Experimental Evidence}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, year = {2007}, volume = {45}, pages = {487-501}, abstract = {This article reports the results of a set of experiments designed to examine whether a taste for fairness affects people’s preferred tax structure. Using the Fehr and Schmidt model, we devise a simple test for the presence of social preferences in voting for alternative tax structures. The experimental results show that individuals demonstrate concern for their own payoff and inequality aversion in choosing between alternative tax structures. However, concern for redistribution decreases as the deadweight loss from progressive taxation increases. Our findings have important implications for tax policy design.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Aczel2000, author = {Aczel, J. and Gilanyi, A. and Maksa, G. and Marley, A. J. A.}, title = {Consistent Aggregation of Simply Scalable Families of Choice Probabilities}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2000}, volume = {39,3}, pages = {241-263}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Acze:87, title = {A Short Course on Functional Equations:Based upon recent applications tothe social and behavioural sciences}, publisher = {D. Reidel}, year = {1987}, author = {Acz{\'e}l, J.}, address = {Dordrecht}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{Acze:87SI, author = {Acz{\'e}l, J.}, title = {Scale-invariant equal sacrifice in taxation and conditional functional equations}, journal = {Aequationes Mathematicae}, year = {1987}, volume = {32}, pages = {336-349}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Acz'el1966, title = {Lectures on Functional Equations and their Applications, Mathematics in Science and Engineering}, publisher = {Academic Press}, year = {1966}, author = {Acz{\'e}l, J.}, number = {9}, address = {New York}, key = {maths}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Acze:66, title = {Lectures on Functional Equations and their Applications}, publisher = {Academic Press}, year = {1966}, author = {Acz{\'e}l, J.}, number = {9}, series = {Mathematics in Science and Engineering}, address = {New York}, abstract = {Betty & Gordon Moore Library: QA431 .A39 1966 UL: South Front, Floor 4: 349:4.c.95.111}, key = {mathematics} } @BOOK{AcDa:75, title = {On Measures of Information and Their Characterizations}, publisher = {Academic Press}, year = {1975}, author = {Acz{\'e}l, J. and Dar{\'o}czy, Z.}, address = {New York}, comment = {Betty & Gordon Moore Library Q370.A26.1975}, key = {information}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.01.05} } @INBOOK{AcDa:75-1, chapter = {3: The Fundamental Equation of Information}, pages = {71-102}, title = {On Measures of Information and Their Characterizations}, publisher = {Academic Press, New York}, year = {1975}, author = {Acz{\'e}l, J. and Dar{\'o}czy, Z.}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @INBOOK{AcDa:75-4, chapter = {4: Further Characterizations of Shannon Entropy}, pages = {103-133}, title = {On Measures of Information and Their Characterizations}, publisher = {Academic Press, New York}, year = {1975}, author = {Acz{\'e}l, J. and Dar{\'o}czy, Z.}, key = {information}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @BOOK{AcDh:89, title = {Functional Equations in Several Variables}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1989}, author = {Acz{\'e}l, J. and Dhombres, J. G.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{AcGiMaMa:00, author = {Acz{\'e}l, J.. and Gilanyi, A. and Maksa, G. and Marley, A. J. A.}, title = {Consistent Aggregation of Simply Scalable Families of Choice Probabilities}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2000}, volume = {39,3}, pages = {241-263}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Adac:99, author = {Adachi, M. A.}, title = {On the Choice of Pricing Policies: Ex Ante Commitment and Prisoners' Dilemma}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {1647-1663}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{AdGi:85TE, author = {Adam, M. C. and Ginsburgh, V.}, title = {The Effects of Irregular Markets on Macroeconomic Policy}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1985}, volume = {29}, pages = {15-33}, key = {macro} } @TECHREPORT{AdBr:06, author = {Adam, S. and Browne, J.}, title = {Options for a {UK} 'flat tax': Some simple simulations}, institution = {The Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {2006}, type = {IFS Briefing Note}, number = {72}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.02.07} } @ARTICLE{Adam:97, author = {Adam-M{\"u}ller, A. F. A.}, title = {Export hedging decisions under revenue and exchange rate risk: A note}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1997}, pages = {1421-1426}, key = {monetary} } @ARTICLE{Adam:76, author = {Adams, K.}, title = {Pareto's Answer to Inflation}, journal = {New Scientist}, year = {1976}, volume = {71}, pages = {534-537}, key = {Distributions} } @ARTICLE{Adams1976, author = {Adams, K.}, title = {Pareto's Answer to Inflation}, journal = {New Scientist`}, year = {1976}, volume = {71}, pages = {534-537}, key = {Distributions}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{HBAI:08, title = {Households Below Average Income: An analysis of the income distribution 1994/95-2006/07}, publisher = {Department for Work and Pensions}, year = {2008}, author = {Adams, N. and Johnson, G. and Matejic, P. Murray, C. and Toufexis, N. and Whatley, J.}, address = {London}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.30}, url = {http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/hbai/hbai2007/pdf_files/full_hbai08.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{AdHe:95, author = {Adams, R. and He, J.}, title = {Sources of income inequality and poverty in rural {P}akistan}, institution = {International food policy research institute}, year = {1995}, number = {102}, address = {Washington}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Addo:76, author = {Addo, H.}, title = {Trends in international value-inequality 1969-1970: an empirical study}, journal = {Journal of Peace Research}, year = {1976}, volume = {13}, pages = {13-34}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{AdLe:84, author = {Adelman, I. and Levy, A.}, title = {Decomposing {T}heil's index of income inequality into between and within components}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1984}, volume = {30}, pages = {119 - 121}, number = {30}, note = {Reply :volume 32, 1986,107-108}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{AdPo:07, author = {Adler,M.D. and Posner,E.A.}, title = {Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis}, institution = {UPenn}, year = {2007}, type = {Research paper}, number = {07-15}, abstract = {A growing body of research on happiness or subjective well-being shows, among other things, that people adapt to many injuries more rapidly than is commonly thought, fail to predict the degree of adaptation and hence overestimate the impact of those injuries on their well-being, and, similarly, enjoy small or moderate rather than significant changes in well-being in response to significant changes in income. Some researchers believe that these findings pose a challenge to cost-benefit analysis, and argue that project evaluation decision-procedures based on economic premises should be replaced with procedures that directly maximize subjective well-being. This view turns out to be wrong or, at best, premature. Cost-benefit analysis remains a viable decision-procedure. However, some of the findings in the happiness literature can be used to generate valuations for cost-benefit analysis where current approaches have proven inadequate.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{AdPs:07, author = {Adler, Matthew and Posner, Eric}, title = {Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis}, institution = {University of Chicago, Olin Law and Economics Program}, year = {2007}, abstract = {A growing body of research on happiness or subjective well-being shows, among other things, that people adapt to many injuries more rapidly than is commonly thought, fail to predict the degree of adaptation and hence overestimate the impact of those injuries on their well-being, and, similarly, enjoy small or moderate rather than significant changes in well-being in response to significant changes in income. Some researchers believe that these findings pose a challenge to cost-benefit analysis, and argue that project evaluation decision-procedures based on economic premises should be replaced with procedures that directly maximize subjective well-being. This view turns out to be wrong or, at best, premature. Cost-benefit analysis remains a viable decisionprocedure. However, some of the findings in the happiness literature can be used to generate valuations for cost-benefit analysis where current approaches have proven inadequate.}, key = {happiness}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @BOOK{AdPo:06, title = {New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis}, publisher = {Harvard Univeristy Press}, year = {2006}, author = {Adler, M. D. and Posner, E. A.}, pages = {256}, month = {October}, note = {ISBN 0-674-02279-3}, abstract = {This book provides a systematic account of CBA as a welfarist decision procedure. We reject the traditional defense of CBA in terms of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and argue instead that CBA is a workable proxy for overall well-being. We also modify the preference-based account of well-being to which CBA is traditionally linked, and argue that preferences need to be self-interested and fully-informed to produce welfare. This view has many implications for the actual practice of CBA. Chapter 1 summarizes and rejects traditional defenses of CBA. Chapter 2 provides the foundations for a new defense. It argues that that preferences must be idealized and self-interested to produce welfare; that interpersonal welfare comparisons are possible; and that overall well-being is morally relevant, if not morally decisive. Chapters 3 and 4 compare CBA with alternative administrative decision-procedures - such as intuitive balancing, safety-maximizing procedures, "feasibility" analysis, and others - and argue that CBA is the welfare-maximizing procedure, given decision costs, accuracy, and the political realities of the administrative state. Chapter 5 discusses possible modifications in the practice of CBA that flow from our account, such as the "laundering" of preferences, the rejection of environmental "existence values," and the use of distributional weights. Chapter 6 responds to standard objections to CBA, involving its insensitivity to rights and distribution; incommensurability; the discounting of future benefits and costs; the WTP/WTA disparity; and the valuation of human life. In considering these objections, it is important to understand that CBA is not itself a bedrock moral criterion, nor a superprocedure, but simply a practicable tool to implement one part of the moral bedrock - overall well-being.}, key = {cost benefit analysis}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @ARTICLE{AdPe:91, author = {Admati, A. and Perry, M.}, title = {Joint Projects Without Commitment}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1991}, volume = {58}, pages = {259-276}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{AdBo:01, author = {Adsera, A. and Boix, C.}, title = {Must We Choose? European Unemployment, American Inequality and the Impactof Education and Labor Market Institutions}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2001}, volume = {16}, pages = {611-638}, key = {Labour} } @ARTICLE{Adsera2001, author = {Adsera, A. and Boix, C.}, title = {Must We Choose? European Unemployment, American Inequality and the Impact of Education and Labor Market Institutions}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2001}, volume = {(16) 4}, pages = {611-638}, key = {Labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AfGa:07, author = {Afonso, Antonio and Gaspar, Vitor}, title = {Dupuit, Pigou and cost of inefficiency in public services provision}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {2007}, volume = {132}, pages = {485 - 502}, abstract = {In this paper we revisit the literature on the economic implications of inefficiency in public services provision. Most authors emphasize the need of changing public sector management practices and the scope of activities carried out by general government. Following Dupuit (1844) and Pigou (1947) we focus instead on the increase in the cost of public services’ provision, when indirect costs, associated with the excess burden of taxation, are taken into account. We rely on Hicks’ compensating variation (following Diamond and McFadden (1974) and Auerbach (1985)), and some public sector inefficiency coefficients from Afonso et al. (2005; 2006) to show that these magnification mechanisms are not only conceptually relevant, they are also important from a quantitative point of view.}, key = {Public Goods}, keywords = {Government efficiency, Excess burden, Taxes, Spending}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @BOOK{Afri:87, title = {Logic of choice and economic theory}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1987}, author = {Afriat, S. N.}, address = {Oxford}, comment = {Location: UL: South Wing, Floor 5 Classmark: 200.c.98.1534}, key = {consumption} } @BOOK{Afri:80, title = {Demand functions and the Slutsky matrix}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1980}, author = {Afriat, S. N.}, number = {7}, series = {Princeton studies in mathematical economics}, address = {Princeton, N.J.}, comment = {Location: Betty & Gordon Moore Library HB801 .A33 1980}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{Agel:99, author = {Agell, J.}, title = {On the Benefits from Rigid Labour Markets: Norms, Market Failures, and SocialInsurance}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F143-F164}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Agell1999, author = {Agell, J.}, title = {On the Benefits from Rigid Labour Markets: Norms, Market Failures, and Social Insurance}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F143-F164}, key = {social security}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{AgEnSo:98, title = {Incentives and redistribution in the welfare state: The {S}wedish tax reform}, publisher = {MacMillan Press Ltd}, year = {1998}, author = {Agell, Jonas and Englund, Peter and Sodersten, Jan}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{AgLo:97, author = {Agell, Jonas and Lommerud, Kjell Erik}, title = {Minimum wages and the incentives for skill formation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {25-40}, number = {1}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{AgPe:00, author = {Agell, J. and Persson, M.}, title = {Tax Arbitrage and Labor Supply}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {78,1-2}, pages = {3-24}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Aghevli1981, author = {Aghevli, B. B. and Mehran, F.}, title = {Optimal grouping of income distribution data}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1981}, volume = {76}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AgMe:81, author = {Aghevli, B. B. and Mehran, F.}, title = {Optimal grouping of income distribution data}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1981}, volume = {76}, pages = {22-26}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2287035} } @BOOK{AgBa:05, title = {Volatility and Growth}, publisher = {OUP}, year = {2005}, author = {Aghion, P. and Banerjee, A.}, pages = {148}, series = {Claredon Lectures in Economics}, key = {growth}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.03.22} } @ARTICLE{AgBo:97, author = {Aghion, Philippe and Bolton, Patrick}, title = {A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {151-172}, number = {2}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @ARTICLE{AgCaGa:99, author = {Aghion, P. and Caroli, E. and Garcia-Penalosa, C.}, title = {Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspectives of the New Growth Theories}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1999}, volume = {37}, pages = {1615-60}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{Aghion1999, author = {Aghion, Philippe and Caroli, Eve and Garcia-Penalosa, Cecilia}, title = {Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1999}, volume = {37}, pages = {1615-1660}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{AgWi:98, title = {Growth, Inequality and Globalization: Theory, History and Policy}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Aghion, P. and Williamson, J. G.}, address = {Cambridge}, note = {Raffaele Mattioli Lectures}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Agul:99, author = {Agulnik, P.}, title = {The Proposed State Second Pension}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {409-422}, key = {pensions} } @INCOLLECTION{Ahlu:74, author = {Ahluwalia, M. S.}, title = {Income inequality: Some dimensions of the problem}, booktitle = {Redistribution with Growth}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1974}, editor = {Chenery, H. et al.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{AhRiUg:99, author = {Ahn, N. and {de la Rica}, S. and Ugidos, A.}, title = {Willinness to move for work and unemployment duration in {S}pain}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {335-359}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Ahsa:74PA, author = {Ahsan, S. M.}, title = {Progression and risk-taking}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1974}, volume = {26}, pages = {318-328}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{AiMW:98, author = {Aiginger, Karl and Mueller, Dennis C. and Weiss, Christoph}, title = {Objectives, topics and methods in industrial organization during the nineties:results from a survey}, journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {16}, pages = {799-830}, number = {6}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{AiGo:70, author = {Aigner, D. J. and Goldberger, A. S.}, title = {Estimation of {P}areto's Law from Grouped Observations}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1970}, volume = {65}, pages = {712-723}, key = {Distributions} } @ARTICLE{AiHe:67, author = {Aigner, D. J. and Heins, A. J.}, title = {A social welfare view of the measurement of income equality}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1967}, volume = {13}, pages = {12-25}, number = {3}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Ains:08ZA, author = {Ainsworth, R. T.}, title = {Zappers and phantom-ware: A global demand for tax fraud technology}, institution = {Boston University School of Law}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {08-20}, abstract = {There is a demand-market for technology that facilitates tax fraud. By all accounts the providers in this market are working in a growth industry. In the short term this is bad news for those concerned with tax policy and information privacy. In the long term however, the fight against technology-assisted fraud is stimulating the development of a more robust technology base within tax administrations, and this is good news for those who believe that a sophisticated technological infrastructure is needed to resolve difficult questions of tax design. This paper focuses on two technology-accelerants of SME tax fraud - zappers and phantom-ware. Zappers and phantom-ware are programs that are added-on (zappers) or factory installed (phantom-ware) to modern ECRs or point-of-sale (POS) systems. Some programs (zappers) have no legitimate purpose other than to facilitate cash skimming at the point-of-sale. Others programs (phantom-ware) may have legitimate (non-fraud) purposes, although these purposes are somewhat obscure (remote from normal business uses). Phantom-ware programs are frequently hidden (in the sense of not being disclosed in user manuals), making their use and even their existence difficult to detect on audit. With training a fraudster can skim cash receipts with phantom-ware as effectively as with a zapper. The range of technology-regulation being considered by governments in response to these frauds stretches from the development of a centralized data-base to collect and retain all records of all retail sales in a jurisdiction; to mandatory government certification of each and every ECR in use in a jurisdiction; to direct encryption by the government of the raw transactional data passing through an ECR or POS system - without regard for the background system that generates it - a solution that has seen both market-segment and a whole-market permutations; to voluntary third-party encryption and third-party certification of ECRs. There are of course advocates for minimal regulation and traditional audit-enforcement, admittedly with significant enhanced technology training. The audit approach is most effective when there is authority to perform comprehensive audits - a simultaneous examination of all relevant taxes (income, consumption, and welfare levies). One of the anomalies of this research is that there are very few reported cases of phantom-ware and zappers used in American to skim cash sales. What accounts for this omission? There are two places to look for the answer: (1) relative tax rates - maybe the American tax rates are significantly different from those in the EU and Canada, and as a result there is no incentive to skim cash sales in America; or (2) enforcement efforts - maybe the American tax enforcement efforts are significantly different, and as a result we do not pick-up on all the technology-assisted fraud that is going on. This paper suggests the problem is in the American enforcement regime.}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.07.30}, url = {http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1139826} } @TECHREPORT{Ains:08ZT, author = {Ainsworth, R. T.}, title = {Zappers: tax fraud, technology and terrorist funding}, institution = {Boston University School of Law}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper Series, Law and Economics}, number = {08-07}, note = {Forthcoming ABA Tax Lawyer: State and Local Edition}, abstract = {"Zappers," or automated sales suppression devices, have brought unheard of efficiencies and economies of scale to a very simple tax fraud - skimming cash sales at point of sale (POS) terminals (electronic cash registers). Until recently the largest tax fraud case in Connecticut, also the "largest computer driven tax-evasion case in the nation," was a zapper case. Stew Leonard's Dairy in Norwalk Connecticut skimmed $17 million in receipts and hid the cash in St. Martin (a Caribbean island). Talal Chahine and his wife, Elfat El Aouar, owners of the La Shish restaurant chain in Detroit Michigan have the dubious honor of replacing Stew Leonard as the leading U.S. zapper fraud case. They zapped $20 million in cash sales and sent the funds to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Zapper frauds (like electronic cash registers) are not confined to the U.S. Zappers are also a significant problem in Canada, Brazil, Australia, and many countries in the EU. When the U.S. and foreign experiences are considered comparatively, it is not the similarity in the fraud-mechanism (the zapper) that is the most striking - it is the difference in the enforcement mechanism that catches one's attention. In both Canada and Brazil zappers were identified through consumption (not income) tax investigations, and this difference should suggest to U.S. policy-makers that important enforcement opportunities lay within a strengthened State-Federal audit exchange at the retail sales tax level. This paper makes this income tax/retail sales tax connection, and extends it by opening up for consideration the enforcement opportunities that are available through certified tax software solutions under the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA). An extension of the SSUTA is proposed through the adoption of German Working Group on Cash Register's proposal to use encryption and smart cards in ECRs and POS systems. A certified service provider (CSP) under the SSUTA (as extended) with current levels of technology, could easily be employed not only to assure the States that the correct retail sales tax was being collected and remitted, but also assure the federal government that cash sales were not being skimmed by zappers.}, key = {tax administration}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13}, url = {http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095266} } @TECHREPORT{Ains:06BC, author = {Ainsworth, R. T.}, title = {Biometrics, certified software solutions, and the Japanese consumption tax: a proposal for the tax commission}, institution = {Boston University School of Law}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {06-45}, abstract = {Significant change is anticipated in the Japanese Consumption Tax. The Japanese Tax Commission is recommending that the rate should double, multiple rates should be employed, and the ?bookkeeping method? of accounting should be abandoned in favor of the European ?invoice method.? The Tax Commission faces a tax policy dilemma. The aging population drives the need for a tax increase (making the Consumption Tax an obvious target for revenue enhancement) at exactly the same time the population is shrinking in overall size, thereby reducing the number of working-consumers who can pay the higher tax. These are dramatic changes for the Japanese Consumption Tax. While revenue needs drive the primary change (the rate increase), it is the inherent regressivity of the tax that drives the second (the adoption of multiple rates). The third change (the use of an invoice method of accounting) is an inevitable consequence of multiple rates. Thus, aside from the rate increase itself it is the structural regressivity of this tax on consumption that is the driver of the most significant of the proposed structural changes. Can this inherent characteristic be changed? This paper proposes a way out of this dilemma. It proposes the adoption of certified transaction tax software at the point of (final) sale, and the distribution (for voluntary use by the needy) of IDs embedded with (a) digitally recognized biometric identifiers and (b) digital tax exemption certificates. Rates could then rise without excessively burdening the poor, elderly and handicapped. The Australian use of a software registry, and the Brazilian experiments in e-invoicing are contrasted.}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.07.30}, url = {http://ssrn.com/abstract=947485} } @TECHREPORT{Ains:06BS, author = {Ainsworth, R. T.}, title = {Biometrics: solving the regressivity of {VAT}s and {RST}s with ``smart card'' technology}, institution = {Boston University School of Law}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper Series, Law and Economics}, number = {06-20}, abstract = {Biometric identifiers embedded in national identity cards puts a formerly impossible goal of consumption taxation within the grasp of policymakers for the first time. Never before has it been possible to design a broad-based, single rate consumption tax that is truly progressive. No consumption tax has ever had all three of the critical attributes of a progressive consumption tax: a broad base, a single rate, and measured relief for those in greatest need. Although economists have urged that a broad base and a single rate be pursued over progressivity, most consumption taxes instead seek progressivity at the expense of both base and rate considerations. The reason is entirely political. The essential problem (under the current system) is that when tax relief is granted it is universal not surgical. Thus, under most consumption taxes rich and poor alike enjoy an exemption for the purchase of food for home consumption. However, with each universal exemption - tax practice compromises tax theory without achieving progressivity. Technology offers policymakers a surgical option. Three technology-intensive developments (smart national IDs; fully digital consumption tax regimes; certified tax calculation software) make a new breed of consumption tax possible. It is a simple matter of embedding exemption certificates in smart IDs equipped with biometric identifiers, and then processing sales transactions through certified tax calculation software. Not only is the technology to do this is available today but all critical pieces have been part of successful pilot projects. The time for the progressive consumption tax has arrived.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.04}, url = {http://ssrn.com/abstract=922691} } @TECHREPORT{Ains:06DC, author = {Ainsworth, R. T.}, title = {Digital Consumption Tax}, institution = {Boston University School of Law}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper Series, Law and Economics}, number = {06-26}, abstract = {Modern technology is dramatically changing the way consumption taxes are collected, but it is also changing the way policymakers assess the operation and impact of these taxes. Whether the design is a standard credit-invoice value added tax (VAT) of European design, or a retail sales tax (RST) of American design, or the credit subtraction VAT without invoices type of consumption tax (CT) of Japanese design, technology is having a profound impact. Government certified transaction software is in place in the United States. The Streamlined Sales Tax offers taxpayers in 18 states the option of having their retail sales tax determined in a manner that not only assures accuracy, but which carries with it audit immunity. The software is provided at no cost to the taxpayer in instances where the taxpayer volunteers to collect the tax on out-of-state sales. Similar software certification regimes are under consideration in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that would be global in scope and handle the whole range of VAT transaction for a multinational enterprise. Discussions have commenced in various forums with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United States Aid for International Development (USAID) on applications of this technology in developing country contexts. Certification of transaction tax determinations and audit immunity are attributes of immense interest to multinational enterprises that are increasingly under pressure from securities and corporate governance regulations to assure accurate financial statements and operational cash flow figures. This pressure is global in scope, as indicated by: Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S.; the Loi de Securite Financiere in France; the Companies Act of 2004 in the U.K.; the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (part 9) (CLERP 9) in Australia; the Kouninkaikeishihou no ichibu wo kaisei suru houritsu 2004-4-1 (An Act to Amend Part of the Certified Public Accounting Law) in Japan; and the recent modifications to the E.U.'s Eighth Corporate Directive (84/253/EEC). But technology offers more than a linear application of digital processes to formerly paper based and manual systems. When certified transaction tax technology is merged with "smart" card technology in IDs that possess digitized biometric identity information an opportunity opens for hyper transformation of the consumption tax. It is entirely within the grasp of policymakers today to design a broad-based, single rate consumption tax that is truly and independently progressive. In many respects, this is the Holy Grail of consumption tax theory. Technology offers it to us today. This text begins and ends with a tax reform. It starts with a proposal to the President's (George W. Bush's) Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, and ends with a proposal for the consideration of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's Tax Commission. Neither tax reform commission appears at the moment to be considering technological solutions, although both are critically interested in consumption taxes. In the U.S. case both of the identified structural barriers to a federal level VAT (federal-state coordination and regressivity) can be answered technologically. In the Japanese case a wholesale transformation of the CT is under consideration; one that would move the Japanese CT to an invoice system with multiple rates and a standard rate of 10 percent or higher. The structural departure that this proposal makes from the traditional Japanese CT need not be taken if technological solutions are applied, although the "double digit" rate increase seems to be a given for revenue reasons.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13}, url = {http://ssrn.com/abstract=928397} } @ARTICLE{Ai-SaLo:00, author = {Ait-Sahalia, Y. and Lo, A. W.}, title = {Nonparametric Risk Management and Implied Risk Aversion}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2000}, volume = {94}, pages = {9-51}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Ait-Sahalia2000, author = {Ait-Sahalia, Y. and Lo, A. W.}, title = {Nonparametric Risk Management and Implied Risk Aversion}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2000}, volume = {94,1-2}, pages = {9-51}, key = {risk}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{AiBr:57, title = {The Lognormal Distribution}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1957}, author = {Aitchison, J. and Brown, J. A. C.}, address = {London}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{AiBr:54, author = {Aitchison, J. and Brown, J. A. C.}, title = {On the criteria for descriptions of income distribution}, journal = {Metroeconomica}, year = {1954}, volume = {6}, pages = {88-107}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Aitchison1954, author = {Aitchison, J. and Brown, J. A. C.}, title = {On the criteria for descriptions of income distribution}, journal = {Metroeconomica}, year = {1954}, volume = {6}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{AiBo:80AG, title = {A General Taxpayer Opinion Survey}, year = {1980}, author = {Aitken, S. and Bonneville, E.}, address = {Washington D. C.}, institution = {CSR Inc.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Aiya:95, author = {Aiyagari, S. R.}, title = {Optimal Capital Income Taxation with Incomplete Markets, Borrowing ConstraintsandConstant Discounting}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1995}, volume = {103}, pages = {1158-1175}, key = {Optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{Aiyagari1995, author = {Aiyagari, S. R.}, title = {Optimal Capital Income Taxation with Incomplete Markets, Borrowing Constraintsand Constant Discounting}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1995}, volume = {103}, pages = {1158-1175}, key = {Optimal taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Ajzen1991, author = {Ajzen, I.}, title = {{The} theory of planned behavior}, journal = {Organizational behavior and human decision}, year = {1991}, volume = {50}, pages = {179-211}, key = {behavioural}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Ajzen1980, title = {{Understanding} attitudes and predicting social behavior}, publisher = {Prentice Hall}, year = {1980}, author = {Ajzen, I. and Fishbein, M.}, address = {Englewood-Cliffs}, key = {behavioural}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Akerelof1991, author = {Akerelof, G. A.}, title = {Procrastination and Obedience}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1991}, volume = {81}, pages = {1-19}, key = {crime}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Aker:84, author = {Akerlof,G.}, title = {Gift Exchange and Efficiency-Wage Theory: Four Views}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1984}, volume = {74}, pages = {79-83}, abstract = {The four paradigms to which I refer are those of dual labor markets, thetheory of bureaucracy, the theory of work groups, and equity theory.}, key = {labour market} } @ARTICLE{Aker:82, author = {Akerlof,G.}, title = {Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1982}, volume = {97}, pages = {543-569}, abstract = {This paper explains involuntary unemployment in terms of the response offirms to workers' group behavior. Workers' effort depends upon the normsdetermining a fair day's work. In order to affect those norms, firms maypay more than the market-clearing wage. Industries that pay consistentlymore than the market-clearing wage are primary, and those that pay onlythe market-clearing wage are secondary. Thus, this paper also gives a theoryfor division of labor markets between primary and secondary.}, key = {labour market} } @ARTICLE{Aker:78TE, author = {Akerlof, G.}, title = {The economics of ``tagging'' as applied to the optimal income tax, welfare programs, and manpower training}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1978}, volume = {68}, pages = {8-19}, key = {information}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.11} } @ARTICLE{Aker:98, author = {Akerlof, G. A.}, title = {Men without children}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1998}, volume = {108}, pages = {287-309}, number = {447}, key = {population economics} } @ARTICLE{Aker:91, author = {Akerlof, G. A.}, title = {Procrastination and Obedience}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1991}, volume = {81}, pages = {1-19}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Aker:70, author = {Akerlof, G. A.}, title = {The Market for ``Lemons'', Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1970}, volume = {84}, pages = {488-500}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{Akha:96, author = {Akhand, H. A.}, title = {Effective Federal Individual Income Tax Functions: A Specification Search}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1996}, pages = {19-25}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{AlMaAlKh:00, author = {Al-Mahrubi, F. A.. and Al-Khoudh, O.}, title = {Corruption and Inflation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {66}, pages = {199-202}, key = {corruption} } @ARTICLE{NaSm:00, author = {Al-Najjar, N. I. and Smorodinsky, R.}, title = {Provision of a Public Good with Bounded Cost}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, pages = {297-301}, key = {Public Goods} } @ARTICLE{AlArAsBa:99, author = {Albaek, Karsten and Arai, Mahmood and Asplund, Rita and Barth, Erling andMadsen, Erik Strojer}, title = {Measuring Wage effects of plant size}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {5}, pages = {425-448}, number = {4}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{AlAl:83, author = {Alcaide, A. and Alcaide, J.}, title = {Distribuci{\'o}n Personal de la Renta {E}spa{\~n}ola en 1980}, journal = {Hacienda P{\'u}blica Espa{\~n}ola}, year = {1983}, volume = {85}, pages = {485-509}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Alcaide1983, author = {Alcaide, A. and Alcaide, J.}, title = {Distribuci\'on Personal de la Renta {E}spa\~nola en 1980}, journal = {Hacienda P\'ublica Espa\~nola}, year = {1983}, volume = {85}, pages = {485-509}, key = {INCOME DISTRIBUTION:EMPIRICAL}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{AlPCRM:97, author = {Alcalde, Jose and P{\'e}rez-Castrillo, David and Romero-Medina, Antonio}, title = {Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations}, institution = {Institut Valencia D'Investigacions Economiques}, year = {1997}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {WP-AD 97-10}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Alch:84, author = {Alchian, T. M.}, title = {A new measure of tax progressivity}, journal = {Public finance}, year = {1984}, volume = {39}, pages = {1-9}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{AlSa:78, author = {Alden, J. and Saha, S.}, title = {Analysis of second jobholding in the EEC}, journal = {Regional Studies}, year = {1978}, volume = {12}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{AlDiTMacC:04, author = {Alesina, A. and Di Tella, R. and MacCulloch, R.}, title = {Inequality and happiness: are {E}uropeans and {A}mericans different?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {2009-2042}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{AlFe:05, author = {Alesina,A. and Ferrara,E.}, title = {Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {897-931}, abstract = {This paper explores how individual preferences for redistribution dependon future income prospects. In addition to estimating the impact of individuals’socioeconomic background and of their subjective perceptions of futuremobility, we employ panel data to construct 'objective' measures of expectedgains and losses from redistribution for different categories of individuals.We find that such measures have considerable explanatory power and performbetter than 'general mobility' indexes. We also find that preferences forredistribution respond to individual beliefs on what determines one’s positionin the social ladder. Ceteris paribus, people who believe that the Americansociety offers ’equal opportunities are more averse to redistribution.}, key = {Redistribution} } @BOOK{AlGl:04, title = {Fighting Poverty in the {US} and {E}urope}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2004}, author = {Alesina, A. and Glaeser, E. L.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{AlIcKa:07, author = {Alesina, Alberto and Ichino, Andrea and Karabarbounis, Loukas}, title = {Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores}, institution = {Harvard institute of Economic Research}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2145}, abstract = {Gender Based Taxation (GBT) satisfies Ramsey’s optimal criterion by taxing less the more elastic labor supply of (married) women. This holds when different elasticities between men and women are taken as exogenous and primitive. But in this paper we also explore differences in gender elasticities which emerge endogenously in a model in which spouses bargain over the allocation of home duties. GBT changes spouses’ implicit bargaining power and induces a more balanced allocation of house work and working opportunities between males and females. Because of decreasing returns to specialization in home and market work, social welfare improves by taxing conditional on gender. When income sharing within the family is substantial, both spouses may gain from GBT.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Optimal Taxation, Economics of Gender, Family Economics, Elasticity of Labor Supply.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{AlLaF:02, author = {Alesina, A. and {La F}errara, E.}, title = {Who Trusts Others?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {85}, pages = {207-234}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{AlDa:87CA, title = {Consequences and Perspectives: Different Economic Systems}, publisher = {Gower}, year = {1987}, author = {Alessandrini, S. and Dallago, B.}, address = {Aldershot}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{AlLu:97, author = {Alessie, R. and Lusardi, A.}, title = {Saving and {I}ncome {S}moothing: {E}vidence from panel data}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1997}, volume = {41}, pages = {1251-1279}, number = {7}, month = {July}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{AlLu:99, author = {Alessie, R. and Lusardi, A. and Kapetyn, A.}, title = {Saving After Retirement: Evidence from Three Different Surveys}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {277-310}, key = {pensions} } @TECHREPORT{AlFe:87, author = {Alexander, C. and Feinstein, J. S.}, title = {A Microeconometric Analysis of Income Tax Evasion}, institution = {Massachusetts Institute of Technology}, year = {1987}, type = {Mimeo}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{AlCo:99, author = {Alexander, Cindy R. and Cohen, Mark A.}, title = {Why Do Corporations Become Criminals? Ownership, Hidden Actions, and Crimeas an Agency Cost}, journal = {Journal of Corporate Finance}, year = {1999}, volume = {5}, pages = {1-34}, number = {1}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{AlSo:06, author = {Alexander, J. and Sobel, M.}, title = {Risk Neutrality and Ordered Vector Spaces}, journal = {Risk Management}, year = {2006}, volume = {06}, pages = {1-10}, abstract = {The following result clarifies when preferences over time and under risk correspond to discounting and are not risk neutral. If a binary relation  on a real vector space V satisfies four axioms, then there is a utility function U = f  u : V ! R where u: V ! R is linear as a map of vector spaces and f : R ! R is continuous and weakly monotone. Three axioms are familiar: weak ordering, continuity, and non-triviality. The fourth axiom is X ? Y  () 0 (where 0 is the zero element in V ) implies X  () Y (X, Y 2 V ). The function f : R ! R is linear if and only if  also satisfies the converse of the fourth axiom. When V is a real vector space of stochastic processes and 0 is the zero process, it is known that the four axioms imply the existence of discount factors and the linearity of an intra-period utility function. So preferences correspond to discounting and are not risk neutral only if the converse of the fourth axiom is not satisfied.}, key = {risk}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{Alexeev2001, author = {Alexeev, M. and Leitzel, J.}, title = {Income Distribution and Price Controls: Targeting a Social Safety Net During Economic Transition}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {9}, pages = {1647-1663}, key = {social security}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AlLe:01, author = {Alexeev, M. and Leitzel, J.}, title = {Income Distribution and Price Controls: Targeting a Social Safety Net DuringEconomic Transition}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {9}, pages = {1647-1663}, key = {social security} } @TECHREPORT{AlChKa:08, author = {Alfaro, L. and Charlton, A. and Kanczuk, F.}, title = {Firm-{S}ize {D}istribution and {C}ross-{C}ountry {I}ncome {D}ifferences}, institution = {Harvard Business School}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {07-086}, month = {May}, abstract = {We investigate, using firm level data for 79 developed and developing countries, whether differences in the allocation of resources across heterogeneous plants are a significant determinant of cross-country differences in income per worker. For this purpose, we use a standard version of the neoclassical growth model augmented to incorporate monopolistic competition among heterogeneous firms. For our preferred calibration, the model explains 58% of the log variance of income per worker. This figure should be compared to the 42% success rate of the usual model.}, key = {distributions}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.17} } @TECHREPORT{AlChKa:07, author = {Alfaro, Laura and Charlton, Andrew and Kanczuk, Fabio}, title = {Firm-Size Distribution and Cross-Country Income Differences}, institution = {Harvard Business School}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {07-086}, abstract = {We investigate, using a unique firm level dataset of nearly 20 million firms in 80 countries, whether differences in the allocation of resources across heterogeneous plants are a significant determinant of cross-country differences in income per worker. Using a monopolistic competitive firm framework to derive our benchmark calibration, we find that the model over-explains income variance. We further explore whether the results are driven by sample biases, calibration assumptions, or modeling choice. We find the same results prevail even in sub-samples in which the data are more reliable, and when we vary the calibration assumptions. This suggests the need for more complex modeling structures. Despite these acknowledged shortcomings, our results suggest that misallocation of resources is a crucial determinant of income dispersion.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {heterogeneous plants, productivity, policy distortions}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{Ali:76, author = {Ali, A. A. G.}, title = {Landowners' behavior under self-assessment: theoretical treatment}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1976}, volume = {3}, pages = {171-179}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{AlBrPoWe:99, author = {Aliprantis, C. D. and Brown, D. J. and Polyrakis, I. A. and Werner, J.}, title = {Portfolio Dominance and Optimality in Infinite Security Markets}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {30}, pages = {347-366}, number = {3}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{Alke:65, title = {Mathematics and Politics}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1965}, author = {Alker, H. R.}, address = {New York}, key = {politics} } @INCOLLECTION{Alke:70, author = {Alker, H. R. Jr.}, title = {Measuring inequality}, booktitle = {The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems}, publisher = {Addison-Wesley}, year = {1970}, editor = {Tufte, E. R.}, address = {Reading, Massachusetts}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{AlRu:64, author = {Alker, H. R. Jr. and Russet, B.}, title = {On measuring inequality}, journal = {Behavioral Science}, year = {1964}, volume = {9}, pages = {207-218}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Alla:53, author = {Allais, M.}, title = {Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulatset axiomes de l'{\'e}cole am{\'e}ricaine}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1953}, volume = {21}, pages = {503-546}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Allais1953, author = {Allais, M.}, title = {Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axiomes de l'\'ecole am\'ericaine}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1953}, volume = {21}, pages = {503-546}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{AlHa:79, title = {The expected Utility Hypothesis and the {A}llais Paradox}, publisher = {D. Reidel}, year = {1979}, author = {Allais, M. and Hagen, O.}, address = {Dordrecht}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{Alle:49, title = {Statistics for Economists}, publisher = {Hutchinson}, year = {1949}, author = {Allen, R. G. D.}, address = {London}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Alle:36, author = {Allen, R. G. D.}, title = {Professor {S}lutsky's theory of consumer choice}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1936}, volume = {3}, pages = {120-129}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{AlSa:72, author = {Allingham, M. and Sandmo, A.}, title = {Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1972}, volume = {1}, pages = {323-338}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Alli:72, author = {Allingham, M. G.}, title = {The measurement of inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1972}, volume = {5}, pages = {163-169}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Alli:82, author = {Allison, P. D.}, title = {Discrete-time methods for the analysis of event histories}, booktitle = {Sociological Methodology 1982}, publisher = {Jossey-Bass}, year = {1982}, editor = {Leinhardt, S.}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Alli:81, author = {Allison, P. D.}, title = {Inequality measures for nominal data}, journal = {American Sociological Review}, year = {1981}, volume = {46}, pages = {371-372}, note = {Reply to {K}rishnan}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095071} } @ARTICLE{Alli:78, author = {Allison, P. D.}, title = {Measures of Inequality}, journal = {American Sociological Review}, year = {1978}, volume = {43}, pages = {865-880}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Allison1978, author = {Allison, P. D.}, title = {Measures of inequality}, journal = {American Sociological Review}, year = {1978}, volume = {43}, pages = {865- 880}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Allisson1981, author = {Allisson, P. D.}, title = {Inequality measures for nominal data (reply to Krishnan)}, journal = {American Sociological Review}, year = {1981}, volume = {46}, pages = {371-372}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Alm:99, author = {Alm, J.}, title = {Tax compliance and administration}, booktitle = {Handbook on Taxation}, publisher = {Marcel Dekker}, year = {1999}, editor = {Hildreth, W. B. and Richerdson, J. A.}, pages = {741-768}, address = {New York}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Alm1988, author = {Alm, J.}, title = {Uncertain tax policies, individual behavior, and welfare}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1988}, volume = {78}, pages = {237-245}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Alm:88, author = {Alm, J.}, title = {Compliance costs and the tax avoidance-tax evasion decision}, journal = {Public Finance Quarterly}, year = {1988}, volume = {16}, pages = {31-66}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Alm:88UT, author = {Alm, J.}, title = {Uncertain tax policies, individual behavior and welfare}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1988}, volume = {78}, pages = {237-245}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Alm:85TW, author = {Alm, J.}, title = {The welfare cost of the underground economy}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, year = {1985}, pages = {243-263}, note = {April}, key = {underground} } @TECHREPORT{AlBa:85, author = {Alm, J. and Bahl, R.}, title = {An evaluation of the structure of the {J}amaican personal income tax}, institution = {Jamaica Tax Study Examination Project}, year = {1985}, type = {Metropolitan Studies Program, Staff Paper}, number = {15}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Alm1985, author = {Alm, J. and Bahl, R.}, title = {An evaluation of the structure of the {J}amaican personal income tax}, year = {1985}, type = {Jamaica Tax Study Examination Project, Metropolitan Studies Program, Staff Paper}, number = {15}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AlBaMu:90, author = {Alm, J. and Bahl, R. and Murray, M. N.}, title = {Understanding Taxpaying Behavior: A Conceptual Framework with Implicationsfor Research}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1990}, volume = {72}, pages = {603-613}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Alm1990a, author = {Alm, J. and Bahl, R. and Murray, M. N.}, title = {Understanding Taxpaying Behavior: A Conceptual Framework with Implications for Research}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1990}, volume = {72}, pages = {603-613}, key = {Tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AlCrMcK:93, author = {Alm, J. and Cronshaw, M. B. and McKee, M.}, title = {Tax compliance with endogenous audit selection rules}, journal = {Kyklos}, year = {1993}, volume = {46}, pages = {27-45}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.19} } @TECHREPORT{AlMc:06, author = {Alm, J. and McKee, M.}, title = {Audit Certainty, Audit Productivity and Taxpayer Compliance}, institution = {Andrew Young School of Policy Studies}, year = {2006}, type = {Reseach Paper}, number = {06-43}, address = {Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Georgia State University P.O. Box 3992 Atlanta, GA 30302-3992}, month = {March}, abstract = {Strategies for dealing with evasion include such standard policies as stricter enforcement (e.g., increased audit rates, more extensive audits, larger penalties). However, the exact responses of taxpayers to these enforcement measures are quite difficult to measure with existing field data, and so are not known precisely. In this paper we use experimental methods to examine how individuals respond in their compliance decisions to a “certain” probability of audit and to information concerning the “productivity” of an audit. Our design informs some individuals that their return will be audited with certainty prior to making their compliance decision, while other individuals receive information that they will not be audited; we also inform individuals of the productivity of the audit by stating how much unreported income will be discovered via the audit. We find that the announcement of audits increases the compliance rate of those who are told that they will be audited. However, the compliance rate of those who know that they will not be audited falls, and the net effect is that overall compliance falls.}, key = {productivity}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{AlMc:04, author = {Alm,J. and Mckee,M.}, title = {Tax compliance as a coordination game}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, year = {2004}, volume = {54}, pages = {297-312}, abstract = {This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate compliance behaviorwhen returns are selected for audit based upon the deviation of each individual’stax report from the average report of all other taxpayers. Our experimentalresults indicate that individuals find it difficult to coordinate on thezero-compliance equilibrium. However, pre-game communication that mimicsinformation-sharing provided by tax guides provides a mechanism that allowssuch coordination. Nevertheless, the tax authority is able to overcomethis taxpayer coordination by a subtle change is its audit rule, a changethat targets the audits in a different way without increasing the numberof audits.}, key = {Tax compliance - firms} } @ARTICLE{AlMcBe:90, author = {Alm, J. and McKee, W. and Beck, W.}, title = {Amazing grace: Tax amnesties and tax compliance}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1990}, volume = {43}, pages = {23-37}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{AlJaMcK:92, author = {Alm, J. and Jackson B. R. and McKee, M.}, title = {Estimating the determinants of taxpayer compliance with experimental data}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1992}, volume = {45}, pages = {107-114}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{AlWh:99, author = {Alm, J. and Whittington, L. A.}, title = {For Love or Money? The Impact of Income Taxes on Marriage}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {297-316}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{AlCaRa:07, author = {Alonso-Carrera,J. and Caballe,J. and Raurich,X.}, title = {Aspirations, Habit Formation, and Bequest Motive}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2007}, volume = {117}, pages = {813-836}, abstract = {We consider an economy where individuals use their standard of living based on past consumption in order to evaluate the utility arising from current consumption. We analyse how this process of preference formation affects the bequest motive. We show that habits (based on one’s own past consumption) reduce the willingness of individuals to leave bequests, while aspirations (based on the standard of living of parents) make the existence of positive bequests easier. The long-run effects of both habits and aspirations on capital stock and on the amount of bequests depend on whether or not the bequest motive is operative.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{AlCaRa:08, author = {Alonso-{C}arrera, J. and Caball{\'e}, J. and Raurich, X.}, title = {Estate taxes, consumption externalities, and altruism}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {1751-1764}, number = {7}, abstract = {We study how the introduction of consumption externalities affects the optimality of the dynamic equilibrium in an economy displaying dynastic altruism. When the bequest motive is inoperative consumption externalities affect the intertemporal margin between young and old consumption and thus modify the intertemporal path of aggregate consumption and capital. The optimal tax policy that solves this intertemporal suboptimality consists of a tax on capital income and a pay-as-you-go social security system. The latter solves the excess of capital accumulation due to the inoperativeness of the bequest motive and the former solves the suboptimal allocation of consumption due to consumption externalities. When the bequest motive is operative consumption externalities only cause an intratemporal misallocation of consumption but do not affect the optimality of the capital stock level. This suboptimal allocation of consumption implies in turn that the path of bequest deviates also from optimality. The optimal tax policy in this case consists of an estate tax and a capital income tax.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.18} } @TECHREPORT{Alst:06, author = {Alstott, A. L.}, title = {Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation}, institution = {Yale Law School}, year = {2006}, type = {Research Paper}, number = {117}, month = {November}, abstract = {Equality of opportunity is understood to be one of the bedrock principles supporting the taxation of inheritance. The idea is that inherited wealth offers an unjustified head start for some individuals at the expense of others. In political theory, this principle is closely identified with the branch of liberalism known as resource equality. But the resource equality ideal has not been fully translated into the legal literature. The classics of the legal literature use the term “equal opportunity” quite generally and often blend equal opportunity with goals that are quite distinct, like wealth equalization. This Essay revisits the topic of inheritance taxation to see whether a single-minded focus on equality of opportunity, interpreted as resource equality, can shed new light on questions of legal design. I conclude that the present estate tax and major proposals for inheritance taxation only weakly track the equal opportunity principle. A system of inheritance aimed at equality of opportunity would look radically different than current law or the classic proposals for reform, in at least four dimensions. First, the equal-opportunity principle suggests that inheritance taxation should be combined with a social inheritance, meaning a government expenditure program that would pay a universal, public inheritance. Second, in an equal-opportunity regime, gifts and inheritance received from close relatives should be taxed, while those received from peers, spouses, friends, and strangers should be exempt. This counterintuitive rule would reverse the standard result, which is to tax inheritance from parents, children, and other close relatives at the same rates or at lower rates. Third, the equal opportunity view implies that there should be no penalty on socalled “generation-skipping transfers,” which occur when a grandparent leaves her wealth to her grandchildren rather than to her children. Fourth and finally, equal opportunity suggests that gifts and bequests received by younger individuals should be taxed at higher rates than those received by older individuals.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{AlAuKoSmWa:01, author = {Altig, D. and Auerbach, A. J. and Kotlikoff, L. J. and Smetters, K. A. and Walliser, J.}, title = {Simulating Fundamental Tax Reform in the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {91}, pages = {574-595}, key = {tax reform}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{AlCuZe:98, author = {Altman, D. and Cutler, D. and Zeckhauser, R.}, title = {Adverse Selection and Adverse Retention}, journal = {American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Tenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association)}, year = {1998}, volume = {88}, pages = {122-126}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @TECHREPORT{Alto:91, author = {Altonji, J. G.}, title = {The demand for and return to education when education outcomes are uncertain}, institution = {NBER}, year = {1991}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {3714}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {labour} } @TECHREPORT{Altonji1991a, author = {Altonji, J. G.}, title = {The demand for and return to education when education outcomes are uncertain}, year = {1991}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {3714}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{AlDu:91, author = {Altonji, J. G. and Dunn}, title = {Relationships among the family incomes and labor market outcomes of relatives}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {1991}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {3724}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {labour} } @TECHREPORT{Altonji1991, author = {Altonji, J. G. and Dunn}, title = {Relationships among the family incomes and labor market outcomes of relatives}, year = {1991}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {3724}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AlHaKo:97, author = {Altonji, Joseph G. and Hayashi, Fumio and Kotlikoff, Laurence J.}, title = {Parental Altruism and inter vivos transfers: theory and evidence}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1997}, volume = {105}, pages = {1121-1166}, number = {6}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{AlHaKo:92, author = {Altonji, J. G. and Hayashi, F. and Kotlikoff, L. J.}, title = {Is the extended family altruistically linked? Direct tests using micro data}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1992}, volume = {82}, pages = {1177-1198}, key = {population economics} } @TECHREPORT{AlSe:94, author = {Altonji, J. G. and Segal, L.}, title = {Small sample bias in {GMM} estimation of covariance structures}, institution = {NBER}, year = {1994}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {156}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{AlSi:87, author = {Altonji, J. G. and Siow, A.}, title = {Testing the Response of Consumption to Income Changes with (Noisy) Panel Data.}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1987}, volume = {102}, pages = {293-328}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{AlMi:98, author = {Altug, Sumru and Miller, Robert A.}, title = {The effect of work experience on female wages and labour supply}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {45-85}, key = {labour} } @TECHREPORT{AlSa:06, author = {Alvaredo, Facundo and Saez, Emmanuel}, title = {Income and Wealth Concentration in Spain in a Historical and Fiscal Perspective}, institution = {CEPR}, year = {2006}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {5836}, abstract = {This paper presents series on top shares of income and wealth in Spain over the 20th century using personal income and wealth tax return statistics, as well as employment income statistics. Top income shares are highest in the 1930s in spite of substantial individual income tax evasion biasing down our estimates. This suggests that income inequality was much higher in the precivil war period than it is today. Employment income concentration was moderate in the 1960s and 1970s and dropped sharply from 1975 to 1977 during the transition to democracy. Top income shares have increased significantly since the mid-1990s due to an increase in wage income concentration and a surge in realized capital gains. Financial wealth concentration has also increased in the 1990s but real estate prices have increased sharply as well. As real estate wealth is less concentrated than financial wealth, on net, top wealth shares have declined slightly during the period 1982-2002. The wealth tax exemption of stocks for owners-managers since 1994 has gradually eroded by almost 40% the taxable wealth at the top, creating a very serious loophole in the wealth tax as well as large efficiency costs.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Income and wealth inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @TECHREPORT{AlKo:05, author = {Alvarez, L. and Koskela, E.}, title = {Progressive Taxation and Irreversible Investment under Uncertainty}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2005}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1377}, address = {Luis H. R. Alvarez Department of Economics Quantitative Methods in Management Turku School of Economics and Business Administration 20500 Turku Finland luis.alvarez@tukkk.fi Erkki Koskela Department of Economics University of Helsinki P.O. Box 17 00014 Helsinki Finland erkki.koskela@helsinki.fi}, month = {January}, abstract = {We analyze the impact of progressive taxation on irreversible investment under uncertainty. We show that if tax exemption is lower than sunk cost, higher tax rate will decelerate optimal investment by increasing the optimal investment threshold, while if tax exemption exceeds sunk cost, three different regimes arise. For "small" volatilities the optimal investment threshold is a positive function of volatility, but independent of tax rate. For "medium" volatilities it is independent of both tax rate and volatility. Finally, for "high" volatilities the optimal investment threshold depends positively on volatility, but negatively on tax rate so that we have "tax paradox".}, key = {taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @BOOK{Amem:85, title = {Advanced Econometrics}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1985}, author = {Amemiya, T.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Amem:78, author = {Amemiya, T.}, title = {A Note on a Random Coefficient Model}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1978}, volume = {19}, pages = {793-796}, key = {econometrics} } @INCOLLECTION{Amie:99, author = {Amiel, Y.}, title = {The Subjective Approach to the Measurement of Income Inequality}, booktitle = {Handbook on Income Inequality Measurement}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1999}, editor = {Silber, J.}, address = {Dewenter}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Amie:96, author = {Amiel, Y.}, title = {The Subjective Approach to the Measurement of Income Inequality}, institution = {STICERD, LSE}, year = {1996}, type = {mimeo}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Amie:91, author = {Amiel, Y.}, title = {On the transfer principle in measuring income inequality}, institution = {Ruppin Institute}, year = {1991}, type = {Mimeo}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Amie:81, author = {Amiel, Y.}, title = {Some Remarks on Income Inequality, the {G}ini index and {P}aretian socialwelfare functions}, institution = {Foerder Institute for Economic Research}, year = {1981}, number = {17-81}, address = {Tel Aviv University, Israel}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{AmCo:02AT, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Attitudes towards Risk and Inequality: A Questionnaire-Experimental Approach}, booktitle = {Experimental Economics: Financial Markets, Auctions, and Decision Making}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {2002}, editor = {Andersson, F. and Holm, H. J.}, chapter = {9}, pages = {85-115}, address = {Dewenter}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{AmCo:94II, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Income Inequality and Social Welfare}, booktitle = {Taxation, Poverty and Income Distribution}, publisher = {Edward Elgar}, year = {1994}, editor = {Creedy, J}, pages = {193-219}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{AmCo:94IC, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Inequality Changes and income Growth}, booktitle = {Models and measurement of welfare and inequality}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, pages = {3-26}, address = {Berlin, Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{AmCo:98PP, author = {Amiel, Y. And Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Poverty Perceptions and the poverty Line}, booktitle = {Distribution of Welfare and Household Production:an International Perspective}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Jenkins, S. P. and Kapteyn, A. And Van Praag, B.}, pages = {179-193}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{AmCo:99IT, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Income transformations and income inequality}, booktitle = {Advances in Econometrics, Income Distribution and Scientific Methodology}, publisher = {Physica Verlag}, year = {1999}, editor = {Slottje, D.}, pages = {209-232}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{AmCo:07SW, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Social Welfare and Individual Preferences under Uncertainty: A Questionnaire-Experimental Approach}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {2007}, volume = {14}, pages = {345-362}, key = {Welfare} } @ARTICLE{AmCo:03IW, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Inequality, welfare and monotonicity}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {2003}, volume = {9}, pages = {35-46}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Amiel2002, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Inequality, welfare and monotonicity}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {2002}, volume = {9}, pages = {35-46}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{AmCo:01AT, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Attitudes to Risk and Inequality: A New Twist on the Transfer Principle}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {2001}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {56}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{AmCo:01RA, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Risk and Inequality Perceptions}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {2001}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {55}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{AmCo:99TA, title = {Thinking about Inequality}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1999}, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{AmCo:98DO, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Distributional orderings and the transfer principle: a re-examination}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, pages = {195-215}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{AmCo:98RP, author = {Amiel, Yoram and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Risk Perceptions and Distributional Judgments}, institution = {London School of Economics}, year = {1998}, type = {Conference Draft}, address = {UK}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{AmCo:97IT, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Income transformations and income inequality}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1997}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {24}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{AmCo:97IW, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Inequality, Welfare and Monotonicity}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1997}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {29}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{AmCo:97TM, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {The measurement of poverty: an experimental questionnaire investigation}, journal = {Empirical Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {22}, pages = {571-588}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{AmCo:96DO, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Distributional orderings and the transfer principle: A Re-examination}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1996}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {14}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{AmCo:95TM, author = {Amiel, Y. And Cowell, F. A.}, title = {The measurement of poverty: an experimental questionnaire investigation}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1995}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {5}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{AmCo:94MD, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Monotonicity, dominance and the {P}areto principle}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1994}, volume = {45}, pages = {447-450}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{AmCo:92, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Measurement of Income Inequality: Experimental test by Questionnaire}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1992}, volume = {47}, pages = {3-26}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{AmCoDaPo:08, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A. and Davidovitz, L. and Polovin, A.}, title = {Preference reversals and the analysis of income distributions}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2008}, volume = {30}, pages = {305-330}, abstract = {It is knownfrom the literature on uncertainty that in cases where individuals express a preference for a high win-probability bet over a bet with high winnings they neverthelesswill bidmore to obtain the bet with high winnings.We investigatewhether a similar phenomenon applies in the parallel social-choice situation. Here decisions are to be made between a distribution with a large group of high-income people and a distribution with a small group of very high-income people. Results from a number of experimental designs are analysed.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.24}, url = {http://www.swetswise.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/FullTextProxy/swproxy?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.springerlink.com%2Fopenurl.asp%3Fgenre%3Darticle%26id%3Ddoi%3A10.1007%2Fs00355-007-0234-3&ts=1222251906424&cs=1875405341&userName=0100048.ipdirect&emCondId=100048&articleID=35408221&yevoID=2179019&titleID=187417&referer=1&remoteAddr=158.143.192.135&hostType=PRO} } @ARTICLE{AmCoGa:09, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A. and Gaertner, W.}, title = {To Be or not To Be Involved: A Questionnaire-Experimental View on {H}arsanyi's Utilitarian Ethics}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2009}, pages = {forthcoming}, abstract = {According to standard theory founded on Harsanyi (J Polit Econ 61:434– 435, 1953; 63:309–321, 1955) a social welfare function can be appropriately based on the individual’s approach to choice under uncertainty. We investigate how people really do rank distributions in terms of welfare. According to Harsanyi, the evaluation can be done from the standpoint of an uninvolved external judge, a public official, for example, or by a person who knows that she holds one of the positions in society, with an equal chance for any of the available positions. Are these two structures to be viewed differently? We use a questionnaire experiment to focus on the two different interpretations of the Harsanyi approach. There are important, systematic differences that transcend the cultural background of respondents.}, doi = {10.1007/s00355-008-0324-x}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, key = {welfare}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.08}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/n5616x738v221302/fulltext.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{AmCoGa:06, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A. and Gaertner, W.}, title = {To Be or not To Be Involved: A Questionnaire-Experimental View on {H}arsanyi's Utilitarian Ethics}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {2006}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {85}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{AmCoPo:01, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A. and Polovin, A.}, title = {Risk Perceptions, Income Transformations and Inequality}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {45}, pages = {964-976}, key = {risk} } @TECHREPORT{AmCoPo:00, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A. and Polovin, A.}, title = {Risk Perceptions, Income Transformations and Inequality}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {2000}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{AmCoPo:96, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F. A. and Polovin, A.}, title = {Inequality amongst the Kibbutzim}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1996}, volume = {63}, pages = {S63-S85}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{AmCoSl:04, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F.A. and Slottje, D.J.}, title = {Why Do People Violate the Transfer Principle? Evidence from EducationalSample Surveys}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {2004}, volume = {11}, pages = {1-16}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Amiel2004, author = {Amiel, Y. and Cowell, F.A. and Slottje, D.J.}, title = {Why Do People Violate the Transfer Principle? Evidence from Educational Sample Surveys}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {2004}, volume = {11}, pages = {1-16}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{AmCr:94, author = {Amiel, Y. And Creedy, J.}, title = {Measuring inequality aversion}, institution = {University of Melbourne}, year = {1994}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {400}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{AmCrHu:99, author = {Amiel, Y. and Creedy, J. and Hurn, S.}, title = {Attitudes towards inequality}, journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {101}, pages = {83-96}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{AmRaTo:03, author = {Amin, S. and Rai, A. S. and Topa, G.}, title = {Does Microcredit Reach the Poor and Vulnerable? Evidence from Northern {B}angladesh}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {70}, pages = {59-82}, abstract = {This paper evaluates whether microcredit programs such as the popular GrameenBank reach the relatively poor and vulnerable in two Bangladeshi villages.It uses a unique panel dataset with monthly consumption and income datafor 229 households before they received loans. We find that while microcreditis successful at reaching the poor, it is less successful at reaching thevulnerable. Our results also suggest that microcredit is unsuccessful atreaching the group most prone to destitution, the vulnerable poor. Ourmain contribution is to explicitly evaluate the targeting of an antipovertyintervention using the efficient risk-sharing framework in Townsend [Econometrica62 (1994) 539-591].}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Amor:99, author = {Amoros, P.}, title = {Efficiency and Income Redistribution in the Single-Peaked Preferences Modelwith Several Commodities}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {63}, pages = {341-349}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Amoros1999, author = {Amoros, P.}, title = {Efficiency and Income Redistribution in the Single-Peaked Preferences Model with Several Commodities}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {63}, pages = {341-349}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AmSc:99, author = {Amundsen, E. S. and Schob, R.}, title = {Environmental Taxes on Exhaustible Resources}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {311-329}, key = {Environment} } @ARTICLE{AnLi:07, author = {An, Din and Little, Roderick}, title = {Multiple imputation: an alternative to top coding for statistical disclosure control}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society}, year = {2007}, volume = {170}, pages = {923-940}, abstract = {Top coding of extreme values of variables like income is a common method of statistical disclosure control, but it creates problems for the data analyst. The paper proposes two alternative methods to top coding for statistical disclosure control that are based on multiple imputation.We show in simulation studies that the multiple-imputation methods provide better inferences of the publicly released data than top coding, using straightforward multiple-imputation methods of analysis, while maintaining good statistical disclosure control properties.We illustrate the methods on data from the 1995 Chinese household income project.}, key = {Multiple Imputation}, keywords = {Confidentiality, Disclosure protection, Multiple imputation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @BOOK{Anan:83, title = {Inequality and poverty in {M}alaysia}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1983}, author = {Anand, S.}, address = {London}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{AnSe:08, author = {Anand, S. and Segal, P.}, title = {What Do We Know about Global Income Inequality?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2008}, volume = {46}, pages = {57-94}, number = {1}, month = {March}, abstract = {In this paper, we review the recent literature on global interpersonal income inequality. While all estimates agree that the level is very high, with a Gini of between 0.630 and 0.686 in the 1990s, there is no consensus regarding the direction of change. We discuss methodological issues, including the use of national accounts versus survey- based estimates of mean income (or consumption) and the choice of purchasing power parity exchange rates. Findings of a rise or fall in global income inequality are not robust across different estimation methods and datasets. Given the diversity of estimates and various sources of uncertainty, including gaps and errors in the underlying data, we conclude there is insufficient evidence to determine the direction of change in global interpersonal inequality in recent decades.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.18} } @ARTICLE{AnSe:00, author = {Anand, S. and Sen, A. K.}, title = {The Income Component of the Human Development Index}, journal = {Journal of Human Development}, year = {2000}, volume = {1}, pages = {83-106}, key = {poverty}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.10.02} } @ARTICLE{AnEsRe:05, author = {Anbarci, N. and Escaleras, M. and Register, C.}, title = {Earthquake Fatalities: The Interaction of Nature and Political Economy}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {1907-1933}, abstract = {To say that the level of fatalities resulting from an earthquake is inversely related to a country’s per capita level of income is hardly novel. What makes our approach novel is that we relate fatalities to both per capita income and the level of inequality that exists within a country through their joint impact on the likelihood of collective action being taken to mitigate the destructive potential of quakes. We first develop a theoretical model which offers an explanation as to why, in some environments, different segments of society prove incapable of arriving at what all parties perceive to be an agreeable distribution of the burden of the necessary collective action, causing the relatively wealthy simply to self-insure against the disaster while leaving the relatively poor to its mercy. Following this, we test our theoretical model by evaluating 269 large earthquakes occurring worldwide, between 1960 and 2002, taking into account other factors that influence a quake’s destructiveness such as its magnitude, depth and proximity to population centers. Using a Negative Binomial estimation strategy with both random and fixed estimators, we find strong evidence of the theoretical model’s predictions. That is, while earthquakes themselves are natural phenomena beyond the reach of humankind, our collective inaction with respect to items like the creation and enforcement of building codes, failure to retrofit structures and to enact quake-sensitive zoning clearly plays a part in determining the actual toll that a given quake takes. And, it is through these and other examples of collective inaction that limited per capita income and inequality couple together with a given quake’s natural destructive power in determining the actual fatalities resulting from a quake.}, key = {political economy}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{Ande:99, author = {Anderberg, D.}, title = {Determining the Mix of Public and Private Provision of Insurance by MajorityRule}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {417-440}, key = {Social insurance} } @ARTICLE{Anderberg1999, author = {Anderberg, D.}, title = {Determining the Mix of Public and Private Provision of Insurance by Majority Rule}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {417-440}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Anderhub2001a, author = {Anderhub, V. and Giese, S. and Gueth, W. and Hoffmann, A. and Otto,T.}, title = {Tax Evasion with Earned Income - an Experimental Study}, journal = {Finanzarchiv}, year = {2001}, volume = {58}, pages = {188 - 206}, institution = {Huboldt-University Berlin}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, type = {mimeo} } @ARTICLE{AnMuSc:01, author = {Anderhub, V. and Muller, R. and Schmidt, C.}, title = {Design and Evaluation of an Economic Experiment Via The Internet}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {2001}, volume = {46,2}, pages = {227-247}, abstract = {The paper investigates whether Internet experiments are an appropriate alternativeto traditional laboratory experiments. For an economic experiment of individualdecision making results obtained over the Internet are compared to resultsobtained in the laboratory using exactly the same software. Of particularinterest are differences in individual behavior. Our main findings are:(1) running our own experiment on the Internet and in the laboratory generatedsimilar data when economic decision behavior is concerned. (2) Variancein economic decision behavior is generally higher on the Internet experiment.(3) Decision times are shorter on the Internet. (4) Internet software providesa helpful platform for implementing economic experiments. The paper alsoreports on design challenges and how we have solved them.}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{Ande:98, author = {Anderlini, Luca}, title = {Forecasting errors and bounded rationality: An example}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1998}, volume = {36}, pages = {71-90}, number = {2}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{AnFe:97, author = {Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo}, title = {Costly {C}oasian Contracts}, institution = {London School of Economics}, year = {1997}, month = {January}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{AnFe:94, author = {Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo}, title = {Incomplete written contracts: Undescribable states of nature}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1994}, pages = {1085-1124}, month = {November}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Ande:77, author = {Andersen, P.}, title = {Tax evasion and labour supply}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {79}, pages = {375-383}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{Ande:08IA, author = {Anderson, G.}, title = {Indices and tests for alienation based upon {G}ini type and distributional overlap measures}, booktitle = {Advances on Income Inequality and Concentration Measures}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2008}, editor = {Betti, G. and Lemmi, A.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @ARTICLE{Ande:08TE, author = {Anderson, Gordon}, title = {The empirical assessment of multidimensional welfare, inequality and poverty: Sample weighted multivariate generalizations of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov two sample tests for stochastic dominance}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2008}, volume = {6}, pages = {73-87}, abstract = {Sample weighted multidimensional extensions to existing stochastic dominance, inequality and polarization comparison techniques are introduced and employed to examine whether or not ignoring multidimensional and sample weighting aspects result in misleading inferences. The techniques are employed in the context of a sample of nations, in essence each country in the sample is represented by an agent characterized by the per capita GNP of that country, the GNP growth rate of that country and the average life expectancy in that country. In essence the inequality that is being examined is that between the representative agents in these countries, intra country inequality is not being measured. The results suggest that multidimensional techniques lead to substantially different conclusions from those drawn from the use of unidimensional measures and that sample weighting also has a profound effect on the empirical outcomes.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {welfare, inequality, poverty}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @TECHREPORT{Ande:94, author = {Anderson, G.}, title = {Nonparametric tests of stochastic dominance in income distributions}, institution = {University of Toronto}, year = {1994}, type = {Department of Economics and Institute for Policy Analysis Discussion Paper}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{AnGe:05, author = {Anderson, G. and Ge, Y.}, title = {The Size Distribution of Chinese Cities}, journal = {Regional Science \& Urban Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {35}, pages = {756-776}, abstract = {This paper uses urban data to investigate two important issues regarding city sizes in China, the relative growth of cities and the nature of the city size distribution. The manner in which cities of different sizes grow relative to each other is examined and, contrary to the common empirical finding that the relative size and rank of cities remains stable over time, it is found that the Economic Reforms and the One Child Policy since 1979 have delivered significant structural change in the Chinese urban system. The city size distribution remains stable before the reforms but exhibits a convergent growth pattern in the post-reform period. The theoretical literature on city sizes highlights a link between log normal and Pareto distributions for city sizes prompting the employment of Pearson goodness-of-fit tests to examine directly which theoretical distribution provides the best approximation to the empirical city size distribution. Contrary to the evidence for other countries, a log normal rather than Pareto specification turns out to be the preferred distribution.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{AnCa:99, author = {Anderson, J. E. and Carasciuc, L.}, title = {Tax Evasion in a Transition Economy: Theory and Empirical Evidence fromthe Former {S}oviet {U}nion Repiblic of {M}oldova}, institution = {Department of Economics, University of Nebraska}, year = {1999}, type = {Mimeo}, address = {Lincoln,Nebraska, USA}, comment = {JAnderson4@unl.edu}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Anderson1999, author = {Anderson, J. E. and Carasciuc, L.}, title = {Tax Evasion in a Transition Economy: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the Former {S}oviet {U}nion Repiblic of {M}oldova}, institution = {Department of Eocnomics, University of Nebraska}, year = {1999}, type = {Mimeo}, address = {Lincoln,Nebraska, USA}, comment = {JAnderson4@unl.edu}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AnRoRo:00, author = {Anderson, L. R. and Rodgers, Y. V. and Rodrigues, R. R.}, title = {Cultural Differences in Attitudes Towards Bargaining}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {69}, pages = {45-54}, key = {bargaining} } @ARTICLE{Anderson2000, author = {Anderson, P. M. and Meyer, B. D.}, title = {The Effects of the Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax on Wages, Employment, Claims and Denials}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {78,1-2}, pages = {81-106}, key = {social insurance}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AnMe:00, author = {Anderson, P. M. and Meyer, B. D.}, title = {The Effects of the Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax on Wages, Employment,Claims and Denials}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {78,1-2}, pages = {81-106}, key = {social insurance} } @BOOK{Ande:76TE, title = {The Economics of Crime}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1976}, author = {Anderson, R. W.}, address = {London}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{AnGoHo:02, author = {Simon P. Anderson and Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt}, title = {Minimum-Effort Coordination Games: Stochastic Potential and Logit Equilibrium}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {2001}, volume = {34}, pages = {177 - 199}, number = {2}, doi = {DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0800}, issn = {0899-8256}, keywords = {coordination game; logit equilibrium; stochastic potential} } @ARTICLE{AnGoHo:98, author = {Simon P. Anderson and Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A.}, title = {Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {106}, pages = {828--853}, number = {4}, abstract = {The winner-take-all nature of all-pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors, which we introduce with a logit formulation. The equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point: the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs. We prove existence, uniqueness, and symmetry properties. In contrast to the Nash equilibrium, the comparative statics of the logit equilibrium are intuitive: rent dissipation increases with the number of players and the bid cost. Overdissipation of rents is impossible under full rationality but is observed in laboratory experiments. Our model predicts this property.}, copyright = {Copyright © 1998 The University of Chicago Press}, issn = {00223808}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Aug., 1998}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press} } @ARTICLE{AnPaKr:01TE, author = {Anderson, S. P. and de Palma, A. and Kreider, B.}, title = {The Efficiency of Indirect Taxes under Imperfect Competition}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {81}, pages = {231-251}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{AnPaKr:01TI, author = {Anderson, S. P. and de Palma, A. and Kreider, B.}, title = {Tax Incidence in Differentiated Product Oligopoly}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {81}, pages = {173-192}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{AnDa:54, author = {Anderson, T.W. and Darling, D. A.}, title = {A test of goodness of fit}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1954}, volume = {49}, pages = {765-759}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.04.07} } @ARTICLE{AnDa:52, author = {Anderson, T. W. and Darling, D. A.}, title = {Asymptotic theory of certain ``goodness of fit'' criteria based on stochastic processes}, journal = {The Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1952}, volume = {23}, pages = {193-212}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.04.07} } @ARTICLE{AnGo:57, author = {Anderson, T. W. and Goodman, L. A.}, title = {Statistical Inference about {M}arkov Chains}, journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1957}, pages = {89-109}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{AnLy:99, author = {Andersson, F. and Lyttkens, C. H.}, title = {Preferences for Equity in Health Beyond the Veil of Ignorance}, journal = {Health Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {8}, pages = {369-378}, abstract = {Individual attitudes to distribution of life years between two groups ina society are explored by means of an experiment. Subjects are asked toplace themselves behind a veil of ignorance whichis specified in termsof risk for some subjects and in terns of uncertainty for some subjects}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{Andrae1872, author = {von Andrae, J. E.}, title = {{\"U}ber Die Bestimmung Des Wahrscheinlichen Fehlers Durch Die Gegebenen Differenzen Von Gleich Genauen Beobachtungen Einer Unbekannten}, journal = {Astronomische Nachrichten}, year = {1872}, volume = {72}, pages = {257-272}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{vonA:72, author = {von Andrae, J. E.}, title = {{\"U}ber die Bestimmung des wahrscheinlichen Fehlers durch die gegebenen Differenzenvon gleich genauen Beobachtungen einer Unbekannten}, journal = {Astronomische Nachrichten}, year = {1872}, volume = {72}, pages = {257-272}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Andr:07, author = {Andreoni, James}, title = {Giving gifts to groups: How altruism depends on the number of recipients}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {1731-1749}, abstract = {When a single gift goes to a group of recipients, how does giving depend on the size of the group? This question is important for understanding charitable giving and fund-raising, public goods provision, family altruism, and more. If we think of the gift as giving up a dollar to create a social surplus, then we want to know how the number of recipients of that surplus affects its value to the giver. In other words, how congestible is altruism? This paper builds a theoretical framework for this question and begins to answer it with a controlled experiment. The finding is that for most subjects altruism is congestible. For the average subject, a gift that results in one person receiving x is equivalent to one in which n people receive x /n^0.68 each.}, key = {Charitable Giving}, keywords = {Altruism, Public goods, Charitable giving, Revealed preference}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{Andr:95, author = {Andreoni, J.}, title = {Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {85}, pages = {891-904}, key = {Public Goods} } @ARTICLE{Andr:92, author = {Andreoni, James}, title = {{IRS} as loan shark: tax compliance with borrowing constraints}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1992}, volume = {49}, pages = {35-46}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Andr:91, author = {Andreoni, J.}, title = {The Desirability of a Permanent Tax Amnesty,}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {(45)2}, pages = {143-159}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Andr:91b, author = {Andreoni, James}, title = {Reasonable doubt and the optimal magnitude of fines: should the penaltyfit the crime?}, journal = {RAND Journal of Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {22}, pages = {385-395}, number = {3}, month = {Autumn}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Andreoni1991a, author = {Andreoni, James}, title = {The desirability of a permanent tax amnesty}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {45}, pages = {143-159}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Andr:90, author = {Andreoni, J.}, title = {Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1990}, volume = {100}, pages = {466-477}, key = {Public goods} } @ARTICLE{Andr:88PP, author = {Andreoni, J.}, title = {Privately Provided Public Goods: The Limits to Altruism}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1988}, volume = {35}, pages = {57-73}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Andr:88WF, author = {Andreoni, J.}, title = {Why Free-Ride? Stategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1988}, volume = {37}, pages = {291-304}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{AnBe:96, author = {Andreoni, J. and Bergstrom, T.}, title = {Do Government Subsidies Increase the Supply of Public Goods}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {1996}, volume = {88}, pages = {295-308}, key = {Public Goods} } @ARTICLE{Andreoni1996, author = {Andreoni, James and Bergstrom, Theodore C.}, title = {Do Government subsidies increase the private supply of public goods?}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {1996}, volume = {88}, pages = {295-308}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AnErFe:98, author = {Andreoni, James and Erard, Brian and Feinstein, Jonathan}, title = {Tax Compliance}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1998}, volume = {36}, pages = {818-860}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{AnMi:95, author = {Andreoni, J. and Miller, J. H.}, title = {Auctions with artifical adaptive agents}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {1995}, volume = {10}, pages = {39-64}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{AnPe:04, author = {Andreoni, James and Petrie, Ragan}, title = {Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {1605-1623}, abstract = {Laboratory researchers in economics assiduously protect the confidentialityof subjects. Why? Presumably because they fear that the social consequencesof identifying subjects and their choices would significantly alter theeconomic incentives of the game. But these may be the same social effectsthat institutions, like charitable fund-raising, are manipulating to helpovercome free riding and to promote economic efficiency. We present anexperiment that unmasks subjects in a systematic and controlled way. Weshow that, as intuition suggests, identifying subjects has significanteffects. Surprisingly, we found that two supplemental conditions meantto mimic common fund-raising practices actually had the most dramatic influenceson behavior.}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{AnMeMi:08, author = {Andreson, L. R. and Mellor, J. M. and Milyo, J.}, title = {Inequality and public good provision: {A}n experimental analysis}, journal = {Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {37}, pages = {1010-1028}, number = {3}, abstract = {Recent studies report that economic inequality is associated with reduced government expenditures on social programs. Several prominent social scientists, including Putman (Putnam, R., 2000. Bowling Alone. Simon and Schuster, New York), attribute this to the detrimental “psychosocial effects” of group heterogeneity on cooperation.We test the hypothesis that inequality within a group reduces individual contributions in a public goods experiment. Unlike previous examinations of inequality and public good provision, we introduce inequality by manipulating the levels and distributions of fixed payments given to subjects. When made salient through public information about each individual’s standing within the group, inequality reduces contributions to the public good for all group members.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {rodano}, timestamp = {2008.06.12} } @TECHREPORT{AnJeLe:07, author = {Andrews, Dan and Jencks, Christopher and Leigh, Andrew}, title = {Do Rising Top Incomes Lift All Boats?}, institution = {Harvard Business School}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, abstract = {We estimate the relationship between top income shares and economic growth for a panel of 12 developed nations observed for between 22 and 85 years. Pooling data for 1920 to 1999, we find no systematic relationship. But between 1960 and 1999 a rise in the income share of the top decile is positively and significantly related to faster economic growth in the following year. In our preferred fixed effects specification, a one percentage point increment in the top decile's share of pretax income in year t-1 is associated with an 0.12 percentage point increment in economic growth in year t. Unless the increase in the top decile's share persists, an increase in t-1 does not appreciably affect growth in subsequent years (t plus 1...t plus n). Growth is more reliably related to changes in the income share of households between the 90th and 99th percentiles than to changes in the income share of those above the 99th percentile. The relationship between top income shares and growth does not appear to be driven by changes in either educational attainment or top tax rates. As long as the top decile's share keeps rising, the estimated effect on the mean income of the bottom nine deciles is negative. However, if the top decile's share stabilizes at a higher level, the estimated effect on the mean income of the bottom nine deciles is negative for the first twelve years but positive thereafter.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Inequality, growth, income distribution, national income}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @INCOLLECTION{Andr:83, author = {Andrews, D. W. K.}, title = {Empirical process methods in econometrics}, booktitle = {Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 1}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1983}, editor = {Griliches, Z. and Intriligator, M. D.}, chapter = {37}, pages = {2248-2294}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{Andr:97, author = {Andrews, D. W. K.}, title = {A simple counterpart to the bootstrap}, institution = {Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University}, year = {1997}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {1157}, address = {New Haven, Connecticut}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{AnStSwUp:99, author = {Andrews, Martyn J. and Stewart, Mark B. and Swaffield, Joanna K. and Upward,Richard}, title = {The estimation of union wage differentials and the impact of methodologicalchoices}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {5}, pages = {449-474}, number = {4}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{AnMo:90, author = {Andvig, Jens Chr. and Moene, Karl Ove}, title = {How Corruption May Corrupt}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1990}, volume = {13}, pages = {63-76}, key = {corruption} } @ARTICLE{Ange:08, author = {Angel-Urdinola, Diego}, title = {Can a minimum wage increase have an adverse impact on inequality? Evidence from two Latin American economies}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2008}, volume = {6}, pages = {57-71}, abstract = {This paper uses a semiparametric model to analyze the impact of an increase in the real minimum wage on inequality in Colombia between 1995 and 1999 and in Paraguay between 1993 and 2000–2001. Simulations suggest that if the employment effects of the minimum wage increase are ignored, the underlying policies would contribute to reduce earnings inequality in Colombia and would be inequality neutral in Paraguay. By considering the drop in wages of those who lost their jobs, simulations suggest that in both countries the policy in question would increase earnings inequality under some assumptions about the employment elasticity of the minimum wage and the new level of earnings unemployed workers rely upon. While these findings do not mean that minimum wage increases in LDCs (Less Developed Countries) necessarily have adverse distributional affects, they suggest that minimum wage policy should be implemented with care depending on how sensitive employment is to wage increases.}, key = {Wage Inequality}, keywords = {Minimum wages, earnings inequality, distribution of wages, Latin America}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{Ange:07, author = {Angeles, L.}, title = {Income inequality and colonialism}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {51}, pages = {1155-1176}, month = {July}, abstract = {This paper proposes that colonialism is a major explanation behind today’s differences in income inequality across countries. We argue that income inequality has been higher in the colonies where the percentage of European settlers to total population was higher, as long as Europeans remained a minority. The countries where Europeans became the majority of the population did not suffer from high inequality. These initial differences continue to hold today. The empirical evidence we provide strongly supports our thesis.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{AnHePa:06, author = {Angeletos, G. and Hellwig, C. and Pavan, A.}, title = {Signalling a Global Game: Signalling and Policy Traps}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2006}, volume = {114}, pages = {452-484}, abstract = {This paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs. While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous information generated by policy interventions leads to multiple equilibria. The policy maker is thus trapped into a position where self-fulfilling expectations dictate, not only the coordination outcome, but also the optimal policy. This result does not rely on the freedom to choose out-of-equilibrium beliefs, nor on the policy being a public signal; it may obtain even if the policy is observed with idiosyncratic noise.}, key = {games}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.01} } @ARTICLE{AnBeKr:06, author = {Angrist, J. and Bettinger, E. and Kremer, M.}, title = {Long-Term Educational Consequences of Secondary School Vouchers: Evidence from Administrative Records in Colombia}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {96}, pages = {847-862}, key = {education, training}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.01} } @ARTICLE{Angr:04, author = {Angrist, Joshua D.}, title = {Treatment Effect Heterogeneity in Theory and Practice}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2004}, volume = {114}, pages = {C52-C83}, key = {econometrics} } @INCOLLECTION{AnKr:99, author = {Angrist, J. D. and Krueger, A. B.}, title = {Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics}, booktitle = {Handbook of Labor Economics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1999}, editor = {Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D.}, volume = {3A}, chapter = {23}, pages = {1347}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Angrist1992, author = {Angrist, J. D. and Krueger, A. B.}, title = {The Effect of Age at School Entry on Educational Attainment: An Application of Instrumental Variables with Moments from Two Samples}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1992}, volume = {87}, pages = {328-368}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AnKr:92, author = {Angrist, J. D. and Krueger, A. B.}, title = {The Effect of Age at School Entry on Educational Attainment: An Applicationof Instrumental Variables with Moments from Two Samples}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1992}, volume = {87}, pages = {328-368}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{AnAu:63, author = {Anscombe, F. and Aumann, R. J.}, title = {A Definition of Subjective Probability}, journal = {Annals of mathematical Statistics}, year = {1963}, volume = {34}, pages = {199-205}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Anscombe1963, author = {Anscombe, F. and Aumann, R. J.}, title = {A Definition of Subjective Probability}, journal = {Annals of Subjective Probability}, year = {1963}, volume = {34}, pages = {199-205}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ApSo:99, author = {Apel, M. and Soderstein, J.}, title = {Personal Taxation and Investment Incentives in a Small Open Economy}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {79-88}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{ApMa:, author = {Apesteguia,J. and Maier-Rigaud,F.}, title = {The Role of Rivalry Public Goods versus Common-Pool Resources}, abstract = {Despite a large theoretical and empirical literature on public goods andcommon-pool resources, a systematic comparison of these two types of socialdilemmas is lacking. In fact, there is considerable confusion about thesetwo types of dilemma situations. As a result, they are often treated alike.In this paper we argue that the degree of rivalry is the fundamental differencebetween the two games. We show that rivalry implies that both games cannotbe represented by the same game theoretic structure. Furthermore, we experimentallystudy behavior in a quadratic public good and a quadratic common-pool resourcegame with identical Pareto optimum but divergent interior Nash equilibria.The results show that participants clearly perceive the differences inrivalry. Aggregate behavior in both games starts relatively close to Paretoefficiency and converges to the respective Nash equilibrium.}, key = {Public Goods} } @TECHREPORT{ApRe:07, author = {Apps, Patricia and Rees, Ray}, title = {The Taxation of Couples}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion Paper Series}, number = {2910}, abstract = {This paper is concerned with the question of how couples should be taxed. One reason for the importance of this issue is simply that the overwhelming majority of individuals live in households formed around couples, and so it could be argued that empirically, this is the single most important problem in personal income taxation. A second reason is that the economic theory of optimal taxation and tax reform, at least as it is presented in the mainstream literature, provides little guidance on this issue, resting as it does on models of the single person household. An old insight in the earlier public finance literature is that any discussion of the taxation of two-person households necessarily involves the recognition of the importance of household production. In this paper we try to show how a simple model of household production can be used to help the analysis of optimal taxation and tax reform, and to put the "conventional wisdom", which says that it is optimal to tax women on a separate, lower tax schedule than men, on a firmer basis. What emerges clearly from the analysis is how centrally important the relationship between productivity in household production and female labour supply really is, and how little we know about it empirically.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {optimal taxation, household production, labour supply}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{ApRe:99, author = {Apps, P. and Rees, R.}, title = {On the Taxation of Trade Within and Between Households}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {241-263}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Arac:07, author = {Arachi, Giampaolo}, title = {Optimal Origin-based Commodity Taxation in a Small Open Economy}, journal = {The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis \& Policy}, year = {2007}, volume = {7}, pages = {N/A}, abstract = {This paper investigates whether the pursuit of redistributional objectives may provide a rationale for origin-based taxation in small open economies. The analysis is developed in a simple two-class economy where consumers are classified according to the type of labour they supply. As world prices are given for a small open economy, the full burden of origin-based commodity taxes falls on the two types of labour. When a non-linear tax is levied on labour income, origin-based taxes cannot directly improve income distribution as the two types of labour face different marginal tax rates. However, the government can exploit the differential incidence of these origin-based taxes and increase social welfare by relaxing the self-selection constraints that bind the non-linear tax. Rather surprisingly, the value judgements embedded in the social welfare functional do not affect the structure of optimal origin-based commodity taxation. The paper also shows that the optimal structure of origin-based commodity taxation does not change when the labour income tax schedule is constrained to be linear, and that a positive sourcebased tax on capital income may be optimal if it results in a differential burden on the two types of labour.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {capital income taxation, commodity taxation, income distribution, taxation in open economies, tax incidence}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{Arac:01, author = {Arachi, G.}, title = {Efficient Tax Competition with Factor Mobility and Trade: A Note}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2001}, volume = {8,2}, pages = {171-188}, key = {tax competition} } @ARTICLE{ArSa:07, author = {Arachi, Giampaolo and Santoro, Alessandro}, title = {Tax Enforcement for SMEs: Lessons from the Italian Experience?}, journal = {eJournal of Tax Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {5}, pages = {224-243}, abstract = {The paper aims to provide a detailed description and evaluation of the Italian experience in tax auditing and enforcement for SMEs which we believe may have some lessons for developing countries with similar sized shadow economies and large numbers of micro-enterprises. We focus on an audit strategy known as “Studi di settore”, which roughly translates as “business sector analyses”, which relies on statistical methods to select the taxpayers to be audited. We show how Studi disettore can be used as an audit rule or as a presumptive tax and we compare it with optimal audit rules and with alternative presumptive taxes on the basis of the available evidence for Italy. We discuss whether Studi di settore may be a useful policy tool for establishing presumptive taxation for SMEs in developing countries when resources for tax auditing are scarce. A presumptive regime may naturally evolve in a full-fledged audit selection mechanism following the development of the private and public sectors.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @BOOK{Arai:98, title = {The Economics of Education: An analysis of College-Going behavior}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {1998}, author = {Arai, Kazuhiro}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{ArFeLa:08, author = {Araujo, M. C. and Ferreira F. H. G. and Lanjouw, P. and {\"O}, B.}, title = {Local inequality and project choice: Theory and evidence from Ecuador}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {1022-1046}, number = {5-6}, month = {June}, abstract = {This paper provides evidence consistent with elite capture of Social Fund investment projects in Ecuador. Exploiting a unique combination of data sets on village-level income distributions, Social Fund project administration, and province-level electoral results, we test a simple model of project choice when local political power is unequally distributed. In accordance with the predictions of the model, poorer villages are more likely to receive projects that provide excludable (private) goods to the poor, such as latrines. Controlling for poverty, more unequal communities are less likely to receive such projects. Consistent with the hypothesis of elite capture, these results are sensitive to the specific measures of inequality and elite power used in the empirical analysis, and are strongest for expenditure shares at the top of the distribution.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @ARTICLE{Arma:06, author = {Armantier, O.}, title = {Do Wealth Differences Affect Fairness Considerations?}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {47}, pages = {391-429}, key = {wealth}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @ARTICLE{ArGo:00, author = {Armendariz, B. and Gollier, C.}, title = {Peer group formation in an adverse selection model}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2000}, volume = {110}, pages = {632-643}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{ArRo:99, author = {Armstrong, M. and Rochet, J.-C.}, title = {Multi-dimensional screening: A User's Guide}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {959-979}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{ArSa:06, author = {Armstrong, M. and Sappington, D.}, title = {Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2006}, volume = {44}, pages = {325-366}, abstract = {In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process. While stressing the importance of case-specific analyses, this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies.}, key = {regulation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.01} } @INCOLLECTION{Arno:08, author = {Arnold, B. C.}, title = {The {L}orenz curve: evergreen after 100 years}, booktitle = {Advances on Income Inequality and Concentration Measures}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2008}, editor = {Betti, G. and Lemmi, A.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @ARTICLE{Arno:90, author = {Arnold, B. C.}, title = {The {L}orenz Order and the Effects of Taxation Policies}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {42}, pages = {249-264}, abstract = {To any finite population of n individuals with associated incomes x1…, xn we can associate a Lorenz curve. By associating this population with a random variable X representing the income of a randomly chosen individual of the population, the concept of a Lorenz curve and the associated partial order (the Lorenz Order) based on nested Lorenz curves is readily extended to be defined in the class of all non-negative integrable random variables. In this context well known results on inequality attenuating and inequality rank preserving taxation policies are found to admit simple more general proofs. Some results on the effects of random taxation are also reviewed. The effects of applying different taxation policies within subpopulations lead one to consider questions regarding inequality attenuation results in mixture settings. It is observed that, more generally, inequality comparisons can be unambiguously made between any non-negative variables even if measured in dissimilar units.}, key = {public economics}, url = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119999735/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0} } @BOOK{Arno:87, title = {Majorization and the {L}orenz Order: A Brief Introduction}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1987}, author = {Arnold, B. C.}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Arno:83, title = {Pareto Distributions}, publisher = {International Cooperative Publishing House}, year = {1983}, author = {Arnold, B. C.}, address = {Fairland, MD}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{ArBrRoSh:87, author = {Arnold, B. C. and Brockett, P. L. and Robertson, C. A. and Shu, B. Y.}, title = {Generating orders families of {L}orenz curves by strongly unimodal distributions}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1987}, volume = {5}, pages = {305-308}, abstract = {From any strongly unimodal density on the real line, it is possible to generate a one-parameter family of Lorenz curves. The resulting families of Lorenz curves are Lorenz ordered with respect to the indexing parameter. Symmetry of the unimodal density results in the generation of sym- metric Lorenz curves. A related characterization of the normal distribution is presented.}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1391912} } @ARTICLE{Arnold1987, author = {Arnold, B. C. and Brockett, P. L. and Robertson, C. A. and Shu, B. Y.}, title = {Generating orders families of {L}orenz curves by strongly unimodal distributions}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1987}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{ArVi:85, author = {Arnold, B. C. and Villase\~nor, J. A.}, title = {Inequality-Preserving and Inequality-Attenuating Transformations}, institution = {Colegio de Postgraduados}, year = {1985}, address = {Chapingo, Mexico}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{ArVi:84, author = {Arnold, B. C. and Villase\~nor, J. A.}, title = {Some examples of fitted general quadratic {L}orenz curves}, institution = {University of California, Riverside}, year = {1984}, type = {technical report}, number = {130}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Arnold1985, author = {Arnold, B. C. and Villasenor, J. A.}, title = {Inequality-Preserving and Inequality-Attenuating Transformations}, year = {1985}, type = {Mimeo}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Arnold1984, author = {Arnold, B. C. and Villasenor, J. A.}, title = {Some examples of fitted general quadratic {L}orenz curves}, year = {1984}, type = {technical report}, number = {130}, address = {University of California, Riverside}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{ArKr:98, author = {Arnott, Richard and Kraus, Marvin}, title = {Self-financing of congestible facilities in a growing economy}, booktitle = {Topics in Public Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Pines, David and Sadka, Efraim and Zilcha, Itzhak}, chapter = {7}, pages = {161-184}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Arns:94, author = {Arnsperger, C.}, title = {Envy-Freeness and Distributive Justice}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {1994}, volume = {8}, pages = {155-186}, key = {distributions}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Arnsperger1994, author = {Arnsperger, Christian}, title = {Envy-freeness and Distributive Justice}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {1994}, volume = {8}, pages = {155-186}, number = {2}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ArLo:99PT, author = {Aronsson, Thomas and Lofgren, Karl-Gustaf}, title = {Pollution tax design and `green' national accounting}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {1457-1474}, number = {8}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{ArLo:99WE, author = {Aronsson, T. and L{\"o}fgren, K.-G.}, title = {Welfare Equivalent {NNP} Under Distributional Objectives}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {63}, pages = {239-243}, abstract = {This note concerns social accounting, when there are social objectives for the distribution of utility across consumers. The most important result is that a suboptimal distribution across agents causes the net national product to fail as a welfare measure.}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{ArHeSa:00, author = {Arrazola, M. and de Jevia, J. and Sanz, J. F.}, title = {More on Tax Perception and Labour Supply: The Spanish Case}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, pages = {15-21}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{ArMe:92, author = {Arrellano, M. and Meghir, C.}, title = {Female Labour Supply and On-The-Job Search: An Empirical Model EstimatedUsing Complementary Data Sets}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1992}, volume = {59}, pages = {537-559}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Arrellano1992, author = {Arrellano, M. and Meghir, C.}, title = {Female Labour Supply and On-The-Job Search: An Empirical Model Estimated Using Complementary Data Sets}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1992}, volume = {59}, pages = {537-559}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ArLa:01, author = {Arrondel, L. and Laferr{\`e}re, A.}, title = {Taxation and Wealth Transmission in {F}rance}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, pages = {3-33}, abstract = {This paper studies inter-vivos transfers and bequests in France and theirrelation to the French inheritance law and taxation using administrativerecords and a national households survey. Transmission behavior is highlyresponsive to changes in the fiscal system: inter-vivos gifts increasedafter a 1992 law made them partly tax-free. Moreover, the probability ofgiving to children is greater (ceteris paribus) if parents' wealth is taxable.For children, the probability of receiving a gift over the life cycle increaseswith their permanent income. The amount received increases with currentincome. It increases or bears no relation to permanent income, dependingon the specification. Thus we find no direct support for the altruisticnor for the exchange motive. These results are compatible with a modelwhere parents transfer to the best endowed child.}, key = {wealth} } @INCOLLECTION{ArMaPe:97, author = {Arrondel, L. and Masson, A. and Pestieau, P.}, title = {Bequest and inheritance: empirical issues and {F}rench-{US} comparision}, booktitle = {Is Inheritance Legitimate? Ethical and Economic Aspects of Wealth Transfers}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1997}, editor = {Erreygers, G. and Vandervelde, T.}, pages = {89-125}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {wealth} } @TECHREPORT{ArMaVe:98, author = {Arrondel, L. and Masson, A. and Verger, D.}, title = {How to measure attitude towards risk and time preference: collecting newdata}, institution = {CNRS-DELTA}, year = {1998}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {Paris}, key = {risk} } @INCOLLECTION{Arro:86, author = {Arrow, K. J.}, title = {The Economics of Agency}, booktitle = {Principals and Agents: Structure of Business}, publisher = {Harvard Business School Press}, year = {1986}, editor = {Pratt, John and Zeckhauser, Richard}, address = {Boston}, key = {micro} } @INCOLLECTION{Arro:81, author = {Arrow, K. J.}, title = {Optimal and Voluntary income distribution}, booktitle = {Economic welfare and the Economics of {S}oviet Socialism: Essays in Honorof {A}bram {B}ergson}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1981}, editor = {Rosefielde, S.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Arro:98, author = {Arrow, Kenneth J.}, title = {The external costs of voting rules: a note on {G}uttman, {B}uchanan and{T}ullock}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {14}, pages = {219-222}, number = {2}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Arro:84, title = {Social Choice and Justice: Collected Papers of {K}enneth {J}. {A}rrow}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, year = {1984}, author = {Arrow, K. J.}, volume = {1}, address = {Oxford}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Arro:78, author = {Arrow, K. J.}, title = {Nozick's entitlement theory of justice}, journal = {Philosophia}, year = {1978}, volume = {7}, pages = {265-279}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Arro:73, author = {Arrow, K. J.}, title = {Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on {R}awls' Theory of Justice}, journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1973}, volume = {70}, pages = {245-263}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Arro:73RP, author = {Arrow, K. J.}, title = {{R}awls' Principle of Just Saving}, journal = {Swedish Journal of Economics}, year = {1973}, volume = {75}, pages = {323-335}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Arro:70EI, title = {Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing}, publisher = {North-Holland}, year = {1970}, author = {Arrow, K. J.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{Arro:65SA, title = {Some Aspects of the Theory of Risk-Bearing}, publisher = {Yrj{\"o} Jahnssonin S{\"a}{\"a}ti{\"o}}, year = {1965}, author = {Arrow, K. J.}, address = {Helsinki}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Arro:64, author = {Arrow, K. J.}, title = {The role of securities in the optimal allocation of risk-bearing}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1964}, volume = {31}, pages = {91-96}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Arro:51AA, author = {Arrow, K. J.}, title = {Alternative approaches to the theory of choice in risk-taking situations}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1951}, volume = {19}, pages = {404-437}, key = {risk} } @BOOK{Arro:51SC, title = {Social Choice and Individual Values}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1951}, author = {Arrow, K. J.}, address = {New York}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Arro:50, author = {Arrow, K. J.}, title = {A difficulty in the concept of social welfare}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1950}, volume = {58}, pages = {328-346}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{ArDe:54, author = {Arrow, K. J. and Debreu, G.}, title = {Existence of equilibrium in a competitive economy}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1954}, volume = {22}, pages = {265-290}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{ArHa:71, title = {General Competitive Analysis}, publisher = {Oliver and Boyd}, year = {1971}, author = {Arrow, K. J. and Hahn, F. H.}, address = {Edinburgh}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{AsTeBa:93, author = {Ashby, F. G. and Tein, J. Y. and Balakrishnan, J. D.}, title = {Response time distributions in memory scanning}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Psychology}, year = {1993}, volume = {37}, pages = {526-555}, key = {psychology} } @ARTICLE{AsRu:08, author = {Ashby, Nathan and Sobel, Russell}, title = {Income inequality and economic freedom in the U.S. states}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {2008}, volume = {134}, pages = {329-346}, abstract = {This paper examines the impact of economic freedom on income inequality using cross-sectional data for U.S. states. While previous research has explored this relationship internationally, the results have been conflicting. In addition, while it seems obvious that the large institutional differences across countries will impact income inequality, it isn’t so obvious that the smaller variation in policies among U.S. states can have a measurable impact. Can improvements in income inequality be used as a justification for marginal promarket policy reforms at the state level, or is this argument applicable only to national-level institutional reforms?}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Inequality, Economic freedom, Institutions}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{Ashe:91, author = {Asheim, G. B.}, title = {Unjust Intertemporal Allocations}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1991}, volume = {54}, pages = {350-371}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{AsBu:02, author = {Asheim, Geir B. and Buchholz, Wolfgang}, title = {A General Approach to Welfare Measurement through National Income Accounting}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2002}, pages = {1-31}, abstract = {We develop a framework for analyzing national income accounting using arevealed welfare approach that is sufficiently general to cover, e.g.,both the standard discounted utilitarian and maximin criteria as specialcases. We show that the basic welfare properties of comprehensive nationalincome accounting, which were previously ascribed only to the discountedutilitarian case, in fact extend to this more general framework. In particular,it holds under a wide range of circumstances that real nnp growth (or equivalently,a positive value of net investments) indicates welfare improvement. Weillustrate the applicability of our approach by considering resource allocationmechanisms in the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model of capital accumulation andresource depletion.}, key = {income} } @ARTICLE{AsHaOo:99, author = {Ashenfelter, O. and Harmon, C. and Oosterbeek, H.}, title = {A Review of Estimates of the {Schooling/Earnings} Relationship, with Testfor Publication Bias}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {453-470}, key = {Education, training} } @ARTICLE{Ashenfelter1999, author = {Ashenfelter, O. and Harmon, C. and Oosterbeek, H.}, title = {A Review of Estimates of the {Schooling/Earnings} Relationship, with Test for Publication Bias}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {453-470}, key = {Education, training}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AsSm:79CW, author = {Ashenfelter, O. and Smith, R. S.}, title = {Compliance with the minimum wage laws}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1979}, volume = {87}, pages = {333-359}, key = {Minimum wage} } @ARTICLE{ABI:98, author = {{Association of British Insurers}}, title = {Insurance {P}remium {T}ax: is it regressive?}, journal = {Insurance Trends}, year = {1998}, month = {July}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{IBA:82, title = {Tax Avoidance, Tax Evasion}, publisher = {Sweet and Maxwell}, year = {1982}, author = {International Bar Association}, address = {London}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{AsKrSmTe:04, author = {Asvanund,A. and Krishnan,R. and Smith,M. and Telang,R.}, title = {Interest-Based Self-Organizing Peer-to-Peer Networks: A Club Economics Approach}, institution = {H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management}, year = {2004}, abstract = {Improving the information retrieval (IR) performance of peer-to-peer networksis an important and challenging problem. Recently, the computer scienceliterature has attempted to address this problem by improving IR searchalgorithms. However, in peer-to-peer networks, IR performance is determinedby both technology and user behavior, and very little attention has beenpaid in the literature to improving IR performance through incentives tochange user behavior. We address this gap by combining the club goods economicsliterature and the IR literature to propose a next generation file sharingarchitecture. Using the popular Gnutella 0.6 architecture as context, weconceptualize a Gnutella ultrapeer and its local network of leaf nodesas a "club" (in economic terms). We specify an information retrieval-basedutility model for a peer to determine which clubs to join, for a club tomanage its membership, and for a club to determine to which other clubsthey should connect. We simulate the performance of our model using a uniquereal-world dataset collected from the Gnutella 0.6 network. These simulationsshow that our club model accomplishes both performance goals. First, peersare self-organized into communities of interest - in our club model peersare 85% more likely to be able to obtain content from their local clubthan they are in the current Gnutella 0.6 architecture. Second, peers haveincreased incentives to share content - our model shows that peers whoshare can increase their recall performance by nearly five times over theperformance offered to free-riders. We also show that the benefits providedby our club model outweigh the added protocol overhead imposed on the networkfor the most valuable peers, that our results are stronger in larger simulatednetworks, and that our results are robust to dynamic networks with typicallevels of user entry and exit.}, key = {clubs} } @ARTICLE{AtCh:08, author = {At, Christian and Chappe, Nathalie}, title = {Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction}, journal = {Review of Law and Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {4}, pages = {35-44}, abstract = {This paper extends the law enforcement literature with imperfect information by introducing a new technology to improve information acquisition. Individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of detection and can postpone their decision whether or not to commit crime in order to learn about the actual probability of detection. We show that the optimal fine is the maximal one when information acquisition is easy.}, key = {Crime}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{AtBa:79, author = {Atack, J. And Bateman, F.}, title = {The measurement and trend of inequality}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1979}, volume = {4}, pages = {389-393}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{AtCoPe:04, author = {Atella, V. and Coggins, J. and Perali, F.}, title = {Aversion to Inequality in Italy and Its Determinants}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2004}, volume = {2}, pages = {117-144}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{AtChKe:99, author = {Atkeson, A. and Chari, V. V. and Kehoe, P.}, title = {Taxing Capital Income: A Bad Idea}, journal = {Federal Reserve Bank of Minnepolis Quarterly Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {Summer}, pages = {3-17}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{AtkB:90, author = {Atkinson, A.B.}, title = {Public Economics and the Economic Public}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1990}, volume = {34}, pages = {225-248}, key = {public economics}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{AtkB:77, author = {Atkinson, A.}, title = {Optimal Taxation and the Direct versus Indirect Tax Controversy}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {10}, pages = {590-606}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @TECHREPORT{AtLe:06, author = {Atkinson, A. and Leigh, A.}, title = {The Distribution of Top Incomes in Australia}, institution = {Centre for Economic Policy Reseach}, year = {2006}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {514}, address = {Social Policy Evaluation, Analysis and Research Centre, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University}, month = {March}, abstract = {Using taxation statistics, we estimate the income share held by top income groups in Australia over the period 1921-2002. We find that the income share of the richest fell from the 1920s until the mid-1940s, rose briefly in the post-war decade, and then declined until the early-1980s. During the 1980s and 1990s, top income shares rose rapidly. At the start of the twenty-first century, the income share of the richest was higher than it had been at any point in the previous fifty years. Among top income groups, recent decades have also seen a rise in the share of top income accruing to the super-rich. Trends in top income shares are similar to those observed among other elite groups, such as judges, politicians, top bureaucrats and CEOs. We speculate that changes in top income shares may have been affected by top marginal tax rates, skill-biased technological change, social norms about , and the internationalisation of the market for English-speaking CEOs.}, key = {distributions}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @INCOLLECTION{AtkB:80HE, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {Horizontal Equity and the Distribution of the Tax Burden}, booktitle = {The economics of taxation}, publisher = {Brookings Institute}, year = {1980}, editor = {Aaron, H. J. and Boskin, M. J.}, pages = {3-18}, key = {equity} } @INCOLLECTION{AtkB:07MT, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {Measuring top incomes: methodological issues}, booktitle = {Top Incomes over the 20th Century: A contrast between continental {E}uropean and {E}nglish-speaking countries}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, chapter = {2}, pages = {18-42}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.27} } @INCOLLECTION{AtkB:07TD, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {The distribution of top incomes in the {U}nited {K}ingdom 1908-2000}, booktitle = {Top Incomes over the 20th Century: A contrast between continental {E}uropean and {E}nglish-speaking countries}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, chapter = {4}, pages = {82-140}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.27} } @INCOLLECTION{AtkB:95, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {Capabilities, Exclusion and the supply of goods}, booktitle = {Choice, Welfare and Development: A Festschrift in honor of {A}martya {K}.{S}en}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1995}, editor = {Basu, K. and Pattanaik, P. and Suzumura, K.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{AtkB:96a, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {Seeking to explain the Distribution of Income}, booktitle = {New Inequalities: the Changing Distribution of Income and Wealth in theUnited Kingdom}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1996}, editor = {Hills , J.}, pages = {19-48}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @INCOLLECTION{AtkB:80IA, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {Inheritance and the distribution of wealth}, booktitle = {Public Policy and the Tax System}, publisher = {George Allen and Unwin}, year = {1980}, editor = {Hughes, G. A. and Heal, G. M.}, chapter = {2}, pages = {36-66}, address = {London}, key = {wealth} } @INCOLLECTION{AtkB:75TD, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {The Distribution of Wealth in {B}ritain in the 1960s - the Estate Duty Method Re-Examined}, booktitle = {The Personal Distribution of Income and Wealth}, publisher = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {1975}, editor = {Smith, J. D.}, address = {New York}, key = {wealth} } @INCOLLECTION{AtkB:74, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {Poverty and Income Inequality in {B}ritain}, booktitle = {Poverty, Inequality and The Class Structure}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1974}, editor = {Wedderburn, D.}, address = {London}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{AtkB:, author = {Atkinson , A. B.}, title = {Measuring poverty and differences in family composition}, institution = {STICERD}, type = {ESRC programme on taxation, incentives and the distribution of income DiscussionPaper}, number = {146}, address = {London School of Economics}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{AtkB:08MO, author = {Atkinson , A. B.}, title = {More on the measurement of inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2008}, volume = {6}, pages = {277-283}, abstract = {The article, written in 1973, examines what comparisons of income distributions can be made when Lorenz curves cross, employing the concept of third-order stochastic dominance.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.04}, type = {mimeo}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/g5qwtv1k8n6q419g/} } @ARTICLE{AtkB:07TL, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {The long run earnings distribution in five countries: ``remarkable stability,'' U, V or W?}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2007}, volume = {53}, pages = {1-24}, key = {earnings}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.07.23} } @ARTICLE{AtkB:04, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {Income tax and top incomes over the twentieth century}, journal = {Hacienda P{\'u}blica Espa{\~n}ola}, year = {2004}, volume = {168}, pages = {123-141}, key = {Inequality} } @TECHREPORT{AtkB:03, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {Income Inequality in {OECD} Countries: Data and Explanations}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2003}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, abstract = {Revised version of paper prepared for the CESifo conference on “Globalization,Inequality and Well-Being” in Munich, November 8-9, 2002, where the participantsmade very helpful comments. I am most grateful to the referee, whose perceptivereport has led me to make significant revisions, so that this version issubstantially different from that circulated as CESifo Working paper No881.}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Atkinson2003, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {Income Inequality in OECD Countries: Data and Explanations}, year = {2003}, abstract = {Revised version of paper prepared for the CESifo conference on "Globalization, Inequality and Well-Being" in Munich, November 8-9, 2002, where the participants made very helpful comments. I am most grateful to the referee, whose perceptive report has led me to make significant revisions, so that this version is substantially different from that circulated as CESifo Working paper No 881.}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, type = {Working Paper} } @BOOK{AtkB:98, title = {Poverty in {E}urope}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishers}, year = {1998}, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, series = {Yrj{\"o} Jahnsson Lectures}, address = {Oxford}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{Atkinson1998a, title = {Poverty in {E}urope}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishers}, year = {1998}, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, series = {Yrjo Jahnsson Lectures}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AtkB:97, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {Bringing income distribution in from the cold}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {297-321}, key = {income distribution}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.07.30} } @ARTICLE{AtkB:97BI, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {Bringing Income Distribution In From The Cold}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {297-321}, month = {March}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{AtkB:97MO, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {Measurement of {T}rends in {P}overty and the {I}ncome {D}istribution}, institution = {The Microsimulation Unit, Department of Applied Economics, University ofCambridge}, year = {1997}, type = {DAE Working Paper}, number = {MU 9701}, month = {May}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{AtkB:93a, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {What is happening to the distribution of income in the {UK}?}, journal = {Proceedings of the British Academy}, year = {1993}, volume = {82}, pages = {317-351}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{AtkB:89, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {Measuring inequality and differing social judgements}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1989}, type = {{ESRC} Research Programme in Taxation, Incentives and the Distribution ofIncome. Discussion Paper}, number = {129}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{AtkB:87, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {On the measurement of poverty}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1987}, volume = {55}, pages = {749-764}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{AtkB:85HS, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {How should we measure poverty?}, institution = {STICERD}, year = {1985}, type = {ESRC programme on taxation, incentives and the distribution of income DiscussionPaper}, number = {82}, address = {London School of Economics}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{AtkB:83, title = {The Economics of Inequality}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1983}, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, address = {Oxford}, edition = {Second}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{AtkB:81, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {The measurement of economic mobility}, booktitle = {Essays in honour of {J}an {P}en}, year = {1981}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{AtkB:80ID, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {Income distribution and inequality of opportunity}, journal = {I H S Journal}, year = {1980}, volume = {4}, pages = {65-80}, note = {Series A}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{AtkB:77OT, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {Optimal taxation and the direct versus indirect tax controversy}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {10}, pages = {590-606}, number = {4}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{AtkB:75EI, title = {The Economics of Inequality}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1975}, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, address = {Oxford}, edition = {First}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{AtkB:73HP, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {How progressive should income tax be?}, booktitle = {Essays in Modern Economics}, publisher = {Longman}, year = {1973}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{AtkB:73MO, author = {Atkinson , A. B.}, title = {More on the measurement of inequality}, institution = {University of Essex}, year = {1973}, type = {mimeo}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Atkinson1972a, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {The distribution of wealth and the individual life cycle}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1972}, volume = {23}, pages = {239-254}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AtkB:71, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {The distribution of wealth and the individual life cycle}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1971}, volume = {23}, pages = {239-254}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{AtkB:70, author = {Atkinson, A. B.}, title = {On the Measurement of Inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1970}, volume = {2}, pages = {244-263}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{AtBo:87, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Bourguignon, F.}, title = {Income distribution and differences in needs}, booktitle = {Arrow and the foundations of the theory of economic policy}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1987}, editor = {Feiwel, G. R.}, chapter = {12}, pages = {350-370}, address = {New York}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{AtBo:89, author = {Atkinson, Anthony B. and Bourguignon, Fran\'cois}, title = {The design of direct taxation and family benefits}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1989}, volume = {41}, pages = {3-29}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{AtBo:82, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Bourguignon, F.}, title = {The comparison of multi-dimensional distributions of economic status}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1982}, volume = {49}, pages = {183-201}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{AtBoMo:92, title = {Empirical Studies of Earnings Mobility}, publisher = {Harwood Academic Publishers}, year = {1992}, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Bourguignon, F. and Morrisson, C.}, key = {mobility} } @TECHREPORT{AtBoMo:87, author = {Atkinson , A. B. and Bourguignon, F. and Morrisson, C.}, title = {Earnings mobility}, year = {1987}, type = {European Economic Review - Papers and proceedings of the second annual congressof the {E.E.A.}}, key = {mobility}, pages = {619-632}, volume = {22-24/8} } @TECHREPORT{Atkinson1987, author = {Atkinson , A. B. and Bourguignon, F. and Morrisson, C.}, title = {Earnings mobility}, year = {1987}, type = {European Economic Review - Papers and proceedings of the second annual congress of the {E.E.A.}}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, pages = {619-632}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, volume = {22-24/8} } @CONFERENCE{AtBr:04, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Brandolini, A.}, title = {Global World Inequality: Absolute, Relative or Intermediate?}, year = {2004}, organization = {28th General Conference of the International Association}, key = {income inequality: empirical}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AtBr:01, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Brandolini, A.}, title = {Promise and Pitfalls in the Use of Secondary Data-sets: Income Inequality in {OECD} Countries as a Case Study}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2001}, volume = {39}, pages = {771-799}, key = {income : empirical}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @BOOK{AtCaMaNo:02, title = {Social Indicators: The {EU} and Social Inclusion}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Cantillon, B. and Marlier, E. and Nolan, B.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{AtGaLeSu:98, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Gardiner, K. and Lechene, V. and Sutherland, H.}, title = {Comparing poverty rates across countries: a case study of {F}rance and the{U}nited {K}ingdom}, booktitle = {Distribution of Welfare and Household Production:an International Perspective}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Jenkins, S. P. and Kapteyn, A. And Van Praag, B.}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @INCOLLECTION{AtGoSu:88, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Gomulka, J. and Sutherland, H.}, title = {Grossing-up {FES} data for tax-benefit models}, booktitle = {Tax-Benefit Models}, publisher = {STICERD}, year = {1988}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Sutherland, H.}, pages = {223-253}, address = {London School of Economics, London}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{AtGoHa:89, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Gordon, J. P. F. and Harrison, A. J.}, title = {Trends in the shares of top wealth-holders in {B}ritain 1923-1981}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1989}, volume = {51}, pages = {315-332}, key = {wealth} } @BOOK{AtHa:78, title = {Distribution of {P}ersonal {W}ealth in {B}ritain}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1978}, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Harrison, A. J.}, key = {wealth} } @BOOK{AtHaSt:78, title = {Wealth and Personal Incomes}, publisher = {Pergamon Press Ltd on behalf of The Royal Statistical Society and the Social Science Research Council}, year = {1978}, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Harrison, A. J. and Stark, T.}, address = {London}, key = {Data} } @BOOK{AtMaTr:83, title = {Parents and Children: Incomes in Two Generations}, publisher = {Heinemann}, year = {1983}, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Maynard, A. and Trinder, C.}, address = {London}, key = {mobility} } @BOOK{AtMi:92, title = {Economic Transformation in {E}astern {E}urope and the Distribution of Income}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1992}, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Micklewright, J.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{AtMi:91, author = {Atkinson, A. B and Micklewright, J.}, title = {Unemployment Compensation and Labor Market Transitions: A Critical Review}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1991}, volume = {29}, pages = {1679-727}, key = {labour} } @INCOLLECTION{AtPi:07TA, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, title = {Towards a unified data set on top incomes}, booktitle = {Top Incomes over the 20th Century: A contrast between continental {E}uropean and {E}nglish-speaking countries}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, chapter = {13}, pages = {531-565}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.27} } @BOOK{AtRaSm:95, title = {Income Distribution in {OECD} countries: The Evidence from the {L}uxembourg {I}ncome {S}tudy}, publisher = {OECD, Paris}, year = {1995}, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Rainwater, L. and Smeeding , T. M.}, number = {18}, series = {Social Policy Studies}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{Atkinson1994, title = {Income Distribution in {OECD} countries: The Evidence from the {L}uxembourg {I}ncome {S}tudy}, publisher = {OECD, Paris}, year = {1994}, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Rainwater, L. and Smeeding , T. M.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{AtSa:07, author = {Atkinson,A. B. and Salverda, W.}, title = {Top Incomes in the {N}etherlands over the Twentieth Century}, booktitle = {Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @ARTICLE{AtSa:80, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Sandmo, A.}, title = {Welfare Implications of the Taxation of Savings}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1980}, volume = {90}, pages = {529-549}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{AtSt:74, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Stern, N. H.}, title = {{P}igou, taxation and public goods}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1974}, volume = {41}, pages = {119-128}, key = {public goods} } @BOOK{AtSt:80, title = {Lectures on Public Economics}, publisher = {McGraw Hill}, year = {1980}, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Stiglitz, J. E.}, address = {Basingstoke}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{AtSt:76, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {The design of tax Structure: direct versus Indirect Taxation}, journal = {The Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1976}, volume = {6}, pages = {55-75}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{AtSt:72, author = {Atkinson, A. B. and Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {The Structure of Indirect Taxation and Economic Efficiency}, journal = {The Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1972}, volume = {1}, pages = {97-119}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{AtCrKn:99, author = {Atkinson, M. E. and Creedy, J. and Knox, D. M.}, title = {Alternative Retirement Income Arrangements and Lifetime Income Inequality:Lessons from {A}ustralia}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {103-117}, key = {pensions} } @ARTICLE{Atkinson1999, author = {Atkinson, M. E. and Creedy, J. and Knox, D. M.}, title = {Alternative Retirement Income Arrangements and Lifetime Income Inequality: Lessons from {A}ustralia}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {103-117}, key = {pension}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{AtDa:96, author = {Attanasio, O. and Davis, S.}, title = {Relative Wage Movements and the Distribution of Consumption}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1996}, volume = {Vol 104}, pages = {1227-1262}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.24} } @ARTICLE{AtRR:00, author = {Attanasio, O. and Rios-Rull, J.-V.}, title = {Consumption smoothing in island economies: Can public insurance reduce welfare?}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2000}, volume = {44}, pages = {1225-1258}, key = {social insurance} } @ARTICLE{AtWe:95, author = {Attanasio, O. and Weber, G.}, title = {Is Consumption Growth Consistent with Intertemporal Optimization?",}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1995}, volume = {103}, pages = {1121-1157}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{AtWe:93, author = {Attanasio, O. and Weber, G.}, title = {Consumption growth, the interest rate and aggregation}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1993}, volume = {60}, pages = {631-649}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{AtBr:95, author = {Orazio P. Attanasio and Martin Browning}, title = {Consumption over the Life Cycle and over the Business Cycle}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {85}, pages = {1118-1137}, number = {5}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{AtCaDeDu:00, author = {Attfield, C. L. F. and Cannon, Edmund S. and Demery, D. and Duck, NigelW.}, title = {Economic Growth and Geographic Proximity}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {109-112}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{AuBoMa:08, author = {Audet, M. and Boccanfuso, D. and Makdissi, P.}, title = {A model of horizontal inequality}, journal = {Applied Economics Letters}, year = {2008}, volume = {15}, pages = {469-471}, abstract = {The concept of horizontal inequality is generally used in economics to refer to the unequal treatment of equal individuals by the fiscal system. For example, an economic system can treat unequally two individuals who hold identical levels of production factors. The following note will present a method that allows us to identify the level of horizontal inequality of an economic system.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {rodano}, timestamp = {2008.06.13} } @BOOK{AuK0:87, title = {Dynamic Fiscal Policy}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1987}, author = {Auerbach, A. and Kotlikoff, L.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {macro} } @INCOLLECTION{Auer:85, author = {Auerbach, A. J.}, title = {The theory of excess burden and optimal taxation}, booktitle = {Handbook of Public Economics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1985}, editor = {Auerbach, A. J. and Feldstein, M.}, volume = {1}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {Optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{Auer:97, author = {Auerbach, A. J.}, title = {The Future of Fundamental Tax Reform}, journal = {The American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association)}, year = {1997}, volume = {97}, pages = {143-146}, key = {tax reform}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @TECHREPORT{AuHa:99, author = {Auerbach, A. J. and Hassett, K. A.}, title = {A New Measure of Horizontal Equity}, institution = {NBER}, year = {1999}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {7035}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, abstract = {In this paper, we propose a new measure of horizontal equity that overcomes many of the shortcomings of previous proposed measures. Our starting point is the observation that a well-behaved social welfare function need not evaluate global' (vertical equity) differences in after-tax income using the same weights it applies to local' (horizontal equity) differences, even though this constraint has been applied in the past. Following work on the structure of individual preferences, we show that a social welfare function can imply different preferences toward horizontal and vertical equity. Adopting the general approach to the measurement of inequality developed by Atkinson (1970), we use such a social welfare function to derive measures of inequality that are decomposable into components naturally interpreted as indices of horizontal and vertical equity. In particular, the former index measures deviations from the fundamental principle that equals be treated equally. Finally, we apply our new measure to two tax-return data sets, evaluating the degree to which the horizontal equity of the US personal income tax has changed over time, and how horizontal equity would be altered by one version of recent proposals to do away with the so-called marriage penalty.'}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{AuBr:95, author = {Aumann, R. and Brandenburger, A.}, title = {Epistemic conditions for {N}ash equilibrium}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1995}, volume = {63}, pages = {1161-1180}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{AuMa:85, author = {Aumann, R. and Maschler, M.}, title = {Game-theoretic analysis of a bamkruptcy problem from the {T}almud}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1985}, volume = {36}, pages = {195-213}, key = {claims} } @TECHREPORT{Aura:04, author = {Aura, Saku}, title = {Estate and Capital Gains Taxation: Efficiency and Political Economy Considerations}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2004}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1198}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, abstract = {In this paper a simple dynastic overlapping-generations model with homogeneousagentsis used to analyze the optimal use of capital income tax, labor incometax and estate tax. The results of this analysis add to the conventionalwisdom about capital income taxation: while it is true that in the longrun the estate tax rate should be set to zero, it is also true that othercapital income taxation is a usable policy tool even in the steady state.The other contribution of the paper is the building of a simple dynamicpolitical economy model where the structure of capital taxes is determined.In a median-voter framework with no policy commitment, estate taxationis used too heavily as a capital-tax-revenue-collecting tool relative tothesecond-best optimum for the social planner.}, key = {wealth taxation} } @ARTICLE{Aust:03, author = {Austen-Smith, D.}, title = {Majority preference for subsidies over redistribution}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1617–1640}, abstract = {Among other activities, democratic governments redistribute resources directly through tax schemes that explicitly benefit the poor and indirectly through subsidizing particular goods and services that do not. Indeed, in some cases the effective redistribution under subsidy policies is clearly away from the poor. This paper studies when a majority might prefer subsidy policies over direct income redistribution in economies with mean greater than median income. The main result is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for subsidies to be majority preferred to direct redistribution: in sum, subsidies are strictly majority preferred to redistribution when the gap between median and mean incomes is not 'too great'.}, key = {Redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Austen-Smith2003, author = {Austen-Smith, D.}, title = {Majority preference for subsidies over redistribution}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1617-1640}, key = {Redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{ATO:08, author = {{Australian Taxation Office}}, title = {Compliance Program 2008-09}, institution = {ATO}, year = {2008}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.04.28} } @TECHREPORT{ATO:09, author = {{Australian Taxation Office}}, title = {2008-2009 Compliance Program}, institution = {Australian Government}, year = {2008}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.04.27} } @ARTICLE{AuDe:89, author = {Ausubel, Lawrence M. and Deneckere, Raymond J.}, title = {Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1989}, volume = {57}, pages = {511--531}, number = {3}, abstract = {This paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. We prove that, as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero, all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria. This reverses a well-known conjecture of Coase. Alternatively, one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one-sided incomplete information in which an uniformed seller makes all the offers. Our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game.}, copyright = {Copyright © 1989 The Econometric Society}, issn = {00129682}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {May, 1989}, publisher = {The Econometric Society} } @ARTICLE{AuJo:01, author = {Auten, G. and Joulfaian, D.}, title = {Bequest Taxes and Capital Gains Realizations}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {81}, pages = {213-229}, key = {wealth taxation} } @ARTICLE{AuKaKe:08, author = {Autor, D. H. and Katz, L. F. and Kearney, M.S.}, title = {Trends in {U.S.} wage inquality: revising the revisionists}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2008}, volume = {90}, pages = {300-323}, number = {2}, abstract = {A recent “revisionist” literature characterizes the pronounced rise in U.S. wage inequality since 1980 as an “episodic” event of the first half of the 1980s driven by nonmarket factors (particularly a falling real minimum wage) and concludes that continued increases in wage inequality since the late 1980s substantially reflect the mechanical confounding effects of changes in labor force composition. Analyzing data from the Current Population Survey for 1963 to 2005, we find limited support for these claims. The slowing of the growth of overall wage inequality in the 1990s hides a divergence in the paths of upper-tail (90/50) inequality— which has increased steadily since 1980, even adjusting for changes in labor force composition—and lower-tail (50/10) inequality, which rose sharply in the first half of the 1980s and plateaued or contracted thereafter. Fluctuations in the real minimum wage are not a plausible explanation for these trends since the bulk of inequality growth occurs above the median of the wage distribution. Models emphasizing rapid secular growth in the relative demand for skills—attributable to skill-biased technical change— and a sharp deceleration in the relative supply of college workers in the 1980s do an excellent job of capturing the evolution of the college/high school wage premium over four decades. But these models also imply a puzzling deceleration in relative demand growth for college workers in the early 1990s, also visible in a recent “polarization” of skill demands in which employment has expanded in high-wage and low-wage work at the expense of middle-wage jobs. These patterns are potentially reconciled by a modified version of the skill-biased technical change hypothesis that emphasizes the role of information technology in complementing abstract (high-education) tasks and substituting for routine (middle-education) tasks.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {rodano}, timestamp = {2008.06.12} } @TECHREPORT{Aviy:07, author = {Avi-Yonah,R.S.}, title = {Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage, and the International Tax Regime}, institution = {University of Michigan Law \& Economics}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, number = {07-001}, abstract = {This paper argues that a coherent international tax regime exists, embodied in both the tax treaty network and in domestic laws, and that it forms a significant part of international law (both treaty-based and customary). The practical implication is that countries are not free to adopt any international tax rules they please, but rather operate in the context of the regime, which changes in the same ways international law changes over time. Thus, unilateral action is possible, but is also restricted, and countries are generally reluctant to take unilateral actions that violate the basic norms that underlie the regime. Those norms are the single tax principle (i.e., that income should be taxed once - not more and not less) and the benefits principle (i.e., that active business income should be taxed primarily at source, and passive investment income primarily at residence).}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{Aviy:06, author = {Avi-Yonah,R.S.}, title = {Corporate Social Responsibility and Strategic Tax Behavior}, institution = {University of Michigan Law \& Economics}, year = {2006}, type = {Working paper}, number = {06-008}, abstract = {This paper addresses two questions. First, from the perspective of the corporation, should the corporation cooperate and pay the corporate tax, or should it engage in “strategic” tax behavior designed to minimize or eliminate its corporate tax burden? Second, from the perspective of the state, should the state use the corporate tax just to raise revenue, or should it also try to use it as a regulatory tool to steer corporate behavior in directions that it deems beneficial to society? The paper argues that whatever our view of the nature of the corporation and of the legitimacy of corporate social responsibility, corporations should not be permitted to engage in strategic behavior that is designed solely to minimize their taxes, while the state should use the corporate tax as a regulatory tool.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{AyMaVF:98, author = {Mohamed Ayadi and Mohamed Salah Matoussi and Maria-Pia Victoria-Feser}, title = {Urban Rural Poverty Comparisons in {T}unisia: A Robust Statistical Approach}, institution = {University of Geneva}, year = {1998}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{Ayalaforthcoming1995, author = {Ayala, L. and Mart{\'{\i}}nez, R. and Ruiz-Huerta, J.}, title = {La distribuci\'on de la renta en {E}spa\~na desde una perspectiva internacional: tendencias y factores de cambio}, booktitle = {Segundo Simposio Sobre La Distribuci\'on de La Renta Y de La Rizqueza}, publisher = {Fundaci\'on Argentaria}, year = {forthcoming 1995}, editor = {Gutierrez, L. and Maravall, J. M.}, address = {Madrid}, institution = {Instituto de Estudios Fiscales}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{AyMaRH:95, author = {Ayala, L. and Mart{\'{\i}}nez, R. and Ruiz-Huerta, J.}, title = {La distribuci{\'o}n de la renta en {E}spa{\~n}a desde una perspectiva internacional:tendencias y factores de cambio}, booktitle = {Segundo Simposio Sobre La Distribuci{\'o}n de La Renta Y de La Rizqueza}, publisher = {Fundaci{\'o}n Argentaria}, year = {forthcoming 1995}, editor = {Gutierrez, L. and Maravall, J. M.}, address = {Madrid}, institution = {Instituto de Estudios Fiscales}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Azar:04, author = {Azar, Ofer H.}, title = {What sustains social norms and how they evolve? The case of tipping}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {2004}, volume = {54}, pages = {49-64}, abstract = {The paper presents a model of the evolution of social norms. When a normis costly to follow and people do not derive benefits from following itother than avoiding social disapproval, the norm erodes over time. Tippercentages, however, increased over the years, suggesting that peoplederive benefits from tipping including impressing others and improvingtheir self-image as being generous and kind. The implications to the normof not cooperating with new workers who accept lower wages are discussed;the model suggests that incumbent workers have reasons to follow this normin addition to avoiding social disapproval.}, key = {social custom} } @ARTICLE{AzGr:08, author = {Azuma, Yoshiaki and Grossman, Herschel}, title = {A Theory of the Informal Sector}, journal = {Economics and Politics}, year = {2008}, volume = {20}, pages = {62-79}, abstract = {In many countries, especially poor countries, a heavy burden of taxes, fees, bureaucratic hassles, and bribes drives many producers into an informal sector. This paper shows that we can attribute the existence of a large informal sector to the fact that, because productive endowments contain important unobservable components, the state cannot adjust the amounts that it extracts from producers in the formal sector finely according to each producer’s endowment. Given this fact, we find that if the endowment of well-endowed producers is sufficiently large relative to poorly endowed producers, or if their number is relatively large, or if the quality of public services is sufficiently low, then the state extracts a large enough amount from producers in the formal sector that poorly endowed producers choose to work in the informal sector. This result obtains both for a proprietary state, which maximizes its own net revenue, and for a hypothetical benevolent state, which would maximize total net output. But, we also find that there exist combinations of the distribution of endowments and the quality of public services such that the policies of a proprietary state, but not the policies of a hypothetical benevolent state, would cause poorly endowed producers to work in the informal sector}, key = {Public Goods}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{B.1999, author = {Ellickson B. and Grodal B. and Scotchmer S. and Zame W.R.}, title = {Clubs and Market}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {1185-1217}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BaMu:06, author = {B\"auerle, N. and M\"uller, A.}, title = {Stochastic orders and risk measures: Consistency and bounds}, journal = {Insurance: Mathematics and Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {38}, pages = {132–148}, key = {risk}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.03.26} } @ARTICLE{BaBa:03, author = {Bac, M. and Bag, P. K.}, title = {Strategic Information Revelation in Fundraising}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {659-679}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{BaRoLyWoKaSo:07, author = {Backlund, Eric and Rowe, Goeff and Lynch, John, and Wolfson, Michael and Kaplan, George and Sorlie, Paul}, title = {income distribution, differential mortality, socioeconomic factors, multilevel models}, journal = {International Journal of Epidemiology}, year = {2007}, volume = {36}, pages = {590-596}, abstract = {Background: Some of the most consistent evidence in favour of an association between income inequality and health has been among US states. However, in multilevel studies of mortality, only two out of five studies have reported a positive relationship with income inequality after adjustment for the compositional characteristics of the state's inhabitants. In this study, we attempt to clarify these mixed results by analysing the relationship within age–sex groups and by applying a previously unused analytical method to a database that contains more deaths than any multilevel study to date. Methods: The US National Longitudinal Mortality Study (NLMS) was used to model the relationship between income inequality in US states and mortality using both a novel and previously used methodologies that fall into the general framework of multilevel regression. We adjust age–sex specific models for nine socioeconomic and demographic variables at the individual level and percentage black and region at the state level. Results: The preponderance of evidence from this study suggests that 1990 state-level income inequality is associated with a 40% differential in state level mortality rates (95% CI = 26–56%) for men 25–64 years and a 14% (95% CI = 3–27%) differential for women 25–64 years after adjustment for compositional factors. No such relationship was found for men or women over 65. Conlcusions: The relationship between income inequality and mortality is only robust to adjustment for compositional factors in men and women under 65. This explains why income inequality is not a major driver of mortality trends in the United States because most deaths occur at ages 65 and over. This analysis does suggest, however, the certain causes of death that occur primarily in the population under 65 may be associated with income inequality. Comparison of analytical techniques also suggests coefficients for income inequality in previous multilevel mortality studies may be biased, but further research is needed to provide a definitive answer.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {income distribution, differential mortality, socioeconomic factors, multilevel models}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @TECHREPORT{BaKl:97, author = {Bager-Sjogren, Lars and Klevmarken, N. Anders}, title = {Inequality and Mobility of Wealth in Sweden 1983/84 - 1992/93}, institution = {Department of Economics, Uppsala University}, year = {1997}, number = {1997:7}, month = {February}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{BaLi:89, author = {Bagnoli, M. and Lipman, B.}, title = {Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core Through Private Contributions}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1989}, volume = {56}, pages = {583-602}, key = {Public goods} } @ARTICLE{Bagnoli1991, author = {Bagnoli, M. and McKee, M.}, title = {Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods}, journal = {Eocnomic Inquiry}, year = {1991}, volume = {29}, pages = {351-366}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BaMc:91, author = {Bagnoli, M. and McKee, M.}, title = {Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, year = {1991}, volume = {29}, pages = {351-366}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{BaSaSw:95, author = {Bagnoli, Mark and Salant, Stephen W. and Swierzbinski, Joseph E.}, title = {Intertemporal self-selection with multiple buyers.}, journal = {Economic Theory}, year = {1995}, volume = {5}, pages = {513 -526}, number = {3}, abstract = {We consider a monopolist selling durable goods to consumers with unit demands but different preferences for quality. The seller can offer items of different quality at the same time to induce buyers to self-select, as in Mussa-Rosen (1978), but is not artificially constrained to offer only one such menu. Instead the seller can offer without precommitment a sequence of menus over time. In the two-buyer case where the seller has complete information about each buyer's marginal valuation for quality, the seller's profits exceed what can be obtained from a single menu and sometimes approximate the profits of a perfectly discriminating monopolist. In companion papers (Bagnoli et al., 1990, 1992), we show that these conclusions continue to hold (1) in the infinite-horizon case with any finite number of buyers and (2) in two-period examples where the seller has incomplete information about buyer preferences. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR Copyright of Economic Theory is the property of Springer Scienc}, issn = {09382259}, keywords = {DURABLE goods, Consumer, MONOPOLISTIC competition, PURCHASING, COMPETITION, QUALITY of products, PROFIT -- Accounting, CONSUMERS, FACTORY management, DECISION making, PURCHASING agents, INDUSTRIAL procurement}, url = {http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=4534874&site=ehost-live&scope=site} } @ARTICLE{BaSaSw:89, author = {Bagnoli, Mark and Salant, Stephen W. and Swierzbinski, Joseph E.}, title = {Durable-Goods Monopoly with Discrete Demand}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1989}, volume = {97}, pages = {1459--1478}, number = {6}, month = {dec}, abstract = {We analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good. Unlike previous analyses, we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum. None of the main conclusions of the literature on durable-goods monopoly survives this change in assumption. Coase's conjecture that a durable-goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous-time limit, Bulow's proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it, and Stokey's proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite. Thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers--so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts--has proved misleading in the context of durable-goods monopoly.}, copyright = {Copyright 1989 The University of Chicago Press}, issn = {0022-3808}, jstor_articletype = {Full Length Article}, jstor_date = {198912}, jstor_formatteddate = {Dec., 1989}, language = {EN}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BaSt:06, author = {Bagwell, K. and Staiger, R.}, title = {Will International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading System?}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {96}, pages = {877-895}, key = {macro}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.01} } @ARTICLE{BaLiQiWa:01, author = {Bai, C-E and Li, D. D. and Qian, Y. and Wang, Y.}, title = {Financial Repression and Optimal Taxation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {70}, pages = {245-251}, key = {optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{BaTo:01, author = {Bailey, C. and Turner, J.}, title = {Strategies to Reduce Contribution Evasion in Social Security Financing}, journal = {World Development}, year = {2001}, volume = {29}, pages = {385-393}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Bail:85, author = {Bailey, K.}, title = {Entropy measures of inequality}, journal = {Sociological Inquiry}, year = {1985}, volume = {55}, pages = {200-211}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BaCo:97, author = {Bailey,S. and Connolly,S.}, title = {The national lottery: A preliminary assessment of net additionality}, journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1997}, volume = {44}, pages = {100-112}, abstract = {This paper makes a preliminary assessment of how the current structure forthe distribution of UK National Lottery funds affects the promise of netadditionality for the designated ' good causes'. Indifference analysisdemonstrates that the funding structure is optimal in these terms. However,the measurement of net additionality is highly problematic and involvesboth quantitative and qualitative techniques. Whilst a preliminary comparisonwith Ireland shows that the UK system is in a better position to achievenet additionality through tis accountability and transparency, net additionalitycould still be only a relativel small proportion of the dedicated Lotterymoney, depending on the behaviour of politician, local authorities, otherinterest groups, and the distribution boards themselves.}, key = {social policy} } @ARTICLE{BaEl:86CO, author = {Bain, Mary Jo and Ellwood, David T.}, title = {Concepts of Poverty and the Poverty Line}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1986}, volume = {21}, pages = {243-261}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Bake:97, author = {Baker, Michael}, title = {Growth-rate heterogeneity and the covariance structure of life-cycle earnings}, journal = {Journal of Labor Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {15}, pages = {339-375}, number = {2}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{BaBe:99, author = {Baker, Michael and Benjamin, Dwayne}, title = {How do retirement tests affect the labour supply of older men?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {27-51}, number = {1}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{BaMaMi:98, author = {Bala, Venkatesh and Majumdar, Mukul and Mitra, Tapan}, title = {A note on controlling a chaotic t{\^a}tonnement}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {33}, pages = {411-420}, number = {3-4}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{BaSc:80, author = {Balachandran, K. R. and Schaefer, M. E.}, title = {Optimal diversification among classes for auditing income tax returns}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1980}, volume = {35}, pages = {250-258}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{BaFr:05, author = {Baland,J. and Francois,P.}, title = {Commons as insurance and the welfare impact of privatization}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {211-231}, abstract = {It is shown here that, despite the efficiency gains from privatization,when markets are incomplete, all individuals may be made worse off by privatization,even when the resource is equitably privatized. Such market incompletenessis common in the developing world and can explain the often encounteredresistance to efficiency enhancing privatizing reforms, especially in thecase of village level landholdings and forests. The advantage of commonheld property arises because of its superior insurance properties (whichtend to provide income maintenance in low states). Sufficient conditionsare established under which any feasible insurance scheme under privateproperty cannot ex ante Pareto dominate allocations under the commons.}, key = {privatisation} } @ARTICLE{Baland1997, author = {Baland, Jean-Marie and Platteau, Jean-Philippe}, title = {Wealth inequality and efficiency in the {C}ommons, Part I: the unregulated case}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1997}, volume = {49}, pages = {451-482}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BaPl:97, author = {Baland, Jean-Marie and Platteau, Jean-Philippe}, title = {Wealth inequality and efficiency in the {C}ommons, Part I: the unregulatedcase}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1997}, volume = {49}, pages = {451-482}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{BaSa:86, author = {Balcer, Yves and Sadka, Efraim}, title = {Equivalence Scales, Horizontal Equity and Optimal Taxation Under Utilitarianism}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {29}, pages = {79-97}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Bald:87, author = {Baldry, J. C.}, title = {Income tax evasion and the tax schedule: some experimental results}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1987}, volume = {42}, pages = {357-383}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Bald:86, author = {Baldry, J. C.}, title = {Tax evasion is not a gamble}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1986}, volume = {22}, pages = {333-335}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Bald:84TE, author = {Baldry, J. C.}, title = {The Enforcement of Income Tax Laws: Efficiency Implications}, journal = {Economic Record}, year = {1984}, volume = {60}, pages = {156-159}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Bald:79, author = {Baldry, J. C.}, title = {Tax evasion and labour supply}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1979}, volume = {3}, pages = {53-56}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Bale:00, author = {Balestrino, A.}, title = {Mixed Tax Systems and the Public Provision of Private Goods}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2000}, volume = {7}, pages = {463-478}, abstract = {In contrast to what used to be conventional wisdom among economists, several recent contributions have shown that in-kind transfers schemes can be welfare-improvingin the presence of distortionary taxes (usually, linear taxes or a generalincome tax). In this note, we extend previous work by considering the mostgeneral tax system compatible with reasonable information constraints,i.e. a mix of linear indirect and non-linear direct taxes. Three main resultsare noted. We find that in the presence of a mixed tax system (as opposedto the non-linear income tax alone): i) not only encouraged but also discouragedgoods satisfy a condition for the desirability of public provision; ii)there is a tendency for the optimal level of in-kind transfers to be lower;iii) there is a basic equivalence between uniform and income-contingentin-kind transfers. We also show how previous results can be derived asspecial cases of ours and others have to be modified to account for themixed tax system.}, key = {Redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Bale:96, author = {Balestrino, Alessandro}, title = {A note on functioning-poverty in affluent societies}, journal = {notizie di Politeia}, year = {1996}, volume = {12}, pages = {97-105}, number = {43/44}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Baga:05, author = {Balestrino, A. and Galmarini, U.}, title = {On the Redistributive Properties of Presumptive Taxation}, institution = {{CES}ifo}, year = {2005}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1381}, address = {Alessandro Balestrino University of Pisa Department of Economic Sciences Via Serafini 3 56126 Pisa Italy balestrino@sp.unipi.it Umberto Galmarini Catholic University of Milan Institute for Economics and Finance Largo Gemelli 1 20123 Milan Italy umberto.galmarini@unicatt.it}, month = {January}, note = {Category 1: Public Finance}, abstract = {Presumptive taxation, in which an income proxy is used as tax base, has been and is still used today in countries with very diverse situations - developing, transition and developed countries. Usually, this form of taxation is thought of as a revenue-raising device in presence of widespread imperfect tax compliance. We investigate the question of whether presumptive taxation can be used as a redistributive instrument. To this end, we employ an occupational choice model in which an individual can be either an entrepreneur or a worker. We allow for different abilities to dodge taxes across social classes, and consider both the case in which a conventional income tax is in place alongside presumptive taxation and the case in which only presumptive taxation is operating. We argue that a revenue-neutral reform introducing a lump-sum presumptive tax based on occupational choice can improve social welfare, and sometimes even lead to a Pareto-improvement.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Alex}, timestamp = {2006.06.22} } @ARTICLE{BaTh:00, author = {Bali, T. G. and Thurston, T.}, title = {Empirical Estimates of Inflation Tax {L}affer Surfaces}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {63,2}, pages = {529-546}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{BaRu:93, author = {Ballano, C. and Ruiz-Castillo, J.}, title = {Searching by questionnaire for the meaning of income inequality}, journal = {Revista Espa{\~n}ola de Econom{\'i}a}, year = {1993}, volume = {10}, pages = {233-259}, number = {43}, institution = {Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departmento de Economia}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{BaRu:92, author = {Ballano, C. and Ruiz-Castillo, J.}, title = {Searching by questionnaire for the meaning of income inequality}, institution = {Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departmento de Economia}, year = {1992}, number = {43}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BaMiNi:04, author = {Ballester,M. and Miguel,J. and Nieto,J.}, title = {Set comparisons in a general domain:the Indirect Utility Criterion}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2004}, volume = {48}, pages = {139-150}, abstract = {The problem of extending a preference relation on a set to its power setis considered. We interpret the classical Indirect Utility Criterion asthe extreme opposite, in terms of freedom of choice considerations, ofthe well-known Cardinality-based Criterion introduced by Pattanaik andXu, 1990. This paper proposes axiomatic characterizations for suitableextensions of the Indirect Utility Criterion when the basic set of alternativesis uncountable and the preference over this set allows for a continuousutility representation.}, key = {Utility,preference} } @ARTICLE{Band:70, author = {Bandera, V. N.}, title = {Market orientation of state enterprises during {NEP}}, journal = {Soviet Studies}, year = {1970}, volume = {22}, pages = {110-121}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Band:99, author = {Bandr{\'e}s, A. and Cuenca, A.}, title = {Trends in {S}panish state retirement pensions}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {205-219}, key = {pensions} } @ARTICLE{BaBa:05, author = {Bandyopadhyay, D. and Basu, P.}, title = {What drives the cross-country growth and inequality correlation?}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {38}, pages = {1272-1297}, key = {inequality}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.03} } @ARTICLE{BaBa:99, author = {Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu and Bandyopadhyay, Sudeshna Chapati}, title = {Illegal immigration: a supply side analysis}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {57}, pages = {343-360}, number = {2}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{BaCo:06, author = {Bandyopadhyay, S. and Cowell, F.}, title = {Vulnerable Households and Variable Incomes}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {2006}, volume = {13}, pages = {3-30}, key = {Household}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @TECHREPORT{BaCo:05VH, author = {Bandyopadhyay, S. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Vulnerable Households and Variable Incomes}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {2005}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {79}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {income dynamics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.03.16} } @ARTICLE{BaEl:86SI, author = {Bane, M. J. and Ellwood, D. T.}, title = {Slipping into and out of Poverty: The Dynamics of Spells}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1986}, volume = {21}, pages = {1-23}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Bane1985, author = {Bane, M. J. and Ellwood, D. T.}, title = {Slipping into and out of Poverty: The Dynamics of Spells}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1985}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Bane:00, author = {Banerjee,A.}, title = {The Two Poverties}, institution = {MIT, Department of Economics}, year = {2000}, abstract = {There are at least two distinct and inconsistent view of poverty. Theseviews, which can be called "poverty as desperation" and "poverty as vulnerability",have different implications about anti-poverty policy. It is importantto confront the conflict between them before data can be applied to tellwhether any of the views are right or even interesting.}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{BaBe:89, author = {Banerjee, Anindya and Beggs, Alan}, title = {Efficiency in Hierarchies: Implementing the First-Best Solution by SequentialActions}, journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics}, year = {1989}, volume = {20}, pages = {637-645}, number = {4}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{BaDoGaHe:93, title = {Co-integration, Error Correction and the Econometric Analysis of Non-Stationary Data}, publisher = {OUP}, year = {1993}, author = {Banerjee, A. and Dolado, J.J. and Galbraith, J.W. and Hendry, D.F.}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.03} } @ARTICLE{BaDu:03, author = {Banerjee, A. and Duflo, E.}, title = {Inequality and Growth: What can the data say?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Growth}, year = {2003}, volume = {8}, pages = {267-299}, key = {inequality}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.03} } @ARTICLE{BaPi:05, author = {Banerjee,A. and Piketty,T.}, title = {Top Indian Incomes, 1922-2000}, journal = {World Bank Economic Review}, year = {2005}, volume = {19}, pages = {1-20}, abstract = {This article presents data on the evolution of top incomes and wages for 1922– 2000 in India using individual tax return data. The data show that the shares of the top 0.01 percent, 0.1 percent, and 1 percent in total income shrank substantially from the 1950s to the early to mid-1980s but then rose again, so that today these shares are only slightly below what they were in the 1920s and 1930s. This U-shaped pattern is broadly consistent with the evolution of economic policy in India: From the 1950s to the early to mid-1980s was a period of ‘‘socialist’’ policies in India, whereas the subsequent period, starting with the rise of Rajiv Gandhi, saw a gradual shift toward more probusiness policies. Although the initial share of the top income group was small, the fact that the rich were getting richer had a nontrivial impact on the overall income distribution. Although the impact is not large enough to fully explain the gap observed during the 1990s between average consumption growth shown in National Sample Survey–based data and the national accounts–based data, it is sufficiently large to explain a nonnegligible part of it (20–40 percent).}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.07.31} } @TECHREPORT{BaPi:03, author = {Banerjee, A. and Piketty, T.}, title = {Top {I}ndian Incomes, 1956-2000}, institution = {EHESS}, year = {2002}, type = {mimeo}, abstract = {This paper presents data on the evolution of top incomes and wages from1956 to 2000 in India using individual tax returns data. Our data showsthat the shares of the top 0.01%, the top 0.1% and the top 1% in totalincome, shrank very substantially until the early to mid 1980s but thenwent back up again, so that today these shares are only slightly belowwhat they were in 1956. We argue that this U-shaped pattern is broadlyconsistent with the evolution of economic policy in India: The period from1956 to the early to mid 1980s was also the period of “socialist” policiesin India, while the subsequent period, starting with the rise of RajivGandhi, saw a gradual shift towards more probusiness policies. Althoughthe initial share of this group was small, the fact that the rich weregetting richer had a non-trivial impact on the overall income distribution.In particular, its impact is not large enough to fully explain the gapbetween average consumption growth in survey-based NSS data and the Nationalaccounts based NAS data, but is sufficientely large to explain a non-negligiblepart of it (between 20% and 40%).}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{BaDu:07, author = {Banerjee, A. V. and Duflo, E.}, title = {The Economic Lives of the Poor}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2007}, volume = {21}, pages = {141-167}, abstract = {In what turned out to be a rhetorical master-move, the 1990 World Development Report from the World Bank defined the “extremely poor” people of the world as those who are currently living on no more than $1 per day per person, measured at the 1985 purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate. In 1993, the poverty line was updated to $1.08 per person per day at the 1993 PPP exchange rate, which is the line we use in this paper. Poverty lines have always existed—indeed $1 per day was chosen in part because of its proximity to the poverty lines used by many poor countries.1 However the $1-a-day poverty line has come to dominate the conversations about poverty to a remarkable extent. But how actually does one live on less than $1 per day? This essay is about the economic lives of the extremely poor: the choices they face, the constraints they grapple with, and the challenges they meet. The available evidence on the economic lives of the extremely poor is incomplete in many important ways. However, a number of recent data sets and a body of new research have added a lot to what we know about their lives, and taken together there is enough to start building an image of the way the extremely poor live their lives.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @TECHREPORT{BaIySo:08, author = {Banerjee, A. V. and Iyer, L. and Somanathan, R.}, title = {Public Action for Public Goods}, institution = {Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {07-05}, address = {Room E52-251 50 Memorial Drive Cambridge, MA 02142}, abstract = {This paper focuses on the relationship between public action and access to public goods. It begins by developing a simple model of collective action which is intended to capture the various mechanisms that are discussed in the theoretical literature on collective action. We argue that several of these intuitive theoretical arguments rely on special additional assumptions that are often not made clear. We then review the empirical work based on the predictions of these models of collective action. While the available evidence is generally consistent with these theories, there is a dearth of quality evidence. Moreover, a large part of the variation in access to public goods seems to have nothing to do with the ?bottom-up? forces highlighted in these models and instead reflect more ?top-down? interventions. We conclude with a discussion of some of the historical evidence on top-down interventions.}, key = {public goods}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @ARTICLE{BaNe:98, author = {Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Newman, Andrew F.}, title = {Information, the dual economy and development}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {631-653}, number = {4}, key = {development} } @TECHREPORT{BaWe:07, author = {Bankman, Joseph and Weisbach, David}, title = {Consumption Taxation Is Still Superior to Income Taxation}, institution = {University of Chicago Law School}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {358}, abstract = {This essay responds to an article by Daniel Shaviro which argues in part that the failure of empirical assumptions behind the permanent income hypothesis undermines the case for preferring consumption taxation over income taxation. We consider each of Shaviro’s arguments and conclude that none change the basic considerations in favor of consumption taxation in any significant way. Shaviro concludes that administrability and implementation concerns should be central to the choice of the tax base and that these concerns are likely to point to taxing consumption. We agree with this conclusion.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{BaBl:05, author = {Banks, J. and Blundell, R.}, title = {Private Pension Arrangements and Retirement in Britain}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2005}, volume = {26}, pages = {35-53}, key = {pensions}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.20} } @ARTICLE{BaBlLe:96, author = {Banks, J. and Blundell, R. and Lewbel, A.}, title = {Tax Reform and Welfare Measurement: Do We Need Demand System Estimation?}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1996}, volume = {106}, pages = {1227-1241}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Banks1996, author = {Banks, J. and Blundell, R. and Lewbel, A.}, title = {Tax Reform and Welfare Measurement: Do We Need Demand System Estimation?}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1996}, volume = {106}, pages = {1227-1241}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BaBlSm:00, author = {Banks, J. and Blundell, R. and Smith, J. P.}, title = {Wealth Inequality in the {U}nited {S}tates and {G}reat {B}ritain}, institution = {The Institute For Fiscal Studies}, year = {2000}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {20}, address = {Ridgmount St. London}, abstract = {In this paper, we document in detail differences in the US and UK wealthdistributions, particularly in the dimensions outlined above. We also attemptto shed light on potential explanations for these differences. To the extentthat possible explanations are limited by data availability, we also discusswhat data would be needed to improve our understanding of these issues.}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{BaBlTa:98, author = {Banks, J. and Blundell, R. and Tanner, S.}, title = {Is there a Retirement-Savings Puzzle?}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {88}, pages = {769-788}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.24} } @TECHREPORT{BaDi:08, author = {Banks, J. and Diamond, P.A.}, title = {The base for direct taxation}, institution = {Massachusetts Institute of Technology}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {08-11}, address = {Room E52-251 50 Memorial Drive Cambridge, MA 02142}, month = {March}, key = {taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.18} } @TECHREPORT{BaDL:94, author = {Banks, J. and Dilnot, A. and Low, H.}, title = {The Distribution of Wealth in the {UK}}, institution = {Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {1994}, type = {Commentary}, number = {45}, address = {London}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{BaEm:00, author = {Banks, J. and Emmerson, C.}, title = {Public and Private Pension Spending: Principles, Practice and the Need forReform}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2000}, volume = {21}, pages = {1-63}, key = {pensions} } @ARTICLE{Banks2000, author = {Banks, J. and Emmerson, C.}, title = {Public and Private Pension Spending: Principles, Practice and the Need for Reform}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2000}, volume = {21}, pages = {1-63}, key = {pensions}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BaEmTe:05, author = {Banks, J. and Emmerson, C. and Tetlow, G.}, title = {Estimating pension wealth of {ELSA} respondents}, institution = {The Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {2005}, type = {IFS Working Paper}, number = {05/09}, key = {wealth}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.01}, url = {http://www.ifs.org.uk/wps/wp0509.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{BaJo:93, author = {J. Banks and P. Johnson}, title = {Children and Household Living Standards}, institution = {Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {1993}, type = {working paper}, key = {household} } @ARTICLE{BaWa:08, author = {Banzhaf, H. S. and Walsh R. P.}, title = {Do People Vote with Their Feet? An Empirical Test of Tiebout’s Mechanism}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {98}, pages = {843-863}, number = {3}, abstract = {Charles Tiebout’s suggestion that people “vote with their feet” for communities with optimal bundles of taxes and public goods has played a central role in local public finance for over 50 years. Using a locational equilibrium model, we derive formal tests of his premise. The model predicts increased population density in neighborhoods experiencing exogenous improvements in public goods and, for large improvements, increased relative mean incomes. We test these hypotheses in the context of changing air quality. Our results provide strong empirical support for the notion that households “vote with their feet” for environmental quality.}, key = {voting}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.06} } @ARTICLE{BaBuMaRo:95, author = {Bar-Or, Yuval and Burbidge, John and Magee, Lonnie and Robb, A. Leslie,}, title = {The Wage Premium to a University Education in {C}anada 1971-1991,}, journal = {Journal of Labor Economics}, year = {1995,}, volume = {13,}, pages = {752-94}, key = {education,training} } @ARTICLE{Barb:00, author = {Barbanel, J.}, title = {On the Structure of Pareto Optimal Cake Partitions}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {33,4}, pages = {401-424}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Barb:99, author = {Barbanel, J.}, title = {Partition Ratios, Pareto Optimal Cake Division and Related Notions}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {401-428}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{BaJa:94, author = {Barber{\`a}, S. and Jackson, M.}, title = {A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economieswith Public Goods}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1994}, volume = {11}, pages = {241-252}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Barber`a1994, author = {Barber{\`a}, S. and Jackson, M.}, title = {A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Public Goods}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1994}, volume = {11}, pages = {241-252}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BaImMa:07, author = {Barcena-Martin, Elena and Imedio-Olmendo, Luis and Martin-Reyes Guillermina}, title = {Inequality and deprivation within and between groups: An illustration of European union countries}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2007}, volume = {5}, pages = {323-337}, abstract = {This paper broadens the approach of Hey and Lambert (Q. J. Econ. 95,567–573, 1980) regarding relative deprivation to the case in which individuals compare themselves with individuals belonging not only to their own group, but also to other groups. In this way, we obtain the average deprivation of a population in relation to another. This allows us to establish a correspondence between the decomposition of the Gini coefficient based on a partition of the population, and the decomposition of deprivation into two components. One quantifies deprivation within the subpopulation and the other deprivation between populations. An empirical illustration is given, based on the European Community Household Panel (ECHP).}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Between-groups deprivation, Decomposition of the Gini coefficient, ECHP, Within-group deprivation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @TECHREPORT{BaJe:04, author = {Bardasi, E and Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Documentation for Derived Current and Annual Net Household Income Variables}, institution = {Institute for Social and Economic Research}, year = {2004}, type = {mimeo}, address = {University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ}, key = {mobility} } @TECHREPORT{BaJeRi:99, author = {Bardasi, E. and Jenkins, S. P. and Rigg, J. A.}, title = {Documentation for Derived Current and Annual Net Household Income Variables, {BHPS} Waves 1-7}, institution = {Institute for Social and Economic Research}, year = {1999}, type = {ISER working paper}, number = {99-25}, abstract = {This document provides information about a set of derived variables to accompany BHPS waves 1-7. The variables, available for each wave, are estimates of current household net income and annual household net income and some of their components, together with variables which classify persons according to family type and economic status of the family to which they belong. http://www.iser.esse ... paps/pdf/1999-25.pdf}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.11.12} } @ARTICLE{BaGhKa:07, author = {Bardhan, Pranab and Ghatak, Maitreesh and Karaivanov, Alexander}, title = {Wealth inequality and collective action}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {1843-1874}, abstract = {We study the effect of inequality in the distribution of endowments of private inputs (e.g., land, wealth) that are complementary in production with collective inputs (e.g., contribution to public goods such as irrigation and extraction from common-property resources) on efficiency in a class of collective action problems. We focus on characterizing the joint surplus maximizing level of inequality, making due distinction between contributors and non-contributors, in a framework that allows us to consider a wide variety of collective action problems ranging from pure public goods to impure public goods to commons. We show that while efficiency increases with greater equality within the groups of contributors and noncontributors, so long the externalities (positive or negative) are significant, there is an optimal degree of inequality between these groups.}, key = {Wealth Inequality}, keywords = {Collective action, Inequality, Public goods}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{BaBeBeBlCaChLaLeMoMyRuVe:06, author = {Bargain, O. and Beblo, M. and Beninger, D. and Blundell, R. and Carrasco, R. and Chiuri, M. and Laisney, F. and Lechene, V. and Moreau, N. and Myck, M. and Ruiz-{C}astillo, J. and Vermeulen, F.}, title = {Does the Representation of Household Behavior Matter for the Welfare Analysis of Tax-Benefit Policies? An Introduction}, journal = {Rev Econ Household}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {99-111}, key = {household}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @TECHREPORT{BaCa:07, author = {Bargain, Olivier and Callan, Tim}, title = {Analysing the Effects of Tax-Benefit Reforms on Income Distribution: A Decomposition Approach}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {3078}, abstract = {To assess the impact of tax-benefit policy changes on income distribution over time, we suggest a methodology based on counterfactual simulations. We start by decomposing changes in inequality/poverty indices into three contributions: reforms of the tax-benefit structure (rules, rates, etc.), changes in nominal levels of market incomes and tax-benefit parameters (benefit amounts, tax bands, etc.), and all other changes in the underlying population (market income inequality, demographic composition, employment level, etc.). Then, the decomposition helps to extract an absolute measure of the impact of tax-benefit changes on inequality when evaluated against a distributionally-neutral benchmark, i.e., a situation where tax-benefit parameters are adjusted in line with income growth. We apply this measure to assess recent policy changes in twelve European countries. Finally, the full decomposition allows quantifying the relative role of policy changes compared to all other factors. We provide an illustration for France and Ireland and check the sensitivity of the results to the decomposition order.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {tax-benefit policy, inequality, poverty, decomposition, microsimulation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{BaBo:98, author = {Barham, Bradford and Boucher, Stephen}, title = {Migration, remittances and inequality: estimating the net effects of migrationon income distribution}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {55}, pages = {307-334}, number = {2}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{BaBoMaPe:97, author = {Barham, V. and Boadway, R. and Marchand, M. and Pestieau, P.}, title = {Volunteer work and club size: {N}ash Equilibrium and optimality}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {9-22}, key = {public goods} } @INCOLLECTION{BaWo:98, author = {Barham, Vicky and Wooders, Myrna H.}, title = {First and second welfare theorems for economies with collective goods}, booktitle = {Topics in Public Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Pines, David and Sadka, Efraim and Zilcha, Itzhak}, chapter = {3}, pages = {57-88}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Barl:00, author = {Barla, P.}, title = {Firm Size Inequality and Market Power}, journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization}, year = {2000}, volume = {18}, pages = {693-722}, key = {industry} } @TECHREPORT{Barlevy2004, author = {Barlevy, Gadi and Tsiddon, Daniel}, title = {Earnings Inequality and the Business Cycle}, institution = {National Bureau for Economic Research}, year = {2004}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {10469}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, abstract = {Economists have long viewed recessions as contributing to increasing inequality. However, this conclusion is largely based on data from a period in which inequality was increasing over time. This paper examines the connection between long-run trends and cyclical variation in earnings inequality. We develop a model in which cyclical and trend inequality are related, and find that in our model, recessions tend to amplify long-run trends, i.e. they involve more rapidly increasing inequality more when long-run inequality is increasing, and more rapidly decreasing inequality when long-run inequality is decreasing. In support of this prediction, we present evidence that during the first half of the 20th Century when earnings inequality was generally declining, earnings disparities indeed appeared to fall more rapidly in downturns, at least among workers at the top of the earnings distribution.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BaTs:04, author = {Barlevy,G. and Tsiddon,D.}, title = {Earning Inequality and The Business Cycle}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, abstract = {Economists have long viewed recessions as contributing to increasing inequality.However, this conclusion is largely based on data from a period in whichinequality was increasing over time. This paper examines the connectionbetween long-run trends and cyclical variation in earnings inequality.We develop a model in which cyclical and trend inequality are related,and find that in our model, recessions tend to amplify long-run trends,i.e. they involve more rapidly increasing inequality more when long-runinequality is increasing, and more rapidly decreasing inequality when long-runinequality is decreasing. In support of this prediction, we present evidencethat during the first half of the 20th Century when earnings inequalitywas generally declining, earnings disparities indeed appeared to fall morerapidly in downturns, at least among workers at the top of the earningsdistribution.}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Barn:92, author = {Barnett, V.}, title = {Unusual Outliers}, booktitle = {Data Analysis and Statistical Inference, Festschrift in Honour of {P}rof.{D}r. {F}riedhelm {E}icker}, publisher = {Joseph Eul Verlag}, year = {1992}, editor = {Schach, S. and Trenkler, G.}, pages = {93-113}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Baron1982, author = {Baron, D.P. and R.B. Myerson}, title = {Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1982}, volume = {50}, pages = {911-930}, key = {contract}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BaMy:82, author = {Baron, D. and Myerson, R. B.}, title = {Regulating a monopoly with unknown costs}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1982}, volume = {50}, pages = {911-930}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{BaMc:04, author = {Baron,J. and McCaffery,E.}, title = {Masking Redistribution (or its Absence)}, institution = {University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law \& Economics}, year = {2004}, type = {Research Paper}, number = {04-09}, address = {Univ. of Penn. Institute for Law and Economics 3400 Chestnut St. Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA}, month = {July}, abstract = {Research has shown that people vary widely in their support or oppositionto progressive taxation. We argue here that the perception of progressivenessitself is affected by the nature of the tax system and by the way it isframed, or presented. Experiments conducted over the World-Wide Web andusing within-subject design demonstrate that subjects suffer from a rangeof heuristics and biases in understanding and supporting progressive orredistributive taxation. After reviewing some prior results, we reportfour new studies. Two of them indicate that people do not sufficientlyappreciate the reduction of progressiveness that results from the use oftax deductions to partly reimburse private expenditures. The other twoindicate that people do not fully appreciate the reduction in progressivenessthat results from cuts in government services.}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Ba:06, author = {Barr, N.}, title = {Pensions: An Overview of the Issues}, journal = {Oxford Review of Economic Policy}, year = {2006}, volume = {22}, pages = {1-14}, number = {1}, abstract = {Many countries face increasing fiscal problems financing pensions in the face of population aging. There is controversy about the underlying economic theory, about the extent of the problem, and about the best mix of policies to protect old-age security. This paper establishes the areas of debate; gives thumbnail descriptions of pension arrangements in different countries; discusses the main analytical and empirical issues relevant to thinking about pension design; and assesses a range of policy directions. The main conclusions are that what matters most is effective government and economic growth; that the debate between pay-as-you-go and funding is secondary; that good pension schemes can take many forms; and that there is a problem in financing pensions, but not a crisis.}, key = {pensions}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @ARTICLE{Barr:92, author = {Barr, N. A.}, title = {Economic theory and the welfare state: A survey and interpretation}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1992}, volume = {30}, pages = {741-803}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{BaDi:06, author = {Barr, N and Diamond, P.}, title = {The Economics of Pensions}, journal = {Oxford Review of Economic Policy}, year = {2006}, volume = {22}, pages = {15-39}, number = {1}, abstract = {This paper sets out the economic analytics of pensions. After introductory discussion, successive sections consider the effects of different pension arrangements on labour markets, on national savings and growth, and on the distribution of burdens and benefits. These areas are controversial and politically highly salient. While we are open about expressing our own views, the main purpose of the paper is to set out the analytical process by which we reach them, to enable readers to form their own conclusions.}, key = {pensions}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @ARTICLE{Barr:99EC, author = {Barreto, R. A.}, title = {Endogenous Corruption in a Neoclassical Growth Model}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {44}, pages = {35-60}, key = {corruption} } @ARTICLE{BaSw:05, author = {Barrett, C. and Swallow, B.}, title = {Fractal Poverty Traps}, year = {2005}, note = {Department of Applied Economics and Management 315 Warren Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-7801 USA}, abstract = {This paper offers an informal theory of a special sort of poverty trap, one in which multiple dynamic equilibria exist simultaneously at multiple (micro, meso and/or macro) scales of analysis and are self-reinforcing through feedback effects. Small adjustments at any one of these levels are unlikely to move the system away from its dominant, stable dynamic equilibrium. Governments, markets and communities s are simultaneously weak in places characterized by fractal poverty traps. No unit operates at a high-level equilibrium in such a system. All seem simultaneously trapped in low-level equilibria. The fractal poverty traps formulation suggests four interrelated strategic emphases for poverty reduction strategies.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @ARTICLE{BaDo:03, author = {Barrett, G. and Donald, S.}, title = {Consistent Tests for Stochastic Dominance}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2003}, volume = {71}, pages = {71-104}, key = {bootstrap}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{BaSa:98, author = {Barrett, R. and Salles, M.}, title = {On Three Classes of Differentiable Inequality Measures}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {39}, pages = {611-621}, key = {inequality}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{BaSa:95, author = {Barrett, R. and Salles, M.}, title = {On a Generalisation of the Gini Coefficient}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1995}, volume = {30}, pages = {235-244}, key = {income distribution}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{Barr:00, author = {Barro, R.}, title = {Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries}, journal = {Journal of Economic Growth}, year = {2000}, volume = {5}, pages = {5-32}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.03} } @ARTICLE{BaMaSM:95, author = {Barro, R.J. and Mankiw, G. and {Sala-i-Martin}, X.}, title = {Capital mobility and economic growth}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {85}, pages = {103-115}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{BaSM:92, author = {Barro, R.J. and {Sala-i-Martin}, X.}, title = {Convergence}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1992}, volume = {100}, pages = {223-251}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Barr:99BE, author = {Pedro P. Barros}, title = {Budget Effects of Health Care `vouchers'}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {62}, pages = {229-235}, number = {2}, key = {health} } @BOOK{Barr:73, title = {The Liberal Theory of Justice}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1973}, author = {Barry, Brian M.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{BaFeGiMa:79SL, title = {Soviet Law After {S}talin, Law in Eastern {E}urope}, publisher = {Sijthoff and Noordhoff}, year = {1979}, author = {Barry, D. B. and Feldbrugge, G. J. M. and Ginsburgs, G. and Maggs, P. B.}, volume = {20}, address = {Germantown, Maryland}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{BaJuKiSh:97, author = {Barsky, R. B. and Juster, F. T. and Kimball, M. S. and Shapiro, M. D.}, title = {Preference parameters and behavioral heterogeneity : An Experimental Approachin the Health and Retirement Survey}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {112}, pages = {537-579.}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Barsky1997, author = {Barsky, R. B. and Juster, F. T. and Kimball, M. S. and Shapiro, M. D.}, title = {Preference parameters and behavioral heterogeneity : An Experimental Approach in the Health and Retirement Survey}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {112}, pages = {537-579.}, key = {risk}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BaKiJuSh:95, author = {Robert B. Barsky and Miles S. Kimball and F. Thomas Juster and Matthew D.Shapiro}, title = {Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity :An Experimental Approachin the Health and Retirement Survey}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {1995}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {5213}, month = {August}, key = {uncertainty} } @TECHREPORT{Barsky1995, author = {Robert B. Barsky and Miles S. Kimball and F. Thomas Juster and Matthew D. Shapiro}, title = {Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity :An Experimental Approach in the Health and Retirement Survey}, institution = {National Bureau for Economic Research}, year = {1995}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {5213}, month = {August}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Bartels1977, author = {Bartels, C. P. A. and Vries, O. M.}, title = {Succinct analytical descriptions of income distributions using transformation functions}, journal = {Economie Appliqu\'ee}, year = {1977}, volume = {30}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BaVr:77, author = {Bartels, C. P. A. and Vries, O. M.}, title = {Succinct analytical descriptions of income distributions using transformationfunctions}, journal = {Economie Appliqu{\'e}e}, year = {1977}, volume = {30}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Bart:00, author = {Bartlett, Bruce}, title = {Death, Wealth and Taxes}, journal = {The Public Interest}, year = {2000}, pages = {1-13}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Bart:99, author = {William Alan Bartley}, title = {Will Rationing Guns Reduce Crime}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {62}, pages = {241-243}, number = {2}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{deBa:90, author = {de Bartolome, C. A. M.}, title = {Equilibrium and Efficiency in a Community Model with Peer Group Effects}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1990}, volume = {98}, pages = {110-133}, key = {social custom} } @ARTICLE{BaHaJoSl:90, author = {Basmann, R. L. and Hayes, K. J. and Johnson, J. D. and Slottje, D. J.}, title = {A General Functional Form for Approximating the {L}orenz Curve}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1990}, volume = {43}, pages = {77-90}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{BaHaSl:91, author = {Basmann, R. L. and Hayes, K. J. and Slottje, D. J.}, title = {The {L}orenz curve and the mobility function}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1991}, volume = {35}, pages = {105-111}, key = {mobility} } @TECHREPORT{BaSl:88, author = {Basmann, R. L. and Slottje, D. J.}, title = {Some new weighted geometric mean measures of inequality and their relationsto several well-known measures}, year = {1988}, type = {SMU discussion paper}, number = {8711}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BaSl:87AN, author = {Basmann, R. L. and Slottje, D. J.}, title = {A new index of income inequality - the {B} measure}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1987}, volume = {24}, pages = {385-389}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BaBu:99, author = {Bassett, W. F. and Burkett, J. P. and Putterman, L.}, title = {Income Distribution, Government Transfers and the Problem of Unequal Influence}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {207-228}, abstract = {Several papers in the literature have posited that inequality hinders growth by leading to high distorting taxes and transfers. We retest whether inequality and transfers are positively linked, using several alternative definitions and data sets including new income data assembled by the World Bank. We correct an error in a result of Persson and Tabellini [Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1994. Is inequality harmful for growth? American Economic Review, 84, 600–621]; we show that the relationship across mixed country samples is, if anything, negative; and we confirm Perotti’s [Perotti, R., 1996. Growth, income distribution, and democracy: what the data say, Journal of Economic Growth, 1, 149–187] finding that this relationship weakens or disappears when population structure (proportion over 65) is controlled for. We also introduce two alternative theories of the distribution-transfers link that allow political influence to be a function of income.}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Bassett1999, author = {Bassett, W. F., and Burkett, J. P., and Putterman, L.}, title = {Income Distribution, Government Transfers, and the Problem of Unequal Influence}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {207-228}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BaPh:06, author = {Bassetto, M. and Phelan, C.}, title = {Tax Riots}, institution = {Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {WP-06-04}, address = {Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Research Department}, month = {May}, abstract = {This paper considers an optimal taxation environment where household income is private information, and the government randomly audits and punishes households found to be underreporting. We prove that the optimal mechanism derived using standard mechanism design techniques has a bad equilibrium (a tax riot) where households underreport their incomes, precisely because other households are expected to do so as well. We then consider three alternative approaches to designing a tax scheme when one is worried about bad equilibria.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @TECHREPORT{BaFa:91, author = {Bassini, A. and de Falguerolles, A.}, title = {Exploratory multivariate analysis of income inequality: A review}, year = {1991}, type = {mimeo}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Basu:94, author = {Basu, K.}, title = {On Interpersonal Comparison and the Concept of Equality}, booktitle = {Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Spring Verlag}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, pages = {491-510}, key = {equality} } @ARTICLE{Basu:87, author = {Basu, K.}, title = {Axioms for a fuzzy measure of inequality}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1987}, volume = {14}, pages = {275-288}, number = {12}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Basu:85, author = {Basu, K.}, title = {Poverty measurement: a decomposition of the normalization axiom}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1985}, volume = {53}, pages = {1439-1443}, number = {11}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{BaFo:98, author = {Basu, K. and Foster, J. E.}, title = {On measuring literacy}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1998}, volume = {108}, pages = {1733-1749}, number = {451}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{PaGu:07, author = {Basu, Parantap and Guariglia, Alessandra}, title = {Foreign Direct Investment, inequality, and growth}, journal = {Journal of Macroeconomics}, year = {2007}, volume = {29}, pages = {824-839}, abstract = {This paper examines the interactions between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), inequality, and growth, both from an empirical and a theoretical point of view. Using a panel of 119 developing countries, we observe that FDI promotes both inequality and growth, and tends to reduce the share of agriculture to GDP in the recipient country. We then set up a growth model of a dual economy in which the traditional (agricultural) sector uses a diminishing returns technology, while FDI is the engine of growth in the modern (industrial) sector. The main predictions of the model are consistent with the stylized facts observed in the data.}, key = {Foreign Direct Investment}, keywords = {Foreign Direct Investment; Inequality; Growth}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @BOOK{Batc:71, title = {The Economics of Poverty}, publisher = {Wiley}, year = {1971}, author = {Batchelder, A. B.}, address = {New York}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Batc:07, author = {Batchelder,L.L.}, title = {Taxing Privilege More Effectively: Replacing the Estate Tax with an Inheritance Tax}, institution = {Hamilton project}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion paper}, number = {2007-07}, abstract = {The repeal of the estate tax for one year only in 2010 creates vast uncertainty but also provides an opportunity to reconsider the taxation of million would include in income and pay a 15 percentage point surtax on gifts and bequests. This paper proposes replacing the estate tax with an inheritance tax. Heirs receiving lifetime inheritances greater than $2.3 the excess. The proposal would also replace stepped-up basis with carryover basis for bequests. As under the estate tax, the fraction of heirs affected would be miniscule, falling from three to two in 1,000. The proposal has a number of advantages relative to the estate tax. It would reward donors who give more broadly. It would enhance efficiency and reduce compliance costs by curbing tax planning and the rules needed to contain it. Cross-national experience also suggests it would be administrable. Most importantly, the proposal would lower taxes on heirs receiving smaller inheritances and those with moderate incomes, making the tax system better attuned to unearned advantage and ability to pay. At an individual level, the distribution of tax burdens would change considerably: only 5 percent of the estate tax rate for an heir is accounted for by her inheritance tax rate, and vice versa, and each tax would raise 14 percent of revenue from heirs facing no tax burden under the other. The proposal is revenue-neutral relative to 2009 law. A lower exemption would raise more revenue and bring the tax rate on inherited income closer to the income tax rate on noninherited income, which is about three times higher.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @BOOK{BaCaDaHaHaHeJoLoMoOzPeSuSw:02, title = {Economic Valuation with Stated Preference Techniques}, publisher = {Edward Elgar }, year = {2002}, author = {Bateman,I. Carson,R. Day,B. Hanemann,M. Hanley,N. Hett,T. Jones-Lee,M. Loomes,G.Mourato,S, Ozdemiroglu,E. Pearce,D. Sugden,D. and Swanson,J.}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Batl:08, author = {Batley, Richard}, title = {On Ordinal Utility, Cardinal Utility, and Random Utility}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {2008}, volume = {64}, pages = {37-63}, abstract = {Though the Random Utility Model (RUM) was conceived entirely in terms of ordinal utility, the apparatus through which it is widely practised exhibits properties of cardinal utility. The adoption of cardinal utility as a working operation of ordinal is perfectly valid, provided interpretations drawn from that operation remain faithful to ordinal utility. The article considers whether the latter requirement holds true for several measurements commonly derived from RUM. In particular it is found that measurements of consumer surplus change may depart from ordinal utility, and exploit the cardinality inherent in the practical apparatus.}, key = {Utility}, keywords = {Ordinal utility, Cardinal utility, Random Utility Model, Log sum, Rule-of-a-half}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{Bato:58, author = {Bator, F. M.}, title = {The anatomy of market failure}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1958}, volume = {72}, pages = {351 - 378}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{BaCo:08, author = {Battaglini, Marco and Coate, Stephen}, title = {Pareto efficient income taxation with stochastic abilities}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {844-868}, abstract = {This paper studies Pareto efficient income taxation in an economy with finitely-lived individuals whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two-state Markov process. The study yields three main results. First, when individuals are riskneutral, in any period the only individuals whose earnings are distorted are those who currently are and have always been low ability. In addition, the degree to which these perpetual low ability types have their earnings distorted decreases over time, converging to zero if the time horizon is long enough. Second, the earnings distortions are continuous with respect to the degree of risk aversion at the risk neutral solution. Third, Pareto efficient income tax systems can be time consistent even when the degree of correlation in ability types is large. The condition for time consistency suggests a novel theoretical reason why the classic equity–efficiency trade off may be steeper in a dynamic environment than previously thought.}, key = {Pareto}, keywords = {Optimal taxation, New dynamic public finance}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{BaDu:08, author = {Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Dufwenberg, Martin}, title = {Dynamic psychological games}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2008}, volume = {In Press}, pages = {--}, abstract = {The motivation of decision makers who care for various emotions, intentions-based reciprocity, or the opinions of others may depend directly on beliefs (about choices, beliefs, or information). Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti [J. Geanakoplos, D. Pearce, E. Stacchetti, Psychological games and sequential rationality, Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 60-79] point out that traditional game theory is ill-equipped to address such matters, and they pioneer a new framework which does. However, their toolbox - psychological game theory - incorporates several restrictions that rule out plausible forms of belief-dependent motivation. Building on recent work on dynamic interactive epistemology, we propose a more general framework. Updated higher-order beliefs, beliefs of others, and plans of action may influence motivation, and we can capture dynamic psychological effects (such as sequential reciprocity, psychological forward induction, and regret) that were previously ruled out. We develop solution concepts, provide examples, explore properties, and suggest avenues for future research.}, doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.004}, keywords = {Psychological games, Belief-dependent motivation, Extensive-form solution concepts, Dynamic interactive epistemology}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.06.16} } @ARTICLE{BaMa:92, author = {Bauer, J. and Mason, A.}, title = {THE DISTRlBUTION OF INCOME AND WEALTH IN JAPAN}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1992}, volume = {38}, pages = {403-428}, abstract = {This paper reviews research on the distribution of income and wealth in Japan, identifies sources of data on income and wealth, and describes limitations of these data. Evidence that Japan's poorest income groups are relatively well-off is convincing, but there is less evidence that the overall distribution of income in Japan is more equal than in other OECD countries. Agricultural policy, social welfare policy, the tax system, trends in earnings differentials, and the role of the Japanese family are among the many factors that have shaped Japan's income distribution. The rapid appreciation of the stock market and land prices during the late 1980s led to greater inequality in the distribution of wealth. Rapid population aging is expected to lead to an increase in total national wealth relative to national income which may have an adverse impact on the distribution of income.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.07.31} } @ARTICLE{BaPr:73, author = {Bauer, P. T. and Prest, A. R.}, title = {Income differences and inequalities}, journal = {Moorgate and Wall Street}, year = {1973}, volume = {Autumn}, pages = {22-43}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Baum:87, author = {Baum, S. R.}, title = {On the measurement of tax progressivity: relative share adjustment}, journal = {Public Finance Quarterly}, year = {1987}, volume = {15}, number = {4}, note = {also in Eichhorn W:Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality - SpringerVerlag, 166-187, 1994}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Baum:07, author = {Baumol, William}, title = {On income distribution and growth}, journal = {Journal of Policy Modeling}, year = {2007}, volume = {29}, pages = {545-548}, abstract = {The notion that substantial inequality is a stimulus to growth is extremely questionable. It is noted that a highly impoverished sector of the population reduces the productivity of the labor force. Moreover, the evidence that independent inventors and innovative entrepreneurs as a group receive compensation below those of equally educated employees indicates that disproportionate earnings are a questionable incentive.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Sources of inequality; Poverty and growth; Inequality and growth}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{Bave:96, author = {Bavetta, Sebastiano}, title = {Individual liberty, control and the `freedom of choice literature'}, journal = {Notizie di Politeia}, year = {1996}, volume = {12}, pages = {23-30}, number = {43/44}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{BaDe:96, author = {Bavetta, Sebastiano and Del Seta, Marco}, title = {Rough Set Approximations and Freedom of Choice}, institution = {Centre for the Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences, LSE}, year = {1996}, type = {Discussion Paper Series}, number = {DP 26/96}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Bawa:75, author = {Bawa, V.}, title = {Optimal rules for ordering uncertain prospects}, journal = {Journal of Financial Economics}, year = {1975}, volume = {2}, pages = {95-121}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{Bawl:82TS, title = {The Subterranean Economy}, publisher = {McGraw-Hill}, year = {1982}, author = {Bawly, D.}, address = {New York}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Baxt:80, author = {Baxter, M. A.}, title = {Minimum-variance unbiased estimation of the parameters of the {P}areto distribution}, journal = {Metrika}, year = {1980}, volume = {27}, pages = {133-138}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Baxter1980, author = {Baxter, M. A.}, title = {Minimum-variance unbiased estimation of the parameters of the {P}areto distribution}, journal = {Metrika}, year = {1980}, volume = {27}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BaJe:96, author = {Baxter, M. and Jermann, U.J.}, title = {Household Production and the Excess Sensitivity of Consumption to Current Income}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1996}, volume = {104}, pages = {1227-1262}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.24} } @BOOK{BaLa:83, title = {Women and Politics: The Visible Majority}, publisher = {University of Michigan}, year = {1983}, author = {Baxter, M. and Lansing, M.}, address = {Ann Arbor, Michigan}, key = {politics} } @ARTICLE{BaFr:87TE, author = {Bayar, A. and Frank, M.}, title = {The erosion of the different tax bases}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1987}, volume = {42}, pages = {341-350}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{BaMo:04, author = {Baye, Michael R. and Morgan, John}, title = {Price Dispersion in the Lab and on the Internet: Theory and Evidence}, journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {35}, pages = {449--466}, number = {3}, abstract = {Price dispersion is ubiquitous in settings that closely approximate textbook Bertrand competition. We show that only a little bounded rationality among sellers is needed to rationalize such dispersion. A variety of statistical tests, based on datasets from two independent laboratory experiments and structural estimates of the parameters of our models, suggest that bounded-rationality-based theories of price dispersion organize the data remarkably well. Evidence is also presented to suggest that the models are consistent with data from a leading Internet price comparison site.}, copyright = {Copyright © 2004 The RAND Corporation}, issn = {07416261}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Autumn, 2004}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The RAND Corporation} } @ARTICLE{Bayerforthcomming, author = {Bayer, Ralph-C.}, title = {Finding Out Who the Crooks are - Tax Evasion with Sequential Auditing}, journal = {Singapore Economic Review}, year = {forthcomming}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Baye:06, author = {Bayer, R-C.}, title = {A contest with the taxman – the impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested resources}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {50}, pages = {1071-1104}, abstract = {We develop a moral hazard model with auditing where both the principal and the agent can influence the probability that the true state of nature is verified. This setting is widely applicable for situations where fraudulent reporting with costly state verification takes place. However, we use the framework to investigate tax evasion. We model tax evasion as a concealment-detection contest between the taxpayer and the authority. We show that higher tax rates cause more evasion and increase the resources wasted in the contest. Additionally, we find conditions under which a government should enforce incentive compatible auditing in order to reduce wasted resources.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Alex}, timestamp = {2006.06.22} } @ARTICLE{Bayer2006, author = {Bayer, Ralph-C.}, title = {A Contest with the Tax Man - The Impact of Tax Rates on Tax Evasion and Wastefully Invested Resources}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {50}, pages = {1071-1104}, number = {5}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Bayer2004, author = {Bayer, Ralph-C.}, title = {Moral Constraints and the Evasion of Income Tax}, institution = {University of Adelaide}, year = {2004}, type = {School of Economics Working Paper}, number = {2004-9}, journal = {School of Economics Working Paper}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, volume = {2004-9} } @ARTICLE{Bayer2002, author = {Bayer, Ralph-C.}, title = {{Income} tax evasion, opportunities, and evasion costs}, journal = {forthcomming}, year = {2002}, institution = {STICERD}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, type = {mimeo} } @ARTICLE{BaCh:07, author = {Bayer, Ralph-C. and Chan, Mickey}, title = {Network Externalities, Demand Inertia and Dynamic Pricing in an Experimental Oligopoly Market}, journal = {Economic Record}, year = {2007}, volume = {83}, pages = {405--415}, number = {263}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.11.07} } @UNPUBLISHED{Bayer2007, author = {Bayer, Ralph-C and Chan, Mickey}, title = {The Dirty Faces Game Revisited}, note = {School of Economics Working Paper, The University of Adelaide}, year = {2007}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2007.07.31} } @TECHREPORT{BaCo:06TC, author = {Bayer, R.-C. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Tax Compliance and Firms' Strategic Interdependence}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {2006}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {81}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {Tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{BaCoFi:03, author = {Bayer, R.-C. and Cowell, F. A. and Fiorio, C.}, title = {Tax compliance and firms: an integrated analysis}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {2003}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {65}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {Tax evasion} } @UNPUBLISHED{BaKe:09, author = {Ralph-C Bayer and Ke, Changxia}, title = {Asymmetric Price Adjustment with Costly Consumer Search: a Laboratory Study}, note = {School of Economics Working Paper, Adelaide University}, year = {2009}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.01.23} } @BOOK{Bayer1997, title = {{Ein} {Verhaltensmodel} zur {Steuerhinterziehung}}, publisher = {Duncker und Humblot}, year = {1997}, author = {Bayer, Ralph-C. and Reichl, Norbert}, address = {Berlin}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INPROCEEDINGS{BaRe:07, author = {Ralph-C Bayer and Renou, Ludovic}, title = {Measuring the Depth of Iteration in Humans}, booktitle = {MODSIM 2007 International Congress on Modelling and Simulation}, year = {2007}, editor = {L. Oxley and Kulasiri, D.}, pages = {379-385}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.01.23} } @UNPUBLISHED{BaRe:08, author = {Bayer, Ralph.-C. and Renou, Ludovic}, title = {Homo Sapiens meets Homo Strategicus at the Laboratory}, note = {University of Leicester, School of Economics Working Paper}, year = {2008}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.06.18} } @ARTICLE{Bayi:98, author = {Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten}, title = {Interjurisdictional competition in emission taxes under imperfect competitionof local firms}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {14}, pages = {345-368}, number = {2}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Baze:98, title = {Judgment in Managerial Decision-Making}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1998}, author = {Bazerman, M.}, address = {New York}, edition = {fourth}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{BaSa:83, author = {Bazerman, M. H. and Samuelson, W. F.}, title = {I won the auction but {I} don't want the prize}, journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution}, year = {1983}, volume = {27}, pages = {618-634}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Bazerman1983, author = {Bazerman, M. H. and Samuelson, W. F.}, title = {I won the auction but I don't want the prize}, journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution}, year = {1983}, volume = {27}, pages = {618-634}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BeChFoSl:94, author = {Beach, C. M. and Chow, K. and Formby, J. and Slotsve, G.}, title = {Statistical inference for decile means}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1994}, volume = {45}, pages = {161-167}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{BeDa:83, author = {Beach, C. M. and Davidson, R.}, title = {Distribution-free statistical inference with {L}orenz Curves and Income Shares}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1983}, volume = {50}, pages = {723-735}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{BeDa:82, author = {Beach, C. M. and Davidson, R.}, title = {Unrestricted statistical inference with {L}orenz curves and income shares}, institution = {Queens University}, year = {1982}, number = {464}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BeKa:86, author = {Beach, C. M. and Kaliski, S. F.}, title = {{L}orenz {C}urve inference with sample weights: an application to the distributionof unemployment experience}, journal = {Applied Statistics}, year = {1986}, volume = {35}, pages = {38-45}, number = {1}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{BeRi:85, author = {Beach, C. M. and Richmond, J.}, title = {Joint confidence intervals for income shares and {L}orenz curves}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1985}, volume = {26}, pages = {439-450}, number = {6}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{BeRi:82, author = {Beach, C. M. and Richmond, J.}, title = {Joint confidence intervals for {L}orenz Curves}, institution = {Queen's University}, year = {1982}, number = {485}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Beard1994, author = {Beard, T. Randolph and Beil, Richard O., Jr.}, title = {Do People Rely on the Self-Interested Maximization of Others? An Experimental Test}, journal = {Management Science}, year = {1994}, volume = {40}, pages = {252--262}, number = {2}, abstract = {The assumption that agents engage in maximizing behavior, while ubiquitous in economic theory, differs from the assumption that agents are willing to rely on the maximizing behavior of others. This paper offers an empirical examination of this distinction using experimental methods. Utilizing a series of experimental treatments based on a simple, two player extensive form game of perfect information, we find strong evidence that apparently rational people are often unwilling to rely on the self-interested behavior of others, despite the observed near universality of maximizing play.}, copyright = {Copyright © 1994 INFORMS}, issn = {00251909}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Feb., 1994}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {INFORMS}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2632764} } @ARTICLE{BeCaRi:98, author = {Bearse, Peter and Canals, Jose and Rilstone, Paul}, title = {Consistent standard errors for semiparametric duration models with unobservedheterogeneity}, journal = {Economic Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {59}, pages = {153-156}, number = {2}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{BeFr:03, author = {Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Fried, Jesse M.}, title = {Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2003}, volume = {17}, pages = {71-92}, number = {3}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{BeKn:01, author = {Beblo, M. and Knaus, T.}, title = {Measuring Income Inequality in {E}uroland}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2001}, volume = {47}, pages = {301-320}, abstract = {In this paper we propose an aggregate measure of income inequality for the founding countries of the European Monetary Union. Applying the methodology of the Theil index we are able to derive a measure for Euroland as a whole by using complementary data from the European Community Household Panel and the Luxembourg Income Study. The property of additive decomposability allows us to determine each country’s contribution as well as that of each demographic group to overall income inequality. In addition the impact of government transfers on this inequality measure is assessed.}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.21}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2250/cgi-bin/fulltext/118996451/PDFSTART} } @ARTICLE{Bech:95, author = {Marco Becht}, title = {The Theory and Estimation of Individual and Social Welfare Measures}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {1995}, volume = {9}, pages = {53-87}, number = {1}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{BeJu:89TC, author = {Beck, P. J. and Jung, W.}, title = {Taxpayer compliance under uncertainty}, journal = {Journal of Accounting and Public Policy}, year = {1989}, volume = {8}, pages = {1-27}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{BeJu:89TP, author = {Beck, P. J. and Jung, W.}, title = {Taxpayers' reporting decisions and auditing under information asymmetry}, journal = {The Accounting Review}, year = {1989}, volume = {64}, pages = {468-487}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Beck1998, author = {Beck, Richard M.}, title = {The inefficiency of the poll tax}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {67}, pages = {241-252}, number = {2}, month = {February}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Beck:65, author = {Becker, G.S.}, title = {A Theory of the Allocation of Time}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1965}, volume = {75}, pages = {493-517}, key = {time use}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{BeMuGr:06, author = {Becker, Gary and Murphy, Kevin and Grossman, Michael}, title = {The Market for Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2006}, volume = {114}, pages = {38-60}, abstract = {This paper considers the costs of reducing consumption of a good by making its production illegal and punishing apprehended illegal producers. We use illegal drugs as a prominent example. We show that the more inelastic either demand for or supply of a good is, the greater the increase in social cost from further reducing its production by greater enforcement efforts. So optimal public expenditures on apprehension and conviction of illegal suppliers depend not only on the difference between the social and private values from consumption but also on these elasticities. When demand and supply are not too elastic, it does not pay to enforce any prohibition unless the social value is negative. We also show that a monetary tax could cause a greater reduction in output and increase in price than optimal enforcement against the same good would if it were illegal, even though some producers may go underground to avoid a monetary tax. When enforcement is costly, excise taxes and quantity restrictions are not equivalent.}, key = {Illegal Goods}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{BeMuWe:05, author = {Becker,G. and Murphy,K. and Werning,I.}, title = {The Equilibrium Distribution of Income and the Market for Status}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2005}, volume = {113}, pages = {282-310}, abstract = {This paper explores the implications for risk-taking behavior and the equilibriumdistribution of income of assuming that the desire for status positionsis a powerful motive and that it raises the marginal utility of consumption.In contrast to previous analyses, we consider the case in which statuspositions are sold in a hedonic market. We show that such a complete hedonicmarket in status positions can be perfectly replicated by a simpler arrangementwith a "status good" and a social norm that assigns higher status to thosethat consume more of this good. The main result is that for a wide rangeof initial conditions the equilibrium distribution over income, status,and consumption is the same, that this allocation requires inequality ofincome and consumption, and that this allocation coincides with the optimumof a utilitarian planner.}, key = {Income distribution} } @ARTICLE{Beck:68CA, author = {Becker, G. S.}, title = {Crime and punishment - an economic approach}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1968}, volume = {76}, pages = {169-217}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Becker1965, author = {Becker, G. S.}, title = {The economics of the allocation of time}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1965}, volume = {75}, pages = {493-517}, key = {consumption}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BePhSo:05, author = {Becker, G. S. and Philipson, T. J. and Soares, R. R.}, title = {The Quantity and Quality of Life and the Evolution of World Inequality}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2005}, volume = {95}, pages = {277-291}, abstract = {GDP per capita is usually used to proxy for the quality of life of individuals living in different countries. Welfare is also affected by quantity of life, however, as represented by longevity. This paper incorporates longevity into an overall assessment of the evolution of cross-country inequality and shows that it is quantitatively important. The absence of reduction in cross-country inequality up to the 1990s documented in previous work is in stark contrast to the reduction in inequality after incorporating gains in longevity. Throughout the post–World War II period, health contributed to reduce significantly welfare inequality across countries. This paper derives valuation formulas for infra-marginal changes in longevity and computes a “full” growth rate that incorporates the gains in health experienced by 96 countries for the period between 1960 and 2000. Incorporating longevity gains changes traditional results; countries starting with lower income tended to grow faster than countries starting with higher income. We estimate an average yearly growth in “full income” of 4.1 percent for the poorest 50 percent of countries in 1960, of which 1.7 percentage points are due to health, as opposed to a growth of 2.6 percent for the richest 50 percent of countries, of which only 0.4 percentage points are due to health. Additionally, we decompose changes in life expectancy into changes attributable to 13 broad groups of causes of death and three age groups. We show that mortality from infectious, respiratory, and digestive diseases, congenital, perinatal, and “ill-defined” conditions, mostly concentrated before age 20 and between ages 20 and 50, is responsible for most of the reduction in life expectancy inequality. At the same time, the recent effect of AIDS, together with reductions in mortality after age 50—due to nervous system, senses organs, heart and circulatory diseases—contributed to increase health inequality across countries.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.09.21}, url = {http://www.atypon-link.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/AEAP/doi/pdf/10.1257/0002828053828563} } @ARTICLE{BeTo:86, author = {Becker, G. S. and Tomes, N.}, title = {Human capital and the rise and fall of families}, journal = {Journal of Labor Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {87}, pages = {S1-S39}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @ARTICLE{Becker1979, author = {Becker, G. S. and Tomes, N.}, title = {An equilibrium theory of the distribution of income and intergenerational mobility}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1979}, volume = {87}, pages = {1153-1189}, key = {income distribution:theoretical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BeTo:79, author = {Becker, G. S. and Tomes, N.}, title = {An equilibrium theory of the distribution of income and intergenerationalmobility}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1979}, volume = {87}, pages = {1153-1189}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @TECHREPORT{BeHa:94, author = {Becker, I. and Hauser, R.}, title = {The development of the income distribution in the {F}ederal {R}epublic of{G}ermany during the seventies and eighties}, institution = {University of Frankfurt}, year = {1994}, type = {EVS-Projekt Arbeitspapier}, number = {1}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{BeFu:07, author = {Becker, Johannes and Fuest, Clemens}, title = {Tax Enforcement and Tax Havens under Formula Apportionment}, institution = {FiFo - CPE}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {07-8}, abstract = {In this paper, we consider optimal tax enforcement policy in the presence of profit shifting towards tax havens. We show that, under separate accounting, tax enforcement levels may be too high due to negative fiscal externalities. In contrast, under formula apportionment, tax enforcement is likely to be too low due to positive externalities of tax enforcement. Our results challenge recent contributions arguing that, under formula apportionment, there is a tendency towards inefficiently high levels of (effective) tax rates}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Corporate Taxation, Foreign Direct Investment}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{Beck:80, author = {Becker, R. A.}, title = {On the long-run steady state in a simple model of equilibrium with heterogeneoushouseholds}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1980}, volume = {95}, pages = {375-382}, key = {growth} } @BOOK{BeBo:97, title = {Capital Theory, Equilibrium Analysis and Recursive Utility}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {1997}, author = {Becker, R.A. and Boyd III, J. H.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{BeBuSl:87TI, author = {Becker, W. and B{\"u}chner, H-J. and Sleeking, S.}, title = {The impact of public expenditures on tax evasion: an experimental approach}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1987}, volume = {34}, pages = {243-252}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{BeBa:70, author = {Beckerman, W. and Bacon, R.}, title = {The International Distribution of Incomes}, booktitle = {Unfashionable Economics. Essays in Honour of {L}ord {B}alogh}, publisher = {Weidenfeld and Nicolson}, year = {1970}, editor = {Streeten, P.}, address = {London}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{BeGoLiWe:88, author = {Becketti, S. and Gould, W. and Lillard, L. and Welch,F.}, title = {The {PSID} after 14 years}, journal = {Journal of Labor Economics}, year = {1988}, volume = {6}, pages = {472-492}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{BCFS:94, author = {Beckman, S. And Cheng, D. And Formby, J. P. and Smith, W. J.}, title = {Preferences for income distributions and redistributions: evidence fromexperiments with real income at stake}, institution = {University of Colorado - Denver and University of Alabama}, year = {1994}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Beckman1994, author = {Beckman, S. And Cheng, D. And Formby, J. P. and Smith, W. J.}, title = {Preferences for income distributions and redistributions: evidence from experiments with real income at stake}, institution = {University of Colorado - Denver and University of Alabama}, year = {1994}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Beckman2004, author = {Beckman, S. R. and Formby, J. P. and Smith, W. J.}, title = {Efficiency, Equity and Democracy: Experimental Evidence On {O}kun's Leaky Bucket}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {2004}, volume = {11}, pages = {17-42}, key = {experimental}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BeFoSm:04, author = {Beckman, S. R. and Formby, J. P. and Smith, W. J.}, title = {Efficiency, equity and democracy: experimental evidence on {O}kun's leakybucket}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {2004}, volume = {11}, pages = {17-42}, month = {experiments} } @ARTICLE{BeFoSmZh:04, author = {Beckman, S. R. and Formby, J. P. and Smith, W. J. and Zheng, B.}, title = {Risk, inequality aversion and biases born of social position: further experimentaltests of the leaky bucket}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {2004}, volume = {12}, pages = {73-96}, key = {experiments} } @ARTICLE{BeFoSmZh:02, author = {Beckman, S. R. and Formby, J. P. and Smith, W. J. and Zheng, B.}, title = {Envy, malice and {P}areto efficiency: An experimental examination}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2002}, volume = {19}, pages = {349-367}, abstract = {Economists have long speculated that envy and malice play important rolesin economic decisions. Surprisingly little empirical evidence has beenoffered in support of such claims. This paper uses experimental and multinomiallogit techniques to estimate the effects of envy and malice in economicdecisions involving Pareto efficiency. Envy and malice turn out to be powerfulmotivations with strong differential impacts across countries and relativepositions. In some cases, opposition to Pareto gains reaches 60%. Behinda veil of ignorance, however, opposition falls to 10% overall. Pareto efficiencythus garners its greatest support under conditions which can lay claimto greatest legitimacy, those free of situational and personal bias.}, key = {experiments} } @ARTICLE{Been:04, author = {Beenstock,M.}, title = {Rank and Quantity Mobility in the Empirical Dynamics of Inequality}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2004}, volume = {50}, pages = {519-541}, abstract = {Horizontal and vertical measures of inequality are related through mobility.The paper draws attention to two types of mobility: quantity mobility,which refers to mobility in income itself, and rank mobility, which refersto mobility in the position in the distribution of income. Individuallymatched census data for earnings in Israel are used to illustrate theseconcepts empirically. Mobility is measured between 1983 and 1995. It isshown that earnings in Israel are highly mobile. The high degree of earningsmobility implies that horizontal measures of inequality considerably overstatethe underlying level of inequality. The method of errors in variables isused to distinguish between current and permanent mobility and inequality.Permanent earnings are more equal than current earnings and less mobile.Finally, the methodology is applied to PSID. It is shown that earningswere more mobile in Israel than in the United States.}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{BeGo:01, author = {Beenstock, M. and Goldin, E.}, title = {What Jackpot: The Optimal Lottery Tax}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2001}, volume = {(16) 4}, pages = {655-671}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{BeFo:65, author = {Beesley, M. E. and Foster, C. D.}, title = {The {V}ictoria Line. Social Benefits and Finances}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A}, year = {1965}, volume = {128}, pages = {67-88}, key = {cost-benefit analysis} } @BOOK{BePoTa:95, title = {From Parent to Child: Intrahousehold Allocations and Intergenerational Relationsin the {U}nited {S}tates}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, year = {1995}, author = {Behrman, J. and Pollak, R. and Taubman, P.}, address = {Chicago}, key = {household} } @ARTICLE{Behrman1994, author = {Behrman, J. E. and Rosenzweig, M. R. and Taubman, P.}, title = {Endowments and the allocation of schooling in the family and in the marriage market: the twins experiment.}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1994}, volume = {102}, pages = {1131-1174}, key = {population economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BeRoTa:94, author = {Behrman, J. E. and Rosenzweig, M. R. and Taubman, P.}, title = {Endowments and the allocation of schooling in the family and in the marriagemarket: the twins experiment}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1994}, volume = {102}, pages = {1131-1174}, key = {population economics} } @BOOK{Behrman1995, title = {From parent to child:intrahousehold allocations and intergenerational relations in the {U}nited {S}tates}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, year = {1995}, author = {Behrman, J. R. And Pollak, R. A. and Taubman, P.}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{BePT:95, title = {From parent to child:intrahousehold allocations and intergenerational relationsin the {U}nited {S}tates}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, year = {1995}, author = {Behrman, J. R. And Pollak, R. A. and Taubman, P.}, key = {wealth} } @TECHREPORT{BeRo:02, author = {Behrman, Jere R. and Rosenzweig, Mark R.}, title = {Parental Allocations to Children: New Evidence on Bequest Differences AmongSiblings}, institution = {University of Pennsylvania}, year = {2002}, type = {Penn Institute for Economic Research Working Paper}, number = {7}, abstract = {We use new survey-based data on siblings to assess the potential role ofbequests in either redistributing income among siblings or affecting offspringbehavior as implied by prominent models. The data are not focused on theupper tail of the wealth distribution and include both own and sib reportson own bequests and on sib’s bequests, enabling the use of a flexible measurementmodel. Our results indicate that bequests are received by almost two-thirdsof eligible decedents, average bequest amounts are a significant fractionof annual earnings, and there are significant differences between siblingswith respect to schooling, earnings, and visits with parents. However,there are not significant sib differences in bequests once measurementerror is incorporated into the analysis.}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{BeVyTe:96, author = {Beirlant, J. and Vynckier, P. and Teugels, J. L.}, title = {Tail index estimation, {P}areto quantile plots, and regression diagnostics}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1996}, volume = {91}, pages = {1651-1667}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{BeGa:06, author = {Belan, P. and Gauthier, S.}, title = {Optimal Indirect Taxation with a Restricted Number of Tax Rates}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {1201-1213}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{BeGaLa:08, author = {Belan, P. and Gauthier, S. and Laroque, G.}, title = {Optimal grouping of commodities for indirect taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {1738-1750}, abstract = {Indirect taxes contribute to a sizeable part of government revenues around the world. Typically there are few different tax rates, and the goods are partitioned into classes associated with each rate. The present paper studies how to group the goods in these few classes. We take as given the number of tax rates and study the optimal aggregation (or classification) of commodities of the fiscal authority in a second best setup. The results are illustrated on data from the United Kingdom.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.18} } @ARTICLE{BeNi:95, author = {Bell, Brian and Nickell, Stephen}, title = {The Collapse in Demand for the Unskilled and Unemployed across the OECD}, journal = {Oxford Review of Economic Policy}, year = {1995}, pages = {40-62}, key = {labour} } @INCOLLECTION{Bell:88, author = {Bell, D. E.}, title = {Disappointment in decision-making under uncertainty}, booktitle = {Decision making: descriptive, normative and prescriptive interactions}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1988}, editor = {Bell, D. E. and Raiffa, H. and Tversky, A.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Bell:82, author = {Bell, D. E.}, title = {Regret in decision-making under uncertainty}, journal = {Operations Research}, year = {1982}, volume = {30}, pages = {961-981}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{BeRaTv:88, title = {Decision making: descriptive, normative and prescriptive interactions}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1988}, author = {Bell, D. E. and Raiffa, H. and Tversky, A.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{BeHa:99, author = {Bell, D. N. F. and Hart, R. A.}, title = {Unpaid Work}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {271-90}, key = {labour} } @INCOLLECTION{BeSc:92, author = {Bell, John and Schokkaert, Erik}, title = {Interdisciplinary theory and research on justice}, booktitle = {Justice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1992}, editor = {Scherer, Klaus R.}, chapter = {7}, pages = {237-253}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Bell:98, author = {Bellettini, Giorgio}, title = {Aggregate uncertainty, political instability and income redistribution}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {14}, pages = {19-33}, number = {1}, abstract = {This paper associates political instability with real shocks affecting the income of the median voter, in a two-period model where two political parties set redistribution in order to defend the interests of well-defined constituencies. Current policies affect future voting outcomes and an intertemporal trade-off arises for the parties since their optimal one-period strategy does not maximize the probability of being re-elected. The higher the volatility of the real shock, the more likely that parties deviate from the optimal one-period strategy by choosing a conservative strategy, which increases their chances of re-election and the expected lifetime utility of their constituencies.}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @ARTICLE{BenH:90, author = {Ben Horim, M.}, title = {Stochastic dominance and truncated sample data}, journal = {Journal of Financial Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {13}, pages = {105-116}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{BenD:98, author = {Ben-David, Dan}, title = {Convergence clubs and subsistence economies}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {55}, pages = {153-169}, number = {1}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{BeGi:94, author = {Ben-Porath, E. and Gilboa, I.}, title = {Linear measures, the {G}ini index and the income-equality trade-off}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1994}, volume = {64}, pages = {443-467}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Ben-Porath1994, author = {Ben-Porath, E. and Gilboa, I.}, title = {Linear measures, the {G}ini index, and the income-equality trade-off}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1994}, volume = {64}, pages = {443-467}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BeGiSc:97, author = {Ben-Porath, Elchanan and Gilboa, Itzhak and Schmeidler, David}, title = {On the measurement of inequality under uncertainty}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1997}, volume = {75}, pages = {194-204}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Bena:04, author = {Benabou, Roland}, title = {Inequality, Technology, and the Social Contract}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2004}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {10371}, abstract = {The distribution of human capital and income lies at the center of a nexus of forces that shape a country's economic, institutional and technological structure. I develop here a unified model to analyze these interactions and their growth consequences. Five main issues are addressed. First, I identify the key factors that make both European-style "welfare state" and US-style "laissez-faire" social contracts sustainable.; I also compare the growth rates of these two politico-economic steady states, which are no Pareto-rankable. Second, I examine how technological evolutions affect the set of redistributive institutions that can be durably sustained, showing in particular how skill-biased technical change may cause the welfare state to unravel. Third, I model the endogenous determination of technology or organizational form that results from firms' tailoring the flexibility of their production processes to the distribution of workers' skills. The greater is human capital heterogeneity, the more flexible and wage-disequalizing is the equilibrium technology. Moreover, firms' choices tend to generate excessive flexibility, resulting in suboptimal growth or even selfsustaining technology-inequality traps. Fourth, I examine how institutions also shape the course of technology; thus, a world-wide shift in the technology frontier results in different evolutions of production processes and skill premia across countries with different social contracts. Finally, I ask what joint configurations of technology, inequality and redistributive policy are feasible in the long run, when all three are endogenous. I show in particular how the diffusion of technology leads to the "exporting" of inequality across borders; and how this, in turn, generates spillovers between social contracts that make it more difficult for nations to maintain distinct institutions and social structures.}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @TECHREPORT{Benabou1998, author = {Benabou, Roland and Ok, Efe A.}, title = {Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: the {P}{O}{U}{M} hypothesis}, institution = {IDEI, New York University}, year = {1998}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BeChSc:02, author = {Benassi, C. and Chirco, A. and Scrimitore, M.}, title = {Income concentration and market demand}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {2002}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BeCl:07, author = {Benchekroun,H. and Claude,D.}, title = {Tax differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly}, journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {7}, pages = {article 26}, abstract = {This paper studies the effects of uncoordinated environmental tax policies on firms’ incentives to form bilateral R&D collaborations. It is shown that the complete network is pair-wise stable for small differences in the taxation of environmental emissions. Larger tax differentials may induce firms to abandon all their international collaborations.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Benhabib1994, author = {Benhabib, J. and Spiegel, M.}, title = {The Role of Human Capital in Economic Development. Evidence from Aggregate Cross-Country Data}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {34}, pages = {143-173}, key = {development}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BeSp:94, author = {Benhabib, J. and Spiegel, M.}, title = {The Role of Human Capital in Economic Development. Evidence from AggregateCross-Country Data}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {34}, pages = {143-173}, key = {development} } @INCOLLECTION{BeMa:85OT, author = {Benjamini, Y. and Maital, S.}, title = {Optimal tax evasion and optimal tax evasion policy: behavioral aspects}, booktitle = {The Economics of the Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1985}, editor = {Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A.}, address = {Berlin, Germany}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Benn:00, author = {Bennedsen, M.}, title = {Political Ownership}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {76}, key = {political economy} } @TECHREPORT{Benn:08, author = {Bennett, J.}, title = {Formality, Informality, and Social Welfare}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2008}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {3550}, address = {P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany}, month = {June}, abstract = {An industry is modeled in which entrepreneurs, who are heterogeneous in ability, may produce formally or informally. It is shown how the formal-informal mix depends on the distribution of ability, product demand and a variety of parameters. The industry equilibrium is compared to one in which informality is prohibited. With relatively high product demand, the effect of entrepreneurs being free to choose informality is that consumer surplus and total employment are reduced, but profit is redistributed towards more able entrepreneurs. With relatively low product demand the opposite effects obtain. With high (low) demand informality is a built-in stabilizer (destabilizer).}, key = {formality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.05} } @ARTICLE{Benn:98, author = {Bennett, John}, title = {Prices versus quantities and distributional inefficiency}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {58}, pages = {63-67}, number = {1}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Beno:00, author = {Benoit, J.-P.}, title = {The {G}ibbard-{S}atterthwaite Theorem: A Simple Proof}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {69}, pages = {319-322}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Bent:70, author = {Bentzel, R.}, title = {The social significance of income distribution statistics}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1970}, volume = {16}, pages = {253-264}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Bentzel1970, author = {Bentzel, R.}, title = {The social significance of income distribution statistics}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1970}, pages = {253-264}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{BeMo:75, author = {Benus, J. and Morgan, J. N.}, title = {Time Period, Unit of Analysis and Income Concept in the Analysis of IncomeDistribution}, booktitle = {The Personal Distribution of Income and Wealth}, publisher = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {1975}, editor = {Smith, J. D.}, address = {New York}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{BeVa:06, author = {Bergemann, D. and V{\"a}lim{\"a}ki, J.}, title = {Information in Mechanism Design}, institution = {Cowles Foundation}, year = {2006}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {1532R}, address = {Department of Economics, Yale University, 28 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, CT 06511}, month = {January}, abstract = {We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss an emerging literature on the role of endogenous payo and strategic information for the design and the eciency of the mechanism. We speci cally consider information management in the form of acquisition of new information or disclosure of existing information. Second, we argue that in the presence of endogenous information, the robustness of the mechanism to the type space and higher order beliefs becomes a natural desideratum. We discuss recent approaches to robust mechanism design and robust implementation.}, key = {information}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{Berg:82, author = {Berger, R.}, title = {Multiparameter Hypothesis Testing and Acceptance Sampling}, journal = {Technometrics}, year = {1982}, volume = {24}, pages = {295-300}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Berg:79, author = {Bergstrom, T.}, title = {When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1979}, volume = {81}, pages = {25-49}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{BeBlVa:86, author = {Bergstrom, T. and Blume, L. and Varian, H.}, title = {On the Private Provision of Public Goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {29}, pages = {25-49}, key = {Public goods} } @ARTICLE{BeCo:83, author = {Bergstrom, T. and Cornes, R.}, title = {Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory ofPublic Goods}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1983}, volume = {51}, pages = {1753-1756}, key = {Public goods} } @ARTICLE{Bergstrom1983, author = {Bergstrom, T. and Cornes, R.}, title = {Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1983}, volume = {51}, pages = {1753-1756}, key = {Public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Berg:96, author = {Bergstrom, T. C.}, title = {Economics in a family way}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1996}, volume = {34}, pages = {1903-1934}, key = {population economics} } @ARTICLE{Berk:00, author = {Berkowitz, D.}, title = {Tax Rights in Transition Economies: A Tragedy of the Commons?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {76}, pages = {369-397}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{BeGo:93, author = {Berliant, M. and Gouveia, M.}, title = {Equal Sacrifice and Incentive Compatible Income Taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {51}, pages = {219-40}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{BeBoGr:94, author = {Berman, Eli and Bound, John and Griliches, Zvi}, title = {Changes in the Demand for skilled labor within {US} Manufacturing Industries}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {109}, pages = {367-98}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{BeBoMa:98, author = {Berman, E. and Bound, J. and Machin, S.}, title = {Implications of Skill-Based Technological Change: International Evidence}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1998}, pages = {1245-1279}, key = {Technology} } @ARTICLE{Bern:44, author = {Bernadelli, H.}, title = {The Stability of the Income Distribution}, journal = {Sankhya}, year = {1944}, volume = {6}, pages = {351-362}, key = {Distributions} } @ARTICLE{BeJo:96, author = {Bernard, A. B. and Jones, C. I.}, title = {Productivity Across Industries and Countries: Time Series Theory and Evidence}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1996}, volume = {78}, pages = {135-146}, key = {productivity} } @ARTICLE{Bern:98, author = {Bernasconi, Michele}, title = {Tax evasion and orders of risk aversion}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {67}, pages = {123-134}, number = {1}, month = {January}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Bernasconi1998, author = {Bernasconi, M.}, title = {Tax Evasion and Orders of Risk Aversion}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {67}, pages = {123-134}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Bern:94, author = {Bernasconi, M.}, title = {How should income be divided? Questionnaire evidence from behind the veilof ignorance.}, institution = {University of Pavia}, year = {1994}, type = {mimeo}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BeCh:73, author = {Berndt, E. R. and Christensen, L. R.}, title = {The internal structure of functional relationships: separability, substitutionand aggregation}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1973}, volume = {40}, pages = {403-410}, key = {aggregation} } @ARTICLE{Berndt1973, author = {Berndt, E. R. and Christensen, L. R.}, title = {The internal structure of functional relationships: separability, substitution and aggregation}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1973}, volume = {40}, pages = {403-410}, key = {aggregation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BeLeSc:04, author = {Bernheim,B. and Lemke,R. and Scholz,J.}, title = {Do estate and gift taxes affect the timing of private transfers?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {2617-2637}, abstract = {Proposals to alter the estate tax are contentious and have been consideredlargely in an empirical vacuum. This paper examines time series and cross-sectionalvariation to identify the effects of estate and gift taxation on the timingof private transfers. The analysis is based on data from the 1989, 1992,1995, 1998, and 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Legislative activityduring this period reduced the tax disadvantage of bequests relative togifts. Moreover, the magnitude of this reduction differed systematicallyacross identifiable household categories. We find that households experiencinglarger declines in the expected tax disadvantages of bequests reduced intervivos transfers relative to households experiencing small declines in thetax disadvantages of bequests. This finding is consistent with the hypothesisthat the timing of transfers is responsive to applicable gift and estate tax rates. The results also provide evidence of a systematic bequest motivefor highwealth households.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{BeSe:03, author = {Bernheim, B. and Severinov, S.}, title = {Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2003}, volume = {111}, pages = {733-764}, key = {altruism}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.20} } @ARTICLE{BeTh:05, author = {Bernheim,B. and Thomadsen,R.}, title = {Memory and Anticipation}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2005}, volume = {115}, pages = {271-304}, abstract = {The introduction of memory imperfections into models of economic decisionmaking creates a natural role for anticipatory emotions. Their combinationhas striking behavioural implications.The paper first shows that agentscan rationally select apparently dominated strategies. We consider Newcomb’sParadox and the Prisoners' Dilemma. We provide a resolution for Newcomb’sParadox and argue it requires the decision maker to ascribe only a tinyweight to anticipatory emotions. For some ranges of parameters, it is possibleto obtain cooperation in the Prisoners' Dilemma with probability arbitrarilyclose to unity. The second half of the paper provides a theory of reminders.}, key = {games} } @TECHREPORT{Bern:99TA, author = {Bernheim, B. D.}, title = {Taxation and Saving}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {1999}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {7061}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Bern:86, author = {Bernheim, B. D.}, title = {On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1986}, volume = {76}, pages = {789-793}, key = {Public goods} } @TECHREPORT{BeRa:05, author = {Bernheim, B. D. and Rangel, A.}, title = {Behavioral public economics: Welfare and policy analysis with non-standard decision makers}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2005}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {11518}, address = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w11518}, key = {public economics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.23} } @ARTICLE{BeBa:88, author = {Bernheim, D. C. and Bagwell, K.}, title = {Is everything neutral?}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1988}, volume = {96}, pages = {308-338}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{BeShSu:85, author = {Bernheim, D. C. and Shleifer, A. and Summers, L. H.}, title = {The strategic bequest motive}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1985}, volume = {93}, pages = {1045-1076}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Bern:99GC, author = {Bernholz, P.}, title = {The Generalized {C}oase Theorem and Separable Individual Preferences: AnExtension}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {331-335}, key = {externalities} } @ARTICLE{Bernholz1999, author = {Bernholz, P.}, title = {The Generalized {C}oase Theorem and Separable Individual Preferences: An Extension}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {331-335}, key = {externalities}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Bern:54, author = {Bernouilli, D.}, title = {Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk (1738, translated{L}ouise {S}ommer)}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1954}, volume = {22}, pages = {23-36}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Bernouilli1954, author = {Bernouilli, D.}, title = {Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk (1738, translated {L}ouise {S}ommer)}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1954}, volume = {22}, pages = {23-36}, key = {risk}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BeMi:97, author = {Bernstein, J. and Mishel, L.}, title = {Has Wage Inequality Stopped Growing?}, journal = {Monthly Labor Review}, year = {1997}, volume = {120}, pages = {3-16}, number = {12}, key = {wages} } @INCOLLECTION{BeTaWi:92, author = {Beron, K. J. and Tauchen,H. V. and Witte, A. D.}, title = {The effects of audits and sociological variables on compliance}, booktitle = {Why people pay taxes}, publisher = {The University of Michigan Press}, year = {1992}, editor = {Slemrod, J.}, pages = {67-89}, key = {Tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{BeSi:92, author = {Berrebi, Z. M. and Silber, J.}, title = {On rightist, centrist and leftist generalizations of the{G}ini index}, institution = {Bar Ilan University}, year = {1992}, type = {mimeo}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BeSi:89, author = {Berrebi, Z. M. and Silber, J.}, title = {Deprivation, the {G}ini index of inequality and the flatness of an incomedistribution}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1989}, volume = {18}, pages = {229-237}, number = {12}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BeSi:87, author = {Berrebi, Z. M. and Silber, J.}, title = {Dispersion, asymmetry and the {G}ini index of inequality}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1987}, volume = {28}, pages = {331-338}, number = {6}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BeSi:87RD, author = {Berrebi, Z. M. and Silber, J.}, title = {Regional differences and the components of growth and inequality change}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1987}, volume = {25}, pages = {285-298}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Berrebi1985a, author = {Berrebi, Z. M. and Silber, J.}, title = {Income inequality indices and deprivation: a generalization}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1985}, volume = {99}, pages = {807-810}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BeSi:85, author = {Berrebi, Z. M. and Silber, J.}, title = {Income inequality indices and deprivation: a generalization}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1985}, volume = {100}, pages = {807-810}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BeSi:85TG, author = {Berrebi, Z. M. and Silber, J.}, title = {The {G}ini coefficient and negative income: a comment}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1985}, volume = {37}, pages = {525-526}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{BeSi:84, author = {Berrebi, Z. M. and Silber, J.}, title = {Interquantile differences, income inequality measurement and the {G}iniconcentration index}, institution = {Bar Ilan University}, year = {1984}, number = {2}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BeSi:83, author = {Berrebi, Z. M. and Silber, J.}, title = {On an absolute measure of distributional change}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1983}, volume = {22}, pages = {139-146}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BeSi:81, author = {Berrebi, Z. M. and Silber, J.}, title = {Weighting income ranks and levels}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1981}, volume = {7}, pages = {391-7}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{BeSi:81LM, author = {Berrebi, Z. M. and Silber, J.}, title = {Leftist measures of income inequality and change}, institution = {Bar Ilan University}, year = {1981}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {R I 8107}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BeBoMo:83CI, author = {Berry, A. and Bourguignon, F. and Morrisson, C.}, title = {Changes in the world distributions of income between 1950 and 1977}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1983}, volume = {93}, pages = {331-350}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2232796} } @ARTICLE{BeBoMo:83TL, author = {Berry, A. and Bourguignon, F. and Morrisson, C.}, title = {The level of world inequality: how much can one say?}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1983}, volume = {29}, pages = {217-243}, abstract = {This paper constructs estimates of income and consumption inequality for the world (124 countries), using various measures of inequality. It then goes on to examine the possible effects of various sources of error in the estimates, and attempts to set rough limits to the size of such effects. Among the sources of error examined are purchasing power parities used for currency conversion, systematic errors in estimates of per capita incomes, differences in age structure, government tax and expenditure policy, and lifetime income effects. The paper concludes that, although the level of uncertainty in the estimates is too great to permit conclusions about, for instance, trends over time, it is clear that the level of world inequality is extreme, and that it is primarily due to differences in average incomes across countries rather than to intra-country inequality.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, url = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/cgi-bin/fulltext/119543772/PDFSTART} } @ARTICLE{Berry1983, author = {Berry, A. and Bourguignon, F. and Morrisson, C.}, title = {Changes in the world distributions of income between 1950 and 1977}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1983}, volume = {93}, pages = {331-350}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Berry1981, author = {Berry, A. and Bourguignon, F. and Morrisson, C.}, title = {The level of world inequality: how much can one say?}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1981}, volume = {29}, pages = {217-243}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Berry2002, author = {Berry, Albert and Serieux, John}, title = {All about the Giants: Probing the Influences on Growth and Income Inequality at the end of the 20th Century}, year = {2002}, volume = {840}, abstract = {This paper presents estimates of world output growth from 1970 to 2000, the distribution of income among countries and persons for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000, and world poverty rates for the same years. It also presents the results of a series of simulation exercises that attempt isolate the effect of particular country and regional experiences on world output growth and changes in global income inequality and poverty. The authors find that rapid growth in China (despite a downward adjustment of official growth estimates) had a powerful impact on the growth of world output in both the 1980s and 1990s, but that negative economic growth in Eastern Europe more than offset that effect in the 1990s. With respect to the distribution of income however, the equalizing effect of China's rapid growth, despite the contradictory impact of increasing domestic inequality, was dominant through both the 1980s and 1990s. Only India's influence remained substantial by comparison. Other identifiable events of the period, such as the economic contraction in Eastern Europe and continued economic decline in Africa had little statistical impact. Thus, when the combined influence of these two countries' above-average growth rates is removed, the improving global distribution of income suggested by all statistical measures becomes one of sharply worsening inequality. The impact of these twocountries is similarly critical with respect to global poverty reduction.}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {growth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{BeSe:02, author = {Berry, Albert and Serieux, John}, title = {All about the Giants: Probing the Influences on Growth and Income Inequalityat the end of the 20th Century}, year = {2002}, volume = {840}, abstract = {This paper presents estimates of world output growth from 1970 to 2000,the distribution of income among countries and persons for the years 1980,1990 and 2000, and world poverty rates for the same years. It also presentsthe results of a series of simulation exercises that attempt isolate theeffect of particular country and regional experiences on world output growthand changes in global income inequality and poverty. The authors find thatrapid growth in China (despite a downward adjustment of official growthestimates) had a powerful impact on the growth of world output in boththe 1980s and 1990s, but that negative economic growth in Eastern Europemore than offset that effect in the 1990s. With respect to the distributionof income however, the equalizing effect of China’s rapid growth, despitethe contradictory impact of increasing domestic inequality, was dominantthrough both the 1980s and 1990s. Only India’s influence remained substantialby comparison. Other identifiable events of the period, such as the economiccontraction in Eastern Europe and continued economic decline in Africahad little statistical impact. Thus, when the combined influence of thesetwo countries’ above-average growth rates is removed, the improving globaldistribution of income suggested by all statistical measures becomes oneof sharply worsening inequality. The impact of these twocountries is similarlycritical with respect to global poverty reduction.}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {growth}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{Berr:07, author = {Berry,C.}, title = {School Consolidation and Inequality}, journal = {Brookings Papers on Education Policy}, year = {2007}, volume = {2006/2007}, pages = {49-76}, abstract = {Between 1930 and 1970, two-thirds of schools and nine of every ten school districts that existed in the United States were eliminated in a process of consolidation. In this paper, I ask whether the dramatic growth in the size of schools and districts led to a decrease in the variation in student outcomes. Specifically, I examine whether changes in school and district size are associated with inequality in adult wages. Overall, I find evidence that consolidation had significant effects on the variation in adult wages only for students with the lowest level of educational attainment. Although not the primary focus of the paper, I also find that increases in school term length are consistently associated with reductions in adult wage inequality. My analysis is confined to white males, and the results may not generalize to other groups.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @BOOK{BeLi:96, title = {Statistics, Theory and Methods}, publisher = {Duxbury Press}, year = {1996}, author = {Berry, D. A. and Lindgren, B. W.}, address = {Belmont, CA}, edition = {Second}, comment = {QA276.12 .B47 1996}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.22} } @ARTICLE{BeWa:99, author = {Steven T. Berry and Joel Waldfogel}, title = {Public Radio in the {U}nited {S}tates: Does It Correct Market Failure orCannibalize Commercial Stations?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {189-211}, number = {2}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{BeRo:00, author = {Bertero, E. and Rondi, L.}, title = {Financial Pressure and the Behaviour of Public Enterprises Under Soft andHard Budget Constraints: Evidence from {I}talian Panel Data}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {75}, pages = {73-98}, key = {Finance} } @ARTICLE{Bertero2000, author = {Bertero, E. and Rondi, L.}, title = {Financial Pressure and the Behaviour of Public Enterprises Under Soft and Hard Budget Constraints: Evidence from {I}talian Panel Data}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {75}, pages = {73-98}, key = {Finance}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Bert:07, author = {Bertocchi, G.}, title = {The Vanishing Bequest Tax: The Comparative Evolution of Bequest Taxation in Historical Perspective}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {2578}, address = {IZA P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany}, month = {January}, note = {This paper can be downloaded without charge at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=961854}, abstract = {Several countries have recently abolished or significantly reduced their taxes on bequests. Bequest taxes, on the other hand, were among the first to be introduced when modern systems of taxation were developed at the end of the nineteenth century. We propose an explanation for these facts which is based on a dynamic political economy model where redistribution is determined not only by wealth inequality but also by sectoral reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing. The model shows that the dynamics of capital accumulation induce a reduction of wealth inequality, which is further accelerated by the redistributive impact of the bequest tax. Through a standard politico-economic mechanism, wealth equalization pushes toward a reduced role of the bequest tax. At the same time, however, a second mechanism is at work, with structural reallocation from agriculture to manufacturing shifting the tax base from hard-to-avoid taxes on land toward easy-to-avoid taxes on capital. The differential treatment of land and capital introduces a source of asymmetry in the tax system which interferes with the determination of the dynamic political equilibrium of the model. Its effect is to compress bequest taxation but also to delay its gradual reduction due to declining wealth inequality. A number of extensions to the basic model allow to match our theory with the long-term evolution of bequest taxation in modern democracies and with the drastic discrepancies currently observed between tax systems in developed and underdeveloped countries.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{BeSp:98, author = {Bertocchi, Graziella and Spagat, Michael}, title = {Growth under uncertainty with experimentation}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1998}, volume = {23}, pages = {209-231}, number = {2}, key = {growth} } @INCOLLECTION{Bert:99, author = {Bertola, G.}, title = {Macroeconomics of distribution}, booktitle = {Handbook of Income Distribution}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1999}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Bourguignon, F.}, chapter = {10}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @ARTICLE{Bert:93, author = {Bertola, G.}, title = {Factor Shares and Savings in Endogenous Growth}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1993}, volume = {83}, pages = {1184-1198}, abstract = {In models of steady investment-driven growth, an individual's propensity to save depends on how much of his income is drawn from accumulated factors of production ("capital") rather than from nonaccumulated factors. When agents are heterogeneous in this respect, growth-oriented policies have distributional consequences, and in the absence of lump-sum redistribution, their implementation faces political constraints. If the medium voter is capital-poor relative to the economy's representative agent, political interactions tend to slow down growth when policy acts on capital's income share and tend to accelerate it when investment subsidies are the policy instrument of choice.}, key = {growth}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.10} } @TECHREPORT{BeKo:07, author = {Bertola, G. and Koeniger, W.}, title = {Consumption Smoothing and Income Redistribution}, institution = {CEPR}, year = {2007}, type = {CEPR Discussion Paper Series}, number = {6051}, month = {January}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.24} } @ARTICLE{BePo:97, author = {Bertoletti, Paolo and Poletti, Clara}, title = {Welfare effects of discriminatory two-part tariffs constrained by pricecaps}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {56}, pages = {293-298}, number = {3}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Bert:83, author = {Bertrand, J.}, title = {Th{\'e}orie math{\'e}matique de la richesse sociale}, journal = {Journal des Savants}, year = {1883}, pages = {499-508}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{BeMu:01, author = {Bertrand, M. and Mullainathan, S.}, title = {Do People Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data}, journal = {The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings}, year = {2001}, volume = {91}, pages = {67-72}, key = {survey}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.18} } @ARTICLE{BeSc:06, author = {Bertrand, M. and Schoar, A.}, title = {The Role of Family in Family Firms}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2006}, volume = {20}, pages = {73-96}, abstract = {History is replete with examples of spectacular ascents of family businesses. The Rothschilds, for example, not only amassed the greatest concentration of private wealth the Western world has ever seen, they are also credited with changing the fate of history by financing monarchs and kings—one of their most famous bets being the support for Wellington’s armies, which ultimately led to the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo. At the height of their power, a French journalist reportedly said in 1841: “There is but one power in Europe and that is Rothschild” (Ferguson, 1998).}, key = {industry}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.01} } @ARTICLE{BeLe:98, author = {Bertschek, I. and Lechner, M.}, title = {Convenient estimators for the panel probit model}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1998}, volume = {87}, pages = {329-371}, number = {2}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{BeVa:99, author = {Besada, M. and Vazquez, C.}, title = {The Generalized Marginal Rate of Substitution}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {31}, pages = {553-560}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{BeChLaMa:08, author = {Beshears, J. and Choi, J. J. and Laibson, D. and Madrian, B. C.}, title = {How Are Preferences Revealed?}, institution = {Yale}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {08-15}, month = {April}, abstract = {Revealed preferences are tastes that rationalize an economic agent’s observed actions. Normative preferences represent the agent’s actual interests. It sometimes makes sense to assume that revealed preferences are identical to normative preferences. But there are many cases where this assumption is violated. We identify five factors that increase the likelihood of a disparity between revealed preferences and normative preferences: passive choice, complexity, limited personal experience, third-party marketing, and intertemporal choice. We then discuss six approaches that jointly contribute to the identification of normative preferences: structural estimation, active decisions, asymptotic choice, aggregated revealed preferences, reported preferences, and informed preferences. Each of these approaches uses consumer behavior to infer some property of normative preferences without equating revealed and normative preferences. We illustrate these issues with evidence from savings and investment outcomes.}, key = {micro}, owner = {rodano}, timestamp = {2008.06.12} } @ARTICLE{Besl:95, author = {Besley, T.}, title = {Non-market Institutions for Credit and Risk Sharing in Low-Incomes Countries}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1995}, volume = {9}, pages = {115-127}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.24} } @ARTICLE{Besl:90, author = {Besley, T.}, title = {Means Testing versus Universal Provision in Poverty Alleviation Programmes}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1990}, volume = {57}, pages = {119-129}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{BeCo:98, author = {Besley, T. and Coate, S.}, title = {Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1998}, key = {efficiency} } @ARTICLE{BeCo:91, author = {Besley, T. and Coate, S.}, title = {Public Provision of Private Goods and the Redistribution of Income}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1991}, volume = {81}, pages = {979-984}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{BeGh:07, author = {Besley, Timothy and Ghatak, Maitreesh}, title = {Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {1645-1663}, abstract = {This paper explores the feasibility and desirability of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). We identify CSR with creation of public goods or curtailment of public bads. Using a model with profitmaximizing firms, the paper shows that there is a direct parallel between CSR and traditional models of private provision of public goods. Indeed, firms that use CSR will produce public goods at exactly the same level as predicted by the standard voluntary contribution equilibrium for public goods. We compare CSR with government provision and charitable provision, discussing when CSR by private for-profit firms could have a comparative advantage in dealing with public goods provision.}, key = {Public Goods}, keywords = {CSR, Public Goods}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{BeHaPr:99, author = {Besley, T. and Hall, J. and Preston, I.}, title = {The Demand for Private Health Insurance: Do Waiting Lists Matter?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {155-181}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{BeMa:93, author = {Besley, T. and MacLaren, J.}, title = {Taxes and Bribery: the Role of Wage Incentives}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1993}, volume = {103}, pages = {119-141}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Besley1993, author = {Besley, T. and MacLaren, J.}, title = {Taxes and Bribery: the Role of Wage Incentives}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1993}, volume = {103}, pages = {119-141}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BeMe:98, author = {Timothy Besley and Costas Meghir}, title = {Tax Based Savings Incentives}, institution = {London School of Economics}, year = {1998}, month = {September}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{BePr:05, author = {Besley,T. and Prat,A.}, title = {Credible Pensions}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2005}, volume = {26}, pages = {119-135}, abstract = {One of the main problems in pension policy is to develop an institutionalframework that guarantees that public and private pensions promises arekept. This paper discusses how the governance of public and private pensionsis key to making such promises credible. It argues that credibility concernsundermine the case for earnings-related pensions run by the state and privatedefined benefit plans.}, key = {pensions} } @ARTICLE{BePrRi:97, author = {Besley, Timothy and Preston, Ian and Ridge, Michael}, title = {Fiscal anarchy in the {UK}: Modelling poll tax noncompliance}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {137-152}, number = {2}, month = {May}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{BeCo:03, author = {Besley, T. J. and Coate, S.}, title = {Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a politicaleconomy approach}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {2611– 2637}, key = {Local public goods} } @ARTICLE{Besley2003, author = {Besley, T. J. and Coate, S.}, title = {Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {2611- 2637}, key = {Local public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BePr:88, author = {Besley, T. J. and Preston, I. P.}, title = {Invariance and the axiomatics of income tax progression: a comment}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {40}, pages = {159-163}, number = {4}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{BeRo:98, author = {Besley, Timothy J. and Rosen, Harvey S.}, title = {Vertical externalities in tax setting: evidence from gasoline and cigarettes}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {70}, pages = {383-398}, number = {3}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{BeGu:98, author = {Bester, Helmut and G{\"u}th, Werner}, title = {Is altruism evolutionarily stable?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {34}, pages = {193-209}, number = {2}, key = {Altruism} } @ARTICLE{BeSl:06, author = {Bettinger,E. and Slonim,R.}, title = {Using experimental economics to measure the effects of a natural educational experiment on altruism}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {1625-1648}, abstract = {Economic research examining how educational intervention programs affect primary and secondary schooling focuses largely on test scores although the interventions can affect many other outcomes. This paper examines how an educational intervention, a voucher program, affected students’ altruism. The voucher program used a lottery to allocate scholarships among low-income applicant families with children in K-8th grade. By exploiting the lottery to identify the voucher effects, and using experimental economic methods, we measure the effects of the intervention on children’s altruism. We also measure the voucher program’s effects on parents’ altruism and several academic outcomes including test scores.We find that the educational intervention positively affects students’ altruism towards charitable organizations but not towards their peers. We fail to find statistically significant effects of the vouchers on parents’ altruism or test scores.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Bett:98, author = {Bettzuge, Marc Oliver}, title = {An extension of a theorem by {M}itjushin and {P}olterovich to incompletemarkets}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {30}, pages = {285-300}, number = {3}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{BeSi:79, author = {Bevan, D. L. and Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {Intergenerational transfers and inequality}, journal = {Greek Economic Review}, year = {1979}, volume = {1}, pages = {8 - 26}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BeNe:81, author = {Beveridge, S. and Nelson, C.R.}, title = {A new approach to decomposition of economic time series into permanent and transitory components with particular attention to measurement of the `business cycle'}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1981}, volume = {7}, pages = {151-174}, abstract = {This paper introduces a general procedure for decomposition of non -stationary time series into a permanent and a transitory component allowing both components to be stochastic. The permanent component is shown to be a random walk with drift 2nd the transitory or cyclical component is a stationary process wl_h mean zero. The decomposition methodology, which depends only on past data and therefore is computable in ‘real time’, is applied to the problem of measuring and dating business ‘cycles’ in the postwar U.S. economy. We find that measured expansions and contractions are of roughly equivalent duration and thal our dating of cyclical episodes tends to lead the traditional NBER dating and, to a lesser extent, the ‘growth cycle’ chronology of Zarnowitz and Boschan (1977).}, key = {income decomposition}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{BeRo:99, author = {Beyer, H. and Rojas, P. and Vergara, R.}, title = {Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {59}, pages = {103-123}, key = {international} } @ARTICLE{Bhat:43, author = {Bhattacharya, A.}, title = {On a measure of distance between two statistical populations defined bytheir probability distributions}, journal = {Bull. Cal. Math. Soc.}, year = {1943}, volume = {35}, pages = {688-691}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Bhat:07, author = {Bhattacharya, D.}, title = {Inference on inequality from household survey data}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2007}, volume = {137}, pages = {674-707}, abstract = {I develop a theory of asymptotic inference for the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient for testing economic inequality when the data come from stratified and clustered household surveys with large number of clusters per stratum. Using the asymptotic framework of Bhattacharya [Asymptotic Inference from multi-stage surveys. Journal of Econometrics 126(1), 145–171], I derive a weak convergence result for the continuously-indexed Lorenz process even when the underlying density is not uniformly bounded away from zero. I provide analytical formulae for the asymptotic covariance functions that are corrected for both stratification and clustering and develop consistent tests for Lorenz dominance. Inference on the Gini coefficient follows as a corollary. The methods are applied to per capita household expenditure data from the complexly designed Indian national sample survey to test for changes in inequality before and after the reforms of the early 1990s. Ignoring the survey design is seen to produce qualitatively different results, especially in the urban sector where the population sorts more completely into rich and poor neighborhoods.}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @TECHREPORT{BhLa:04, author = {Bhattacharya, Jay and Lakdawalla, Darius}, title = {Time-Inconsistency and Welfare}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {10345}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, abstract = {Self-control devices, such as rehabilitation programs, group commitment,and informal fines, can make time-inconsistent smokers better off. Healtheconomists have used this result to argue in favor of cigarette taxes thatrestrain smoking. However, taxes alone are not Pareto-improving overall,because they benefit today’s smoker at the expense of her future selves,who have less demand for self-control. We suggest an alternative classof taxation policies that provide self-control and benefit a smoker atevery point in life. Smokers could be allowed to purchase “smoking licenses”when they start to smoke, and in exchange commit their future selves toface compensated cigarette taxes. We show that this scheme – which couldbe made voluntary – improves the welfare of current and future smokers,generates positive revenue for the government, and can be made incentivecompatible.Similar schemes can also be envisioned to address problems of time-inconsistencyin other contexts.}, journal = {NBER Working Paper Series}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{BhMa:67, author = {Bhattacharya, N. and Mahalanobis, B.}, title = {Regional Disparities in household consumption in {I}ndia}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1967}, volume = {62}, pages = {143-161}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Bhattacharya1989, author = {Bhattacharya, R. N. and Qumsiyeh, M.}, title = {Second Order {Lp}-Comparisons Between the Bootstrap and Empirical {E}dgeworth Expansion Methodologies}, journal = {The Annals of Statistics}, year = {1989}, volume = {17}, pages = {160-169}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BhQu:89, author = {Bhattacharya, R. N. and Qumsiyeh, M.}, title = {Second Order {Lp}-Comparisons Between the Bootstrap and Empirical {E}dgeworthExpansion Methodologies}, journal = {The Annals of Statistics}, year = {1989}, volume = {17}, pages = {160-169}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{Bhat:92, author = {Bhattacharyya, D. K.}, title = {On the Economic Rationale of Estimating the Hidden Economy}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F348-F359}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Bhattacharyya1999, author = {Bhattacharyya, D. K.}, title = {On the Economic Rationale of Estimating the Hidden Economy}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F348-F359}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Bian:97, author = {Bianchi, M.}, title = {Testing for Convergence: Evidence From Non-Parametric Multimodality Tests}, journal = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, year = {1997}, volume = {12}, pages = {393-409}, abstract = {In this paper, we test the convergence hypothesis in a cross-section of 119 countries by means of bootstrap multimodality tests and nonparametric density estimation techniques. By looking at the density distribution of GDP across countries in 1970, 1980 and 1989, we ®nd low mobility patterns of intra-distribution dynamics and increasing evidence for bimodality. The ®ndings stand in sharp contrast with the convergence prediction.}, key = {bootstrap}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @TECHREPORT{BiD'A:08, author = {Biancotti, C. and D'Alessio G.}, title = {Values, Inequality and Happiness}, institution = {Bank of Italy}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {669}, month = {April}, abstract = {This paper examines the relationship between inequality and happiness through the lens of heterogeneous values, beliefs and inclinations. Drawing upon opinion data from the European Social Survey for twenty-three countries, we find that individual views on a wide range of themes can be effectively summarized by two orthogonal dimensions: moderation and inclusiveness. The former is defined as a tendency to take mild stands on issues rather than extreme ones; the latter is defined as the degree of support for a social model that grants equal rights to everyone who willingly subscribes to a shared set of rules, regardless of background and circumstances. These traits matter when it comes to how inequality affects subjective well-being; specifically, those who are either more moderate or more inclusive than their average compatriots prefer lower levels of inequality. In the case of moderation, inequality aversion can be read in terms of a desire for stability: people who are reluctant to take strong stands are especially wary of conflict, tension and unrest, which often go handin- hand with disparities. In the case of inclusiveness, the main element at play is likely to be distress accruing on a perception of unfairness.}, key = {happiness}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.05} } @TECHREPORT{Bibi:05, author = {Bibi, S.}, title = {Measuring Poverty in a Multidimensional Perspective: A Review of Literature}, institution = {Poverty and Economic Policy}, year = {2005}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2005-07}, key = {poverty}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{BiDu:05, author = {Bibi,S. and Duclos,J.}, title = {Decomposing poverty changes into vertical and horizontal components}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {57}, pages = {205-215}, abstract = {Variations in aggregate poverty indices can be due to differences in averagepoverty intensity, to changes in the welfare distances between those poorof initially unequal welfare status and/or to emerging disparities in welfareamong those poor of initially similar welfare status. This note uses ageneral cost-of-inequality approach that decomposes the total change inpoverty into a sum of indices of each of these three components. This decompositioncan serve inter alia to integrate horizontal and vertical equity criteriain the poverty alleviation assessment of social and economic programmes.The use of these measures is briefly illustrated using Tunisian data.}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{BiRa:95, author = {Bidani, Benu and Ravallion, Martin}, title = {Decomposing social indicators using distributional data}, institution = {Poverty and Human Resources Division}, year = {1995}, type = {Policy Research Working Paper}, number = {1487}, address = {The World Bank}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Bier:, author = {Bierbrauer, F.}, title = {Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in A Two-{C}lass Economy}, institution = {Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods}, year = {2005}, month = {November}, abstract = {This paper combines the problem of optimal income taxation with the free-rider problem in public good provision. There are two groups of individuals with private information on their earning ability and their valuation of a public good. Adjustments of the transfer system are needed to discourage the more productive from exaggerating the desirability of public good provision. Similarly, the less productive need to be prevented from understating their valuation. Relative to an optimal income tax, which focuses solely on earning ability, income transfers are increased whenever a public good is installed and are decreased otherwise.}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{Biew:02, author = {Biewen, M.}, title = {Bootstrap Inference for Inequality, Mobility and Poverty Measurement}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2002}, volume = {108}, pages = {317-342}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Biew:00, author = {Biewen, M.}, title = {Income Inequality in {G}ermany During the 1980s and 1990s}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2000}, volume = {46}, pages = {1-19}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{BiJe:06, author = {Biewen, M. and Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Variance Estimation for Generalized Entropy and Atkinson Inequality Indices: the Complex Survey Data Case}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2006}, volume = {68}, pages = {371-383}, abstract = {We derive the sampling variances of generalized entropy and Atkinson indices when estimated from complex survey data, and show how they can be calculated straightforwardly using widely available software. We also show that, when the same approach is used to derive variance formulae for the independent and identically distributed case, it leads to estimators that are simpler than those proposed before. Both cases are illustrated with a comparison of income inequality in Britain and Germany.}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Alex}, timestamp = {2006.06.22} } @ARTICLE{BiBiLa:07, author = {Bilbao,A. and Bilbao, C. and Labeaga, J.M.}, title = {A method for evaluating the excess burden associated with characteristics of the goods}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2007}, volume = {96}, pages = {209-214}, month = {August}, abstract = {Subsidies aimed at heterogeneous goods, as housing, do not merely generate the traditional excess burden: there is another welfare loss since the distortion affects non-price characteristics. We show that the aforementioned welfare loss exists and can be quantified.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{BiJiLo:98, author = {Bilbao, J. M. and Jiminez, A. and Lopez, J. J.}, title = {The {B}anzhaf power index on convex geometries}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1998}, volume = {36}, pages = {157-173}, abstract = {In this paper, we introduce the Banzhaf power indices for simple games onconvex geometries. We define the concept of swing for these structures,obtaining convex swings. The number of convex swings and the number ofcoalitions such that a player is an extreme point are the basic tools todefine the convex Banzhaf indices, one normalized and other probabilistic.We obtain a family of axioms that give rise to the Banzhaf indices. Inthe last section, we present a method to calculate the convex Banzhaf indiceswith the computer program Mathematica, and we apply this to compute powerindices in the Spanish and Catalan parliaments and in the Council of Ministersof the European Union.}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Bili:94, author = {Bilginsoy, C.}, title = {Quesnay's Tableau Economique: Analytics and Policy Implications}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1994}, volume = {46}, pages = {519-533}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @BOOK{Bill:86, title = {Probability and Measure}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1986}, author = {Billingsley, P.}, address = {New York}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{BiGr:04, author = {Bilodeau, Marc and Gravel, Nicolas}, title = {Voluntary provision of a public good and individual morality}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {645-666}, abstract = {We examine, both in general games in strategic form and in games of voluntaryprovision of a public good, some implications of the assumption that individualsmay obey ethical codes of conduct. The notion of morality considered capturesthe intuition (often attributed to Kant) that a moral action leads to thebest outcome when it is properly universalized. We propose a formalizationof this idea which generalizes earlier attempts made in this directionin the literature by allowing the players to differ both in their strategysets and their preferences. We show that it is easy to find examples ofgames in which no moral behavior of this type exists or where the onlyexisting ‘Kantian’ code of conduct leads to a Pareto-inefficient outcome.We then more specifically examine the issues of existence and Pareto-efficiencyof Kantian norms of behavior in games of voluntary provision of a publicgood. We find in this context that there is no conflict between moralityand Pareto-efficiency since any Kantian norm of behavior is Pareto-efficient.We also prove the existence of a Kantian norm of individual contribution.}, key = {public goods} } @TECHREPORT{Bilo:05, author = {Bilotkach,V.}, title = {A Tax Evasion - Bribery Game: Experimental Evidence from Ukraine}, institution = {University of California, Irvine}, year = {2005}, abstract = {This paper examines the issue of tax evasion by enterprises through underreporting activity, which appears wide-spread in developing and transition economies. We develop a view of this phenomenon as an equilibrium of the game between a businessman and an imperfectly monitored supervising (tax) official, in which a businessman can hide part of his profit and offer a bribe to the official. We determine conditions under which such tax evasion and bribery become wide-spread in the society, resulting in shadow economy. The game is put into an experimental setting in Kiev, Ukraine, with the emphasis of spreading of the tax evasion and bribery activity in the laboratory setting. We find that once it becomes known that substantial share of subjects playing the role of supervising officials agree to accept bribes from subjects playing the role of businessmen, the latter offer bribes more aggressively. Yet, this in turn does not affect the behavior of subjects playing the role of supervising officials.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{BiKo:95, author = {Binder, D. A. and Kovacevic, M. S.}, title = {Estimating Some Measures of Income Inequality from Survey Data: An Applicationof the Estimating Equations Approach}, journal = {Survey Methodology}, year = {1995}, volume = {21,2}, pages = {137-145}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Binder1995, author = {Binder, D. A. and Kovacevic, M. S.}, title = {Estimating Some Measures of Income Inequality from Survey Data: An Application of the Estimating Equations Approach}, journal = {Survey Methodology}, year = {1995}, volume = {21,2}, pages = {137-145}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Bing:80TE, title = {Tax Evasion: The Law and the Practice}, publisher = {Alexander Harden Financial Services}, year = {1980}, author = {Bingham, T.}, address = {London}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{BiLa:02, author = {Bingley, P. and Lanot, G.}, title = {The Incidence of Income Tax on Wages and Labour Supply}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {83}, pages = {173-194}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Binh1991, author = {Binh, T. N.}, title = {A note on {P}f\"ahler's aggregate measures of tax progressivity}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1991}, volume = {46}, pages = {157-159}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Binh:91, author = {Binh, T. N.}, title = {A note on {P}f{\"a}hler's aggregate measures of tax progressivity}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1991}, volume = {46}, pages = {157-159}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Binm:99, author = {Binmore, K.}, title = {Why Experiment in Economics?}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F16-F24}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{Binmore1999, author = {Binmore, K.}, title = {Why Experiment in Economics?}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F16-F24}, key = {experimental}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Binm:92, title = {Fun and Games}, publisher = {D. C. Heath and Co.}, year = {1992}, author = {Binmore, K.}, address = {Lexington}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Binm:87, author = {Binmore, K.}, title = {Experimental Economics}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1987}, volume = {31}, pages = {257-264}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{BiKl:02, author = {Binmore, K. and Klemperer, P.}, title = {The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the {British 3G} Telecom Licences}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2002}, volume = {112}, pages = {C74-C96}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Binsw, author = {Binswanger, H. P.}, title = {Attitudes towards risk: experimental measurement in rural {I}ndia}, journal = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics}, year = {1980}, volume = {62}, pages = {395-407}, key = {risk}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.18} } @ARTICLE{Bior:74, author = {Erik Biorn}, title = {Estimating the Flexibility of the Marginal Utility of Money: An Errors-in-VariablesApproach}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1974}, volume = {5}, pages = {177-185}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{Biorn1974, author = {Erik Biorn}, title = {Estimating the Flexibility of the Marginal Utility of Money: An Errors-in-Variables Approach}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1974}, volume = {5}, pages = {177-185}, key = {consumption}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Birc:64, author = {Birch, M. W.}, title = {A New Proof of the {P}earson-{F}isher Theorem}, journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1964}, volume = {35}, pages = {817-824}, key = {statistics} } @INCOLLECTION{Bird:91, author = {Bird, E.}, title = {Income Variation among {W}est {G}erman Households}, booktitle = {Lebenslagen im {W}andel: Zur {E}inkommensdynamik in {D}eutschland seit 1984}, publisher = {Campus}, year = {1991}, editor = {Rendtel, U. and Wagner, G.}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Bird:01, author = {Bird, E. J.}, title = {Does the Welfare State Induce Risk-Taking?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {80}, pages = {357-383}, key = {welfare state} } @ARTICLE{Bird1998, author = {Bird, Edward J.}, title = {Rising {US} income inequality: declining opportunities or diversifying choices of family, work and education?}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, pages = {95-119}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Bird:98, author = {Bird, Edward J.}, title = {Rising {US} income inequality: declining opportunities or diversifying choicesof family, work and education?}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, pages = {95-119}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{Bird:92, title = {Tax policy and economic development}, publisher = {Johns Hopkins}, year = {1992}, author = {Bird, R. M.}, address = {Baltimore and London}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{BiLo:97, author = {Birdsall, N. and Londono, J. L.}, title = {Asset Inequality Matters: An Assessment of the {W}orld {B}ank's Approachto Poverty Reduction}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1997}, volume = {87}, pages = {32-37}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Birdsall1997, author = {Birdsall, N. and Londono, J. L.}, title = {Asset Inequality Matters: An Assessment of the {W}orld {B}ank's Approach to Poverty Reduction}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1997}, volume = {87}, pages = {32-37}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BiRoSa:95, author = {Birdsall, N. and Ross, D. and Sabot, R.}, title = {Inequality and Growth Reconsidered: Lessons from East Asia}, journal = {World Bank Economic Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {9}, pages = {477-508}, key = {growth}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.18} } @ARTICLE{Biru:06, author = {Birulin,O.}, title = {Public goods with congestion}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2006}, volume = {129}, pages = {289-299}, abstract = {I consider the problem of the efficient provision of a congested (limited capacity) public good in a setting with asymmetric information. I show, in particular, that when the capacity of the good is limited, in a wide class of economies it is possible to construct an incentive compatible mechanism that always produces the good at the efficient level, balances the budget and satisfies voluntary participation constraints. This result is in contrast with the corresponding impossibility result for pure public goods due to Mailath and Postlewaite (Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990) 351–359) and Rob (J. Econ. Theory 47}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{BiChTh:94, author = {Bishop, J. A. and Chakraborti, S. And Thistle, P. D.}, title = {Relative inequality, absolute inequality and welfare: large sample tests for partial orders}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {46}, pages = {41-60}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Bishop1994a, author = {Bishop, J. A. and Chakraborti, S. And Thistle, P. D.}, title = {Relative inequality, absolute inequality, and welfare: large sample tests for partial orders}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {46}, pages = {41-60}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BiChTh:91, author = {Bishop, J. A. and Chakraborti, S. and Thistle, P. D.}, title = {Relative deprivation and economic welfare: A statistical investigation with {G}ini-based welfare indices}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {93}, pages = {421-437}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Bishop1991d, author = {Bishop, J. A. and Chakraborti, S. and Thistle, P. D.}, title = {Relative deprivation and economic welfare: A statistical investigation with {G}ini-based welfare indices}, journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {93}, pages = {421-437}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BiChTh:89, author = {Bishop, J. A. and Chakraborti, S. and Thistle, P. D.}, title = {Asymptotically distribution-free statistical inference for generalized {L}orenz curves}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1989}, volume = {71}, pages = {725-727}, number = {11}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BiChTh:88, author = {Bishop, J. A. and Chakraborti, S. And Thistle, P. D.}, title = {Large sample tests for absolute {L}orenz dominance}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1988}, volume = {26}, pages = {291-294}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{BiChTh:87, author = {Bishop, J. A. and Chakraborti, S. And Thistle, P. D.}, title = {Distribution-free statistical inference for generalized {L}orenz curves}, institution = {University of Alabama}, year = {1987}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BiChFo:94, author = {Bishop, J. A. and Chiou, J.-R. and Formby, J. P.}, title = {Truncation Bias and the Ordinal Evaluation of Income Inequality}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1994}, volume = {12}, pages = {123-127}, abstract = {Lorenz dominance analysis is used to examine the effect of top-coding on the ordinal evaluation of U.S. income inequality across time. Current Population Survey microdata are adjusted for truncation bias, and statistical inference procedures are used to examine biennial changes in unadjusted and adjusted Lorenz curves. Beginning in 1985, the truncation bias has a significant effect on ordinal rankings of income inequality.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.10}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1391928} } @TECHREPORT{BiChZh:94, author = {Bishop, J. A. and Chow, E. V. and Zheng, B.}, title = {Statistical infrence and decomposable poverty measures}, institution = {East Carolina University}, year = {1994}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{BiChZh:95, author = {Bishop, J. A. and Chow, K. V. and Zheng, B.}, title = {Statistical inference and decomposable poverty measures}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {47}, pages = {329-340}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{BiFoZh:97, author = {Bishop, J. A. and Formby, J. B. and Zheng, B.}, title = {Statistical Inference and the {S}en Index of Poverty}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1997}, volume = {38}, pages = {381-387}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{BiFoSm:91IC, author = {Bishop, John A. and Formby, John P. and Smith, W. James}, title = {International Comparisons of Income Inequality: Tests for {L}orenz Dominance Across Nine Countries}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1991}, volume = {58}, pages = {461-477}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BiFoSm:91LD, author = {Bishop, John A. and Formby, John P. and Smith, W. James}, title = {Lorenz Dominance and Welfare: Changes in the U.S. Distribution of Income,1967-1986}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1991}, volume = {73}, pages = {134-139}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Bishop1991b, author = {Bishop, John A. and Formby, John P. and Smith, W. James}, title = {Lorenz Dominance and Welfare: Changes in the U.S. Distribution of Income, 1967-1986}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1991}, volume = {73}, pages = {134-139}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Bishop1991c, author = {Bishop, John A. and Formby, John P. and Smith, W. James}, title = {International Comparisons of Income Inequality: Tests for Lorenz Dominance Across Nine Countries}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1991}, volume = {58}, pages = {461-477}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{BiFoTh:89, author = {Bishop, J. A. and Formby, J. P. and Thistle, P. D.}, title = {Statistical inference, income distributions and social welfare}, booktitle = {Research on Economic Inequality I}, publisher = {JAI Press}, year = {1989}, editor = {Slottje, D. J.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BiFoTh:97, author = {Bishop, J. A. and Formby, J. P. and Thistle, P. D.}, title = {Changing {A}merican earnings distributions: one-half century of experience}, journal = {Empirical Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {22}, pages = {501-514}, number = {4}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{BiFoTh:91, author = {Bishop, J. A. and Formby, J. P. and Thistle, P. D.}, title = {Rank dominance and international comparisons of income distributions}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1991}, volume = {35}, pages = {1399-1409}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{BiFiHo:95, title = {Discrete Multivariate Analysis: Theory and Practice}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {1995}, author = {Bishop, Y. M. M. and Fienberg, S. E and Holland, P. W.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{BiGo:05, author = {Bisin, A. and Gottardi, P.}, title = {Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2006}, volume = {114}, pages = {485-516}, note = {Category 9: Indsutrial Organisation}, abstract = {Do Walrasian markets function orderly in the presence of adverse selection? In particular, is their outcome efficient? This paper addresses these questions in the context of a Rothschild and Stiglitz insurance economy. We identify an externality associated with the presence of adverse selection as a special form of consumption externality. Consequently, we show that while competitive equilibria always exist, they are not typically incentive efficient. However, as markets for pollution rights can internalize environmental externalities, markets for consumption rights can be designed so as to internalize the consumption externality due to adverse selection. With such markets competitive equilibria exist and are always incentive efficient. Moreover, any incentive efficient allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium.}, institution = {{CES}ifo}, key = {industry}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.01} } @ARTICLE{BiVe:98, author = {Bisin, Alberto and Verdier, Thierry}, title = {On the cultural transmission of preferences for social status}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {70}, pages = {75-97}, number = {1}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{BiDi:01, author = {Biswas-Diener, R. and Diener, E.}, title = {Making the Best of a Bad Situation: Satisfaction in the Slums of Calcutta}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {55}, pages = {329-352}, key = {poverty}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Bjer:70, author = {Bjerke, K.}, title = {Income and wage distributions Part {I}: a survey of the literature}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1970}, volume = {16}, pages = {235-252}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Bjerke1970, author = {Bjerke, K.}, title = {Income and wage distributions Part I: a survey of the literature}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1970}, volume = {16}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BjSc:98, author = {Bjerksund, Petter and Schjelderup, Guttorm}, title = {The political economy of capital controls and tax policy in a small openeconomy}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {14}, pages = {543-559}, number = {3}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Bjorklund1995a, author = {Bjorklund, Anders and Palme, Marten and Svensson, Ingemar}, title = {Assessing the effects of {S}wedish tax and benefit reforms on income distribution using different income concepts}, institution = {National Institute of Economic Research, Economic Council}, year = {1995}, type = {Tax Reform Evaluation Report}, number = {13}, address = {Stockholm, Sweden}, month = {August}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BjFr:08, author = {Bj{\"o}rklund, A. and Freeman, R.}, title = {Searching for Optimal Inequality/Incentives}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {14014}, abstract = {This paper examines the evolution of economic inequality in Sweden before, during and after the major macro-economic recession in the early 1990s. Earnings and income inequality increased after the downturn, but government safety net programs buttressed disposable income for those with low income, and despite the rise in inequality, Sweden remained one of the most egalitarian economies in the world. The rise in inequality raised the return to observable skills, but the returns are still too low to explain that Sweden moved to the top of the league tables in knowledge intensive activities. Our analysis of attitudes to inequality shows that more Swedes expressed more concern over the inequity in inequality after the rise in inequality in the 1990s than in the past. Further, more Swedes expressed greater dissatisfaction with wages and working conditions. On the other hand, the rise in unemployment did not reduce overall subjective well being, probably because individuals adapted to higher levels of unemployment.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.15} } @ARTICLE{BjJa:97, author = {Bj{\"o}rklund, A. and J{\"a}ntti, M.}, title = {Intergenerational income mobility in {S}weden compared to the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1997}, volume = {87}, pages = {1009-1018}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{BjLiPl:06, author = {Bj{\"o}rklund, A. and Lindahl, M. and Plug, E.}, title = {The Origins of Intergenerational Associations: Lessons from Swedish Adoption Data}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {71}, pages = {999-1028}, abstract = {We use unique Swedish data with information on adopted children’s biological and adoptive parents to estimate intergenerational mobility associations in earnings and education. We argue that the impact from biological parents captures broad prebirth factors, including genes and prenatal environment, and the impact from adoptive parents represents broad postbirth factors, such as childhood environment. We find that both pre- and postbirth factors contribute to intergenerational earnings and education transmissions, and that prebirth factors are more important for mother’s education and less important for father’s income. We also find some evidence for a positive interaction effect between postbirth environment and prebirth factors.}, key = {mobility}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Bjorklund1995, author = {Bj{\"o}rklund, A. and Palme, M. and Svensson, I.}, title = {Tax reform and income distribution - an assessment using alternative income concepts}, journal = {Swedish Economic Policy Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {2}, pages = {229-266}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BjPaSv:95AT, author = {Bj{\"o}rklund, A. and Palme, M. and Svensson, I.}, title = {Assessing the effects of {S}wedish tax and benefit reforms on income distributionusing different income concepts}, institution = {National Institute of Economic Research, Economic Council}, year = {1995}, type = {Tax Reform Evaluation Report}, number = {13}, address = {Stockholm, Sweden}, month = {August}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{BjPaSv:95TR, author = {Bj{\"o}rklund, A. and Palme, M. and Svensson, I.}, title = {Tax reform and income distribution - an assessment using alternative incomeconcepts}, journal = {Swedish Economic Policy Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {2}, pages = {229-266}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{Blac:58, title = {The Theory of Committees and Elections}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1958}, author = {Black, D.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {politics} } @ARTICLE{Blac:48, author = {Black, D.}, title = {On the rationale of group decision making}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1948}, volume = {56}, pages = {23-24}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{BlMoSmTo:88, title = {Inequalities in health: The {B}lack {R}eport: The Health divide}, publisher = {Penguin, London}, year = {1988}, author = {Black, D. and Morris, J. N. and Smith, C. and Townsend, P. and Whitehead,M.}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{BlDo:97, author = {Black, David C. and Dowd, Michael R.}, title = {Measuring real interstate income inequality in the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {56}, pages = {367-370}, number = {3}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{BlDrLeMu:97, author = {Blackaby, D. and Drinkwater, S. and Leslie, D. and Murphy, P.}, title = {A picture of male and female unemployment among Britain's ethnic minorities}, journal = {Scottish Journal of Polical Economy}, year = {1997}, pages = {182-197}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Blackaby1999, author = {Blackaby, D.H. and Murphy P.D. and O'Leary N.C.}, title = {The Payment of Public Sector Workers in the {UK}: Reconciliation with North American Findings}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {65}, pages = {239-243}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BlLeMuOL:98, author = {Blackaby, D. H. and Leslie, D. G. and Murphy, P. D. and O'Leary, N. C.}, title = {The ethnic wage gap and employment differentials in the 1990s: Evidencefor {B}ritain}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {58}, pages = {97-103}, number = {1}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{BlMuLe:99, author = {Blackaby, D. H. and Murphy, P. D. and O'Leary, N. C.}, title = {The Payment of Public Sector Workers in the {UK}: Reconciliation with {N}orth{A}merican Findings}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {65}, pages = {239-243}, key = {Earnings, wages} } @TECHREPORT{Blac:93, author = {Blackburn, M. L.}, title = {International comparisons of income poverty and extreme income poverty}, institution = {CEPS/INSTEAD}, year = {1993}, type = {Luxembourg Income Study, Working Paper}, number = {87}, address = {Luxembourg}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Blac:89, author = {Blackburn, M. L.}, title = {Interpreting the magnitude of changes in measures of income inequality}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1989}, volume = {42}, pages = {21-25}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BlBlNe:93, author = {Blackburn, M. L. and Bloom, D. E. and Neumark, D.}, title = {Fertility timing, wages and human capital}, journal = {Journal of Population Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {6}, pages = {1-30}, number = {1}, key = {population economics} } @BOOK{Blac:97, title = {Comparing Poverty: The {U}nited {S}tates and Other Industrial Nations}, publisher = {The American Enterprise Institute}, year = {1997}, author = {Blackburn, McKinley, L.}, address = {Washington, D.C.}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{BlBoDo:01, author = {Blackorby, C. and Bossert, W. and Donaldson, D.}, title = {Population Ethics and the Existence of Value Functions}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {82,2}, pages = {301-308}, key = {population economics} } @ARTICLE{BlBoDo:97, author = {Blackorby, C. and Bossert, W. and Donaldson, W.}, title = {Critical-Level Utilitarianism and the Population-Ethics Dilemma}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {1997}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{BlBr:04, author = {Blackorby, C. and Brett, C.}, title = {Production Efficiency and Direct-Indirect Tax Mix}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2004}, volume = {6}, pages = {165-180}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @INCOLLECTION{BlDo:84, author = {Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D.}, title = {Ethically significant ordinal indices of relative inequality}, booktitle = {Advances in Econometrics}, publisher = {JAI Press}, year = {1984}, editor = {Basmann, R. L. and Rhodes, G. G.}, volume = {3}, pages = {83-6}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{BlDo:94, author = {Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D.}, title = {Measuring the cost of children: a theoretical framework}, booktitle = {The Measurement of Household Welfare}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1994}, editor = {Blundell, R. W. and Preston, I. and Walker, I.}, chapter = {1}, pages = {51-69}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{BlDo:99, author = {Charles Blackorby and David Donaldson}, title = {Market Demand Curves and {D}upuit-{M}arshall Consumers' Surpluses: A GeneralEquilibrium Analysis}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1999}, volume = {37}, pages = {139-163}, number = {2}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Blackorby1980, author = {Blackorby, C. and Donaldson , D.}, title = {Ethical indices for the measurement of poverty}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1980}, volume = {48}, pages = {1053-1860}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BlDo:80, author = {Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D.}, title = {A theoretical treatment of indices of absolute inequality}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1980}, volume = {21}, pages = {107-136}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BlDo:80b, author = {Blackorby, C. and Donaldson , D.}, title = {Ethical indices for the measurement of poverty}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1980}, volume = {48}, pages = {1053-1060}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{BlDo:78, author = {Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D.}, title = {Measures of relative equality and their meaning in terms of social welfare}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1978}, volume = {18}, pages = {59-80}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{BlDo:78IW, author = {Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D.}, title = {Inequality within and among population subgroups: Ethically consistent subindices}, institution = {University of British Columbia}, year = {1978}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {78-36}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BlDo:77, author = {Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D.}, title = {Utility vs equity: some plausible quasi-orderings}, journal = {Journal Public Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {7}, pages = {365-381}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Blackorby1981, author = {Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D. and Auersperg, M.}, title = {A new procedure for the measurement of inequality within and among population subgroup}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {1981}, volume = {14}, pages = {665-685}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BlDoAu:81, author = {Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D. and Auersperg, M.}, title = {A new procedure for the measurement of inequality within and among population subgroups}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {1981}, volume = {14}, pages = {665-685}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{BlDoAu:78, author = {Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D. and Auersperg, M.}, title = {Inequality within and among population subgroups. Ethically consistent subindices}, institution = {University of British Columbia}, year = {1978}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {10}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BlDoWe:99, author = {Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D. and Weymark, J. A.}, title = {Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem for State-Contingent Alternatives}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {365-387}, key = {social choice} } @ARTICLE{Blac:53, author = {Blackwell, D.}, title = {Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments}, journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1953}, volume = {24}, pages = {265-272}, key = {statistics} } @INCOLLECTION{Blad:85CW, author = {Blades, D. W.}, title = {Crime: what should be included in the national accounts and what differencewould it make?}, booktitle = {The Economics of the Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1985}, editor = {Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A.}, address = {Berlin, Germany}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{BlCa:98, author = {Blake, Andrew P. and Camba-Mendez, Gonzalo}, title = {Filtered least squares and measurement error}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {59}, pages = {163-168}, number = {2}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{BlJuSi:07, author = {Blalock,G. and Just,D.R. and Simon, D.H.}, title = {Hitting the Jackpot or Hitting the Skids: Entertainment, Poverty, and the Demand for State Lotteries}, journal = {American Journal of Economics and Sociology}, year = {2007}, volume = {66}, pages = {545-570}, number = {3}, abstract = {State-sponsored lotteries are a lucrative source of revenue. Despite their low payout rates, lotteries are extremely popular, particularly among low-income citizens. State officials laud the benefits of lottery proceeds and promote the fun and excitement of participation. This entertainment value is one explanation for lottery demand by the poor: individuals with lower incomes substitute lottery play for other entertainment. Alternatively, low-income consumers may view lotteries as a convenient and otherwise rare opportunity for radically improving their standard of living. Bad times may cause desperation, and the desperate may turn to lotteries in an effort to escape hardship. This study tests these competing explanations. We examine lottery sales data from 39 states over 10 years and find a strong and positive relationship between sales and poverty rates. In contrast, we find no relationship between movie ticket sales, another inexpensive form of entertainment, and poverty rates.}, key = {lotteries}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{BlOs:07, author = {Blanchflower, D.G. and Oswald, A.}, title = {IS WELL-BEING U-SHAPED OVER THE LIFE CYCLE?}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, number = {12935}, abstract = {Recent research has argued that psychological well-being is U-shaped through the life cycle. The difficulty with such a claim is that there are likely to be omitted cohort effects (earlier generations may have been born in, say, particularly good or bad times). Hence the apparent U may be an artifact. Using data on approximately 500,000 Americans and Europeans, this paper designs a test that makes it possible to allow for different birth-cohorts. A robust U-shape of happiness in age is found. Ceteris paribus, well-being reaches a minimum, on both sides of the Atlantic, in people's mid to late 40s. The paper also shows that in the United States the well-being of successive birth-cohorts has gradually fallen through time. In Europe, newer birth-cohorts are happier.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{BlGoGrMa:02, author = {Blanden, J. and Goodman, A. and Gregg, P. and Machin, S.}, title = {Changes in Intergenerational Mobility in {B}ritain}, institution = {Centre for Economic Performance}, year = {2002}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {London School of Economics}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{BlGrMa:07, author = {Blanden, J. and Gregg, P. and Macmillan, L.}, title = {Accounting for Intergenerational Income Persistence: Noncognitive Skills, Ability and Education}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {2007}, volume = {117}, pages = {43-60}, abstract = {We analyse in detail the factors that lead to intergenerational persistence among sons, where this is measured as the association between childhood family income and later adult earnings. We seek to account for the level of income persistence in the 1970 BCS cohort and also to explore the decline in mobility in the UK between the 1958 NCDS cohort and the 1970 cohort. The mediating factors considered are cognitive skills, non-cognitive traits, educational attainment and labour market attachment. Changes in the relationships between these variables, parental income and earnings are able to explain over 80% of the rise in intergenerational persistence across the cohorts.}, key = {income mobility}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @INCOLLECTION{Blan:94, author = {Blank, Rebecca}, title = {The Widening Wage Distribution and its Policy Implications}, booktitle = {Aspects of Distribution of Wealth and Income}, publisher = {The Macmillan Press Ltd}, year = {1994}, editor = {Papadimitriou, Dimitri B.}, chapter = {10}, pages = {185-193}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Blan:02, author = {Blank, R.}, title = {Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2002}, volume = {40}, pages = {1105-1166}, key = {welfare}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{Blan:02EV, author = {Blank, R.}, title = {Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2002}, volume = {40}, pages = {1105-1166}, key = {welfare}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Blan:89, author = {Blank, R.}, title = {Analysing the length of welfare spells}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1989}, volume = {39}, pages = {245 - 273}, key = {social security} } @TECHREPORT{Blan:02CE, author = {Blank, R. M.}, title = {Can Equity and Efficiency Complement Each Other?}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2002}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {W8820}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138 USA}, abstract = {Economists tend to assume that redistributive transfers increase equitybut cause a loss in efficiency, the so-called 'leaky bucket' effect. Thispaper explores situations where efficiency losses are small or where equityand efficiency might even complement each other. A simple model identifieskey parameters that cause leaky buckets and which policy can affect. Threesituations are discussed where the equity/efficiency tradeoff may be low:When transfers go to populations with no capacity to change their behavior;when transfers go to programs that limit efficiency losses through behavioralrequirements; and when commodities are subsidized that function as long-terminvestments and create future income gains.}, key = {Redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Blan:00, author = {Blank, R. M.}, title = {When Can Public Policy Makers Rely on Private Markets? The Effective Provisionof Social Services}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2000}, volume = {110}, pages = {C34-C49}, key = {social services} } @ARTICLE{Blank2000, author = {Blank, R. M.}, title = {When Can Public Policy Makers Rely on Private Markets? The Effective Provision of Social Services}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2000}, volume = {110}, pages = {C34-C49}, key = {social services}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BlRu:96, author = {Blank, R. M. and Ruggles, P.}, title = {When do women use aid to families with dependent children and food stamps?The dynamics of eligibility versus participation}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1996}, volume = {31}, pages = {57-89}, number = {1}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Blau:97, author = {Blau, David M.}, title = {Social security and the labor supply of older married couples}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {4}, pages = {371-415}, number = {4}, month = {December}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Blau:98, author = {Blau, F.}, title = {Trends in the Well-Being of {A}merican Women, 1970-95}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1998}, volume = {36}, pages = {112-165}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{BlKa:96, author = {Blau, Francine D. and Kahn, Lawrence M.}, title = {International differences in male wage inequality: institutions versus market forces}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1996}, volume = {104}, pages = {791-837}, number = {4}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{BlNi:04, author = {Bleaney,M. and Nishiyama,A.}, title = {Income inequality and growth - does the relationship vary with the incomelevel?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2004}, volume = {84}, pages = {349-355}, abstract = {For three different specifications of a cross-country growth model, thecoefficient of initial income inequality is remarkably similar for high-and low-income countries, contrary to some recent suggestions in the literature,but varies markedly across models.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BlPi:05, author = {Bleichrodt,H. and Pinto,J.}, title = {The validity of qalys under non-expected utlity}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2005}, volume = {115}, pages = {533-550}, abstract = {This paper examines applications of non-expected utility in the health domain.The most widely used utility model in health economics, the time-linearQALY model, assumes (i) separability of quality of life and life duration,and (ii) linearity of the utility for life duration. We perform new tests,which are robust to violations of expected utility, of these two assumptions.The data support separability, but show that the utility for life durationis concave rather than linear. The finding of concave utility may not besurprising in itself. The contribution of this paper is to demonstratethis empirically without being invalidated by violations of expected utility.}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{BlDeHaHu:85, author = {Blinder, A.S. and Deaton, A. and Hall, R.E. and Hubbard, R.G.}, title = {The Time Series Consumption Function Revisited}, journal = {Brookings Papers on Economic Activity}, year = {1985}, volume = {2}, pages = {465-521}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @BOOK{Blin:90, title = {Paying for Productivity}, publisher = {Brookinfs Institution}, year = {1990}, author = {Blinder, Alan S.}, address = {Washington DC.}, institution = {Brookings Institution}, key = {productivity} } @ARTICLE{Blin:76, author = {Blinder, A. S.}, title = {Inequality and mobility in the distribution of wealth}, journal = {Kyklos}, year = {1976}, volume = {28}, pages = {607-638}, key = {wealth} } @BOOK{Blin:74, title = {Toward an Economic Theory of Income Distribution}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {1974}, author = {Blinder, A. S.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {{income distribution:theoretical}} } @ARTICLE{Blin:73AM, author = {Blinder, A. S.}, title = {A model of inherited wealth}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1973}, volume = {87}, pages = {608-626}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Blin:73WD, author = {Blinder, A. S.}, title = {Wage discrimination: Reduced form and structural estimates}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1973}, volume = {8}, pages = {436-455}, key = {discrimination}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.05.07} } @TECHREPORT{Blinder2000, author = {Blinder, A. S. and Morgan, J.}, title = {Are Two Heads Better Than One?: An Experimental Analysis of Group Vs. Individual Decisionmaking}, year = {2000}, journal = {NBER Working Paper Series}, key = {Experiments}, owner = {a1100971}, pages = {1-48}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, volume = {Working Paper 7909} } @TECHREPORT{BlMo:00, author = {Blinder, A. S. and Morgan, J.}, title = {Are Two Heads Better Than One?: An Experimental Analysis of Group Vs. IndividualDecisionmaking}, year = {2000}, journal = {NBER Working Paper Series}, key = {Experiments}, pages = {1-48}, volume = {Working Paper 7909} } @ARTICLE{BlRo:85, author = {Blinder, A. S. and Rosen, H. S.}, title = {Notches}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1985}, volume = {75}, pages = {736-747}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Blis:08, author = {Bliss, C.}, title = {Multiple equilibrium in the Diamond Capital Model}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2008}, volume = {100}, pages = {143-145}, number = {1}, month = {July}, abstract = {When the EIS varies with consumption, multiple, even uncountably many, steady-state solutions may be obtained to the Diamond Capital Model. The many equilibria are solutions to a differential equation for the EIS value. This technique has general application.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.21} } @ARTICLE{Blis:04, author = {Bliss, C.}, title = {Koopmans recursive preferences and income convergence}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2004}, volume = {117}, pages = {124-139}, abstract = {Stiglitz (Econometrica 37 (1969) 382) shows income convergence in a many-agentSolow growth model with integrated capital markets (ICM). The many-agentRamsey model (MARM) without ICM also gives income convergence. With a MARM,equal discount rates, and ICM, convergence of incomes (as opposed to productper capita) cannot occur. These results depend upon fixed savingpropensities(Stiglitz) or separable additive preferences (Ramsey). Non-convergenceof incomes is shown when preferences are identical Koopmans separable (KS).Endogenous discount rates may violate KS. A model for that case is developedwhen, even under favourable assumptions, oscillations or chaotic dynamicsmay result.}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{BlBr:64, author = {Blitz, R. C. and Brittain, J. A.}, title = {An extension of the {L}orenz diagram to the correlation of two variables}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1964}, volume = {23}, pages = {37-143}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Blitz1964, author = {Blitz, R. C. and Brittain, J. A.}, title = {An extension of the {L}orenz diagram to the correlation of two variables}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1964}, volume = {23}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BlZe:06, author = {Bloch,F. and Zenginobuz,E.U.}, title = {Tiebout equilibria in local public good economies with spillovers}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {2006}, pages = {1745-1763}, abstract = {This paper analyzes the effects of spillovers on the equilibrium population distribution across jurisdictions in a local public good economy with free mobility. Spillovers are parametrized by a matrix [aij] where aija[0, 1]. When spillovers are symmetric and close to 0 or 1 (pure local public goods and pure public goods), all equilibrium jurisdiction structures are symmetric. However, any population distribution can be sustained in equilibrium for some value of the spillover parameter a. In the class of utility functions with additive externalities, we identify the unique family of utility functions for which equilibria are symmetric except for an isolated value of a. This is a class of utility functions which are linear in the public good and a power function of the private good, u(c, c)=A(1c)b +c. With this specification of utility, we show that an increase in a results in a more fragmented equilibrium population distribution, and that when spillovers are asymmetric and large, a jurisdiction which is more centrally located (i.e. benefits more from the public goods provided in other jurisdictions) has a larger population in equilibrium.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{BlHe:75LT, author = {Block, M. K. and Heineke, J. M.}, title = {Labor theoretic analysis of criminal choice}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1975}, volume = {65}, pages = {314-325}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{BlHe:73TA, author = {Block, M. K. and Heineke, J. M.}, title = {The allocation of effort under uncertainty: the case of risk-averse behavior}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1973}, volume = {81}, pages = {376-385}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{BlLi:75CP, author = {Block, M. K. and Lind, R. C.}, title = {Crime and punishment reconsidered}, journal = {Journal of Legal Studies}, year = {1975}, volume = {4}, pages = {241-247}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{BlLi:75EA, author = {Block, M. K. and Lind, R. C.}, title = {Economic analysis of crimes punishable by imprisonment}, journal = {Journal of Legal Studies}, year = {1975}, volume = {4}, pages = {479-492}, key = {crime} } @TECHREPORT{BlCh:04, author = {Blomquist,S. and Christiansen,V.}, title = {Taxation and heterogeneous preferences}, institution = {CESIFO}, year = {2004}, abstract = {Non-linear income taxes and linear commodity taxes are analysed when peoplediffer with respect to ability, high-skilled agents have heterogeneouspreferences, and neither individual abilities nor preferences are observable.The paper highlights how informational constraints may motivate differentialtreatment of people with different preferences for leisure even if unequaltreatment is not desirable per se. Which preference type will be betteror worse off is shown to depend on the self-selection constraints associatedwith the information asymmetry. We characterize pure income tax optima,which may be bunching or separating optima. In particular, the income taxmay not be able to distinguish between those low-income people who arelow-skilled and those who have strong preference for leisure. As is shown,there may still be an impact on the optimum income tax schedule as it willdepend on the composition of the population with respect to types of individuals.Finally, the paper addresses what can be achieved by commodity taxes whenpreferences are heterogeneous, in particular, in terms of targeting groupsthat the income tax is incapable of discriminating between.}, key = {optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{BlCh:03, author = {Blomquist, Soren and Christiansen, Vidar}, title = {Is there a case for public provision of private goods if preferences areheterogeneous? An example with day care}, year = {2003}, number = {938}, abstract = {A strong case for public provision of certain private goods has been establishedfor an economy in which individuals have homogeneous preferences but differin skill levels. There has been a critique of this model/mechanism arguingthat heterogeneous preferences at a given skill level would invalidatethe mechanism, implying that public provision of private goods is merelyof theoretical, not of practical interest. The argument is that if thepublic provision level is set so as to fit the low skill person with ahigh preference for the publicly provided good, the low skill person witha low preference for the good comes out worse than in a system withoutpublic provision. In this paper we take this critique seriously and investigateif a public provision scheme can be constructed so that we obtain a strictPareto improvement when going from a pure tax/transfer system to the publicprovision scheme even if preferences are heterogeneous. We find that heterogeneouspreferences do not invalidate the benefits of publicly provided privategoods. We also characterise the optimum tax and public provision policy.}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {public economics}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{BlCh:01, author = {Blomquist, Soren and Christiansen, Vidar}, title = {The Role of Prices on Excludable Public Goods}, year = {2001}, number = {536}, abstract = {When a poublic good ist excludable it is possible to charge individualsfor using the good. We study the role of prices on excludable public goodsusing an extension of the Stiglitz-Stern version of the Mirrlees optimalincome tax model. Our discussion includes both the case where the publicgood is a final consumer good and the case where it is an intermediategood. We demonstrate that for a public consumer good charging a positiveprice may be desirable, but only under certain conditions. However, charginga lower than optimal price may be less efficient than setting a zero price.Conditions are identified under which consumers should be rationed in theirdemand rather than adjusting demand to price. We also conclude that producersusing an intermediate public good as input should not be charged a positiveprice.}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {public economics}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{BlCh:99, author = {Blomquist, S. and Christiansen, V.}, title = {The Political Economy of Publicly Provided Private Goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {31-54}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{BlMi:08, author = {Blomquist, S. and Micheletto, L.}, title = {Age-related Optimal Income Taxation}, journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {110}, pages = {45-71}, number = {1}, abstract = {In most countries, average income varies with age. In this paper we investigate if and how it is possible to enhance the redistributive mechanism by relating tax payments to age. Using an OLG model where some individuals are low skilled all their life while others are low skilled when young but high skilled when old, we first show how an age dependent optimal income tax can Pareto improve upon an age independent income tax. We then characterize the optimal age dependent income tax. A tax on interest income is part of the optimal tax structure.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.18} } @ARTICLE{BlMi:06, author = {Blomquist, S. and Micheletto, L.}, title = {Optimal Redistributive Taxation When Government's and Agents' Preferences Differ}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {1215-1233}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{Blon:99SL, author = {Blonski, Matthias}, title = {Social Learning with Case-Based Decisions}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1999}, volume = {38}, pages = {59-77}, number = {1}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Blon:99WI, author = {Blonski, Matthias}, title = {When is rational behavior consistent with rules of thumb? A link betweenevolutionary terminology and neoclassical methodology}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {131-144}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Blonski1999, author = {Blonski, Matthias}, title = {When is rational behavior consistent with rules of thumb? A link between evolutionary terminology and neoclassical methodology}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {131-144}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BlGrVaR:02, author = {Bloom, N. and Griffith, R. and {Van R}eenen, J.}, title = {Do {R\&D} Tax Credits Work? Evidence from a Panel of Countries 1979-1997}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {85}, pages = {1-31}, key = {industry} } @BOOK{BlSt:83, title = {Least Absolute Deviations: Theory, Applications and Algorithms}, publisher = {Burkhauser}, year = {1983}, author = {Bloomfield, P. and Steiger, W. L.}, address = {Boston, Massachusetts}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{BlMaHo:99, author = {David K. Blough and Carolyn W. Madden and Mark C. Hornbrook}, title = {Modeling Risk Using Generalized Linear Models}, journal = {Journal of Health Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {18}, pages = {153-171}, number = {2}, key = {health} } @TECHREPORT{BlMaSa:08, author = {Blumkin, T. and Margalioth, Y. and Sadka, E.}, title = {The Role of Stigma in the Design of Welfare Programs}, institution = {Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2305}, abstract = {We consider the notion of welfare stigma à la Besley and Coate (1992b). This stigma is attributed to welfare claimants by society when they are perceived as undeserving in the sense that they falsely claim to be eligible for welfare benefits. However, due to imperfect information, this stigma may be extended, with some probability, to all welfare claimants. We examine the implications of this kind of stigma for the design of welfare programs.}, key = {stigma}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @TECHREPORT{BlRuGa:08, author = {Blumkin, Tomer and Ruffle, Bradley and Ganun, Yosef}, title = {Are Income and Consumption Taxes ever Really Equivalent? Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real Goods}, institution = {CESIFO}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2194}, abstract = {The public finance literature demonstrates the equivalence between consumption and labor income (wage) taxes. We construct an environment in which individuals make real laborleisure choices and spend their earned income on real goods. We use this experimental framework to test whether a labor income tax and an equivalent consumption tax lead to an identical labor-leisure allocation. Despite controlling for subjects’ work ability and inherent labor-leisure preferences and not allowing for saving, subjects reduce their labor supply significantly more in response to an income tax than they do in response to an equivalent consumption tax. We discuss the economic implications of a policy shift from an income to a consumption tax.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {experimental economics, tax equivalence, income tax, consumption tax, behavioral economics.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{BlSa:05, author = {Blumkin,T. and Sadka,E.}, title = {Income taxation with intergenerational mobility: Can higher inequality lead to less progression?}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2005}, volume = {49}, pages = {1915-1925}, abstract = {We introduce the notion of social mobility into an optimal income tax model. This is done by allowing earning abilities to be partly innate and partly acquired through investments in human capital (education). The implications for the optimal re-distributive policy are studied.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{BlSa:04, author = {Blumkin, Tomer and Sadka, Efraim}, title = {Minimum Wage with Optimal Income Taxation}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2004}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1125}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, abstract = {Minimum wage legislation is a standard policy tool in most countries. However,the overall merits of minimum wage are controversial due to its potentialadverse effects on unemployment. In this paper we construct a simple modelin which minimum wage plays an important re-distributive role, alongsideincome taxation, without generating adverse effects on unemployment.}, key = {optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{Blumkin2004, author = {Blumkin, Tomer and Sadka, Efraim}, title = {Minimum Wage with Optimal Income Taxation}, year = {2004}, number = {1125}, abstract = {Minimum wage legislation is a standard policy tool in most countries. However, the overall merits of minimum wage are controversial due to its potential adverse effects on unemployment. In this paper we construct a simple model in which minimum wage plays an important re-distributive role, alongside income taxation, without generating adverse effects on unemployment.}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{BlSa:03, author = {Blumkin, T. and Sadka, E.}, title = {Estate taxation with intended and accidental bequests}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {88}, pages = {1– 21}, abstract = {In this paper we examine the properties of the optimal estate tax in the presence of a complete set of tax instruments available to the social planner. We allow for both types of bequest motives, namely altruistic and accidental. We examine the case for estate taxation which seems to be the strongest (but not impeccable) with accidental bequests. In general, the estate tax is highly sensitive to the relative importance of the two bequest motives.}, key = {wealth taxation} } @ARTICLE{Blumkin2003, author = {Blumkin, T. and Sadka, E.}, title = {Estate taxation with intended and accidental bequests}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {88}, pages = {1- 21}, key = {wealth tax}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BlSa:01, author = {Blumkin, T. and Sadka, E.}, title = {Estate taxation}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2001}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {558}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, key = {wealth taxation} } @ARTICLE{Blun:00, author = {Blundell, R.}, title = {Work Incentives and `In-work' Benefit Reforms: A Review}, journal = {Oxford Review of Economic Policy}, year = {2000}, volume = {16}, pages = {27-44}, number = {1}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Blun:88, author = {Blundell, R.}, title = {Consumer Behaviour: Theory and Empirical Evidence – A Survey}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1988}, volume = {98}, pages = {16-65}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.24} } @ARTICLE{BlBo:98, author = {Blundell, R. and Bond, S.}, title = {Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1998}, volume = {87}, pages = {115-143}, number = {1}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{BlBrMe:94, author = {Richard Blundell and Martin Browning and Costas Meghir}, title = {Consumer Demand and the Life-Cycle Allocation of Household Expenditures}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1994}, volume = {61}, pages = {57-80}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{BlDeGoRe:00, author = {Blundell, R. and Dearden, A. and Goodman, A. and Reed, H.}, title = {The Returns to Higher Education in Britain: Evidence from a British Cohort}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2000}, volume = {110}, pages = {F82-F99}, key = {education, training} } @TECHREPORT{BlDeMe:96, author = {Blundell, R. And Dearden, L. And Meghir, C.}, title = {The determinants and effects of work related training in Britain}, institution = {IFS}, year = {1996}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{BlDeMeSi:99, author = {Richard Blundell and Lorraine Dearden and Costas Meghir and Barbara Sianesi}, title = {Human Capital Investment: The Returns from Education and Training to theIndividual, the Firm and the Economy}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {1-23}, number = {1}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{BlDuMcMe:00, author = {Blundell, R. and Duncan, A. and McCrae, J. and Meghir, C.}, title = {The Labour Market Impact of Working Families' Tax Credit}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2000}, volume = {21}, pages = {75-103}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{BlDuMe:98, author = {Blundell, R. and Duncan, A. and Meghir, C.}, title = {Estimating labor supply responses using tax reforms}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1998}, volume = {66}, pages = {827-861}, number = {4}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{BlLe:91, author = {Blundell, Richard and Lewbell, Arthur}, title = {The Information Content of Equivalence Scales}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1991}, volume = {50}, pages = {49-68}, key = {Equivalence scales} } @ARTICLE{BlPi:03, author = {Blundell, R and Pistaferri, L.}, title = {Income Volatility and Household Consumption}, journal = {The Journal of Human Resources}, year = {2003}, volume = {38}, pages = {1032-1050}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.11.07} } @TECHREPORT{BlPiPr:02, author = {Blundell, R. and Pistaferri, L. and Preston, I.}, title = {Partial Insurance, Information and Consumption Dynamics}, institution = {CERP}, year = {2002}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {3666}, address = {Centre for Economic Policy Research 90–98 Goswell Rd, London EC1V 7RR, UK}, month = {November}, note = {www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP3666.asp and http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=369540}, abstract = {This Paper uses panel data on household consumption and income to evaluate the degree of insurance to income shocks. Our aim is to describe the transmission of income into consumption . Our framework nests the special cases of self-insurance and the complete markets assumption. We assess the degree of insurance over and above selfinsurance through savings by contrasting shifts in the cross-sectional distribution of income growth with shifts in the cross-sectional distribution of consumption growth, and analyse the way these two measures of household welfare correlate over time. We combine panel data on income from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) with consumption data from repeated Consumres Expenditure Survey (CEX) cross-sections in a structural way, i.e. using conventional demand analysis rather than reduced form imputation procedures. Our results point to some partial insurance but reject the complete markets restriction. We find a greater degree of insurance for transitory shocks and differences in the degree of insurance over time and across education. We also document the importance of durables and of taxes and transfers as a means of insurance.}, key = {information}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{BlPr:98, author = {Blundell, R. and Preston, I.}, title = {Consumption Inequality and Income Uncertainty}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {113}, pages = {603-640}, abstract = {This paper places the debate over using consumption or income in studies of inequality growth in a formal intertemporal setting. It highlights the importance of permanent and transitory income uncertainty in the evaluation of growth in consumption inequality. We derive conditions under which the growth of variances and covariances of income and consumption can be used to separately identify the growth in the variance of permanent and transitory income shocks. Household data from Britain for the period 1968-1992 are used to show a strong growth in transitory inequality toward the end of this period, while younger cohorts are shown to face significantly higher levels of permanent inequality.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{Blundell1998, author = {Richard Blundell and Ian Preston}, title = {Consumption Inequality and Income Uncertainty}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {113}, pages = {603-639}, key = {consumption}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BlPr:95CI, author = {Blundell, R. and Preston, I.}, title = {Consumption inequality and income uncertainty}, institution = {Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {1995}, type = {mimeo}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{BlPr:95IE, author = {Blundell, Richard and Preston, Ian}, title = {Income, expenditure and the living standards of {UK} households}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1995}, volume = {16}, pages = {40-54}, number = {3}, month = {August}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{BlPr:95IO, author = {Blundell, Richard and Preston, Ian}, title = {Income or consumption in the measurement of inequality and poverty?}, institution = {Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {1994}, type = {Working Paper Series}, number = {W94/12}, month = {September}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BlSt:05HA, author = {Blundell, R. and Stoker, T.}, title = {Heterogeneity and Aggregation}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2005}, volume = {43}, pages = {347-391}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.24} } @ARTICLE{BlSt:99, author = {Richard Blundell and Thomas M. Stoker}, title = {Consumption and the Timing of Income Risk}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {475-507}, number = {3}, key = {consumption} } @TECHREPORT{BlSt:94, author = {Richard Blundell and Thomas M. Stoker}, title = {Consumption and the Timing of Income Risk}, institution = {The Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {1994}, type = {Working Paper Series}, number = {W94/9}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Blundell1982, author = {Blundell, R. and Walker, I.}, title = {Modelling the joint distribution of household labour supplies and commodity demands}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1982}, volume = {92}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BlWa:82, author = {Blundell, R. and Walker, I.}, title = {Modelling the joint distribution of household labour supplies and commoditydemands}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1982}, volume = {92}, pages = {351-364}, key = {labour} } @INCOLLECTION{BlPrWa:94, author = {Blundell, R. W. and Preston, I. and Walker, I.}, title = {An introduction to applied welfare analysis}, booktitle = {The Measurement of Household Welfare}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1994}, editor = {Blundell, R. W. and Preston, I. and Walker, I.}, chapter = {1}, pages = {1-50}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{BoCu:01, author = {Boadway, R. and Cuff, K.}, title = {A Minimum Wage Can Be Welfare-Improving and Employment-Enhancing}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {45}, pages = {553-576}, key = {minimum wage} } @ARTICLE{BoHa:99, author = {Boadway, R. and Hayashi, M.}, title = {Country Size and the Voluntary Provision of International Public Goods}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {619-638}, key = {Public Goods} } @ARTICLE{BoKe:93, author = {Boadway, Robin and Keen, Michael}, title = {Public goods, self-selection and optimal income taxation}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1993}, volume = {34}, pages = {463-478}, key = {public goods} } @TECHREPORT{BoLeMaPe:04, author = {Boadway, Robin and Leite-Monteiro, Manuel and Marchand, Maurice G and Pestieau,Pierre}, title = {Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection}, institution = {Centre for Economic Policy Research}, year = {2004}, type = {CEPR Discussion Paper}, number = {4253}, abstract = {This Paper starts from the result of Rochet (1989), that with distortionary income taxes social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated. This finding is re-examined when ex post moral hazard and adverse selection are included, and under different informational assumptions. Individuals can take actions influencing the size of the loss in the event of accident (or ill health). Social insurance can be supplemented by private insurance, but private insurance markets are affected by both adverse selection and moral hazard. The main purpose of the present Paper is to study how equity and efficiency considerations should be traded off in choosing the optimal coverage of social insurance when those features are introduced.}, key = {social insurance} } @ARTICLE{BoMaMo:07, author = {Boadway, Robin and Marceau, Nicolas and Mongrain, Steeve}, title = {Redistributive Taxation under Ethical Behaviour}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {109}, pages = {505-529}, abstract = {We consider the implications of ethical behaviour on the effect of a redistributive tax-transfer system. In choosing their labour supplies, individuals take into account whether their tax liabilities correspond to what they view as ethically acceptable. If tax liabilities are viewed as ethically acceptable, a taxpayer behaves ethically, does not distort her behaviour, and chooses to work as if she were not taxed. On the other hand, if ethical behaviour results in tax liabilities that exceed those that are ethically acceptable, she behaves egoistically (partially or fully), distorts her behaviour, and chooses her labour supply taking into account the income tax. We establish taxpayers’ equilibrium behaviour and obtain that labour supply is less elastic when taxpayers may behave ethically than when they act egoistically. We characterise and compare the egoistic voting equilibrium linear tax schedules under potentially ethical and egoistic behaviour. We also compare our results to those obtained under altruism, an alternative benchmark.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Ethical behaviour, Kantian preferences, income taxation, redistribution}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{BoMaSa:99, author = {Boadway, R. and Marceau, N. and Sato, M.}, title = {Agency and the Design of Welfare Systems}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {1-30}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Boadway2000a, author = {Boadway, R. and Marchand, M. and Pestieau, P.}, title = {Redistribution with Unobservable Bequests: A Case for Taxing Capital Income}, journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {102}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BoMaPe:00, author = {Boadway, R. and Marchand, M. and Pestieau, P.}, title = {Redistribution with Unobservable Bequests: A Case for Taxing Capital Income}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {102}, pages = {253-267}, abstract = {This paper addresses the question of the optimal taxation of labour and interest income in an overlapping generations model with two unobservable characteristics, ability and inheritance. We assume realistically that saving can only be taxed anonymously, whereas the tax on labour earnings can be individualized and made non-linear. In such a setting, we show that a withholding tax on interest income along with a non-linear tax on labour income is desirable. The role of interest income taxation is to indirectly tax inherited wealth.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{BoMaVi:98, author = {Boadway, Robin and Marchand, Maurice and Vigneault, Marianne}, title = {The consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and publicspending in a federation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {68}, pages = {453-478}, number = {3}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{BoRa:99, author = {Boadway, R. and Raj, B.}, title = {Contemporary Issues in Empirical Public Finance}, journal = {Empirical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {24}, key = {Public Economics} } @ARTICLE{BoSa:00, author = {Boadway, R. and Sato, M.}, title = {The Optimality of Punishing Only the Innocent: The Case of Tax Evasion}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2000}, volume = {7}, pages = {641-664}, abstract = {We study the effects on tax enforcement and tax policy of unintentionalcompliance errors by taxpayers and administrative errors by tax auditors.The government can impose both penalties for misreporting and rewards forhonest reporting. Maximal sanctions will not be applied because errorsare possible, so evasion cannot be eliminated costlessly. Under optimalpolicy intentional evasion can be deterred, but innocent tax evaders mustbe penalized whether they have unintentionally evaded or have been mistakenlyconvicted. This deters intentional evasion, but limits redistribution.Without rewards for honest reporting, the revelation principle need notapply, so intentional evasion can occur.}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{BoSoTr:07, author = {Boadway, Robin and Song, Zhen and Tremblay, Jean-Francois}, title = {Commitment and matching contributions to public goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {1664-1683}, abstract = {We study multi-stage processes of non-cooperative voluntary provision of public goods. In the first stage, one or more players announce contributions that may be conditional on the subsequent contributions of others. In later stages, players choose their own contributions and fulfill any commitments made in the first stage. Equilibrium contributions are characterized under different assumptions about the commitment ability of players, the number of public goods and whether players commit to matching rates or to discrete quantities. We focus on contribution mechanisms that can emerge and be sustainable without a central authority, and that may be particularly relevant for international public goods. Efficient levels of public goods can be achieved under some circumstances, while in others commitment is ineffective.}, key = {Public Goods}, keywords = {Voluntary provision, Matching contributions, Commitment, Public goods}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{Boad:76, author = {Boadway, R. W.}, title = {The welfare foundations of cost-benefit analysis}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1976}, volume = {90}, pages = {541-556}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Boad:74, author = {Boadway, R. W.}, title = {The welfare foundations of cost-benefit analysis}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1974}, volume = {84}, pages = {926-939}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{BoBr:84, title = {Welfare Economics}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, year = {1984}, author = {Boadway, R. W. and Bruce, N.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{BIR:96, title = {Inland Revenue Statistics}, publisher = {HMSO}, year = {1996}, author = {{Board of Inland Revenue }}, address = {London}, key = {wealth} } @BOOK{BIR:72, title = {Survey of Personal Incomes}, publisher = {HMSO}, year = {1972}, author = {{Board of Inland Revenue}}, address = {London}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{BoRoSw:07, author = {Bobek,D.D. and Roberts,R.W. and Sweeney,J.T.}, title = {The Social Norms of Tax Compliance:Evidence from Australia, Singapore,and the United States}, journal = {Journal of Business Ethics}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, pages = {49-64}, abstract = {Tax compliance is a concern to governments around the world. Prior research (Alm, J. and I. Sanchez: 1995, KYKLOS 48, 3–19) has attributed unexplained inter-country differences in compliance rates to differences in social norms. Economics researchers studying tax compliance in the United States (U.S.) (see for example J. Andreoni et al.: 1998, Journal of Economic Literature 36, 818–860) have called for more attention to social (as opposed to economic) influences on tax compliance. In this study, we extend this prior research by explicitly examining the role of social norms [Cialdini, R. and M. Trost: 1998, The Handbook of Social Psychology (Oxford University Press, New York)] on tax compliance in three different countries. We test our research hypotheses using a hypothetical compliance scenario, which was administered in Australia, Singapore, and theU.S. There were differences in compliance rates and social norms among the three countries. Factor analysis of the social norm questions identified three distinct social norm constructs.Two of these factors were significant in explaining tax compliance behavior. The first andmost influential factorwas taxpayers’ own personal moral beliefs, along with the beliefs of those close to them (e.g., friends and important others). The second significant factor represented societal views of proper behavior.We conclude that social norms help to explain tax compliance intentions and why tax compliance rates are higher thanwould be predicted by strictly economicmodels.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Bohm1994, author = {Bohm, P.}, title = {Time preference and Preference Reversal among experienced subjects: the effects of real payments}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1994}, volume = {104}, pages = {1370-1378}, key = {risk}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Bohm:94, author = {Bohm, P.}, title = {Behavior under Uncertainty Without Preference Reversal}, journal = {Empirical Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {19}, pages = {185-200}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Bohm:94TP, author = {Bohm, P.}, title = {Time preference and Preference Reversal among experienced subjects: theeffects of real payments}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1994}, volume = {104}, pages = {1370-1378}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Boid:83TE, author = {Boidman, N.}, title = {Tax evasion - the present state of non-compliance}, journal = {Bulletin for International Fiscal Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {37}, pages = {451-479}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Boit:56, author = {Boiteux, M.}, title = {Sur la geston des monopoles publics astreints {\`a} l'{\'e}quilibre budg{\'e}taire}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1956}, volume = {24}, pages = {22-40}, key = {micro} } @INCOLLECTION{Hild:08, author = {Bojer, H.}, title = {Income inquality and the economic position of women in {N}orway 1970-2002}, booktitle = {Advances on Income Inequality and Concentration Measures}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2008}, editor = {Betti, G. and Lemmi, A.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @ARTICLE{Boje:02, author = {Bojer, H.}, title = {Women and the Rawlsian Social Contract}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {2002}, volume = {15}, pages = {393 - 408}, key = {Welfare} } @TECHREPORT{Boje:97CA, author = {Bojer, Hilde}, title = {Children and Distributional Justice}, institution = {Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Oslo}, year = {1997}, key = {population economics} } @TECHREPORT{Boje:97TE, author = {Bojer, H.}, title = {The effect on inequality of changes in an income component}, institution = {Department of Economics Discussion Paper}, year = {1997}, address = {University of Oslo}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Bolton2000, author = {Bolton, Gary and Axel Ockenfels}, title = {{ERC}: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2000}, volume = {90}, pages = {166-193}, key = {Behavioural}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{BoDe:05, title = {Contract Theory}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {2005}, author = {Bolton, P. and Dewatripont, M. }, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{BoNe:98, author = {Bonanno, Giacomo and Nehring, Klaus}, title = {On the logic and the role of Negative introspection of common belief}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1998}, volume = {35}, pages = {17-36}, number = {1}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{BoDe:03, author = {Bond, S. R. and Devereux, M. P.}, title = {Generalised R-Based and S-Based Taxes under Uncertainty}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1291-1311}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{Bonf:30, title = {Elemente di Statistica Generale}, publisher = {Libreria Seber}, year = {1930}, author = {Bonferroni, C.}, address = {Firenze}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.21} } @TECHREPORT{BoCoTaZi:06, author = {Bonin, H. and Constant, A. and Tatsiramos, K. and Zimmerman, K.}, title = {Native-Migrant Differences in Risk Attitudes}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2006}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {1999}, address = {P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany}, month = {March}, abstract = {This paper questions the perceived wisdom that migrants are more risk-loving than the native population. We employ a new large German survey of direct individual risk measures to find that first-generation migrants have lower risk attitudes than natives, which only equalize in the second generation.}, key = {risk}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{BoEaLeWe:99, author = {Bonn, M. and Earle, D. and Lea, S. and Webley, P.}, title = {South African Children's Views of Wealth, Poverty, Inequality and Umemployment}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {593-612}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{BoBo:05, author = {Bontems,P. and Bourgeon,J.}, title = {Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2005}, volume = {49}, pages = {409-435}, abstract = {We study the optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy when(i) the regulator does not know the firms’ abatement costs, (ii) penaltiesfor tax evasion are limited, and (iii) monitoring of pollution is costly.We show that the threat of being audited alter the usual firms’ incentivesto over-estimate their abatement costs. In particular, depending on thefirms’ abatement costs, the optimal policy may involve over or under-deterrencecompared to the full information outcome. We then investigate the propertiesof a pollution standard. We show that this policy comes close to an environmentaltax once the economic incentives of the accompanying enforcement policyare considered.}, key = {optimal taxation} } @TECHREPORT{Book:07, author = {Book, Leslie}, title = {Freakonomics and the Tax Gap: An Applied Perspective}, institution = {Villanova University School of Law}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2007-12}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{BoBo:07, author = {Boone, J. and Bovenberg, L.}, title = {The Simple Economics of Bunching: Optimal Taxation with Quasi-Linear Preferences}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {9}, pages = {89-105}, abstract = {This paper models unemployment as a binding nonnegativity constraint on hours worked in an optimal income tax problem with quasi-linear preferences.We show that bunching of workers resulting from this binding constraint provides a more convincing description of the bottom of the labor market than bunching due to violation of the secondorder condition for individual optimization. Although a binding nonnegativity constraint destroys the closed form solution of optimal marginal tax rates, the optimal tax problem can be characterized in a two-dimensional diagram in which comparative statics can be performed in straightforward fashion.}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{BoBo:02, author = {Boone, J. and Bovenberg, L.}, title = {Optimal Labour Taxation and Search}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {85}, pages = {53-97}, key = {optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{Boos1980, author = {Boos, D. D. and Serfling, R. J.}, title = {A Note on Differential and the CLT and LIL for Statistical Functions, with Application to $M$-estimates}, journal = {Annals of Statistics}, year = {1980}, volume = {8}, pages = {618-624}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BoSe:80, author = {Boos, D. D. and Serfling, R. J.}, title = {A Note on Differential and the CLT and LIL for Statistical Functions, withApplication to $M$-estimates}, journal = {Annals of Statistics}, year = {1980}, volume = {8}, pages = {618-624}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{BoGa:96, author = {Booth, Alison L. and Garcia-Serrano, Carlos and Jenkins, Stephen P.}, title = {New Men and New Women: Is There Convergence In Patterns Of Labour MarketTransition?}, institution = {ERSC Research Centre on Micro-Social Change}, year = {1996}, number = {96-9}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Bopp:83, author = {Bopp, A.}, title = {The Demand for Kerosene: A Modern {G}iffen Good,}, journal = {Applied Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {15}, pages = {459-467}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Bord:85, title = {Fixed Point Theorems with Applications to Economics and Game Theory}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1985}, author = {Border, K.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Border1987, author = {Border, K. and Sobel, J.}, title = {Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1987}, volume = {54}, pages = {525-540}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BoSo:87AT, author = {Border, K. and Sobel, J.}, title = {A theory of auditing and plunder}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1987}, volume = {54}, pages = {525-540}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Bord:93, author = {Bordignon, M.}, title = {A fairness approach to tax evasion}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {52}, pages = {345-362}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{BoMcDMa:96, author = {Bordley, R. F. and McDonald, J. B. and Mantrala, A.}, title = {Something New, Something Old: Parametric Models for the Size Distribution of Income}, journal = {Journal of Income Distribution}, year = {1996}, volume = {6}, pages = {91-103}, key = {income distribution:functional form}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.10} } @ARTICLE{BoRo:94, author = {Borenstein, Severin and Rose, Nancy L.}, title = {Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1994}, volume = {102}, pages = {653--683}, number = {4}, abstract = {We study dispersion in the prices an airline charges to different passengers on the same route. This variation in fares is substantial: the expected absolute difference in fares between two passengers on a route is 36 percent of the airline's average ticket price. The pattern of observed price dispersion cannot easily be explained by cost differences alone. Dispersion increases on routes with more competition or lower flight density, consistent with discrimination based on customers' willingness to switch to alternative airlines or flights. We argue that the data support models of price discrimination in monopolistically competitive markets.}, copyright = {Copyright 1994 The University of Chicago Press}, issn = {00223808}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.08} } @ARTICLE{BoMa:88, author = {Borg, M. and Mason, P.}, title = {The Budgetary Incidence of a Lottery to Support Education}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1988}, volume = {61}, pages = {75-85}, key = {Lotteries} } @BOOK{BoMASh:91, title = {The Economic Consequences of State Lotteries}, publisher = {Praeger Publishers}, year = {1991}, author = {Borg, M. and Mason, P. and Shapiro, S.}, address = {New York}, key = {Lotteries} } @ARTICLE{BoRa:01, author = {Borge, Lars-Erik and Rattso, Jorn}, title = {Income Distribution and Tax Structure: Microeconomic Test of the Meltzer-RichardHypothesis}, year = {2001}, number = {543}, abstract = {The tax structure is important for the income distribution and thereforea key playground for redistributive politics. The standard theory assumesthat more unequal income distribution will create a majority for more redistribution(Meltzer and Richard). This study investigates the empirical validity ofthis relationship in a microeconomic study of the tax structure in decentralizedgovernment in Norway. The choice of revenue instruments studied involvesuser charges and property taxes oriented towards housing. While user chargesact as head taxes, property taxes have distributive consequences. The approachis in the tradition of majority rule, and we show how the local governmentdecisions regarding tax structure and spending level can be understoodas one-dimensional. This motivates the empirical analysis where the actualincome distribution is measured by the ratio of median to mean income.The estimated model confirms that more equal income distribution impliesa shift in the tax burden from property taxes to user charges.}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {taxation}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{BoMa:07, author = {Borger,B.D. and Mayeres,I.}, title = {Optimal taxation of car ownership, car use and public transport: Insights derived from a discrete choice numerical optimization model}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {51}, pages = {1177-1204}, number = {5}, abstract = {We formulated and numerically evaluated a model of car ownership, car use and public transport use for peak and off-peak hours of the day. The model was used to study the optimal tax structure for passenger transport in Belgium, with special emphasis on the optimal tax treatment of diesel versus gasoline cars. We obtained a number of interesting results. First, if the government can set all fixed and variable transport taxes optimally, the higher marginal external cost of diesel use implies that the optimal tax per kilometre for the use of a diesel car is higher than for the use of a gasoline car. Moreover, high congestion implies that the taxes on car use in the peak period are more than twice their current levels. However, the optimal tax on ownership of a diesel car is some 200€ below its current level. Second, if the government uses kilometre taxes that do not differentiate between fuel types, the optimal ownership tax on a diesel car is twice as high as the tax on a gasoline car. Furthermore, if political constraints restrict user taxes to their current levels, we find that optimal ownership taxes on diesel cars double, whereas those on gasoline cars rise by 30%. Finally, subsidies to public transport are found to be optimal as long as variable car taxes are not differentiated between periods.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Borj:04, author = {Borjas, George J.}, title = {Food insecurity and public assistance}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {1421-1443}, abstract = {Abstract This paper examines if welfare programs reduce the probabilitythat vulnerable households experience food deprivation because of financialconstraints. Although the 1996 welfare reform legislation specificallylimited the eligibility of immigrant households to receive assistance,many states chose to protect their immigrant populations by offering state-fundedaid to these groups. I exploit these changes in eligibility rules to examinethe link between food insecurity and public assistance. The evidence indicatesthat a 10 percentage point cut in the fraction of the population that receivespublic assistance increases the fraction of food-insecure households byabout 5 percentage points.}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{BoMcGMcK:91, title = {Regional Income Inequality and Poverty in the {U}nited {K}ingdom}, publisher = {Dartmouth Publishing Co.}, year = {1991}, author = {Borooah, V. K. and McGregor, P. P. L. and McKee, P. M.}, address = {Aldershot}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Bo-Su:00, author = {Borsch-Supan, A.}, title = {Incentive Effects of Social Security on Labor Force Participation: Evidencein {G}ermany and Across {E}urope}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {78,1-2}, pages = {25-49}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Borsch-Supan2000, author = {Borsch-Supan, A.}, title = {Incentive Effects of Social Security on Labor Force Participation: Evidence in {G}ermany and Across {E}urope}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {78,1-2}, pages = {25-49}, key = {social security}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BoEsSa:89, author = {Bosch, A. and Escribano, C. and S{\'a}nchez, I.}, title = {Evoluci{\'o}n de la desigualdad y la pobreza en {E}spa{\~n}a: Estudio basado enlas {E}ncuestas de {P}resupuestos {F}amiliares}, institution = {INE}, year = {1989}, address = {Madrid}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{BDSi:99, author = {Bosch-Domenech, A. and Silvestre, J.}, title = {Does Risk Aversion or Attraction Depend on Income?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {65}, pages = {265-273}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Bosch-DomenechAntoni2002, author = {{Bosch-Domenech, Antoni} and {Montalvo, Jose G.} and {Nagel, Rosemarie} and {Satorra, Albert}}, title = {One, Two, (Three), Infinity, ... : Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {2002}, volume = {92}, pages = {1687--1701}, number = {5}, copyright = {Copyright 2002 American Economic Association}, group = {Shorter Papers}, jstor_articletype = {Full Length Article}, jstor_date = {200212}, jstor_formatteddate = {Dec., 2002}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {American Economic Association}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BoNo:75, author = {Boskin, M. J. and Nold, F. C.}, title = {A {M}arkov Model of Turnover in Aid to Families with Dependent Children}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1975}, volume = {10}, pages = {467-481}, number = {4}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{BoSh:78, author = {Boskin, M. J. and Sheshinski, E.}, title = {Optimal Income Redstribution when the individual Welfare depends on relativeincome}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1978}, volume = {92}, pages = {589-602}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Boskin1978, author = {Boskin, M. J. and Sheshinski, E.}, title = {Optimal Income Redstribution when the individual Welfare depends on relative income}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1978}, volume = {92}, pages = {589-602}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Bosm:07, author = {Bosmans, K.}, title = {Extreme inequality aversion without separability}, journal = {Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {32}, pages = {589-594}, number = {3}, abstract = {Hammond (J Econ Theory 11, 465–467, 1975), Meyer (J Econ Theory 11, 119–132, 1975), and Lambert (The distribution and redistribution of income Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2001) provide the formal result connecting leximin and the idea of extreme inequality aversion for social preferences of the expected utility type. Using an analogous approach, we show that for social preferences not necessarily satisfying the separability axiom that underlies expected utility theory, the case of extreme inequality aversion is covered by the class of weakly maximin social preferences—i.e., the class of social preferences that give priority to the worst off in all cases in which the worst off is not indifferent.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Bosm:07CD, author = {Bosmans, K.}, title = {Comparing degrees of inequality aversion}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2007}, volume = {29}, pages = {405-428}, abstract = {We propose a straightforward dominance procedure for comparing social welfare orderings (SWOs) with respect to the degree of inequality aversion they express. Three versions of the procedure are considered, each of which uses a different underlying criterion of inequality comparisons: (i) a concept based on the Lorenz quasi-ordering, which we argue to be the ideal version, (ii) a concept based on a minimalist criterion of inequality, and (iii) a concept based on the relative differentials quasi-ordering. It turns out that the traditional Arrow–Pratt approach is equivalent to the latter two concepts for important classes of SWOs, but that it is profoundly inconsistent with the Lorenz-based concept.With respect to the problem of combining extreme inequality aversion and monotonicity, concepts (ii) and (iii) identify as extremely inequality averse a class of SWOs that includes leximin as a special case, whereas the Lorenzbased concept (i) concludes that extreme inequality aversion and monotonicity are incompatible.}, key = {inequality }, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.26} } @ARTICLE{BoSc:04, author = {Bosmans, K. and Schokkaert, E.}, title = {Social welfare, the veil of ignorance and purely individual risk: An empirical examination}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality,}, year = {2004}, volume = {11}, pages = {85-114}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Boss:00, author = {Bossert, W.}, title = {Opportunity Sets and Uncertain Consequences}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {33,4}, pages = {475-496}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Bossert2000, author = {Bossert, W.}, title = {Opportunity Sets and Uncertain Consequences}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {33}, pages = {475-496}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Boss:95, author = {Bossert, W.}, title = {Redistribution mechanisms based on individual characteristics}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1995}, volume = {29}, pages = {1-17}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Boss:90, author = {Bossert, W.}, title = {An axiomatization of the single series {G}inis}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1990}, volume = {50}, pages = {89-92}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Boss:90a, author = {Bossert, W.}, title = {Population replication and ethically poverty measurement}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1990}, volume = {20}, pages = {227-238}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Boss:90b, author = {Bossert, W.}, title = {Social evaluation with variable population size: an alternative concept}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1990}, pages = {143-158}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Boss:88, author = {Bossert, W.}, title = {A note on intermediate inequality indices which are quasilinear means}, institution = {Karlsruhe University}, year = {1988}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {289}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Boss:88a, author = {Bossert, W.}, title = {Generalized {G}ini social evaluation functions and low income group aggregation}, institution = {Karlsruhe University}, year = {1988}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {343}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Boss:88b, author = {Bossert, W.}, title = {Rawlsian welfare orderings with variable population size}, institution = {Karlsruhe University}, year = {1988}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {341}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Boss:87, author = {Bossert, W.}, title = {Ethical inequality measures and the population substitution principle}, institution = {University of British Columbia}, year = {1987}, type = {mimeo}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{BoDA:04, author = {Bossert, W. and D'Ambrosio, C.}, title = {Reference Groups and Individual Deprivation}, institution = {D{\'e}partement de sciences {\'e}conomiques}, year = {2004}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2004-10}, address = {Universit{\'e} de Montr{\'e}al, C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-Ville, Montr{\'e}al (Qu{\'e}bec)H3C 3J7, Canada}, abstract = {We provide an axiomatization of Yitzhaki’s index of individual deprivation.Our result differs from an earlier characterization due to Ebert and Moyesin the way the reference group of an individual is represented in the model.Ebert and Moyes require the index to be defined for all logically possiblereference groups, whereas we employthe standard definition of the referencegroup as the set of all agents in a society. As a consequence of this modification,some of the axioms used by Ebert and Moyes can no longer be applied andwe provide alternative formulations.}, key = {deprivation} } @ARTICLE{BoDA:06, author = {Bossert, W. and {D}'Ambrosio, C.}, title = {Reference Groups and Individual Deprivation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {421-426}, key = {deprivation}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{BoFl:96, author = {Bossert, W. and Fleurbaey, M.}, title = {Redistribution and Compensation}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1996}, volume = {13}, pages = {343-355}, key = {redistribution}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/content/m154718pw6k70363/fulltext.pdf} } @ARTICLE{BoPf:90, author = {Bossert, W. and Pfingsten, A.}, title = {Intermediate inequality: concepts, indices and welfare implications}, journal = {Mathematical Social Science}, year = {1990}, volume = {19}, pages = {117-134}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{BoSw:06, author = {Bossert, W. and Schworm, W.}, title = {Measures of Polarization}, institution = {D{\'e}partement de Sciences Economiques and CIREQ}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {Universit{\'e} de Montr{\'e}al, C.P. 6128, succursale Centreville, Montr{\'e}al QC H3C 3J7, Canada}, key = {polarisation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.02.21} } @ARTICLE{BoSpSu:07, author = {Bossert,W. and Sprumont,Y. and Suzumura K.}, title = {Ordering infinite utility streams}, journal = {Journal of Economic theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {135}, pages = {579-589}, abstract = {We reconsider the problem of ordering infinite utility streams. As has been established in earlier contributions, if no representability condition is imposed, there exist strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous orderings of intertemporal utility streams.We examine the possibility of adding suitably formulated versions of classical equity conditions. First, we provide a characterization of all ordering extensions of the generalized Lorenz criterion as the only strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous rankings satisfying the strict transfer principle. Second, we offer a characterization of an infinite-horizon extension of leximin obtained by adding an equity-preference axiom to strong Pareto and finite anonymity.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{BoKlWa:07, author = {Bossmann,M. and Kleiber, C. and W{\"a}alde}, title = {Bequests, taxation and the distribution of wealth in a general equilibrium model}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {1247-1271}, month = {August}, abstract = {This paper examines the role of bequests and of taxation on bequests for the distribution of wealth. We investigate a model with overlapping generations and heterogenous households where parents derive utility directly from their bequests. We obtain all results analytically. Using the coefficient of variation as the measure of inequality, bequests per se diminish the inequality of wealth since they raise private savings and hence average wealth holdings more than the variance of wealth. From a policy perspective, taxing bequests and redistributing government revenue lump-sum among the young generation further decreases wealth inequality.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Botm:99, author = {Botman, Dennis}, title = {Vouchers as a Way to Finance Unemployment Benefits}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {62}, pages = {223-227}, number = {2}, key = {social security} } @TECHREPORT{BoCh:97, author = {Bottiroli Civardi, Marisa and Chiappero Martinetti, Enrica}, title = {Strutture famigliari e povert{\`a}: un raffronto fra diversi metodi di analisi}, institution = {Quaderni Del Dipartimento Di Economia Pubblica e Territoriale, Universit{\`a}Degli Studi Di Pavia}, year = {1997}, number = {8/1997}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{BottiroliCivardi1997, author = {Bottiroli Civardi, Marisa and Chiappero Martinetti, Enrica}, title = {Strutture famigliari e povert\`a: un raffronto fra diversi metodi di analisi}, institution = {Quaderni Del Dipartimento Di Economia Pubblica e Territoriale, Universit\`a Degli Studi Di Pavia}, year = {1997}, number = {8/1997}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BoCh:96, author = {Bottiroli Civardi, Marisa and Chiappero Martinetti, Enrica}, title = {Bien-{\^e}tre et composition des menages:le cas de l'{I}talie}, journal = {M{\'e}nages, families, parent{\`e}les et solidarit{\'e}s dans les populations mediterran{\'e}ennes}, year = {1996}, volume = {7}, pages = {285-294}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{BottiroliCivardi1996, author = {Bottiroli Civardi, Marisa and Chiappero Martinetti, Enrica}, title = {Bien-\^etre et composition des menages:le cas de l'{I}talie}, journal = {M\'enages, families, parent\`eles et solidarit\'es dans les populations mediterran\'eennes}, year = {1996}, volume = {7}, pages = {285-294}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BoCh:93, author = {Bottiroli Civardi, Marisa and Chiappero Martinetti, Enrica}, title = {La distribuzione personale dei redditi in {I}talia negli anni ottanta}, journal = {Polis}, year = {1993}, volume = {VII}, pages = {389-412}, number = {3}, month = {December}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{BoMa:95, author = {Bottiroli Civardi, Marisa and Martinetti Chiappero, Enrica}, title = {Family as economic unit in the analyses of income inequality and poverty}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1995}, volume = {6}, pages = {157-176}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{Boul:75, author = {Boulding, K. E.}, title = {The pursuit of equality}, booktitle = {The Personal Distribution of Income and Wealth}, publisher = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {1975}, editor = {Smith, J. D.}, address = {New York}, note = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BoBrDuRo:94, author = {Bound, J. and Brown, C. and Duncan, G. J. and Rodgers, W. L.}, title = {Evidence on the Validity of Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Labor MarketData}, journal = {Journal of Labor Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {12}, pages = {345-367}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Bound1994, author = {Bound, J. and Brown, C. and Duncan, G. J. and Rodgers, W. L.}, title = {Evidence on the Validity of Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Labor Market Data}, journal = {Journal of Labor Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {12}, pages = {345-367}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BoBrDuRo:89, author = {Bound, J. and Brown, C. and Duncan, G. J. and Rodgers, W. L.}, title = {Measurement Error in Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Labor Market Surveys:Results from two validation studies}, institution = {NBER}, year = {1989}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2884}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{BoKr:91, author = {Bound, J. and Krueger, A. B.}, title = {The Extent of Measurement Error in Longitudinal Earnings Data: Do two Wrongsmake a Right?}, journal = {Journal of Labor Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {9}, pages = {1-24}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Bound1991, author = {Bound, J. and Krueger, A. B.}, title = {The Extent of Measurement Error in Longitudinal Earnings Data: Do two Wrongs make a Right?}, journal = {Journal of Labor Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {9}, pages = {1-24}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BoKr:89, author = {Bound, J. and Krueger, A. B.}, title = {The Extent of Measurement Error in Longitudinal Earnings Data: Do two Wrongsmake a Right?}, institution = {NBER}, year = {1989}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2885}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Bour:89, author = {Bourguignon, F.}, title = {Family size and social utility: Income distribution dominance criteria}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1989}, volume = {42}, pages = {67-80}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Bour:81, author = {Bourguignon, F.}, title = {Pareto superiority of unegalitarian equilibria in {S}tiglitz's model ofwealth distribution with convex saving function}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1981}, volume = {49}, pages = {1469-1475}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Bour:79, author = {Bourguignon, F.}, title = {Decomposable income inequality measures}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, volume = {47}, pages = {901-920}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BoCh:92, author = {Bourguignon, F. and Chiappori, P. A.}, title = {Collective Models of Household Behavior: An Introduction}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1992}, volume = {36}, pages = {355-64}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{BoFe:07, author = {Bourguignon, Francois and Ferreira, Francisco}, title = {Inequality of Opportunity in Brazil}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2007}, volume = {53}, pages = {585-618}, abstract = {This paper proposes a measure of the contribution of unequal opportunities to earnings inequality. Drawing on the distinction between “circumstance” and “effort” variables in John Roemer’s work on equality of opportunity, we associate inequality of opportunities with five observed circumstances which lie beyond the control of the individual—father’s and mother’s education; father’s occupation; race; and region of birth. The paper provides a range of estimates of the importance of these opportunity-forming circumstances in accounting for earnings inequality in one of the world’s most unequal countries. We also decompose the effect of opportunities into a direct effect on earnings and an indirect component, which works through the “effort” variables. The decomposition is applied to the distribution of male earnings in urban Brazil, in 1996. The five observed circumstances are found to account for between 10 and 37 percent of the Theil index, depending on cohort and allowing for the possibility of biased coefficient estimates due to unobserved correlates. On average, 60 percent of this impact operates through the direct effect on earnings. Parental education is the most important circumstance affecting earnings, but the occupation of the father and race also play a role.}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{BoFi:97, author = {Bourguignon, Francois and Fields, Gary}, title = {Discontinuous losses from poverty, generalized P(alpha) measures and optimaltransfers to the poor}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {63}, pages = {155-175}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Bourguignon1997, author = {Bourguignon, Francois and Fields, Gary}, title = {Discontinuous losses from poverty, generalized P(alpha) measures and optimal transfers to the poor}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {63}, pages = {155-175}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BoFoGu:01, author = {Bourguignon, F. and Fournier, M. and Gurgand, M.}, title = {Fast development with a stable income distribution: {T}aiwan, 1979-94}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2001}, volume = {47}, pages = {139-163}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.05.07} } @ARTICLE{BoMo:02, author = {Bourguignon, F. and Morrisson, C.}, title = {Inequality Among World Citizens: 1820-1992}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2002}, volume = {92}, pages = {727-744}, abstract = {This paper investigates the distribution of well being among world citizens during the last two centuries. The estimates show that inequality of world distribution of income worsened from the beginning of the 19th century to World War II and after that seems to have stabilized or to have grown more slowly. In the early 19th century most inequality was due to differences within countries; later, it was due to differences between countries. Inequality in longevity, also increased during the 19th century, but then was reversed in the second half of the 20th century, perhaps mitigating the failure of income inequality to improve in the last decades.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.03}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3083279} } @ARTICLE{BoMo:98, author = {Bourguignon, Francois and Morrisson, Christian}, title = {Inequality and development: the role of dualism}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {57}, pages = {233-257}, number = {2}, key = {development} } @ARTICLE{BoMo:90, author = {Bourguignon, Francois and Morrisson, Christian}, title = {Income distribution, development and foreign trade}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1990}, volume = {34}, pages = {1113-1132}, key = {development} } @ARTICLE{Bourguignon2000, author = {Bourguignon, F. and Verdier, T.}, title = {Oligarch, democracy, inequality and growth}, journal = {Journal of decelopment Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {62}, pages = {285-313}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BoVe:00, author = {Bourguignon, F. and Verdier, T.}, title = {Oligarch, democracy, inequality and growth}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {62}, pages = {285-313}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BoCrIvWo:98, author = {Bousquet, Alain and Cremer, Helmuth and Ivaldi, Marc and Wolkowicz, Michel}, title = {Risk sharing in licensing}, journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {16}, pages = {535-554}, number = {5}, key = {micro} } @INCOLLECTION{Bove:98, author = {Bovenberg, A. Lans}, title = {Destination- and origin-based taxation under international capital mobility}, booktitle = {Topics in Public Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Pines, David and Sadka, Efraim and Zilcha, Itzhak}, chapter = {13}, pages = {286-313}, key = {taxation} } @INCOLLECTION{BoGo:02, author = {Bovenberg, L. and Goulder, L.}, title = {Environmental taxation and regulation}, booktitle = {Handbook of Public Economics}, publisher = {Elsevier Science BV}, year = {2002}, editor = {Auerbach, A. J. and Feldstein, M.}, volume = {3}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {environment} } @ARTICLE{Bowd:00, author = {Bowden, R. J.}, title = {The Ordered Mean Difference as a Portfolio Performance Measure}, journal = {Journal of Empirical Finance}, year = {2000}, volume = {7}, pages = {195-223}, key = {finance} } @ARTICLE{Bowe:45, author = {Bowen, H.}, title = {The interpretation of voting in the allocation of economic resources}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1945}, volume = {58}, pages = {27-48}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Bowe:70, title = {Acceptable Inequalities}, publisher = {Allen and Unwin}, year = {1970}, author = {Bowen, I.}, address = {London}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BoGi:02, author = {Bowles, S. and Gintis, H.}, title = {The Inheritance of Inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2002}, volume = {16}, pages = {3–30}, number = {3}, key = {Mobility} } @ARTICLE{Bowm:45, author = {Bowman, M. J.}, title = {A Graphical Analysis of Personal Income Distribution in the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1945}, volume = {35}, pages = {607-628}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Bows:80TD, author = {Bowsher, N. N.}, title = {The demand for currency: is the underground economy undermining monetaryeconomy?}, journal = {Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review}, year = {1980}, volume = {62}, pages = {11-17}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Bowsher1980, author = {Bowsher, N. N.}, title = {The demand for currency: is the underground economy undermining monetary economy?}, journal = {Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review}, year = {1980}, volume = {62}, pages = {11-17}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BoCo:64, author = {Box, G. E. P. and Cox, D. R.}, title = {An analysis of transformations}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B}, year = {1964}, volume = {26}, pages = {211-252}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{BoEl:93, author = {Boylan, R. T. and El-Gamal, M. A.}, title = {Fictitious play: a statistical study of multiple economic experiments}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {1993}, volume = {5}, pages = {205-222}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{BoOg, author = {Boylan,T.A. and O'Gorman,P.F.}, title = {AXIOMATIZATION AND FORMALISM IN ECONOMICS}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {2007}, volume = {21}, pages = {426-446}, number = {3}, abstract = {In this paper we address a number of issues in the historiography and methodology of the formalization of economics in the twentieth century. We argue that Debreu's approach to formalism pursuing his Bourbakist programme was based on Hilbert's version of finitism. The latter project attempted to retain its place in Cantor's ‘paradise’ and in so doing bequeathed serious methodological consequences. There was, however, at the turn of the twentieth century an alternative version of finitism available, that provided by Poincaré, which if adopted by economics would have led to a radically different approach to economic theorizing and modelling. We argue that these reflections must be embedded in an alternative larger methodological framework.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @BOOK{Brac:79TA, title = {Tax Avoidance and Evasion:- The Individual and Society}, publisher = {Panopticum Press}, year = {1979}, author = {Bracewell-Milnes, B.}, address = {London}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Brachmann1996, author = {Brachmann, Klaus and Stich, A. and Trede, Mark}, title = {Rounding Errors in Income Data}, institution = {Seminar f\"ur Wirtschafts- und Socialstatistik, Universit\"at zu K\"oln.}, year = {1996}, address = {Albertus-Magnus-Platz. D-50923 K\"oln}, key = {distributions}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BrStTr:96, author = {Brachmann, Klaus and Stich, A. and Trede, Mark}, title = {Rounding Errors in Income Data}, institution = {Seminar f{\"u}r Wirtschafts- und Socialstatistik, Universit{\"a}t zu K{\"o}ln.}, year = {1996}, address = {Albertus-Magnus-Platz. D-50923 K{\"o}ln}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{BrFi:08, author = {Bracht, Juergen and Figuières, Charles and Ratto, Marisa}, title = {Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {54-90}, abstract = {We compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods experiments. One mechanism, the Falkinger mechanism, rewards and penalizes agents for deviations from the average contributions to the public good (Falkinger mechanism). The other, the compensation mechanism, allows agents to subsidize the other agents' contributions (compensation mechanism). It is found that both mechanisms lead to an increase in the level of contributions to the public goods. However, the Falkinger mechanism predicts the average level of contributions more reliably than the compensation mechanism.}, key = {Public Goods}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.04} } @ARTICLE{BrRo:88, author = {Bradburd, R. M. and Ross, D. R.}, title = {A general measure of multidimensional inequality}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1988}, volume = {50}, pages = {429-433}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Brad:04, author = {Bradford,D.}, title = {The X Tax in the World Economy}, institution = {Center for Economic Studies \& Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)}, year = {2004}, abstract = {This paper considers the treatment of multinational business in the systemknown as an X Tax. The focus is on the choice between origin and destinationtreatments of transborder transactions. The destination-principle approachsidesteps the transferpricing problem. It remains in the origin-principleapproach, which, however, presents fewer challenges of monitoring the imports,obviates the "tourism problem" whereby people can reduce their taxes byconsuming in a low-tax jurisdiction and avoids transition effects associatedwith introduction of the tax and subsequent tax rate changes. The papersuggests special rules for transborder transactions between related partiesto deal with the transfer-pricing problem.}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Bran:92, author = {Brandenburger,A.}, title = {Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1992}, volume = {6}, pages = {83-101}, abstract = {The approach of this paper involves analyszing the decision problem facingeach player in a strategic ("interactive") situation. It might be describedas doing "interactive decision theory." In addition to grounding game theoryin considerations that are of the essence in actual strategic situations,the approach has a number of other objectives. As conventionally formulated,non-cooperative game theory seems somewhat divorced from single-persondecision theory, with its special apparatus of strategy randomization,equilibrium points, and the like. By contrast, the approach of this paperaims to make game theory more immediately accessible to peope who are trainedin decision theory but who are not "game theorist." A related objectiveis to make game theory easier to teach to students. Finally, the approachsuggests new directions for research into the nature of strategic situations.Some further thoughts along these lines are offered in the closing sectionof the paper.}, key = {games} } @TECHREPORT{Bran:08, author = {Brandolini, A.}, title = {On Applying Synthetic Indices of Multidimensional Well-Being: Health and Income Inequalities in Selected EU Countries}, institution = {Bank of Italy}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {668}, month = {Aprii}, abstract = {The multidimensional view of well-being is receiving growing attention, both in academic research and policy-oriented analysis. This paper examines empirical strategies to measure poverty and inequality in multiple domains, concentrating on two problems in the use of synthetic multidimensional indices: the weighting structure of different functionings and the functional form of the index. These problems are illustrated by comparing inequality and deprivation in income and health in the four largest countries of the EU: France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.05} } @TECHREPORT{Bran:07, author = {Brandolini, Andrea}, title = {Measurement of income distribution in supranational entities: The case of the European Union}, institution = {Banca D'Italia}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {623}, abstract = {Greater social cohesion is an explicit goal of the European Union. Progress is monitored considering the performance in each member country on the basis of national indicators; EUwide estimates of inequality and poverty play no role. Yet this is a basic information to evaluate the progress of the Union toward grater social cohesion. This paper examines the methodological requirements of this evaluative exercise, and provides the first estimates of inequality and poverty in the enlarged European Union as if it was a single country.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {income distribution, inequality, poverty, Euro area, European Union}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @INCOLLECTION{BrAl:01, author = {Brandolini, A. and D'Alessio, G.}, title = {Household Structure and Income Inequality}, booktitle = {Women Work, Family and Social Policies in Italy}, year = {2001}, editor = {del Boca, D. and Repetto, R. G.}, key = {labour market} } @INCOLLECTION{BrSm:08IP, author = {Brandolini, A. and Smeeding, T. M.}, title = {Inequality Patterns in Western-Type Democracies: Cross-Country Differences and Time Changes}, booktitle = {Democracy, Inequality and Representation}, publisher = {Russell Sage Foundation.}, year = {2008}, editor = {Democracy, Inequality and Representation, P. Beramendi and C. J. Anderson (eds), New York, Russell Sage Foundation.}, address = {New York}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.06.28}, url = {http://darp.lse.ac.uk/papersdb/Brandolini-Smeeding_(DemocracyInequalityRepresentation).pdf } } @INCOLLECTION{BrSm:08II, author = {Brandolini, A. and Smeeding, T. M.}, title = {Income Inequality in Richer and {OECD} Countries}, booktitle = {Oxford Handbook on Economic Inequality}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2008}, editor = {Salverda, W. and Nolan, N. and Smeeding, T. M.}, chapter = {4}, address = {Oxford}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.06.28}, url = {http://darp.lse.ac.uk/papersdb/Brandolini-Smeeding_(OxfordHandbookEconomicInequality).pdf} } @ARTICLE{BrFi:03, author = {Brandts, Jordi and Figueras, Neus}, title = {An exploration of reputation formation in experimental games}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, year = {2003}, volume = {50}, pages = {89--115}, number = {1}, month = jan, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.09} } @ARTICLE{Brandts2001, author = {Brandts, J. and Schram, A.}, title = {Cooperation and Noise in Public Goods Experiments: Applying the Contribution Function Approach}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, pages = {399-427}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BrSc:01, author = {Brandts, J. and Schram, A.}, title = {Cooperation and Noise in Public Goods Experiments: Applying the ContributionFunction Approach}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, pages = {399-427}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Bras:99, author = {Brasington, David M.}, title = {Joint provision of public goods: The consolidation of school districts}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {373-393}, number = {3}, key = {public goods} } @TECHREPORT{BrNiVa:03, author = {Bratberg, E. and A. Nilsen, \/O. and Vaage, K.}, title = {Assessing Changes in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility}, institution = {Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit}, year = {2003}, type = {IZA Discussion Paper}, number = {797}, abstract = {Previous research on changes in intergenerational mobility suggests thatmobility is decreasing over time. One explanation for this pattern is increasedcross-sectional income inequality. In contrast to most other OECD countries,income inequality in Norway has been remarkably stable through large partsof the 1980s and the 1990s, not least due to a compression of the earningsdistribution during the same period. Using longitudinal data for Norwegianchildren born in 1950, 1955, 1960, and 1965, we find a relatively highdegree of earnings mobility. Furthermore, there is no tendency to increasinginequality along this dimension. This finding supports the hypothesis thatintergenerational mobility is positively correlated with a compressed incomedistribution. Quartile father-child earnings transition matrices, togetherwith non-parametric regressions, indicate quite high mobility in the middleof the distribution and somewhat more persistence at the top and bottom.This approach also reveals increased mobility over time for sons, but aless clear picture for daughters.}, key = {mobility} } @TECHREPORT{BrNiVa:05, author = {Bratberg,E. and Nilsen,O. and Vaage,K.}, title = {Intergenerational Mobility: Trends Across the Earnings Distribution}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2005}, abstract = {The analysis, based on register data for Norwegian cohorts born 1950, 1955,and 1960, shows that the intergenerational earnings mobility is high. Usingquantile regression, mobility is found to be lower at the lower end ofthe earnings distribution than at the upper end. The findings also indicatethat mobility increases over time and that the increase seems to be somewhathigher for lower earnings. Finally, we find that the increase in earningsmobility over time has been larger for women than for men.}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{BrRoRaNaJaErOs:07, author = {Bratsberg, B. and R{\o}ed, K. and Raaum, O. and Naylor, R. and J{\"a}ntti, M. and Eriksson, T. and {\"O}sterbacka, E.}, title = {Nonlinearities in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility: Consequences for Cross-Country Comparisons}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {2007}, volume = {117}, pages = {72-92}, abstract = {We show that the patterns of intergenerational earnings mobility in Denmark, Finland and Norway, unlike those for the US and the UK, are highly nonlinear. The Nordic relationship between log earnings of sons and fathers is flat in the lower segments of the fathers earnings distribution – sons growing up in the poorest households have the same adult earnings prospects as sons in moderately poor households – and is increasingly positive in middle and upper segments. This convex pattern contrasts sharply with our findings for the US and the UK, where the relationship is much closer to being linear. As a result, cross-country comparisons of intergenerational earnings elasticities may be misleading with respect to transmission mechanisms in the central parts of the earnings distribution and uninformative in the tails of the distribution.}, key = {earnings}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @INCOLLECTION{Brau:88, author = {Braulke, M.}, title = {How to retrieve the {L}orenz curve from sparse data}, booktitle = {Measurement in Economics}, publisher = {Physica-Verlag}, year = {1988}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Brau:83, author = {Braulke, M.}, title = {An approximation to the {G}ini coefficient for population based on sparse information for sub-groups}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {2}, pages = {75-81}, number = {12}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Brau:88MM, author = {Braun, D.}, title = {Multiple Measures of {U.S.} Income Inequality}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1988}, volume = {70}, pages = {398-405}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BrGo:08, author = {Bray, M. and Goodhart, C.}, title = {'You might as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb': the loss function of an agent}, journal = {The Manchester School}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, pages = {279-300}, number = {3}, month = {June}, abstract = {Most of those who take macro and monetary policy decisions are agents. The worst penalty which can be applied to these agents is to sack them. Agents thus have loss functions which are bounded above. We work with a bell loss function which has this property. With additive uncertainty the certainty equivalence which holds for a quadratic loss function breaks down with a bell loss function when there are two or more targets. With multiplicative (Brainard) uncertainty policy is more conservative than in the absence of multiplicative uncertainty, but less so with the bell than the quadratic loss function.}, key = {utility, preference}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @ARTICLE{BrGuLo:08, author = {Bra{\~n}as-{G}arza, P. and Guillen, P. and L{\'o}pez del {P}aso, R.}, title = {Math skills and risk attitudes}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2008}, volume = {99}, pages = {332-336}, number = {2}, abstract = {We study whether math ability affects decision making under risk. Participants where divided in three math skill groups according to their performance in a GRE-like math test. We find no difference in behavior between groups across several risk measuring tasks.}, owner = {rodano}, timestamp = {2008.06.13} } @BOOK{Brehm1966, title = {{A} therory of psychological reactance}, publisher = {New York, London}, year = {1966}, author = {Brehm, J.}, key = {behavioural}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Brehm1981, title = {{Psychological} {Reactance}}, publisher = {New York}, year = {1981}, author = {Brehm, S. S. and Brehm, J.}, key = {behavioural}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BrHaPf:04, author = {Breitmeyer, C. and Hakenes, H. and Pfingsten, A.}, title = {From Poverty Measurement to the Measurement of Downside Risk}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2004}, volume = {47}, pages = {327-348}, key = {poverty}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{Bren:73, author = {Brennan, G.}, title = {Pareto-optimal redistribution:the case of malice and envy}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1973}, volume = {2}, pages = {173-183}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{BrBu:80TP, title = {The Power To Tax}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1980}, author = {Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J.}, address = {Cambridge, {UK}}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{BrPi:96, author = {Brennan, G. and Pincus, J. J.}, title = {A minimalist model of federal grants and flypaper effects}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {61}, pages = {229-246}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{BrPe:07, author = {Brenneisen,F. and Peichl,A.}, title = {Welfare Effects of Tax Reforms}, institution = {FiFo-CPE}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {07-5}, abstract = {This paper combines the theoretical cognition of welfare measurement with the technique of microsimulation allowing to quantify the welfare effects and the excess burden of tax systems and tax reforms. The newly developed microsimulation module is applied on severeal flat tax reform scenarios which can decrease the excess burden caused by the tax system depending on the tax schedule parameters.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Bren:86, author = {Brent, R. J.}, title = {An axiomatic basis for the three objective social welfare functions withina poverty context}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1986}, volume = {20}, pages = {89-94}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Brent1986, author = {Brent, R. J.}, title = {An axiomatic basis for the three objective social welfare functions within a poverty context}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1986}, volume = {20}, pages = {89-94}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Bres:87, author = {Bresnahan, T. J.}, title = {Competition and collusion in the {A}merican automobile industry: the 1955price war}, journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics}, year = {1987}, volume = {35}, pages = {457-482}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{BrWo:93, author = {Brester, G. W. and Wohlgenant, M. K.}, title = {Correcting for Mreasurement Error in Food Demand Estimation}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1993}, volume = {75}, pages = {352-356}, key = {measurement error} } @ARTICLE{BrKe:00, author = {Brett, C. and Keen, M.}, title = {Political Uncertainty and the Earmarking of Environmental Taxes}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {75}, pages = {315-340}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{BrWe:08PG, author = {Brett, Craig and Weymark, John}, title = {Public Good Provision and the Comparative Statics of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {49}, pages = {255-290}, abstract = {Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs an income tax schedule for redistributive purposes and provides a public good optimally. There are two types of individuals, distinguished by their skill levels, who have the same quasilinear preferences for labor supply and the consumption of a private and a public good. Comparative statics are obtained for the weights in a weighted utilitarian social welfare function, the prices of the two goods, a taste parameter that measures the onerousness of working, and the skill levels.}, key = {Public Goods}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{BrWe:08TI, author = {Brett, C. and Weymark, J. A.}, title = {The impact of changing skill levels on optimal nonlinear income taxes}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {1765-1771}, number = {7}, month = {July}, abstract = {The impact of changing an individual's skill level on the solution to a finite population version of the Mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem with quasilinear-in-leisure preferences is investigated. It is shown that it is possible to sign the directions of change in everyone's optimal consumptions and optimal marginal tax rates in response to such a change.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @ARTICLE{Bret:98, author = {Brett, Graig}, title = {Tax reform and collective family decision-making}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {70}, pages = {425-440}, number = {3}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Breu:01, author = {Breunig, R.}, title = {An Almost Unbiased Estimator of the Coefficient of Variation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {(70)1}, pages = {15-19}, key = {Inequality} } @ARTICLE{Brew:81, author = {Brewer, K. R. W.}, title = {The Analytical Use of Unequal Probability Sample: A Case Study}, journal = {Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute}, year = {1981}, volume = {49}, pages = {685-698}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{Brew:03, author = {Brewer,M.}, title = {What do the child poverty targets mean for the child tax credit?}, institution = {Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {2003}, abstract = {The government has a target for child poverty to fall to 3.1 million by2004-05, measured by the number of children in households with less than60% median income after housing costs. The latest data showed that 3.8million children (30% of children in Britain) were in poverty in 2001-02on this definition. To help achieve the target, increases to means-testedbenefits and tax credits need to take effect in April 2004, and thereforeneed to be announced in the forthcoming Pre-Budget Report. New calculationssuggest that around £1 billion of further spending on the child tax creditmight be needed to meet the child poverty target. Increases in other benefitsor tax credits could also reduce child poverty, but at greater cost. Butif the government chooses not to increase support for families with childrenin 2004-05, then real spending on child-contingent support in the tax andbenefit system will still have increased by over 50% since 1997, and childpoverty in 2004-05 should be at its lowest level since 1989. The governmentis still deciding what definition of child poverty it wishes to targetin the longer term. If it wishes to reduce further child poverty measuredunder its current definition, then this will require the means-tested benefitsand tax credits received by poor families with children to rise fasterthan the rate of inflation in the absence of helpful economic or demographicchanges, such as more parents working. However, continuing to target apoverty measure defined exclusively in terms of incomes may skew the policyresponse excessively towards tax credit and means-tested benefits changes,and away from improving public services for children which might have agreater impacton their well-being over the longer term. By way of example,the extra spending that we think is needed for the government to meet itstarget for 2004-05 would pay for the current Sure Start programme - whichaims to improve the health and well-being of families and children agedunder 5 in disadvantaged areas - to be doubled in size.}, key = {social policy} } @ARTICLE{Brew:01, author = {Brewer, M.}, title = {Comparing In-Work Benefits and the Reward to Work for Families with Childrenin the {US} and the {UK}}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2001}, volume = {22}, pages = {41-77}, key = {income support} } @ARTICLE{Brewer2001, author = {Brewer, M.}, title = {Comparing In-Work Benefits and the Reward to Work for Families with Children in the {US} and the {UK}}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2001}, volume = {22}, pages = {41-77}, key = {income support}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BrBr:06, author = {Brewer, M. and Browne, J.}, title = {The effect of the working families' tax credit on labour market participation}, institution = {The Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {2006}, type = {Briefing Note}, number = {69}, abstract = {Working families’ tax credit (WFTC) was introduced in October 1999 to replace family credit (FC) as the main form of support for low-income working families with children. It aimed to help reduce child poverty both by attracting parents from previously workless families into the labour market and by directing additional support to those already working but living in families with a low income. WFTC was considerably more generous than FC: the credit amount was higher, there was more support for childcare and the rate of credit withdrawal was lower. Because WFTC was only available to families where someone was working, these changes would make it financially more attractive to have one adult in a family work 16 or more hours a week; we would therefore expect some parents in previously workless households to decide to work. Some low-income families with two workers, however, received a windfall gain from this reform, and we might expect that, in some of these families, one of the adults might decide that they no longer needed to work. This Briefing Note compares five recent studies that have examined the labour market impact of WFTC. There is a consensus that WFTC increased the proportion of lone mothers who work but seems to have had little effect overall on the proportion of adults in couples with children who work. If anything, WFTC increased the number of hours worked by adults in families with dependent children, largely because the reform was of particular help to those working fulltime. Overall, it seems likely that WFTC increased the employment rate, because the number of adults in previously workless families who moved into work probably outweighed the number of adults in previously two-worker families who decided not to work.}, key = {labour market}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.03.26} } @TECHREPORT{BrGoMyShSh:04, author = {Brewer, M. and Goodman, A. and Myck. M. and Shaw, J. and Shephard, A.}, title = {Poverty and inequality in Britain: 2004}, institution = {Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {2004}, type = {Commentary}, number = {96}, address = {London}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{BrGoSh:03, author = {Brewer,M. and Goodman,A. and Shephard,A.}, title = {How has child poverty changed under the Labour government? An update}, institution = {Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {2003}, abstract = {An additional 100,000 children were lifted out of poverty on the most commonlycited of the government’s relative poverty measures between 2000–01 and2001–02. The most recent figures show 3.8 million children (roughly 30per cent of all children) in Britain in households with income below 60per cent of the median income after housing costs. Although this meansthat almost one in three children in Britain live in poverty on this definition,this is the lowest level recorded since 1991. Since the Labour governmentcame to power, the total drop in the numbers in child poverty has beenaround 500,000. In 1998-99, the government set a target for child povertyin 2004-05. If the rate of decline in child poverty observed since 1998-99continues for three more years, then the government will miss this target.Indeed, it is now further behind schedule than it was based on figuresfrom 2000-01. The rather slow decline in recorded child poverty is due,in large part, to the fact that the government is targeting relative, ratherthan absolute, poverty. Income growth has been particularly strong acrosssociety since 1998-99, and this means that the poverty line has risen significantlyover this time. Although the government is continuing to increase the livingstandards of low-income households with children, the gap with the restof society is not closing as fast as the government would like. Rectifyingthis may require additional resources to be directed to families with childrenin the forthcoming Budget, on top of measures already announced.}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{BrMuPhSi:08, author = {Brewer, M. and Muriel, A. and Phillips, D. and Sibieta, L.}, title = {Poverty and Inequality in the {UK}: 2008}, institution = {The Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {2008}, type = {IFS Commentary}, number = {105}, abstract = {In this Commentary, we assess the changes to average incomes, inequality and poverty that have occurred under the first 10 years of the Labour government, with a particular focus on the changes that have occurred in the latest year of data. This analysis is based upon the latest figures from the DWP's Households Below Average Income (HBAI) series, published on 10 June 2008 (Department for Work and Pensions, 2008c). The HBAI series takes household income as its measure of living standards and is derived from the Family Resources Survey, a survey of around 28,000 households in the United Kingdom that asks detailed questions about income from a range of sources.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.01}, url = {http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/comm105.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{BrSiWr:08, author = {Brewer, M. and Sibieta, L. and Wren-Lewis, L.}, title = {Racing Away? Income Inequality and the Evolution of High Incomes}, institution = {Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {2008}, type = {Briefing Note}, number = {76}, key = {income distribution}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.06} } @INCOLLECTION{Brez:85TS, author = {Brezinski, H.}, title = {The second economy in the {S}oviet {U}nion and its implications for economicpolicy}, booktitle = {The Economics of the Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1985}, editor = {Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A.}, address = {Berlin, Germany}, key = {underground} } @TECHREPORT{OFTR:99, author = {John S. Bridgeman}, title = {Vulnerable Consumers and Financial Services: The Report of the DirectorGeneral's Inquiry}, institution = {Office of Fair Trading}, year = {1999}, type = {Report}, number = {OFT 255}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{Brid:84, author = {Bridges, B.}, title = {Post fisc distributions of income: Comment}, journal = {Public Finance Quarterly}, year = {1984}, volume = {12}, pages = {231-240}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Br:07, author = {Brill, Alex M.}, title = {Individual Income Taxes After 2010: Post-Permanence-ism.}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {2007}, volume = {60}, pages = {347 - 369}, number = {3}, abstract = {This paper consists of three parts. First, I review the legislative history related to the enactment of two major tax cut proposals during George W. Bush's presidency, the first in 2001 and the second in 2003. Second, I present results from a simple tax calculator that calculates the expected change in tax liabilities from 2010 to 2011 under current law for taxpayers of different filing status and at different income levels. The paper concludes by exploring some alternative approaches to address the looming tax increase and describes possible lessons from the legislative tax history of 2001-2006. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of National Tax Journal is the property of National Tax Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of }, issn = {00280283}, keywords = {TAX cuts, TAXATION -- Law & legislation, TAXATION -- Rates & tables, BUSH, George W. (George Walker), 1946-, INCOME, UNITED States}, url = {http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=heh&AN=27375847&site=ehost-live&scope=site} } @ARTICLE{BrHa:06, author = {Brito, D. and Hamilton, J. and Intriligator, M. and Sheshinski, E. and Slutsky, S.}, title = {Private Information, {C}oasian Bargaining, and the Second Welfare Theorem}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {871-895}, key = {bargaining}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{BrHaSlSt:90, author = {Brito, D. and Hamilton, J. and Slutsky, S. and Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {Pareto efficient tax structures}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1990}, volume = {42}, pages = {61-77}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{BrInSh:97, author = {Brito, Dagobert, L. and Intriligator, Michael D. and Sheshinski, Eytan}, title = {Privatization and the distribution of income in the commons}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {181-205}, number = {2}, month = {May}, key = {privatisation} } @ARTICLE{BrHaSlSt:91, author = {Brito, L. and Hamilton, J. and Slutsky, S. and Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {Dynamic optimal income taxation with government commitment}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {44}, pages = {15-35}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Brit:62, author = {Brittain, J. A.}, title = {Interpolation of frequency distribution of aggregated variables and estimationof the {G}ini concentration measure}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Brittain1962, author = {Brittain, J. A.}, title = {Interpolation of frequency distribution of aggregated variables and estimation of the {G}ini concentration measure}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1962}, volume = {22}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Brit:73, title = {Is there an Economic Consensus?}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1973}, author = {Brittan, S. E.}, address = {London}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{BrJeSvSo:07, author = {Brochner, Jens and Jensen, Jesper and Svensson, Patrik and Sorensen, Peter}, title = {The Dilemmas of Tax Coordination in the Enlarged European Union}, journal = {CESifo Economic Studies}, year = {2007}, volume = {53}, pages = {561 - 595}, abstract = {This study evaluates the economic effects of corporate tax coordination in the enlarged European Union (EU) using a computable general equilibrium model. Our main findings are as follows: (i) Corporate tax coordination can yield modest aggregate welfare gains. The 2004 enlargement of the EU has increased the potential gains from tax harmonization, provided corporate tax rates and tax bases are harmonized at their unweighted averages. (ii) All scenarios for coordination leave some EU Member States as winners and others as losers. An agreement on tax coordination is therefore likely to require elaborate compensation mechanisms. (iii) The large and diverse country effects suggest that Enhanced Cooperation for a subset of the Member States may be the most likely route towards tax coordination. (iv) Identifying winners and losers from coordination for the purpose of a compensation mechanism may be problematic, since countries experiencing gains in GDP and welfare tend to lose tax revenues, and vice versa.}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Corporate tax harmonization, EU tax coordination}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @INCOLLECTION{Broe:85TU, author = {Broesterhuizen, G. A. A. M.}, title = {The unobserved economy and the national accounts in the {N}etherlands: asensitivity analysis}, booktitle = {The Economics of the Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1985}, editor = {Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A.}, address = {Berlin, Germany}, key = {underground} } @BOOK{Bron:71, title = {Income Distribution Theory}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1971}, author = {Bronfenbrenner, M.}, address = {London}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @ARTICLE{BrMcPoRaSm:96, author = {Bronfman,C. and McCabe,K. and Porter,D. and Rassenti,S. and Smith,V.}, title = {An Experimental Examination of the Walrasian tatonnement Mechanism}, journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {27}, pages = {681-699}, abstract = {This is a systematic experimental comparison of the efficency and competitiveproperties of a computerized multiunit tatonnement with or without a dynamicimprovement rule, with or without publicity of order flow information.All version of the tatonnenment are comparatively less efficient than thecontinuous double auction. The tatonnement yields competitive prices, butboth sides tend to underreveal demand /supply, causing inefficiency. Onlythe full-information, no-improvement-rule version of the tatonnement procedureapproaches the efficiency of the double auction.}, key = {efficiency} } @INCOLLECTION{Broo:98b, author = {Broome, John}, title = {Is Incommensurability Vagueness?}, booktitle = {Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Ruth Chang}, pages = {67-89}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{Broo:99b, author = {Broome, John}, title = {Incommensurable Values}, booktitle = {Well-Being and Morality: Essays of Honour of James Griffin}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1999}, editor = {Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{Broo:98, author = {Broome, John}, title = {Extended Preferences}, booktitle = {Preferences}, publisher = {de Gruyter}, year = {1998}, editor = {Christoph Fehige and Georg Meggle and Ulla Wessels}, pages = {279-296}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{Broo:93, author = {Broome, John}, title = {Can a Human Be Moderate?}, booktitle = {Value, Welfare and Morality}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1993}, editor = {Frey, R. G. and Morris, Christopher}, pages = {279-286}, address = {Cambridge, U.K.}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{Broo:88, author = {Broome, J.}, title = {What's the good of equality?}, booktitle = {Current Issues in Microeconomics}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1988}, editor = {Hey, J.}, address = {Basingstoke, Hampshire}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Broo:93b, author = {Broome, John}, title = {Goodness is Reducible to Betterness: The Evil of Death is the Value of Life}, booktitle = {The Good and the Economical: Ethical Choices in Economics Management}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1993}, editor = {Koslowski, Peter and Shionoya, Yuichi}, pages = {70-84}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Broo:91b, author = {Broome, John}, title = {Fairness}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, year = {1990-1}, volume = {91}, pages = {87-102}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Broo:99, title = {Ethics Out of Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1999}, author = {Broome, John}, address = {Cambridge, U.K.}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Broo:94, author = {Broome, John}, title = {Discounting the Future}, journal = {Philosophy and Public Affairs}, year = {1994}, volume = {23}, pages = {128-156}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Broo:94b, author = {Broome, John}, title = {Structured and Unstructured Valuation}, journal = {Analyse and Kritik}, year = {1994}, volume = {16}, pages = {121-132}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Broome1994, author = {Broome, John}, title = {Structured and Unstructured Valuation}, journal = {Analyse \& Kritik}, year = {1994}, volume = {16}, pages = {121-132}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Broo:93c, author = {Broome, John}, title = {Qalys}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {50}, pages = {149-167}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Broo:91, title = {Weighing Goods}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, year = {1991}, author = {Broome, J.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Broo:91Ut, author = {Broome, John}, title = {Utility}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {1991}, volume = {7}, pages = {1-12}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{Broo:90, author = {Broome, John}, title = {Bolker-Jeffrey Expected Utility Theory and Axiomatic Utilitarianism}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1990}, volume = {57}, pages = {477-502}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Broo:84, author = {Broome, J.}, title = {Uncertainty and fairness}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1984}, volume = {94}, pages = {624-632}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Broome1984, author = {Broome, J.}, title = {Uncertainty and fairness}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1984}, volume = {94}, pages = {624-632}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Broo:78, author = {Broome, John}, title = {Trying to Value a Life}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1978}, volume = {9}, pages = {91-100}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Broo:75, author = {Broome, J.}, title = {An important theorem on income tax}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1975}, volume = {42}, pages = {649-652}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Bros:95, author = {Brose,P}, title = {Sickness absense:an Empirical analysis of the HUS panel}, institution = {Uppsala University}, year = {1995}, number = {13}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{BrCuExRu:08, author = {Brouwer, W. B. F. and Culyer, A. J., N. and Exel, J. A. and Ruttena, F. F.H.}, title = {Welfarism vs. extra-welfarism}, journal = {Journal of Health Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {27}, pages = {325-338}, abstract = {‘Extra-welfarism’ has received some attention in health economics, yet there is little consensus on what distinguishes it from more conventional ‘welfarist economics’. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of each in order to make a systematic comparison of the ways in which they evaluate alternative social states. The focus, though this is not intended to be exclusive, is on health. Specifically, we highlight four areas in which the two schools differ: (i) the outcomes considered relevant in an evaluation; (ii) the sources of valuation of the relevant outcomes; (iii) the basis of weighting of relevant outcomes and (iv) interpersonal comparisons. We conclude that these differences are substantive.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.05.05} } @BOOK{Brow:72, title = {The Framework of Regional Economics in The {U}nited {K}ingdom}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1972}, author = {Brown, A. J.}, address = {London}, key = {regional} } @ARTICLE{Brow:68MA, author = {Brown, C. V.}, title = {Misperceptions about income tax and incentives}, journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1968}, volume = {15}, pages = {1-21}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{BLRU:84TE, author = {Brown, C. V. and Levin, E. J. and Rosa, P. J. and Ulph, D. T.}, title = {Tax evasion and avoidance on earned income: some survey evidence}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1984}, volume = {5}, pages = {1-22}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Brow:07, author = {Brown,D.A.}, title = {Pensions and Risk Aversion: The Influence of Race, Ethnicity, and Class on Investor Behavior}, journal = {Lewis and Clark Law Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {11}, abstract = {Defined Contribution plans have greatly expanded over the last two decades. Defined Contribution plans place the investment risk on employees. Employee investment decision making should be examined to determine whether those decisions are influenced by race, ethnicity and/or class. Empirical data show that investor behavior is greatly influenced by race, ethnicity and/or class. Blacks and Hispanics are far less likely to invest in the stock market than whites. Low-income whites are far more likely to invest in the stock market than blacks or Hispanics regardless of income. As a result, retirement account balances are the greatest for many white households and the least for black, Hispanic, and certain white households. This article explores those issues and suggests solutions that will allow employees to overcome their built-in biases and make wiser investment choices.}, key = {Pensions}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @BOOK{Brow:77, title = {The inequality of pay}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1977}, author = {Brown, H. P.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Brow:68, title = {Pay and profits}, publisher = {A. M. Kelley Publishers}, year = {1968}, author = {Brown, H. P.}, address = {New York}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Brow:76, author = {Brown, J. A. C.}, title = {The mathematical and statistical theory of income distribution}, booktitle = {The Personal Distribution of Income}, publisher = {Allen and Unwin, London}, year = {1976}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Brow:92EO, author = {Browne, M. J.}, title = {Evidence of adverse selection in the individual health insurance market}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Insurance}, year = {1992}, volume = {59}, pages = {13-33}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{Brow:92, author = {Browning, M.}, title = {Children and Household Economic Behavior}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1992}, volume = {30}, pages = {1434-1475}, key = {household} } @ARTICLE{BrBoChLe:94, author = {Browning, M. and Bourguignon, F. and Chiappori, P. A. and Lechene,V.}, title = {Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1994}, volume = {102}, pages = {1067-96}, key = {household} } @ARTICLE{BrCh:98, author = {Browning, M. and Chiappori, P. A.}, title = {Efficient intra-household allocations: a general characterization and empiricaltests}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1998}, volume = {66}, pages = {1241-1278}, number = {6}, key = {household} } @ARTICLE{BrCh:06, author = {Browning, M. and Chiappori, P. and Lechene, V.}, title = {Collective and Unitary Models: A Clarification}, journal = {Rev Econ Household}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {5-14}, key = {distributions}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{BrChLe:06, author = {Browning, M. and Chiappori, P. and Lechene, V.}, title = {Collective and Unitary Models: A Clarification}, journal = {Rev Econ Household}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {5-14}, key = {distributions}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @TECHREPORT{BrCr:2004, author = {Browning, M. and Crossley, T.F.}, title = {Shocks, Stocks and Socks: Smoothing Consumption over a Temporary Income Loss}, institution = {University of Copenhagen}, year = {2004}, type = {CAM Working Papers}, address = {http://www.econ.ku.dk/CAM/Files/workingpapers/2004/2004-05_Browning_Crossley.pdf.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.24} } @ARTICLE{BrCri:01, author = {Browning, M. and Crossley, T. F.}, title = {The Life-Cycle Model of Consumption and Saving}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2001}, volume = {15}, pages = {3–22}, number = {3}, key = {Consumption} } @TECHREPORT{Brow:99, author = {Browning, M., Crossley, T.F.,}, title = {Shocks, Stocks and Socks: Consumption Smoothing and the Replacement of Durables during and Unemployment Spell}, institution = {Australia National University}, year = {1999}, type = {Faculty of Economics and Commerce Discussion Papers}, number = {376}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.24} } @INCOLLECTION{ChKe:00, author = {Brownlee, E.}, title = {Historical Perspective on {U.S.} Tax Policy Toward the Rich}, booktitle = {Does Atlas Shrug? The Economics Consequences of Taxing the Rich}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {2000}, editor = {Slemrod, J.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {macro} } @ARTICLE{BrHa:82, author = {Bruce, N. and Harris, R. G.}, title = {Cost-benefit criteria and the compensation principle in evaluating smallprojects}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1982}, volume = {90}, pages = {755-776}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Bruce1982, author = {Bruce, N. and Harris, R. G.}, title = {Cost-benefit criteria and the compensation principle in evaluating small projects}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1982}, volume = {90}, pages = {755-776}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Brue:04, author = {Brueckner,J.}, title = {Fiscal Decentralization with Distortionary Taxation: Tiebout vs. Tax Competition}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2004}, volume = {11}, pages = {133-153}, abstract = {This paper explores a question that lies at the intersection of two vastliteratures. The goal is to gauge whether the good side of fiscal decentralization,as emphasized by the Tiebout literature, dominates the bad side, as studiedin the tax-competition literature. The results, which are derived by numericalsimulation, show that either answer to this question is possible. Underfavorable conditions, where the curvature of the production function andthe dispersion of preferences are both high, the gains from Tiebout sortingare likely to outweigh the loss from the capital-tax distortion, so thatthe good side of fiscal decentralization dominates. If either of theseconditions is absent, however, the bad side can win, making decentralizationundesirable. When this happens, the lessons of the Tiebout tradition areoverturned, with economic efficiency requiring centralized rather thandecentralized provision of public goods.}, key = {tax competition} } @ARTICLE{Brue:01, author = {Brueckner, J.}, title = {Tax Increment Financing: A Theoretical Enquiry}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {81}, pages = {321-343}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Brue:00, author = {Brueckner, J. K.}, title = {A {T}iebout/tax-competition model}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {77}, pages = {285-306}, key = {tax competition} } @ARTICLE{Brug:93, author = {Brugiavini,A.}, title = {Uncertainty Resolution and the Timing of Annuity Purchase}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {50}, pages = {31-62}, abstract = {This paper considers the question of why the annuity market is thin. A modelis presented in which consumers have the option of purchasing annuitiesbefore discovering their survival probability; they can then recontractthe initial choice after the resolution of this form of uncertainty. Itis shown that consumers purchase insurance against their own survival-probability type at a very young age and do not undertake further transactions.This characterization is then used to analyze the effects of introducingfuture income uncertainty and to investigate the trade-off between oldage insurance motive and portfolio flexibility.}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{BrIs:99, author = {Brunello, G. and Ishikawa, T.}, title = {Elite Schools, High Tech Jobs and Economic Welfare}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {395-419}, key = {education,training} } @ARTICLE{BrMi:99, author = {Brunello, G. and Miniaci, R.}, title = {The Economic Returns to Schooling for {I}talian Men: An Evaluation Basedon Instrumental Variables}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {509-519}, key = {Education, training} } @ARTICLE{Brunello1999, author = {Brunello, G. and Miniaci, R.}, title = {The Economic Returns to Schooling for {I}talian Men: An Evaluation Based on Instrumental Variables}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {509-519}, key = {Education, training}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BrSo:07, author = {Brunello, G. and Sonedda, D.}, title = {Progressive taxation and wage setting when unions strategically interact}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {2007}, volume = {59}, pages = {127-140}, number = {1}, abstract = {In a multisector economy with unionized labor markets, the interdependence of union wage claims—typical of industrial bargaining—affects the relationship between tax progressivity and wage pressure, which varies in a nonlinear fashion with the nature of the wage bargain, and can be hump-shaped. Our empirical analysis of 20 OECD countries for the period 1997–2004 shows that higher tax progressivity increases pre-tax wages (and unemployment) in countries characterized by industry level wage bargaining, and reduces them in countries with local or fully centralized bargaining.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {rodano}, timestamp = {2008.06.12} } @ARTICLE{Brun:96, author = {Brunner, Johann K.}, title = {Transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded pension system: The caseof differing individuals and intragenerational fairness}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {60}, pages = {131-146}, key = {pensions} } @ARTICLE{Brunner1996, author = {Brunner, Johann K.}, title = {Transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded pension system: The case of differing individuals and intragenerational fairness}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {60}, pages = {131-146}, key = {pension}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Brun:93, author = {Brunner, J. K.}, title = {The Principle of Equal Proportional Sacrifice as a Bargaining Solution}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {45}, pages = {133-46}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Brun:89, title = {Theory of equitable taxation: Normative foundation and distributive consequencesof income taxation}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {1989}, author = {Brunner, J. K.}, address = {New York, Berlin, Tokyo}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{BrPe:08, author = {Brunner, J. K. and Pech, S.}, title = {Optimum Taxation of Inheritances}, institution = {Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2319}, abstract = {We incorporate the fact that inheritances create a second distinguishing characteristic of individuals, in addition to earning abilities, into an optimum income taxation model with bequests motivated by joy of giving. We show that a tax on inheritances and a uniform tax on all expenditures including bequests are equivalent and that either is desirable, according to an intertemporal social objective, if on average high-able individuals have larger inherited endowments than low-able. We demonstrate that such a situation results as the outcome of a process with stochastic transition of abilities over generations, if all descendants are more probable to have their parent’s ability rank than any other.}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.09.14} } @ARTICLE{BrJu:08, author = {Brunnermeier, Markus K. and Julliard, Christian}, title = {{Money Illusion and Housing Frenzies}}, journal = {Review of Financial Studies}, year = {2008}, volume = {21}, pages = {135-180}, number = {1}, abstract = {A reduction in inflation can fuel run-ups in housing prices if people suffer from money illusion. For example, investors who decide whether to rent or buy a house by simply comparing monthly rent and mortgage payments do not take into account the fact that inflation lowers future real mortgage costs. We decompose the price-rent ratio into a rational component--meant to capture the "proxy effect" and risk premia--and an implied mispricing. We find that inflation and nominalinterest rates explain a large share of the time series variation of the mispricing, and that the tilt effect is very unlikely to rationalize this finding.}, doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhm043} } @ARTICLE{BrNa:08, author = {Brunnermeier, M. K. and Nagel, S.}, title = {Do Wealth Fluctuations Generate Time-Varying Risk Aversion? Micro-Evidence on Individuals’ Asset Allocation}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {98}, pages = {713-736}, number = {3}, abstract = {We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to investigate how households’ portfolio allocations change in response to wealth fluctuations. Persistent habits, consumption commitments, and subsistence levels can generate time-varying risk aversion with the consequence that when the level of liquid wealth changes, the proportion a household invests in risky assets should also change in the same direction. In contrast, our analysis shows that the share of liquid assets that households invest in risky assets is not affected by wealth changes. Instead, one of the major drivers of household portfolio allocation seems to be inertia: households rebalance only very slowly following inflows and outflows or capital gains and losses.}, key = {risk aversion}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.06} } @ARTICLE{BrPe:08a, author = {Brunnermeier, Markus K. and Pedersen, Lasse Heje}, title = {Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity}, journal = {Review of Financial Studies}, year = {2008}, pages = {doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn098}, abstract = {We provide a model that links an asset's market liquidity (i.e., the ease with which it is traded) and traders' funding liquidity (i.e., the ease with which they can obtain funding). Traders provide market liquidity, and their ability to do so depends on their availability of funding. Conversely, traders' funding, i.e., their capital and margin requirements, depends on the assets' market liquidity. We show that, under certain conditions, margins are destabilizing and market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually reinforcing, leading to liquidity spirals. The model explains the empirically documented features that market liquidity (i) can suddenly dry up, (ii) has commonality across securities, (iii) is related to volatility, (iv) is subject to "flight to quality," and (v) co-moves with the market. The model provides new testable predictions, including that speculators' capital is a driver of market liquidity and risk premiums.}, doi = {10.1093/rfs/hhn098}, eprint = {http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/hhn098v2.pdf} } @BOOK{Brun:95, title = {Inflazione, crescita e controllo monetario: lezioni non lineari dalla crisie dall ripresa}, publisher = {Edizioni dell'Elefante}, year = {1995}, author = {Bruno, M.}, address = {Rome}, key = {macro} } @ARTICLE{BrHa:76, author = {Bruno, M. and Habib, J.}, title = {Taxes, family grants and redistribution}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1976}, volume = {5}, pages = {57-79}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{BrRaSq:96, author = {Bruno, Michael and Ravallion, Martin and Squire, Lyn}, title = {Equity and growth in developing countries}, institution = {Poverty and Human Resources Division}, year = {1996}, type = {Policy Research Working Paper}, number = {1563}, address = {The World Bank}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Brus:07, author = {Brush, J.}, title = {Does income inequality lead to more crime? A comparison of cross-sectional and time-series analyses of United Satates countries}, journal = {economics letters}, year = {2007}, volume = {96}, pages = {264-268}, month = {August}, abstract = {This paper estimates the effect of income inequality on crime in United States counties using both cross-sectional and first-differenced approaches. Income inequality is positively associated with crime rates in the cross section analysis, but negatively associated with crime rates in the time-series analysis.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{BrMa:08, author = {Bryan, K. A. and Martinez, L.}, title = {On the Evolution of Income Inequality in the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Economic Quarterly}, year = {2008}, volume = {94}, pages = {97-120}, abstract = {This article discusses the evolution of income inequality in the United States. We focus mainly on the evolution of inequality since the 1960s because more data are available for this period than for earlier periods. We document that income inequality rose in the United States during the period under study. Furthermore, our article documents periods characterized by a decline in real income for lower income groups. We show that the increase in inequality is concentrated among individuals with higher income and we explain that welfare inequality may have increased less than income inequality (and, in fact, may actually have decreased). In addition, this article summarizes the findings of studies on inequality trends between the 1820s and the 1960s. We show that the recent period of increasing inequality followed a period of decreasing inequality since World War I, which in turn followed a period of increasing inequality in the 19th century.}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.09.20}, url = {http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/economic_research/economic_quarterly/pdfs/spring2008/bryan_martinez.pdf} } @ARTICLE{BuSp:06, author = {Buccirossi, P. and Spagnolo, G.}, title = {Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {1281-1297}, key = {corruption}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Buch:63, author = {Buchanan, J.}, title = {The Economics of Earmarked Taxes}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1963}, volume = {71}, pages = {457-469}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Buch:98, author = {Buchanan, James M.}, title = {Agreement and efficiency: response to {G}uttman}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {14}, pages = {209-213}, number = {2}, key = {efficiency} } @ARTICLE{Buch:65, author = {Buchanan, J. M.}, title = {An economic theory of clubs}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1965}, volume = {32}, pages = {1-14}, key = {clubs} } @ARTICLE{Buchanan1965, author = {Buchanan, J. M.}, title = {An Economic Theory of Clubs}, journal = {Ecnomica}, year = {1965}, volume = {32}, pages = {1-14}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BuKa:63, author = {Buchanan, J. M. and Kafoglis, M.}, title = {A note on Public goods supply}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1963}, volume = {53}, pages = {403-414}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{BuSt:62, author = {Buchanan, J. M. and Stubblebine, C.}, title = {Externality}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1962}, volume = {29}, pages = {371-384}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{BuKo:95, author = {Buchholz, W. and Konrad, K.}, title = {Strategic Transfers and the Private Provision of Public Goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1995}, volume = {57}, pages = {489-505}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{BuPe:05, author = {Buchholz,W. and Peters,W.}, title = {A Rawlsian Approach to International Cooperation}, journal = {Kyklos}, year = {2005}, volume = {58}, pages = {25-44}, key = {international} } @ARTICLE{BuRiSc:88, author = {Buchholz, W. and Richter, W. F. and Schwaiger, J.}, title = {Distributional Implications of Equal Sacrifice Rules}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1988}, volume = {5}, pages = {223-26}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{BuHa:98, author = {Buchinshky, M. and Hahn, J. Y.}, title = {An alternative estimator for the censored quantile regression model}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1998}, volume = {66}, pages = {653-671}, number = {3}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Buch:94, author = {Buchinsky, M.}, title = {Changes in the {US} Wage Structure 1963-1987: Application of Quantile Regression}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1994}, volume = {62}, pages = {405-58}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{Buchinsky1994, author = {Buchinsky, M.}, title = {Changes in the {U.S.} wage structure 1963-1987: application of quantile regression}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1994}, volume = {62}, pages = {405-458}, key = {wages}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BuHu:95, author = {Buchinsky, M. and Hunt, J.}, title = {Wage Mobility in the {U}nited {S}tates}, institution = {NBER}, year = {1995}, type = {working paper}, number = {5455}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{BuCr:06, author = {Buckley, E. and Croson, R.}, title = {Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the Voluntary Provision of Linear Public Goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {935-955}, key = {public goods}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @ARTICLE{BuMeSh:03, author = {Buckley, N. and Mestelman, S. and Shehata, M.}, title = {Subsidizing Public Inputs}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {819-846}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{BuPe:06, author = {Bucks, B. and Pence, K.}, title = {Do Homeowners Know Their House Values and Mortgage Terms?}, institution = {Federal Reserve}, year = {2006}, abstract = {To assess whether homeowners know their house values and mortgage terms, we compare the distributions of these variables in the household-reported 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to the distributions in lender-reported data. We also examine the share of SCF respondents who report not knowing these variables. We find that most homeowners appear to report their house values and broad mortgage terms reasonably accurately. Some adjustable-rate mortgage borrowers, though, and especially those with below-median income, appear to underestimate or not know how much their interest rates could change.}, key = {housing}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{Buco:98, author = {Bucovetsky, Sam}, title = {Federalism, equalization and risk aversion}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {67}, pages = {301-328}, number = {3}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Budd:70, author = {Budd, E. C.}, title = {Postwar Changes in the Size Distribution of Income in the {US}}, journal = {American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings}, year = {1970}, volume = {60}, pages = {247-260}, key = {income distribution,empirical} } @INCOLLECTION{BuRa:75, author = {Budd, E. C. and Radner, D. B.}, title = {The {B}ureau of {E}conomic {A}nalysis and {C}urrent {P}opulation {S}urveySize Distributions: Some Comparisons for 1964}, booktitle = {The Personal Distribution of Income and Wealth}, publisher = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {1975}, editor = {Smith, J. D.}, address = {New York}, key = {income distribution,empirical} } @ARTICLE{Buhmann1988, author = {Buhmann, B. and Rainwater, L. and Schmaus, G. and Smeeding, T.}, title = {Equivalence scales, well-Being, inequality and poverty: Sensitivity Estimates across ten countries using the {L}uxembourg {I}ncome {S}tudy {(LIS)} database}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1988}, volume = {34}, pages = {115-142}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BuRaScSm:88, author = {Buhmann, B. and Rainwater, L. and Schmaus, G. and Smeeding, T.}, title = {Equivalence scales, well-Being, inequality and poverty: Sensitivity Estimatesacross ten countries using the {L}uxembourg {I}ncome {S}tudy {(LIS)} database}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1988}, volume = {34}, pages = {115-142}, key = {Equivalence scales} } @ARTICLE{Buhmann1987, author = {Buhmann, B., and Rainwater, L., and Schmaus, G. and Smeeding, T.}, title = {Equivalence Scales, Well-Being, Inequality and Poverty: Sensitive Estimates across ten countries using the {L}uxemburg Income Study ({LIS}) Database}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1987}, volume = {33}, pages = {115-142}, key = {INCOME DISTRIBUTION:EMPIRICAL}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BuKn:97, author = {Bukszar, E. and Knetsch, J.}, title = {Fragile redistribution choices behind a veil of ignorance}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1997}, volume = {14}, pages = {63-74}, number = {1}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Bulc:84ED, author = {Bulckaen, F.}, title = {Equit... dei sistemi di controllo della evasione delle imposte personalisul reddito}, journal = {Rivista di Diritto Finanziario e Scienza delle Finanze}, year = {1984}, volume = {63}, pages = {399-426}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Bulckaen1984, author = {Bulckaen, F.}, title = {Equit... dei sistemi di controllo della evasione delle imposte personali sul reddito}, journal = {Rivista di Diritto Finanziario e Scienza delle Finanze}, year = {1984}, volume = {63}, pages = {399-426}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BuGeKl:85, author = {Bulow, J. and Geanakoplos, J. and Klemperer, P.}, title = {Multimarket Oligopoly: strategic substitutes and complements}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1985}, volume = {93}, pages = {488-511}, key = {Micro} } @ARTICLE{Bu:82, author = {Bulow, Jeremy I.}, title = {Durable-Goods Monopolists.}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1982}, volume = {90}, pages = {p314 - 332}, number = {2}, abstract = {Durable-goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist. To the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it, or to make binding promises about his future production, such problems are ameliorated. Given the inability to do the above, the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist renters. A reverse Averch-Johnson result--that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs (including plant modernization and research and development) than would the renters--is shown. It is also shown that, even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable-goods monopolists, it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies. This paper explains the special type of monopoly power held by a firm that is a monopolist in the production and sale of a d}, issn = {00223808}, keywords = {DURABLE goods, Consumer, MONOPOLIES}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Burak2007, author = {Burak, M. and Williams, W. B. and Kerr, J.}, title = {Tax Benchmarking Survey for the Chemical Insdustry}, institution = {PriceWaterhouseCoopers}, year = {2007}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2008.01.30} } @TECHREPORT{BuWiKe:07, author = {Burak, M. and Williams, W. B. and Kerr, J.}, title = {Tax Benchmarking Survey for the Chemical Industry}, institution = {PriceWaterhouseCoopers}, year = {2007}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2008.01.30} } @ARTICLE{BuRa:82, author = {Burbea, J. and Rao, R.}, title = {Entropy Differential Metric, Distance and Divergence Measures in Probability Spaces: A Unified Approach}, journal = {Journal of Multivariate Analysis}, year = {1982}, volume = {12}, pages = {575-596}, key = {mathematics}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{BuLGPi:99, author = {Burchardt, T. and {Le G}rand, J. and Piachaud, D.}, title = {Social exclusion in {B}ritain 1991-1995}, journal = {Social Policy and Administration}, year = {1999}, volume = {33}, pages = {227-244}, key = {Social exclusion} } @ARTICLE{BuCo:97, author = {Burdett, K. and Coles, M. C.}, title = {Marriage and class}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {112}, pages = {141-168}, key = {population economics} } @ARTICLE{BuJu:83, author = {Burdett, Kenneth and Judd, Kenneth L.}, title = {Equilibrium Price Dispersion}, journal = {Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society}, year = {1983}, volume = {51}, pages = {955--970}, number = {4}, abstract = {It is shown that wquilibria with dispersed prices exist in environments with identical and rational agents on both sides of the market. In particular, the original Stigler model of nonsequential search often has many equilibria, some with price dispersion. Also, price dispersion holds in equilibrium in general if search is "noisy," i.e., there is some chance of learning two or more prices when an agent is looking for one price.}, copyright = {Copyright 1983 The Econometric Society}, issn = {00129682}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.05.04} } @ARTICLE{BuJe:96, author = {Burgat, P and Jeanrenaud, C.}, title = {Do Benefit and Equal Absolute Sacrifice Rules Really Lead to Different TaxationLevels?}, journal = {Public Finance Quarterly}, year = {1996}, pages = {148-62}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Burgat1996, author = {Burgat, P and Jeanrenaud, C.}, title = {Do Benefit and Equal Absolute Sacrifice Rules Really Lead to Different Taxation Levels?}, journal = {Public Finance Quarterly}, year = {1996}, pages = {148-62}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{BuSt:91, author = {Burgess, R. S. L. and Stern, N. H.}, title = {Social Security in Developing Countries: What, Why, Who and How?}, booktitle = {Social Security in Developing Countries}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1989}, editor = {Ahmad, E. and Dr{\`e}ze, J. and Hills, J. and Sen, A. K.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{BuSt:93, author = {Burgess, R. S. L. and Stern, N. H.}, title = {Taxation and Development}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1993}, volume = {31}, pages = {762-830}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{BuGaJePr:00, author = {Burgess, S. and Gardiner, K. and Jenkins, S. P. and Propper, C.}, title = {Measuring Income Risk}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {2000}, type = {CASE Paper}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Burgoyne1998, author = {Burgoyne, Carole B. and Routh, David A.}, title = {Perceptions, Attributions and Policy in the Economic Domain: A theoretical and comparative analysis}, journal = {International Journal of Comparative Sociology}, year = {1998}, key = {economic psychology}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BuRo:98, author = {Burgoyne, Carole B. and Routh, David A.}, title = {Perceptions, Attributions and Policy in the Economic Domain: A theoreticaland comparative analysis}, journal = {International Journal of Comparative Sociology}, year = {1998}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{BuFe:98, author = {Burguet, Roberto and Fernandez-Ruis, Jorge}, title = {Growth through taxes or borrowing? A model of development traps with publiccapital}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {14}, pages = {327-344}, number = {2}, key = {growth} } @INCOLLECTION{BuGe:78, author = {Burk, R. and Gehrig, W.}, title = {Indices of income inequality and societal income: An axiomatic approach}, booktitle = {Theory and Applications of Economic Indices}, year = {1978}, editor = {Eichhorn, W. and Opitz, O. and Shephard, R. D.}, pages = {305-358}, address = {W{\"u}rzburg}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BuBe:00, author = {Burkhard, D. and Bernhard, E.}, title = {Price Volatility and Risk with Non-Separability of Preferences}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2000}, volume = {39}, pages = {21-34}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{BuBuFeHo:04, author = {Burkhauser, R, V. and Butler, J. and Feng, S. and Houtenville, A. J.}, title = {Long Term Trends in Earnings Inequality: What the {CPS} Can Tell Us}, journal = {Economic Letters}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, pages = {295-299}, abstract = {Changes in Current Population Survey (CPS) topcoding rules in the 1990s artificially increased measured earnings inequality. We create a time-consistent CPS data series and compare trends in earnings inequality from 1975 to 2001.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.10}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2061/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V84-4B725CW-3&_user=1177143&_coverDate=02%2F29%2F2004&_rdoc=23&_fmt=high&_orig=browse&_srch=doc-info(%23toc%235860%232004%23999179997%23475918%23FLA%23display%23Volume)&_cdi=5860&_sort=d&_docanchor=&_ct=23&_acct=C000051857&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=1177143&md5=2cd9f9ccfba4ad503f503d72c3fd7f52} } @TECHREPORT{BuFeJe:07, author = {Burkhauser,R.V. and Feng, S. and Jenkins,S.P.}, title = {Using the P90/P10 Index to Measure US Inequality Trends with Current Population Survey Data: A View from Inside the Census Bureau Vaults}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {2839}, abstract = {The March Current Population Survey (CPS) is the primary data source for estimation of levels and trends in labor earnings and income inequality in the USA. Time-inconsistency problems related to top coding in theses data have led many researchers to use the ratio of the 90th and 10th percentiles of these distributions (P90/P10) rather than a more traditional summary measure of inequality. With access to public use and restricted-access internal CPS data, and bounding methods, we show that using P90/P10 does not completely obviate time-inconsistency problems, especially for household income inequality trends. Using internal data, we create consistent cell mean values for all top-coded public use values that, when used with public use data, closely track inequality trends in labor earnings and household income using internal data. But estimates of longer-term inequality trends with these corrected data based on P90/P10 differ from those based on the Gini coefficient. The choice of inequality measure matters.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{BuMeSm:94, author = {Burkhauser, R. and Merz, J. and Smeeding, T. M.}, title = {Relative Inequality and Poverty in {G}ermany and the {U}nited {S}tates usingalternative Equivalence Scales}, institution = {Universit{\"a}t L{\"u}neburg, Forschungsinstitut Freie Berufe}, year = {1994}, type = {Discussion Paper}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{Burkhauser1994, author = {Burkhauser, R. and Merz, J. and Smeeding, T. M.}, title = {Relative Inequality and Poverty in {G}ermany and the {U}nited {S}tates using alternative Equivalence Scales}, institution = {Universit\"at L\"uneburg, Forschungsinstitut Freie Berufe}, year = {1994}, type = {Discussion Paper}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BuCrDaJe:99, author = {Burkhauser, Richard V. and {Crews Cutts}, Amy D. and Daly, Mary C. and Jenkins,Stephen P.}, title = {Testing the significance of income distribution changes over the 1980s businesscycle: a cross-national comparison}, journal = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, year = {1999}, volume = {14}, pages = {253-272}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Burkhauser1999, author = {Burkhauser, Richard V. and {Crews Cutts}, Amy D. and Daly, Mary C. and Jenkins, Stephen P.}, title = {Testing the significance of income distribution changes over the 1980s business cycle: a cross-national comparison}, journal = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, year = {1999}, volume = {14}, pages = {253-272}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{BuCrDaJe:96, author = {Burkhauser, Richard V. and Crews, Amy D. and Daly, Mary C. and Jenkins,Stephen P.}, title = {Where in the World is the Middle Class? A Cross-National Comparison of theVanishing Middle Class using Kernel Density Estimates}, institution = {ESRC Research Centre on Micro-Social Change}, year = {1996}, type = {Working Papers}, number = {96-8}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{BuFeJeLa:08, author = {Burkhauser, R. V. and Feng, S. and Jenkins, S. P. and Larrimore, J.}, title = {Estimating Trends in {US} Income Inequality Using the Current Population Survey: The Importance of Controlling for Censoring}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {14247}, month = {August}, series = {Working Paper Series}, url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w14247} } @ARTICLE{Burkhauser1996, author = {Burkhauser, R. V. and Smeeding, M. and Merz, J.}, title = {Relative {I}nequality and {P}overty in {G}ermany and the {U}nited {S}tates {U}sing {A}lternative {E}quivalence {S}cales}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1996}, volume = {42}, pages = {381-400}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BuSM:96, author = {Burkhauser, R. V. and Smeeding, M. and Merz, J.}, title = {Relative Inequality and Poverty in {G}ermany and the {U}nited {S}tates usingAlternative Equivalence Scales}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1996}, volume = {42}, pages = {381-400}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{BuHe:97, author = {Burlando, Roberto and Hey, John D.}, title = {Do {A}nglo-{S}axons free-ride more?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {41-60}, number = {1}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{BuCrDi:95, author = {Burns, P. and Crawford, I. and Dilnot, A.}, title = {Regulation and Redistribution in Utilities}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1995}, volume = {16}, pages = {1-22}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Burr:94, author = {Burr, D.}, title = {A Comparison of certain Bootstrap Confidence Intervals in the {C}ox Model}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1994}, volume = {89}, pages = {1290-1302}, number = {428}, key = {bootstrap} } @INCOLLECTION{Burr:08, author = {Burrell, Q. L.}, title = {Measuring relative equality of concentration between different income/wealth distributions}, booktitle = {Advances on Income Inequality and Concentration Measures}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2008}, editor = {Betti, G. and Lemmi, A.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @ARTICLE{Burt:99, author = {Burtless, G.}, title = {Effects of Growing Wage Disparities and Changing Family Composition on the{U.S.} Income Distribution}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {853-865}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Burtless1999, author = {Burtless, G.}, title = {Effects of Growing Wage Disparities and Changing Family Composition on the {U.S.} Income Distribution}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {853-865}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Burt:95, author = {Burtless, G.}, title = {International Trade and the Rise in Earinings Inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1995}, volume = {33}, pages = {800-816}, number = {2}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.07.30} } @ARTICLE{Bush:98, author = {Bushinsky, M.}, title = {Recent advances in quantile regression techniques: A practical guide forempirical research}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1998}, volume = {33}, pages = {88-126}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Bushinsky1998, author = {Bushinsky, M.}, title = {Recent advances in quantile regression techniques: A practical guide for empirical research}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1998}, volume = {33}, pages = {88-126}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Butl:00, author = {Butler, D. J.}, title = {Do Non-Expected Utility Choice Patterns Spring from Hazy Preferences? AnExperimental Study of Choice 'errors'}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2000}, volume = {41,3}, pages = {277-297}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Butler2000, author = {Butler, D. J.}, title = {Do Non-Expected Utility Choice Patterns Spring from Hazy Preferences? An Experimental Study of Choice 'errors'}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2000}, volume = {41,3}, pages = {277-297}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{BuBuMiPi:87, author = {Butler, J. S. and Burkhauser, R. V. and Mitchell, J. M. and Pi Ncus , T.P.}, title = {Measurement Error in Self-Reported Health Variables}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1987}, volume = {69}, pages = {644-650}, key = {measurement error} } @ARTICLE{Butl:87, author = {Butler, R. J.}, title = {New indices of segregation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1987}, volume = {24}, pages = {359-362}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{BuMc:89, author = {Butler, R. J. and McDonald, J. B.}, title = {Using incomplete moments to measure inequality}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1989}, volume = {42}, pages = {109-19}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{BuMc:87, author = {Butler , R. J. and McDonald, J. B.}, title = {Interdistributional income inequality}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1987}, volume = {5}, pages = {13-18}, key = {distributions}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1391210} } @ARTICLE{Bu:90, author = {Butz, David A.}, title = {Durable-Good Monopoly and Best-Price Provisions}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1990}, volume = {80}, pages = {1062--1076}, number = {5}, month = {dec}, abstract = {Best-price provisions guarantee buyers that the prices they pay are the lowest available. If the seller subsequently cuts price, then each previous buyer is entitled to a refund. A durable-good monopolist who offers certain forms of these provisions can construct a consistent plan yielding the same profits as rental agreements and contracts with explicit quantity commitments. The provisions require special circumstances to be practical, but they are simple and effective and appear in a variety of economic settings. Three applications are discussed: international commodity agreements, markets for electric turbogenerators, and markets for financial claims.}, copyright = {Copyright 1990 American Economic Association}, issn = {0002-8282}, jstor_articletype = {Full Length Article}, jstor_date = {199012}, jstor_formatteddate = {Dec., 1990}, keywords = {610, 611, 612}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {American Economic Association}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Buyz:82, author = {Jeannine Buyze}, title = {The Estimation of Welfare Levels of a Cardinal Utility Function}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1982}, volume = {17}, pages = {325-332}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{Boes:00, author = {B{\"o}s, D.}, title = {Earmarked Taxation: Welfare Versus Political Support}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {75}, pages = {439-462}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{Bos:97, author = {B{\"o}s, Dieter}, title = {The incentive effects of earmarked taxation}, institution = {Dept. of Economics, University of Bonn, Germany}, year = {1997}, month = {November}, note = {preliminary version}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{Buch:87DE, author = {B{\"u}chner, H.-J.}, title = {Der {E}influss der {S}teuerhinterziehungauf direkte und indirekte {S}teuern}, institution = {Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universit{\"a}t Bonn}, year = {1987}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {A-100}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Buch:87SS, author = {B{\"u}chner, H-J.}, title = {Steuerhinterziehung und subjektivempfundene Steuerlast}, institution = {Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universit{\"a}t Bonn}, year = {1987}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {A-83}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{B'enabou2000, author = {B{\'e}nabou, R.}, title = {Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2000}, pages = {96-129}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Bena:00, author = {B{\'e}nabou, R.}, title = {Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2000}, volume = {90}, pages = {96-129}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{BeOk:98, author = {B{\'e}nabou, Roland and Ok, Efe A.}, title = {Social mobility and the demand for redistribution: the {POUM} hypothesis}, institution = {IDEI, New York University}, year = {1998}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Bena:96, author = {Bénabou, R.}, title = {Inequality and Growth}, journal = {NBER Macroeconomics Annual}, year = {1996}, volume = {11}, pages = {11-74}, abstract = {Using two unifying models and an empirical exercise, this paper presents and extends the main theories linking income distribution and growth, as well as the relevant empirical evidence. The first model integrates the political-economy and imperfect-capital-market theories. It allows for explicit departures from perfect democracy and embodies the tradeoff between the growth costs and benefits of redistribution through taxes, land reform, or public schooling: such policies simultaneously depress saving incentives and ameliorate the wealth constraints which impede investment by the poor. The second model is a growth version of the prisoner's dilemma which captures the essence of theories where sociopolitical conflict reduces the security of property rights, thereby discouraging accumulation. The economy's growth rate is shown to be a decreasing function of interest groups' rent-seeking abilities, as well as of the gap between rich and poor. It is not income inequality per se that matters, however, but inequality in the relative distribution of earning and political power. For each of the three channels of political economy, capital markets, and social conflict, the empirical evidence is surveyed and discussed in conjunction with the theoretical analysis. Finally, the possibility of multiple steady states leads the author to raise and take up a new empirical issue: are cross-country differences in inequality permanent, or gradually narrowing? Equivalently, is there convergence not only in first moments (GDP per capita), but in distribution?}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.10} } @ARTICLE{C.1999, author = {Blackorby C. and Donaldson D. and Weymark J.A.}, title = {Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem for State-Contingent Alternatives}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {365-387}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Caba:90, author = {Caballero, R.J.}, title = {Consumption Puzzles and Precautionary Savings}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1990}, volume = {25}, pages = {113-136}, abstract = {When marginal utility is convex, agents accumulate savings as a precautionary measure against labor-income eventualities. This paper shows that precautionary savings can go a long way in making the excess-growth, excess-smoothness, and excess-sensitivity features of consumption consistent with the stochastic processes of labor income observed in the U.S. at the microeconomic level.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{Caba:95, author = {Caball{e\'}, J.}, title = {Endogenous Growth, Human Capital, and Bequests in a Life-Cycle Model}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1995}, volume = {47}, pages = {156-181}, key = {human capital}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.12.22} } @ARTICLE{CaMa:99, author = {Cadsby, Charles Bram and Maynes, Elizabeth}, title = {Voluntary provision of threshold public goods with continuous contributions:experimental evidence}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {53-73}, number = {1}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Caga:58TD, author = {Cagan, P.}, title = {The demand for currency relative to total money supply}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1958}, volume = {66}, pages = {303-329}, key = {monetary} } @ARTICLE{CaDe:08, author = {Cagetti, M. and De Nardi, M.}, title = {Wealth Inequality: Data and Models}, journal = {Macroeconomic Dynamics}, year = {2008}, volume = {12}, pages = {285–313}, abstract = {In the United States wealth is highly concentrated and very unequally distributed: the richest 1% hold one third of the total wealth in the economy. Understanding the determinants of wealth inequality is a challenge for many economic models. We summarize some key facts about the wealth distribution and what economic models have been able to explain so far.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.10.04} } @TECHREPORT{CaDe:07, author = {Cagetti,M. and De Nardi,M.}, title = {Estate Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, number = {13160}, abstract = {We study the effects of abolishing estate taxation in a quantitative and realistic framework that includes the key features that policy makers are worried about: business investment, borrowing constraints, estate transmission, and wealth inequality. We use our model to estimate effective estate taxation. We consider various tax instruments to reestablish fiscal balance when abolishing estate taxation. We find that abolishing estate taxation would not generate large increases in inequality, and would, in some cases, generate increases in aggregate output and capital accumulation. If, however, the resulting revenue shortfall were financed through increased income or consumption taxation, the immensely rich, and the old among those in particular, would experience a welfare gain, at the cost of welfare losses for the vast majority of the population.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{CaLa:07, author = {Cahuc, Pierre and Laroque, Guy}, title = {Optimal Taxation and Monopsonistic Labor Market: Does Monopsony Justify the Minimum Wage?}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {2955}, abstract = {We analyze optimal taxation in an economy with monopsonistic labor markets. The individuals, whose only decisions are whether to work, or not, have heterogeneous productivities and opportunity costs of work. Given its preferences for redistribution, the government, which does not observe the opportunity costs of work, chooses a tax scheme implementing the second best allocation. We compare the optima in the competitive and monopsonistic environments. We find that the government can always implement the second best allocation of the competitive economy in the monopsonistic environment. The optimal tax schedule comprises employment subsidies financed by taxes on profits. In this setup, there is no room for a minimum wage.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {minimum wage, optimal taxation, monopsony}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @TECHREPORT{CaZy:05, author = {Cahuc,P. and Zylberberg,A.}, title = {Optimum Income Taxation and Layoff Taxes}, institution = {CEPR}, year = {2005}, type = {discussion paper}, abstract = {This paper analyzes optimum income taxation in a model with endogenous job destruction that gives rise to unemployment. It is shown that optimal tax schemes comprise both payroll and layoff taxes when the state provides public unemployment insurance and aims at redistributing income. The optimal layoff tax is equal to the social cost of job destruction, which amounts to the discounted value of the sum of unemployment benefits (that the state pays to unemployed workers) and payroll taxes (that the state does not get when workers are unemployed). Our quantitative analysis suggests that the introduction of layoff taxes, that are usually absent from actual tax schemes, could lead to significant increases in employment and GDP.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Cala:07, author = {Calabrese, Stephen}, title = {Majority Voting over Publicly Provided Goods, Redistribution, and Income Taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {9}, pages = {319-334}, abstract = {Federal, state, and many local governments make decisions that involve taxation, redistribution, and provision of public goods. Positive models to study these issues encounter the well-known problem that majority-voting equilibrium (MVE) may fail to exist in such multidimensional models. In this paper, with reasonable restrictions on preferences, I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of an MVE in a model with linear income tax and government expenditure policies that affect individual labor/leisure choices. My majority-voting result takes account of the possibility that low-skill individuals will drop out of the labor force under some tax and expenditure configurations.}, key = {Public Goods}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{CaEp:06, author = {Calabrese, S. and Epple, D. and Romer, T. and Sieg, H.}, title = {Local Public Good Provision: Voting, Peer Effects, and Mobility}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {959-981}, key = {publics goods}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @TECHREPORT{CaOl:96, author = {Calabuig, Vicente and Olcina, Gonzalo}, title = {Forward Induction in a Wage Repeated Negotiation}, institution = {Institut Valencia D'Investigacions Economiques}, year = {1997}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {WP-AD 97-16}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{CaHa:99, author = {Callan, T. and Harmon, C.}, title = {The Economic Return to Schooling in {I}reland}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {543-550}, key = {education, training} } @ARTICLE{CaNo:91, author = {Callan, T. and Nolan, B.}, title = {Concepts of Poverty and the Poverty Line}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {1991}, volume = {5}, pages = {243-261}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Calm:86, author = {Calmus , T. W.}, title = {Intersecting tax concentration curves in measurement of tax progressivity:a comment}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1986}, volume = {39}, pages = {119-121}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Calmus1986, author = {Calmus , T. W.}, title = {Intersecting tax concentration curves in measurement of tax progressivity: a comment}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1986}, volume = {39}, pages = {119-121}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CaCaSo:07, author = {Calvet, Laurent and Campbell, John and Sodini, Paolo}, title = {Down or Out: Assessing the Welfare Costs of Household Investment Mistakes}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2007}, volume = {115}, pages = {707-747}, abstract = {This paper investigates the efficiency of household investment decisions using comprehensive disaggregated Swedish data. We consider two main sources of inefficiency: underdiversification (“down”) and nonparticipation in risky asset markets (“out”). While a few households are very poorly diversified, most Swedish households outperform the Sharpe ratio of their domestic stock index through international diversification. Financially sophisticated households invest more efficiently but also more aggressively, and overall they incur higher return losses from underdiversification. The return cost of nonparticipation is smaller by almost one-half when we take account of the fact that nonparticipants would likely be inefficient investors.}, key = {Household Investment}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @TECHREPORT{CaDe:05, author = {Calvo,C. and Dercon,S.}, title = {Measuring Individual Vulnerability}, institution = {University of Oxford}, year = {2005}, abstract = {Standard poverty analysis makes statements about deprivation after the veilof uncertainty has been lifted. This implies that there is no meaningfulrole for risk as part of an assessment of potentially low states of well-being.In this paper, we introduce a concept of vulnerability, as a threat ofpoverty, with downside risk at its core. More specifically, we define avulnerability measure as an assessment of the magnitude of the threat ofpoverty, measured ex-ante, before uncertainty is resolved. We describethe welfare-economic foundations for desirable properties of a vulnerabilitymeasure and assess to what extent some measures used in empirical workabide by them. We also present two families of measures that are fullyconsistent with our axiomatic approach.}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{CaJa:04, author = {Calvó-Armengol, A. and Jackson. M. O.}, title = {The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {2004}, volume = {94}, pages = {426-454}, abstract = {We develop a model where agents obtain information about job opportunities through an explicitly modeled network of social contacts. We show that employment is positively correlated across time and agents. Moreover, unemployment exhibits duration dependence: the probability of obtaining a job decreases in the length of time that an agent has been unemployed. Finally, we examine inequality between two groups. If staying in the labor market is costly and one group starts with a worse employment status, then that group's drop-out rate will be higher and their employment prospects will be persistently below that of the other group.}, key = {information}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.10} } @ARTICLE{CaCuSeMo:05, author = {Camacho-Cuena, E. and Seidl, C. and Morone, A.}, title = {Comparing preference reversal for general lotteries and income distributions}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {2005}, volume = {26}, pages = {682-710}, key = {psychology} } @INCOLLECTION{Came:95, author = {Camerer, C.}, title = {Individual decision making}, booktitle = {The {H}andbook of {E}xperimental {E}conomics}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1995}, editor = {Kagel, J. H. and Roth, A. E.}, chapter = {8}, pages = {587-673}, address = {Princeton, New Jersey}, key = {Experiments} } @INCOLLECTION{Camerer1995a, author = {Camerer, Colin}, title = {{Individual} decision making}, booktitle = {Handbook of Experimental Economics}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1995}, editor = {Kagel, John H. and Roth, Alvin E.}, chapter = {8}, pages = {587-673}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Camerer1998, author = {Camerer, Colin}, title = {Bounded Rationality in Individual Decision Making}, journal = {Experimental Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {1}, pages = {163-183}, key = {behavioural}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Camerer1999, author = {Camerer, Colin and Ho, Teck-Hua}, title = {Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {827--874}, number = {4}, month = jul, abstract = {In 'experience-weighted attraction' (EWA) learning, strategies have attractions which reflect initial predispositions, are updated based on payoff experience, and determine choice probabilities according to some rule (e.g., logit). EWA includes reinforcement learning and weighted fictitious play (belief learning) as special cases, and hybridizes their key elements. Using three sets of experimental data, the authors show that reinforcement and belief learning are generally rejected in favor of EWA. EWA is able to combine the best features of these approaches, allowing attractions to begin and grow flexibly as choice reinforcement does but reinforcing unchosen strategies substantially as belief-based models implicitly do. [Journal Article; Publisher's URL]}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.03.01} } @ARTICLE{CaWe:92, author = {Colin Camerer and Martin Weber}, title = {Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1992}, volume = {5}, pages = {325-370}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{TvKa:92AI, author = {Colin Camerer and Martin Weber}, title = {Advances in prospect theory:Cumulative representation of uncertainty}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1992}, volume = {5}, pages = {297 -323}, key = {risk} } @BOOK{Ca:03, title = {Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction}, publisher = {Priceton University Press}, year = {2003}, author = {Camerer, Colin F.}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.09} } @ARTICLE{Camerer2002, author = {Camerer, Colin F. and Ho, Teck-Hua and Chong, Juin-Kuan}, title = {Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2002}, volume = {104}, pages = {137--188}, number = {1}, month = may, abstract = {Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e., they respond only to their own previous experience and ignore others' payoff information) and behavior is not sensitive to the way in which players are matched. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this paper, we extend our adaptive experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning model to capture sophisticated learning and strategic teaching in repeated games. The generalized model assumes there is a mixture of adaptive learners and sophisticated players. An adaptive learner adjusts his behavior the EWA way. A sophisticated player rationally best-responds to her forecasts of all other behaviors. A sophisticated player can be either myopic or farsighted. A farsighted player develops multiple-period rather than single-period forecasts of others' behaviors and chooses to "teach" the other players by choosing a strategy scenario that gives her the highest discounted net present value. We estimate the model using data from p-beauty contests and repeated trust games with incomplete information. The generalized model is better than the adaptive EWA model in describing and predicting behavior. Including teaching also allows an empirical learning-based approach to reputation formation which predicts better than a quantal-response extension of the standard type-based approach. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C91.}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.03.01} } @ARTICLE{CaHo:99, author = {Camerer, C. F. and Hogarth, R. M.}, title = {The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1999}, volume = {19}, pages = {7-42}, key = {experiments}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.20} } @ARTICLE{CaWi:97, author = {Cameron, C. and Windmeijer, F.}, title = {An {R}-squared measure of goodness of fit for some common nonlinear regressionmodels}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1997}, volume = {77}, pages = {329-342}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{CaWi:96, author = {Cameron, C. and Windmeijer, F.}, title = {R-squared measures for count data regression models with applications tohealth care utilization}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1996}, volume = {14}, pages = {209-220}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Came:88TE, author = {Cameron, S.}, title = {The economics of crime deterrence: a survey of the theory and evidence}, journal = {Kyklos}, year = {1988}, volume = {41}, pages = {301-323}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{CaGo:01, author = {Caminada, K. and Goudswaard, K.}, title = {International Trends in Income Inequality and Social Policy}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2001}, volume = {8}, pages = {395-415}, abstract = {In most OECD-countries income inequality has increased during the last twodecades. In this paper, we investigate whether changes in the overall distributionof income can be attributed to social policy measures. For most (but notall) countries we find a possible relationship between changing welfarestate policies (as measured by expenditure ratios and replacement rates)and changing income inequality. Especially the United Kingdom and the Netherlandscombined an above-average rise in inequality with a reduction in the generosityof the welfare system.A more elaborate budget incidence analysis for theNetherlands indicates that in the period 19811997 inequality of disposablehousehold income increased sharply. The two main forces behind this phenomenonwere a more unequal distribution of market incomes and changes in socialtransfers. Fundamental social security reforms in the Netherlands indeedseem to have made the income distribution less equal. However, income inequalityin the Netherlands is still below the OECD average at the end of the observedperiod.}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Camp:07, author = {Campanale, Claudio}, title = {Increasing returns to savings and wealth inequality}, journal = {Review of Economic Dynamics}, year = {2007}, volume = {10}, pages = {646-675}, abstract = {In this paper I present an explanation to the fact that in the data wealth is substantially more concentrated than income. Starting from the observation that the composition of households’ portfolios changes towards a larger share of high-yield assets as the level of net worth increases, I first use data on historical asset returns and portfolio composition by wealth level to construct an empirical return function. I then augment an Overlapping Generation version of the standard neoclassical growth model with idiosyncratic labor income risk and missing insurance markets to allow for returns on savings to be increasing in the level of accumulated assets. The quantitative properties of the model are examined and show that an empirically plausible difference between the return faced by poor and wealthy agents is able to generate a substantial increase in wealth inequality compared to the basic model, enough to match the Gini index and all but the top 1 percentile of the US distribution of wealth.}, key = {Wealth Inequality}, keywords = {Wealth inequality; Self-insurance; Portfolio composition; Increasing returns}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{Camp:87AF, author = {Campano, F.}, title = {A Fresh Look at {C}hampernowne's Five-Parameter Formula}, journal = {{\'E}conomie Appliqu{\'e}e}, year = {1987}, volume = {40}, pages = {161-175}, key = {Distributions}, type = {distribution} } @TECHREPORT{CaDo:07, author = {Campante, Filipe and Do, Quoc-Anh}, title = {Inequality, Redistribution, and Population}, institution = {Harvard Unibersity, John F. Kennedy School of Government}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {RWP07-046}, abstract = {We document a negative relationship between population size and inequality in the cross-country data. We propose an explanation built on the existence of a size effect in the political economy of redistribution, particularly in the presence of different channels of popular request for redistribution, e.g. “institutional” channels and “revolutions”. Based on the assumption that the threat of revolution is directly related to the number of people that may attempt to revolt, the theory predicts that the stylized fact initially uncovered by the paper can be refined as follows: there is a negative relationship between population size, and its geographical concentration, and post-tax inequality in non-democracies. We subject these predictions to extensive empirical scrutiny in a cross-country context, and the data robustly confirm these patterns of inequality, population, and the interaction with democracy.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Inequality, Redistribution, Population Size, Population Density, Population Concentration, Revolutions}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{CaKe:03, author = {Campbell, Donald E. and Kelly, Jerry S.}, title = {On the {A}rrow and {W}ilson impossibility theorems}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2003}, volume = {20}, pages = {273-281}, abstract = {A social welfare function is Arrovian if it is transitive-valued and satisfiesIIA. We examine the logical relation between the statements (A) If f isArrovian with domain P then it is dictatorial if it satisfies the Paretocriterion and (W) If f is Arrovian with domain P then it is dictatorialor inversely dictatorial if it is non-null and satisfies non-imposition.We exhibit a class of domains on which W implies A and another on whichA implies W. We also present examples of domains on which one of the statementsis true and the other is false.}, key = {Welfare} } @ARTICLE{CaKe:00, author = {Campbell, D. E. and Kelly, J. S.}, title = {Weak Independence and Veto Power}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {66}, pages = {183-189}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{Camp:06, author = {Campbell, J.}, title = {Household Finance}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {12149}, address = {NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138}, month = {March}, abstract = {The welfare benefits of financial markets depend in large part on how effectively households use these markets. The study of household finance is challenging because household behavior is difficult to measure accurately, and because households face constraints that are not captured by textbook models, including fixed costs, uninsurable income risk, borrowing constraints, and contracts that are non-neutral with respect to inflation. Evidence on participation, diversification, and the exercise of mortgage refinancing options suggests that many households are reasonably effective investors, but a minority make significant mistakes. This minority appears to be poorer and less well educated than the majority of more successful investors. There is some evidence that households understand their own limitations, and try to avoid financial strategies that require them to make decisions they do not feel qualified to make. Some financial products involve a cross-subsidy from naive households to sophisticated households, and this can inhibit the emergence of products that would promote effective financial decision making by households.}, key = {household}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Camp:87DS, author = {Campbell, J.Y.}, title = {Does Saving Anticipate Declining Labor Income? An Alternative Test of the Permanent Income Hypothesis}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1987}, volume = {55}, pages = {1249-1273}, abstract = {The permanent income hypothesis implies that people save because they rationally expect their permanent income to decline; they save "for a rainy day." It follows that saving should be at least as good a predictor of deciines in labor income as any other forecast that can be constructed from publicly available information. The paper tests this hitherto ignored implication of the permanent income hypothesis, using quarterly aggregate data for the period 1953-84 in the United States. By contrast with much of the recent literature, the results here are valid when income is stationary in first differences rather than levels.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @TECHREPORT{Camp:86, author = {Campbell, J.Y.}, title = {Does Saving Anticipate Declining Labor Incorre? An Alternative Test of the Permanent Incone Hypothesis}, institution = {NBER}, year = {1986}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1805}, address = {NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138}, month = {January}, abstract = {The permanent income hypothesis implies that people save because they rationally expect their labor income to decline; they save tifor a rainy day". It follows that saving should be at least as good a predictor of declines in labor income as any other forecast that can be constructed from publicly available information. The paper tests this hitherto ignored implication of the permanent income hypothesis, using quarterly aggregate data for the period 1953-84 in the U.S. A vector autoregression for saving and changes in labor income is used to generate an unrestricted forecast of declines in labor income. In the VAR, saving Granger causes labor income changes as one would expect if the PIH is true. The mean of the unrestricted forecast is far from the mean of saving, but the dynamics of the two series are quite similar. The paper presents both formal test statistics and an informal evaluation of the "fit" of the permanent income hypothesis. By contrast with most of the recent literature, the results here are valid when income is nonstationary.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{CaDe:89, author = {Campbell, J. and Deaton, A.}, title = {Why is Consumption So Smooth?}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1989}, volume = {56}, pages = {357-373}, abstract = {For thirty years it has been accepted that consumption is smooth because permanent income is smoother than measured income. This paper considers the evidence for the contrary position, that permanent income is in fact less smooth than measured income, so that the smoothness of consumption cannot be straightforwardly explained by permanent income theory. The paper argues that in postwar U.S. quarterly data, consumption is smooth because it responds with a lag to changes in income.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{CaMa:91, author = {Campbell, J.Y. and Mankiw, N.G.}, title = {The response of consumption to income: A cross-country investigation}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1991}, volume = {35}, pages = {723-767}, abstract = {In previous work we have argued that aggregate, post-war, United States data on consumption and income are well described by a model in which a fraction of income accrues to individuals who consume their current income rather than their permanent income. This fraction is estimated to be about 50”/., indicating a substantial departure from the permanent income hypothesis. In this paper we ask whether the same model fits quarterly data from the United Kingdom over the period 1957-1988 and from Canada, France, Japan, and Sweden over the period 1972-1988. We also explore several generalizations of the basic model.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @TECHREPORT{CaMa:89, author = {Campbell, J.Y. and Mankiw, N.G.}, title = {Consumption, Income and Interest Rates: Reinterpreting the Time Series Evidence}, institution = {NBER}, year = {1989}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2924}, address = {NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138}, month = {April}, abstract = {This paper proposes that the time-series data on consumption, income, and interest rates are best viewed as generated not by a single representative consumer but by two groups of consumers. Half the consumers are forward-looking and consume their permanent income, but are extremely reluctant to substitute consumption temporarily. Half the consumers follow the "rule of thumb" of consuming their current income. The paper documents three empirical regularities that, it argues, are best explained by this medal. First, expected changes in income are associated with expected changes in consumption. Second, expected real interest rates are not associated with expected changes in consumption. Third, periods in which consumption is high relative to income are typically followed by high growth in income. The paper concludes by briefly discussing the implications of these findings for economic policy and economic research.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{CaRe:98, author = {Cancian, M. and Reed, D.}, title = {Assessing the Effect of Wives' Earnings on Family Income Inequality}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1998}, volume = {80}, pages = {73-79}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Caner2004, author = {Caner, A. and Wolff, E.}, title = {Asset Poverty In The {U}nited {S}tates, 1984-99: Evidence From The Panel Study Of Income Dynamics}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2004}, volume = {50}, pages = {493-518}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CaWo:04, author = {Caner, A. and Wolff, E.}, title = {Asset Poverty In The {U}nited {S}tates, 1984–99: Evidence From The PanelStudy Of Income Dynamics}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2004}, volume = {50}, pages = {493-518}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{CaDAl:07, author = {Cannari, L. and D'{\A}lessio, G.}, title = {The Opinion of Italians on Tax Evasion}, institution = {Bank of Italy}, year = {2007}, type = {Economics Research Paper}, number = {618}, month = {February}, abstract = {In this paper we use data from the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) to study what Italian households think of tax evasion, and to estimate their propensity to evade taxes. This propensity turns out to be larger for the self-employed than for employees; within the group of employees, the propensity is higher for blue-collar workers than for white-collars workers. The propensity decreases with both education and age; it is higher in provincial capitals with higher unemployment and crime rates, and where social capital and the quality of public services are lower. The aversion to tax evasion turns out to be quite low across all social classes; this result suggests that mechanisms of general reprobation have a modest role in hampering tax evasion. Comparing SHIW data with those collected through a similar survey carried out by the Ministry of Finance, we find that the propensity to evade taxes has increased from 1992 to 2004.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{CaDAMa:08, author = {Cannari, L. and D’Alessio, G. and Marchese, G.}, title = {Italian Household Wealth: Background, Main Results, Outlook}, institution = {Bank of Italy}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {household}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.06} } @TECHREPORT{CaNo:96, author = {Cantillon, S. and Nolan,B.}, title = {Are married women more deprived than their husbands?}, institution = {The economic and social research institute}, year = {1996}, number = {73}, address = {ireland}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{CaSa:96, author = {Cant{\'o}-S{\'a}nchez, O.}, title = {Poverty dynamics in {S}pain: A study of transitions in the 1990s}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1996}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {15}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{CaCoSi:00, author = {Caplan, A. J. and Cornes, R. C. and Silva, E. C. D.}, title = {Pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralizedleadership and imperfect labor mobility}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {77}, pages = {265-284}, key = {welfare state} } @ARTICLE{Caplan2000, author = {Caplan, A. J. and Cornes, R. C. and Silva, E. C. D.}, title = {Pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {77}, pages = {265-284}, key = {welfare state}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CaHoSoTu:07, author = {Cappelen,A.W. and Hole,A.D. and Sorensen,E. and Tungodden,B.}, title = {The Pluralism of Fairness Ideals: An Experimental Approach}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {97}, pages = {818-827}, abstract = {A core question in the contemporary debate on distributive justice is how to understand fairness in situations involving production. Important theories of distributive justice, such as strict egalitarianism, liberal egalitarianism, and libertarianism, provide different answers to this question. This paper presents the results from a dictator game where the distribution phase is preceded by a production phase. Each player’s contribution is a result of a freely chosen investment level and an exogenously given rate of return. We estimate simultaneously the prevalence of three principles of distributive justice among the players and the distribution of the weight they attach to fairness.}, key = {fairness}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @INCOLLECTION{Carb:90, author = {Carbonaro, G.}, title = {Global indicators of poverty}, booktitle = {Income and Wealth Distribution, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {Springer verlag}, year = {1990}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Zenga, M.}, pages = {254-271}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Ca-NiKl:03, author = {Carbonell-Nicolou, O. and Klor, E. F.}, title = {Representative Democracy and Marginal Rate Progressive Income Taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1137-1164}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Card1992, author = {Card, D.}, title = {Using Regional Variation in Wages to Measure the Effects of the Federal Minimum Wage}, journal = {Industrial and Labor Relations Review}, year = {1992}, volume = {46}, pages = {22-37}, key = {wages}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Card:92, author = {Card, D.}, title = {Using Regional Variation in Wages to Measure the Effects of the FederalMinimum Wage}, journal = {Industrial and Labor Relations Review}, year = {1992}, volume = {46}, pages = {22-37}, key = {wages} } @BOOK{CaFr:93, title = {Small {D}ifferences that {M}atter: {L}abour {M}arkets and {I}ncome {M}aintenancein {C}anada and the {U}nited {S}tates}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, year = {1993}, author = {Card, D. and Freeman, R.}, address = {Chicago}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{CaKr:95, title = {Myth and Measurement: The New Ecponomics of the Minimum Wage}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1996}, author = {Card, D. and Krueger, A.}, address = {Princeton}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{CaLe:94, author = {Card, D. and Lemieux, T.}, title = {Changing Wage Structure and Black-White Differentials}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1994}, volume = {84}, pages = {29-33}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{CaLe:00, author = {Card, D. and Levine, P. B.}, title = {Extended Benefits and the Duration of {UI} Spells: Evidence from the NewJersey Extended Benefit Program}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, pages = {107-138}, key = {social insurance} } @ARTICLE{Card2000, author = {Card, D. and Levine, P. B.}, title = {Extended Benefits and the Duration of {UI} Spells: Evidence from the New Jersey Extended Benefit Program}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, key = {social insurance}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Card:03, author = {Cardon, J. H.}, title = {Strategic Quality Choice and Charter Schools}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {703-727}, key = {Education, training} } @ARTICLE{CaDaJoSt:05, author = {Carlsson, F. and Daruvala, D. and Johansson-Stenman, O.}, title = {Are people inequality averse or just risk averse?}, journal = {Economica}, year = {2005}, volume = {72}, pages = {375-396}, type = {Inequality} } @TECHREPORT{CaDaJo:00, author = {Carlsson, F. and Daruvala, D. and Johansson-Stenman, O.}, title = {Are People Inequality Averse Or Just Risk Averse?}, institution = {Department of Economics, G{\"o}teborg University}, year = {2000}, type = {working paper}, address = {Box 640, SE-40530 G{\"o}teborg, Sweden}, key = {risk} } @TECHREPORT{CaHaHe:02, author = {Carneiro, P. M. and Hansen, K. T. and Heckman, J. J.}, title = {Removing the Veil of Ignorance in Assessing the Distributional Impacts of Social Policies}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2002}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {W8840}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138 USA}, abstract = {This paper summarizes our recent research on evaluating the distributionalconsequences of social programs. This research advances the economic policyevaluation literature beyond estimating assorted mean impacts to estimatedistributions of outcomes generated by different policies and determinehow those policies shift persons across the distributions of potentialoutcomes produced by them. Our approach enables analysts to evaluate thedistributional effects of social programs without invoking the 'Veil ofIgnorance' assumption often used in the literature in applied welfare economics.Our methods determine which persons are affected by a given policy, wherethey come from in the ex-ante outcome distribution and what their gainsare. We apply our methods to analyze two proposed policy reforms in Americaneducation. These reforms benefit the middle class and not the poor.}, key = {Redistribution} } @TECHREPORT{CaBuVe:04, author = {Carpenter,J. and Burks,S. and Verhoogen,E.}, title = {Comparing Students to Workers:The Effects of Social Framing on Behaviorin Distribution Games}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2004}, abstract = {To investigate the external validity of Ultimatum and Dictator game behaviorwe conduct experiments in field settings with naturally occurring variationin "social framing." Our participants are students at Middlebury College,non-traditional students at Kansas City Kansas Community College (KCKCC),and employees at a Kansas City distribution center. Ultimatum game offersare ordered: KCKCC > employee > Middlebury. In the Dictator game employeesare more generous than students in either location. This indicates thatworkers behaved distinctly from both student groups because their allocationsdo not decrease between games, an effect we attribute to the social framingof the workplace.}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{CaVeBu:05, author = {Carpentera, J. and Verhoogenb, E. and Burks. S.}, title = {The effect of stakes in distribution experimentss}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2005}, volume = {86}, pages = {393-398}, abstract = {We replicate previous results showing that stakes do not affect offers in the ultimatum game (UG) and show that stakes also have no effect on allocations in the dictator game (DG). Both results are robust to the inclusion of demographic factors.}, key = {experiments}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.20} } @INCOLLECTION{CaSt:77TA, author = {Carr-Hill, R. and Stern, N. H.}, title = {Theory and estimation in models of crime and its social control and theirrelations to concepts of social output}, booktitle = {The Economics of Public Services}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1977}, editor = {Feldstein, M. S. and Inman, R. P.}, address = {London, {UK}}, key = {tax evasion} } @PHDTHESIS{Carr:95, author = {Carrascal, U.}, title = {Escales de Equivalencia de Consumo: Aplicaci{\'o}n al caso {E}spa{\~n}ol}, year = {1995}, institution = {Universidad de Valladolid}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @PHDTHESIS{Carrascal1995, author = {Carrascal, U.}, title = {Escales de Equivalencia de Consumo: Aplicaci\'on al caso {E}spa\~nol}, year = {1995}, institution = {Universidad de Valladolid}, key = {INCOME DISTRIBUTION:EMPIRICAL}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Carr:97, author = {Carroll, C. D.}, title = {Buffer-Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {112}, pages = {1-55}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{Carr:94, author = {Christopher D. Carroll}, title = {How Does Future Income Affect Current Consumption?}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {109}, pages = {111-148}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{CaSa:97, author = {Christopher D. Carroll and Andrew A. Samwick}, title = {The Nature of Precautionary Wealth}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {40}, pages = {41-71}, key = {wealth} } @TECHREPORT{CaSa:95, author = {Christopher D. Carroll and Andrew A. Samwick}, title = {How Important is Precautionary Saving?}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {1995}, type = {NBER working paper series}, number = {5194}, month = {July}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{CaHaZe:92, author = {Carroll, C. D. Carroll and Hall, R.E. Hall and Zeldes, S.P. }, title = {The Buffer-Stock Theory of Saving: Some Macroeconomic Evidence}, journal = {Brookings Papers on Economic Activity}, year = {1992}, volume = {1992}, pages = {61-156.}, number = {2}, key = {consumption} } @TECHREPORT{CaJoRi:07, author = {Carroll,R. and Joulfaian,D. and Rider,M.}, title = {Income Mobility: The Recent American Experience}, institution = {Andrew Young School of Policy Studies}, year = {2007}, type = {Research Paper}, number = {0718}, abstract = {This paper examines the pattern of income mobility during the 1980s and the mid 1990s. It employs a panel of individual income tax returns for the years 1979 through 1995 to study this pattern, and explore whether income mobility has increased during the period. We focus on working age Americans, those age 30 and over in 1979, the first year of the panel, and up to age 61 in 1995, the last year of the panel. Consistent with other research, we find evidence of considerable mobility. For example, more than one-half of those in the bottom quintile move to a higher quintile over the period.}, key = {income}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @BOOK{CaThHe:99, title = {Microeconomic Issues Today}, publisher = {M.E.Sharpe}, year = {1999}, author = {Carson,R. Thomas,W. and Hecht,J.}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Cart:96, author = {Carte, Ian}, title = {The concept of freedom in the work of {A}martya {S}en: an alternative analysisconsistent with freedom's independent value}, journal = {Notizie di Politeia}, year = {1996}, volume = {12}, pages = {7-22}, number = {43/44}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{CaIr:91, author = {Carter, J. R. and Irons, M. D.}, title = {Are economists different and if so, why?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1991}, volume = {5}, pages = {171-177}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{Cart:84II, author = {Carter, M.}, title = {Issues in the hidden economy}, journal = {Economic Record}, year = {1984}, volume = {60}, pages = {209-211}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Cart:99II, author = {Carter, Thomas J.}, title = {Illegal immigration in an efficiency wage model}, journal = {Journal of International Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {49}, pages = {385-401}, comment = {JEL classification: F22, J41}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Cart:99TE, author = {Carter, T. J.}, title = {The Effect of Taxes on Labour in Efficiency Wage Models: A Comment}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {325-327}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Cart:98, author = {Carter, Thomas J.}, title = {Minimum wage laws: what does an employment increase imply about output andwelfare?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {36}, pages = {473-485}, number = {4}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{CaCrPe:00, author = {Casamatta, G. and Cremer, H. and Pestieau, P.}, title = {Political Sustainability and the Design of Social Insurance}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {75}, pages = {341-364}, key = {social insurance} } @ARTICLE{CaDe:03, author = {Casarico, A. and Devillanova, C.}, title = {Social Security and Migration with Endogenous Skill Upgrading}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87, (3-4)}, pages = {773-797}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Case:01, author = {Case, A.}, title = {Election Goals and Income Redistribution: Recent Evidence from Albania}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {45}, pages = {405-423}, key = {redistribution} } @TECHREPORT{CaDe:04, author = {Case,A. and Deaton,A.}, title = {Health and wealth among the poor: India and South Africa compared}, institution = {Research Program in Development Studies and Center for Health and Wellbeing,Princeton University}, year = {2004}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Case:92, author = {Casella, A.}, title = {On markets and clubs: economic and political integration of regions with unequal productivity}, journal = {American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings}, year = {1992}, volume = {82}, pages = {115-121}, key = {clubs} } @ARTICLE{Cass:92, author = {Casella, A.}, title = {Participation in a Currency Union}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1992}, volume = {82}, pages = {847-863}, key = {macro}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{CaFr:92, author = {Casella, A. and Frey, B.}, title = {Federalism and clubs. Towards an economic theory of overlapping political jurisdictions}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1992}, volume = {36}, pages = {635-646}, key = {clubs} } @BOOK{CaBe:03, title = {Statistical inference}, publisher = {Thomson Press}, year = {2002}, author = {Casella, G. and Berger, R. L.}, comment = {Moore: QA276 .C37 2002}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.22} } @ARTICLE{CaCo:06, author = {Caselli, F. and Coleman, W.}, title = {The World Technology Frontier}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {96}, pages = {499-522}, abstract = {We study cross-country differences in the aggregate production function when skilled and unskilled labor are imperfect substitutes. We find that there is a skill bias in cross-country technology differences. Higher-income countries use skilled labor more efficiently than lower-income countries, while they use unskilled labor relatively and, possibly, absolutely less efficiently. We also propose a simple explanation for our findings: rich countries, which are skilled-labor abundant, choose technologies that are best suited to skilled workers; poor countries, which are unskilled-labor abundant, choose technologies more appropriate to unskilled workers. We discuss alternative explanations, such as capital-skill complementarity and differences in schooling quality.}, key = {technology}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{CaBe:96, author = {Casini, Leonardo and Bernetti, Iacopo}, title = {Public project evaluation, environment and {S}en's theory}, journal = {notizie di Politeia}, year = {1996}, volume = {12}, pages = {55-78}, number = {43/44}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{CaGi:89a, author = {Caso, C. and Gil, M. A.}, title = {Estimating income inequality in the stratified sampling from complete data:{P}art {I}: The unbiased estimation and applications}, journal = {Kybernetika}, year = {1989}, volume = {25}, pages = {298-311}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{CaGi:89b, author = {Caso, C. and Gil, M. A.}, title = {Estimating income inequality in the stratified sampling from complete data;{P}art {II}: The asymptotic behaviour and the choice of sample size}, journal = {Kybernetika}, year = {1989}, volume = {25}, pages = {312-319}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Caso1989, author = {Caso, C. and Gil, M. A.}, title = {Estimating income inequality in the stratified sampling from complete data; {P}art {II}: The asymptotic behaviour and the choice of sample size}, journal = {Kybernetika}, year = {1989}, volume = {25}, pages = {312-319}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Caso1989a, author = {Caso, C. and Gil, M. A.}, title = {Estimating income inequality in the stratified sampling from complete data: {P}art {I}: The unbiased estimation and applications}, journal = {Kybernetika}, year = {1989}, volume = {25}, pages = {298-311}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CaKh:99, author = {Timothy N. Cason and Feisal U. Khan}, title = {A Laboratory Study of Voluntary Public Goods Provision with Imperfect Monitoringand Communication}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {58}, pages = {533-552}, number = {2}, abstract = {This paper reports 17 laboratory sessions that introduce imperfect contributionmonitoring in the voluntary contributions mechanism. In the imperfect monitoringtreatment subjects learn others' public good contributions every six periodsand the experiment also includes face-to-face verbal communication as atreatment variable. The results demonstrate that improved contributionmonitoring does not increase contributions without verbal communicationand that communication (even with imperfect monitoring) dramatically improvessubjects' ability to efficiently provide the public good. The results haveimplications for the design of development programs that feature a prominentrole for collective action.}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{CaMu:02, author = {Cason, T. N. and Mui, V.-L.}, title = {Fairness and Sharing in Innovation Games: A Laboratory Investigation}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2002}, volume = {48}, pages = {243-264}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{CaSh:01, author = {Cason, Timothy N. and Sharma, Tridib}, title = {Durable Goods, Coasian Dynamics, and Uncertainty: Theory and Experiments}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2001}, volume = {109}, pages = {1311--1354}, number = {6}, abstract = {This paper presents a model in which a durable goods monopolist sells a product to two buyers. Each buyer is privately informed about his own valuation. Thus all players are imperfectly informed about market demand. We study the monopolist's pricing behavior as players' uncertainty regarding demand vanishes in the limit. In the limit, players are perfectly informed about the downward-sloping demand. We show that in all games belonging to a fixed and open neighborhood of the limit game there exists a generically unique equilibrium outcome that exhibits Coasian dynamics and in which play lasts for at most two periods. A laboratory experiment shows that, consistent with our theory, outcomes in the Certain and Uncertain Demand treatments are the same. Median opening prices in both treatments are roughly at the level predicted and considerably below the monopoly price. Consistent with Coasian dynamics, these prices are lower for higher discount factors. Demand withholding, however, leads to more trading periods than predicted.}, copyright = {Copyright © 2001 The University of Chicago Press}, issn = {00223808}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Dec., 2001}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press} } @TECHREPORT{Cass:08UBU, author = {Cass, David}, title = {Utility-Based Utility}, institution = {University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Economic Research}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {001}, abstract = {A major virtue of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, for example, in the theory of general financial equilibrium (GFE), is that they ensure intertemporal consistency: consumption-portfolio plans (for the future) are in fact executed (in the future) — assuming that there is perfect foresight about relevant endogenous variables. This note proposes an alternative to expected utility, one which also delivers consistency between plan and execution — and more. In particular, it turns out that one special case is in fact simply discounted (subjective) expected utility. Moreover, this alternative formulation affords an extremely natural setting for introducing extrinsic uncertainty. The key idea behind my approach is to divorce the concept of filtration (of the state space) from any considerations involving probability (on the state space), and then concentrate attention on nested utilities of consumption looking forward from any date-event: utility today depends only on consumption today and prospective utility of consumption tomorrow, utility tomorrow depends only on consumption tomorrow and prospective utility of consumption the day after tomorrow, and so on.}, key = {Utility}, keywords = {Utility theory, Expected utility, Intertemporal consistency, Extrinsic uncertainty, Cass-Shell Immunity Theorem}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @TECHREPORT{Cass:08UBUT, author = {Cass, David}, title = {Utility-Based Utility: The Johnsen-Donaldson Hypothesis}, institution = {University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Economic Research}, year = {2008}, abstract = {A major virtue of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, for example, in the theory of general financial equilibrium (GFE), is that they ensure time consistency: consumption-portfolio plans (for the future) are in fact executed (in the future) —assuming that there is perfect foresight about relevant endogenous variables. This note examines an alternative to expected utility, one which also delivers consistency between plan and execution — and more. In particular, it turns out that one special case is in fact simply discounted expected utility. Moreover, this alternative formulation affords an extremely natural setting for introducing extrinsic uncertainty. The key idea behind this approach is to divorce the concept of filtration (of the state space) from any considerations involving probability (on the state space), and then to concentrate attention on nested utilities of consumption looking forward from any date-event: utility today depends only on consumption today and prospective utility of consumption tomorrow, utility tomorrow depends only on consumption tomorrow and prospective utility of consumption the day after tomorrow, and so on.}, key = {Utility}, keywords = {Utility theory, Expected utility, Intertemporal consistency, Extrinsic uncertainty, Cass-Shell Immunity Theorem}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{CaLa:98, author = {Cassou, Steven P. and Lansing, Kevin J.}, title = {Optimal fiscal policy, public capital and the productivity slowdown}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1998}, volume = {22}, pages = {911-935}, number = {6}, key = {productivity} } @ARTICLE{CaMa:00, author = {Castagnoli, E. and Maccheroni, F.}, title = {Restricting Independence to Convex Cones}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {34}, pages = {215-223}, key = {mathematics} } @INCOLLECTION{CaMu:90, author = {Castagnoli, E. and Muliere, P.}, title = {A note on inequality measures and the {Pigou-Dalton} principle of transfers}, booktitle = {Income and Wealth Distribution, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1990}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Zenga, M.}, pages = {171-182}, address = {Berlin, Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Cast:07, author = {Castellacci,F.}, title = {EVOLUTIONARY AND NEW GROWTH THEORIES. ARE THEY CONVERGING?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {2007}, volume = {21}, pages = {585-627}, number = {3}, abstract = {This paper presents a critical review of evolutionary and new growth theories. The purpose is to discuss the often-made claim that the two approaches, both inspired by Schumpeter's seminal work, are becoming more and more similar in terms of the sources and mechanisms of the growth process on which they focus. According to this argument, some kind of theoretical convergence between the two paradigms is taking place. Differently from previous surveys of the field, this paper compares evolutionary and new growth theories by focusing on their major theoretical foundations. The discussion leads to the conclusion that the two approaches greatly differ with respect to all of their main theoretical building blocks, and that no convergence between the two paradigms is therefore taking place. This finding should be welcomed by both evolutionary and new growth scholars, because it is the process of interaction and the fruitful exchange of ideas between different approaches that lead to advances in growth theory, not their convergence to a common paradigm.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Cebu:77, author = {Cebula, R. J.}, title = {A note on equal proportional sacrifice}, journal = {American Economist}, year = {1977}, volume = {21}, pages = {72}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{CeGa:02, author = {Celentani, M. and Ganuza, J.-J.}, title = {Corruption and Competition in Procurement}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2002}, volume = {46}, pages = {1273-1303}, key = {corruption} } @ARTICLE{CeCu:03, author = {Centoni, M and Cubadda, G.}, title = {Measuring the business cycle effects of permanent and transitory shocks in cointegrated time series}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2003}, volume = {80}, pages = {45-51}, abstract = {This paper proposes a statistical framework to evaluate the contribution of permanent and transitory shocks to the cyclical fluctuations of cointegrated variables. An empirical application with US macroeconomic data reveals that transitory shocks are responsible for most of the variability at the business cycle frequencies.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @BOOK{CSO:91, title = {Retail Prices 1914-1990}, publisher = {HMSO}, year = {1991}, author = {{Central Statistical Office}}, address = {London}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{IRC:05, author = {Innocenti Research Centre}, title = {Child Poverty in Rich Countries 2005}, institution = {Innocenti Research Centre}, key = {Poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{CeZa:90, author = {Cerioli, A. and Zani, S.}, title = {A fuzzy approach to the measurement of poverty}, booktitle = {Income and Wealth Distribution, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1990}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Zenga, M.}, pages = {272-284}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Chadwick2002, author = {Chadwick, L. and Solon, L.}, title = {Intergenerational Income Mobility among Daughters.}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2002}, volume = {92}, pages = {335- 44}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ChSo:02, author = {Chadwick, L. and Solon, L.}, title = {Intergenerational Income Mobility among Daughters.}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2002}, volume = {92}, pages = {335– 44}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Chae:02, author = {Chae, S.}, title = {Tax Incidence with Bargaining}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2002}, volume = {77}, pages = {199-204}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Chak:94, author = {Chakraborti, S.}, title = {Asymptotically distribution-free joint confidence intervals for generalized{L}orenz curves based on complete data}, journal = {Statistics and Probability Letters}, year = {1994}, volume = {21}, pages = {229-235}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Chakraborti1994, author = {Chakraborti, S.}, title = {Asymptotically distribution-free joint confidence intervals for generalized {L}orenz curves based on complete data}, journal = {Statistics and Probability Letters}, year = {1994}, volume = {21}, pages = {229-235}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Chak:07, author = {Chakravarty, S. R.}, title = {A deprivation-based axiomatic characterization of the absolute {B}onferroni index of inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2007}, volume = {5}, pages = {339-351}, abstract = {We investigate several properties of the Bonferroni inequality index, including its welfare theoretic interpretation. We also interpret and characterize the absolute Bonferroni index as the average of subgroup average depression indices, where to each income we associate a subgroup containing all persons whose incomes are not higher than this income. An aggregate depression index for a subgroup has been derived axiomatically as the sum of gaps between the subgroup highest income and all incomes not higher than that.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {inequality, Bonferroni index, welfare, transfers, depression, characterization}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{Chak:01TV, author = {Chakravarty, S. R.}, title = {The variance as a subgroup decomposable measure of inequality}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {53}, pages = {79-95}, number = {1}, note = {39}, abstract = {An inequality index is called subgroup decomposable if it can be expressed as a weighted sum of inequality values calculated for population subgroups plus the contribution arising out of differences among subgroup means. Theil (1967) and Shorrocks (1980) pointed out two important requirements for subgroup decomposable inequality indices. Shorrocks (1980) has shown that Theil's mean logarithmic deviation, for which the weights of subgroup terms are respective population shares, is the only relative inequality index that fulfils these two properties. In this paper we show that the variance is the only absolute inequality index to satisfy the population share weighted subgroup decomposability property, which in turn implies that it also meets the two properties suggested by Theil and Shorrocks. A numerical illustration of several inequality indices in also presented in the paper. JEL classification numbers: D31, D63.}, key = {inequality decomposition}, keywords = {INCOME INEQUALITY; POPULATION SUBGROUPS; UNEQUAL INEQUALITIES; INDEXES; WELFARE; TERMS} } @ARTICLE{Chak:98RD, author = {Chakravarty, S. R.}, title = {Relative Deprivation and Satisfaction Orderings}, journal = {Keio Economic Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {34}, pages = {17-31}, key = {deprivation} } @ARTICLE{Chakravarty1998b, author = {Chakravarty, S. R.}, title = {Relative Deprivation and Satisfaction Orderings}, journal = {Keio Economic Studies}, year = {1998}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Chak:97OS, author = {Chakravarty, S. R.}, title = {On {S}horrocks' Reinvestigation of the {S}en Poverty Index}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {1241-1242}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Chak:96, author = {Chakravarty, S. R.}, title = {Relative Deprivation and Satisfaction Orderings}, institution = {Indian Statistical Institute}, year = {1996}, type = {working paper}, address = {Calcutta, India}, key = {deprivation} } @BOOK{Chak:90, title = {Ethical social index numbers}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1990}, author = {Chakravarty, S. R.}, address = {Berlin}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Chak:88, author = {Chakravarty, S. R.}, title = {Extended {G}ini indices of inequality}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1988}, volume = {29}, pages = {147-156}, number = {2}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Chak:84, author = {Chakravarty, S. R.}, title = {Normative indices for measuring social mobility}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1984}, volume = {15}, pages = {175-180}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Chak:83a, author = {Chakravarty, S. R.}, title = {A new index of poverty}, journal = {Mathematical Social Science}, year = {1983}, volume = {6}, pages = {307-313}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Chak:83b, author = {Chakravarty, S. R.}, title = {Ethically flexible measures of poverty}, journal = {The Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {16}, pages = {74-85}, key = {poverty} } @PHDTHESIS{Chak:81, author = {Chakravarty, S. R.}, title = {On measurement of income inequality and poverty}, year = {1981}, address = {Calcutta}, institution = {Indian Statistical Institute}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{ChCh:84, author = {Chakravarty, S. R. and Chakraborty, A. B.}, title = {On indices of relative deprivation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1984}, volume = {14}, pages = {283-287}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{ChDAMu:03, author = {Chakravarty, S. R. and D'Ambrosio, C. and Muliere, P.}, title = {Target Shortfall Orderings and Indices}, institution = {German Institute for Economic Research}, year = {2003}, type = {{DIW} Discussion Paper}, number = {340}, address = {K{\"o}nigin-Luise-Str. 5, 14195 Berlin, Germany}, month = {March}, abstract = {Given any income distribution, to each income we associate a subgroup containingall persons whose incomes are not higher than this income and a person'starget shortfall in a subgroup is the gap between the subgroup highestincome and his own income. We then develop an absolute target shortfallordering, which, under constancy of population size and total income, impliesthe Lorenz and Cowell-Ebert complaint orderings. Under the same restrictions,one distribution dominates the other by this ordering if and only if thedominated distribution can be obtained from the dominant one by a sequenceof rank preserving progressive transfers, where each transfer is sharedequally by all persons poorer than the donor of the transfer. The relationshipof the ordering with the absolute deprivation and differential orderings,and its consistency with ranking of distributions by absolute target shortfallindices are explored. Well-known inequality indices like the absolute Giniindex and the standard deviation are interpreted as absolute target shortfallindices. Finally, the possibility of a relative target shortfall orderingis also discussed.}, key = {deprivation} } @ARTICLE{ChDu:87, author = {Chakravarty, S. R. and Dutta, B.}, title = {A note on measures of distance between income distribution}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1987}, volume = {41}, pages = {185-188}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{ChDuWe:85, author = {Chakravarty, S. R. and Dutta, B. and Weymark, J.}, title = {Ethical indices of income mobility}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1985}, volume = {2}, pages = {1-21}, key = {mobility} } @INCOLLECTION{ChEi:94, author = {Chakravarty, S. R. and Eichhorn, W.}, title = {Measurement of Income Inequality: Observed Versus True Data}, booktitle = {Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, pages = {28-32}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{ChMa:01, author = {Chakravarty, S. R. and Majumdar, A.}, title = {Inequality, polarisation and welfare: Theory and applications}, journal = {Australian Economic Papers}, year = {2001}, volume = {40}, pages = {1-13}, key = {Polarisation} } @ARTICLE{ChMo:03, author = {Chakravarty, S. R. and Moyes, P.}, title = {Individual welfare, social deprivation and income taxation}, journal = {Economic Theory}, year = {2003}, volume = {21}, pages = {843-869}, abstract = {In a homogeneous framework where individuals can only be distinguished onthe basis of their incomes, we examine the incidence of taxation on theamount of deprivation felt in the society.We conceive deprivation in termsof utility or well-being rather than just in terms of income and we measureit by comparing the deprivation profiles arising in the different situations.We identify the restrictions to be imposed on the utility function whichguarantee that a more progressive system of taxes always results in lesssocial deprivation. We show that, in general, it is not possible to getan equivalence and realize a social improvement in terms of social deprivationby substituting a more progressive system of taxes for a less progressiveone.}, key = {deprivation} } @ARTICLE{ChMu:99MD, author = {Chakravarty, Satya R. and Mukherjee, Diganta}, title = {Measures of deprivation and their meaning in terms of social satisfaction}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {1999}, volume = {47}, pages = {89-100}, key = {deprivation} } @ARTICLE{ChMu:99RI, author = {Chakravarty, Satya R. and Mukherjee, Diganta}, title = {Ranking income distributions by deprivation orderings}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {1999}, volume = {46}, pages = {125-135}, key = {deprivation} } @ARTICLE{ChMu:98, author = {Chakravarty, Satya R. and Mukherjee, Diganta}, title = {Optimal subsidy for the poor}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {61}, pages = {313-319}, number = {3}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{ChMu:98LT, author = {Chakravarty, S. R. and Mukherjee, D.}, title = {Lorenz transformation, utilitarian deprivation rule and equal sacrificeprinciple}, journal = {The Manchester School}, year = {1998}, volume = {66}, pages = {521-531}, key = {deprivation} } @ARTICLE{Chakravarty1997, author = {Chakravarty, S. R. and Mukherjee, D.}, title = {Lorenz transformation, utilitarian deprivation rule and equal sacrifice principle}, journal = {The Manchester School}, year = {1997}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Chakravarty1998, author = {Chakravarty, Satya R. and Mukherjee, Diganta and Ranade, Ravindra R.}, title = {On the family of subgroup and factor decomposable measures of multidimensional poverty}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, pages = {175-194}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ChMuRa:98, author = {Chakravarty, Satya R. and Mukherjee, Diganta and Ranade, Ravindra R.}, title = {On the family of subgroup and factor decomposable measures of multidimensionalpoverty}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, pages = {175-194}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{ChSi:94, author = {Chakravarty, S. R. and Silber, J.}, title = {Employment Segregation Indices: An Axiomatic Characterization}, booktitle = {Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W}, pages = {912-920}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{ChTy:98, author = {Chakravarty, S. R. and Tyagarupananda, S.}, title = {The Subgroup Decomposable Absolute Indices of Inequality}, booktitle = {Quantitative Economics: Theory and Practice}, publisher = {Allied Publishers Limited}, year = {1998}, editor = {Chakravarty, S. R. and Coondoo, D. and Mukherjee, R.}, chapter = {11}, pages = {247-257}, address = {New Delhi}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{ChTy:00, author = {Chakravarty, S. R. and Tyagarupananda, S.}, title = {The Subgroup Decomposable Absolute and Intermediate Indices of Inequality}, institution = {Indian Statistical Institute}, year = {2000}, type = {mimeo}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{ChWe:88, author = {Chakravarty, S. R. and Weymark, J. A.}, title = {Axiomatization of the Entropy numbers equivalent index of industrial concentration}, booktitle = {Measurement in Economics}, publisher = {Physica Verlag}, year = {1988}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Cham:84, author = {Chamberlain, G.}, title = {Panel Data}, booktitle = {Handbook of Econometrics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1984}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{Cham:04, author = {Chamberlain,T.}, title = {Does uneven expected risk promote poverty and instability?}, institution = {Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics}, year = {2004}, abstract = {One of the hallmarks of a distressed economy is the spread between the nation’sgovernment bond yield and the yield of comparable U.S. Treasuries It isunderstood that this spread can be symptomatic of an important level ofeconomic distress in the developing nations. Many believe that this conditionwill be corrected (and prosperity achieved) by the prescription of privatization,open markets, and proper fiscal/monetary discipline (Washington Consensus).But could socioeconomic dysfunction have a deeper cause that will not yieldto this prescription? In particular, could persistently higher expected-riskin the planning by disadvantaged people everywhere, simply as a consequenceof their disadvantage, defeat confidence and discourage investment in educationand business? In addressing this possibility, instant utility theory withits deeper foundation than standard utility theory and mathematical economicsis introduced. This deeper understanding is then used to produce a parametricrelationship which shows that increased expected-risks due to reduced discretionarypower results in diminished rates of investment, in personal and materialcapital. That is, the analysis reveals an essential tendency for relativelydisadvantaged individuals and nations to become more disadvantaged, dueto lower or secondary discretionary-power in making decisions. This findingindicates a more definitive criterion for parity in socioeconomic interrelationships-inparticular, Rawls’ stipulation that "...there is no injustice in the greaterbenefits earned by the few provided that the situation of persons not sofortunate is thereby improved" is adjusted to "...there is no injusticein the greater benefits earned by the few provided that the benefits anddiscretionary-power of persons not so fortunate are thereby improved."In adopting this criterion it is recognized that utility theory per se,and Pareto optimality in particular (along with utilitarianism), are insufficientdue to more general or higher-level considerations for advancing freedomand human welfare. This new perspective recommends a different direction.In particular, instead of traveling the neoclassical course of unrestrainedmarkets as the ideal or optimal, set a revised bearing by means of institutionalinitiatives where the global market is suitably adjusted or moderated atthe borders to offset uneven expected risk. This would require (continuing)resource transfers from the advantaged to the disadvantaged-within nationsand between nations-for the foreseeable future, as appropriate to theirrespective needs and cultures. It is understood, in this new guideline,that the disadvantaged will primarily lift-themselves to better socialand material conditions, this being operationally necessary for both systemicand practical reasons.}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Cham:50, author = {Chamberlin, E. H.}, title = {Product heterogeneity and public policy}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1950}, volume = {40}, pages = {85-92}, key = {industry} } @BOOK{Cham:33, title = {The Theory of Monopolistic Competition}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1933}, author = {Chamberlin, E. H.}, address = {Cambridge, Mass.}, key = {industry} } @BOOK{ChYu:06, title = {Macroeconomics}, publisher = {Thomson}, year = {2006}, author = {Chamberlin, G. and Yueh, L.}, pages = {582}, note = {www.thomsonlearning.co.uk/chamberlin_yueh}, key = {macro}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.03.22} } @ARTICLE{Cham:07, author = {Chambers, Christopher}, title = {Ordinal aggregation and quantiles}, journal = {Journal of Economics Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {137}, pages = {416-431}, abstract = {Consider the problem of aggregating a profile of interpersonally comparable utilities into a social utility. We require that the units of measurement of utility used for agents is the same as the units of measurement for society (ordinal covariance) and a mild Pareto condition (monotonicity).We provide several representations of such social aggregation operators: a canonical representation, a Choquet expectation representation, a minimax representation, and a quantile representation (with respect to a possibly non-additive set function on the agents).We also isolate an additional condition that gives us a quantile representation with respect to a probability measure, in both the finite and infinite agents case.}, key = {Welfare}, keywords = {Ordinal, Quantile, Axiom, Choquet integral, Probability, Rawlsian, Social welfare}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{ChQu:08, author = {Chambers, R. G. and Quiggin, J.}, title = {Comparative statics for state-contingent technologies}, journal = {Journal of Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {93}, pages = {203-214}, number = {2}, abstract = {The implications of supermodularity conditions in comparative-static analysis are analyzed for a generalized version of the separable-effort representation of a firm facing stochastic prices and a stochastic technology. Previous analysis is generalized in two ways. General risk-averse, as opposed to expected-utility, preferences are considered. The stochastic technology is represented by an Arrow– Debreu state-space representation. It is shown that results familiar from the theory of the price-taking firm in the absence of risk generalize to the uncertain case.}, key = {risk}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @ARTICLE{ChQu:97, author = {Chambers, R. G. and Quiggin, J.}, title = {Separation and hedging results with state-contingent production}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {187-209}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.03.26} } @ARTICLE{ChFi:00, author = {Chami, R. and Fischer, J. H.}, title = {Do Private Income Transfers Increase Labor Market Risk?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {69,2}, pages = {143-151}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Cham:01CI, author = {Chamley, C.}, title = {Capital Income Taxation, Wealth Distribution and Borrowing Constraints}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, pages = {55-69}, abstract = {The theorem of zero taxation of capital income is reexamined and is shown to hinge critically on the assumptions of a long horizon and perfect markets for the inter-temporal allocation of resources. The theorem does not hold when borrowing constraints prevent individuals from insuring against idiosyncratic shocks and have a precautionary motive for savings. Structural assumptions are made such that with no taxation, aggregate savings are socially ‘excessive’ in the long-run, i.e. the rate of return is smaller than the discount rate. Sufficient conditions for a Pareto efficient taxation or subsidization of capital in the long-run depend on the correlation between individuals’ consumption and savings. A subsidy may be efficient when individuals’ incomes follow a predictable pattern of life-cycles with no negative bequest.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Cham:01OT, author = {Chamley, C. P.}, title = {Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium With InfiniteLives}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2001}, volume = {54}, pages = {607-622}, key = {Optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{Chamley2001, author = {Chamley, C. P.}, title = {Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium With Infinite Lives}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2001}, volume = {54}, pages = {607-622}, key = {Optimal taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Cham:74, author = {Champernowne, D. G.}, title = {A comparison of measures of income distribution}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1974}, volume = {84}, pages = {787-816}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Champernowne1974, author = {Champernowne, D. G.}, title = {A comparison of measures of income distribution}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1974}, volume = {84}, pages = {787-816}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Cham:73, title = {The Distribution of Income Between Persons}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1973}, author = {Champernowne, D. G.}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Cham:56, author = {Champernowne, D. G.}, title = {Comment on the Paper by {P.E. Hart} and {S.J. Prais}}, journal = {Journal of The Royal Statistical Society}, year = {1956}, volume = {A 119}, pages = {181-183}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Cham:53, author = {Champernowne, D. G.}, title = {A model of income distribution}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1953}, volume = {63}, pages = {318-351}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Champernowne1953, author = {Champernowne, D. G.}, title = {A model of income distribution}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1953}, volume = {63}, pages = {318-351}, key = {distributions}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Cham:52, author = {Champernowne, D. G.}, title = {The graduation of income distribution}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1952}, volume = {20}, pages = {591-615}, key = {distributions} } @INBOOK{ChCo:98-10, chapter = {10: Fantastic Models of Wealth and Income Distribution}, pages = {218-249}, title = {Economic Equality and Income Distribution}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Champernowne, D. G. and Cowell, F.}, note = {ISBN: 0521580552}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @BOOK{ChCo:98, title = {Economic Inequality and Income Distribution}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Champernowne, D. G. and Cowell, F. A.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{ChGoMeMu:02, author = {Chan, K. S. and Godby, R. and Mestelman, S. and Muller, R. A.}, title = {Crowding-Out Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2002}, volume = {48}, pages = {305-317}, key = {Public Goods} } @ARTICLE{Chan:07, author = {Chander,P.}, title = {Income Tax Evasion and the Fear of Ruin}, journal = {Economica}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, pages = {315-328}, abstract = {This paper characterizes the optimal income tax function when the agent is risk averse and the objective of the principal is to maximize a social welfare function. We show that the optimal tax function is generally non-decreasing and concave if the principal’s objective is maximin and the agent’s utility function satisfies a reasonable condition which we call ‘repetitive risk aversion’. It is shown further that in many cases the optimal tax function is similarly concave when the social welfare function is utilitarian.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Chander1998, author = {Chander, Parkash and Wilde, Louis L.}, title = {A general characterization of optimal income tax enforcement}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {165-183}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ChWi:98, author = {Chander, Parkash and Wilde, Louis L.}, title = {A general characterization of optimal income tax enforcement}, journal = {Review of Economics Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {165-183}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{ChWi:92, author = {Chander, P. and Wilde, L. L.}, title = {Corruption in tax administration}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1992}, volume = {49}, pages = {33-349}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{ChLa:99, author = {Chang, J.-J. and Lai C.-C.}, title = {Carrots or Sticks? A Social Custom Viewpoint on Worker Effort}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {297-310}, key = {social custom} } @ARTICLE{ChLa:04, author = {Chang, Juin-Jen. and Lai, Ching-Chong.}, title = {Collaborative Tax Evasion and Social Norms: Why Deterrence Does Not Work}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {2004}, volume = {56}, pages = {344-368}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{Chang1987a, author = {Chang, O. H. and Nichols, D. R. and Schultz, J. J.}, title = {Taxpayer Attitudes Towards Tax Audit Risk}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1987}, volume = {8}, pages = {299-309}, key = {Tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ChNiSc:87TA, author = {Chang, O. H. and Nichols, D. R. and Schultz, J. J.}, title = {Taxpayer attitudes toward tax audit risk}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1987}, volume = {8}, pages = {299-309}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Chantreuil1999, author = {Chantreuil, F. and Trannoy, A.}, title = {Inequality Decomposition Values: The Trade-Off Between Marginality and Consistency}, year = {1999}, pages = {1-26}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{ChTr:99, author = {Chantreuil, F. and Trannoy, A.}, title = {Inequality Decomposition Values: The Trade-Off Between Marginality and Consistency}, institution = {THEMA}, year = {1999}, type = {Working Papers}, number = {99-24}, address = {Université de Cergy-Pontoise}, key = {inequality decomposition}, pages = {1-26} } @ARTICLE{Chap:98, author = {Chapman, D. A.}, title = {Habit formation and aggregate consumption}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1998}, volume = {66}, pages = {1223-1230}, number = {5}, key = {consumption} } @INCOLLECTION{ChKe:99, author = {Chari, V. V. and Kehoe, P.}, title = {Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy}, booktitle = {Handbook of Macroeconomics}, publisher = {Elsevier}, year = {1980}, editor = {Taylor, J. and Woodford, M.}, address = {New York}, key = {macro} } @TECHREPORT{ChHu:02, author = {Charles, K. K. and Hurst, E.}, title = {The Correlation Of Wealth Across Generations}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2002}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {9314}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Charness2005, author = {Charness, Gary and Rabin, Matthew}, title = {Expressed preferences and behavior in experimental games}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {2005}, volume = {53}, pages = {151-169}, number = {2}, month = nov, keywords = {Beliefs, Experiment, Expressed preferences, Positive reciprocity, Social preferences}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2007.07.31} } @ARTICLE{Charness2002, author = {Charness, Gary and Matthew Rabin}, title = {Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {117}, pages = {817-869}, note = {The Quaterly Journal of Economics}, key = {Behavioural}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ChRa:02, author = {Charness, G. and Rabin,M.}, title = {Understanding social preferences with simple tests}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {117}, pages = {817-869}, key = {utility, preference}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.07.30} } @ARTICLE{Chat:99, author = {Chateauneuf, Alain}, title = {Comonotonicity axioms and rank-dependent expected Utility theory for arbitraryconsequences}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {21-45}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Chateauneuf1999, author = {Chateauneuf, Alain}, title = {Comonotonicity axioms and rank-dependent expected Utility theory for arbitrary consequences}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {21-45}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ChCoMe:04, author = {Chateauneuf, Alain and Cohen, Michele and Meilijson, Isaac}, title = {Four notions of mean-preserving increase in risk, risk attitudes and applications to the rank-dependent expected utility model}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {40}, pages = {547-571}, abstract = {This article presents various notions of risk generated by the intuitivelyappealing single-crossing operations between distribution functions. Thesestochastic orders, Bickel and Lehmann dispersion or (its equal-mean version)Quiggin’s monotone mean-preserving increase in risk and Jewitt’s location-independentrisk, have proved to be useful in the study of Pareto allocations, orderingof insurance premia and other applications in the expected utility (EU)setup. These notions of risk are also relevant to the Quiggin–Yaari rank-dependentexpected utility (RDEU) model of choice among lotteries. Risk aversionis modeled in the vNM expected utility model by Rothschild and Stiglitz’smean-preserving increase in risk (MPIR). Realizing that in the broaderrank-dependent setup this order is too weak to classify choice, Quiggindeveloped the stronger monotone MPIR for this purpose. This paper reviewsfour notions of mean-preserving increase in risk—MPIR, monotone MPIR andtwo versions of location-independent risk (renamed here left- and right-monotoneMPIR)—and shows which choice questions are consistently modeled by eachof these four orders.}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{ChCoMe:97, author = {Chateauneuf, A. and Cohen, M. and Meilijson, I.}, title = {New tools to better model behavior under risk and uncertainty: An Overview}, journal = {Finance}, year = {1997}, volume = {18}, pages = {25--46}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{ChDaTa:00, author = {Chateauneuf, A. and Dana, R.-A. and Tallon, J.-M.}, title = {Optimal Risk-Sharing Rules and Equilibria with {C}hoquet-Expected-Utility}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {34}, pages = {191-214}, key = {risk} } @TECHREPORT{ChMo:00, author = {Chateauneuf, A. and Moyes, P.}, title = {Inequality Measurement and theWeakening of the Transfer Principle}, institution = {GRAPE}, year = {2000}, key = {inequality }, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.23} } @ARTICLE{ChSiCh:07, author = {Chatterjee,A. and Sinha,S. and Chakrabarti,B.K.}, title = {Economic inequality: Is it natural?}, journal = {Current Science}, year = {2007}, volume = {92}, pages = {1383-1389}, number = {10}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{ChJaSu:02, author = {Chaudhuri, S. and Jalan, J. and Suryahadi, S.}, title = {Assessing Household Vulnerability to Poverty from Cross-sectional Data: A Methodology and Estimates from {I}ndonesia}, institution = {Columbia University}, year = {2002}, type = {Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series}, number = {0102-52}, address = {New York, NY 10027}, key = {vulnerability}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.09.20} } @TECHREPORT{ChFiLe:08, author = {Checchi, D. and Fiorio, C. V. and Leonardi, M.}, title = {Intergenerational Persistence in Educational Attainment in Italy}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2008}, type = {Discussion Paper}, abstract = {In this paper we show that there is a reduction in the correlation coefficient between father and children schooling levels over time in Italy. However, focusing on equality ofcircumstances, we show that there is still a persistent difference in the odds of attaining acollege degree between children of college educated parents and children of parents with lower secondary education attainment. The explanation of these trends lies in differential impact of liquidity constraints and risk aversion. Some descriptive evidence on the persistentdifferential in returns to college education depending on father¡¯s education is also provided.}, key = {education attainment}, owner = {Zhang Zhijun}, timestamp = {2000.09.30} } @ARTICLE{ChBu:00, author = {Chechile, R. A. and Butler, S. F.}, title = {Is ``Generic Utility Theory" a suitable theory of choice behavior for gammbleswith mixed gains and losses?}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {2000}, volume = {20}, pages = {189-211}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Chechile2000, author = {Chechile, R. A. and Butler, S. F.}, title = {Is ``Generic Utility Theory" a suitable theory of choice behavior for gammbles with mixed gains and losses?}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {2000}, volume = {20}, pages = {189-211}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ChCo:97, author = {Chechile, R. A. and Cooke, A. D. J.}, title = {An experimental test of a class of utility models: evidence for contextdependency}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1997}, volume = {14}, pages = {75-93}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Chechile1997, author = {Chechile, R. A. and Cooke, A. D. J.}, title = {An experimental test of a class of utility models: evidence for context dependency}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1997}, volume = {14}, pages = {75-93}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Chechile1999, author = {Chechile, R. A. and Luce, R. D.}, title = {Reanalysis of the {Chechile-Cooke} experiment: correcting for mismatchewd gambles}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1999}, volume = {18}, pages = {321-325}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ChLu:99, author = {Chechile, R. A. and Luce, R. D.}, title = {Reanalysis of the {Chechile-Cooke} experiment: correcting for mismatchewdgambles}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1999}, volume = {18}, pages = {321-325}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{ChGhLePa:94, author = {Cheli,P. and Ghellini,A. and Lemmi, A. and Pannuzi, N}, title = {Measuring poverty}, journal = {Statistics in transition, Journal of the Polish Statistical Association}, year = {1994}, volume = {1}, pages = {585-636}, number = {5}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{ChFa-Gr:01, author = {Chemla, G. and Faure-Grimaud, A.}, title = {Dynamic Adverse Selection and Debt}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {45}, pages = {1773-1792}, key = {monetary} } @ARTICLE{Chen:03, author = {Chen, B.-L.}, title = {Tax evasion in a model of endogenous growth}, journal = {Review of Economic Dynamics}, year = {2003}, volume = {6}, pages = {381–403}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.12.28} } @ARTICLE{ChTR:82, author = {Chen, Chau-Nan and Tsaur, Tien-Wang and Rhai, Tong-Shieng}, title = {The {G}ini coefficient and negative income}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1982}, volume = {34}, pages = {473-476}, number = {11}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{ChCh:05, author = {Chen, K.-P. and Chu, C. Y. C.}, title = {Internal control versus external manipulation: a model of corporate income tax evasion}, journal = {RAND Journal of Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {36}, pages = {151-164}, key = {tax compliance - firms}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.01.30}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1593759?origin=JSTOR-pdf} } @BOOK{ChGiIr:99, title = {Mathematical Explorations with {MATLAB}}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1999}, author = {Chen, K. and Giblin, P. and Irving, A.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{ChDaRa:94, author = {Chen, S. and Datt, G. and Ravallion, M.}, title = {Is Poverty Increasing in the Developing World?}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth?}, year = {1994}, volume = {40}, pages = {359-376}, key = {poverty}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.20} } @ARTICLE{ChTa:98, author = {Chen, Y. and Tang, F.-F.}, title = {Learning and Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Public Goods Provision}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {106}, pages = {633-662}, key = {Public Goods} } @ARTICLE{Chen:07, author = {Chen, Z.}, title = {Development and inequality: Evidence from an endogenous switching regression without regime separation}, journal = {economics letters}, year = {2007}, volume = {96}, pages = {269-274}, month = {August}, abstract = {An endogenous switching regression without regime separation is fitted to examine the relationship between development and inequality. Results suggest evidences for the Kuznets hypothesis and that the turning point may depend on population size and openness of the economy.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{ChLi:06, author = {Cheng, Y. and Li, S.}, title = {Income Inequality and Efficiency: A Decomposition Approach and Applications to China}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2006}, volume = {91}, pages = {8-14}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @ARTICLE{Chen:99, author = {Chenghu, M.}, title = {Uncertainty Aversion and Rationality in Games of Perfect Information}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1999}, volume = {24}, pages = {451-482}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Chen:97, author = {Chennells, Lucy}, title = {The windfall tax}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1997}, volume = {18}, pages = {279-291}, number = {3}, month = {August}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{ChDiRo:00, author = {Chennells, L. and Dilnot, A. and Roback, N.}, title = {A Survey Of The {UK} Tax System}, institution = {The Institute For Fiscal Studies}, year = {2000}, type = {Briefing Note}, number = {9}, address = {Ridgmount St. London}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{ChVa:97, author = {Chennells, Lucy and Van Reenen, John}, title = {Technical change and earnings in {B}ritish establishments}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {587-604}, number = {256}, month = {November}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Ches:91, author = {Chesher, A.}, title = {The effect of measurement error}, journal = {Biometrika}, year = {1991}, volume = {78}, pages = {451-462}, number = {3}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{ChSc:02, author = {Chesher, A. and Schluter, C.}, title = {Measurement Error and Inequality Measurement}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {2002}, volume = {69}, pages = {357-378}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.04}, type = {Discussion Paper}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1556735} } @TECHREPORT{ChSc:99, author = {Chesher, A. and Schluter, C.}, title = {Measurement Error and Inequality Measurement}, institution = {Department of Economics, University of Bristol}, year = {1999}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {463}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Chet:08, author = {Chetty, R.}, title = {Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2008}, volume = {116}, pages = {Ch:08}, number = {2}, abstract = {This paper presents new evidence on why unemployment insurance (UI) benefits affect search behavior and develops a simple method of calculating the welfare gains from UI using this evidence. I show that 60 percent of the increase in unemployment durations caused by UI benefits is due to a “liquidity effect” rather than distortions on marginal incentives to search (“moral hazard”) by combining two empirical strategies. First, I find that increases in benefits have much larger effects on durations for liquidity-constrained households. Second, lump-sum severance payments increase durations substantially among constrained households. I derive a formula for the optimal benefit level that depends only on the reduced-form liquidity and moral hazard elasticities. The formula implies that the optimal UI benefit level exceeds 50 percent of the wage. The “exact identification” approach to welfare analysis proposed here yields robust optimal policy results because it does not require structural estimation of primitives.}, key = {social insurance}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.19} } @ARTICLE{Chet:06, author = {Chetty, R.}, title = {A New Method for Estimating Risk Aversion}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {96}, pages = {1821-1834}, key = {risk}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{ChLo:06, author = {Chetty, R. and Looney, A.}, title = {Consumption smoothing and the welfare consequences of social insurance in developing economies}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {2351-2356}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.24} } @TECHREPORT{ChLo:05, author = {Chetty, R. and Looney, A.}, title = {Consumption Smoothing and the Welfare Consequences of Social Insurance in Developing Economies}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2005}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {11709}, address = {NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138}, month = {October}, abstract = {Studies of risk in developing economies have focused on consumption fluctuations as a measure of the value of insurance. A common view in the literature is that the welfare costs of risk and benefits of social insurance are small if income shocks do not cause large consumption fluctuations. We present a simple model showing that this conclusion is incorrect if the consumption path is smooth because individuals are highly risk averse. Empirical studies find that many households in developing countries rely on inefficient methods to smooth consumption, suggesting that they are indeed quite risk averse. Hence, social safety nets may be valuable in low-income economies even when consumption is not very sensitive to shocks.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @TECHREPORT{ChLoKr:07, author = {Chetty, R. and Looney, A. and Kroft, K.}, title = {Salience andTaxation: Theory and Evidence}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {13330}, address = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w13330}, key = {public economics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.23} } @ARTICLE{Chew:83, author = {Chew, Soo-Hong}, title = {A generalization of the quasi-linear mean with application to the measurement of income inequality}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1983}, volume = {51}, pages = {1065-1092}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Chew:84, author = {Chew, Soo Hong}, title = {An axiomatizaton of the rank dependent quasilinear mean generalizing the {G}ini mean and the quasi-linear mean}, institution = {John Hopkins University}, year = {1984}, address = {John Hopkins University}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{ChKaSa:87, author = {Chew, S. H. and Karni, E. and Safra, Z.}, title = {Risk Aversion in the Theory of Expected Utility with Rank-Dependant Probabilities}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1987}, volume = {67}, pages = {402-435}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{Chia:84, title = {Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics}, publisher = {McGraw-Hill}, year = {1984}, author = {Chiang, Alpha C.}, address = {New York}, edition = {third}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{Chia:96, author = {Chiappero Martinetti, Enrica}, title = {Standard of living evaluation based on {S}en's approach: some methodologicalsuggestions}, journal = {notizie di Politeia}, year = {1996}, volume = {12}, pages = {37-53}, number = {43/44}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Chia:96b, author = {Chiappero Martinetti, Enrica}, title = {Le ipotesi di riforma dell'{I}rpef contenute nel {L}ibro {B}ianco:una stimadegli effetti redistributivi}, journal = {Rassegna Tributaria}, year = {1996}, volume = {XXXIX}, pages = {161-176}, number = {1}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Chia:94, author = {Chiappero Martinetti, Enrica}, title = {A new approach to evaluation of well-being and poverty by fuzzy set theory}, journal = {Giornale Degli Economisti e Annali di Economia}, year = {1994}, pages = {366-388}, month = {Luglio-Settembre}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{ChEk:99, author = {Chiappori, P. A. and Ekeland, I.}, title = {Aggregation and Market Demand: An Exterior Differential Calculus Viewpoint}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {1435-1458}, key = {Micro} } @INCOLLECTION{ChSa:03, author = {Chiappori, P.-A. and Salani{\'e}, B.}, title = {Testing Contract Theory: a Survey of Some Recent Work}, booktitle = {Advances in Economics and Econometrics: theory and applications}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2003}, editor = {Dewatripoint, M. and Hansen, L. P. and Turnovsky, S.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {info} } @INCOLLECTION{Chin:91, author = {Ching, P.}, title = {Size Distribution of Income in the {P}hillipines}, booktitle = {Making Economies More Efficient and More Equitable: Factors Determining Income Distribution}, publisher = {Kinokuniya}, year = {1991}, editor = {Mizoguchi, T.}, address = {Tokyo}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Chip:85, author = {Chipman, J. S.}, title = {The theory and measurement of income distribution}, journal = {Advances in Econometrics}, year = {1985}, volume = {4}, pages = {135-165}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Chip:74, author = {Chipman, J. S.}, title = {The welfare ranking of {P}areto distributions}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1974}, volume = {9}, pages = {275-282}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Chis:74, author = {Chiswick, B. R.}, title = {Income Inequality: Regional Analysis with a Human-Capital Framework}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {1974}, address = {New York}, key = {regional} } @ARTICLE{Chis:71, author = {Chiswick, B. R.}, title = {Earnings Inequality and Economic Development}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1971}, volume = {85}, pages = {21-32}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Chis:68, author = {Chiswick, B. R.}, title = {The Average Level of Schooling and the Intraregional Inequality of Income:A Clarification}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1968}, volume = {58}, pages = {495-501}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Chiswick1968, author = {Chiswick, B. R.}, title = {The Average Level of Schooling and the Intraregional Inequality of Income: A Clarification}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1968}, volume = {58}, pages = {495-501}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Chiu:98, author = {Chiu, W. H.}, title = {Income inequality, human capital accumulation and economic performance}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1998}, volume = {108}, pages = {44-59}, number = {446}, month = {January}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @ARTICLE{ChMa:98, author = {Chiu, W. Henry and Madden, Paul}, title = {Burglary and income inequality}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {69}, pages = {123-141}, number = {1}, month = {July}, key = {crime} } @TECHREPORT{ChJa:08, author = {Chiuri, M. C. and Jappelli, T.}, title = {Do the elderly reduce housing equity? An international comparison}, institution = {Center for Financial Studies}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2008/20}, abstract = {We explore the pattern of elderly homeownership using microeconomic surveys of 15 OECD countries, merging 60 national household surveys on about 300,000 individuals. In all countries the survey is repeated over time, permitting construction of an international dataset of repeated cross-sectional data. We find that ownership rates decline considerably after age 60 in all countries. However, a large part of the decline depends on cohort effects. Adjusting for them, we find that ownership rates start falling after age 70 and reach a percentage point per year decline after age 75. We find that differences across country ownership trajectories are correlated with indicators measuring the degree of market regulations.}, key = {wealth}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.22}, url = {http://www.ifk-cfs.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/wp/08_20.pdf} } @ARTICLE{ChKuPiPu:05, author = {Chmura,T. and Kube,S. and Pitz,T, and Puppe,C.}, title = {Testing (beliefs about) social preferences: Evidence from an experimentalcoordination game}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2005}, volume = {88}, pages = {214-220}, abstract = {We report experimental results on a simple coordination game in which twoplayers can coordinate either on an equal distribution of payoffs or ona Pareto superior but unequal distribution of payoffs. We find that thehigher the difference in individual payoffs, the less likely is a successfulcoordination on the Pareto superior distribution. While this is well inline with the recent models of inequity aversion, our results are bestexplained not by a preference for equality per se but rather by the beliefthat the opponent has such a preference.}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{ChSh:97, author = {Cho, Byung Sun and Shin, Kwanho}, title = {Intra-industry wage differences over the business cycle}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {56}, pages = {317-323}, number = {3}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{ChKr:87, author = {Cho, I.-K. and Kreps, D. M.}, title = {Signaling games and stable equilibrium}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1987}, volume = {102}, pages = {179-221}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{Cho1987, author = {Cho, I. K. and Kreps, D.}, title = {Signalling Games and Stable Equilibria}, journal = {Quaterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1987}, volume = {102}, pages = {179-222}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ChTh:03, author = {Choi, J. P. and Thum, M.}, title = {The Dynamics of Corruption with the Ratchet Effect}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {427-443}, key = {corruption} } @ARTICLE{ChLa:05, author = {Chone,P. and Laroque,G.}, title = {Optimal incentives for labor force participation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {395-425}, abstract = {Optimal taxation is analyzed under a Rawlsian criterion in an economy wherethe only decision of the agents is to participate, or not, to the laborforce. The model allows for heterogeneity both in the agent’s productivitiesand aversions to work. At a first-best optimal schedule, the marginal agentwho decides to work pockets all of her productivity, while being just compensatedfor her work aversion. When the planner does not observe work aversion,financial compensation for work is lower than productivity. Theory putslittle restrictions on the shape of the optimal tax schedules. The usualfirst-order conditions involving the elasticities of participation onlyapply for sufficiently regular economies. We qualitatively show how theoptimal incentive schemes depend on the underlying structure of the preferences:100% marginal tax rates or subsidies to work are related to specific featuresof the economies.}, key = {optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{ChGr:07a, author = {Chong, A. and Gradstein, M.}, title = {Inequality and informality}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {159-179}, abstract = {This paper presents theory and evidence on the determinants of the size of the informal sector. We propose a simple theoretical model in which it is positively related to income , more so under weak institutions, and is negatively related to the economy's wealth. These predictions are then empirically validated using different proxies of the size of the informal sector, income , and institutional quality. The results are shown to be robust with respect to a variety of econometric specifications. We also find that government interventions through regulations lose much of its robustness in the presence of the above factors.}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.15} } @ARTICLE{ChGr:07b, author = {Chong, Alberto and Gradstein, Mark}, title = {Inequality and Institutions}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2007}, volume = {89}, pages = {454 - 465}, abstract = {This paper presents theory and evidence on the relationship between inequality and institutional quality. We exhibit a model in which the two may dynamically reinforce each other and set to test this relationship with a broad array of institutional measures. The double causality between institutional strength and a more equal distribution of income is empirically established using dynamic panel and linear feedback analysis.}, key = {Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{ChSi:06, author = {Choo, Eugene and Siow, Aloysius}, title = {Who Marries Whom and Why}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2006}, volume = {114}, pages = {175 - 201}, abstract = {This paper proposes and estimates a static transferable utility model of the marriage market. The model generates a nonparametric marriage matching function with spillover effects. It rationalizes the standard interpretation of marriage rate regressions and points out its limitations. The model was used to estimate U.S. marital behavior in 1971/72 and 1981/82. The marriage matching function estimates show that the gains to marriage for young adults fell substantially over the decade. Unlike contradictory marriage rate regression results, the marriage matching function estimates showed that the legalization of abortion had a significant quantitative impact on the fall in the gains to marriage for young men and women.}, key = {Marriage}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{Chop:82UI, author = {Chopra, O. P.}, title = {Unaccounted income - some estimates}, journal = {Economic and Political Weekly}, year = {1982}, volume = {17}, pages = {739-744}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Choq:53, author = {Choquet, G.}, title = {Theory of capacities}, journal = {Annales de l 'Institut Fourier}, year = {1953}, volume = {5}, pages = {131-295}, address = {Grenoble}, key = {mathematics} } @TECHREPORT{Chor:07, author = {Chorvat, Terrence}, title = {Tax Compliance and the Neuroeconomics of Temporal Substitution}, institution = {George Mason Univrsity, School of Law}, year = {2007}, type = {Research Paper}, number = {29}, abstract = {This article argues that the relationship between the timing of tax payments and the decision of how much tax will be paid may have a greater impact on the level of tax compliance than would be predicted under standard exponential discounting models. To the extent that taxpayers exhibit hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic time discounting, compliance may be improved by separating the time at which tax returns are filed from the time in which it is paid or in which previously paid tax is refunded.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @TECHREPORT{ChCr:04, author = {Chotikapanich,D. and Creedy,J.}, title = {The Atkinson Inequality Measure and Its Sampling Properties: Bayesian andclassical approaches}, year = {2004}, abstract = {This paper examines several Bayesian methods of obtaining posterior probabilitydensity functions of the Atkinson inequality measure and its associatedsocial welfare function, in the context of grouped income distributiondata. The methods are compared with asymptotic standard errors. The roleof the number of income classes is investigated using a simulated distribution.If only a small number of groups is available in published data, thereis a clear gain from generating the posterior probability density functionwhen using an explicit income distribution assumption. Even with a smallnumber of groups, the Bayesian approach gives results that are close tothe sample values obtained using the corresponding individual observations.}, key = {Inequality} } @ARTICLE{ChGr:05, author = {Chotikapanich, D. and Griffiths, W.}, title = {Averaging {L}orenz curves}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2005}, volume = {3}, pages = {1-19}, abstract = {A large number of functional forms has been suggested in the literaturefor estimating Lorenz curves that describe the relationship between incomeand population shares. The traditional way of overcoming functional-formuncertainty when estimating a Lorenz curve is to choose the function thatbest fits the data in some sense. In this paper we describe an alternativeapproach for accommodating functional-form uncertainty, namely, how touse Bayesian model averaging to average the alternative functional forms.In this averaging process, the different Lorenz curves are weighted bytheir posterior probabilities of being correct. Unlike a strategy of pickingthe best-fitting function, Bayesian model averaging gives posterior standarddeviations that reflect the functionalform uncertainty. Building on ourearlier work (Chotikapanich and Griffiths, 2002), we construct likelihoodfunctions using the Dirichlet distribution and estimate a number of Lorenzfunctions for Australian income units. Prior information is formulatedin terms of the Gini coefficient and the income shares of the poorest 10%and poorest 90% of the population. Posterior density functions for thesequantities are derived for each Lorenz function and are averaged over allthe Lorenz functions.}, key = {Income distribution: theoretical} } @ARTICLE{ChPrTa:07, author = {Chotikapanich, D. and Prasada Rao, D. S. and Tang, K. K.}, title = {Estimating Income Inequality in {C}hina Using Grouped Data and the Generalized Beta Distribution}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2007}, volume = {53}, pages = {127-147}, abstract = {There are two main types of data sources of income distributions in China: household survey data and grouped data. Household survey data are typically available for isolated years and individual provinces. In comparison, aggregate or grouped data are typically available more frequently and usually have national coverage. In principle, grouped data allow investigation of the change of inequality over longer, continuous periods of time, and the identification of patterns of inequality across broader regions. Nevertheless, a major limitation of grouped data is that only mean (average) income and income shares of quintile or decile groups of the population are reported. Directly using grouped data reported in this format is equivalent to assuming that all individuals in a quintile or decile group have the same income. This potentially distorts the estimate of inequality within each region. The aim of this paper is to apply an improved econometric method designed to use grouped data to study income inequality in China. A generalized beta distribution is employed to model income inequality in China at various levels and periods of time. The generalized beta distribution is more general and flexible than the lognormal distribution that has been used in past research, and also relaxes the assumption of a uniform distribution of income within quintile and decile groups of populations. The paper studies the nature and extent of inequality in rural and urban China over the period 1978 to 2002. Income inequality in the whole of China is then modeled using a mixture of province-specific distributions. The estimated results are used to study the trends in national inequality, and to discuss the empirical findings in the light of economic reforms, regional policies, and globalization of the Chinese economy.}, key = {income distribution: empirical}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{ChVaPr:97, author = {Chotikapanich, D. and Valenzuela, R. and Prasada Rao, D. S.}, title = {Global and regional inequality in the distribution of income: estimationwith limited and incomplete data}, journal = {Empirical Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {22}, pages = {533-546}, number = {2}, key = {statistics} } @UNPUBLISHED{Chou2007, author = {Chou, E. and McConnell, M. and Nagel, R. and Plot, C. R.}, title = {The Control of Game Form Recognition in Experiments: Understanding Dominant Strategy Failures in a Simple Two Person “Guessing” Game}, note = {CalTech Social Science Working Paper 1274}, year = {2007}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.07.21} } @ARTICLE{ChEiMa:91, author = {Christiano, L.J. and Eichenbaum, M. and Marshall, D.}, title = {The Permanent Income Hypothesis Revisited}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1991}, volume = {59}, pages = {397-423}, abstract = {Measured aggregate U.S. consumption does not behave like a martingale. This paper develops and tests two variants of the permanent income model that are consistent with this fact. In both variants, we assume agents make decisions on a continuous time basis. According to the first variant, the martingale hypothesis holds in continuous time and serial persistence in measured consumption reflects only the effects of time aggregation. We investigate this variant using both structural and atheoretical econometric models. The evidence against these models is far from overwhelming. This suggests that the martingale hypothesis may yet be a useful way to conceptualize the relationship between aggregate quarterly U.S. consumption and income. According to the second variant of the permanent income model, serial persistence in measured consumption reflects the effects of exogenous technology shocks and time aggregation. In this model, continuous time consumption does not behave like a martingale. We find little evidence against this variant of the permanent income model. It is difficult, on the basis of aggregate quarterly U.S. data, to convincingly distinguish between the different continuous time models considered in the paper.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{ChHoKe:99, author = {Christiansen, F. and Hougaard, J. L. and Keiding, H.}, title = {An Axiomatic Characterization of Efficiency Indices}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {63}, pages = {33-37}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Chri:83, author = {Christiansen, V.}, title = {Some important properties of the social marginal utility of income}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {85}, pages = {359-371}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Chri:80TC, author = {Christiansen, V.}, title = {Two comments on tax evasion}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1980}, volume = {13}, pages = {389-401}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{ChJa:78, author = {Christiansen, V. and Jansen, E. S.}, title = {Implicit social preferences in the {N}orwegian system of social welfare}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1978}, volume = {10}, pages = {217-245}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Chri:87, title = {Sex Differences in Political Participation: Process of Change in FourteenNations}, publisher = {Praeger}, year = {1987}, author = {Christy, C. A.}, address = {New York}, key = {politics} } @ARTICLE{Chu:90, author = {Chu, C.}, title = {A model of income tax evasion with venal tax officials: the case of {T}aiwan}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1990}, pages = {392-408}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{ChuC:91, author = {Chu, C. Y. Cyrus}, title = {Primogeniture}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1991}, volume = {99}, pages = {78-99}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Chu:90PB, author = {Chu, C. Y. C.}, title = {Plea-bargaining with the IRS}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1990}, volume = {26}, pages = {19-34}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Chu:90TE, author = {Chu, C. Y. C.}, title = {Public Finance}, year = {1990}, volume = {45}, pages = {392-408}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{ChHuKo:96, author = {Chu, C. Y. Cyrus and Huang, Ding-Yuan and Koo, Hui-Wen}, title = {The Preference Foundation of the Generalized Entropy Measures}, institution = {Department of Economics, National Taiwan University}, year = {1996}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{ChKo:95, author = {Chu, C. Y. Cyrus and Koo, H.-W.}, title = {Bequest division and income inequality: comparative dynamics of {M}arkovbranching processes}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1995}, volume = {62}, pages = {423-440}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Chu1995, author = {Chu, C. Y. Cyrus and Koo, H.-W.}, title = {Bequest division and income inequality: comparative dynamics of {M}arkov branching processes}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1995}, volume = {62}, pages = {423-440}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ChKo:90, author = {Chu, C. Y. Cyrus and Koo, H.-W.}, title = {Intergenerational income-group mobility and differential fertility}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1990}, volume = {80}, pages = {1125-1138}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{ChWa:98, author = {Chu, C. Y. Cyrus and Wang, C.}, title = {Economy of specialization and diseconomy of externalities}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {69}, pages = {249-261}, number = {2}, key = {externalities} } @ARTICLE{ChHa:08, author = {Chu, Francis and Halpern, Joseph}, title = {Great Expectations, Part I: On the Customizability of Generalized Expected Utility}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {2008}, volume = {64}, pages = {1-36}, abstract = {We propose a generalization of expected utility that we call generalized EU (GEU), where a decision maker’s beliefs are represented by plausibility measures and the decision maker’s tastes are represented by general (i.e., not necessarily real-valued) utility functions. We show that every agent, “rational” or not, can be modeled as a GEU maximizer. We then show that we can customize GEU by selectively imposing just the constraints we want. In particular, we show how each of Savage’s postulates corresponds to constraints on GEU.}, key = {Utility}, keywords = {generalized expected utility, representation theorem, plausibility measure, Savage’s Postulates}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{ChuW:92, author = {Chu, W.}, title = {Demand Signalling and Screening in Channels of Disitribution}, journal = {Marketing Science}, year = {1992}, volume = {11}, pages = {327-347}, key = {micro}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{Chun:03, author = {Chun, Y.}, title = {One-Sided Population Monotonicity, Separability, and the Uniform Rule}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {March 2003}, volume = {78 (3)}, pages = {343-349}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Chun:01, author = {Chun, Y. J.}, title = {The Redistributive Effects of Risky Taxation}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2001}, volume = {8}, pages = {433-454}, abstract = {This paper examines heterogeneous effects of uncertainty of the U.S. taxpolicies across income classes. We construct a multi-class general equilibriumstochastic OLG model with a stochastic process of effective tax rates.In accordance with empirical evidence, the model includes two types offamilies: a high-income family, whose members have bequest motives andshare risks; and a low-income family, whose members do not. Some notableresults are as follows: (i) under a CRRA preference the efficient allocationof resources within family generates the same proportional standard deviationof consumption and leisure among family members; (ii) the welfare costof the uncertainty of a tax policy is higher for the low-income familythan for the high-income family: the cost for the low-lifetime-income familyis about 145% of that for the high-lifetime-income family; Finally, (iii)the absolute level of the welfare cost for the whole population is shownto be about 0.53% of GNP, which is higher than the welfare cost measuresby previous research such as Bizer and Judd (1989) and Skinner (1988).}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{ChDuHe:08, author = {Chusseau, N. and Dumont, M. and Hellier, J.}, title = {Explaining Rising Inequality: Skill-Biased Technical Change and NorthSouth Trade}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {2008}, volume = {22}, pages = {409-457}, number = {3}, month = {July}, abstract = {We review the ‘skill-biased technological change (SBTC) versus North–South trade (NST)’ debate in order to explain widening wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. The traditional explanations based on exogenous SBTC and on the North–South Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson approach, as well as the early estimates that diagnosed a clear prevalence of the former, are firstly exposed and discussed. A presentation is then made of the recent theoretical literature that endogenizes SBTC, introduces new channels of impacts from NST, and combines both explanations. Finally, the current estimates show that (i) both explanations are relevant, (ii) their impacts differ according to industries and countries, (iii) outsourcing is the main vector of impact from NST and (iv) SBTC and NST interact.}, key = {wage inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.21} } @ARTICLE{Ciccone1999, author = {Ciccone, A. and Matsuyama, K}, title = {Efficiency and Equilibrium with Dynamic Increasing Aggregate Returns Due to Demand Complementarities}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {499-525}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CiMa:99, author = {Ciccone, A. and Matsuyama, K}, title = {Efficiency and Equilibrium with Dynamic Increasing Aggregate Returns Dueto Demand Complementarities}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {499-525}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Cigno2003, author = {Cigno, A. and Luporini, A. and Pettini, A.}, title = {Transfers to families with children as a principal-agent problem}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1165-1177}, key = {Welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CiLuPe:03, author = {Cigno, A. and Luporini, A. and Pettini, A.}, title = {Transfers to families with children as a principal-agent problem}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1165–1177}, key = {Welfare} } @ARTICLE{CiPe:02, author = {Cigno, A. and Pettini, A.}, title = {Taxing Family Size and Subsidizing Child-Specific Commodities?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {84}, pages = {75-90}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{CiPaPu:05, author = {Cinyabuguma,M. and Page,T. and Putterman,L.}, title = {Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {1421-1435}, number = {public goods}, abstract = {In a public goods experiment with the opportunity to vote to expel membersof a group, we found that contributions rose to nearly 100% of endowmentswith significantly higher efficiency compared with a no-expulsion baseline.Our findings support the intuition that the threat of expulsion or ostracismis a device that helps some groups to provide public goods.} } @TECHREPORT{ClEtPoSeSt:04, author = {Clark,A. and Etile,F. and Postel-Vinay,F. and Senik,C. and Straeten,K.}, title = {Heterogeneity in Reported Well-Being:Evidence from Twelve European Countries}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2004}, abstract = {This paper models the relationship between income and reported well-beingusing latent class techniques applied to panel data from twelve Europeancountries. Introducing both intercept and slope heterogeneity into thisrelationship, we strongly reject the hypothesis that individuals transformincome into well-being in the same way. We show that both individual characteristicsand country of residence are strong predictors of the four classes we identify.We expect that differences in the marginal effect of income on well-beingacross classes will be reflected in both behaviour and preferences forredistribution.}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{ClOs:96, author = {Clark, A. and Oswald, A.}, title = {Satisfaction and Comparison Income}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {61}, pages = {359-381}, key = {income distribution}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Clar:96, author = {Clark, A. E.}, title = {Job satisfaction and gender: Why are women so happy at work?}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {4}, pages = {341-370}, number = {4}, month = {December}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{ClFrSh:08, author = {Clark, A. E. and Frijters, P. and Shields, M. A.}, title = {Relative Income, Happiness, and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2008}, volume = {46}, pages = {95-144}, number = {1}, month = {March}, abstract = {The well-known Easterlin paradox points out that average happiness has remained constant over time despite sharp rises in GNP per head. At the same time, a micro literature has typically found positive correlations between individual income and individual measures of subjective well-being. This paper suggests that these two findings are consistent with the presence of relative income terms in the utility function. Income may be evaluated relative to others (social comparison) or to oneself in the past (habituation). We review the evidence on relative income from the subjective well-being literature. We also discuss the relation (or not) between happiness and utility, and discuss some nonhappiness research (behavioral, experimental, neurological) related to income comparisons. We last consider how relative income in the utility function can affect economic models of behavior in the domains of consumption, investment, economic growth, savings, taxation, labor supply, wages, and migration.}, key = {utility, preference}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.22} } @ARTICLE{ClOs:98, author = {Clark, Andrew E. and Oswald, Andrew J.}, title = {Comparison-concave utility and following behaviour in social and economicsettings}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {70}, pages = {133-155}, number = {1}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Clar:73, author = {Colin Clark}, title = {The Marginal Utility of Income}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1973}, volume = {25}, pages = {145-159}, number = {2}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{ClFrMu:04, author = {Clark, J. and Friesen, L. and Muller, A.}, title = {The good, the bad, and the regulator: an experimental test of two conditional audit schemes.}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, year = {2004}, volume = {42}, pages = {69-87}, key = {tax compliance - firms}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.22} } @ARTICLE{Clar:99, author = {Clark, S.}, title = {Law, property and marital dissolution}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {C41-C54}, key = {household} } @ARTICLE{Clark1999a, author = {Clark, S.}, title = {Law, property and marital dissolution}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {C41-C54}, key = {household}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Clark1981, author = {Clark, S. and Hemming, R. and Ulph, D.}, title = {On indices for the measurement of poverty}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1981}, volume = {91}, pages = {515-526}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ClHU:81, author = {Clark, S. and Hemming, R. and Ulph, D.}, title = {On indices for the measurement of poverty}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1981}, volume = {91}, pages = {515-526}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{ClTa:99, author = {Clark, T. and Taylor, J.}, title = {Income Inequality: A Tale of Two Cycles?}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {387-408}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Clar:71, author = {Clarke, E. H.}, title = {Multi-part pricing of public goods}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {1971}, volume = {11}, pages = {17-33}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Clar:95, author = {Clarke, G. R. G.}, title = {More Evidence on Income Distribution and Growth}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1995}, volume = {47}, pages = {403-27}, key = {inequality}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.03} } @ARTICLE{ClCo:08, author = {Clarke, R. and Collie, D. R.}, title = {Welfare in the {N}ash equilibrium in export taxes under {B}ertrand duopoly}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {60}, pages = {183–189}, number = {2}, month = {April}, abstract = {In the Eaton and Grossman Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (1986), pp. 383–406 model of export taxes under Bertrand duopoly, it is shown that welfare in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes is always higher than welfare under free trade for both countries.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.22} } @ARTICLE{ClDa:84, author = {Clarke, R. and Davies, S. W.}, title = {On measuring concentration and diversification}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1984}, volume = {15}, pages = {145-152}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{ClGa:05, author = {Clementi, F. and Gallegati, M.}, title = {Pareto's law of income distribution: evidence for {G}ermany, the {U}nited {K}ingdom, and the {U}nited {S}tates}, booktitle = {Econophysics of Wealth Distributions}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2005}, editor = {Chatterjee, A. and Yarlagadda, S. and Chakrabarti, B. K.}, address = {Berlin}, key = {income distribution:functional form}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.09.14} } @ARTICLE{Clip:08, author = {Clippel, G. D.}, title = {Equity, envy and efficiency under asymmetric information}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2008}, volume = {99}, pages = {265-267}, number = {2}, abstract = {Varian's (Varian, H., 1974. Equity, Envy and Efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory 9, 63–91) main results are not valid anymore if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting: 1) envy-freeness and efficiency may be incompatible; 2) there may exist efficient allocation rules such that every agent envies another. Two weaker positive properties are formulated.}, key = {equity}, owner = {rodano}, timestamp = {2008.06.12} } @BOOK{ClCo:89, title = {Selling Hope, State Lotteries in America}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1989}, author = {Clotfelter, C. and Cook, P.}, address = {Cambridge, Mass}, key = {Lotteries} } @ARTICLE{ClCo:87, author = {Clotfelter, C. and Cook, P.}, title = {Implicit Taxation in Lottery Finance}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1987}, volume = {40}, pages = {533-546}, key = {Public goods} } @ARTICLE{Clot:83TE, author = {Clotfelter, C. T.}, title = {Tax evasion and tax rates}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1983}, volume = {65}, pages = {363-373}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Cnos:98, author = {Cnossen, Sijbren}, title = {Global trends and issues in value added taxation}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {1998}, volume = {5}, number = {3}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{CoDr:02, author = {Coady, D. and Dr{\`e}ze, J.}, title = {Commodity Taxation and Social Welfare: The Generalized {R}amsey Rule}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2002}, volume = {9}, pages = {295-316}, abstract = {Commodity taxes have three distinct roles: (1) revenue collection, (2) interpersonalredistribution, and (3) resource allocation. The paper presents an integratedtreatment of these three concerns in a second-best general equilibriumframework, which leads to the “generalized Ramsey rule” for optimum taxation.We show how many standard results on optimum taxation and tax reform havea straightforward counterpart in this general framework. Using this framework,we also try to clarify the notion of “deadweight loss,” as well as therelation between alternative distributional assumptions and the structureof optimum taxes.}, key = {optimal taxation} } @TECHREPORT{CoDr:00, author = {Coady, D. and Dr{\`e}ze, J.}, title = {Commodity Taxation an Social Welfare: The Generalised Ramsey Rule}, institution = {Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines}, year = {2000}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {DEDPS 27}, month = {September}, abstract = {Commodity taxes have three distinct roles: (1) revenue collection, (2) interpersonal redistribution, and (3) resource allocation. The paper presents an integrated treatment of these three concerns in a second-best general equilibrium framework, which leads to the "generalised Ramsey rule" for optimum taxation. We show how many standard results on optimum taxation and tax reform have a straightforward counterpart in this general framework. Using this framework, we also try to clarify the notion of "deadweight loss" as well as the relation between alternative distributional assumptions and the structure of optimum taxes.}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.05} } @ARTICLE{Co:72, author = {Coase, R. H.}, title = {Durability and Monopoly}, journal = {Journal of Law and Economics}, year = {1972}, volume = {15}, pages = {143--149}, number = {1}, month = {apr}, copyright = {Copyright 1972 The University of Chicago; published by The University of Chicago Press}, issn = {0022-2186}, jstor_articletype = {Full Length Article}, jstor_date = {197204}, jstor_formatteddate = {Apr., 1972}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Coas:60, author = {Coase, R. H.}, title = {The Problem of Social Cost}, journal = {Journal of Law and Economics}, year = {1960}, volume = {2}, pages = {1-44}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Coas:37, author = {Coase, R. H.}, title = {The mature of the firm}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1937}, volume = {4}, pages = {386-405}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Coch:91, author = {Cochrane, John}, title = {A Simple Test of Consumption Insurance}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1991}, volume = {99}, pages = {957 - 976}, abstract = {Are consumers effectively insured against idiosyncratic shocks to income or wealth, either by formal institution such as charities, private insurance, and government programs or by informal mechanisms such as gifts and "loans" from relative, friends, and neighbours? Under full insurance, consumption growth should be cross-sectionally independent of idiosyncratic variables that are exogenous to consumers. This proposition is tested by cross-sectional regressions of consumption growth on a variety of exogenous variables. Full insurance is rejected for long illness and involuntary job loss, but not for spells of unemployment, loss of work due to strike, and an involuntary move.}, key = {Consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.24} } @ARTICLE{Coch:89, author = {Cochrane, J.H.}, title = {The Sensitivity of Tests of the Intertemporal Allocation of Consumption to Near-Rational Alternatives}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1989}, volume = {79}, pages = {319-337}, abstract = {Suppose a consumer sets consumption equal to income each period, rather than follow the optimalpermanent income decision rule. How much utility does he lose? This paper $rids that the answer is typically less than 104 -$1 per quarter in environments specified by popular tests on aggregate data, and concludes that the theory does not make predictions in those environments that are robust to small costs of information, transactions, etc.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @BOOK{Coch:77, title = {Sampling Techniques}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1977}, author = {Cochrane, W. G.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @BOOK{Coff:70AP, title = {A Popular History of Taxation}, publisher = {Longmans}, year = {1970}, author = {Coffield, J.}, address = {London}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{CoGr:07, author = {Cogneau, D. and Grimm, M.}, title = {The Measurement of Income Distribution Dynamics When Demographics Are Correlated With Income}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2007}, volume = {53}, pages = {246-274}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{CoEi:07, author = {Cohen,A. and Einav,L.}, title = {Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {97}, pages = {745-788}, abstract = {We develop a structural econometric model to estimate risk preferences from data on deductible choices in auto insurance contracts. We account for adverse selection by modeling unobserved heterogeneity in both risk (claim rate) and risk aversion. We find large and skewed heterogeneity in risk attitudes. In addition, women are more risk averse than men, risk aversion exhibits a U-shape with respect to age, and proxies for income and wealth are positively associated with absolute risk aversion. Finally, unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is greater than that of risk, and, as we illustrate, has important implications for insurance pricing.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Cohe:89, author = {Cohen, G.}, title = {On the currency of egalitarian justice}, journal = {Ethics}, year = {1989}, volume = {99}, pages = {906-944}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{CoJaSa:85, author = {Cohen, M. and Jaffray, J. Y. and Said, T.}, title = {Individual Behavior under Risk and under Uncertainty: An Experimental Study}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {1985}, volume = {18}, pages = {203-228}, key = {risk} } @TECHREPORT{CoRuSt:05, author = {Cohen,M.A. and Rust,R.T. and Steen,S.}, title = {Prevention, Crime Control or Cash? Public Preferences Towards Criminal Justice Spending Priorities}, institution = {Robert H. Smith School}, year = {2005}, type = {Working paper}, number = {RHS06-048}, abstract = {We propose and test a new survey methodology to assess the public's criminal justice spending priorities. Respondents are explicitly forced to trade-off one type of crime prevention or control policy for another and to consider the fact that any money spent on crime prevention or control policies is money they could otherwise have in their pockets. Thus, respondents are asked to allocate a fixed budget into five categories - more prisons, police, youth prevention programs, drug treatment for nonviolent offenders, and a tax rebate to citizens. In a nationally representative sample, we found overwhelming public support for more money being devoted to youth prevention, drug treatment for nonviolent offenders, and more police. However, the median respondent would not allocate any new money to building more prisons and would not avail him or herself of a tax rebate if the money were spent on youth prevention, drug treatment and police. At the margin, we estimate the public would receive $3.07 in perceived value by spending $1.00 of their tax dollars on youth prevention; $1.86 in value for every dollar spent on drug treatment; and $1.76 in value for a dollar spent on police. However, the public would clearly not spend more on prisons at the margin, deriving only 71 cents in value for every dollar spent.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @BOOK{Cohe:01, title = {Microeconomic Policy}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2001}, author = {Cohen,S.}, key = {economic policy} } @ARTICLE{CoKaVa:84, author = {Colasanto, D. and Kapteyn, A. and Van der Gaag, J.}, title = {Two subjective definitions of poverty: Results from the Wisconsin basicneeds study}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1984}, volume = {19}, pages = {127-138}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Colasanto1984, author = {Colasanto, D. and Kapteyn, A. and Van der Gaag, J.}, title = {Two subjective definitions of poverty: Results from the Wisconsin basic needs study}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1984}, volume = {19}, pages = {127-138}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CoMaPo:98, author = {Cole, Harold L. and Mailath, George J. and Postlewaite, Andrew}, title = {Class systems and the enforcement of social norms}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {70}, pages = {5-35}, number = {1}, key = {social custom} } @ARTICLE{Cole:00, author = {Coleman, W. J. II}, title = {Welfare and Optimum Dynamic Taxation of Consumption and Income}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {76}, pages = {1-39}, key = {taxation} } @INBOOK{Cole:01-3, chapter = {3: Classical Extreme Value Theory and Models}, pages = {45-73}, title = {An Introduction to Statistical Modeling of Extreme Values}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2001}, author = {Coles, S.}, key = {statistics}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @INBOOK{Cole:01-4, chapter = {4: Threshold Models}, pages = {74-91}, title = {An Introduction to Statistical Modeling of Extreme Values}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2001}, author = {Coles, S.}, key = {statistics}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @TECHREPORT{Coll:84ST, author = {Collard, D.}, title = {Some tax investigation rules}, institution = {University of Bath}, year = {1984}, type = {mimeo}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{CoGo:99CC, author = {Collard, D. and Godwin, M.}, title = {Compliance Costs for Employers: {UK} {PAYE} and National Insurance, 1995-96}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {423-450}, key = {Compliance} } @ARTICLE{Coll:98, author = {Collie, David R.}, title = {Trade policy under {B}ertrand duopoly with integrated markets: the purestrategy equilibrium}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {60}, pages = {179-183}, number = {2}, key = {international} } @ARTICLE{CoPl:91, author = {Collins, J. H. and Plumlee, R. D.}, title = {The Taxpayer's Labor and Reporting Decision: The Effect of Audit Schemes}, journal = {The Accounting Review}, year = {1991}, volume = {66}, pages = {559-576}, abstract = {Individuals failed to report between $70 and $79 billion in federal taxes due on legal income received in 1986. This amount is equivalent to approximately 20 percent of federal income taxes due and 40 percent of the federal deficit in that year. Including underreporting of organizations and of those who receive illegal income likely pushes the annual amount of taxes due, but not paid, above the $100 billion mark (Roth et al. 1989, 1). Thus, reporting income for tax purposes may be characterized by a high degree of inaccurate self-reporting with an immediate economic impact. This problem can be countered by auditing self-reported income. An audit scheme is the approach by which a taxing authority chooses the self- reports to be audited. This paper describes an experiment that examines the effect of three audit schemes on taxpayers' joint or related decisions about the level of labor to be supplied and the amount of income (if any) to underreport. The three audit schemes differ principally in the information used by the taxing authority to determine which self-reports of income to audit: (a) no information is used -reports are chosen strictly at random; (b) reported income is the basis for choosing the reports to be audited; (c) an estimate of true income is used in addition to reported income to select audit cases. Also examined is the impact of alternative tax rates and penalty levels on earned and underreported income.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.19}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/247809} } @ARTICLE{CoSt:99, author = {Colman, A. M. and Stirk, J. A.}, title = {Singleton Bias and Lexicographic Preferences Among Equally Valued Alternatives}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation}, year = {1999}, volume = {40}, pages = {337-351}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{Colo:99, author = {Coloma, German}, title = {Capital accumulation and income distribution as the outcome of a dynamicgame}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1999}, volume = {23}, pages = {1177-1196}, key = {{income distribution:theoretical}} } @ARTICLE{Coloma1999, author = {Coloma, German}, title = {Capital accumulation and income distribution as the outcome of a dynamic game}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1999}, volume = {23}, pages = {1177-1196}, key = {income distribution:theory}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INBOOK{Co:00, chapter = {A new model of income distribution: The Pareto lognormal distribution}, title = {Studies in Contemporary Economics}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Zenga, M.}, author = {Colombi, R.}, owner = {faybisov}, timestamp = {2007.06.12} } @ARTICLE{CoFo:08, author = {Comeo, Giacomo and Fong, Christina}, title = {What's the monetary value of distributive justice?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {289-308}, abstract = {This paper proposes a model that can be implemented to estimate the willingness to pay for distributive justice, defined as distribution according to desert. We derive a formula that allows one to recover the willingness to pay for distributive justice from fiscal data and the estimated coefficients of a probit regression. Using this formula and data from a 1998 Gallup Social Audit, we find that on average the monetary value of justice for US households amounts to about one fifth of their disposable income. Moreover, we find evidence of markedly heterogeneous preferences for justice that differ by race and education.}, key = {Distributive Justice}, keywords = {Distributive justice; Governmental redistribution; Fairness}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @MISC{USco:92, author = {US Department of Commerce}, title = {Statistical Abstract of the United States, Economics and Statistics}, year = {1992-1995}, key = {Data} } @ARTICLE{CoPeRi:08, author = {Conconi, Paola and Perroni, Carlo and Riezman, Raymond}, title = {Is partial tax harmonization desirable?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {254-267}, abstract = {We consider a setting in which capital taxation is characterized by two distortions working in opposite directions. On one hand, governments engage in tax competition and are tempted to lower capital tax rates. On the other hand, they are unable to commit to future policies and, once capital has been installed, have incentives to increase taxes. In this setting, there exists a tax that optimally trades off the two distortions. We compare three possible tax harmonization scenarios: no tax harmonization (all countries set taxes unilaterally), global tax harmonization (all countries coordinate their capital taxes), and partial tax harmonization (only a subset of all countries coordinate capital taxes). We show that, if capital is sufficiently mobile, partial tax harmonization benefits all countries compared to both global and no harmonization.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Tax competition, Commitment, Partial coordination}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{CoPr:07, author = {Conde-Ruiz, J.I. and Profeta, P.}, title = {The Redistributive Design of Social Security Systems}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {2007}, volume = {117}, pages = {686-712}, abstract = {Countries with low intragenerational redistribution in social security systems (Bismarckian) are associated with larger public pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension and lower income inequality than countries with more redistributive social security (Beveridgean). This article introduces a bidimensional voting model to account for these features. Agents different in age, income and in their ability to invest in the capital market vote on the degree of redistribution of the social security system and on the size of the transfer. In an economy with three income groups, a small Beveridgean system is supported by low-income agents, who gain from its redistributive feature, and high-income individuals, who seek to minimise their tax contribution and to invest in a private scheme. Middle-income individuals instead favour a large Bismarckian system.}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @TECHREPORT{CoKiKr:07, author = {Conesa,J.C. and Kitao,S. and Krueger,D.}, title = {Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea After All!}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, number = {W12880}, abstract = {In this paper we quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic, uninsurable income shocks, where households also differ permanently with respect to their ability to generate income. The welfare criterion we employ is ex-ante (before ability is realized) expected (with respect to uninsurable productivity shocks) utility of a newborn in a stationary equilibrium. Embedded in this welfare criterion is a concern of the policy maker for insurance against idiosyncratic shocks and redistribution among agents of different abilities. Such insurance and redistribution can be achieved by progressive labor income taxes or taxation of capital income, or both. The policy maker has then to trade off these concerns against the standard distortions these taxes generate for the labor supply and capital accumulation decision. We find that in our model the optimal capital income tax rate is significantly positive. The optimal (marginal and average) tax rate on capital is 36%, in conjunction with a progressive labor income tax code that is, to a first approximation, a flat tax of 23% with a deduction that corresponds to about $6,000 (relative to an average income of households in the model of $35,000). We argue that the high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life cycle structure of the model whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is due to the insurance and redistribution role of the income tax system.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{CoKiKr:06, author = {Conesa, J.C. and Kitao, S. and Krueger, D.}, title = {Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea After All!}, institution = {Center for Financial Studies}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2006/21}, address = {Mertonstr. 17-21, HPF 73 D-60325 Frankfurt am Main}, month = {September}, note = {juancarlos.conesa@uab.es sagiri.kitao@nyu.edu dkrueger@econ.upenn.edu}, abstract = {In this paper we quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic, uninsurable income shocks, where households also differ permanently with respect to their ability to generate income. The welfare criterion we employ is ex-ante (before ability is realized) expected (with respect to uninsurable productivity shocks) utility of a newborn in a stationary equilibrium. Embedded in this welfare criterion is a concern of the policy maker for insurance against idiosyncratic shocks and redistribution among agents of different abilities. Such insurance and redistribution can be achieved by progressive labor income taxes or taxation of capital income, or both. The policy maker has then to trade off these concerns against the standard distortions these taxes generate for the labor supply and capital accumulation decision. We find that the optimal capital income tax rate is not only positive, but is significantly positive. The optimal (marginal and average) tax rate on capital is 36%, in conjunction with a progressive labor income tax code that is, to a first approximation, a flat tax of 23% with a deduction that corresponds to about $6,000 (relative to an average income of households in the model of $35,000). We argue that the high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life cycle structure of the model whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is due to the insurance and redistribution role of the income tax system.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @TECHREPORT{CoDi:00, author = {Conley, J. and Dix M.}, title = {Beneficial Inequality in the Provision of Municipal Services: Why Rich NeighbourhoodsShould Get Plowed First}, institution = {University of Illinois}, year = {2000}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {00-0104}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{CoDi:96, author = {Conley, John P. and Diamantaras, Dimitrios}, title = {Generalized {S}amuelson conditions and welfare theorems for nonsmooth economies}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {59}, pages = {137-152}, key = {public economics} } @INCOLLECTION{CoWo:98, author = {Conley, John P. and Wooders, Myrna H.}, title = {Anonymous pricing in {T}iebout economies and economies with clubs}, booktitle = {Topics in Public Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Pines, David and Saka, Efraim and Zilcha, Itzhak}, chapter = {4}, pages = {89-120}, key = {clubs} } @ARTICLE{Conl:96, author = {Conlisk,J.}, title = {Why Bounded Rationality?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1996}, volume = {34}, pages = {669-700}, number = {Economic theory} } @ARTICLE{Conl:89RM, author = {Conlisk, J.}, title = {Ranking mobility matrices}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1989}, volume = {29}, pages = {231-235}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Conl:89TV, author = {Conlisk, J.}, title = {Three variants on the {A}llais example}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1989}, volume = {79}, pages = {392-407}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Conlisk1984, author = {Conlisk, John and Gerstner, Eitan and Sobel, Joel}, title = {Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1984}, volume = {99}, pages = {489--505}, number = {3}, month = {Aug.}, abstract = {In the model of this paper a monopoly seller of a durable good holds periodic sales as a means of price discrimination. A new cohort of consumers enters the market in each period, interested in purchasing the good either immediately or after a delay. Within each cohort, consumers vary in their tastes for the good. Under broad conditions, the seller will vary the price over time. In most periods, he will charge a price just low enough to sell immediately to consumers with a high willingness to pay. Periodically, however, he will drop the price far enough to sell to an accumulated group of consumers with a low willingness to pay.}, copyright = {Copyright 1984 The MIT Press}, issn = {00335533}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.07} } @BOOK{CoMo:64, title = {Statistics in Theory and Practice}, publisher = {Pitman}, year = {1964}, author = {Connor, L. R. and Morrell, A. J. H.}, address = {London}, edition = {5th}, key = {Statistics} } @ARTICLE{Conn:86SP, author = {Connor, W. D.}, title = {Social Policy under {G}orbach{\"e}v}, journal = {Problems of Communism}, year = {1986}, volume = {35}, pages = {31-46}, key = {social policy} } @ARTICLE{Connor1986, author = {Connor, W. D.}, title = {Social Policy under {G}orbach\"ev}, journal = {Problems of Communism}, year = {1986}, volume = {35}, pages = {31-46}, key = {social policy}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{ConseilSup'erieurdel'EmploidesRevenusetdesCouts1996, title = {Les In\'egalit\'es d'Emploi et de Revenu. Les anne\'es 90}, publisher = {Editions La D\'ecouverte}, year = {1996}, author = {{Conseil Sup{\'e}rieur de l'Emploi, des Revenus et des Co{\^u}ts}}, address = {29-34 quai Voltaire, Paris 75344}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{CSER:96, title = {Les In{\'e}galit{\'e}s d'Emploi et de Revenu. Les anne{\'e}s 90}, publisher = {Editions La D{\'e}couverte}, year = {1996}, author = {{Conseil Sup{\'e}rieur de l'Emploi, des Revenus et des Co{\^u}ts}}, address = {29-34 quai Voltaire, Paris 75344}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{CoZi:04, author = {Constant, Amelie and Zimmermann, Klaus F}, title = {Occupational Choice Across Generations}, year = {2004}, number = {4258}, abstract = {There are few studies on occupational choices in Germany, and secondgenerationoccupational choice and mobility is even less investigated. Such researchis important because occupations determine success in the labour market.In a country like Germany occupations also reflect a general socioeconomicstanding. This Paper looks at the patterns of employment in Germany, analyseshow individual men and women access jobs given their family background,and investigates why men and women have different occupational distributions.Based on the German Socio-Economic Panel we estimate multinomial logitmodels of occupational choice for the children of immigrants as well asfor natives. Our findings are surprisingly similar for both natives andimmigrants. For both Germans and immigrants, we find that gender significantlyand differentially affects occupational choice, and that individuals withmore education choose higher-ranking jobs. The role of experience is importantfor natives and qualified individuals only. Germans are more likely tochoose occupations similar to their fathers’ occupation when their fatheris in the white collar or professional category. In stark contrast, theimmigrants’ occupational choice is more influenced by their mother’s educationand not by their fathers’ occupation.}, institution = {Centre for Economic Policy Research}, key = {mobility}, type = {CEPR Discussion Paper} } @ARTICLE{ChSa:99, author = {Constantatos, Christos and Sartzetakis, Eftichios S.}, title = {On commodity taxation in vertically differentiated markets}, journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization}, year = {1999}, volume = {17}, pages = {1203-1217}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Cont:81TS, author = {Contini, B.}, title = {The second economy of {I}taly}, journal = {Journal of Contemporary Studies}, year = {1981}, volume = {4}, note = {reprinted in Tanzi 1982b}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{CoFo:99, author = {Contoyannis, Paul and Forster, Martin}, title = {The distribution of health and income: A theoretical framework}, journal = {Journal of Health Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {5}, pages = {605-622}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{CoKi:98, author = {Conway, Karen Smith and Kimmel, Jean}, title = {Male labor supply estimates and the decision to moonlight}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {5}, pages = {135-166}, number = {2}, abstract = {This research improves the manner in which moonlighting is examined by recognizingthatworkers may moonlight due to primary job hours constraints or because jobsareheterogeneous. Our theoretical model permits both motives for moonlightingand considersmoonlighting in tandem with labor supply behavior on the primaryjob. Both primary andsecondary job hours equations are estimated usingdata from the SIPP for prime-aged men.We conclude that the moonlightingdecision is quite responsive to wage changes on bothjobs and arises fromboth motives and that properly modeling moonlighting produces arelativelyhigh primary job labor supply elasticity.}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Cook:72, author = {Cook, P.}, title = {A one-line proof of the {S}lutsky equation}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1972}, volume = {62}, pages = {139}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Coop:94, author = {Cooper, G. S.}, title = {The Benefit Theory of Taxation}, journal = {Australian Tax Forum}, year = {1994}, volume = {11}, pages = {397-509}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Corc:84AN, author = {Corchon, L.}, title = {A note on tax evasion and the theory of games}, institution = {Madrid}, year = {1984}, type = {mimeo}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{CoIt:97, author = {Corchon, Luis and Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Inigo}, title = {A Proposal to Unify Some Concepts in the Theory of Fairness}, institution = {Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas, S.A.}, year = {1997}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {WP-AD 97-21}, month = {October}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{CoFr:02, author = {Corchon, Luis C. and Fradera, Isabel}, title = {Comparative statics in Cournot free entry equilibrium}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2002}, volume = {44}, pages = {155-168}, abstract = {In this paper we study the effects of a change in an exogenous variable(the fixed cost or a parameter in the demand function) on the output andthe number of active firms in a Symmetric Cournot Equilibrium with FreeEntry (SCEFE). The results obtained here are different from those obtainedin the Cournot model with a given number of firms. In particular, an increasein demand might yield a decrease in the output of the industry.We alsoshow that any observation on prices, profits and number of firms is compatiblewith the assumption that the market is in a SCEFE. If fixed costs can beobserved, there is a loose relationship between the profit rate and thenumber of active firms. This result is used as a warning against the useof the profit rate as a measure of an anticompetitive position and againstthe Structure–Conduct–Performance paradigm.}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{CoGo-Ma:00, author = {Corchon, L. C. and Gonzalez-Maestre, M.}, title = {On the Competitive Effects of Divisionalization}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2000}, volume = {39}, pages = {71-79}, key = {Micro} } @ARTICLE{CoPu:98, author = {Corchon, Luis C. and Puy, M. Socorro}, title = {Individual rationality and voting in cooperative production}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {59}, pages = {83-90}, number = {1}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Cord:08, author = {Cordoba, Juan-Carlos}, title = {U.S. inequality: Debt constraints or incomplete asset markets?}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {55}, pages = {350-364}, abstract = {To examine the role of debt constraints and incomplete asset markets (lack of insurance markets) in explaining U.S. inequality, we run horse races between competing models. For a widely used model, we decompose inequality into its fundamental driving forces. The underlying source of inequality in all models is uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. Both debt constraints and incomplete asset markets are needed to account for inequality, but asset market incompleteness is the key friction. It better accounts for the concentration and dispersion of wealth, and is the most costly friction in terms of welfare. Tight debt constraints are important for explaining the lower tail of the wealth distribution.}, key = {Wealth Inequality}, keywords = {Idiosyncratic risk, Wealth distribution, Debt constraints, Incomplete markets, Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{CoHa:99, author = {Cordoba, Jose M. and Hammond, Peter J.}, title = {Asymptotically strategy-proof {W}alrasian exchange}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1999}, volume = {36}, pages = {185-212}, number = {3}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{CoJoMoVi:07, author = {Coricelli, Giorgio and Joffily, Mateus and Montmarquette, Claude and Villeval, Marie-Claire}, title = {Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally?}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {07-24}, abstract = {The economic models of tax compliance predict that individuals should evade taxes when the expected benefit of cheating is greater than its expected cost. When this condition is fulfilled, the high compliance however observed remains a puzzle. In this paper, we investigate the role of emotions as a possible explanation of tax compliance. Our laboratory experiment shows that emotional arousal, measured by Skin Conductance Responses, increases in the proportion of evaded taxes. The perspective of punishment after an audit, especially when the pictures of the evaders are publicly displayed, also raises emotions. We show that an audit policy that induces shame on the evaders favors compliance.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Tax evasion, emotions, neuro-economics, physiological measures, shame, experiments}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{CoHa:53, author = {Corlett, W. J. and Hague, D. C.}, title = {Complementarity and the excess burden of taxation}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1953}, volume = {21}, pages = {21-30}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Cornelis, author = {Cornelis, A. Los}, title = {Galton's error and the under-representation of systematic risk}, journal = {Journal of Banking and Finance}, volume = {23}, pages = {1793-1829}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Corn:99, author = {Cornelis, A. Los}, title = {Galton's error and the under-representation of systematic risk}, journal = {Journal of Banking and Finance}, year = {1999}, volume = {23}, pages = {1793-1829}, key = {uncertainty} } @TECHREPORT{Corn:00, author = {Corneo, G.}, title = {Inequality And The State: Comparing {U.S.} and {G}erman Preferences}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2000}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {398}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, key = {Inequality} } @ARTICLE{CoGr:02, author = {Corneo, G. and Gr{\"u}ner, H.-P.}, title = {Individual Preferences for Political Redistribution}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {83}, pages = {83-107}, abstract = {What drives peoples support of governmental reduction of income inequality?We employ data from a large international survey in order to evaluate theexplanatory power of three competing forces, referred to as the homo oeconomicuseffect, the public values effect and the social rivalry effect. The empiricalanalysis reveals that at the aggregate level all three effects play a significantrole in shaping individual preferences for political redistribution. Attitudesof citizens in formerly socialist countries turn out to differ from thoseof western citizens in a systematic way.}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{CoGr:00, author = {Corneo, G. and Gr{\"u}ner, H.-P.}, title = {Social Limits to Redistribution}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2000}, volume = {90}, pages = {1491-1507}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{CoOl:99SC, author = {Corneo, Giacomo and Jeanne, Olivier}, title = {Segmented communication and fashionable behavior}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1999}, volume = {39}, pages = {371-385}, number = {4}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{CoJe:98, author = {Corneo, Giacomo and Jeanne, Olivier}, title = {Social organization, status and savings behavior}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {70}, pages = {37-51}, number = {1}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{CoJe:97, author = {Corneo, Giacomo and Jeanne, Olivier}, title = {Conspicuous consumption, snobbish and conformism}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {66}, pages = {55-71}, number = {1}, month = {October}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{CoJe:97OR, author = {Corneo, Giacomo and Jeanne, Olivier}, title = {On relative wealth effects and the optimality of growth}, journal = {Economic Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {54}, pages = {87-92}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{CoJe:97SB, author = {Corneo, Giacomo and Jeanne, Olivier}, title = {Snobs, bandwagons and the origin of social customs in consumer behavior}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1997}, volume = {32}, pages = {333-347}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{CoJe:97ST, author = {Corneo, Giacomo and Jeanne, Olivier}, title = {Status,the distribution of wealth and growth}, institution = {Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms Universitat}, year = {1997}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {A-561}, address = {Bonn, Germany}, month = {October}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{CoMa:00, author = {Corneo, G. and Marquardt, M.}, title = {Public Pensions, Unemployment Insurance and Growth}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {75}, pages = {293-311}, key = {pensions} } @ARTICLE{CoOl:99PE, author = {Corneo, G. and Olivier, J.}, title = {Pecuniary Emulation, Inequality and Growth}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {1665-1678}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{CoHa:07AP, author = {Cornes, Richard and Hartley, Roger}, title = {Aggregatve Public Good Games}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {9}, pages = {201 - 219}, abstract = {We exploit the aggregative structure of the public good model to provide a simple analysis of the voluntary contribution game. In contrast to the best response function approach, ours avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased, and can readily analyze games involving many heterogeneous players. We demonstrate the approach at work on the standard pure public good model and show how it can analyze extensions of the basic model.}, key = {Public Goods}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{CoHa:07WL, author = {Cornes, Richard and Hartley, Roger}, title = {Weak links, good shots and other public good games: Building on BBV}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {1684-1707}, abstract = {We suggest an alternative way of analyzing the canonical Bergstrom–Blume–Varian model of noncooperative voluntary contributions to a public good that avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased. We exploit this approach to analyze models in which the aggregate level of public good is determined as a more general social composition function of individual gifts — specifically, as a CES form — rather than as an unweighted sum. We also analyze Hirshleifer's weakest-link and bestshot models. In each case, we characterize the set of equilibria, in some cases establishing existence of a unique equilibrium as well as briefly pointing out some interesting comparative static properties. We also study the weakest-link and best-shot limits of the CES composition function and show how the former can be used for equilibrium selection and the latter to establish that equilibria of some better-shot games are identical to those of the much simpler best-shot game.}, key = {Public Goods}, keywords = {Non-cooperative games, Public goods, Weakest links, Best shots}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @BOOK{Cornes1996, title = {The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1996}, author = {Cornes, Richard and Sandler, Todd}, edition = {2nd}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{CoSa:96, title = {The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1996}, author = {Cornes, Richard and Sandler, Todd}, edition = {second}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{CoSa:94, author = {Cornes, R. and Sandler, T.}, title = {The Comparative Static Properties of the Impure Public Good Model}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {54}, pages = {403-421}, key = {Public Goods} } @ARTICLE{CoSa:84, author = {Cornes, R. and Sandler, T.}, title = {Easy Riders, Joint Production and Public Goods}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1984}, volume = {94}, pages = {580-598}, key = {Public goods} } @TECHREPORT{Corr:05, author = {Correia,I.H.}, title = {Consumption Taxes and Redistribution}, institution = {CEPR}, year = {2005}, type = {discussion paper}, number = {5280}, abstract = {It is relatively well known that the introduction of consumption taxation as an alternative in the tax code, and as the main source of government revenues, leads to a more efficient tax system. However the conventional wisdom is that the change from the actual tax code, based on taxation of capital and labour income to this consumption-based system, has undesirable distributional consequences. In this work, a very simple method is developed to argue that the converse is the most reasonable outcome from that fundamental tax reform. The main difference in relation to the literature comes from the assumed source of household heterogeneity. Additionally, it is shown that the inclusion of a tax on consumption allows for redistributive policies with no costs in terms of efficiency.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Corr:00, author = {Correia, I. H.}, title = {On the efficiency and equity trade-off}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {44}, pages = {581-603}, key = {efficiency} } @ARTICLE{Corr:99FR, author = {Correia, I. H.}, title = {Fiscal Rules of Income Transformation}, journal = {Economic Theory}, year = {1999}, volume = {13}, pages = {199-205}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Correia1999, author = {Correia, I. H.}, title = {On the Efficiency and Equity Trade Off}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {44}, pages = {581-603}, key = {Efficiency}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CoFaCa:76, author = {Cortese, C. F. and Falk, R. F. and Cohen, J. K.}, title = {Further consideration on the methodological analysis of segregation indices}, journal = {American Sociological Review}, year = {1976}, volume = {41}, pages = {630-637}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{COSTA-GOMES2006, author = {COSTA-GOMES, MIGUEL A. and CRAWFORD, VINCENT P.}, title = {Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study.}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {96}, pages = {p1737 - 1768}, number = {5}, abstract = {This paper reports an experiment that elicits subjects' initial responses to 16 dominance-solvable two-person guessing games. The structure is publicly announced except for varying payoff parameters, to which subjects are given free access. Varying the parameters allows very strong separation of the behavior implied by leading decision rules. Subjects' decisions and searches show that most subjects understood the games and sought to maximize payoffs, but many had simplified models of others' decisions that led to systematic deviations from equilibrium. The predictable component of their deviations is well explained by a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses based on level-k thinking. (JEL C72, C92, D83). ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR Copyright of American Economic Review is the property of American Economic Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users }, issn = {00028282}, keywords = {DECISION making, PROBLEM solving, BEHAVIOR, GUESSING games, CHOICE (Psychology), GAMES for two, HUMAN behavior, INCENTIVE (Psychology), HUMAN experimentation in psychology}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, url = {http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=23261451&site=ehost-live&scope=site} } @ARTICLE{Costa-Gomes2001, author = {Costa-Gomes, Miguel and Crawford, Vincent P. and Broseta, Bruno}, title = {Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2001}, volume = {69}, pages = {1193--1235}, number = {5}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2007.07.31} } @ARTICLE{Costa-Gomes2008, author = {Costa-Gomes, Miguel and Weizs{\"a}cker, Georg}, title = {Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {2008}, volume = {75}, pages = {729--762}, number = {3}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.07.22} } @ARTICLE{CoDu:97, author = {Couch, K. A. and Dunn, T. A.}, title = {inteergenerational correlations in labor market status: a comparison ofthe {U}nited {S}tates and {G}ermany}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1997}, volume = {32}, pages = {210-232}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Couch1997, author = {Couch, K. A. and Dunn, T. A.}, title = {inteergenerational correlations in labor market status: a comparison of the {U}nited {S}tates and {G}ermany}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1997}, volume = {32}, pages = {210-232}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{CoCoJe:94FF, author = {Coulter, F. A. E. and Cowell, F. A. and Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Family fortunes in the 1970s and the 1980s}, booktitle = {The Measurement of Household Welfare}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1994}, editor = {Blundell, R. W. and Preston, I. and Walker, I.}, pages = {215-246}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @INCOLLECTION{CoCoJe:94I, author = {Coulter, Fiona A. E. and Cowell, Frank A. and Jenkins, Stephen P.}, title = {Equivalence scale relativities and the extent of inequality and poverty}, booktitle = {Taxation, Poverty and Income Distribution}, publisher = {Edward Elgar}, year = {1994}, editor = {Creedy, J.}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{CoCoJe:94II, author = {Coulter, Fiona A. E. and Cowell, Frank A. and Jenkins, Stephen P.}, title = {Equivalence scales and assessment of income distribution}, booktitle = {Standard of Living and Families: Observation and Analysis}, publisher = {Eurotext}, year = {1994}, editor = {Ekert-Jaff{\'e}, O.}, pages = {345-365}, address = {Paris}, journal = {European Journal of Population}, key = {Equivalence scales} } @TECHREPORT{CoCoJe:98, author = {Coulter, F. A. E. and Cowell, F. A. and Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Inequality estimation with weighted data}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1998}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {26}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Coulter1994, author = {Coulter, Fiona A. E. and Cowell, Frank A. and Jenkins, Stephen P.}, title = {Equivalence scales and assessment of income distribution}, journal = {European Journal of Population}, year = {1994}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CoCoJe:92DI, author = {Coulter, Fiona A. E. and Cowell, Frank A. and Jenkins, Stephen P.}, title = {Differences in Needs and Assessement of Income Distributions}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {44}, pages = {77-124}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{CoCoJe:92ES, author = {Coulter, Fiona A. E. and Cowell, Frank A. and Jenkins, Stephen P.}, title = {Equivalence scale relativities and the extent of inequality and poverty}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1992}, volume = {102}, pages = {1067-1082}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Coulter1992, author = {Coulter, Fiona A. E. and Cowell, Frank A. and Jenkins, Stephen P.}, title = {Equivalence scale relativities and the extent of inequality and poverty}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1992}, volume = {102}, pages = {1067-1082}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Cour:38, title = {Recherches sur les Principes Math{\'e}mathiques de la Th{\'e}orie des Richesses}, publisher = {M. Rivi{\`e}re et Cie}, year = {1838}, author = {Cournot, A.}, address = {Paris}, key = {Micro} } @ARTICLE{CoGa:98, author = {Courtault, Jean-Michel and Gayant, Jean-Pascal}, title = {Local risk aversion in the rank dependent expected utility model: Firstorder versus second order effects}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {59}, pages = {207-212}, number = {2}, key = {uncertainty} } @TECHREPORT{Cowe:05, author = {Cowell, F.A.}, title = {Gini, Deprivation and Complaints}, institution = {DARP}, year = {2005}, address = {STICERD, LSE, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE}, month = {July}, note = {Prepared for the 2005 International Conference In Memory Of Two Social Scientists: C. Gini And M. O. Lorenz . Siena, Certosa di Pontignano 23-26 May, 2005}, abstract = {Recent insights from the philosopher Larry Temkin have suggested a new basis for the measurement of income inequality, founded on the notion of individual "complaints" about income distribution. Under certain specifi- cations of the relationship between complaints and personal incomes it can be shown that a concept similar to the concept of deprivation then emerges. In turn deprivation is related to the Gini index and to poverty. The paper examines the relationships between the Gini index and Lorenz orderings on the one hand and deprivation, poverty and complaints on the other hand.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:04CS, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Carrots and Sticks in Enforcement}, booktitle = {The Crisis in Tax Administration}, publisher = {The Brookings Instiution}, year = {2004}, editor = {Aaron, H. J. and Slemrod, J.}, pages = {230-275}, address = {Washington DC}, key = {Tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:00MI, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Measurement of Inequality}, booktitle = {Handbook of Income Distribution}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {2000}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Bourguignon, F.}, chapter = {2}, pages = {87-166}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:08, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Gini, deprivation and complaints}, booktitle = {Advances on Income Inequality and Concentration Measures}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2008}, editor = {Betti, G. and Lemmi, A.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:07GD, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Gini, Deprivation and Complaints}, booktitle = {Advances in income inequality and concentration measures}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2007}, editor = {Betti, G. and Lemmi, A.}, chapter = {3}, address = {London}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.03.07} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:07IM, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Inequality: Measurement}, booktitle = {The New Palgrave}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, year = {2007}, editor = {Blume, L. and Durlauf, S.}, address = {Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.03.07} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:89TC, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {The consequences of progressive income taxation for the shadow economy}, booktitle = {The Political Economy of Progressive Taxation}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1989}, editor = {B{\"o}s, D. and Hofreiter, M.}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {underground} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:88PM, author = {Cowell, Frank A.}, title = {Poverty Measures, Inequality and Decomposability}, booktitle = {Welfare and Efficiency in Public Economics}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1988}, editor = {B{\"o}s, D. and Rose, M. and Seidl, C.}, pages = {149-166}, address = {Berlin, Heidelberg}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:08ID, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Income Distribution and Inequality}, booktitle = {The Elgar Companion To Social Economics}, publisher = {Edward Elgar}, year = {2008}, editor = {Davis, J. B. and Dolfsma, W.}, chapter = {13}, address = {Cheltenham}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.01} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:08IM, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Inequality: Measurement}, booktitle = {The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, year = {2008}, editor = {Durlauf, S. N. and Blume, L. E.}, address = {Basingstoke}, edition = {2nd}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.01} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:85PP, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Public policy and tax evasion: some problems}, booktitle = {The Economics of the Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1985}, editor = {Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A.}, address = {Berlin, Germany}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:87TE, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {The economic analysis of tax evasion}, booktitle = {Surveys in The Economics of Uncertainty}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, year = {1987}, editor = {Hey, J. D. and Lambert, P.}, chapter = {9}, address = {Oxford}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:99EO, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Estimation of inequality indices}, booktitle = {Handbook on Income Inequality Measurement}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1999}, editor = {Silber, J.}, address = {Dewenter}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:85TS, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {The structure and duration of unemployment: Conference overview}, publisher = {Bureau of Labour Market Research}, year = {1985}, editor = {Volker, P.}, address = {Canberra, Australia}, key = {labour} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:91TE, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Tax-evasion experiments: an economist's view}, booktitle = {Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1991}, editor = {Webley, P. and Robben, H. and Elffers, H. and Hessing , K.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{Cowe:07MI, title = {Measuring Inequality}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, address = {Hemel Hempstead}, edition = {Third}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:06, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Theil, Inequality Indices and Decomposition}, journal = {Reseach on Economic Inequality}, year = {2006}, volume = {13}, pages = {345-360}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @BOOK{Cowe:03TE, title = {The Economics of Poverty and Inequality}, publisher = {Edward Elgar}, year = {2003}, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, address = {Cheltenham, {UK}}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Cowell2003b, title = {The Economics of Poverty and Inequality}, publisher = {Edward Elgar}, year = {2003}, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, address = {Cheltenham, UK}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Cowe:98IA, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Intermediate and Other Inequality Measures}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1998}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {42}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Cowe:98ID, author = {Cowell, Frank A.}, title = {Inheritance and the Distribution of Wealth}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1998}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {34}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {wealth} } @TECHREPORT{Cowe:98MI, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Measurement of Inequality}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1998}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {36}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Cowe:97EO, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Estimation of inequality indices}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1997}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {25}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Cowe:96FI, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Family Instability, Family Incomes and Inequality}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1996}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {12}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Cowe:95EA, title = {Enga{\~n}ar al Estado}, publisher = {Alianza Editorial}, year = {1995}, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, address = {Madrid}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{Cowe:95MI, title = {Measuring Inequality}, publisher = {Harvester Wheatsheaf}, year = {1995}, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, address = {Hemel Hempstead}, edition = {Second}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:93, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {What's wrong with going underground?}, journal = {International Economic Insights}, year = {1993}, volume = {15}, pages = {20-22}, number = {November/December}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:92, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Tax evasion and Inequity}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1992}, volume = {13}, pages = {521-543}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:91GB, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Grouping bounds for inequality measures under alternative informational assumptions}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1991}, volume = {48}, pages = {1-14}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Cowe:90CT, title = {Cheating the Government}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {1990}, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:90TS, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Tax Sheltering and the cost of evasion}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1990}, volume = {42}, pages = {231-243}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:89AO, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Analysis of income distributions using microcomputer technology}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1989}, volume = {1}, pages = {249-267}, key = {inequality}, publisher = {JAI Press} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:89HI, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Honesty is sometimes the best policy}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1989}, volume = {33}, pages = {605-617}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:89SV, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Sampling variance and decomposable inequality measures}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1989}, volume = {42}, pages = {27-41}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:88ID, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Inequality decomposition - three bad measures}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {40}, pages = {309-312}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:88OT, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {On the distribution of lifetime income in a lognormal model}, booktitle = {Essays on Income Distribution, Economic Welfare and Taxation}, publisher = {ETLA}, year = {1988}, address = {Helsinki}, key = {distributions} } @TECHREPORT{Cowe:88TS, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Tax sheltering and the cost of evasion}, institution = {London School of Economics}, year = {1988}, type = {Taxation, Incentives and the Distribution of Income Discussion Paper}, number = {119}, address = {Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:87EE, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {El an{\'a}lisis econ{\'o}mico de la evasi{\'o}n fiscal}, journal = {Estudios Econ{\'o}micos}, year = {1987}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Cowell1987, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {El an\'alisis econ\'omico de la evasi\'on fiscal}, journal = {Estudios Econ\'omicos}, year = {1987}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Cowe:86MP, title = {Microeconomic Principles}, publisher = {Philip Allan}, year = {1986}, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{Cowe:86WB, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Welfare benefits and the economics of takeup}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1986}, type = {ESRC Research Programme in Taxation, Incentives and the Distribution ofIncome}, number = {89}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:85AF, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {`{A} fair suck of the sauce bottle' -- or what do you mean by inequality?}, journal = {Economic Record}, year = {1985}, volume = {6}, pages = {567-579}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:85EA, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {The Economic analysis of tax evasion: a survey}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {37}, pages = {163-193}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:85MD, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Multilevel decomposition of {T}heil's index of inequality}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1985}, volume = {31}, pages = {201-205}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:85MO, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Measures of Distributional Change: An Axiomatic Appoach}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1985}, volume = {52}, pages = {135-151}, key = {income distributional:theoretical}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:85TE, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Tax evasion with labour income}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1985}, volume = {26}, pages = {19-34}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Cowell1985, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {The measurement of distributional change: an axiomatic approach}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1985}, volume = {52}, pages = {135-151}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Cowell1985e, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {`{A} fair suck of the sauce bottle'-or what do you mean by inequality?}, journal = {Economic Record}, year = {1985}, volume = {6}, pages = {567-579}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Cowe:84FS, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Family splits and income inequality}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1984}, type = {ESRC Research Programme in Taxation, Incentives and the Distribution ofIncome}, number = {77}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Cowe:84TF, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {The firm and illegal employment: an economic analysis}, institution = {LSE}, year = {1984}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:84TS, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {The structure of {A}merican income inequality}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1984}, volume = {30}, pages = {351-375}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Cowe:83, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Social welfare functions and income inequality}, institution = {LSE}, year = {1983}, type = {mimeo}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:81IM, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Income maintenance schemes under wage-rate uncertainty}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1981}, volume = {71}, pages = {692-702}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:81TA, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Taxation and labour supply with risky activities}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1981}, volume = {48}, pages = {365-379}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:80GE, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Generalized Entropy and the Measurement of Distributional Change}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1980}, volume = {13}, pages = {147-159}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Cowe:80LT, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Limits to Redistribution: a commentary}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Colston Symposium}, publisher = {Colston Research Society}, year = {1980}, address = {London}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:80OT, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {On the structure of additive inequality measures}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1980}, volume = {47}, pages = {521-531}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:79IA, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Income and incentives for the working poor}, journal = {Three Banks Review}, year = {1979}, pages = {32-48}, number = {122}, key = {public economics} } @PHDTHESIS{Cowe:77IT, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Income Tax Incidence, Redistribution and the Individual Life Cycle}, school = {University of Cambridge}, year = {1977}, address = {UK}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{Cowe:77MI, title = {Measuring Inequality}, publisher = {Phillip Allan}, year = {1977}, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, address = {Oxford}, edition = {First}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:75IT, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Income tax incidence in an ageing population}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1975}, volume = {6}, pages = {343-367}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:75OT, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {On the estimation of lifetime income - a correction}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1975}, volume = {70}, pages = {588-589}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Cowe:75SN, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Some notes on progression and risk-taking}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1975}, volume = {42}, pages = {313-318}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{Cowe:73, author = {Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Income tax progression and optimal economic growth}, institution = {University of Essex}, year = {1973}, type = {Public Economics Workshop Paper}, number = {15}, address = {Colchester, Essex}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{CoAt:83, title = {Panel Data on Incomes}, publisher = {ICERD}, year = {1983}, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Atkinson, A. B.}, address = {LSE,London}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{CoEb:04, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Ebert, U.}, title = {Complaints and Inequality}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2004}, volume = {23}, pages = {71-89}, key = {Inequality} } @TECHREPORT{CoEb:02, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Ebert, U.}, title = {Complaints and Inequality}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {2002}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {61}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {Inequality} } @ARTICLE{Cowell1999i, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Ferreira, F. H. G. and Litchfield, J. A.}, title = {Income Distribution in {B}razil 1981-1990. Parametric and Non-Parametric Approaches}, journal = {Journal of Income Distribution}, year = {1999}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CoFeLi:98, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Ferreira, F. H. G. and Litchfield, J. A.}, title = {Income Distribution in {B}razil 1981-1990. Parametric and Non-ParametricApproaches}, journal = {Journal of Income Distribution}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, pages = {63-76}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Cowell1998d, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Ferreira, F. H. G. and Litchfield, J. A.}, title = {Income Distribution in {B}razil 1981-1990. Parametric and Non-Parametric Approaches}, journal = {Journal of Income Distribution}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, pages = {63-76}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{CoFeLi:96, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Ferreira, F. H. G. and Litchfield, J. A.}, title = {Income Distribution in Brazil 1981-1990. Parametric and Non-Parametric Approaches}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1996}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {22}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{CoFl:07, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Flachaire, E.}, title = {Income Distribution and Inequality Measurement: The Problem of Extreme Values}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2007}, volume = {141}, pages = {1044-1072}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.03.07} } @TECHREPORT{CoGa:00, author = {Cowell, Frank A. and Gardiner, K. A.}, title = {Welfare Weights}, institution = {Office of Fair Training}, year = {2000}, type = {OFT Economic Research Paper}, number = {202}, address = {Salisbury Square, London}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{Cowell1999g, author = {Cowell, Frank A. and Gardiner, K. A.}, title = {Welfare Weights}, institution = {Office of Fair Training}, year = {1999}, type = {Discussion Paper}, address = {London}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{CoGo:99IN, title = {INeQ: Software for Distributional Analysis}, publisher = {STICERD}, year = {1999}, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Gomulka, J.}, address = {London School of Economics,London}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{CoGoVF:95a, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Gomulka, J. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {The Dirty Data Book: Robust Statistical Analysis of Income Distributions,Inequality and Poverty}, year = {1995}, note = {Book in Preparation, STICERD, LSE}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{CoGo:95, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Gordon, J. P. F.}, title = {Auditing with ghosts}, booktitle = {The economics of organised crime}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press and CEPR}, year = {1995}, editor = {Fiorentini, G. and Peltzman, S.}, pages = {185-196}, address = {Cambridge, London}, key = {Tax compliance - firms} } @TECHREPORT{CoGo:90, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Gordon, J. P. F.}, title = {On Becoming a Ghost}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1990}, type = {ESRC Research Programme in Taxation, Incentives and the Distribution ofIncome}, number = {127}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{CoGo:89, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Gordon, J. P. F.}, title = {On Becoming a Ghost: Indirect Tax Evasion and Government Audit Policy}, institution = {STICERD}, year = {1989}, type = {ESRC programme on taxation, incentives and the distribution of income DiscussionPaper}, number = {127}, address = {London School of Economics}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{CoGo:89OB, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Gordon, J. P. F.}, title = {On becoming a ghost}, institution = {London School of Economics}, year = {1989}, type = {Taxation, Incentives and the Distribution of Income Discussion Paper}, address = {Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{CoGo:88UT, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Gordon, J. P. F.}, title = {Unwillingness to pay: tax evasion and public good provision}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1988}, volume = {36}, pages = {305-321}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{CoJe:03, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Estimating welfare indices: household sample design}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {2003}, volume = {9}, pages = {147-172}, key = {Welfare}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.18} } @TECHREPORT{CoJe:00EW, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Estimating Welfare Indices: Households Weights and Sample Design}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {2000}, type = {Distributional Analysis Research Programme Working Paper}, number = {48}, address = {Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE}, abstract = {http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/pubs/workpaps/wp2000-23.htm}, howpublished = {http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/pubs/workpaps/wp2000-23.htm}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{CoJe:99, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Inequality estimation with weighted data}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1999}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {26}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{CoJe:95, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {How much inequality can we explain? {A} methodology and an application to the {USA}}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1995}, volume = {105}, pages = {421-430}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Cowell1995, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {How much inequality can we explain? {A} methodology and an application to the {USA}}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1995}, volume = {105}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{CoJe:93TC, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {The changing pattern of income inequality. The {US} in the 1980s}, institution = {University College of Swansea}, year = {1993}, type = {Department of Economics Discussion Paper}, number = {93-10}, address = {Swansea, Wales SA2 8PP}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @INCOLLECTION{CoJeLi:96, author = {Cowell, Frank A. and Jenkins, Stephen P. and Litchfield, Julie A.}, title = {The Changing Shape of the {UK} Income Distribution: Kernel Density Estimates}, booktitle = {New Inequalities: the Changing Distribution of Income and Wealth in the{U}nited {K}ingdom}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1996}, editor = {Hills , J. R.}, chapter = {3}, pages = {49-75}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{CoKu:81AA, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Kuga, K.}, title = {Additivity and the Entropy concept: An axiomatic approach to inequality measurement}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1981}, volume = {25}, pages = {131-143}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{CoKu:81IM, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Kuga, K.}, title = {Inequality measurement: an axiomatic approach}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1981}, volume = {15}, pages = {287-305}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Cowell1981a, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Kuga, K.}, title = {Additivity and the Entropy concept: An axiomatic approach to inequality measure}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1981}, volume = {25}, pages = {131-143}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{CoKu:76, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Kuga, K.}, title = {Inequality measures and the integrability problem}, institution = {University of Keele}, year = {1976}, type = {Department of Economics Discussion Paper}, number = {11}, address = {Keele, Staffs}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{CoLiMe:99, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Litchfield, J. A. and Mercader-Prats, M.}, title = {Income Inequality Comparisons with Dirty Data: The {UK} and {S}pain Duringthe 1980s}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1999}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {45}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{CoMe:82, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Mehta, F.}, title = {The estimation and interpolation of inequality measures}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1982}, volume = {49}, pages = {273-290}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{CoMe:99, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Mercader-Prats, M.}, title = {Equivalence scales and inequality}, booktitle = {Handbook on Income Inequality Measurement}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1999}, editor = {Silber, J.}, address = {Dewenter}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{CoMe:97, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Mercader-Prats, M.}, title = {Equivalence scales and inequality}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1997}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {27}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{CoSc:98ID, author = {Cowell, Frank A. and Schluter, C.}, title = {Income Mobility: a Robust Apprach}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1998}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {37}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {mobility} } @TECHREPORT{CoSc:98MI, author = {Cowell, Frank A. and Schluter, Christian}, title = {Measuring Income Mobility with Dirty Data}, institution = {Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion}, year = {1998}, type = {CASE paper}, number = {16}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{CoSc:01, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Schokkaert, E.}, title = {Risk Perceptions and Distributional Judgments}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {42}, pages = {941-952}, abstract = {We examine the role of laboratory questionnaire-experiments and recent appliedempirical research on attitudes in understanding the relationships betweenpeople ' perceptions of inequality and their perceptions of risk.We considerrisk in three interpretations:& vacuo 'in day-to-day life and in the originalposition.}, key = {risk} } @TECHREPORT{CoSh:80, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Inequality decomposition by population subgroup}, institution = {London school of Economics}, year = {1980}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @INCOLLECTION{CoVF:08MI, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Modelling {L}orenz Curves: robust and semi-parametric issues}, booktitle = {Modeling Income Distributions and {L}orenz Curves}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2008}, editor = {Chotikapanich, D.}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.07.21} } @INCOLLECTION{CoVF:99DA, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Distributional Analysis: A Robust Approach}, booktitle = {Putting Economics To Work}, publisher = {STICERD}, year = {1999}, editor = {H. Glennerster}, address = {London}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{CoVF:07RS, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Robust Stochastic Dominance: A Semi-Parametric Approach}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2007}, volume = {5}, pages = {21-37}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.03.01} } @ARTICLE{CoVF:06DD, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Distributional Dominance with Trimmed Data}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economics Statistics}, year = {2006}, volume = {24}, pages = {291-300}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{CoVF:03DF, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Distribution-Free Inference for Welfare Indices under Complete and Incomplete Information}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2003}, volume = {1}, pages = {191-219}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{CoVF:02a, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Distribution-Free Inference for Welfare Indices under Complete and IncompleteInformation}, institution = {London School of Economics and University of Geneva}, year = {2002}, note = {Mimeo}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{CoVF:02WR, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Welfare Rankings in the Presence of Contaminated Data}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2002}, volume = {70}, pages = {1221-1233}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{CoVF:01DD, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Distributional Dominance with Dirty Data}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {2001}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {51}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{CoVF:01RS, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Robust {L}orenz Curves: A semi-parametric approach}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {2001}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {50}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{CoVF:99SI, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Statistical Inference for Welfare Indices under Complete and IncompleteInformation}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1999}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {47}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{CoVF:98DD, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Distributional Dominance with Dirty Data}, institution = {STICERD}, year = {1998}, type = {Working paper}, address = {London School of Economics}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{CoVF:98SI, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Statistical Inference for {L}orenz Curves with Censored Data}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1998}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {35}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{CoVF:96d, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Poverty Judgments with Imperfect Data}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1996}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {28}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{CoVF:96PM, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Poverty Measurement with Contaminated Data: A Robust Approach}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1996}, volume = {40}, pages = {1761-1771}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{CoVF:96RP, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Robustness Properties of Inequality Measures}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1996}, volume = {64}, pages = {77-101}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{CoVF:96WJ, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Welfare judgements in the presence of contaminated data}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1996}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {13}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{CoVF:94RP, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Robustness Properties of Poverty Indices}, institution = {London School of Economics}, year = {1994}, type = {{DARP} Discussion Papers no 8, {STICERD}}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {poverty} } @MISC{Cowell1994a, author = {Cowell, Frank A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Robustness Properties of Poverty Indices}, howpublished = {European Economic Annual Meeting}, month = {September}, year = {1994}, note = {Maastricht}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @MISC{CoVF:93, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Robustness Properties of Inequality Measures}, howpublished = {International Seminar on Economic Policy and Income distribution}, month = {May}, year = {1993}, note = {Israel}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{CoVF:93RI, author = {Cowell, F. A. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Robustness Properties of Inequality Measures: The Influence Function andthe Principle of Transfers}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1993}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {1}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{CoCr:04, author = {Cowell, F.A. and Cruces, G.A.}, title = {Perceptions of inequality and risk}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {2004}, volume = {12}, pages = {99-132}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Cox:84RR, author = {Cox, D.}, title = {Raising revenue in the underground economy}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1984}, volume = {37}, pages = {283-288}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{CoEsJi:98, author = {Cox, Donald and Eser, Zekeriya and Jimenez, Emmanuel}, title = {Motives for private transfers over the life cycle: An analytical frameworkand evidence for {P}eru}, journal = {Journal of Development Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {55}, pages = {57-79}, number = {1}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Cox:62, author = {Cox, D. R.}, title = {Further results on tests of separate families of hypotheses}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B}, year = {1962}, volume = {24}, pages = {406-464}, key = {statistics} } @INPROCEEDINGS{Cox:61, author = {Cox, D. R.}, title = {Tests of Separate Families of Hypotheses}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Fourth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statisticsand Probability}, year = {1961}, volume = {1}, pages = {105-23}, address = {Berkeley, CA}, publisher = {University of California Press}, key = {statistics} } @BOOK{CoOa:84, title = {Analysis of Survival Data}, publisher = {Chapman and Hall}, year = {1984}, author = {Cox, D. R. and Oakes, D.}, key = {mobility} } @TECHREPORT{CoFrSa:07, author = {Cox,J.C. and Friedman,D. and Sadiraj,V.}, title = {Revealed Altruism}, institution = {Andrew Young School of Policy Studies}, year = {2007}, type = {Research Paper}, number = {07-14}, abstract = {This paper develops a nonparametric theory of preferences over one's own and others' monetary payoffs. We introduce more altruistic than (MAT), a partial ordering over preferences, and interpret it with known parametric models. We also introduce and illustrate more generous than (MGT),a partial ordering over opportunity sets. Several recent studies focus on two player extensive form games of complete information in which the first mover (FM) chooses a more or less generous opportunity set for the second mover (SM). Here reciprocity can be formalized as the assertion that an MGT choice by the FM will elicit MAT preferences in the SM. A further assertion is that the effect on preferences is stronger for acts of commission by FM than for acts of omission. We state and prove propositions on the observable consequences of these assertions. Finally, empirical support for the propositions is found in existing data from investment games and from Stackelberg games and in new data from Stackelberg mini-games.}, key = {Altruism}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Cox1997, author = {Cox, J. C.}, title = {On testing the utility hypothesis}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {1054-1078}, key = {economic psychology}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Cox:97, author = {Cox, J. C.}, title = {On testing the utility hypothesis}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {1054-1078}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{CoEp:89, author = {Cox, J. C. and Epstein, S.}, title = {Preference Reversals Without the Independence Axiom}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1989}, volume = {79}, pages = {408-426}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Cox89, author = {Cox, J. C. and Epstein, S.}, title = {Preference Reversals Without the Independence Axiom}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {89}, volume = {79}, pages = {408-426}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Cram:78, author = {Cramer, J. S.}, title = {A Function for the Size Distribution of Income: Comment}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1978}, volume = {46}, pages = {459-460}, key = {Distributions} } @ARTICLE{CrNo:90TR, author = {Crane, S. E. and Nourzad, F.}, title = {Tax rates and tax evasion: Evidence from California tax amnesty data}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1990}, volume = {43}, pages = {189-199}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{CrNo:87OT, author = {Crane, S. E. and Nourzad, F.}, title = {On the treatment of income tax rates in empirical analysis of tax evasion}, journal = {Kyklos}, year = {1987}, volume = {40}, pages = {338-348}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{CrNo:86IA, author = {Crane, S. E. and Nourzad, F.}, title = {Inflation and tax evasion: An empirical analysis}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1986}, volume = {68}, pages = {217-223}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Crane1985, author = {Crane, S. E. and Nourzad, F.}, title = {The time value of money and income tax evasion under risk-averse behaviour: theoretical analysis and empirical evidence}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1985}, volume = {40}, pages = {381-394}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CrNo:85TT, author = {Crane, S. E. and Nourzad, F.}, title = {The time value of money and income tax evasion under risk-averse behaviour:theoretical analysis and empirical evidence}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1985}, volume = {40}, pages = {381-394}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{CrSmTa:99, author = {Crawford, I. and Smith, Z. and Tanner, S.}, title = {Alcohol Taxes, Tax Revenues and the Single European Market}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {287-304}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Crawford1999, author = {I. Crawford and Smith Z. and Tanner S.}, title = {Alcohol Taxes, Tax Revenues and the Single European Market}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {287-304}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Craw:02, author = {Crawford, V. P.}, title = {Introduction to Experimental Game Theory}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2002}, volume = {104}, pages = {1-15}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{CrSo:82, author = {Crawford, V. P. and Sobel, J.}, title = {Strategic information transmission}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1982}, volume = {50}, pages = {1431-1451}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{Cree:97, author = {Creedy, John}, title = {Inequality, mobility and income distribution comparisons}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1997}, volume = {18}, pages = {293-302}, number = {3}, month = {August}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Cree:90, author = {Creedy, J.}, title = {Measuring wealth in a simple two-period model}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1990}, volume = {43}, pages = {179-195}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Cree:88, author = {Creedy, J.}, title = {Increasing the time period in the measurement of inequality}, institution = {University of Melbourne}, year = {1988}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Cree:85, title = {Dynamics of Income Distribution}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, year = {1985}, author = {Creedy, J.}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Cree:77, author = {Creedy, J.}, title = {The principle of transfers and the variance of logarithms}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1977}, volume = {39}, pages = {153-8}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{CrKaKe:07, author = {Creedy, J. and Kalb, G. and Kew, H.}, title = {Confidence Intervals for Policy Reforms in Behavioural Tax Microsimulation Modelling}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {59}, pages = {37-65}, abstract = {This paper addresses the need for a measure of the uncertainty that is associated with the results calculated using tax policy behavioural microsimulation models. Deriving the analytical measure would be extremely complicated. Therefore, a simulated approach is proposed, which approximates the sampling distribution of aggregate measures based on the sampling distribution of the estimated labour supply parameters. This approach, which is very computer intensive, is compared with a more time-efficient approach where the functional formof the sampling distribution is assumed to be normal. The results show that in many instances the results from the two approaches are quite similar. The exception is when aggregate measures for minor types of payments, involving relatively small groups of the population, are examined.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{CrDeMaPe:07, author = {Cremer, Helmuth and De Doner, Philippe and Maldonado, Dario and Pestieau, Pierre}, title = {Voting over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {2041-2061}, abstract = {This paper studies the determination through majority voting of a pension scheme when society consists of far-sighted and myopic individuals. All individuals have the same basic preferences but myopics tend to adopt short-term view (instant gratification) when dealing with retirement saving and labor supply. Consequently, they will find themselves with low consumption after retirement and regret their insufficient savings decisions. Henceforth, when voting they tend to commit themselves into forced saving.We consider a pension scheme that is characterized by two parameters: the payroll tax rate (that determines the size or generosity of the system) and the “Bismarckian factor” that determines its redistributiveness. Individuals vote sequentially. We examine how the introduction of myopic agents affects the generosity and the redistributiveness of the pension system. Our main result is that a flat pension system is always chosen when all individuals are of one kind (all far-sighted or all myopic), while a less redistributive system may be chosen if society is composed of both myopic and far-sighted agents. Furthermore, while myopic individuals tend to prefer larger payroll taxes than their far-sighted counterparts, the generosity of the system does not always increase with the proportion of myopics.}, key = {Social Security}, keywords = {Social security, Myopia, Dual-self model}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{CrGa:01, author = {Cremer, H. and Gahvari, F.}, title = {Second Best Taxation of Emissions and Polluting Goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {80}, pages = {169-197}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{CrGa:00, author = {Cremer, H. and Gahvari, F.}, title = {Tax Evasion, Fiscal Competition and Economic Integration}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2000}, volume = {44}, pages = {1633-1657}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{CrGa:96, author = {Cremer, H. and Gahvari, F.}, title = {Tax evasion, concealment and the optimal linear income tax}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {60}, pages = {235-249}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Cremer1995, author = {Cremer, H. and Gahvari, F.}, title = {{Tax} {Evasion} and the {Optimum} {General} {Income} {Tax}}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1995}, volume = {60}, pages = {235-249}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CrGa:94, author = {Cremer, H. and Gahvari, F.}, title = {Tax evasion, concealment and the optimal linear income tax}, journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {96}, pages = {219-239}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{CrGa:93, author = {Cremer, H. and Gahvari, F.}, title = {Tax Evasion and Optimal Commodity Taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {50}, pages = {261-275}, key = {Tax compliance - firms} } @ARTICLE{CrGaLa:98, author = {Cremer, Helmuth and Gahvari, Firouz and Ladoux, Norbert}, title = {Externalities and optimal taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {70}, pages = {343-364}, number = {3}, key = {Optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{Cremer2003a, author = {Cremer, H. and Laffont, J.-J.}, title = {Public goods with costly access}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1985-2012}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CrLa:03, author = {Cremer, H. and Laffont, J.-J.}, title = {Public goods with costly access}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1985–2012}, key = {public goods} } @TECHREPORT{CrLoPe:07, author = {Cremer,H. and Lozachmeur,J.M. and Pestieau,P.}, title = {Income Taxation of Couples and the Tax Unit Choice}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, number = {2005}, abstract = {This paper studies the optimal non linear income tax of couples. We build a general unitary model of labor supply and allow multidimensional heterogeneity in a discrete type framework. We concentrate our analysis on the resulting intra-family labor allocation of labor supplies and show that this analysis is strongly related to the choice of the tax unit (individual versus joint taxation). We give a necessary condition to have fully joint taxation in this framework and discuss some examples.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{CrLoPe:04, author = {Cremer, Helmuth and Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie and Pestieau, Pierre}, title = {Social security, retirement age and optimal income taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {2259-2281}, abstract = {It is often argued that implicit taxation on continued activity of elderlyworkers is responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement.In a world of laissez-faire or of first-best efficiency, there would beno such implicit taxation. The point of this paper is that, when first-bestredistributive instruments are not available, because some variables arenot observable, the optimal policy does imply a distortion of the retirementdecision. Consequently, the inducement of early retirement may be partof the optimal tax-transfer policy. We consider a model in which individualsdiffer in their productivity and their capacity to work long and chooseboth their weekly labor supply and their age of retirement. We characterizethe optimal non-linear tax-transfer that maximizes a utilitarian welfarefunction when weekly earnings and the length of active life are observablewhile individuals’ productivity and health status are not observable.}, key = {optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{Cremer1997, author = {Cremer, H. and Marchand, M. and Pestieau, P.}, title = {Investment in local public services: Nash Equilibrium and social optimum}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {23-36}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CrMaPe:97, author = {Cremer, H. and Marchand, M. and Pestieau, P.}, title = {Investment in local public services: {N}ash Equilibrium and social optimum}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {23-36}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{CrMaPe:90, author = {Cremer, H. and Marchand, M. and Pestieau, P.}, title = {Evading, Auditing and Taxing. The equity-compliance Trade-off}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1990}, volume = {43}, pages = {67-92}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{CrPe:06WT, author = {Cremer, H. and Pestieau, P.}, title = {Wealth Transfer Taxation: a Survey of the Theoretical Literature}, booktitle = {Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {2006}, editor = {Gérard-Varet, L.- A. and Kolm, S.- C. and Mercier-Ythier , J.}, volume = {1}, chapter = {16}, pages = {1107-1134}, address = {Amsterdam}, abstract = {The purpose of this paper is to survey the theoretical literature on wealth transfer taxation. The focus is normative: we are looking at the design of an optimal tax structure from the standpoint of both equity and efficiency. The gist of this survey is that the optimal design crucially depends on the assumed bequest motives. Alternative bequest motives are thus analyzed either in isolation or combined. Even though there are as many results as models and as many models as combinations of bequest motives, the general conclusion is that the case for a zero taxation of inheritance is very weak.}, key = {wealth tax}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.12} } @ARTICLE{CrPe:06IT, author = {Cremer, Helmuth and Pestieau, Pierre}, title = {Intergenerational Transfer of Human Capital and Optimal Education Policy}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {2006}, pages = {8}, abstract = {We study the design of education policies (subsidies and public education) when parents’ investment in education is motivated by warmglow altruism and determines the probability that a child has a high ability. The optimal subsidy is not necessarily positive. It is determined by two conflicting terms: a Pigouvian term (warm-glow altruists do not properly account for the impact of education on future generations) and a “paternalistic” effect (the warm-glow term may not be fully included in social welfare). Finally, total crowding out of private expenditure (for one of the types) by public education may be desirable.}, key = {education}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @TECHREPORT{CrPe:03, author = {Cremer, H. and Pestieau, P.}, title = {Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Survey}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2003}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1061}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, abstract = {The purpose of this paper is to survey the theoretical literature on wealth transfer taxation. The focus is normative: we are looking at the design of an optimal tax structure from the standpoint of both equity and efficiency. The gist of this survey is that the optimal design closely depends on the assumed bequest motives. Alternative bequest motives are thus analyzed either in isolation or combined.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Cremer2001, author = {Cremer, H. and Pestieau, P.}, title = {Non-Linear Taxation of Bequests, Equal Sharing Rules and the Tradeoff Between Intra- and Inter-Family Inequalities}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, pages = {35-53}, key = {Wealth tax}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CrPe:01, author = {Cremer, H. and Pestieau, P.}, title = {Non-Linear Taxation of Bequests, Equal Sharing Rules and the Tradeoff BetweenIntra- and Inter-Family Inequalities}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, pages = {35-53}, abstract = {This paper studies the design of the tax and regulatory regime applied to bequests. Bequests are observable, while parent’s wealth and children’s earning abilities are not. Parents know their children’s earning abilities. Parents are altruistic; their utility depends on their children’s utilities, but weights may differ between children. The optimal tax schedule strikes a balance between the (often) conflicting ‘incentive’ and ‘corrective’ effects. When parents attach identical weights to their children, an estate taxation is sufficient. Equal sharing rules appear to be appropriate only in extreme cases such as in presence of the so-called Cinderella effect.}, key = {wealth taxation} } @ARTICLE{CrPe:98, author = {Cremer, Helmuth and Pestieau, Pierre}, title = {Social insurance, majority voting and labor mobility}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {68}, pages = {397-420}, number = {3}, key = {Social insurance} } @ARTICLE{CrPeRo:01, author = {Cremer, H. and Pestieau, P. and Rochet, J.-C.}, title = {Direct versus Indirect Taxation: The Design of the Tax Structure Revisited}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {42}, pages = {781-799}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.10} } @ARTICLE{CrRe:84, author = {Cressie, N. A. C. and Read, T. R. C.}, title = {Multinominal {G}oodness-of-{F}it {T}ests}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B}, year = {1984}, volume = {46}, pages = {440-464}, key = {statistics}, series = {B} } @ARTICLE{Crew:82, author = {Crew, E. L.}, title = {Double cumulative and {L}orenz curves in weather modification}, journal = {Journal of Applied Meteorology}, year = {1982}, volume = {21}, pages = {1063-1070}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{CrSl:07TE, author = {Crocker, K. J. and Slemrod, J.}, title = {The economics of earnings manipulation and managerial compensation}, journal = {RAND Journal of Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {38}, pages = {698-713}, abstract = {This article examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the actual earnings of the firm.When realized, these earnings constitute hidden information that is privately observed by the manager, who may expend resources to generate an inflated earnings report. We characterize the optimal managerial compensation contract in this setting, and demonstrate that contracts contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the incentive both to maximize profits and to report those profits honestly. As a result, some degree of earnings management must be tolerated as a necessary part of an efficient agreement.}, key = {firm}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.19} } @ARTICLE{Crocker2005, author = {Crocker, Keith J. and Slemrod, Joel}, title = {Corporate tax evasion with agency costs}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {1593--1610}, number = {9-10}, month = sep, abstract = {This paper examines corporate tax evasion in the context of the contractual relationship between the shareholders of a firm and a tax manager who possesses private information regarding the extent of legally permissible reductions in taxable income, and who may also undertake illegal tax evasion. Using a costly state falsification framework, we characterize formally the optimal incentive compensation contract for the tax manager and, in particular, how the form of that contract changes in response to alternative enforcement policies imposed by the taxing authority. The optimal contract may adjust to offset, at least partially, the effect of sanctions against illegal evasion, and we find a new and policy-relevant non-equivalence result: penalties imposed on the tax manager are more effective in reducing evasion than are those imposed on shareholders.}, keywords = {Tax evasion, Enforcement, Agency costs}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.07.17}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-4DTTGPB-1/1/0641b81e76ed364a4bb4c7cac5cc58b0} } @ARTICLE{CrSl:05, author = {Crocker, K. J. and Slemrod, J.}, title = {Corporate tax evasion with agency costs}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {1593-1610}, abstract = {This paper examines corporate tax evasion in the context of the contractualrelationship between the shareholders of a firm and a tax manager who possessesprivate information regarding the extent of legally permissible reductionsin taxable income, and who may also undertake illegal tax evasion. Usinga costly state falsification framework, we characterize formally the optimalincentive compensation contract for the tax manager and, in particular,how the form of that contract changes in response to alternative enforcementpolicies imposed by the taxing authority. The optimal contract may adjustto offset, at least partially, the effect of sanctions against illegalevasion, and we find a new and policy-relevant non-equivalence result:penalties imposed on the tax manager are more effective in reducing evasionthan are those imposed on shareholders.}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{CrTs:98, author = {Crone, Lisa and Tschirhart, John}, title = {Separating economic from political influences on government decisions}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {35}, pages = {405-425}, number = {4}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Cron:79, author = {Cronin, D. C.}, title = {A Function for the Size Distribution of Income: A Further Comment}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, volume = {47}, pages = {773-774}, key = {Distributions} } @ARTICLE{Crop:77, author = {Cropper, M. L.}, title = {Health, Investment in Health and Occupational Choice}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1977}, volume = {85}, pages = {1273-1294}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{Cropper1977, author = {Cropper, M. L.}, title = {Health, Investment in Health, and Occupational Choice}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1977}, volume = {85}, pages = {1273-1294}, key = {health}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{CrSu:88, author = {Cropper, M. L. and Sussman, F. G.}, title = {Families and the Economics of Risks to Life}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1988}, volume = {78}, pages = {255-260}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{CrSh:82OT, author = {Cross, R. and Shaw, G. K.}, title = {On the economics of tax aversion}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1982}, volume = {37}, pages = {36-47}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{CrSh:81TE, author = {Cross, R. B. and Shaw, G. K.}, title = {The evasion - avoidance choice - a suggested approach}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1981}, volume = {34}, pages = {489-491}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{CrMaWo:04, author = {Cruces, G. and Makdissi, P. and Wodon, Q. T.}, title = {Poverty Measurement Under Risk Aversion Using Panel Data}, journal = {Contributions to Economic Analysis \& Policy}, year = {2004}, volume = {3}, pages = {1-18}, abstract = {This paper shows how to take into account risk aversion when measuring poverty under income variability. An application to British panel data suggests that income and poverty comparisons between the self-employed and other groups of households are sensitive to assumptions on the degree of risk aversion. The results point to the importance of panel data in order to account for risk aversion and income variability in the measurement of poverty.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{CrGr:08, author = {Crumpler, H. and Grossman, P. J.}, title = {An experimental test of warm glow giving}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {1011-1021}, number = {5-6}, month = {June}, abstract = {This paper reports the results of an experimental test of the warm glow hypothesis. A participant is presented with the opportunity to contribute from her own endowment to a charity of choice. The experiment is designed so that a pure altruist has no incentive to donate. The amount the designated charity will receive is preset; any contribution by the participant crowds out dollarfor- dollar giving by the proctor. We find that participants, on average, donated 20% of their endowments and that approximately 57% of the participants made a donation.}, key = {altruism}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.22} } @ARTICLE{CsGaZi:98, author = {Cs{\"o}rg{\"o}, M. and Gastwirth, J. L. and Zitikis, R.}, title = {Asymptotic confidence bands for the {L}orenz and {B}onferroni curves basedon the empirical {L}orenz curve}, journal = {Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference}, year = {1998}, volume = {74}, pages = {65-91}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Csorgo1998, author = {Cs{\"o}rg{\"o}, M. and Gastwirth, J. L. and Zitikis, R.}, title = {Asymptotic confidence bands for the {L}orenz and {B}onferroni curves based on the empirical {L}orenz curve}, journal = {Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference}, year = {1998}, volume = {74}, pages = {65-91}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{CsCsHo:86, title = {An asymptotic theory for empirical reliability and concentration preocesses}, year = {1986}, author = {Cs{\"o}rg{\H o}, M. and Cs{\"o}rg{\H o}, S. and Horv{\'a}th, L.}, series = {Lectures Notes in Statistics}, address = {Berlin}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{CsMa:89, author = {Cs{\"o}rg{\H o}, M. and Mason, D. M.}, title = {Bootstrapping empirical functions}, journal = {Annals of Statistics}, year = {1989}, volume = {17}, pages = {1447-1471}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{CsZi:96, author = {Cs{\"o}rg{\H o}, M. and Zitikis, R.}, title = {{S}trassen's {LIL} for the {L}orenz {C}urve}, journal = {Journal of Multivariate Analysis}, year = {1996}, key = {statistics} } @INCOLLECTION{CsZi:96b, author = {Cs{\"o}rg{\H o}, M. and Zitikis, R.}, title = {On confidence bands for the {L}orenz and {G}oldie curves}, booktitle = {A Volume in Honor of {S}amuel {K}otz}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1996}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{CsZi:95, author = {Cs{\"o}rg{\H o}, M. and Zitikis, R.}, title = {On the{V}ervaat, {L}orenz and {G}oldie {P}rocesses {I},{II}, {III}}, year = {1995}, type = {Technical Report for Research in Statistics and Probability}, number = {279}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{CuRe:07, author = {Cubitt, Robin and Read, Daniel}, title = {Can intertemporal choice experiments elicit time preferences for consumption?}, journal = {Experimental Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {10}, pages = {369-389}, abstract = {The paper considers what can be inferred about experimental subjects’ time preferences for consumption from responses to laboratory tasks involving tradeoffs between sums of money at different dates, if subjects can reschedule consumption spending relative to income in external capital markets. It distinguishes three approaches identifiable in the literature: the straightforward view; the separation view; and the censored data view. It shows that none of these is fully satisfactory and discusses the resulting implications for intertemporal decision-making experiments.}, key = {Intertemporal Choice}, keywords = {Discount rates, Elicitation of time preferences, Intertemporal decision-making experiments}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{CuMuSt:04, author = {Cubitt, R. P. and Munro, A. and Starmer, C.}, title = {Testing Explanations of Preference Reversal}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2004}, volume = {114}, pages = {709-726}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{CuStSu:98, author = {Cubitt, R. P. and Starmer, C. and Sugden, R.}, title = {On the Validity of the Random Lottery Incentive System}, journal = {Experimental Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {1}, pages = {115-131}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{CuSu:98, author = {Cubitt, Robin P. and Sugden, Robert}, title = {The selection of preferences through imitation}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {761-771}, number = {4}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Cucc:94, author = {Cuccia, A. D.}, title = {The economics of tax compliance: What do we know and where do we go?}, journal = {Journal of Accounting Literature}, year = {1994}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.02.21} } @TECHREPORT{CuGo:02, author = {Cullen, J. B. and Gordon, R. H.}, title = {Taxes and entrepreneurial activity: theory and evidence for the {U.S.}}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2002}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {9015}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{CuJo:96, author = {Cullis, John G. and Jones, Philip R.}, title = {'What a difference a day makes...': Concern about a new approach to valuinga life}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {61}, pages = {455-457}, key = {value of life} } @ARTICLE{Cullis1996, author = {Cullis, John G. and Jones, Philip R.}, title = {'What a difference a day makes...': Concern about a new approach to valuing a life}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {61}, pages = {455-457}, key = {value of life}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{CuJo:87MA, title = {Microeconomics and The Public Economy}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, year = {1987}, author = {Cullis, J. G. and Jones, P. R.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{CuHe:08, author = {Cunha, F. and Heckman, J.}, title = {A New Framework for the Analysis of Inequality}, journal = {Macroeconomic Dynamics}, year = {2008}, volume = {12}, pages = {315–354}, abstract = {This paper presents a new framework for analyzing inequality that moves beyond the anonymity postulate. We estimate the determinants of sectoral choice and the joint distributions of outcomes across sectors. We determine which components of realized earnings variability are due to uncertainty and which components are due to components of human diversity that are forcastable by agents. Using our tools, we can determine how policies shift persons across sectors and outcome distributions across sectors.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.10.04} } @TECHREPORT{CuHe:07, author = {Cunha, Flavio and Heckman, James}, title = {The Evolution of Inequality, Heterogeneity and Uncertainty in Labor Earnings in the U.S. Economy}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {3115}, abstract = {A large empirical literature documents a rise in wage inequality in the American economy. It is silent on whether the increase in inequality is due to greater heterogeneity in the components of earnings that are predictable by agents or whether it is due to greater uncertainty faced by agents. Applying the methodology of Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) to data on agents making schooling decisions in different economic environments, we join choice data with earnings data to estimate the fraction of future earnings that is forecastable and how this fraction has changed over time. We find that both predictable and unpredictable components of earnings have increased in recent years. The increase in uncertainty is substantially greater for unskilled workers. For less skilled workers, roughly 60% of the increase in wage variability is due to uncertainty. For more skilled workers, only 8% of the increase in wage variability is due to uncertainty. Roughly 26% of the increase in the variance of returns to schooling is due to increased uncertainty. Using conventional measures of income inequality masks the contribution of rising uncertainty to the rise in the inequality of earnings for less educated groups.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {wage inequality, uncertainty, sorting, inequality accounting}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{CuAnMu:74, author = {Cunningham, W. H. and Anderson, W. T. and Murphy, J. H.}, title = {Are students real people?}, journal = {Journal of Business}, year = {1974}, volume = {47}, pages = {399-409}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{CuMaTi:87, author = {Curiel, P. and Maschler, M. and Tijs, S. H.}, title = {Bankruptcy Games}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Operations Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {31}, pages = {A143-A59}, key = {claims} } @ARTICLE{Curiel1987, author = {Curiel, P. and Maschler, M. and Tijs, S. H.}, title = {Bankruptcy Games}, journal = {Zeitschrift f\"ur Operations Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {31}, pages = {A143-A59}, key = {claims}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Curr:04, author = {Currie, Janet}, title = {The Take Up of Social Benefits}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {10488}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, abstract = {This paper offers a review of recent literature regarding the take up ofsocial programs in the U.S. and U.K. A few general conclusions are drawn:First, take up is enhanced by automatic or default enrollment and loweredby administrative barriers, although removing individual barriers doesnot necessarily have much effect, suggesting that one must address thewhole bundle. Second, although it may be impossible to devise a definitivetest of the “stigma hypothesis”, other, more concrete types of transactionscosts are probably a good deal more important. Third, although people generallyhave means-tested programs in the United States in mind when they discusstake up, low take up is also a problem in many non means-tested socialinsurance programs and in other countries. Historically, economists havepaid little attention to rules about eligibility, and virtually no attentionto how these rules are enforced or made known to eligibles. Hence, themarginal return to new data about these features of programs is likelyto be high in terms of understanding take up. In an era of social experiments,it might also prove useful to consider experimental manipulations of factorsthought to influence take up.}, key = {social policy} } @ARTICLE{CuGr:01, author = {Currie, J. and Grogger, J.}, title = {Explaining Recent Declines in Food Stamp Program Participation}, journal = {Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs}, year = {2001}, volume = {2}, pages = {203-244}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.12.10} } @ARTICLE{CuKa:92, author = {Cutler, D. M. and Katz, L.}, title = {Rising inequality? Changes in the distribution of income and consumption in the 1980s}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1992}, volume = {82}, pages = {546-551}, number = {2}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{CuRe:98, author = {Cutler, D. M. and Reber, S. J.}, title = {Paying for health insurance: the trade-off between competition and adverseselection}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {113}, pages = {433-466}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{CoVe:08, author = {C{\'o}rdoba, J.C. and Verdier, G.}, title = {Inequality and growth: Some welfare calculations}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {2008}, volume = {32}, pages = {1812-1829}, number = {6}, month = {June}, abstract = {The main lotteries individuals face during their lifetime are country and family of birth. How much consumption growth would a newborn sacrifice to avoid these lotteries? We find that he may be willing to sacrifice a large fraction, if not all, to avoid them. Critical elements for the results are time discounting and risk aversion. Both reduce the effect of growth on welfare while risk aversion increases the benefits of more equal outcomes. Another key factor is the staggering size of risk at birth. Our calculations suggest a research agenda that treats growth and inequality as priorities.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.21} } @ARTICLE{DAdd:49, author = {D'Addario, R.}, title = {Ricerche sulla Curva dei Redditi}, journal = {Giornale degli Economisti ed Annali di Economia}, year = {1949}, volume = {8}, pages = {91-114}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{DAFr:04, author = {D'Ambrosio, C. and Frick, J. R.}, title = {Subjective Well-Being and Relative Deprivation: An Empirical Link}, institution = {Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit}, year = {2004}, type = {IZA Discussion Paper}, number = {1351}, month = {October}, abstract = {This paper explores the relationship between two well-established conceptsof measuring individual well-being: the concept of happiness, i.e. self-reported level of satisfaction with income and life, and relative deprivation/satisfaction,i.e. the gaps between the individual's income and the incomes of all individual sricher/poorer than him. Operationalizing both concepts using micro panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we provide empiricalevidence for subjective well-being depending more on relative satisfaction than on absolute levels of income. This finding holds even after controllingfor other influential factors in a multivariate setting.}, key = {happiness} } @INCOLLECTION{DaWo:06, author = {D'Ambrosio, C. and Wolff, E.N.}, title = {Is wealth becoming more polarized in the {U}nited {S}tates?}, booktitle = {International Perspectives on Household Wealth}, publisher = {Edward Elgar in Association with the Levy Economics Institute}, year = {2006}, editor = {Wolff, E. N.}, chapter = {12}, pages = {394-440}, key = {wealth}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.12.03} } @ARTICLE{D'Antoni1999, author = {D'Antoni, M.}, title = {Piecewise Linear Tax Functions, Progressivity, and the Principal of Equal Sacrifice}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {65}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Dant:99, author = {D'Antoni, M.}, title = {Piecewise Linear Tax Functions, Progressivity and the Principle of EqualSacrifice}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {65}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{ChIcRu:99, author = {Checchi D. and Ichino A. and Rustichini A.}, title = {More Equal But Less Mobile?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {74}, pages = {351-393}, key = {Mobility} } @ARTICLE{EaRu:99, author = {Easley D. and Rustichini A.}, title = {Choice Without Beliefs}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {1157-1184}, key = {Welfare} } @ARTICLE{MaMo:99, author = {Maoz Y. D. and Moav, O.}, title = {Itergenerational Mobility and the Process of Development}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109 (458)}, pages = {677-697}, key = {Development} } @ARTICLE{D.S.1999, author = {Hamermesh D.S. and Scoones W.D.}, title = {Policy Equilibria in a Federal System: The Effects of Higher Tax Ceilings for Unemployment Assistance}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {74}, pages = {191-213}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{D/iaz-Gim'enez1997, author = {D/\iaz-Gim{\'e}nez, J. and Quadrini, V. and Rios-Rull, J.-V.}, title = {Dimensions of Inequality: Facts on the {U.S.} Distribution of Earnings, Income and Wealth}, journal = {Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review}, year = {1997}, volume = {21}, pages = {3-21}, key = {Wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DGQuRR:97, author = {D/\iaz-Gim{\'e}nez, J. and Quadrini, V. and Rios-Rull, J.-V.}, title = {Dimensions of Inequality: Facts on the {U.S.} Distribution of Earnings,Income and Wealth}, journal = {Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review}, year = {1997}, volume = {21}, pages = {3-21}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{DaVo:93, author = {Dagan, N. and Volij, O.}, title = {The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bergaining approach}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1993}, volume = {26}, pages = {287-297}, key = {claims} } @INCOLLECTION{Dagu:85LC, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {Lorenz curve}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences}, year = {1985}, editor = {Banks, D. L. and Read, C. B. and Kotz, S.}, volume = {5}, pages = {156-161}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Dagu:83a, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {Income distribution models}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences}, year = {1983}, editor = {Banks, D. L. and Read, C. B. and Kotz, S.}, volume = {4}, pages = {27--34}, key = {distributions}, owner = {MPVictoriaFeser}, timestamp = {2006.11.02} } @INCOLLECTION{Dagu:__, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {Income inequality measures}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Statistical Science}, publisher = {John Wiley}, editor = {Johnson, N. L. and Kotz, S.}, volume = {6}, pages = {34-40}, address = {New York}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Dagu:97DI, author = {Dagum, Camilo}, title = {Decomposition and interpretation of {G}ini and the {G}eneralized {E}ntropy inequality measures}, journal = {American Statistical Association}, year = {1997}, pages = {200-205}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Dagu:97NA, author = {Dagum, Camilo}, title = {A new approach to the decomposition of the {G}ini income inequality ratio}, journal = {Empirical Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {22}, pages = {515-531}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Dagum1997a, author = {Dagum, Camilo}, title = {Decomposition and interpretation of {G}ini and the {G}eneralized Entropy inequality measures}, journal = {American Statistical Association}, year = {1997}, pages = {200-205}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Dagum1997b, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {A new approach to the decomposition of the {G}ini income inequality ratio}, journal = {Empirical Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {22}, pages = {515-531}, number = {4}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Dagu:96, author = {Dagum, Camilo}, title = {Human Capital measurement and distribution}, journal = {American Statistical Association}, year = {1996}, pages = {194-199}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{Dagu:98II, author = {Dagum, Camilo}, title = {Income inequality measures and social welfare functions: a unified approach}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1995}, volume = {6}, pages = {177-199}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Dagu:93, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {The social welfare bases of {G}ini and other income inequality measures}, journal = {Statistica}, year = {1993}, volume = {8}, pages = {3-30}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Dagu:90, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {On the relationship between income inequality measures and social welfarefunctions}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1990}, volume = {43}, pages = {91-102}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Dagum1990, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {On the relationship between income inequality measures and social welfare functions}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1990}, volume = {43}, pages = {91-102}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Dagu:87, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {Measuring the economic affluence between populations of income receivers}, journal = {Journal of Business and EConomic Statistics}, year = {1987}, volume = {5}, pages = {5-12}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Dagu:85AO, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {Analyses of Income Distribution and Inequality by Education and Sex in {C}anada}, journal = {Advances in Econometrics}, year = {1985}, volume = {4}, pages = {167-227}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Dagu:80, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {Inequality measures between income destributions with applications}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1980}, pages = {1791-1830}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Dagu:80a, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {The Generation and Distribution of Income, the {L}orenz Curve and the {G}iniRatio}, journal = {Economie Appliqu{\'e}e}, year = {1980}, volume = {33}, pages = {327-367}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Dagu:80b, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {Generating Systems and Properties of Income Distribution Models}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1980}, volume = {38}, pages = {3-26}, number = {3-4}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Dagu:80c, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {Sistemas Generadores de Distribution del Ingreso y la Ley de {P}areto}, journal = {El Trimestre Economico}, year = {1980}, volume = {188}, pages = {877-917}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Dagum1980b, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {The Generation and Distribution of Income, the {L}orenz Curve and the {G}ini Ratio}, journal = {Economie Appliqu\'ee}, year = {1980}, volume = {33}, pages = {327-367}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Dagu:78, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {A measure of inequality between income distributions}, journal = {Economie Appliqu{\'e}e}, year = {1978}, volume = {31}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Dagum1978, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {A measure of inequality between income distributions}, journal = {Economie Appliqu\'ee}, year = {1978}, volume = {31}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Dagu:77, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {A New Model of Personal Income Distribution: Specification and Estimation}, journal = {Economie Appliqu{\'e}e}, year = {1977}, volume = {30}, pages = {413-436}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Dagum1977, author = {Dagum, C.}, title = {A New Model of Personal Income Distribution: Specification and Estimation}, journal = {Economie Appliqu\'ee}, year = {1977}, volume = {30}, pages = {413-436}, key = {distributions}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Dagum1998, author = {Dagum, C. and Slottje, D. J.}, title = {A New Method to Estimate the Level and Distribution of Household Human Capital with Application}, journal = {Structural Change and Economic Dynamics}, year = {1998}, volume = {11}, pages = {67-94}, key = {human capital}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DaSl:98, author = {Dagum, C. and Slottje, D. J.}, title = {A New Method to Estimate the Level and Distribution of Household Human Capitalwith Application}, journal = {Structural Change and Economic Dynamics}, year = {1998}, volume = {11}, pages = {67-94}, key = {human capital} } @TECHREPORT{DaNi:07, author = {Dahan, M. and Nisan, U.}, title = {The Effect of Benefits Level on Take-Up Rates: Evidence from a Natural Experiment}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1885}, month = {January}, note = {CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE}, abstract = {This paper exploits a quasi-natural experiment to study the effect of social benefits level on take-up rates. We find that households who are eligible for double benefits (twins) have much higher take-up rate - up to double - as compared to a control group of households. Our estimated effect of benefits level is much higher relative to the standard cross section estimates. This finding is less exposed to a selection bias that might plague much of the previous research on the link between benefits level and take-up. It provides strong empirical support for the level of benefits as a key factor in determining take-up rates.}, key = {benefits}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{DaGu:07, author = {Dahlberg, Matz and Gustavsson, Magnus}, title = {Inequality and Crime: Separating the Effects of Permanent and Transitory Income}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2007}, volume = {70}, pages = {129 - 153}, abstract = {Earlier studies on income inequality and crime have typically used total income or total earnings. However, it is quite likely that it is the changes in permanent rather than in transitory income that affects crime rates. The purpose of this paper is therefore to disentangle the two effects by, first, estimating region-specific inequality in permanent and transitory income and, second, estimating crime equations with the two separate income components as explanatory variables. The results indicate that it is important to separate the two effects; while an increase in the inequality in permanent income yields a positive and significant effect on total crimes and three different property crimes, an increase in the inequality in transitory income has no significant effect. Using a traditional, aggregate, measure of income yields insignificant effects on crime.}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{Dahl:98, author = {Dahlby, Bev}, title = {Progressive taxation and the social marginal cost of public funds}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {67}, pages = {105-122}, number = {1}, month = {January}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Dahl:87, author = {Dahlby, B. G.}, title = {Interpreting inequality measures in a {H}arsanyi framework}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {1987}, volume = {22}, pages = {187-202}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{vanD:99, author = {van Dalen, Hendrik P.}, title = {Intertemporal substitution in public and private consumption - Long-runevidence from the {US} and the {UK}}, journal = {Economic Modelling}, year = {1999}, volume = {16}, pages = {355-370}, number = {3}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{CoVa:01, author = {Dalgaard, C.-J. and Vastrup, J.}, title = {On the Measurement of $\sigma$-Convergence}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {70}, pages = {283-287}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{DaPeSc:07, author = {Dalmazzo, A. and Pekkarinen, T. and Scaramozzino, P.}, title = {O-ring Wage Inequality}, journal = {Economica}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, pages = {515-536}, abstract = {We examine the relationship between technological complexity and wage inequality, using an efficiency wage model that adopts Kremer’s O-ring production function. The model has two main implications: (i) when the production process becomes more complex, within-task wage differences increase between plants, and (ii) between-task wage differences increase within plants. We study these implications empirically using industry data providing quantified information on the complexity of the tasks. We find that wages increase in all the tasks with the complexity of the production process. Furthermore, the relationship between the complexity of the tasks and wages is steepest in the firms with more complex production processes.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Dalt:20, author = {Dalton, H.}, title = {Measurement of the inequality of incomes}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1920}, volume = {30}, pages = {348-361}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Dalton1920, author = {Dalton, H.}, title = {Measurement of the inequality of incomes}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1920}, volume = {30}, pages = {348-361}, number = {9}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DaVa:08, author = {Daly, M. C. and Valletta, R. G.}, title = {Cross-national trends in earnings inequality and instability}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2008}, volume = {99}, pages = {215-219}, number = {2}, abstract = {We compare trends in earnings inequality in theUnited States, Germany, andGreat Britain. Estimation of a heterogeneous growthmodel of permanent and transitory earnings variation reveals substantial convergence in the permanent component of inequality in these countries during the 1990s.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {rodano}, timestamp = {2008.06.12} } @ARTICLE{Damj:05, author = {Damjanovic, T.}, title = {Lorenz dominance for transformed income distributions: A simple proof}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2005}, volume = {50}, pages = {234-237}, abstract = {This article provides a simple proof of the Lorenz dominance criterion for two non-decreasing income transformations. The criterion is extended to the most general case, with only very mild restrictions on the form of initial income distribution or the properties of the income transformations.}, key = {inequality }, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.22} } @ARTICLE{Dana1999a, author = {Dana, James D., Jr.}, title = {Equilibrium Price Dispersion under Demand Uncertainty: The Roles of Costly Capacity and Market Structure}, journal = {The Rand Journal of Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {30}, pages = {632--660}, number = {4}, month = {Winter}, abstract = {When capacity is costly and prices are set in advance, firms facing uncertain demand will sell output at multiple prices and limit the quantity available at each price. I show that the optimal price strategy of a monopolist and the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibria of oligopolists both exhibit intrafirm price dispersion. Moreover, as the market becomes more competitive, prices become more dispersed, a pattern documented in the airline industry. While generating similar predictions, the model differs from the revenue management literature because it disregards market segmentation and fare restrictions that screen customers.}, copyright = {Copyright 1999 The RAND Corporation}, issn = {07416261}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.08} } @ARTICLE{Dana:98, author = {Dana, James D., Jr.}, title = {Advance-Purchase Discounts and Price Discrimination in Competitive Markets}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {106}, pages = {395--422}, number = {2}, month = {Apr.}, abstract = {When both individual and aggregate consumer demand is uncertain and firms set prices before demand is known, price-taking firms may offer advance-purchase discounts. Consumers with relatively more certain demands and with relatively lower valuations have an incentive to buy in advance because the presence of other consumers with higher valuations and more uncertain aggregate demand increases the price they expect to pay in the spot market. Advance-purchase sales are made to low-valuation customers, as predicted by traditional models of second-degree price discrimination, without assuming that firms have market power.}, copyright = {Copyright 1998 The University of Chicago Press}, issn = {00223808}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.07} } @ARTICLE{Dana1999, author = {Dana, R.-A.}, title = {Existence, Uniqueness and Determinancy of Equilibrium in C.A.P.M. With a Riskless Assett}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {167-175}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Danc:90, author = {Dancelli, L.}, title = {On the behaviour of the {Zp} concentration curve}, booktitle = {Income and Wealth Distribution, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1990}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Zenga, M.}, pages = {111-127}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{DaArSa:05, author = {Daniel,G. and Arce,M. and Sandler,T.}, title = {The Dilemma of the Prisoners’ Dilemmas}, journal = {Kyklos}, year = {2005}, volume = {58}, pages = {3-24}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Dani:78, author = {Daniel, T.}, title = {Pitfalls in the Theory of Fairness}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1978}, volume = {19}, pages = {561-564}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{DaNe:93, author = {Danziger, L. and Neuman, S.}, title = {Equality and fertility in the kibbutz}, journal = {Journal of Population Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {6}, pages = {57-66}, number = {1}, key = {Kibbutz} } @ARTICLE{DaVaGaTaSm:84, author = {Sheldon Danziger and Jacques Van der Gaag and Michael K. Taussig and EugeneSmolensky}, title = {The Direct Measurement of Welfare Levels: How Much Does It Cost to MakeEnds Meet?}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1984}, volume = {66}, pages = {500-505}, number = {3}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{DaHaSm:77, author = {Danziger, S. and Haveman, R. and Smolensky, E.}, title = {Comment on {P}aglin 1975}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {67}, pages = {505-512}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Danziger1977, author = {Danziger, S. and Haveman, R. and Smolensky, E.}, title = {Comment on {P}aglin 1975}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {67}, pages = {505-12}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DaTa:79, author = {Danziger, S. and Taussig, M. K.}, title = {The income unit and the anatomy of income distribution}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1979}, volume = {25}, pages = {365-375}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Dard:01, author = {Dardanoni, V.}, title = {A pedagogical proof of {A}rrow's Impossibility Theorem}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2001}, volume = {17}, pages = {107-112}, abstract = {In this note I consider a simple proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem(Arrow 1963). I start with the case of three individuals who have preferenceson three alternatives. In this special case there are 133=2197 possiblecombinations of the three individuals' rational preferences. However, byconsidering the subset of linear preferences and employing the full strengthof the IIA axiom, I reduce the number of cases necessary to completelydescribe the SWF to a small number, allowing an elementary proof suitablefor most undergraduate students. This special case conveys the nature ofArrow's result. It is well known that the restriction to three optionsis not really limiting (any larger set of alternatives can be broken downinto triplets and any inconsistency within a triplet implies an inconsistencyon the larger set). However, the general case of n\geq3 individuals canbe easily considered in this framework, by building on the proof of thesimpler case. I hope that a motivated student, having mastered the simplecase of three individuals, will find this extension approachable and rewarding.This approach can be compared with the traditional simple proofs of Barber{\`a}(1980); Blau (1972); Denicol{\`o} (1996); Fishburn (1970); Kelly (1988); Mueller(1989); Riker and Ordeshook (1973); Sen (1979, 1986); Suzumura (1988) andTaylor (1995).}, key = {social choice} } @ARTICLE{Dard:91, author = {Dardanoni, V.}, title = {On the {L}orenz curve ordering of discounted streams of income}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1991}, volume = {43}, pages = {293-296}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Dard:91MS, author = {Dardanoni, V.}, title = {Measuring social mobility}, institution = {Universit{\'a} di Perugia}, year = {1991}, key = {mobility} } @TECHREPORT{Dardanoni1991, author = {Dardanoni, V.}, title = {Measuring social mobility}, institution = {Universit\'a di Perugia}, year = {1991}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DaFo:99, author = {Dardanoni, V. and Forcina, A.}, title = {Inference for {L}orenz Curve Orderings}, journal = {The Econometrics Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {2}, pages = {49-75}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{DaLa:02, author = {Dardanoni, V. and Lambert, P. J.}, title = {Progressivity Comparisons}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {86}, pages = {99-122}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{DaLa:01, author = {Dardanoni, V. and Lambert, P. J.}, title = {Horizontal inequity comparisons}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2001}, volume = {18}, pages = {799-816}, abstract = {In this paper, we expound the idea that horizontal inequity (HI) in differenttax systems be compared by transplanting the HI from one tax system intothe other, as a mapping between its pre- and post-tax living standard distributionsand then applying known results to compare the extent of association presentin the two joint distributions. We make this idea operational by meansof axioms which, we show, lead to an implementable procedure based on the`copula'. Statistical inference procedures are discussed, and illustrativeempirical exercises are undertaken for the UK, Canadian and Israeli taxand benefit systems.}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{DaLa:88, author = {Dardanoni, V. and Lambert, P. J.}, title = {Welfare rankings of income distributions: a role for the variance and some insights for tax reform}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1988}, volume = {5}, pages = {1-17}, number = {5}, abstract = {When generalized Lorenz curves cross, it is not possible to rank the underlying income distributions by the unanimous preference of all additively separable symmetric inequality-averse social welfare functions. But in many cases, unanimous preference results in terms of inequality-aversion are nevertheless available. When generalized Lorenz curves cross once, variance is decisive in determining a robust welfare ranking, and can provide a rationale for choosing equity over efficiency where these two desiderata conflict. Welfare recommendations for certain types of income tax reform are implied, including cases of yield-increasing redistribution.}, key = {welfare}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/j327435q61p32617/} } @BOOK{DaMy:98, title = {Persistent Disparity: Race and Economic Inequality in the {U}nited {S}tatesSince 1945}, publisher = {Edward Elgar}, year = {1998}, author = {Darity, W. A. and Myers, S. L.}, address = {Cheltenham, {UK}}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Das:08, author = {Das, G. G.}, title = {Does trade and technology transmission facilitate convergence? The role of technology adoption in reducing the inequality of nations}, journal = {Journal of Economic Policy Reform}, year = {2008}, volume = {11}, pages = {67-92}, number = {1}, month = {March}, abstract = {Based on stylized evidence showing variation of the Gini coefficients of income inequality across skill cohorts with the rapid rise in trade in technology-intensive goods, the transmission effects of technology diffusion and income inequality are explored in a global Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) framework. An exogenous technology shock transmitted via trade from the United States induces productivity growth in developing regions. This spillover in technology – aided by absorptive capability, better governance and institutions, technological symmetry and social acceptance – causes income to increase and income inequality to decline. The transmission of technology facilitates convergence of inequality between nations.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.05} } @ARTICLE{DaVaSo:99, author = {Das, M. and Van Soest, A.}, title = {A Panel Data Model for Subjective Information on Household Income Growth}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation}, year = {1999}, volume = {40}, pages = {409-426}, key = {Household} } @ARTICLE{DaPa:82, author = {Das, T. and Parikh, A.}, title = {Decomposition of inequality measures and a comparative analysis}, journal = {Empirical Economics}, year = {1982}, volume = {7}, pages = {23-48}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{DaPa:81, author = {Das, T. and Parikh, A.}, title = {Decompositions of {A}tkinson's measures of inequality}, journal = {Australian Economic Papers}, year = {1981}, volume = {6}, pages = {171-178}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @BOOK{DaPe:72, title = {Cost-Benefit Analysis}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1972}, author = {Dasgupta, A. K. and Pearce, D. W.}, address = {London}, key = {Cost-benefit analysis} } @ARTICLE{Dasg:01, author = {Dasgupta, I.}, title = {Gender-Biased Redistribution and Intra-Household Distribution}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {45}, pages = {1711-1722}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{DaHaMa:79, author = {Dasgupta, P. and Hammond, P. J. and Maskin, E..}, title = {The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentivecompatibility}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1979}, volume = {46}, pages = {185-216}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Dasgupta1979, author = {Dasgupta, P. and Hammond, P. J. and Maskin, E..}, title = {The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1979}, volume = {46}, pages = {185-216}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DaSeSt:73, author = {Dasgupta, P. S. and Sen, A. K. and Starrett, D. A.}, title = {Notes on the measurement of inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1973}, volume = {6}, pages = {180-187}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{DaHaMc:07, author = {Dastrup, Samuel and Hartshorn, Rachel and McDonald, James}, title = {The impact of taxes and transfer payments on the distribution of income: A parametric comparison}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2007}, volume = {5}, pages = {353 - 369}, abstract = {The Luxembourg Income Study data is used to explore the impact of taxes and transfer payments on the distribution of income across 13 countries for different years. The five-parameter generalized beta distribution and 10 of its special cases are considered as models for the size distribution of income. Maximum likelihood methods are used to estimate the model with corresponding measures of goodness of fit and inequality reported. These results identify the best-fitting two-, three-, and four-parameter models as well as describe the inter-temporal patterns of inequality corresponding to earnings, total income, and disposable income. A general pattern of increasing inequality is observed for almost all countries considered along with significantly different distributional impacts of taxes and transfer payments across countries.}, key = {Income Distribution}, keywords = {distribution of income, Gini coefficient, generalized beta, Dagum, Singh–Madalla}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @BOOK{Date:94, publisher = {{B}undeszentrale f{\"u}r {P}olitische {B}ildung}, year = {1994}, author = {{Datenreport 1994}}, address = {Bonn, Germany}, key = {Data} } @ARTICLE{DaDi:00, author = {Datta, B. and Dixon, H.}, title = {Linear-Homothetic Preferences}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {69}, pages = {55-61}, key = {Utility, preference} } @BOOK{Davi:81, title = {Order Statistics}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1981}, author = {David, H. A.}, address = {New York}, edition = {2nd}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Davi:68, author = {David, H. A.}, title = {{G}ini's mean difference rediscovered}, journal = {Biometrika}, year = {1968}, volume = {55}, pages = {573-575}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{DaMi:07, author = {David,M.F. and Milligan,A.G.K.}, title = {The tale of the tails: Canadian income inequality in the 1980s and 1990s}, institution = {University of British Columbia}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, abstract = {We present new evidence on levels and trends in after-tax income inequality in Canada between 1980 and 2000. We argue that existing data sources may miss changes in the tails of the income distribution, and that many of the changes in the income distribution have been in the tails. For this reason, we turn to an alternative source. In particular, we construct data on after-tax and transfer income using Census files augmented with predicted taxes based on information available from administrative tax data. Using these data, we find that Canadian after-tax inequality levels are substantially higher than has been previously recognized, primarily because income levels are lower at the bottom of the distribution than in commonly used survey data. We also find larger long-term increases in after-tax income inequality and far more variability over the economic cycle. This raises interesting questions about the role of the tax and transfer system in mitigating both trends and fluctuations in market income inequality.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{Davi:98, author = {Davidovitz, Liema}, title = {Risk aversion and inequality aversion}, institution = {Ruppin Institute}, year = {1998}, type = {Conference Draft}, address = {Israel}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{DaKr:04, author = {Davidovitz, L. and Kroll, Y.}, title = {On the attitude towards inequality}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {2004}, volume = {11}, pages = {137-148}, key = {experiments} } @ARTICLE{DaMaWi:07, author = {Davidson,C. and Martin, L. and Wilson, J.D.}, title = {Efficient black markets?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {1575-1590}, month = {August}, abstract = {This paper investigates analytically the welfare effects of black-market activities that firms undertake to evade taxes. The desirability of a black market is linked to the attributes of the goods supplied by blackmarket firms. The analysis identifies cases where a black market reduces (increases) the distortionary impact of taxation on the allocation of resources across the goods that the government is attempting to tax, leading to a welfare gain (loss).}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{DaMaWi:05, author = {Davidson,C. and Martin,L. and Wilson,J.}, title = {Tax evasion as an optimal tax device}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2005}, volume = {86}, pages = {285-289}, abstract = {For an economy where goods are taxed at the same rate, we present conditionsunder which firms self-select into a black market such that effective taxationis closer to an optimal discriminatory tax system.}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{DaDu:00, author = {Davidson, R. and Duclos, J.-Y.}, title = {Statistical Inference for stochastic dominance and for the measurement ofpoverty and inequality}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {1435-1464}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Davidson2000, author = {Davidson, R. and Duclos, J.-Y.}, title = {Statistical Inference for stochastic dominance and for the measurement of poverty and inequality}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {1435-1464}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DaDu:97, author = {Davidson, R. and Duclos, J.-Y.}, title = {Statistical Inference for the measurement of the incidence of taxes andtransfers}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {1453-1466}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Davidson1997, author = {Davidson, R. and Duclos, J.-Y.}, title = {Statistical Inference for the measurement of the incidence of taxes and transfers}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {1453-1466}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{DaDu:94, author = {Davidson, R. and Duclos, J.-Y.}, title = {Statistical inference for the measurement of the incidence of taxes andtransfers}, institution = {GREQAM}, year = {1995}, type = {Document de travail}, number = {95A30}, address = {Centre de la vieille Charit{\'e}, Marseille}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Davidson1995, author = {Davidson, R. and Duclos, J.-Y.}, title = {Statistical inference for the measurement of the incidence of taxes and transfers}, institution = {GREQAM}, year = {1995}, type = {Document de travail}, number = {95A30}, address = {Centre de la vieille Charit\'e, Marseille}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DaFl:07, author = {Davidson, Russell and Flachaire, Emmanuel}, title = {Asymptotic and bootstrap inference for inequality and poverty measures}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2007}, volume = {141}, pages = {141 - 166}, abstract = {A random sample drawn from a population would appear to offer an ideal opportunity to use the bootstrap in order to perform accurate inference, since the observations of the sample are IID. In this paper, Monte Carlo results suggest that bootstrapping a commonly used index of inequality leads to inference that is not accurate even in very large samples, although inference with poverty indices is satisfactory. We find that the major cause is the extreme sensitivity of many inequality indices to the exact nature of the upper tail of the income distribution. This leads us to study two non-standard bootstraps, the m out of n bootstrap, which is valid in some situations where the standard bootstrap fails, and a bootstrap in which the upper tail is modelled parametrically. Monte Carlo results suggest that accurate inference can be achieved with this last method in moderately large samples.}, key = {Bootstrap}, keywords = {Income distribution, Poverty, Bootstrap inference}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @BOOK{DaMa:92, title = {Estimation and Inference in Econometrics}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1992}, author = {Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Davi:80, author = {Davies , D. G.}, title = {Measurement of tax progressivity: Comment.}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1980}, volume = {70}, pages = {204-207}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Davi:86, author = {Davies, J. B.}, title = {Does redistribution reduce inequality ?}, journal = {Journal of Labor Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {7}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Davi:82, author = {Davies, J. B.}, title = {Intergenerational transfers, redistribution and inequality}, institution = {The University of Western Ontario}, year = {1982}, type = {Research Report}, number = {8206}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Davi:82TR, author = {Davies, J. B.}, title = {The relative impact of inheritance and other factors of economic inequality}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1982}, volume = {47}, pages = {471-498}, number = {8}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{DaHo:02, author = {Davies, J. B. and Hoy, M.}, title = {Flat Rate Taxes and Inequality Measurement}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {84}, pages = {33-46}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{DaHo:95, author = {Davies, J. B. and Hoy, M.}, title = {Making inequality comparisons when {L}orenz curves intersect}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {85}, pages = {980-986}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118246} } @TECHREPORT{DaHo:94CI, author = {Davies, J. B. and Hoy, M.}, title = {Comparing income distributions when {L}orenz curves intersect}, year = {1994}, type = {Department of Economics Research Report}, number = {9414}, address = {University of Western Ontario}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{DaHo:94TN, author = {Davies, J. B. and Hoy, M.}, title = {The normative significance of using third-degree stochastic dominance incomparing income distributions}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1994}, volume = {64}, pages = {520-530}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Davies1994, author = {Davies, J. B. and Hoy, M.}, title = {The normative significance of using third-degree stochastic dominance in comparing income distributions}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1994}, volume = {64}, pages = {520-530}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{DaHo:85, author = {Davies, J. B. and Hoy, M.}, title = {Comparing income distributions under aversion to downside inequality}, year = {1985}, type = {mimeo}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{DaKu:86, author = {Davies, J. B. and Kuhn, P.}, title = {A dynamic model of redistribution, inheritance and inequality}, institution = {The University of Western Ontario}, year = {1986}, type = {research report}, number = {2}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{DaSh:00, author = {Davies, J. B. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {The Distribution of Wealth and its evolution}, booktitle = {Handbook of Income Distribution}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {2000}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Bourguignon, F.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{DaSh:89, author = {Davies, J. B. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Optimal grouping of income and wealth data}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1989}, volume = {42}, pages = {97-108}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Davies2000, author = {Davies, James B. and Zeng, Jinli and Zhang, Jie}, title = {Consumption Vs. Income Taxes When Private Human Capital Investments Are Imperfectly Observable}, journal = {Journal Of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {77}, pages = {1-28}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DaZeZh:00, author = {Davies, James B. and Zeng, Jinli and Zhang, Jie}, title = {Consumption Vs. Income Taxes When Private Human Capital Investments AreImperfectly Observable}, journal = {Journal Of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {77}, pages = {1-28}, key = {taxation} } @INCOLLECTION{DaHo:93ID, author = {Davis, Douglas D. and Holt, Charles A.}, title = {Individual Decisions}, booktitle = {Experimental Economics}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1993}, editor = {Davis, Douglas D. and Holt, Charles A.}, chapter = {6}, pages = {468-473}, address = {Princeton, N. J.}, key = {economic psychology} } @BOOK{DaHo:93EE, title = {Experimental Economics}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1993}, author = {Davis, Douglas D. and Holt, Charles A.}, address = {Princeton, New Jersey}, key = {economic psychology} } @TECHREPORT{DaKa:05, author = {Davis,G. and Kanago,B.}, title = {How the West Began to Grow Rich}, year = {2005}, key = {econ history} } @BOOK{Davi:54, title = {Political Statistics}, publisher = {Principia Press}, year = {1954}, author = {Davis, H. T.}, address = {Evanston, Illinois}, key = {statistics} } @BOOK{Davi:41, title = {The Analysis of Economic Time Series}, publisher = {the Principia Press}, year = {1941}, author = {Davis, H. T.}, address = {Bloomington, Indiana}, key = {ECONOMETRICS} } @ARTICLE{Davi:84, author = {Davis, J.}, title = {New Money, an Old Man/Lady and 'Two's Company': Subjective Welfare in the Norc General Social Surveys, 1972-1982}, journal = {Social Indicators Reseach}, year = {1984}, volume = {15}, pages = {319-350}, key = {welfare}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @TECHREPORT{DaHe:04, author = {Davis,S. and Henrekson,M.}, title = {Tax effects on work activity, industry mix and shadow economy size: evidencefrom rich country comparisons}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, abstract = {Guided by a simple theory of task assignment and time allocation, we investigatethe long run response to national differences in tax rates on labor income,payrolls and consumption. The theory implies that higher tax rates reducework time in the market sector, increase the size of the shadow economy,alter the industry mix of market activity, and twist labor demand in away that amplifies negative effects on market work and concentrates effectson the less skilled. We also describe conditions whereby cross-countryOLS regressions yield unbiased estimates of the total effect of taxes,inclusive of indirect effects that work through government spending responsesto tax revenues. Regressions on rich-country samples in the mid 1990s indicatethat a unit standard deviation tax rate difference of 12.8 percentage pointsleads to 122 fewer market work hours per adult per year, a drop of 4.9percentage points in the employment-population ratio, and a rise in theshadow economy equal to 3.8 percent of GDP. It also leads to 10 to 30 percentlower employment and value added shares in (a) retail trade and repairs,(b) eating, drinking and lodging, and (c) a broader industry group thatincludes wholesale and motor trade.}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{Davis2004, author = {Davis, Steven J. and Henrekson, Magnus}, title = {Tax Effects on Work Activity, Industry Mix and Shadow Economy Size: Evidence from Rich-Country Comparisons}, institution = {National Bureau for Economic Research}, year = {2004}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {10509}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, abstract = {Guided by a simple theory of task assignment and time allocation, we investigate the long run response to national differences in tax rates on labor income, payrolls and consumption. The theory implies that higher tax rates reduce work time in the market sector, increase the size of the shadow economy, alter the industry mix of market activity, and twist labor demand in a way that amplifies negative effects on market work and concentrates effects on the less skilled. We also describe conditions whereby cross-country OLS regressions yield unbiased estimates of the total effect of taxes, inclusive of indirect effects that work through government spending responses to tax revenues. Regressions on rich-country samples in the mid 1990s indicate that a unit standard deviation tax rate difference of 12.8 percentage points leads to 122 fewer market work hours per adult per year, a drop of 4.9 percentage points in the employment-population ratio, and a rise in the shadow economy equal to 3.8 percent of GDP. It also leads to 10 to 30 percent lower employment and value added shares in (a) retail trade and repairs, (b) eating, drinking and lodging, and (c) a broader industry group that includes wholesale and motor trade.}, key = {social policy}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{DaHi:96, title = {Bootstrap Methods}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1996}, author = {Davison, A. C. and Hinkley, D. V.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{deBo:00, author = {De Borger, B.}, title = {Optimal Two-Part Tariffs in a Model of Discrete Choice}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {76}, pages = {127-150}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{deDo:00, author = {{De D}onder, P.}, title = {Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2000}, volume = {17}, pages = {601-627}, abstract = {Strong assumptions are usually needed to guarantee the existence of a Condorcetwinner in majority voting games. The theoretical literature has developedvarious solution concepts to accommodate the general absence of Condorcetwinner, but very little is known on their economic implications. In thispaper, I select three such concepts (the uncovered set, the bipartisanset and the minmax set), defined as game-theoretical solution conceptsapplied to a Downsian electoral competition game. These concepts are thencomputed by means of simulations in a simple model of purely redistributivetaxation, where factor supply varies with net factor rewards. All threeconcepts give rather sharp predictions and are not too sensitive to smallvariations of the preference profiles.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Hek:98, author = {De Hek, Paul A.}, title = {An aggregative model of capital accumulation with leisure-dependent utility}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1998}, volume = {23}, pages = {255-276}, number = {2}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Croi:98, author = {De La Croix, David}, title = {Growth and the relativity of satisfaction}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1998}, volume = {36}, pages = {105-125}, number = {2}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{DeL:90, author = {De Long, J. Bradford and Shleifer, Andrei and Summers, Lawrence H. and Waldmann, Robert J.}, title = {Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1990}, volume = {98}, pages = {703--738}, number = {4}, abstract = {We present a simple overlapping generations model of an asset market in which irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs both affect prices and earn higher expected returns. The unpredictability of noise traders' beliefs creates a risk in the price of the asset that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively betting against them. As a result, prices can diverge significantly from fundamental values even in the absence of fundamental risk. Moreover, bearing a disproportionate amount of risk that they themselves create enables noise traders to earn a higher expected return than rational investors do. The model sheds light on a number of financial anomalies, including the excess volatility of asset prices, the mean reversion of stock returns, the underpricing of closed-end mutual funds, and the Mehra-Prescott equity premium puzzle.}, copyright = {Copyright © 1990 The University of Chicago Press}, issn = {00223808}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Aug., 1990}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press} } @ARTICLE{DeSa:07, author = {De Santis, Massimiliano}, title = {Individual Consumption Risk and the Welfare Cost of Business Cycles}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {97}, pages = {1488 -1506}, key = {Welfare}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{DeHi:03, author = {De {D}onder, P. and Hindriks, J.}, title = {The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {2491-2505}, abstract = {This paper studies majority voting over quadratic taxation and investigates under which conditions marginal progressivity emerges as a voting outcome. In our model with endogenous income, there is no majority (Condorcet) winning tax schedule. We then investigate less demanding political equilibrium concepts in order to see under which conditions the set of equilibria is composed only of progressive tax functions. We follow three strategies: (i) reduction of the policy space to the tax functions that are ideal for some voter; (ii) elimination of weakly dominated strategies and the use of mixed strategies in a standard Downsian two-party competition game; (iii) assumption that political parties interact repeatedly and care about the size of their majority. Although each approach captures a different aspect of political behavior, they point to the same (simulation-based) conclusion that progressivity is more likely to emerge for most distributions of abilities and that it is actually the only possible voting outcome if the distribution is sufficiently concentrated at the middle.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{DeKK:80TA, author = {Dean, P. N. and Keenan, A. and Kerney, F.}, title = {Taxpayers' attitudes to income tax evasion: an empirical study}, journal = {British Tax Review}, year = {1980}, pages = {28-44}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Dear:99, author = {Dearden, L.}, title = {The Effects of Families and Ability on Men's Education and Earnings in Britain}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {551-567}, key = {Education, training} } @ARTICLE{DeMaRe:97, author = {Dearden, Lorraine and Machin, Stephen and Reed, Howard}, title = {Intergenerational Mobility in Britain}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {47-66}, number = {440}, month = {January}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @INCOLLECTION{Deat:95, author = {Deaton, A.}, title = {Data and econometric tools for development analysis}, booktitle = {Handbook of Development Economics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1995}, editor = {Behrman, J. and Srinivasan, T. N.}, volume = {III}, pages = {1785-1882}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {ECONOMETRICS} } @ARTICLE{Deat:08, author = {Deaton, A.}, title = {Height, health, and inequality: the distribution of adult heights in India}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {98}, pages = {468-474}, number = {2}, key = {inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.15} } @TECHREPORT{Deat:07, author = {Deaton,A.}, title = {Income, aging, health and wellbeing around the world: Evidence from the Gallup World Poll}, institution = {Center for Health and Wellbeing, Princeton University}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, abstract = {During 2006, the Gallup Organization collected World Poll data using an identical questionnaire from national samples of adults from 132 countries. This paper presents an analysis of the data on life-satisfaction (happiness) and health satisfaction and their relationships with national income, age, and life-expectancy. Average happiness is strongly related to per capita national income, with each doubling of income associated with a near one point increase in life satisfaction on a scale from 0 to 10. Unlike previous findings, the effect holds across the range of international incomes; if anything, it is slightly stronger among rich countries. Conditional on national income, recent economic growth makes people unhappier, improvements in life-expectancy make them happier, but life-expectancy itself has little effect. Age has an internationally inconsistent relationship with happiness. National income moderates the effects of aging on self-reported health, and the decline in health satisfaction and rise in disability with age are much stronger in poor countries than in rich countries. In line with earlier findings, people in much of Eastern Europe and in the countries of the former Soviet Union are particularly unhappy and particularly dissatisfied with their health, and older people in those countries are much less satisfied with their lives and their health than are younger people. HIV prevalence in Africa has little effect on Africans’ life or health satisfaction; the fraction of Kenyans who are satisfied with their personal health is the same as the fraction of Britons and higher than the fraction of Americans. The US ranks 81st out of 115 countries in the fraction of people who have confidence in their healthcare system, and has a lower score than countries such as India, Iran, Malawi, or Sierra Leone. While the strong relationship between life-satisfaction and income gives some credence to the measures, the lack of such correlations for health shows that happiness (or self-reported health) measures cannot be regarded as useful summary indicators of human welfare in international comparisons.}, key = {income}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Deat:03HI, author = {Deaton, A.}, title = {Health, Inequality and Economic Development}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2003}, volume = {41}, pages = {113-158}, key = {inequality}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @TECHREPORT{Deat:03MP, author = {Deaton, A.}, title = {Measuring poverty in a growing world (or measuring growth in a poor world)}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2003}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {9822}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{Deat:92, title = {Understanding Consumption}, publisher = {Clarendon Press, Oxford}, year = {1992}, author = {Deaton, A.}, comment = {UL: South Wing, Floor 6 Classmark: 220.c.99.674}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Deat:92HS, author = {Deaton, A.}, title = {Household Saving in LDCs: Credit Markets, Insurance and Welfare}, journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1992}, volume = {94}, pages = {253-273}, abstract = {The author attempts to identify the extent to which poor households in LDCs (mainly farmers) use saving as a means of consumption smoothing in the face of uncertainty and limited credit. He concludes that “hump” life-cycle saving is not an important generator of wealth in LDCs, since consumption tracks current income very closely, providing further evidence of the limited role of credit markets.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.24} } @ARTICLE{Deat:91, author = {Deaton, A.}, title = {Saving and Liquidity Constraints}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1991}, volume = {59}, pages = {1221-1248}, abstract = {This paper is concerned with the theory of saving when consumers are not permitted to borrow, and with the ability of such a theory to account for some of the stylized facts of saving behavior. When consumers are relatively impatient, and when labor income is independently and identically distributed over time, assets act like a buffer stock, protecting consumption against bad draws of income. The precautionary demand for saving interacts with the borrowing constraints to provide a motive for holding assets. If the income process is positively autocorrelated, but stationary, assets are still used to buffer consumption, but do so less effectively and at a greater cost in terms of foregone consumption. In the limit, when labor income is a random walk, it is optimal for impatient liquidity constrained consumers simply to consume their incomes. As a consequence, a liquidity constrained representative agent cannot generate aggregate U.S. saving behavior if that agent receives aggregate labor income. Either there is no saving, when income is a random walk, or saving is contracyclical over the business cycle, when income changes are positively autocorrelated. However, in reality, microeconomic income processes do not resemble their average, and it is possible to construct a model of microeconomic saving under liquidity constraints which, at the aggregate level, reproduces many of the stylized facts in the actual data. While it is clear that many households are not liquidity constrained, and do not behave as described here, the models presented in the paper seem to account for important aspects of reality that are not explained by traditional life-cycle models.}, key = {saving}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{Deat:89, author = {Deaton, A.}, title = {Rice Distribution in {T}hailand}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1989}, volume = {supplement}, pages = {1-37}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Deaton1989, author = {Deaton, A.}, title = {Rice Distribution in {T}hailand}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1989}, volume = {supplement}, pages = {1-37}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{DeGoPa:00, author = {Deaton, A. and Gourinchas, P.-O. and Paxson, C.}, title = {Social security and inequality over the life cycle}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2000}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {7570}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, month = {February}, abstract = {This paper examines the consequences of social security reform for the inequality of consumption across individuals. The idea is that inequality is at least in part the result of individual risk in earnings or asset returns, the effects of which accumulate over time to increase inequality within groups of people as they age. Institutions such as social security, that share risk across individuals, will moderate the transmission of individual risk into inequality. We examine how different social security systems, with different degrees of risk sharing, affect consumption inequality. We do so within the framework of the permanent income hypothesis, and also using richer models of consumption that incorporate precautionary saving motives and borrowing restrictions. Our results indicate that systems in which there is less sharing of earnings risk such as systems of individual accounts produce higher consumption inequality both before and after retirement. However, differences across individuals in the rate of return on assets (including social security assets held in individual accounts) produce only modest additional effects on inequality.}, key = {saving} } @ARTICLE{DeKo:05, author = {Deaton,A. and Kozel,V.}, title = {Data and dogma: the great {I}ndian poverty debate}, journal = {The World Bank Research Observer}, year = {2005}, volume = {20}, pages = {177-199}, abstract = {What happened to poverty in India in the 1990s has been fiercely debated,politically and statistically. The Indian debate has run parallel to, andis itself a large part of, the wider debate about globalization and povertyin the 1990s. The economic reforms of the early 1990s were followed byrates of economic growth that were high by Indian historical standards.The effects on poverty remain controversial, and the official numbers publishedby the Government of India, showing a reduction of poverty from 36 percentof the population in 1993-94 to 26 percent of the population in 1999-00,have been challenged both for showing too little and too much poverty reduction.The various claims have often been frankly political, but there are alsomany important statistical issues, and the Indian debate, of which thispaper is a review, provides an excellent example of how politics and statisticsinteract in an important, largely domestic debate. Although there is nofull consensus on what happened to Indian poverty in the 1990s, there isgood evidence that the official estimates of poverty reduction are toooptimistic, particularly for rural India. This overoptimism was amplifiedby statistical uncertainty that created space for some commentators toargue that poverty had been virtually eliminated in India in the wake ofthe economic reforms. Although this paper is concerned with the measurementof poverty in India, all of the issues-discrepancies between surveys andnational accounts, the effects of questionnaire design, reporting periods,survey non-response, repairing imperfect data, the choice of poverty lines,and the interplay between statistics and politics-have wide resonance elsewhere..}, institution = {The World Bank Research Observer}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{DeNg:98, author = {Deaton, A. and Ng, S.}, title = {Parametric and nonparametric approaches to price and tax reform}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1998}, volume = {93}, pages = {900-909}, number = {443}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{DePa:94IC, author = {Deaton, A. and Paxson, C.}, title = {Intertemporal Choice and Inequality}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1994}, volume = {102}, pages = {437-467}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Deat:97, title = {The Analysis of Household Surveys}, publisher = {Johns Hopkins Press for the World Bank}, year = {1997}, author = {Deaton, A. S.}, address = {Baltimore, Maryland}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Deat:83, author = {Deaton, A. S.}, title = {An explicit solution to an optimal tax problem}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {20}, pages = {333-346}, key = {optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{Deat:81, author = {Deaton, A. S.}, title = {Optimal taxes and the structure of preferences}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1981}, volume = {49}, pages = {1245-1260}, key = {optimal taxation} } @TECHREPORT{DeLu:01, author = {Deaton, A. S. and Lubotsky, D.}, title = {Mortality, inequality and race in {A}merican cities and states}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2001}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {8370}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138}, key = {Inequality} } @ARTICLE{DeMu:86, author = {Deaton, A. S. and Muellbauer, J.}, title = {On Measuring Child Costs: with application to poor countries}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1986}, volume = {94}, pages = {720-744}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{DeMu:80, title = {Economics and Consumer Behavior}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1980}, author = {Deaton, A. S. and Muellbauer, J.}, address = {Cambridge}, comment = {Library Location: UL: South Wing, Floor 6 Classmark: 220.c.98.6}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{BeRa:99, author = {Rajat Deb and Laura Razzolini}, title = {Voluntary Cost Sharing for an Excludable Public Project}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1999}, volume = {37}, pages = {123-138}, number = {2}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Debo:90, author = {DeBoer, L.}, title = {Lotto Sales Stagnation: Product Maturity or Small Jackpots?}, journal = {Growth and Change}, year = {1990}, volume = {21}, pages = {73-77}, key = {risk} } @INCOLLECTION{Debr:60, author = {Debreu, G.}, title = {Topological Methods in Cardinal Utility Theory}, booktitle = {Mathematical methods in the social sciences}, publisher = {Stanford University Press}, year = {1960}, editor = {Arrow, K. and Karlin, S. and Suppes, P.}, address = {Stanford, California}, key = {micro} } @INCOLLECTION{Debr:54, author = {Debreu, G.}, title = {Representation of a preference ordering by a numerical function}, booktitle = {Decision Processes}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1954}, editor = {Thrall, R. and Coombs, C. and Davis, R.}, address = {New York}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Debr:51, author = {Debreu, G.}, title = {The coefficient of resource utilisation}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1951}, volume = {19}, pages = {273-292}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{DeSc:63, author = {Debreu, G. and Scarf, H.}, title = {A limit theorem on the core of an economy}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1963}, volume = {4}, pages = {235-246}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{DeOr:07, author = {Decoster, Andre and Orsini, Kristian}, title = {Hoe Prikkelend Is De Vlaktaks? Verdient De Vlaktaks Zichzelf Terug?}, institution = {Universite Catholique Louvain}, year = {2007}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @TECHREPORT{DeScVa:96, author = {Decoster, A. and Schokkaert, E. and Van Camp, G.}, title = {Horizontal neutrality and vertical redistribution with indirect taxes}, institution = {Centrum Voor Economische Studien}, year = {1996}, number = {47}, address = {Leuven}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Decoster2001, author = {Decoster, A. and Van Camp, G.}, title = {Redistributive Effects of the Shifts from Personal Income Taxes to Indirect Taxes: {B}elgium 1988-93}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2001}, volume = {22}, pages = {79-106}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DeVa:01, author = {Decoster, A. and Van Camp, G.}, title = {Redistributive Effects of the Shifts from Personal Income Taxes to IndirectTaxes: {B}elgium 1988-93}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2001}, volume = {22}, pages = {79-106}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{DeGrKo:99, author = {Deelstra, G. and Grasselli, M. and Koehl, P. -F.}, title = {Conditional Dominance Criteria: Definition and Application to Risk Management}, journal = {Insurance, Mathematics and Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {25}, pages = {295-306}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Dehe:08, author = {Dehejia, R.}, title = {When is {ATE} enough? {R}isk aversion and inequality aversion in evaluating training programs}, journal = {Advances in Econometrics}, year = {2008}, volume = {21}, pages = {263-288}, abstract = {This paper explores the relationship between the theory and practice of program evaluation as it relates to training programs. In practice programs are evaluated by meanvariance comparisons of the empirical distributions of the outcome of interest for the treatment and control programs. Typically, earnings are compared through the average treatment effect (ATE) and its standard error. In theory, programs should be evaluated as decision problems using social welfare functions and posterior predictive distributions for outcomes of interest. This paper considers three issues. First, under what conditions do the two approaches coincide? I.e., when should a program be evaluated based purely on the average treatment effect and its standard error? Second, under more restrictive parametric and functional form assumptions, the paper develops intuitive mean-variance tests for program evaluation that are consistent with the underlying decision problem. Third, these concepts are applied to the GAIN and JTPA data sets.}, institution = {Columbia University and NBER}, key = {inequality}, owner = {rodano}, timestamp = {2008.06.12} } @BOOK{delaD:07, title = {What Do We Know About Globalization? Issues of Poverty and Income Distribution}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {2007}, author = {de la Dehesa, G.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.01.29} } @ARTICLE{DeSq:98NW, author = {Deininger, Klaus and Squire, Lyn}, title = {New ways of looking at old issues: inequality and growth}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {57}, pages = {259-287}, number = {2}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{DeSq:96ND, author = {Deininger, K. and Squire, L.}, title = {A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality}, journal = {World Bank Economic Review}, year = {1996}, volume = {10}, pages = {565-591}, key = {income inequality}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.03}, url = {http://wber.oxfordjournals.org.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/cgi/reprint/10/3/565} } @ARTICLE{DeSeWi:04, author = {Dejuan, J.P. and Seater, J.J. and Wirjanto, T.S.}, title = {A Direct Test of the Permanent Income Hypothesis with an Application to the U.S. States}, journal = {Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking}, year = {2004}, volume = {36}, pages = {1091-1103}, abstract = {This paper tests the prediction of the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) that news about future income induce a revision in consumption equal to the revision in permanent income. We use time-series data from 48 contiguous U.S. states to perform the test. The empirical results provide some support for the PIH across states.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{DeHo:02, author = {Dekker, M. and Hoogeveen, H.}, title = {Bride Wealth and Household Security in Rural Zimbabwe}, journal = {Journal of African Economies}, year = {2002}, volume = {11}, pages = {114-145}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.24} } @ARTICLE{DeRi:98, author = {Del Boca, Daniela and Ribero, Rocio}, title = {Transfers in non-intact households}, journal = {Structural Change and Economic Dynamics}, year = {1998}, volume = {9}, pages = {469-478}, number = {4}, key = {population economics} } @TECHREPORT{dRRC:96, author = {Del Rio, Coral and Ruiz-Castillo, Javier}, title = {Poverty orderings using inverse {G}eneralized {L}orenz curves. The caseof {S}pain, 1980-81 to 1990-91}, institution = {Universidad Carlos III de Madrid}, year = {1996}, month = {December}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @INCOLLECTION{DelR'ioforthcoming1995, author = {Del R{\'{\i}}o, C. and Ruiz-Castillo, J.}, title = {Ordenaci\'on del bienestar e inferencia estad\'{\i}stica. El caso de las {EPF} de 1980-81 y 1990-91.}, booktitle = {Segundo Simposio Sobre La Distribuci\'on de La Renta Y de La Rizqueza}, publisher = {Fundaci\'on Argentaria}, year = {forthcoming 1995}, editor = {Gutierrez, L. and Maravall, J. M.}, address = {Madrid}, institution = {Instituto de Estudios Fiscales}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{dRRC:95, author = {Del R{\'{\i}}o, C. and Ruiz-Castillo, J.}, title = {Ordenaci{\'o}n del bienestar e inferencia estad\'{\i}stica. El caso de las {EPF}de 1980-81 y 1990-91.}, booktitle = {Segundo Simposio Sobre La Distribuci{\'o}n de La Renta Y de La Rizqueza}, publisher = {Fundaci{\'o}n Argentaria}, year = {forthcoming 1995}, editor = {Gutierrez, L. and Maravall, J. M.}, address = {Madrid}, institution = {Instituto de Estudios Fiscales}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{RiRu:00, author = {{Del R}io, C. and Ruiz-Castillo, J.}, title = {Intermediate Inequality and Welfare, Social Choice and Welfare}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {17}, pages = {223-239}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{DeLuPe:93, author = {Delhausse, B. and Luttgens, A. and Perelman, S.}, title = {Comparing measures of poverty and relative deprivation: An example for {B}elgium}, journal = {Journal of Population Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {6}, pages = {83-102}, number = {1}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{Dell:07, author = {Dell, F.}, title = {Top income in {G}ermany Throughout the Twentieth Century}, booktitle = {Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @ARTICLE{Delq:93, author = {Delqui{\'e}, P.}, title = {Inconsistent trade-offs between attributes: new evidence in preference assessmentbiases}, journal = {Management Science}, year = {1993}, volume = {39}, pages = {1382-1395}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Delq:97, author = {Delqui{\'e}, P.}, title = {'Bi-matching': a new preference assessment method to reduce compatibilityeffects}, journal = {Management Science}, year = {1993}, volume = {43}, pages = {640-658}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Delqui'e1993, author = {Delqui{\'e}, P.}, title = {'Bi-matching': a new preference assessment method to reduce compatibility effects}, journal = {Management Science}, year = {1993}, volume = {43}, pages = {640-658}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Delqui'e1993a, author = {Delqui{\'e}, P.}, title = {Inconsistent trade-offs between attributes: new evidence in preference assessment biases}, journal = {Management Science}, year = {1993}, volume = {39}, pages = {1382-1395}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DeIn:99, author = {Alison F. DelRossi and Robert P. Inman}, title = {Changing the Price of Pork: The Impact of Local Cost Sharing on Legislators'Demands for Distributive Public Goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {247-273}, number = {2}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Delt:03, author = {Deltas, G.}, title = {The Small-Sample Bias of The {G}ini Coefficient: Results And Implications For Empirical Research}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2003}, volume = {85}, pages = {226-234}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.07.21} } @ARTICLE{DeLa:98, author = {Demange, Gabrielle and Laroque, Guy}, title = {Long-sighted principal and myopic agents}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {30}, pages = {119-146}, number = {2}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{DeDu:99, author = {Demery, D. and Duck, N. W.}, title = {Imperfect information and consumption in the {U}nited {K}ingdom and the{U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {375-387}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{Demery1999, author = {Demery, D. and Duck, N. W.}, title = {Imperfect information and consumption in the {U}nited {K}ingdom and the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {375-387}, key = {consumption}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DeSc:01, author = {Demougina, D. and Schwager, R.}, title = {Excess Burden of Criminality and Redistribution}, journal = {International Review of Law and Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {(20) 3}, pages = {329-351}, key = {Crime} } @ARTICLE{Dems:68, author = {Demsetz, H.}, title = {Why regulate utilities?}, journal = {Journal of Law and Economics}, year = {1968}, volume = {9}, pages = {55-65}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{DWCl:02, author = {DeNavas-Walt, C. and Cleveland, R. W.}, title = {Money income in the {U}nited {S}tates: 2001}, institution = {Census Bureau}, year = {2002}, type = {Current Population Reports: Consumer Income}, number = {P60-191}, address = {Washington DC}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{DeNWClWe:03, author = {DeNavas-Walt, C. and Cleveland, R. W. and Webster, B.H.}, title = {Income in the {U}nited {S}tates: 2002}, institution = {Census Bureau}, year = {2003}, type = {Current Population Reports: Consumer Income}, number = {P60-221}, address = {Washington DC}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.27}, url = {http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-221.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{DeNWPrLe:06, author = {DeNavas-Walt, C. and Proctor, B. D. and Lee, C. H.}, title = {Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the {U}nited {S}tates: 2005}, institution = {U.S. Census Bureau}, year = {2006}, type = {Current Population Reports}, number = {P60-229}, address = {U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.08.27}, url = {http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{DeNWPrLe:05, author = {DeNavas-Walt, C. and Proctor, B. D. and Lee, C. H.}, title = {Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the {U}nited {S}tates: 2004}, institution = {U.S. Census Bureau}, year = {2005}, type = {Current Population Reports}, number = {P60-229}, address = {U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.06.04}, url = {http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{DeNWPrSm:08, author = {DeNavas-Walt, C. and Proctor, B. D. and Smith, J. C.}, title = {Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the {U}nited {S}tates: 2007}, institution = {U.S. Census Bureau}, year = {2008}, type = {Current Population Reports}, number = {P60-235}, address = {U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.08.27}, url = {http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{DeNWPrSm:07, author = {DeNavas-Walt, C. and Proctor, B. D. and Smith, J. C.}, title = {Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the {U}nited {S}tates: 2006}, institution = {U.S. Census Bureau}, year = {2007}, type = {Current Population Reports}, number = {P60-235}, address = {U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.08.27}, url = {http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-233.pdf} } @ARTICLE{DeFr:04, author = {Denicolo, Vincenzo and Franzoni, Luigi Alberto}, title = {The contract theory of patents}, journal = {International Review of Law and Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {23}, pages = {365-380}, abstract = {Two distinct theories of patents, the ¡°reward theory¡± and the ¡°contracttheory,¡± are customarily adopted by the courts to justify the patent system.The reward theory maintains that the function of the patent system is toremunerate successful innovators so as to encourage R&D effort. In contrast,the contract theory holds that the function of the patent system is topromote the diffusion of innovative knowledge. Assuming that in the absenceof patent protection innovators would rely on trade secrecy, it views patentsas a contract between innovators and society whereby a property right isgranted in exchange for disclosure. This paper develops an economic analysisof the contract theory of patents. To disentangle the disclosure from thereward motive for granting patents, we assume that the innovation processis entirely serendipitous, so that R&D effort is not a concern. Our mainfinding is that the disclosure motive alone suffices to justify the grantof patents. The optimal patent duration should strike a balance betweenthe incentive to induce disclosure and the aim of limiting the monopolydistortion induced by patents.}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Deni:82IU, author = {Denison, E. G.}, title = {Is {US} growth understated because of the underground economy? Employmentratios suggest not}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1982}, volume = {28}, pages = {1-16}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Denison1982, author = {Denison, E. G.}, title = {Is {US} growth understated because of the underground economy? Employment ratios suggest not}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1982}, volume = {28}, pages = {1-16}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DeWoYi:02, author = {Denizer, C. and Wolf, H. and Ying, Y.}, title = {Household Savings in the Transition}, journal = {Journal of Comparative Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {30}, pages = {463-475}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{DeLeMe:99AC, author = {Denuit, M. and Lefevre, C. and Mesfioui, M.}, title = {A Class of Bivariate Stochastic Orderings, with Applications in ActuarialSciences}, journal = {Insurance: Mathematics and Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {24}, pages = {31-50}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{DeLeMe:99OS, author = {Denuit, M. and Lefevre, C. and Mesfioui, M.}, title = {On S-Convex Stochastic Extrema for Arithmetic Risks}, journal = {Insurance, Mathematics and Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {25}, pages = {143-155}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Denuit1999a, author = {Denuit, M. and Lefevre, C. and Mesfioui, M.}, title = {A Class of Bivariate Stochastic Orderings, with Applications in Actuarial Sciences}, journal = {Insurance: Mathematics and Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {24}, pages = {31-50}, key = {mathematics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Deo:00, author = {Deo, R. S.}, title = {On estimation and testing goodness of fit for m-dependent stable sequences}, journal = {Econometrics}, year = {2000}, volume = {99}, pages = {349-372}, key = {statistics} } @BOOK{DSS:98, title = {Households Below Average Income: A Statistical Analysis, 1979-1996/7}, publisher = {The Stationery Office}, year = {1998}, author = {{Department of Social Security }}, address = {London}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{DSS:96, title = {Households Below Average Income: A Statistical Analysis, 1979-1993/4}, publisher = {The Stationery Office}, year = {1996}, author = {{Department of Social Security }}, address = {London}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{DSS:92, title = {Households Below Average Income: A Statistical Analysis, 1979-1988/9}, publisher = {HMSO}, year = {1992}, author = {{Department of Social Security }}, address = {London}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{IRS:79, title = {Estimates of Income Unreported on Individual Income Tax Returns}, year = {1979}, author = {{US} {Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service}}, address = {Washington, D.C.}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{IRS:97, author = {{Department of the Treasury}}, title = {Market Segment Specialization Program}, institution = {Internal Revenue Service}, year = {1997}, type = {Document}, number = {9098}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.04.27} } @ARTICLE{Depk:00, author = {Depken II, C. A.}, title = {Wage Disparity and Team Productivity: Evidence from Major League Baseball}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, pages = {87-92}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{Depk:08, author = {Depken, C. A.}, title = {Benford, {Z}ipf and the blogosphere}, journal = {Applied Economics Letters}, year = {2008}, volume = {15}, pages = {689-692}, abstract = {The blogosphere is a relatively recent development on the Internet and, for this reason, has received limited empirical investigation. This short note investigates whether the popularity of the 500 most popular blogs during August and September of 2005, as measured by in-coming links, followed the first-digit distribution attributed to Benford (1938) and the rank-size distribution attributed to Zipf (1949). The evidence suggests that the blogs investigated were not characterized by either empirical regularity, consistent with blog popularity being caused by network externalities.}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.21}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2262/content/routledg/rael/2008/00000015/00000009/art00006} } @BOOK{Derc:04, title = {Insurance Against Poverty}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2004}, author = {Dercon, Stefan}, address = {Oxford}, key = {Poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Derc:02, author = {Dercon,S.}, title = {Income Risk, Coping Strategies and Safety Nets}, institution = {World Institute for Development Economics Research}, year = {2002}, abstract = {High income risk is part of life in developing countries. Climatic risks,economic fluctuations, but also a large number of individual-specific shocksmake these households vulnerable to serious hardship. For example, detailsare given on the various shocks and events causing serious hardship torural households in Ethiopia in the last twenty years. Not surprisinglyfor Ethiopia, climatic events are the most commoncause of shocks, but manyhouseholds suffer from other common or idiosyncratic shocks related toeconomic policy, labour or livestock. Rural and urban households in developingcountries face substantial risk. Households in risky environments havedeveloped sophisticated (ex ante) risk-management and (ex post) risk-copingstrategies, including self-insurance via savings and informal insurancemechanisms while formal credit and insurance markets appear to contributeonly little to reducing income risk and its consequences. Despite thesestrategies, vulnerability to poverty linked to risk remains high. In thispaper, I focus on theopportunities available to households to use risk-managementand risk-coping strategies, and on the constraints on their effectiveness,by reviewing some of the recent literature on savings as insurance, incomediversification and smoothing, and informal risk-sharing arrangements.Risk and lumpiness limit the opportunities to use assets as insurance.Entry constraints limit the usefulness of income diversification. Informalrisk-sharing only provides limited protection, especially for some of thepoor and their sustainability during periods of change is in doubt. Publicsafety nets are likely to be beneficial, but their impact is at times limitedwhile they may have negative externalities on households not covered bythe safety net. The paper also discusses the implications for policy aswell as the information requirements to increase our understanding of vulnerabilityand implement better vulnerability reducing policies.}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Derc:98, author = {Dercon, Stefan}, title = {Wealth, risk and activity choice: cattle in {W}estern {T}anzania}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {55}, pages = {1-42}, number = {1}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{DeKr:02, author = {Dercon, S. and Krishnan, P.}, title = {Vulnerability, Seasonality and Poverty in {E}thiopia}, journal = {Journal of Development Studies}, year = {2002}, volume = {36}, pages = {25-53}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{DeKr:00, author = {Dercon, S. and Krishnan, P.}, title = {In Sickness and in Health: Risk Sharing within Households in Rural Ethiopia}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2000}, volume = {108}, pages = {688-727}, abstract = {The authors focus on the consumption smoothing ability of individual members of households (than of households as units) over time and in contrast to other household members. They use data on adult nutrition in Ethiopia, and find that poorer households are unable to smooth their consumption, and do not engage in complete risk sharing. Women are disproportionately affected by shocks, and their relative position is better the wealthier their background, the smaller the age difference between the husband and the wife, and the fairer (favourable towards women) divorce laws are. The authors also use risk sharing as a way of measuring Pareto weights for each member of the household, and find that collective household organisation model which leads to Pareto efficiency is rejected by these households (in favour of males).}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{Desa:03, author = {Desai,M.}, title = {The divergence between book income and tax income}, journal = {Tax Policy and the Economy}, year = {2003}, volume = {17}, pages = {169-206}, abstract = {This paper examines the evolution of the corporate profit base and the relationshipbetween book income and tax income for U.S. corporations over the lasttwo decades. The paper demonstrates that this relationship has broken downover the 1990s, and it has broken down in a manner consistent with increasedtax-sheltering activity. The paper traces the growing discrepancy betweenbook income and tax income associated with differential treatments of depreciation,the reporting of foreign source income, and in particular the changingnature of employee compensation.}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{DeDh:04, author = {Desai, Mihir A. and Dharmapala Dhammika}, title = {Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {10471}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, abstract = {This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growthof high-powered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporategovernance. We develop and test a simple model that highlights the roleof complementarities between tax sheltering and managerial diversion indetermining how high-powered incentives influence tax sheltering decisions.The model generates the testable hypothesis that firm governance characteristicsdetermine how incentive compensation changes sheltering decisions. In orderto test the model, we construct an empirical measure of corporate tax avoidance- the component of the book-tax gap not attributable to accounting accruals- and investigate the link between this measure of tax avoidance and incentivecompensation. We find that, for the full sample of firms, increases inincentive compensation tend to reduce the level of tax sheltering, suggestinga complementary relationship between diversion and sheltering. As predictedby the model, the relationship between incentive compensation and tax shelteringis a function of a firm's corporate governance. Our results may help explainthe growing cross-sectional variation among firms in their levels of taxavoidance, the "undersheltering puzzle," and why large book-tax gaps areassociated with subsequent negative abnormal returns.}, key = {Tax compliance - firms} } @TECHREPORT{DeFoHi:03, author = {Desai, Mihir A. and Foley, C. Fritz and Hines Jr., James R.}, title = {A Multinational Perspective on Capital Structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2003}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {9715}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {finance} } @TECHREPORT{DeDh:07, author = {Desai,M.A. and Dharmapala,D.}, title = {Taxes and Portfolio Choice: Evidence from JGTRRA's Treatment of International Dividends}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, abstract = {This paper investigates how taxes influence portfolio choices by exploring the response to the distinctive treatment of foreign dividends in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA). JGTRRA lowered the dividend tax rate to 15% for American equities and extended this tax relief only to foreign corporations from a subset of countries. This paper uses a difference-in-difference analysis that compares US equity holdings in affected and unaffected countries. The international investment responses to JGTRRA were substantial and imply an elasticity of asset holdings with respect to taxes of -1.6. This effect cannot be explained by several potential alternative hypotheses, including differential changes to the preferences of American investors, differential changes in investment opportunities, differential time trends in investment or changed tax evasion behavior.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{DeFoHi:06, author = {Desai, M. and Foley, C. and Hines, J.}, title = {The Demand for Tax Haven Operations}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {513-531}, abstract = {What types of firms establish tax haven operations, and what purposes do these operations serve? Analysis of affiliate-level data for American firms indicates that larger, more international firms, and those with extensive intrafirm trade and high R and D intensities, are the most likely to use tax havens. Tax haven operations facilitate tax avoidance both by permitting firms to allocate taxable income away from high-tax jurisdictions and by reducing the burden of home country taxation of foreign income. The evidence suggests that the primary use of affiliates in larger tax haven countries is to reallocate taxable income, whereas the primary use of affiliates in smaller tax haven countries is to facilitate deferral of U.S. taxation of foreign income. Firms with sizeable foreign operations benefit the most from using tax havens, an effect that can be evaluated by using foreign economic growth rates as instruments for firm-level growth of foreign investment outside of tax havens. One percent greater sales and investment growth in nearby non-haven countries is associated with a 1.5 to 2% greater likelihood of establishing a tax haven operation.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{DeFoHi:06A, author = {Desai, M. and Foley, C. and Hines, J.}, title = {Do Tax Havens Divert Economic Activity?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {219-224}, key = {taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{DeSh:88, author = {Meghnad Desai and Anup Shah}, title = {An Econometric Approach to the Measurement of Poverty}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1988}, volume = {40}, pages = {505-522}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{DeGe:78, author = {Deschamps, R. and Gevers, L.}, title = {Leximin and Utilitarian Rules: A joint characterization}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1978}, volume = {17}, pages = {143-163}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{DeMaRe:99, author = {Desjonqueres, T. and Machin, S. and Van Reenan, J.}, title = {Another Nail in the Coffin? or Can the Trade Based Explanation of ChangingSkill Structures Be Resurrected?}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {101}, pages = {1-22}, key = {Technology} } @ARTICLE{Desjonqueres1999, author = {Desjonqueres, T. and Machin, S. and Van Reenan, J.}, title = {Another Nail in the Coffin? or Can the Trade Based Explanation of Changing Skill Structures Be Resurrected?}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {101}, pages = {1-22}, key = {Technology}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Dess:02, author = {Dessing, M.}, title = {Labor supply, the family and poverty: the {S}-shaped labor supply curve}, journal = {Journal Of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {2002}, volume = {49}, pages = {433-458}, key = {public economics} } @INCOLLECTION{DeSi:08, author = {Deutsch,J and Silber,J}, title = {On the {S}hapley value and the decomposition of inquality by population subgroups with special emphasis on the {G}ini index}, booktitle = {Advances on Income Inequality and Concentration Measures}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2008}, editor = {Betti, G. and Lemmi, A.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @INCOLLECTION{DeSi:99, author = {Deutsch, J. and Silber, J.}, title = {The Decomposition of Inequality by Population Subgroups and the Analysisof Interdistributional Inequality}, booktitle = {Handbook on Income Inequality Measurement}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1999}, editor = {Silber, J.}, chapter = {13}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @INCOLLECTION{Deutsch1999, author = {Deutsch, J. and Silber, J.}, title = {The Decomposition of Inequality by Population Subgroups and the Analysis of Interdistributional Inequality}, booktitle = {Income Inequality Measurement: From Theory to Practice}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1999}, editor = {Silber, J.}, chapter = {13}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DeSi:05, author = {Deutsch,J. and Silber,J.}, title = {Measuring multidimensional poverty: An empirical comparison of various approaches}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2005}, volume = {51}, pages = {145-174}, abstract = {This paper makes a systematic comparison of four approaches to multidimensionalpoverty analysis based respectively on the theory of fuzzy sets, informationtheory, efficiency analysis and axiomatic derivations of poverty indices.The database was the 1995 Israeli Census that provided information on theownership of various durable goods. There appears to be a fair degree ofagreement between the various multidimensional poverty indices concerningthe identification of the poor households. The four approaches have alsoshown that poverty decreases with the schooling level of the head of thehousehold, first decreases and then increases with his/her age and withthe size of the household. Poverty is higher when the head of the householdis single and lower when he/she is married, lowest when the head of thehousehold is Jewish and highest when he/she is Muslim. Poverty is alsohigher among households whose head immigrated in recent years, does notwork or lives in Jerusalem. These observations were made on the basis oflogit regressions. This impact on poverty of many of the variables is notvery different from the one that is observed when poverty measurement isbased only on the income or the total expenditures of the households.}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{DeSi:97, author = {Deutsch, J. and Silber, J.}, title = {Gini's `{T}ransvariazione' and the measurement of distance between distributions}, journal = {Empirical Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {22}, pages = {547-554}, number = {4}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{DeLoRe:08, author = {Devereux, M.P. and Lockwood, B. and Redoano, M.}, title = {Do countries compete over corporate tax rates?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {1210-1235}, number = {5-6}, month = {June}, abstract = {This paper investigates whether OECD countries compete with each other over corporation taxes, and whether such competition can explain the fall in statutory tax rates in the 1980s and 1990s. We develop a model in which multinational firms choose their capital stock in response to an effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), and simultaneously choose the location of their profit in response to differences in statutory tax rates. Governments engage in two-dimensional tax competition: they simultaneously compete over EMTRs for capital and over statutory rates for profit. We estimate the parameters of their reaction functions using data from 21 countries between 1982 and 1999. We find evidence that countries compete over both measures, and moreover, that the estimated slopes of reaction functions are consistent with our theoretical predictions. We find that – consistent with our model, but not some other forms of competition – evidence of strategic interaction is present only between open economies (i.e. those without capital controls in place). The Nash equilibrium average statutory rates implied by the empirical model fall substantially over the period, in line with falls in actual statutory rates. The reductions in equilibrium tax rates can be explained almost entirely by more intense competition generated by the relaxation of capital controls.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.22} } @ARTICLE{Devereux1998a, author = {Devereux, M. B. and Wen, J.-F.}, title = {Political Instability, Capital Taxation, and Growth}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {1635-1651}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DeWe:98, author = {Devereux, M. B. and Wen, J.-F.}, title = {Political Instability, Capital Taxation and Growth}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {1635-1651}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Deve:03, author = {Devereux, Michael P.}, title = {Measuring Taxes on Income from Capital}, year = {2003}, number = {962}, abstract = {This paper provides a conceptual review of how the impact of taxes on theincentive to invest in the corporate sector can be measured. The focusis on measures derived from economic theory. Two measures are derived –effective marginal and average tax rates – which reflect different formsof investment decisions. A number of extensions to the basic model areexamined, including the role of personal taxes, the source of finance andrisk. These measures are compared to empirical measures based on observedtax revenues or tax liabilities.}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {taxation}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{Deve:99, author = {Devereux, M. P.}, title = {Prospects for Co-Ordination of Corporate Taxation and the Taxation of InterestIncome in the {EU}: a comment}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {155-161}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Devereux1999, author = {Devereux, M. P.}, title = {Prospects for Co-Ordination of Corporate Taxation and the Taxation of Interest Income in the {EU}: a comment}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {155-161}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DeGr:98, author = {Devereux, Michael P. and Griffith, Rachel}, title = {Taxes and the location of production: evidence from a panel of {US} multinationals}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {68}, pages = {335-367}, number = {3}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{DeSt:86, author = {Devereux, Michael P. and Griffith, Rachel}, title = {Optimally uniform commodity taxes, taste differences and lump-sum grants}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1986}, volume = {20}, pages = {263-266}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Devi:99, author = {Deville, J.-C.}, title = {Variance Estimation for Complex Statistics and Estimators: Linearizationand Residual Techniques}, journal = {Statistics Canada: Survey Methodology}, year = {1999}, volume = {25}, pages = {193-203}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Deville1999, author = {Deville, J.-C.}, title = {Variance Estimation for Complex Statistics and Estimators: Linearization and Residual Techniques}, journal = {Statistics Canada: Survey Methodology}, year = {1999}, volume = {25}, pages = {193-203}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Devo:08, author = {Devooght, K.}, title = {To Each the Same and to Each his Own: A Proposal to Measure Responsibility-Sensitive Income Inequality}, journal = {Economica}, year = {2008}, volume = {75}, abstract = {This paper deals with the question of how to incorporate modern responsibility-catering egalitarianism into economic theory on the measurement of income inequality. I present a particular axiomatic expression of the main aspects of such egalitarianism. Then, to measure offensive inequality separately I construct a norm or reference income distribution based upon the axiomatic model to replace the perfectly equal income distribution that is used as norm by all common inequality measures. I defend the use of a particular measure of distributional change to determine the degree of offensive inequality, and apply the method to Belgian income data.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{Devo:04, author = {Devooght, K.}, title = {To Each the Same And to Each His Own. A Proposal to Measure Responsibility-SensitiveIncome Inequality}, institution = {University of Kortrijk}, year = {2004}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Devo:03, author = {Devooght, K.}, title = {Measuring inequality by counting `complaints': theory and empirics}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {19}, pages = {241-263}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Devooght2003, author = {Devooght, K.}, title = {Measuring inequality by counting `complaints': theory and empirics}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {2003}, volume = {19}, pages = {241 - 263}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Devo:01, author = {Devooght, K.}, title = {Measuring Inequality by counting 'complaints': theory and empirics}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {2001}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {57}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{DeJeTi(2):99, author = {Dewatripont, M. and Jewitt, I. and Tirole, J.}, title = {The Economics of Career Concerns, Part {II}: Application to Missions andAccountability of Government Agencies}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{DeJeTi:99, author = {Dewatripont, M. and Jewitt, I. and Tirole, J.}, title = {The Economics of Career Concerns, Part 1: Comparing Information Structures}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {183-198}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Dewatripont1999a, author = {Dewatripont, M. and Jewitt, I. and Tirole, J.}, title = {The Economics of Career Concerns, Part {II}: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Dewees1990, author = {Dewees, D. N. and Wilson T. A.}, title = {Cold Houses and Warm Climates Revisited: On Keeping Warm in Chicago, or Paradox Lost}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1990}, volume = {98}, pages = {656-663}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DeWi:90, author = {Dewees, D. N. and Wilson T. A.}, title = {Cold Houses and Warm Climates Revisited: On Keeping Warm in Chicago, orParadox Lost}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1990}, volume = {98}, pages = {656-663}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Dewi:08, author = {Dewilde, Caroline}, title = {Individual and institutional determinants of multidimensional poverty: A European comparison}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, pages = {233 - 256}, abstract = {In this article we evaluate to what extent between-country differences in the probability of being ‘multidimensional’ poor can be explained by a range of ‘domainspecific’ indicators of welfare regime arrangements. To this end, a so-called micro-macro model is estimated, testing the ‘independent’ effect of institutions, as opposed to alternative explanations such as between-country differences in population composition and economic affluence. Although we conclude that institutional arrangements do influence the risk of multidimensional poverty in the expected direction, we also find that bringing the ‘economy’ back into the analyses has a non-trivial impact. Our results point at several avenues for further discussion and research. First, although the more elaborate welfare regimes generally do a better job in preventing poverty, the level of transfers is not always ‘proportional’ to the general standard of living in these countries. Second, we only find partial confirmation for the often cited ‘negative’ impact of labour market flexibility and the related equality-jobs trade-off. While stricter employment regulations do reduce the poverty risk (be it only after controlling for economic affluence), flexibility in terms of the availability of fixed-term labour seems to be preferable to unemployment, even if at the individual level, labour market flexibility increases the likelihood of being poor quite severely.}, key = {Inequality}, keywords = {Poverty measurement, Cumulative deprivation, Comparative welfare state research}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{DeGuSmCa:95, author = {Dex, S. and Gustafsson, S. and Smith, N. and Callan, T.}, title = {Cross-National comparisons of the Labor Force Participation of women marriedto unemployed Men}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1995}, volume = {47}, pages = {611-635}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Dex1995, author = {Dex, S. and Gustafsson, S. and Smith, N. and Callan, T.}, title = {Cross-National comparisons of the Labor Force Participation of women married to unemployed Men}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1995}, volume = {47}, pages = {611-635}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Dey:05, author = {Dey, S.}, title = {Lines of Credit and Consumption Smoothing: The Choice between Credit Cards and Home Equity Lines of Credit}, institution = {Bank of Canada}, year = {2005}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2005-18}, address = {http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/FB3-2-105-18E.pdf}, abstract = {The author models the choice between credit cards and home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) within a framework where consumers hold lines of credit as instruments of consumption smoothing across state and time. Flexible repayment schemes for lines of credit induce risk averse consumers with sufficiently high discount rates to underinsure and hold lines of credit instead as a buffer, even when they have access to full and fair insurance markets. Weighing the fixed upfront fees and higher default costs of HELOCs against the advantages of low and income tax- deductible interest payments, the author finds a threshold level of potential borrowing below which consumers prefer to use credit cards exclusively.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{DhScVo:00, author = {Dhaene,G. and Schokkaert,E. and Voorde,C.}, title = {Best affine unbiased response decomposition}, journal = {Journal of Multivariate Analysis}, year = {2003}, volume = {86}, pages = {242-253}, abstract = {Given two linear regression models y1 = X1P1 + u1 and y2 = X2P2 + u2 wherethe response vectors y1 and y2 are unobservable but the sum y = y1+y2 isobservable, we study the problem of decomposing y into components 1 and2; intended to be close to y1 and y2; respectively. We develop a theoryof best af.ne unbiased decomposition in this setting. A necessary and sufficientcondition for the existence of an af.ne unbiased decomposition is given.Under this condition, we establish the existence and uniqueness of thebest af.ne unbiased decomposition and provide an expression for it.}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Dham:03, author = {Dhami, S.}, title = {The political economy of redistribution under asymmetric information}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {2069–2103}, key = {Redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Dhami2003, author = {Dhami, S.}, title = {The political economy of redistribution under asymmetric information}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {2069-2103}, key = {Redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{DhAl:08, author = {Dhami, S. and al-Nowaihi, A.}, title = {Optimal Income Taxation in the Presence of Tax Evasion: Expected Utility Versus Prospect Theory}, institution = {University of Leicester}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {07/10}, __markedentry = {[zhangz3]}, abstract = {The predictions of expected utility theory (EUT) applied to tax evasion are flawed on two counts: (i) They are quantitatively in error by huge orders of mag- nitude. (ii) Higher taxation is predicted to lower evasion, which is at variance with the evidence. An emerging literature in behavioral economics, most notably based on prospect theory (PT), has shown that behavioral economics is much better at explaining tax evasion. We extend this literature to incorporate issues of optimal taxation. As a benchmark for a successful theory, we require that it should explain, jointly, the facts on the tax rate, tax gap and the level of government expenditure. We find that when taxpayers use EUT (respectively, PT) and the optimal tax is de- rived from a social welfare function that also uses EUT (respectively, PT), then, the calibration results are completely at odds with the facts. However, when taxpayers use PT but the social welfare function uses standard EUT, there is a very close match between the predictions and the facts. This has important implications for context dependent preferences but also for the newly emerging literature on liberalism versus paternalism in behavioral economics.}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.06} } @ARTICLE{DhAl:07CA, author = {Dhami, S. and Al-Nowaihi, A.}, title = {Corruption and the Provision of Public Output in a Hierarchical Asymmetric Information Relationship}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {9}, pages = {727-755}, number = {4}, month = {August}, abstract = {This paper develops a principal-agent model to explore the interaction of corruption, bribery, and political oversight of production. Under full information, an honest politician achieves the first best while a dishonest politician creates shortages and bribes. Under asymmetric information, an honest politician may create more shortages relative to a dishonest one, but the latter creates more bribes. The model identifies a tradeoff between bribery and efficiency. This helps to reconcile some conflicting results on the implications of corruption for the size of the public sector. It also provides new results on the circumstances under which an improvement in the auditing technology is beneficial. The paper identifies conditions under which corruption is welfare enhancing. However, the paper also shows that under precisely these conditions private provision, even by an unregulated monopolist, would be better than public provision.}, key = {politics}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.22} } @TECHREPORT{DhHi:07, author = {Dharmapala,D. and Hines Jr ,J.R.}, title = {Which Countries Become Tax Havens?}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, number = {W12802}, abstract = {This paper analyzes the factors influencing whether countries become tax havens. Roughly 15 percent of countries are tax havens; as has been widely observed, these countries tend to be small and affluent. This paper documents another robust empirical regularity: better-governed countries are much more likely than others to become tax havens. Using a variety of empirical approaches, and controlling for other relevant factors, governance quality has a statistically significant and quantitatively large impact on the probability of being a tax haven. For a typical country with a population under one million, the likelihood of a becoming a tax haven rises from 24 percent to 63 percent as governance quality improves from the level of Brazil to that of Portugal. The effect of governance on tax haven status persists when the origin of a country's legal system is used as an instrument for its quality of its governance. Low tax rates offer much more powerful inducements to foreign investment in well-governed countries than elsewhere, which may explain why poorly governed countries do not generally attempt to become tax havens - and suggests that the range of sensible tax policy options is constrained by the quality of governance.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{DhMe:99, author = {Dhillon, A. and Mertens J.-F.}, title = {Relative Utilitarianism}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {471-498}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{DhMe:97, author = {Dhillon, Amrita and Mertens, Jean-Francois}, title = {An impossibility theorem with von {N}eumann-{M}orgenstern preferences}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {56}, pages = {305-309}, number = {3}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{DhPeSc:99, author = {Dhillon, A. and Perroni, C. and Scharf, K. A.}, title = {Implementing Tax Coordination}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {243-268}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{DhWoZi:07, author = {Dhillon,A. and Wooders, M. and Zissimos, B.}, title = {Tax Competition Reconsidered}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {9}, pages = {391-423}, number = {3}, month = {June}, abstract = {In a classic model of tax competition, this paper shows that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much or too little public good provision. The key is whether there exists a unilateral incentive to deviate from the efficient state and, if so, whether this entails raising or lowering taxes. A priori, there is no reason to suppose the incentive is in either one direction or the other.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @INCOLLECTION{Dhom:84, author = {Dhombres, J. G.}, title = {Some recent applications of functional equations}, publisher = {Reidel}, year = {1984}, editor = {Acz{\'e}l, J.}, address = {Dordrecht}, book = {Functional Equations: History, Applications, Theory,}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{DhAlBiVeDiHoJoLuRuVi:06, author = {Dhyne, E. and {\'A}lvarez, L. and Bihan, H. and Veronese, G. and Dias, D. and Hoffmann, J. and Jonker, N. and L{\"u}nnemann, P. and Rumler, F. and Vilmunen, J.}, title = {Price Changes in the Euro Area and the United States: Some Facts from Individual Consumer Price Data}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2006}, volume = {20}, pages = {171-192}, abstract = {Prices of goods and services do not adjust immediately in response to changing demand and supply conditions. This observation has led to the development of a number of theories to explain price stickiness, including models that rely on implicit or explicit contracts, menu costs or coordination failure. In addition, a body of theoretical literature has shown that the nature of nominal price rigidities determines the response of inflation and output to a wide variety of shocks and has several implications for the conduct of monetary policy. However, empirical assessment of the actual extent of price rigidity has remained limited. In fact, most existing micro-studies focus on very specific products or markets: for example, Cecchetti (1986) on newsstand prices of magazines; Lach and Tsiddon (1992) and Eden (2001) on food product prices; Kashyap (1995) on catalogue prices; Levy et al. (1997) on supermarket prices; and Genesove (2003) on apartment rents.}, key = {macro}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.01} } @TECHREPORT{DiHaMa:07, author = {Di Tella, Rafael and Haisken-De New, John and MacCulloch, Robert}, title = {Happiness Adaptation to Income and to Status in an Individual Panel}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {13159}, abstract = {We study "habituation" to income and to status using individual panel data on the happiness of 7,812 people living in Germany from 1984 to 2000. Specifically, we estimate a "happiness equation" defined over several lags of income and status and compare the long run effects. We can (cannot) reject the hypothesis of no adaptation to income (status) during the four years following an income (status) change. In the short-run (current year) a one standard deviation increase in status and 52% of one standard deviation in income are associated with similar increases in happiness. In the long-run (five year average) a one standard deviation increase in status has a similar effect to an increase of 285% of a standard deviation in income. We also present different estimates of habituation across sub-groups. For example, we find that those on the right (left) of the political spectrum adapt to status (income) but not to income (status).}, key = {Happiness}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{DiMa:06, author = {Di {T}ella, R. and Mac{C}ullogh, R.}, title = {Some Uses of Happiness Data in Economics}, journal = {Journal of Economics Perspectives}, year = {2006}, volume = {20}, pages = {25-46}, key = {welfare}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{DiGi:96, author = {Diamantaras, Dimitrios and Gilles, Robert P.}, title = {The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization and the Core}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1996}, volume = {37}, pages = {851-860}, number = {4}, month = {November}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Diamantaras1994, author = {Diamantaras, Dimitrios and Wilkie, Simon}, title = {A Generalization of {K}aneko's Ratio Equilibrium for Economies with Private and Public Goods}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1994}, volume = {62}, pages = {499-512}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DiWi:94, author = {Diamantaras, Dimitrios and Wilkie, Simon}, title = {A Generalization of {K}aneko's Ratio Equilibrium for Economies with Privateand Public Goods}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1994}, volume = {62}, pages = {499-512}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{DiGe:99, author = {Diamond, Harvey and Gelles, Gregory}, title = {Gaussian approximation of expected utility}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {64}, pages = {301-307}, number = {3}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Diam:08, author = {Diamond, P.}, title = {Behavioral economics}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {1858-1862}, number = {8-9}, month = {August}, key = {behavioral economics}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.21} } @ARTICLE{Diam:06, author = {Diamond, P.}, title = {Optimal Tax Treatment of Private Contributions for Public Goods with and without Warm Glow Preferences}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {897-919}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @ARTICLE{Diam:06A, author = {Diamond, P.}, title = {Reforming Public Pensions in the US and the UK}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {2006}, volume = {116}, pages = {94-118}, month = {February}, abstract = {This essay describes the current debate on reforming Social Security in the US, along with a brief description of how the programme works. Along the way it comments on the quality of some reform proposals as well as their political standing. Where issues are similar, some inferences are drawn for the UK. While the focus of this essay is the political debate, the debate and my analysis do draw on the academic literature, which is not surprising since academics have played a number of roles in the debate, making reform proposals, being on and staffing the commission appointed by President Bush, and working for the Bush administration. Each year the Office of the Actuary of Social Security prepares a projection of the finances of the system for the next 75 years (Board of Trustees, 2005). The Office also does projections for reform proposals. Despite the presence of three cabinet members among the five Trustees who have the power to set the economic and demographic assumptions, the projections have wide acceptance and are viewed as coming from widely-respected civil servants, not the cabinet members officially in charge. They play a key role in the political process, although recently the Congressional Budget Office has started doing projections as well (Congressional Budget Office, 2005).}, key = {pensions}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @BOOK{Diam:03, title = {Taxation, Incomplete Markets and Social Security}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2003}, author = {Diamond, Peter A.}, address = {Cambridge Massachusetts}, key = {Public Economics} } @ARTICLE{Diam:98, author = {Diamond, Peter A.}, title = {Optimal Income taxation: an example with a {U}-Shaped pattern of optimalmarginal tax rates}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {88}, pages = {83-95}, number = {1}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Diam:67, author = {Diamond, Peter A.}, title = {Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics and interpersonal comparison ofutility: comment}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1967}, volume = {75}, pages = {765-766}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Diamond1967, author = {Diamond, Peter A.}, title = {Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics and interpersonal comparison of utility: comment}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1967}, volume = {75}, pages = {765-766}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Diamond2003, author = {Diamond , P. A. and Koszegi, B.}, title = {Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and retirement}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1839-1872}, key = {saving}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DiKo:03, author = {Diamond , P. A. and Koszegi, B.}, title = {Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and retirement}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1839–1872}, key = {saving} } @ARTICLE{DiMi:71PE, author = {Diamond, P. A. and Mirrlees, J. A.}, title = {Optimal taxation and public production {I}: production efficiency}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1971}, volume = {61}, pages = {8-27}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{DiMi:71TR, author = {Diamond, P. A. and Mirrlees, J. A.}, title = {Optimal taxation and public production {II}: tax rules}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1971}, volume = {61}, pages = {261-278}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{DiMc:74, author = {Diamond, P.A. and McFadden, D.L.}, title = {Some Uses of the Expediture Function in Public Finance}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1974}, volume = {3}, pages = {3-21}, key = {finance}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{Dick:00, author = {Dickens, R.}, title = {The Evolution of Individual Male Earnings in Great Britain: 1975-95}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2000}, volume = {110}, pages = {27-49}, key = {earnings} } @TECHREPORT{DiEl:01, author = {Dickens, R. and Ellwood, D. T.}, title = {Whither Poverty in {G}reat {B}ritain and the {U}nited {S}tates? The determinantsof changing poverty and whether work will work}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2001}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {8253}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{DiMaMa:99, author = {Dickens, R. and Machin, S. and Manning, A.}, title = {The Effects of Minimum Wages on Employment: Theory and Evidence from Britain}, journal = {Journal of Labor Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {17}, pages = {1-22}, key = {Minumum wage} } @ARTICLE{DiMaMa:98, author = {Dickens, Richard and Machin, Stephen and Manning, Alan}, title = {Estimating the effect of minimum wages on employment from the distributionof wages: A critical view}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {5}, pages = {109-134}, number = {2}, key = {Minimum wage} } @ARTICLE{Di-Co:99, author = {Dickert-Conlin, S.}, title = {Taxes and Transfers: Their Effects on a Decision to End a Marriage}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {241-263}, key = {population economics} } @ARTICLE{Di-CoCh:99, author = {Dickert-Conlin, S. and Chandra, A.}, title = {Taxes and the Timings of Births}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {107}, pages = {161-177}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Dick:07FER, author = {Dickey, Heather}, title = {Regional Earnings Inequality in Great Britain: Evidence from Fixed-effects Regressions}, journal = {LABOUR}, year = {2007}, volume = {21}, pages = {763 - 787}, abstract = {Earnings inequality in Great Britain has increased substantially over the last two decades at both the national and regional levels. This paper examines the determinants of regional hourly earnings over the period 1976–95 by estimating regional fixed-effects earnings equations. Using panel data from the New Earnings Survey, individual-specific heterogeneity is controlled for, and superior estimates of the factors affecting regional earnings are obtained. Increasing returns to skill, increasing industrial differentials, and increasing premiums for older workers are found to have contributed to increasing regional earnings inequality, and consequently rising earnings inequality at the national level.}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{Dick:07QR, author = {Dickey, Heather}, title = {Regional Earnings Inequality in Great Britain: Evidence from Quantile Regressions}, journal = {Journal of Regional Science}, year = {2007}, volume = {47}, pages = {775 - 806}, abstract = {The increase in national earnings inequality in Great Britain over the last two decades has predominantly been a result of increasing earnings inequality within the regions of Great Britain, and not rising inequality between regions. However, there is a severe lack of empirical research exploring the evolution of earnings inequality within regions. This paper investigates the causes of rising within-region inequality in Great Britain. It examines the changes that have taken place between 1976 and 1995, and regional quantile regressions are estimated to reveal those factors that have contributed to the rise in within-region inequality.}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{Dick:98, author = {Dickinson, David L.}, title = {The voluntary contributions mechanism with uncertain group payoffs}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {35}, pages = {517-533}, number = {4}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{DiBaSo:04, author = {Diekmann,K. and Barsness,Z. and Sondak,H.}, title = {Uncertainty, Fairness Perceptions, and Job Satisfaction: A Field Study}, journal = {Social Justice Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {17}, pages = {237-255}, abstract = {Following uncertainty management theory, we argue that when people faceincreased uncertainty, fairness becomes more important to them and judgmentsof fairness affect their reactions more strongly. The organizational fieldstudy reported here examines the effects of uncertainty about performancestandards and appropriate behaviors on the relationship between fairnessand job satisfaction. Results reveal that uncertainty moderates the positiverelationship between fairness perceptions and job satisfaction such thatthemore uncertain people are about performance standards and appropriatebehaviors, the stronger the relationship between fairness and job satisfaction.Further results reveal a significant moderating effect of uncertainty specificallyfor procedural fairness and interactional fairness. We discuss the implicationsof our findings for the uncertainty management model.}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{DiSaSeDi:93, author = {Diener, E. and Sandvik, E. and Seidlitz, L. and Diener, M.}, title = {The Relationship Between Income and Well Being: Relative or Absolute?}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {28}, pages = {195-223}, key = {income distribution}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Diew:05, author = {Diewert,W.}, title = {Index Number Theory Using differences Rather than Ratios}, journal = {The American Journal of Economics and Sociology}, year = {2005}, volume = {64}, pages = {311-360}, abstract = {Traditional index number theory decomposes a value ratio into the productof a price index times a quantity index. The price (quantity) index isinterpreted as an aggregate price (quantity) ratio. The present paper takesan alternative approach to index number theory, started by Bennet and Montgomeryin the 1920s, which decomposes a value difference into the sum of a pricedifference plus a quantity difference. Axiomatic and economic approachesto this alternative branch of index theory are considered in the presentpaper. The analysis presented has some relevance to accounting theory inwhich revenue, cost, or profit changes need to be decomposed into pricequantity components or where standard or budgeted performance is comparedwith actual performance (variance analysis). The methodology presentedin the paper is also relevant for consumer surplus analysis.}, key = {mathematics} } @INCOLLECTION{Diew:93, author = {Diewert, W. E.}, title = {Symmetric means and choice under uncertainty}, booktitle = {Index Number Theory}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1993}, editor = {Diewert, W. E. and Nakamura, A. O.}, volume = {I}, chapter = {14}, pages = {355-521}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Diew:1988, author = {Diewert, W. E.}, title = {On Tax Reform}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {1988}, volume = {21}, pages = {1-40}, key = {tax reform}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{Diew:83, author = {Diewert, W. E. .}, title = {Cost-benefit analysis and project evaluation: a comparison of alternativeapproaches}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {22}, pages = {265-302}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Diewert1983, author = {Diewert, W. E. .}, title = {Cost-benefit analysis and project evaluation: a comparison of alternative approaches}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {22}, pages = {265-302}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Diew:71, author = {Diewert, W. E. .}, title = {An application of the {S}hephard duality theorem: a generlized {L}eontiefproduction function}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1971}, volume = {79}, pages = {481-507}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Diewert1971, author = {Diewert, W. E. .}, title = {An application of the {S}hephard duality theorem: a generlized {L}eontief production function}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1971}, volume = {79}, pages = {481-507}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DiVeSaUr:07, author = {Diez, H. and Lasso de la Vega, M. C. and de Sarachu, A. and Urrutia, A. M.}, title = {A Consistent Multidimensional Generalization of the {P}igou-{D}alton Transfer Principle: An Analysis}, journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {7}, pages = {Article 45}, abstract = {This paper explores the implications of using multidimensional majorization criteria to derive inequality measures, without taking into consideration the idea behind the Pigou-Dalton principle, in the sense that if a richer person transfers something of at least one attribute to a poorer person the inequality falls. A new and basic criterion proposed by Fleurbaey and Trannoy (2003) which generalizes this idea to the multidimensional framework is explored, and its logical relationships with the dominance criteria that exist in the literature are analyzed. The paper also surveys the existent multidimensional inequality indices in order to see whether they meet this new criterion.}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.07.18}, url = {http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol7/iss1/art45} } @ARTICLE{DiLu:96, author = {Dillen, M. and Lundholm, M.}, title = {Dynamic income taxation, redistribution and the ratchet effect}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {59}, pages = {69-93}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{DiMiSu:08, author = {Dills, Angela and Miron, Jeffrey and Summers, Garrett}, title = {What do Economists Know about Crime?}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {13759}, abstract = {In this paper we evaluate what economists have learned over the past 40 years about the determinants of crime. We base our evaluation on two kinds of evidence: an examination of aggregate data over long time periods and across countries, and a critical review of the literature. We argue that economists know little about the empirically relevant determinants of crime. Even hypotheses that find some support in U.S. data for recent decades are inconsistent with data over longer horizons or across countries. This conclusion applies both to policy variables like arrest rates or capital punishment and to less conventional factors such as abortion or gun laws. The hypothesis that drug prohibition generates violence, however, is generally consistent with the long times-series and cross-country facts. This analysis is also consistent with a broader perspective in which government policies that affect the nature and amount of dispute resolution play an important role in determining violence.}, key = {Crime}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{DiKaKe:90, author = {Dilnot, A. and Kay, J. and Keen, M. J.}, title = {Allocating Taxes to Households: A Methodology}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1990}, volume = {42}, pages = {210-230}, abstract = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0030-7653%28199001%292%3A42%3A1%3C210%3AATTHAM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.10} } @ARTICLE{DiMo:81WD, author = {Dilnot, A. and Morris, C. N.}, title = {What do we know about the black economy?}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1981}, volume = {2}, pages = {58-73}, note = {reprinted in Tanzi 1982}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{DiNPi:97, author = {DiNardo, J. and Pischke, J.-S.}, title = {The Returns to Computer Use Revisited: Have Pencils Changed the Wage Structure Too?}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {112}, pages = {291-303.}, abstract = {Are the large measured wage differentials for on-the-job computer use a true return to computer skills, or do they just reflect that higher wage workers use computers on their jobs? We examine this issue with three large cross-sectional surveys from Germany. First, we confirm that the estimated wage differential associated with computer use in Germany is very similar to the U. S. differential. Second, we also measure large differentials for on-the-job use of calculators, telephones, pens or pencils, or for those who work while sitting down. We argue that these findings cast some doubt on the literal interpretation of the computer use wage differential as reflecting true returns to computer use or skill.}, key = {earnings, wages}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.07.30} } @ARTICLE{DiEm:05, author = {Disney,R. and Emmerson,C.}, title = {Public Pension Reform in the United Kingdom: What Effect on the FinancialWell-Being of Current and Future Pensioners?}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2005}, volume = {26}, pages = {55-81}, abstract = {Unlike many tax and benefit changes, reforms to public pension programmestake many years to have their full effect. This paper examines the effectof reforms to the public pension programme in the United Kingdom on thestate retirement incomes of current generations of pensioners and on theprospective state incomes of future generations of pensioners. We showthat, for an individual with lifetime earnings close to male average earnings,the UK pension system is at its most generous to those reaching the statepension age around the year 2000, but that the introduction of the statesecond pension and the pension credit postpones this peak for individualson lower incomes and for those with substantial periods out of paid employmentspent with caring responsibilities. We also consider how the ‘mix’ of benefits,particularly between the contributory and income-tested sectors, couldchange over time, and the impact that this would have on incentives tosave for retirement.}, key = {pensions} } @ARTICLE{DiGo:98, author = {Disney, Richard and Gosling, Amanda}, title = {Does it pay to work in the public sector?}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {19}, pages = {347-374}, number = {4}, month = {November}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{DiJoSt:98, author = {Disney, Richard and Johnson, Paul and Stears, Gary}, title = {Asset wealth and asset decumulation among households in the Retirement Survey}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {19}, pages = {153-174}, number = {2}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Dittman1999, author = {I. Dittman}, title = {How Reliable Should Auditors Be? Optimal Monitoring in Principal-Agent Relationships}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {523-546}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Diwa:00, author = {Diwan, R.}, title = {Relational Wealth and the Quality of Life}, journal = {Journal of Socioeconomics}, year = {2000}, volume = {29}, pages = {305-340}, key = {Welfare} } @ARTICLE{Dixi:03, author = {Dixit, A. K.}, title = {On modes of economic governance}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2003}, volume = {71}, pages = {449-481}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Dixi:90, title = {Optimization in Economic Theory}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1990}, author = {Dixit, A. K.}, address = {Oxford}, edition = {second}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{Dixi:80, author = {Dixit, A. K.}, title = {The role of investment in entry-deterrence}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1980}, volume = {90}, pages = {95-106}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{Dixi:79, author = {Dixit, A. K.}, title = {A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers}, journal = {Bell Journal of Economics}, year = {1979}, volume = {10}, pages = {20-32}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{DiBe:97, author = {Dixit, A. K. and Besley, T. J.}, title = {James {M}irrlees' contributions to the theory of information and incentives}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {99}, pages = {207-235}, number = {2}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{DiOl:00, author = {Dixit, A. K. and Olson, M.}, title = {Does Voluntary Participation Undermine the {C}oase Theorem?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {76}, pages = {309-335}, key = {Public Economics} } @ARTICLE{DiSa:77, author = {Dixit, A. K. and Sandmo, A.}, title = {Some simplified formulae for optimal income taxation}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {79}, pages = {417-423}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{DiSk:04, title = {Games of Strategy}, publisher = {Norton}, year = {2004}, author = {Dixit, A. K. and Skeath, S.}, address = {New York}, edition = {second}, key = {Games} } @ARTICLE{DiSt:77, author = {Dixit, A. K. and Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {67}, pages = {297-308}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{DiNardo1996, author = {Di{N}ardo, J. and Fortin, N. and Lemieux, T.}, title = {Labour market institutions and the distribution of wages 1993-1992: A Semiparametric approach}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1996}, volume = {64}, pages = {1001-1045}, number = {5}, key = {wages}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DiFoLe:96, author = {Di{N}ardo, J. and Fortin, N. M. and Lemieux, T.}, title = {Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1996}, volume = {64}, pages = {1001-1044}, key = {labour}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{FoFrLe:94, author = {Di{N}ardo, J. and P. Fr{\'e}chette and Fortin, B. and Lemieux, T.}, title = {The Effect of Taxes on Labor Supply in the Underground Economy}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1994}, volume = {84}, pages = {231-254}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{DiNardo1997, author = {Di{N}ardo, J. and Pischke, J. S.}, title = {The returns to computers revisited: have pencils changed the wage structure too?}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1997}, pages = {291-305}, key = {wages}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DiPi:97, author = {Di{N}ardo, J. and Pischke, J. S.}, title = {The returns to computers revisited: have pencils changed the wage structuretoo?}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1997}, pages = {291-305}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{Dobb:99, author = {Dobbs, I. M.}, title = {Compensating Wage Differentials and the Value of Life}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {63}, pages = {103-109}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{DoSc:06, author = {Doepke, M. and Schneider, M.}, title = {Inflation and the Redistribution of Nominal Wealth}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2006}, volume = {114}, pages = {1069-1097}, abstract = {This study quantitatively assesses the effects of inflation through changes in the value of nominal assets. It documents nominal asset positions in the United States across sectors and groups of households and estimates the wealth redistribution caused by a moderate inflation episode. The main losers from inflation are rich, old households, the major bondholders in the economy. The main winners are young, middle-class households with fixed-rate mortgage debt. Besides transferring resources from the old to the young, inflation is a boon for the government and a tax on foreigners. Lately, the amount of U.S. nominal assets held by foreigners has grown dramatically, increasing the potential for a large inflation-induced wealth transfer from foreigners to domestic households.}, key = {wealth distribution}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.15} } @ARTICLE{DoZi:08, author = {Doghmi, A. and Ziad, A.}, title = {Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2008}, volume = {100}, pages = {150-152}, number = {1}, month = {July}, abstract = {We reexamine Maskin's Theorem by proposing slight modifications on Maskin's conditions of monotonicity and no veto power. We show that any social choice correspondence (SCC) that satisfies strict monotonicity, strict no veto power and unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria.}, key = {economic theory}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.21} } @TECHREPORT{DoFaHuSuScWa:05, author = {Dohmen, T. and Falk, A. and Huffman, D. and Sunde, U. and Schupp, J. and Wagner, G.}, title = {Individual Risk Attitudes: New Evidence from a Large, Representative, Experimentally-Validated Survey}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2005}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {1730}, address = {P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany}, month = {September}, abstract = {This paper presents new evidence on the distribution of risk attitudes in the population, using a novel set of survey questions and a representative sample of roughly 22,000 individuals living in Germany. Using a question that asks about willingness to take risks on an 11-point scale, we find evidence of heterogeneity across individuals, and show that willingness to take risks is negatively related to age and being female, and positively related to height and parental education. We test the behavioral relevance of this survey measure by conducting a complementary field experiment, based on a representative sample of 450 subjects, and find that the measure is a good predictor of actual risk-taking behavior. We then use a more standard lottery question to measure risk preference, and find similar results regarding heterogeneity and determinants of risk preferences. The lottery question makes it possible to estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion for each individual in the sample. Using five questions about willingness to take risks in specific domains — car driving, financial matters, sports and leisure, career, and health — the paper also studies the impact of context on risk attitudes, finding a strong but imperfect correlation across contexts. Using data on a collection of risky behaviors from different contexts, including traffic offenses, portfolio choice, smoking, occupational choice, participation in sports, and migration, the paper compares the predictive power of all of the risk measures. Strikingly, the general risk question predicts all behaviors whereas the standard lottery measure does not. The best overall predictor for any specific behavior is typically the corresponding context-specific measure. These findings call into the question the current preoccupation with lottery measures of risk preference, and point to variation in risk perceptions as an understudied determinant of risky behavior.}, key = {risk}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{DoJi:97, author = {Dolado, J. J. and Jimeno, J. F.}, title = {The causes of {S}panish unemployment: A structural {VAR} approach}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1997}, pages = {1281-1308}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{DoMa:97, author = {Dolado, Juan J. and Marmol, Francesc}, title = {On the properties of the {D}ickey-{P}antula test against fractional alternatives}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {57}, pages = {11-16}, number = {4}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{DoKa:08, author = {Dolan, Paul and Kahneman, Daniel}, title = {Interpretations of Utility and their Implications for the Valuation of Health}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2008}, volume = {118}, pages = {215 - 234}, abstract = {The term utility can be interpreted in terms of the hedonic experience of an outcome (experienced utility) or in terms of the preference or desire for that outcome (decision utility). It is this second interpretation that lies at the heart of the methods that economists have developed to value nonmarket goods, such as health. In this article, we argue that decision utility is unlikely to generate meaningful data on the utility associated with different experiences, and instead economists should look towards developing measures that focus more directly on experienced utility.}, key = {Utility}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{Dolan2001, author = {Dolan, P. and Robinson, A.}, title = {The Measurement of Preferences Over the Distribution of Benefits: The Importance of the Reference Point}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {45,9}, pages = {1697-1709}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DoRo:01, author = {Dolan, P. and Robinson, A.}, title = {The Measurement of Preferences Over the Distribution of Benefits: The Importance of the Reference Point}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {45}, pages = {1697-1709}, abstract = {This paper uses the Atkinson method, which was initially developed to measure the shape of the social welfare function (SWF) in the domain of income, to measure the shape of the SWF with respect to the distribution of health benefits. Two separate studies were conducted involving a total of 71 respondents. A comparison of the results across the two studies suggests that reference point effects play an important role in determining responses. Thus, more research is needed on the role that reference point effects ought to and do play in determining the nature and extent of the efficiency - equity trade-off before the results of studies of this kind can be interpreted as 'equity parameters' which may simply be 'plugged into' an appropriately specified SWF.}, key = {redistribution} } @TECHREPORT{Doll:05, author = {Dollar,D.}, title = {Globalization, Poverty, and Inequality since 1980}, institution = {World Bank}, year = {2004}, abstract = {One of the most contentious issues of globalization is the effect of globaleconomic integration on inequality and poverty. This paper documents fivetrends in the modern era of globalization, starting around 1980. Trend#1: Poor country growth rates have accelerated and are higher than richcountry growth rates-for the first time in modern history. The developingworld economy grew at more than 3.5 percent per capita in the 1990s. Trend#2: The number of poor people in the world has declined significantly-by 375 million people since 1981 -- the first such decline in history.The share of the developing world population living on less than $1 perday was cut in half since 1981. Trend #3: Global inequality (among citizensof the world) has declined - modestly -- reversing a 200-year-old trendtoward higher inequality. Trend #4: There is no general trend toward higherinequality within countries. Trend #5: Wage inequality is rising worldwide(which may seem to contradict trend #4, but it does not because wages area small part of household income in developing countries, which make upthe bulk of the world in terms of countries and population). Furthermore,the trends toward faster growth and poverty reduction are strongest inthe developing countries in which there has been the most rapid integrationwith the global economy, supporting the view that integration has beena positive force for improving peoples lives in the developing world.}, key = {International} } @ARTICLE{DoKr:02, author = {Dollar, D. and Kraay, A.}, title = {Growth is good for the poor}, journal = {Journal of Economic Growth}, year = {2002}, volume = {7}, pages = {195-225}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Domah2001, author = {Domah, P. and Pollitt, M. G.}, title = {The Restructuring and Privatisation of Electricity Distribution and Supply Businesses in England and Wales: A Social Cost-Benefit Analysis}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2001}, volume = {22}, pages = {107-146}, key = {privatisation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DoPo:01, author = {Domah, P. and Pollitt, M. G.}, title = {The Restructuring and Privatisation of Electricity Distribution and SupplyBusinesses in England and Wales: A Social Cost-Benefit Analysis}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2001}, volume = {22}, pages = {107-146}, key = {privatisation} } @ARTICLE{Donaldson2003, author = {Donaldson, D. and Pendakur, K.}, title = {T he political economy of redistribution under asymmetric information}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {88}, pages = {175- 208}, key = {equivalence scales}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DoPe:03, author = {Donaldson, D. and Pendakur, K.}, title = {T he political economy of redistribution under asymmetric information}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {88}, pages = {175– 208}, key = {equivalence scales} } @ARTICLE{DoWe:88, author = {Donaldson, D. and Weymark, J. A.}, title = {Social Choice in Economic Environment}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1988}, volume = {46}, pages = {291-308}, key = {social choice} } @ARTICLE{DoWe:86, author = {Donaldson, D. and Weymark, J. A.}, title = {Properties of fixed-population poverty indices}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1986}, volume = {27}, pages = {667-688}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{DoWe:83, author = {Donaldson, D. and Weymark, J. A.}, title = {Ethically flexible {G}ini indices for income distribution in the continuum}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1983}, volume = {29}, pages = {353-358}, number = {4}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{DoWe:80, author = {Donaldson, D. and Weymark, J. A.}, title = {A single parameter generalization of the {G}ini indices of inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1980}, volume = {22}, pages = {67-68}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Dool:83, author = {Dooley, P. C.}, title = {Consumer's surplus: {M}arshall and his critics}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {16}, pages = {26-38}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Dorf:79, author = {Dorfman, P.}, title = {A formula for the {G}ini coefficient}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1979}, volume = {61}, pages = {146-149}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{DoMiPe:07, author = {Dorling, Danny and Mitchell, Richard and Pearce, Jamie}, title = {The global impact of income inequality on health by age: an observational study}, journal = {BMJ}, year = {2007}, volume = {335}, pages = {1 - 5}, abstract = {Objectives To explore whether the apparent impact of income inequality on health, which has been shown for wealthier nations, is replicated worldwide, and whether the impact varies by age. Design Observational study. Setting 126 countries of the world for which complete data on income inequality and mortality by age and sex were available around the year 2002 (including 94.4% of world human population). Data sources Data on mortality were from the World Health Organization and income data were taken from the annual reports of the United Nations Development Programme. Main outcome measures Mortality in 5-year age bands for each sex by income inequality and income level. Results At ages 15-25 and 29-39 variations in income inequality seem more closely correlated with mortality worldwide than do variations in material wealth. This relation is especially strong among the poorest countries in Africa. Mortality is higher for a given level of overall income in more unequal nations. Conclusions Income inequality seems to have an influence worldwide, especially for younger adults. Social inequality seems to have a universal negative impact on health. Humans are social animals and are not well constructed physiologically to survive in uncooperative surroundings—particularly during the prime of life.}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{DoShDa:06, author = {Dorling, Danny and Shaw, Mary and Davey Smith, George}, title = {Global inequality of life expectancy due to AIDS}, journal = {BMJ}, year = {2006}, volume = {332}, pages = {662 - 664}, abstract = {Global inequality in both health and wealth began to rise worldwide in the early 1980s and has been exacerbated by AIDS in Africa. This trend is not inevitable, and historical trends show that inequality can be reduced}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @BOOK{DoFi:84M, title = {Macroeconomics, 3rd Edn}, publisher = {McGraw Hill}, year = {1984}, author = {Dornbusch, R. and Fischer, S.}, address = {New York}, key = {macro} } @ARTICLE{Dorn:76CW, author = {Dornstein, M.}, title = {Compliance with legal and bureaucratic rules: the case of self-employedtax payers in {I}srael}, journal = {Human Relations}, year = {1976}, volume = {29}, pages = {1019-1034}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Dornstein1976, author = {Dornstein, M.}, title = {Compliance with legal and bureaucratic rules: the case of self-employed tax payers in {I}srael}, journal = {Human Relations}, year = {1976}, volume = {29}, pages = {1019-1034}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Doug:95, title = {British Charitable Gambling 1956-1994}, publisher = {Athlone Press}, year = {1995}, author = {Douglas, A.}, address = {London}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Dowr:05, author = {Dowrick,S.}, title = {The Penn World Table: A Review}, journal = {The Australian Economic Review}, year = {2005}, volume = {38}, pages = {233-238}, key = {data} } @ARTICLE{DoAk:05, author = {Dowrick,S. and Akmal,M.}, title = {Contradictory Trends in Global Income Inequality: A tale of two biases}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2005}, volume = {51}, pages = {201-229}, abstract = {Did global income inequality rise or fall over the last decades of the twentiethcentury? The answer depends on how cross-country income comparisons aremade. Exchange rate comparisons suggest that inequality rose whilst thepurchasing power comparisons of the Penn World Table suggest it fell.Weshow that both measures of real incomes lead to biased international incomecomparisons. Exchange rate comparisons ignore the relative price of non-tradables,whilst the fixed price method underlying the Penn World Table is subjectto substitution bias. The contradictory trends are due to growing dissimilaritybetween national price structures increasing the degree of bias in eachmethod. When we correct the income data to eliminate bias we find no compellingevidence of a significant change in world inequality.}, key = {Inequality} } @ARTICLE{Doyle1986, author = {Doyle, Chris}, title = {Intertemporal Price Discrimination, Uncertainty and Introductory Offers}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1986}, volume = {96}, pages = {71--82}, number = {Supplement: Conference Papers}, copyright = {Copyright 1986 Royal Economic Society}, issn = {00130133}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.07} } @ARTICLE{DrHaRe:00, author = {Drees, H. and de Haan, L. and Resnick, S.}, title = {How to Make a Hill Plot}, journal = {The Annals of Statistics}, year = {2000}, volume = {28}, pages = {254-274}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.06.25}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2673989} } @ARTICLE{DrKa:98, author = {Drees, Holger and Kaufmann, Edgar}, title = {Selecting the Optimal Sample Fraction in Univariate Extreme Value Estimation}, journal = {Stochastic Processes and their Applications}, year = {1998}, volume = {75}, pages = {149--172}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{DrKoMc:05, author = {Dreher,A. and Kotsogiannis,C. and Mccorriston,S.}, title = {How Do Institutions Affect Corruption and the Shadow Economy?}, institution = {University of Exeter}, year = {2005}, type = {discussion paper}, abstract = {This paper analyzes a simple model that captures the relationship between institutional quality, the shadow economy and corruption. It shows that an improvement in institutional quality reduces the shadow economy and affects the corruption market. The exact relationship between corruption and institutional quality is, however, ambiguous and depends on the relative effectiveness of the institutional quality in the shadow and corruption markets. The predictions of the model are empirically tested - by means of Structural Equation Modelling that treats the shadow economy and the corruption market as latent variables - using data from OECD countries. The results show that an improvement in institutional quality reduces the shadow economy directly and corruption both directly and indirectly (through its effect on the shadow market).}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Drew:77, author = {Drewnouwki, D.}, title = {Poverty, its meaning and measurement}, journal = {Development and Challenge}, year = {1977}, volume = {8}, pages = {183-208}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Drez:00, author = {Dr{\`e}ze, J.}, title = {Economic and social security in the twenty-first century, with attentionto {E}urope}, institution = {CORE}, year = {2000}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {2000/15}, address = {Louvain-la-Neuve}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Drez:70, author = {Dr{\`e}ze, J.}, title = {Market allocation under uncertainty}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1970}, volume = {2}, pages = {133-165}, key = {uncertainty} } @INCOLLECTION{Drez:74, author = {Dr{\`e}ze, J. H.}, title = {Axiomatic Theories of Choice, Cardinal Utility and Subjective probability:A Review}, booktitle = {Allocation Under Uncertainty: Equilibrium and Optimality}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1974}, editor = {Dr{\`e}ze, J. H.}, pages = {3-23}, address = {New York}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{Drez:93, title = {Moneta e Incertezza: Inflazione, Interesse, Indicizzazione}, publisher = {Edizioni dell'Elefante}, year = {1993}, author = {Dr{\`e}ze, J. H.}, address = {Rome}, key = {finance} } @ARTICLE{DrMo:72CD, author = {Dr{\`e}ze, J. H. and Modigliani, F.}, title = {Consumption decisions under uncertainty}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1972}, volume = {5}, pages = {308-335}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{DrRu:99, author = {Dr{\`e}ze, J. H. and Rustichini, A.}, title = {Moral Hazard and Conditional Preferences}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {31}, pages = {159-181}, number = {2}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{DuGW:87AW, author = {Dubin, J. A. and Graetz, M. J. and Wilde, L. L.}, title = {Are we a nation of tax cheaters? New econometric evidence on tax compliance}, journal = {American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings}, year = {1987}, volume = {77}, pages = {240-245}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{DuWi:88AE, author = {Dubin, J. A. and Wilde, L. L.}, title = {An empirical analysis of federal income tax auditing and compliance}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1988}, volume = {41}, pages = {61-74}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{DuMaOk:04, author = {Dubra, Juan and Maccheroni, Fabio and Ok, Efe A.}, title = {Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2004}, volume = {115}, pages = {118-133}, abstract = {We study the problem of obtaining an expected utility representation fora potentially incomplete preference relation over lotteriesby means ofa set of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions. It is shown that, whenthe prize space is a compact metric space, a preference relation admitssuch a multi-utility representation provided that it satisfies the standardaxioms of expected utility theory. Moreover, the representing set of utilitiesis unique in a welldefined sense.}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Ducl:00, author = {Duclos, J.-Y.}, title = {Gini Indices and the Redistribution of Income}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2000}, volume = {7}, pages = {141-162}, abstract = {Just as the Gini inequality index captures people's relative deprivation(Yitzhaki, 1979), so, we show in this paper, Gini-based progressivity andhorizontal inequity indices capture individual perceptions of relativefiscal harshness and ill-fortune. In fact, we find that these links betweenindividualistic perceptions and the measurement of the distribution andredistribution of income generalise to the family of indices based on theextended Ginis of Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and Yitzhaki (1983). Through''leaky bucket'' experiments, we also suggest how we can parameterise theinequality aversion present in these indices. Analysis of the Canadiangross and net income distributions (conducted using recently developedstatistical inference procedures) shows the distribution and the aggregationof these individual indicators of relative deprivation, fiscal harshnessand ill-fortune in 1981 and in 1990.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Ducl:98, author = {Duclos,J.}, title = {Social evaluation functions, economic isolation and the Suits index of progressivity}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {69}, pages = {103-121}, abstract = {We propose a class of social evaluation functions which capture the well-beingof economically isolated individuals in a society. This specification islinked to the important sociological literature on socioeconomic isolation,and to the increasing importance of social exclusion as a basis for theformulation of social policy. From these social evaluation functions, whichobey standard axioms of welfare economics, associated classes of indicesof inequality, tax departure from proportionality, and tax redistributionare derived. An important special case of these indices is the popularSuits index of progressivity, for which no social welfare foundation haspreviously been provided. We illustrate this interpretation of the Suitsindices using the British regime of personal income taxes and NationalInsurance contributions; we find that they reduce economic isolation byup to 10%.}, key = {social exclusion} } @ARTICLE{DuEsRa:05, author = {Duclos,J. and Esteban,J. and Ray,D.}, title = {Polarization: concepts, measurement, estimation}, journal = {Econometrica}, volume = {forthcoming}, abstract = {We develop the measurement theory of polarization for the case in whichincome distributions can be described using density functions. The maintheorem uniquely characterizes a class of polarization measures that .tinto what we call the "identity-alienation" framework, and simultanouslysatisfies a set of axioms. Second, we provide sample estimators of populationpolarization indices that can be used to compare polarization across timeor entities. Distribution-free statistical inference results are also usedin order to ensure that the orderings of polarization across entities arenot simply due to sampling noise. An illustration of the use of these toolsusing data from 21 countries shows that polarization and inequality orderingscan often di.er in practice.}, key = {polarisation} } @ARTICLE{Duclos2003, author = {Duclos, J.-Y. and Gr{\'e}goire, P.}, title = {Absolute and Relative Deprivation and the Measurement of Poverty}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2003}, volume = {48}, pages = {471}, abstract = {This paper develops the link between poverty and inequality by focussing on a class of poverty indices (some of them well-known) which aggregate normative concerns for absolute and relative deprivation. The indices are distinguished by a parameter that captures the ethical sensitivity of poverty measurement to "exclusion" or "relative-deprivation" aversion. We also show how the indices can be readily used to predict the impact of growth on poverty. An illustration using LIS data finds that the United States show more relative deprivation than Denmark and Belgium whatever the percentiles considered, but that overall deprivation comparisons of the four countries considered will generally necessarily depend on the intensity of the ethical concern for relative deprivation. The impact of growth on poverty is also seen to depend on the presence of and on the attention granted to concerns over relative deprivation.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DuGr:02, author = {Duclos, J.-Y. and Gr{\'e}goire, P.}, title = {Absolute and Relative Deprivation and the Measurement of Poverty}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2002}, volume = {48}, pages = {471-492}, abstract = {This paper develops the link between poverty and inequality by focussingon a class of poverty indices (some of them well-known) which aggregatenormative concerns for absolute and relative deprivation. The indices aredistinguished by a parameter that captures the ethical sensitivity of povertymeasurement to "exclusion" or "relative-deprivation" aversion. We alsoshow how the indices can be readily used to predict the impact of growthon poverty. An illustration using LIS data finds that the United Statesshow more relative deprivation than Denmark and Belgium whatever the percentilesconsidered, but that overall deprivation comparisons of the four countriesconsidered will generally necessarily depend on the intensity of the ethicalconcern for relative deprivation. The impact of growth on poverty is alsoseen to depend on the presence of and on the attention granted to concernsover relative deprivation.}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{DuGr:99, author = {Duclos, J.-Y. and Gr{\'e}goire, P.}, title = {Absolute and Relative Deprivation and the Measurement of Poverty}, institution = {Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs}, year = {1999}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {213}, address = {Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York 13244-1020}, abstract = {This paper develops the link between poverty and inequality by focussingon a class of poverty indices (some of them well-known) which aggregatenormative concerns for absolute and relative deprivation. The indices aredistinguished by a parameter that captures the ethical sensitivity of povertymeasurement to "exclusion" or "relative-deprivation" aversion. We alsoshow how the indices can be readily used to predict the impact of growthon poverty. An illustration using LIS data finds that the United Statesshow more relative deprivation than Denmark and Belgium whatever the percentilesconsidered, but that overall deprivation comparisons of the four countriesconsidered will generally necessarily depend on the intensity of the ethicalconcern for relative deprivation. The impact of growth on poverty is alsoseen to depend on the presence of and on the attention granted to concernsover relative deprivation.}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{DuMa:05, author = {Duclos,J. and Makdissi,P.}, title = {Sequential Stochastic Dominance and the Robustness of Poverty ordings}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2005}, volume = {51}, abstract = {When comparing poverty across distributions, an analyst must select a povertyline to identify the poor, an equivalence scale to compare individualsfrom households of different compositions and sizes, and a poverty indexto aggregate individual deprivation into an index of total poverty. A differentchoice of poverty line, poverty index or equivalence scale can of coursereverse an initial poverty ordering. This paper develops easily-checkedsequential stochastic dominance conditions that throw light on the robustnessof poverty comparisons to these important measurement issues. These generalconditions extend well-known results to any order of dominance, to thechoice of individual versus family based aggregation, and to the estimationof "critical sets" of measurement assumptions. Our theoretical resultsare briefly illustrated using data for four countries drawn from the LuxembourgIncome Study databases.}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{DuMa:99, author = {Duclos, Jean-Yves and Makdissi, Paul}, title = {Sequential Stochastic Dominance and the Robustness of Poverty Orderings}, institution = {Universit{\'e} Laval}, year = {1999}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {99-05}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{DuSaYo:06, author = {Duclos, J.-Y. and Sahn, D. E. and Younger, S. D.}, title = {Robust Multidimensional Poverty Comparisons}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {2006}, volume = {116}, pages = {943-968}, abstract = {We demonstrate how to make poverty comparisons using multidimensional indicators of well-being, showing in particular how to check whether the comparisons are robust to aggregation procedures and to the choice of multidimensional poverty lines. In contrast to earlier work, our methodology applies equally well to what can be defined as union, intersection or intermediate approaches to dealing with multidimensional indicators of well-being. To make this procedure of some practical usefulness, the article also derives the sampling distribution of various multidimensional poverty estimators, including estimators of the critical poverty frontiers outside which multidimensional poverty comparisons can no longer be deemed ethically robust. The results are illustrated using data from a number of developing countries.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @BOOK{DuAr:06, title = {Poverty and Equity: Measurement, Policy, and Estimation with {DAD}}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2006}, author = {Duclos, {J.-Y.} and Araar, A.}, pages = {393}, comment = {Edited by Jacques Silber}, key = {poverty}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.03.22} } @TECHREPORT{DuWo:04, author = {Duclos, {J.-Y.}, and Wodon, Q.}, title = {What is {"Pro-Poor"}?}, institution = {World Bank}, year = {2004}, address = {World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA,}, month = {August}, abstract = {Assessing whether distributional changes are ”pro-poor” has become increasingly widespread in academic and policy circles. Starting from relatively general ethical axioms, this paper proposes simple graphical methods to test whether distributional changes are indeed pro-poor. Pro-poor standards are first defined. An important issue is whether these standards should be absolute or relative. Another issue is whether pro-poor judgements should put relatively more emphasis on the impact of growth upon the poorer of the poor. Having formalized the treatment of these issues, the paper describes various ways for checking whether broad classes of ethical judgements will declare a distributional change to be pro-poor.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {Alex}, timestamp = {2006.06.22} } @ARTICLE{Du:96, author = {Dudey, Marc}, title = {Dynamic Monopoly with Nondurable Goods}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1996}, volume = {70}, pages = {470--488}, number = {2}, abstract = {A nondurable good monopolist who posts a single price will generally achieve an inefficient outcome. But is it possible that the monopolist would achieve efficiency by repeatedly posting prices before delivery? If buyers recognize the effect of current purchases on future prices, then, under complementary ideal conditions, the answer is yes. On the other hand, traditional concerns about monopoly are viable if the seller bears a small cost per buyer of market reopening.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D42, L12.}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.07} } @ARTICLE{DuHeLi:06, author = {Dudine, Paolo and Hendel, Igal and Lizzeri, Alessandro}, title = {Storable Good Monopoly: The Role of Commitment.}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {96}, pages = {1706 -- 1719}, number = {5}, abstract = {We study dynamic monopoly pricing of storable goods in an environment where demand changes over time. The literature on durables has focused on incentives to delay purchases. Our analysis focuses on a different intertemporal demand incentive. The key force on the consumer side is advance purchases or stockpiling. In the case of storable goods, the stockpiling motive has recently been documented empirically. We show that, in this environment, if the monopolist cannot commit, then prices are higher in all periods, and social welfare is lower, than in the case in which the monopolist can commit. This is in contrast with the analysis in the literature on the Coase conjecture. (JEL D21, D42, L12). ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR Copyright of American Economic Review is the property of American Economic Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or emai}, issn = {00028282}, keywords = {MONOPOLY capitalism, SUPPLY & demand, DURABLE goods, Consumer, PUBLIC welfare, PURCHASING, DELAY of gratification}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Dues:49, title = {Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1949}, author = {Duesenberry, J. S.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{DuSo:89, author = {Duffie, D. and Sonnenschein, H.}, title = {Arrow and general equilibrium theory}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1989}, volume = {27}, pages = {565-598}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Duffy1997, author = {Duffy, J. and Nagel, R.}, title = {On the robustness of behaviour in experimental `beauty contest' games}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {1684-1700}, number = {445}, key = {economic psychology}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DuNa:97, author = {Duffy, J. and Nagel, R.}, title = {On the robustness of behaviour in experimental `beauty contest' games}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {1684-1700}, number = {445}, month = {November}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{DuOcVe:07, author = {Duffy, John and Ochs, Jack and Vesterlund, Lise}, title = {Giving little by little: Dynamic voluntary contribution games}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {1708 - 1730}, abstract = {Charitable contributions are frequently made over time. Donors are free to contribute whenever they wish and as often as they want, and are frequently updated on the level of contributions by others. A dynamic structure enables donors to condition their contribution on that of others, and, as Schelling [Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.] suggested, it may establish trust thereby increasing charitable giving. Marx and Matthews [Marx, Leslie, and Steven Matthews, “A Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project,” Review of Economic Studies, 67, 2000, 327–358.] build on Schelling's insight and show that multiple contribution rounds may secure a provision level that cannot be achieved in the static, one-shot setting, but only if there is a discrete, positive payoff jump upon completion of the project. We examine these two hypotheses experimentally using static and dynamic public good games. We find that contributions are indeed higher in the dynamic than in the static game. However, in contrast to the predictions, the increase in contributions in the dynamic game does not depend critically on the existence of a completion benefit jump or on whether players can condition their decisions on the behavior of other members of their group.}, key = {Charitable Giving}, keywords = {Dynamic public goods game; Voluntary contribution mechanism; Information; Reciprocity}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{Duflo2002, author = {Duflo, E. and Saez, E.}, title = {Participation and Investment Decisions in a Retirement Plan: The Influence of Colleagues' Choices}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {85}, pages = {121-148}, key = {social security}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DuSa:02, author = {Duflo, E. and Saez, E.}, title = {Participation and Investment Decisions in a Retirement Plan: The Influenceof Colleagues' Choices}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {85}, pages = {121-148}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{DuGn:00, author = {Dufwenberg, Martin and Gneezy, Uri}, title = {Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study}, journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization}, year = {2000}, volume = {18}, pages = {7--22}, number = {1}, month = jan, keywords = {Bertrand model, Price competition, Experiment, Market concentration, Bounded rationality, Noise-bidding}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.11.14} } @ARTICLE{DuHeKiSo:08, author = {Dufwenberg, Martin and Heidhues, Paul and Kirchsteiger, Georg and Sobel, Joel}, title = {Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium}, journal = {SSRN eLibrary}, year = {2008}, keywords = {markets, other-regarding preferences, self-interest, welfare}, language = {English}, location = {http://ssrn.com/paper=1143178}, price = {$5.00}, publisher = {SSRN} } @ARTICLE{DuKi:04, author = {Dufwenberg, Martin and Kirchsteiger, Georg}, title = {A theory of sequential reciprocity}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {2004}, volume = {47}, pages = {268--298}, number = {2}, month = may, abstract = {Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [Amer. Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution concept--sequential reciprocity equilibrium--for which we prove an equilibrium existence result. The model is applied in several examples, and it is shown that it captures very well the intuitive meaning of reciprocity as well as certain qualitative features of experimental evidence.}, keywords = {Reciprocity, Extensive form games}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.06.16} } @ARTICLE{DuLiMo:05, author = {Dufwenberg, Martin and Lindqvist, Tobias and Moore, Evan}, title = {Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {2005}, volume = {95}, pages = {1731--1737}, number = {5}, copyright = {Copyright © 2005 American Economic Association}, issn = {00028282}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Dec., 2005}, publisher = {American Economic Association} } @ARTICLE{DuDu:83, author = {DuMouchel, William H. and Duncan, Greg, J.}, title = {Using sample survey weights in multiple regression analyses of stratifiedsamples}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1983}, volume = {78}, pages = {535-543}, number = {383}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{DuPr:93, author = {Duncan, A. and Preston, I.}, title = {Small sample bias in non- parametric estimates of the generalised entropyclass of inequality indices}, institution = {Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {1993}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{DuHi:89, author = {Duncan, G. J. and Hill, M.}, title = {Assessing the quality of household panel survey data: The case of the {PSID}}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1989}, volume = {7}, pages = {441-451}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{DuDu:55, author = {Duncan, O. D. and Duncan, B.}, title = {A methodological analysis of segregation indices}, journal = {American Sociological Review}, year = {1955}, volume = {20}, pages = {210-217}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{DuHo:78, author = {Dunn, A. L. and Hoffman, P. D. R. B.}, title = {The Distribution of Personal Wealth}, journal = {Economic Trends}, year = {1978}, pages = {101-118}, number = {301}, key = {wealth} } @TECHREPORT{Dunn:08, author = {Dunn, E.}, title = {Family Spending: 2007 edition}, institution = {Office for National Statistics}, year = {2008}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.01}, url = {http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_social/Family_Spending_2006-07/FamilySpending2007_web.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{DuSi:07, author = {Dunn, E. and Gibbins, C.}, title = {Family Spending: 2006 edition}, institution = {Office for National Statistics}, year = {2007}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.01}, url = {http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_social/Family_Spending_2005-06/Familyspending2005-06.pdf} } @ARTICLE{DuPh:97, author = {Dunn, T. A. and Phillips, J. W.}, title = {The timing and division of parental transfers to children}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {54}, pages = {135-137}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{DuFi:98, author = {Dupuis, D. J. and Field, C. A.}, title = {Robust Estimation of Extremes}, journal = {The Canadian Journal of Statistics}, year = {1998}, volume = {26}, pages = {199--215}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{DuVF:06, author = {Dupuis, D. J. and Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {A Robust Prediction Error Criterion for {P}areto Modeling of Upper Tails}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Statistics}, year = {2006}, note = {To appear}, key = {statistics}, owner = {MPVictoriaFeser}, timestamp = {2006.08.31} } @TECHREPORT{Dupu:44, author = {Dupuit, J.}, title = {De la mesure de l'utilit{\'e} des travaux publics}, institution = {eds. Scientifiques et Medicales Elsevier}, year = {1844}, type = {Annales des Ponts et Chauss{\'e}es}, address = {Paris}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{DuPu:07, author = {Durante, Ruben and Putterman, Louis}, title = {Preferences for Redistribution and Perception of Fairness: An Experimental Study*}, institution = {Brown University}, year = {2007}, abstract = {Why is there significant political support for progressive taxation and equalizing government transfers in western democracies? Possibilities include individual social preferences for a less unequal distribution than what market forces alone would dictate, demand for social insurance, or successful political coalitions to redistribute away from the rich. We study the relative importance of fairness preferences, risk aversion, and self-interest in determining support for redistribution through a set of experiments in which a large number of subjects are asked to choose what level of taxation to implement under different decision conditions and with four alternative determinants of pre-tax income (two task-based, one random, and one based on socio-economic background). Treatments using varying costs of redistribution to the decision-maker and efficiency losses to recipients are used to study willingness to pay for redistribution and concern for aggregate inefficiency. Most of our subjects prefer that there be less inequality among others and demand for redistribution responds in predictable ways to the cost of taxation and to the dead-weigh loss associated with it. The external validity of the experiment is supported by the high correlation between tax decisions and political preferences. We also find evidence that preferred levels of redistribution are highly responsive to whether pre-tax incomes are determined according to task performance, a trend that is much more evident among men than among women. Comparisons between redistributive choices under different experimental conditions provide interesting insights with regard to the relative importance of inequality aversion and self-interest when choosing under uncertainty and when uncertainty is resolved. In the first case, individuals' expectation about their future position in the income distribution has a considerable impact on their tax choices. When sure of the effect on their own earnings, subjects' tax choices are primarily governed by selfinterest, but fairness preferences continue to play a role.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {income distribution, political economy, redistribution, social preference, experiment.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Durl:96, author = {Durlauf, S.}, title = {A Theory of Persistent Income Inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Growth}, year = {1996}, volume = {1}, pages = {75-94}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @INCOLLECTION{DuQu:99, author = {Durlauf, S. and Quah, D.}, title = {The new empirics of economic growth}, booktitle = {Handbook of Macroeconomics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1999}, editor = {Taylor, J. B. and Woodford, M.}, chapter = {4}, pages = {231--304}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{DuTa:08, author = {Durlauf, S. N. and Tanaka, H.}, title = {Understanding regression versus variance tests for social interactions}, journal = {Economic Enquiry}, year = {2008}, volume = {46}, pages = {25-28}, abstract = {This article considers the relationship between the use of regressions and the use of variance contrast methods to uncover social interactions. We illustrate how these methods employ different identifying assumptions and are therefore complementary approaches. We also provide formal identification results that extend existing ones for the two methods.}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.21}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2250/cgi-bin/fulltext/119397841/PDFSTART} } @ARTICLE{DuVaSo:97, author = {Dustman, Christian and Van Soest, Arthur}, title = {Wage {S}tructures in the private and public sectors in {W}est {G}ermany}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1997}, volume = {18}, pages = {225-247}, number = {3}, month = {August}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{DuSo:98, author = {Dustmann, Christian and Van Soest, Arthur}, title = {Public and private sector wages of male workers in {G}ermany}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {1417-1441}, number = {8}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{DuMu:05, author = {Dutt,A. and Mukhopadhyay,K.}, title = {Globalization and the inequality among nations: A VAR approach}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2005}, volume = {88}, pages = {295-299}, abstract = {Granger causality and impulse-response analysis are used to show that globalization-reflectedby world trade and international capital flow (measured by current-accountdeficits) to GDP ratios-causes an increase in the inequality of per capitaGDP across nations.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{DuEs:92, author = {Dutta, B. and Esteban, J.}, title = {Social welfare and equality}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1992}, volume = {9}, pages = {267-276}, key = {equality} } @ARTICLE{DuPeSe:02, author = {Dutta, B. and Peters, H. and Sen, A.}, title = {Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2000}, volume = {106}, pages = {392-416}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{DuRa:89, author = {Dutta, B. and Ray, D.}, title = {A concept of egalitarianism under participation constraints}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1989}, volume = {57}, pages = {615-635}, key = {claims} } @ARTICLE{DuSeWe:01, author = {Dutta, J. A. and Sefton, J. A. and Weale, M. R.}, title = {Income Distribution and Income Dynamics in the United Kingdom}, journal = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, year = {2001}, volume = {16}, pages = {599-617}, abstract = {In this paper, we propose a model of income dynamics which takes account of mobility both within and between jobs. The model is a hybrid of the mover-stayer model of income dynamics and a geometric random walk. In any period, individuals face a discrete probability of 'moving', in which case their income is a random drawn from a stationary recurrent distribution. Otherwise, they 'stay' and incomes follow a geometric random walk. The model is estimated on income transition data for the United Kingdom from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and provides a good explanation of observed non-linearities in income dynamics. The steady-state distribution of the model provides a good fit for the observed, cross-sectional distribution of earnings. We also evaluate the impact of tertiary education on income transitions and on the long-run distribution of incomes.}, key = {mobility}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.10} } @ARTICLE{DuSeWe:99, author = {Dutta, J. and Sefton, J. and Weale, M.}, title = {Education and Public Policy}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {351-386}, key = {education, training} } @ARTICLE{DuSu:04, author = {Duxbury, D. and Summers, B.}, title = {Financial risk perception: Are individuals variance averse or loss averse?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2004}, volume = {84}, pages = {21-28}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Dwor:81ER, author = {Dworkin, R.}, title = {What is equality? Part 2: Equality of resources}, journal = {Philosophy and Public Affairs}, year = {1981}, volume = {10}, pages = {283-345}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Dwor:81EW, author = {Dworkin, R.}, title = {What is equality? Part 1: Equality of welfare}, journal = {Philosophy and Public Affairs}, year = {1981}, volume = {10}, pages = {185-246}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Dworkin1981b, author = {Dworkin, R.}, title = {What is equality? Part II: Equality of resources}, journal = {Philosophy and Public Affairs}, year = {1981}, volume = {10}, pages = {283-345}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Dworkin1981c, author = {Dworkin, R.}, title = {What is equality? Part I: Equality of welfare}, journal = {Philosophy and Public Affairs}, year = {1981}, volume = {10}, pages = {185-246}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DwLi:84, author = {Dwyer, G. P. and Lindsey, C. M.}, title = {Robert {G}iffen and the {I}rish potato}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1984}, volume = {74}, pages = {188-192}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{DyGr:97, author = {Dynarski, S. and Gruber, J.}, title = {Can Families Smooth Variable Earnings?}, journal = {Brookings Papers on Economic Activity}, year = {1997}, volume = {1997}, pages = {229-303}, abstract = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-2303%281997%291997%3A1%3C229%3ACFSVE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I}, key = {income dynamics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.05} } @TECHREPORT{DiPi:06, author = {D{\'i}az-Gim{\'e}nez, J. and Pijoan-Mas, J.}, title = {Flat Tax Reforms in the {US}: A Boom for the Income Poor}, institution = {Centre for Economic Policy Research}, year = {2006}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {5812}, address = {Centre for Economic Policy Research 90–98 Goswell Rd, London EC1V 7RR, UK Tel: (44 20) 7878 2900, Fax: (44 20) 7878 2999}, month = {September}, abstract = {In this article we quantify the aggregate, distributional and welfare consequences of two revenue neutral flat-tax reforms using a model economy that replicates the U.S. distributions of earnings, income and wealth in very much detail. We find that the less progressive reform brings about a 2.4% increase in steady state output and a more unequal distribution of after-tax income. In contrast, the more progressive reform brings about a -2.6% reduction in steady state output and a distribution of after-tax income that is more egalitarian. We also find that in the less progressive flat-tax economy aggregate welfare falls by -0.17% of consumption, and in the more progressive flat-tax economy it increases by 0.45% of consumption. In both flat-tax reforms the income poor pay less income taxes and obtain sizeable welfare gains.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.15} } @ARTICLE{DAFr:07, author = {D’Ambrosio, C. and Frick, J. R.}, title = {Income satisfaction and relative deprivation: an empirical link}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {81}, pages = {497–519}, abstract = {This paper explores the relationship between two well-established concepts of measuring individual well-being: the concept of happiness, i.e. self-reported level of satisfaction with income, and relative deprivation, i.e. the gaps between the individual's income and the incomes of all individuals richer than him. Operationalizing both concepts using micro panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we provide empirical evidence for subjective well-being depending more on relative deprivation than on absolute levels of income. This ?nding holds after controlling for other in?uential factors in a multivariate setting.}, owner = {faybisov}, timestamp = {2007.07.04} } @ARTICLE{VaJo:03, author = {E. Van Doorslaer, and Jones, A. M.}, title = {Inequalities in Self-Reported Health: Validation of a New Approach to Measurement}, journal = {Journal of Health Economics}, year = {Jan 2003}, volume = {22}, pages = {61-87}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{KoSc:99AU, author = {Koskela E. and Schob R.}, title = {Alleviating Unemployment: The Case for Green Tax Reforms}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {1723-1746}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{EaNeRa:69, author = {Eads, G. and Nerlove, M. and Raduchel, W.}, title = {A long-run cost function for the local service airline industry}, journal = {Review of Economic and Statistics}, year = {1969}, volume = {51}, pages = {258-270}, key = {industry} } @TECHREPORT{East:, author = {Easterlin,R.}, title = {Diminishing Marginal Utility of Income? A Caveat}, institution = {University of Southern California}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{East:01, author = {Easterlin,R.}, title = {Life cycle welfare: evidence and conjecture}, journal = {Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {30}, pages = {31-61}, abstract = {At a point in time subjective well-being is positively related to income;over the life course subjective well-being is constant despite substantialgrowth in income. This paradox is explained by new evidence on consumptionaspirations. At a point in time aspirations vary fairly little by incomelevel; over the life cycle, aspirations increase about in proportion toincome. These shifts in aspirations also affect assessments of past andfuture well-being in such a way that the choices underlying behavior (basedon what psychologists call "decision utility") turn out not to have theirexpected welfare effects (experienced utility). Of the two influences shapingconsumption aspirations - comparisons with others and with one’s past experience- the former appears more salient early in the life cycle and the latter,later on.}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{East:__, author = {Easton, Brian}, title = {A relationship between earnings inequality and wealth inequality}, journal = {Economic Record}, pages = {237-228}, key = {wages} } @INCOLLECTION{Eber:88OT, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {On the decomposition of inequality: Partitions into nonoverlapping sub-groups}, booktitle = {Measurement in Economics}, publisher = {Physica Verlag}, year = {1988}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Eber:08, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Living Standard, Social Welfare, and the Redistribution of Income in a Heterogeneous Population}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2008}, volume = {10}, pages = {873-889}, number = {5}, abstract = {The paper considers the redistribution of income in a population of households which may differ by type. The redistribution is based on (differences in) living standard and a principle of between-type-progressive transfers (BTPT). We characterize the relationship between a social welfare ordering satisfying the BTPT principle and the concept of living standard the principle is based on. It turns out that there is a close link: The ordering of living standard can be derived from the social welfare ordering. Conversely, the class of welfare orderings fulfilling the BTPT principle for a given concept of living standard can be completely described.}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.10.01} } @ARTICLE{Eber:07, author = {Ebert, Udo}, title = {Ethical inequality measures and the redistribution of income when needs differ}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2007}, volume = {5}, pages = {263 - 278}, abstract = {The paper considers nested social welfare functions and ethical inequality measures when households may differ in needs. Several principles of transfers between different household types are introduced and systematically examined. Their implications for the form of welfare functions and inequality measures are derived. The corresponding classes are completely described.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {welfare functions, inequality measures, differences in needs, transfer principles, axiomatization}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{Eber:04, author = {Ebert, Udo}, title = {Coherent inequality views: linear invariant measures reconsidered}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2004}, volume = {47}, pages = {1-20}, abstract = {The objective of the paper is to determine coherent—i.e. internally consistent—inequalityviews. It describes an inequality view by a set of transformations whichlink the distributions regarded as equally unequal. Coherence involvestwo conditions: path-independence and transfer-consistency. Focusing onindividualistic and symmetric transformations the paper identifies theclass of inequality views satisfying these properties. It turns out thatthe transformations have to be linear: Only the relative, absolute, andintermediate view and a novel one—reference-point inequality—are coherent.An inequality measure being compatible with one of these views has to beinvariant with respect to the corresponding transformations.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Eber:04SW, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Social welfare, inequality, and poverty when needs differ}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2004}, volume = {23}, pages = {415-444}, abstract = {The paper examines income distributions of a finite population consisting of households which may differ with respect to needs. Since observed incomes are not directly comparable, income distributions have to be adjusted. Incomes are transformed to equivalent incomes interpreted as living standards and measured for a reference type, and the latter are supplemented by weights depending on needs. A general class of social welfare orderings (being based on adjusted rank-ordered income distributions) is characterized by a set of properties. Severe limitations for the form of the adjustment process are implied. The consequences for the measurement of inequality and poverty are demonstrated, and corresponding orderings are derived.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.21} } @ARTICLE{Eber:00, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Equilizing Incomes: A Normative Approach}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2000}, volume = {7}, pages = {619-640}, abstract = {The paper deals with the comparison of living standards and investigatestwo normative methods of deriving equivalizing transformations for a populationwhich has different household types. The first one equates the utilitylevels of representative household members belonging to different households.The second method evaluates the well-being of households by a social welfareordering defined by means of household utility functions. The methods candetermine the implicit normative assumptions involved in conducting distributionalanalysis using any equivalizing transformation. In particular income-leveldependent equivalence scales can be founded in this framework. The assumptionsunderlying both approaches are examined and compared.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Eber:99CO, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Comment on {F}ields: ``{M}easuring inequality change in an economy withincome growth'' or how reliable is intuition?}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {59}, pages = {527-530}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Eber:99DD, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Dual decomposable inequality measures}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D'Economique}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {234-246}, number = {1}, note = {24}, abstract = {The paper proposes a new single parameter family of (relative) inequality measures possessing the usual properties. Though the inequality orderings they imply are well-known, the measures are of interest since they allow to decompose inequality. When the population is divided into subgroups they are able to describe how much of overall inequality is due to inequality within subgroups and how much is due to inequality between subgroups. The decomposition procedure is new and reflects the standard of living in subgroups. JEL Classification: D63, D31.}, key = {inequality decomposition}, keywords = {POPULATION SUBGROUPS; INCOME INEQUALITY}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/136404} } @ARTICLE{Eber:99UE, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Using equivalent income of equivalent adults to rank income distributions}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1999}, volume = {16}, pages = {233-258}, abstract = {The paper proposes the consistent and rigorous use of equivalence scalesfor households of different size. Equivalence scales are employed for derivingthe income of an equivalent adult representing the household and for weightingthe different household types. The proceeding takes into account the possibilitiesand the needs of different household types at the same time and seems tobe adequate if income distributions are to be compared in terms of socialwelfare or inequality. The approach allows to define and to investigatethe usual concepts (Lorenz curve, Lorenz dominance, social welfare function,progressive transfers etc.) for heterogeneous populations. They can beinterpreted in an obvious way and the results, well known for homogeneouspopulations, can be generalized. Furthermore, some unpleasant and unsatisfactoryparadoxa or impossibility results, which can be found in the literature,vanish in the framework considered.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Ebert1999, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Comment on {F}ields: ``{M}easuring inequality change in an economy with income growth'' or how reliable is intuition?}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {59}, pages = {527-530}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Eber:97, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Social welfare when needs differ}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {233-244}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{Eber:97DD, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Dual decomposable inequality measures}, institution = {Institut f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre, Carl von Ossietzky Universit{\"a}t Oldenburg}, year = {1997}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {V-174-97}, address = {D-26111 Oldenburg}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Eber:97LI, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Linear Inequality Concepts and Social Welfare}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1997}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {33}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Eber:97SG, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Sequential generalised {L}orenz dominance and transfer principles}, institution = {Institut f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre, Carl von Ossietzky Universit{\"a}t Oldenburg}, year = {1997}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {V-172-97}, address = {D-26111 Oldenburg}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Eber:96IC, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Inequality concepts and social welfare}, institution = {Institut f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre, Carl von Ossietzky Universit{\"a}t Oldenburg}, year = {1996}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {V-163-96}, address = {D-26111 Oldenburg}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Eber:95ID, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Income inequality and differences in household size}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1995}, volume = {30}, pages = {37-55}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Eber:95IR, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Income inequality and redistribution in heterogenous populations}, institution = {Institut f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre, Carl von Ossietzky Universit{\"a}t Oldenburg}, year = {1995}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {V-150-95}, address = {D-26111 Oldenburg}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Eber:95UE, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Using equivalence scales to compare household types when needs are different}, institution = {Institut f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaftslehre, Carl von Ossietzky Universit{\"a}t Oldenburg}, year = {1995}, number = {V-154-95}, address = {D-26111 Oldenburg}, key = {Equivalence scales} } @TECHREPORT{Ebert1995, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Using equivalence scales to compare household types when needs are different}, institution = {Institut f\"ur Volkswirtschaftslehre, Carl von Ossietzky Universit\"at Oldenburg}, year = {1995}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {V-154-95}, address = {D-26111 Oldenburg}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Ebert1995d, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Income inequality and differences in household size}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1995}, volume = {30}, pages = {37-55}, number = {V-83-92}, institution = {Universit\"at Oldenburg}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, type = {Discussion Paper} } @ARTICLE{Eber:92AR, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {A re-examination of the optimal non-linear income tax}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1992}, volume = {49}, pages = {47-73}, key = {optimal taxation} } @TECHREPORT{Eber:92OC, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {On comparisons of income distributions when household types are different}, institution = {Universit{\"a}t Oldenburg}, year = {1992}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {2}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Ebert1992a, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Income inequality and differences in household size}, institution = {Universit\"at Oldenburg}, year = {1992}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {V-83-92}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Ebert1992c, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {A Re-Examination of the Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1992}, volume = {64}, pages = {323-341}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Eber:88AF, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {A family of aggregative compromise inequality measure}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1988}, volume = {29}, pages = {363-376}, number = {5}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Eber:88MI, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Measurement of inequality: an attempt at unification and generalization}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1988}, volume = {5}, pages = {147-169}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Eber:87a, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {A note on social welfare orderings}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1987}, volume = {31}, pages = {1145-1147}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Eber:87b, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Size and distribution of incomes as determinants of social welfare}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1987}, volume = {41}, pages = {25-33}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Eber:84, author = {Ebert, U.}, title = {Measures of distance between income distributions}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1984}, volume = {32}, pages = {266-274}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{EbMo:07, author = {Ebert,U. and Moyes,P.}, title = {Income Taxation with Labor Responses}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {9}, pages = {653-682}, number = {4}, abstract = {When incomes are exogenously given, U. Jakobsson (Journal of Public Economics s 5 (1976), 161–168) proved that a progressive tax structure always reduces inequality. We investigate the implications for effective progression of relaxing the assumption of exogenous incomes when individuals have the same preferences but different talents. We extend the standard result and conclude that it is generally impossible to disentangle the respective contributions to inequality reduction of the tax schedule and agents' preferences. For a linear tax schedule to result in less unequally distributed incomes it is sufficient that the elasticity of labor supply be nonincreasing in exogenous income and nondecreasing in productivities. The latter condition proves to be necessary and sufficient when the tax schedule is proportional.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{EbMo:02AS, author = {Ebert, U. and Moyes, P.}, title = {A simple axiomatization of the {F}oster-{G}reer-{T}horbecke poverty orderings}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2002}, volume = {4}, pages = {455-473}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{EbMo:00, author = {Ebert, U. and Moyes, P.}, title = {Consistent Income Tax Structures When Households are Heterogeneous}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2000}, volume = {90}, pages = {116-150}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{EbMo:00AA, author = {Ebert, U. and Moyes, P.}, title = {An axiomatic characterization of {Y}itzhaki's index of individual deprivation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {263-270}, number = {3}, key = {deprivation} } @TECHREPORT{EbWe:04, author = {Ebert, U. and Welsch, H.}, title = {The Social Evaluation Of Income Distribution: An Assessment Based On Happiness Surveys}, institution = {Luxembourg Income Study}, year = {2004}, type = {Working Paper Series}, number = {381}, address = {Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University Syracuse, New York 13244-1020}, abstract = {The paper investigates how the income distribution affects the subjective well-being of society. Starting from the concept of a social welfare function defined on income distributions it assesses the preference for equality in European countries. It examines how mean income and the distribution of income in a country (measured by an appropriate inequality measure) determine the subjective well-being of its inhabitants which is identified with social welfare. This issue is addressed under alternative assumptions concerning the adjustment of needs due to differences in household size. The results derived are relevant for the design and monitoring of redistribution policies.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.04.21} } @ARTICLE{EbMaEs:99, author = {Ebrahimi, N. and Maasoumi, E. and Soofi, E.S.}, title = {Ordering univariate distributions by entropy and variance}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1999}, volume = {90}, pages = {317-336}, abstract = {This paper examines the role of variance and entropy in ordering distributions and random prospects. There is no universal relation between entropy and variance orderings of distributions. But we place their relationship in the context of a stronger ordering relation known as dispersion ordering. Further, some conditions are identiÞed under which variance and entropy order similarly when continuous variables are transformed. We also analyze parametric changes which do not disturb the agreement between these rankings. The results are conveniently tabulated in terms of distribution parameters.}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{EcFr:07, author = {Echenique, F. and Fryer, R.G, Jr.}, title = {A Measure of Segreagation Based on Scoial Interactions}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {122}, pages = {441-485}, month = {May}, abstract = {We develop an index of segregation based on two premises: (1) a measure of segregation should disaggregate to the level of individuals, and (2) an individual is more segregated the more segregated are the agents with whom she interacts. We present an index that satisfies (1) and (2) and that is based on agents’ social interactions: the extent to which blacks interact with blacks, whites with whites, etc. We use the index to measure school and residential segregation. Using detailed data on friendship networks, we calculate levels of within-school racial segregation in a sample of U. S. schools. We also calculate residential segregation across major U. S. cities, using block-level data from the 2000 U. S. Census.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Eche:00, author = {Echevarria, C. A. and Iza, A.}, title = {Income Taxation and Finite Horizons in a Human Capital Model}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2000}, volume = {7}, pages = {665-689}, abstract = {We address the issue of capital vs. labor income taxation in an overlappinggenerations model with a positive externality in the human capital production.We compare the performance of the economy in the steady state under differenttax policies. Three results are obtained. First, the size of the tax revenuerequired strongly affects the optimal (welfare maximizing) capital-laborincome tax portfolio. In particular, a zero physical capital income taxrate need not be optimal. Second, the way in which the finite life cycleis split between the working and the retirement period also matters. Andthird, the size of the externality in the human capital production alsoaffects the optimal income tax rate mix.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Ecke:99, author = {Eckel, C.}, title = {Commentary on ‘‘The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework’’}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1999.}, volume = {19}, pages = {447,48}, key = {experiments}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.18} } @ARTICLE{EcGr:00, author = {Eckel, C. C. and Grossman, P. J.}, title = {Volunteers and Psuedo-volunteers: the effect of recruitment methods in dictatorexperiments}, journal = {Experimental Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {107-120}, pages = {3}, key = {experiments} } @ARTICLE{Eckel2000, author = {Eckel, C. C. and Grossman, P. J.}, title = {Volunteers and Psuedo-volunteers: the effect of recruitment methods in dictator experiments}, journal = {Experimental Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {107-120}, pages = {3}, key = {experiments}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{EcGr:98, author = {Eckel, C. C. and Grossman, P. J.}, title = {Are Women Less Selfish Than Men?: Evidence from Dictator Experiments}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1998}, volume = {108}, pages = {726-735}, key = {Experiments} } @TECHREPORT{Wars:96, author = {Warsaw School of Economics}, title = {Living {C}onditions of {P}olish {H}ouseholds in {M}ay and {N}ovember 1995:the{C}urrent {S}tate, {T}hreats {A}nd {O}pportunities}, institution = {Central Statistical Office}, year = {1996}, month = {July}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{TheE:08KC, author = {The Economist}, title = {Krugman's conundrum}, journal = {The Economist}, year = {2008}, volume = {387}, pages = {88}, number = {8576}, month = {April}, key = {wage inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @ARTICLE{TheE:08OP, author = {The Economist}, title = {Output, prices and jobs}, journal = {The Economist}, year = {2008}, volume = {387}, pages = {109}, number = {8576}, month = {April}, key = {statistics}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.16} } @ARTICLE{TheE:08RI, author = {The Economist}, title = {Regional income distribution}, journal = {The Economist}, year = {2008}, volume = {387}, pages = {110}, number = {8576}, month = {April}, key = {income distribution}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.17} } @ARTICLE{Eden:90, author = {Eden, Benjamin}, title = {Marginal Cost Pricing When Spot Markets Are Complete}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1990}, volume = {98}, pages = {1293--1306}, number = {6}, abstract = {The standard formulation of a spot market subject to uncertain excess demand uses a tatonnement process that restricts trade until the market-clearing price is found. Here I present a model in which there is no restriction on trade during the process of the resolution of uncertainty about aggregate excess demand. The idea is to enlarge the commodity space and define goods by the probability that they will sell, in addition to other characteristics. The probability of sale characteristic is the spot market analogue of the contingencies under which delivery will take place in the Arrow-Debreu model. A failure to distinguish goods by the probability of sale characteristic can lead to the rejection of the competitive paradigm even when everyone is a price taker and the allocation is efficient.}, copyright = {Copyright 1990 The University of Chicago Press}, issn = {00223808}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.08} } @BOOK{Edge:81, title = {Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to theMoral Sciences}, publisher = {Kegan Paul}, year = {1881}, author = {Edgeworth, F. Y.}, address = {London}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{HaMaTo:98, author = {Edited by Haltiwanger, J. and Manser, M. E. and Topel, R.}, title = {Labor Statistics Measurement Issues. Studies in Income and Wealth Volume60}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, year = {1998}, address = {Chicago 60637}, key = {labour} } @TECHREPORT{EdKo:07, author = {Edlund, Lena and Kopczuk, Wojciech}, title = {Women, Wealth and Mobility}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {13162}, abstract = {The extent of and changes in inter-generational mobility of wealth are central to understanding dynamics of wealth inequality but hard to measure. Using estate tax returns data, we observe that the share of women among the very wealthy (top 0.01%) in the United States peaked in the late 1960s, reaching almost 50%. Three decades on, women's share had declined to one third, a return to pre-war levels. We argue that this pattern mirrors the relative importance of inherited vs. self-made wealth in the economy and thus the gender-composition of the wealthiest may serve as a proxy for inter-generational wealth mobility. This proxy for "dynastic wealth'' suggests that wealth mobility in the past century decreased until the 1970s and rose thereafter, a pattern consistent with technological change driving long term trends in income inequality and mobility. Greater wealth mobility in recent decades is also consistent with the simultaneous rise in top income shares and relatively stable wealth concentration.}, key = {Mobility}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @TECHREPORT{Edwa:01, author = {Edwards, J.}, title = {Cost-benefit rules for public good provision with distortionary taxation}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2001}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {544}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, key = {Public goods} } @ARTICLE{HuWh:07, author = {Edwards, Terence Huw and Whalley, John}, title = {Short - and Long-Run Decomposition of UK Wage Inequality Changes}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {59}, pages = {1 - 24}, abstract = {This paper focuses on the decomposition of observed increases in UK wage inequality since 1979 into the component factors of competition from low-wage imports and technological change. Building on recent work by Abrego and Whalley, we argue that the length of production run and degree of fixity of factors is crucial in such analyses. If the response of labour markets to date is a short-run response, in which factors and output have not adjusted fully, then analysis of the causes of increased inequality is substantially altered relative to a long-run factors mobile world.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {general equilibrium, inequality, technology, trade}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @ARTICLE{EeGoSc:97, author = {Eeckhoudt, Louis and Gollier, Christian and Schlesinger, Harris}, title = {The no-loss offset provision and the attitude towards risk of a risk-neutralfirm}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {207-217}, number = {2}, month = {August}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Eeck:00, author = {Eeckhout, J.}, title = {On the Uniqueness of Stable Marriage Matchings}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {69,1}, pages = {1-8}, key = {population economics} } @ARTICLE{Eeck:99, author = {Eeckhout, J.}, title = {Educational mobility: the effect on efficiency and distribution}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {317-333}, key = {education,training} } @ARTICLE{Efe1999, author = {Efe, A. O. and Lambert, P. J.}, title = {On Evaluating Social Welfare by Sequential Generalized {L}orenz Dominance}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {63}, pages = {45-53}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Efro:87, author = {B. Efron}, title = {Better Bootstrap Confidence Intervals}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1987}, volume = {82}, pages = {171 - 200}, key = {bootstrap} } @BOOK{Efro:82, title = {The Jackknife, the Bootstrap and Other Resampling Plans}, publisher = {Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics}, year = {1982}, author = {Efron, B.}, volume = {38}, address = {Philadelphia}, key = {bootstrap} } @BOOK{Efron1982, title = {The Jackknife, the Bootstrap and Other Resampling Plans}, publisher = {SIAM}, year = {1982}, author = {Efron, B.}, address = {Philadelphia}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Efro:79, author = {Efron, B.}, title = {Bootstrap Methods: Another Look at the Jackknife}, journal = {The Annals of Statistics}, year = {1979}, volume = {7}, pages = {1-26}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{EfSt:81, author = {Efron, B. and Stein, C.}, title = {The Jackknife estimate of variance}, journal = {The Annals of Statistics}, year = {1981}, volume = {9}, key = {statistics} } @BOOK{EfTi:93, title = {An Introduction to the Bootstrap}, publisher = {Chapman and Hall}, year = {1993}, author = {Efron, B. and Tibshirani, R.}, address = {London}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{Efron1986, author = {Efron, B. and Tibshirani, R.}, title = {Bootstrap {M}ethods for Standard Errors, Confidence Intervals, and Other Measures of Statistical Accuracy}, journal = {Statistical Science}, year = {1986}, volume = {1}, pages = {54-77}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{EfTi:86, author = {Efron, B. and Tibshirani, R.}, title = {Bootstrap {M}ethods for Standard Errors, Confidence Intervals and OtherMeasures of Statistical Accuracy}, journal = {Statistical Science}, year = {1986}, volume = {1}, pages = {54-77}, key = {bootstrap} } @TECHREPORT{Ehle:95, author = {Ehlers, K.}, title = {Poverty changes for single parent households - an application of DominanceRelations}, institution = {Institut f{\"u}r Finanzwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik}, year = {1995}, number = {53}, address = {Germany}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Ehlers1995, author = {Ehlers, K.}, title = {Poverty changes for single parent households - an application of Dominance Relations}, institution = {Institut f\"ur Finanzwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik}, year = {1995}, number = {53}, address = {Germany}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Eich:90, author = {Eichhorn, W.}, title = {Equations and inequalities in the theory of measurement}, booktitle = {Measurement and Modelling in Economics}, publisher = {North-Holland}, year = {1990}, editor = {Myles, G. D.}, chapter = {2}, pages = {11-25}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Eich:88, author = {Eichhorn, W.}, title = {On a class of inequality measures}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1988}, volume = {5}, pages = {171-177}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Eich:78, title = {Functional Equations in Economics}, publisher = {Addison Wesley}, year = {1978}, author = {Eichhorn, W.}, address = {Reading Massachusetts}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{EiFuRi:84, author = {Eichhorn, W. and Funke, H. and Richter , W. F.}, title = {Tax progression and inequality of income distribution}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1984}, volume = {13}, pages = {127-131}, number = {10}, key = {public economics} } @INCOLLECTION{EiGe:82, author = {Eichhorn, W. and Gehrig, W.}, title = {Measurement of inequality in economics}, booktitle = {Modern Applied Mathematics - optimization and operations research}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1982}, editor = {Korte, B.}, pages = {657-693}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{EiGe:81, author = {Eichhorn, W. and Gehrig, W.}, title = {Generalized convexity and the measurement of inequality}, booktitle = {Generalized concavity in optimization and economics}, publisher = {Academic Press}, year = {1981}, editor = {Schaible, S. and Ziemba, W. T.}, pages = {637-642}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{EiGl:88, author = {Eichhorn, W. and Gleissner, W.}, title = {The equation of measurement}, booktitle = {Measurement in Economics, Theory and Application of Economic Indces}, publisher = {Physica-Verlag}, year = {1988}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, pages = {19-27}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Eichhorn1985, author = {Eichhorn, W. and Gleissner, W.}, title = {On a functional differential equation arising in the theory of the distribution of wealth}, journal = {Aequationes Mathematicae}, year = {1985}, volume = {28}, pages = {190-198}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{EiGl:85, author = {Eichhorn, W. and Gleissner, W.}, title = {On a functional differential equation arising in the theory of the distributionof wealth}, journal = {Aequationes Mathematicae}, year = {1985}, volume = {28}, pages = {190-198}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{EiWa:04, author = {Eichner, Thomas and Wagener, Andreas}, title = {Relative Risk Aversion, Relative Prudence and Comparative Statics UnderUncertainty: The Case of ({m},{r})-Preferences}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {56}, pages = {159-170}, number = {2}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{EiWa:02, author = {Eichner, Thomas and Wagener, Andreas}, title = {Increases in Risk and the Welfare State}, year = {2002}, number = {685}, abstract = {According to many observers, the world is currently getting riskier alongmany of its dimensions. In this paper we analyse how the welfare state,i.e., social insurance that works through redistributive taxation, shoulddeal with this trend. We distinguish between risks that can be insuredby the welfare state and such than cannot (background risks). Insurablerisks can be reduced either by individual self-insurance or, through pooling,by social insurance. Both ways are costly in terms of income foregone.We show: (i) Self-insurance will be higher the more costly is the welfarestate and the larger are background or insured risks. (ii) Full risk coverageby the welfare state can only be optimal in a costless welfare state. (iii)The optimal size of the welfare state is larger the higher are the risksthat it cannot insure. The impact of the size of risks that can be insuredis, however, unclear.}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {risk}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{Eide1999, author = {Eide, E. R. and Showalter, M. H.}, title = {Factors affecting the transmission of earnings across generations: a quantile regression approach}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1999}, volume = {34}, pages = {253-267}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{EiSh:99, author = {Eide, E. R. and Showalter, M. H.}, title = {Factors affecting the transmission of earnings across generations: a quantileregression approach}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1999}, volume = {34}, pages = {253-267}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Eide1998, author = {Eide, E. R. and Showalter, M. H.}, title = {The effect of school quality on student performance: A quantile regression approach}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {58}, pages = {345-350}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{EiSh:98, author = {Eide, E. R. and Showalter, M. H.}, title = {The effect of school quality on student performance: A quantile regressionapproach}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {58}, pages = {345-350}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{EiHuLe:98, author = {Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. and Huizinga, Harry P. and Lemmen, Jan J. G.}, title = {Short-term and long-term government debt and nonresident interest withholdingtaxes}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {68}, pages = {309-334}, number = {3}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{EiPe:91, author = {Einy, E. and Peleg, B.}, title = {Linear measures of inequality for cooperative games}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1991}, volume = {53}, pages = {328-344}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Eisf:07, author = {Eisfeldt, A.L.}, title = {Smoothing with Liquid and Illiquid Assets}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {54}, pages = {1572-1586}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @TECHREPORT{EiHo:08, author = {Nada Eissa and Hilary Hoynes}, title = {Redistribution and Tax Expenditures: The Earned Income Tax Credit}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {14307}, month = {September}, series = {Working Paper Series}, url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w14307} } @ARTICLE{EiJaTh:08, author = {Eissa, Nada and Jacobsen Kleven, Henrik and Thustrup Kreiner, Claus}, title = {Evaluation of four tax reforms in the United States: Labor supply and welfare effects for single mothers}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {795 - 816}, abstract = {An emerging consensus is that labor force participation is more responsive to taxes and transfers than hours worked. To understand the implications of participation responses for the welfare analysis of tax reform, this paper embeds this margin of labor supply in an explicit welfare theoretic framework. We apply the framework to examine the welfare effects on single mothers in the United States following four tax acts passed in 1986, 1990, 1993, and 2001.We propose a simulation method combining features of fully structural microsimulation studies and simple deadweight loss calculations. Our approach accounts for the observed heterogeneity in the microdata, but is simple to implement because we do not need to specify utility functions and estimate utility parameters.We find that each of the four tax acts created substantial welfare gains, and that the gains were concentrated almost exclusively on the participation margin. Our results imply that standard approaches not modeling the participation decision can make large errors.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Tax reform, Labor supply, Welfare analysis, Single mothers, Micro-simulation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.05} } @TECHREPORT{EiKlKr:04, author = {Eissa, N. and Kleven, H. and Kreiner, C.}, title = {Evaluation of Four Tax Reforms in the United States: Labour Supply and Welfare Effects for Single Mothers}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2004}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {10935}, address = {NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 November 2004}, month = {November}, abstract = {A large literature evaluating the welfare effects of taxation has examined the role of the labor supply elasticity, and has shown that the estimated welfare effects are highly sensitive to its size. A common feature of this literature is its exclusive focus on hours worked and the associated marginal tax rate. An emerging consensus among public finance and labor economists, however, is that labor supply is more responsive along the extensive margin (participation) than along the intensive margin (hours worked). To understand the implications of the participation decision for the welfare analysis of tax reform, this paper embeds the extensive margin in an explicit welfare theoretic framework. It is shown that the participation effect on welfare is created by a different tax wedge than the marginaltax wedge relevant for hours of work. This difference is due to non-linearities and discontinuities in tax-transfer schemes, features that are particularly important for the welfare evaluation of tax reforms affecting the bottom of the income distribution. We apply our framework to examine the labor supply and welfare effects for single mothers in the United States following four tax acts passed in 1986, 1990, 1993, and 2001. Our simulations show that each of the four tax acts reduced the tax burden on low-income single mothers, and created substantial welfare gains. We note three features of the welfare effects. First, we find that welfare gains are almost exclusively concentrated along the extensive margin of labor supply. Second, welfare effects along the extensive margin tend to dominate those along the intensive margin, even when the two labor supply elasticities are of similar size. This occurs because the welfare effect on each margin is created by a different tax wedge. Finally, ignoring the composition of the labor supply elasticity may reverse the sign of the welfare effect. In the welfare evaluation of tax reform, we conclude that the composition of the total labor supply elasticity is as important as its size.}, key = {tax reform}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{EkHe:99, author = {Ekelund Jr., R. B. and Hebert, R. F.}, title = {The {D}upuit-{M}arshall Theory of Competitive Equilibrium}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {225-40}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{EkDo:03, author = {Ekelund, R. B. and Dorton, C.}, title = {Criminal Justice Institutions as a Common Pool: The 19th Century Analysisof {E}dwin {C}hadwick}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2003}, volume = {50}, pages = {271-294}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Ekelund2003, author = {Ekelund, R. B. and Dorton, C.}, title = {Criminal Justice Institutions as a Common Pool: The 19th Century Analysis of {E}dwin {C}hadwick}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2003}, volume = {50}, pages = {271-294}, key = {crime}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ElMaGr:95, author = {El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. and Grether, David M.}, title = {Are People Bayesian? Uncovering Behavioral Strategies}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1995}, volume = {90}, pages = {1137--1145}, number = {432}, abstract = {Economists and psychologists have recently been developing new theories of decision making under uncertainty that can accommodate the observed violations of standard statistical decision theoretic axioms by experimental subjects. We propose a procedure that finds a collection of decision rules that best explain the behavior of experimental subjects. The procedure is a combination of maximum likelihood estimation of the rules together with an implicit classification of subjects to the various rules and a penalty for having too many rules. We apply our procedure to data on probabilistic updating by subjects in four different universities. We get remarkably robust results showing that the most important rules used by the subjects (in order of importance) are Bayes's rule, a representativeness rule (ignoring the prior), and, to a lesser extent, conservatism (overweighting the prior).}, copyright = {Copyright © 1995 American Statistical Association}, issn = {01621459}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Dec., 1995}, publisher = {American Statistical Association}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2291506} } @TECHREPORT{ElFuLaOzYi:04, author = {Elbers,C. and Fujii,T. and Lanjouw,P. and Ozler,B. and Yin,W.}, title = {Poverty Alleviation through Geographic Targeting: How Much Does DisaggregationHelp?}, institution = {World Bank}, year = {2004}, abstract = {In this paper, using recently completed "poverty maps" for Cambodia, Ecuador,and Madagascar, we simulate the impact on poverty of transferring an exogenouslygiven budget to geographically defined sub-groups of the population accordingto their relative poverty status. We find large gains from targeting smalleradministrative units, such as districts or villages. However, these gainsare still far from the poverty reduction that would be possible had theplanners had access to information on household level income or consumption.Our results suggest that a useful way forward might be to combine finegeographic targeting using a poverty map with within-community targetingmechanisms.}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{ElLaMiOz:08, author = {Elbers, C. and Lanjouw, P. and Mistiaen, J. A. and Özler, B.}, title = {Reinterpreting between-group inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2008}, volume = {6}, pages = {231-245}, abstract = {We evaluate observed inequality between population groups against a benchmark of the maximum between-group inequality attainable given the number and relative sizes of those groups under examination. Because our measure is normalized by these parameters, drawing comparisons across different settings is less problematic than with conventional inequality decompositions. Moreover, our measure can decline with finer sub-partitioning of population groups. Consequently, the exact manner in which one groups the population acquires greater significance. Survey data from various countries suggest that our approach can provide a complementary perspective on the question of whether (and how much) a particular population breakdown is salient to an assessment of inequality in a country.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.04}, type = {mimeo}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/gnr5w213u067w1tm/} } @BOOK{ElJo:69, title = {Systems of Frequency Curves}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1969}, author = {Elderton , W. P. and Johnson, N. L.}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Elff:91IT, author = {Elffers, H.}, title = {Income Tax Evasion: Theory and Measurement}, year = {1991}, address = {Kluwer, Dewenter}, key = {tax evasion}, publisher = {Burger en Belastingen 9} } @ARTICLE{ElWH:87TC, author = {Elffers, H. and Weigel, R. H. and Hessing, D. J.}, title = {The consequences of different strategies for measuring tax evasion behaviour}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1987}, volume = {8}, pages = {311-337}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{ElJo:08CR, author = {Elger, T. and Jones, B. E.}, title = {Can rejections of weak separability be attributed to random measurement errors in the data?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2008}, volume = {99}, pages = {44-47}, number = {1}, month = {April}, abstract = {Standard non-parametric weak separability tests do not account for measurement errors in the data. We propose a method to determine if rejections of weak separability obtained using such tests can be attributed to random measurement errors in the quantity data.}, key = {Measurement error}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.22} } @TECHREPORT{Elio:97, author = {Eliot, D.}, title = {Grossing-up options in the {F}amily {E}xpenditure {S}urvey. Part {II}}, institution = {Office for National Statistics}, year = {1997}, type = {Internal report}, address = {London}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{Elio:91, author = {Eliot, D.}, title = {Weighting for non-response - a survey researcher's guide}, institution = {Office of Population Censuses and Surveys}, year = {1991}, type = {Report}, address = {London}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{ElGrScZa:99, author = {Ellickson, B. and Grodal, B. and Scotchmer, S. and Zame, W. R.}, title = {Clubs and Market}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {1185-1217}, key = {clubs} } @ARTICLE{ElJo:08PA, author = {Ellingsen, T. and Johannesson, M.}, title = {Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {98}, pages = {990-1008}, number = {3}, __markedentry = {[zhangz3]}, abstract = {Desire for social esteem is a source of prosocial behavior. We develop a model in which actors’ utility of esteem depends on the audience. In a principalagent setting, we show that the model can account for motivational crowding out. Control systems and pecuniary incentives erode morale by signaling to the agent that the principal is not worth impressing. The model also offers an explanation for why agents are motivated by unconditionally high pay and by mission-oriented principals.}, key = {incentive theory}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.06} } @ARTICLE{ElJo:04, author = {Ellingsen, T. and Johannesson, M.}, title = {Promises, threats and fairness}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {2004}, volume = {114}, pages = {397–420}, abstract = {We present experimental evidence that promises and threats mitigate thehold-up problem. While investors rely as much on their own threats as ontheir trading partner’s promises, the latter are more credible. Buildingon recent work in psychology and behavioural economics, we then presenta simple model within which agents are concerned about both fairness andconsistency. The model can account for several of our experimental findings.Its most striking implication is that fairmindedness strengthens the credibilityof promises to behave fairly, but weakens the credibility of threats topunish unfair behaviour.}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{Ellingsen2004, author = {Ellingsen, T. and Johannesson, M.}, title = {Promises, threats and fairness}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {2004}, volume = {114}, pages = {397-420}, abstract = {We present experimental evidence that promises and threats mitigate the hold-up problem. While investors rely as much on their own threats as on their trading partner's promises, the latter are more credible. Building on recent work in psychology and behavioural economics, we then present a simple model within which agents are concerned about both fairness and consistency. The model can account for several of our experimental findings. Its most striking implication is that fairmindedness strengthens the credibility of promises to behave fairly, but weakens the credibility of threats to punish unfair behaviour.}, key = {Experiments}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ElHaCa:98, author = {Elliot, Catherine S. and Hayward, Donald M. and Canon, Sebastian}, title = {Institutional framing - some experimental evidence}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {35}, pages = {455-464}, number = {4}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{ElSa:98, author = {Elliot, Robert F. and Sandy, Robert}, title = {Adam {S}mith may have been right after all: A new approach to the analysisof compensating differentials}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {59}, pages = {127-131}, number = {1}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Ells:61, author = {Ellsberg, D.}, title = {Risk, ambiguity,and the {S}avage axioms}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1961}, volume = {75}, pages = {643-669}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Ells:63, author = {Ellsberg, D.}, title = {Risk, ambiguity,and the {S}avage axioms: Reply}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1961}, volume = {77}, pages = {336-342}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Ellw:00, author = {Ellwoood, D. T.}, title = {The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit and Social Policy Reforms onWork, Marriage and Living Arrangements}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {2000}, volume = {53,4}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Ellwoood2000, author = {Ellwoood, D. T.}, title = {The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit and Social Policy Reforms on Work, Marriage and Living Arrangements}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {2000}, volume = {53,4}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ElKe:03, author = {Wedad Elmaghraby and Pinar Keskinocak}, title = {Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Inventory Considerations: Research Overview, Current Practices, and Future Directions}, journal = {Management Science}, year = {2003}, volume = {49}, pages = {1287--1309}, number = {10}, address = {Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), Linthicum, Maryland, USA}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.10.1287.17315}, issn = {0025-1909}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {INFORMS}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Elst:89, author = {Elster,J.}, title = {Social Norms and Economic Theory}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1989}, volume = {3}, pages = {99-117}, key = {social custom} } @BOOK{ElRo:91, title = {Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1991}, author = {Elster, J. and Roemer, J. E.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{ElFr:68, author = {Eltet{\"o}, O. and Frigyes, E.}, title = {New income inequality measures as efficient tools for causal analysis and planning}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1968}, volume = {36}, pages = {383-396}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{EmKlMi:97, title = {Modelling Extremal Events}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1997}, author = {Embrechts, P. and Kl{\"u}ppelberg, C. and Mikosch, T.}, series = {Applications of Mathematics: Stochastic Modelling and Applied Probability}, address = {Berlin, Heidelberg}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{EmTa:00, author = {Emmerson, C. and Tanner, S}, title = {A Note on the Tax Treatment of Private Pensions and Individual Savings Accounts}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2000}, volume = {21}, pages = {65-74}, key = {pensions} } @ARTICLE{EmFl:07, author = {Emons, Winand and Fluet, Claude}, title = {Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures}, journal = {Journal of Law, Economics and Organization}, year = {2007}, pages = {1 - 23}, abstract = {An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The arbiter’s ability to remain uninformed as well as sequential testifying makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence.}, keywords = {evidence production, procedure, costly state falsification, adversarial, inquisitorial.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{Engel2007, author = {Engel, Christoph}, title = {HOW MUCH COLLUSION? A META-ANALYSIS OF OLIGOPOLY EXPERIMENTS}, journal = {Journal of Competition Law and Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {3}, pages = {491-549}, number = {4}, abstract = {Oligopoly has been among the first topics in experimental economics. Over half a century, some 150 papers have been published. Each individual paper was interested in demonstrating one effect, but in order to do so, experimenters had to specify many more parameters. Thus they have generated a huge body of evidence, untapped so far. This meta-analysis makes this evidence available. More than 100 of the papers lend themselves to calculating an index of collusion. The database behind this paper covers some 500 different settings. The experimental results may be normalized as a percentage of the span between the Walrasian and the Pareto outcomes. In the same way, results may be expressed as a percentage of the distance between the Nash and the Pareto outcomes. For each and every one of the parameters, these two indices make it possible to answer two questions: How far is the market outcome away from the competitive equilibrium? And how good is the Nash prediction? Most importantly, however, the meta-analysis sheds light on how features of the experimental setting interact with each other. Most main effects and many interaction effects are indeed statistically significant.}, doi = {10.1093/joclec/nhm016}, eprint = {http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/3/4/491.pdf}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, url = {http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/3/4/491} } @ARTICLE{EnGa:99, author = {Engel, E. M. R. A. and Galetovic, A. and Raddatz, C. E.}, title = {Taxes and Income Distribution in {C}hile: Some Unpleasant Redistributive Arithmetic}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {59}, pages = {155-192}, abstract = {This paper quantifies the direct impact of taxes on income distribution at the household level in Chile and estimates the distributional effect of several changes in the tax structure. We find that income distributions before and after taxes are very similar (Gini coefficients of 0.488 and 0.496, respectively). Moreover, radical modifications of the tax structure, such as raising the value added tax from 18 to 25% or substituting a 20% flat tax for the present progressive income tax affect the after-tax distribution only slightly. We present some arithmetic showing that the scope for direct income redistribution through progressivity of the tax system is rather limited. By contrast, for parameter values observed in Chile, and possibly in most developing countries, the targeting of expenditures and the level of the average tax rate are far more important determinants of income distribution after government transfers. Thus, a high-yield proportional tax can have a far bigger equalizing impact than a low-yield progressive tax. Moreover, a simple model shows that the optimal tax system is biased against progressive taxes and towards proportional taxes, with a bias that grows with the degree of inequality of pre-tax incomes. Our results suggest that to reduce income inequality, the focus of discussion should be on the amount to be redistributed, the targeting of public spending, and the relative efficiency of alternative taxes, and not on the progressivity of the tax system.}, key = {income distribution} } @TECHREPORT{EnHi:99, author = {Engel, E. M. R. A. and Hines, J. R.}, title = {Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {1999}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {6903}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{EnSt:04, author = {Engelmann, D. and Strobel, M.}, title = {Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {2004}, volume = {94}, pages = {857-869}, key = {experiments}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.20} } @ARTICLE{Epple1996a, author = {Epple, D. and Romano, R.}, title = {Ends Against the Middle: Determining Public Provision When There are Private Alternatives}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {62}, pages = {297-325}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{EpRo:96EA, author = {Epple, D. and Romano, R.}, title = {Ends Against the Middle: Determining Public Provision When There are PrivateAlternatives}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {62}, pages = {297-325}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{EpRo:96PP, author = {Epple, D. and Romano, R.}, title = {Public provision of private goods}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1996}, volume = {104}, pages = {57-84}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{EpSe:91, author = {Epstein, L. and Segal, U.}, title = {Quadratic social welfare functions}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1991}, volume = {100}, pages = {691-712}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Epst:99, author = {Epstein, L. G.}, title = {A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {579-608}, key = {uncertainty} } @TECHREPORT{Epst:81, author = {Epstein, L. G.}, title = {Ethical indices of equality and unpredictability}, institution = {University of Toronto}, year = {1981}, type = {working paper}, number = {8311}, address = {Toronto, Ontario}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{EpZi:91, author = {Epstein, Larry G. and Zin, Stanley E.}, title = {Substitution, Risk aversion and the temporal behavior of consumption andasset returns: an empirical analysis}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1991}, volume = {99}, pages = {263-286}, number = {2}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{EpZi:89, author = {Epstein, Larry G. and Zin, Stanley E.}, title = {Substitution, risk aversion and the temporal behavior of consumption andasset returns: a theoretical framework}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1989}, volume = {57}, pages = {937-969}, number = {4}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Erard2001, author = {Erard, Brian and Ho, Chin-Chin}, title = {{Searching} for {Ghosts}: {Who} are the {Non}-filers and {How} {Much} {Do} {They} {Owe}?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {81}, pages = {25-50}, number = {1}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ErHo:01, author = {Erard, B. and Ho, C.-C.}, title = {Searching for Ghosts: Who are the Nonfilers and How Much Tax Do They Owe?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {81}, pages = {25-50}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{ErSu:88AC, author = {Erekson, O. H. and Sullivan, D. H.}, title = {A cross-section analysis of IRS auditing}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1988}, volume = {41}, pages = {175-189}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{ErBe:99, author = {Erev, I. and Bereby-Meyer, Y. and Roth, A. E.}, title = {The Effects of Adding a Constant to All Payoffs}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation}, year = {1999}, volume = {39}, pages = {111-128}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Eric:00, author = {Erickson, T.}, title = {The ambiguous effect of new and improved goods on the cost of living}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {143-147}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{ErJa:97, author = {Eriksson, T. and J{\"a}ntti, M.}, title = {The distribution of earnings in {F}inland 1971-1990}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1997}, volume = {41}, pages = {1763-1779}, number = {9}, month = {December}, abstract = {We document the distribution and changes in the distribution of earnings in Finland from 1971 to 1990, using a large representative set of data, collected from the population censuses. Earnings inequality dropped dramatically between 1971 and 1975, and continued to decrease until 1985. From 1985 to 1990 there was a substantial increase in the inequality of earnings, comparable in magnitude to that found in the U.K and U.S. While earlier shifts in the inequality of earnings could be accounted for by changes in observed characteristics, the large increase at the end of the 1980s occurs almost completely in the dispersion of earnings within cells of observationally equivalent wage earners. After considering and discarding a number of possible explanations for the changes, we find that changes in labour market institutions are consistent with the observed changes on the inequality of earnings.}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Ermi:93, author = {Ermini, L.}, title = {Effects of Transitory Consumption and Temporal Aggregation on the Permanent Income Hypothesis}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1993}, volume = {75}, pages = {736-740}, abstract = {This paper shows that U.S. monthly consumption data are consistent with the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) when transitory consumption and temporal aggregation effects are jointly incorporated into the model. In this case, a more appropriate representation for PIH is the integratedmoving average IMA(1,l) process with a negative MA coefficient, rather than the repeatedly rejected random walk process. Restrictions on the relative importance of transitory and permanent consumption are also discussed, with and without measurement errors.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{Ermi:08OO, author = {Ermisch, J.}, title = {Origins of social immobility and inequality: parenting and early child development}, journal = {National Institute Economic Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {205}, pages = {62-71}, abstract = {There is growing evidence that differences in children’s intellectual, emotional and behavioural development by parents’ socio-economic status emerge at early ages and tha these differences cast a long shadow over subsequent achievements. This article demonstrates with the Millennium Cohort Study that differences by parents’ income group in cognitive and behavioural development emerge by the child’s third birthday. It shows that an important part of these differences can be accounted for by ‘what parents do’ in terms of educational activities and parenting style.}, key = {social mobility}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.09.17} } @ARTICLE{ErDi:97, author = {Ermisch, John and Di Salvo, Pamela}, title = {The economic determinants of young people's household formation}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {627-644}, number = {256}, month = {November}, key = {population economics} } @TECHREPORT{ErFr:02, author = {Ermisch, J. and Francesconi, M.}, title = {Intergenerational mobility in {B}ritain: new evidence from the {BHPS}}, institution = {Institute for Social and Economic Research}, year = {2002}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {University of Essex, Colchester, Essex}, key = {mobility} } @TECHREPORT{ErFrSi:05, author = {Ermisch, J. and Francesconi, M. and Siedler, T.}, title = {Intergenerational Economic Mobility and Assortative Mating}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2005}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {1847}, address = {P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany}, month = {November}, abstract = {We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and the British Household Panel Survey to estimate the extent of intergenerational economic mobility in a framework that highlights the role played by assortative mating. We find that assortative mating plays an important role. On average about 40-50% of the covariance between parents’ and own permanent family income can be attributed to the person to whom one is married. This effect is driven by strong spouse correlations in human capital, which are larger in Germany than Britain.}, key = {population economics}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{ErJe:99, author = {Ermisch, J. F. and Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Retirement and Housing Adjustment in Later Life: Evidence from the British Household Panel Survey}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {311-333}, key = {housing} } @ARTICLE{Erog:07, author = {Ero{\v g}lu, {\d S}.}, title = {Developing an Index of Deprivation which Integrates Objective and Subjective Dimensions: Extending the Work of Townsend, Mack and Lansley and Haller{\"o}d}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {80}, pages = {493-510}, abstract = {This article presents a new approach to index development, extending the methods used by Townsend, Mack and Lansley and Hallero¨ d to measure deprivation in the developed world. The index combines three ‘objective’ dimensions of deprivation (i.e. monetary, consumption and work-related), and weighs them according to subjective perceptions regarding which items are more critical to deprivation. A particular application of factor analysis to determining deprivation measures and their corresponding weights leads to a more sophisticated and theoretically robust index than those used previously. The index draws on data from interviews with both partners of 17 households randomly sampled from a Turkish squatter settlement. The article contends that the methodological and substantive advantages of this approach are relevant to both developing and developed contexts.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @BOOK{EsMa:72, title = {En Statisk Studie av Inkomstutveklingen}, publisher = {Statisk Centralbyr{\aa}n och Bostadssyrelsen}, year = {1972}, author = {Esberger, S. E. and Malmquist, S.}, address = {Stockholm}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Escr:90, author = {Escribano, C.}, title = {Evoluci{\'o}n de la pobreza y la desigualdad en {E}spa{\~n}a. 1973-1987}, journal = {Informaci{\'o}n Comercial Espa{\~n}ola}, year = {1990}, pages = {81-109}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Escribano1990, author = {Escribano, C.}, title = {Evoluci\'on de la pobreza y la desigualdad en {E}spa\~na. 1973-1987}, journal = {Informaci\'on Comercial Espa\~nola}, year = {1990}, pages = {81-109}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Escr:07, author = {Escriche, L.}, title = {Persistence of Occupational Segregation: The Role of the Intergenerational Transmission of Preferences}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {2007}, volume = {117}, pages = {837-857}, abstract = {This article provides an explanation of the evolution and persistence of the women’s segregation in jobs with less on-the-job training opportunities within the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of preferences. 'Job-priority' and 'family-priority' preferences are considered. Firms' policy and the distribution of women’s preferences are endogenously and simultaneously determined in the long run. The results show though the gender gap in training will diminish, it will also persist over time. This is because both types of women’s preferences coexist at the steady state due to the socialisation effort of parents to preserve their own cultural values.}, key = {equity}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @TECHREPORT{INE:93, author = {Instituto Nacional de Estadistica}, title = {EPF 90-91: Fichero para Usarios}, year = {1993}, address = {Madrid}, key = {Data} } @ARTICLE{Este:86, author = {Esteban, J.}, title = {Income share elasticity and the size distribution of income}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1986}, volume = {27}, pages = {439-444}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{EsGrRa:07, author = {Esteban,J. and Gradin,C. and Ray,D.}, title = {An Extension of a Measure of Polarization, with an application to the income distribution of five OECD countries}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2007}, volume = {5}, pages = {1-19}, abstract = {We introduce an extension of the Esteban and Ray [Econometrica, 62:819–851 1994] measure of polarization that can be applied to density functions. As a by-product we also derive the Wolfson [Am. Econ. Rev., 84:353–358 1994] measure as a special case. This derivation has the virtue of casting both measures in the context of a (statistically) unified framework. We study the polarization of the distribution of household income for five OECD countries (LIS database): US, UK, Canada, Germany and Sweden.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.07.31} } @ARTICLE{EsRa:94, author = {Esteban, J. and Ray, D.}, title = {On the Measurement of Polarization}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1994}, volume = {62}, pages = {819-851}, key = {polarisation} } @TECHREPORT{Este:85, author = {Esteban, J. M.}, title = {Income - share and the size distribution of income}, year = {1985}, type = {working paper}, number = {11}, address = {Universitat Aut{\`o}noma de Barcelona}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Este:76, author = {Esteban, J. M.}, title = {Social welfare functions and inequality measures}, year = {1976}, type = {Economia, working paper}, number = {76}, address = {Universitat Aut{\`o}noma de Barcelona}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{EsMi:97, author = {Estrella, A. and Mishkin, F. S.}, title = {The predictive power of the term structure of interest rates in {E}uropeand the {U}nited {S}tates: implications for the {E}uropean {C}entral {B}ank}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1997}, pages = {1375-1402}, key = {monetary} } @ARTICLE{Estrella1997, author = {Estrella, A. and Mishkin, F. S.}, title = {The predictive power of the term structure of interest rates in {E}urope and the {U}nited {S}tates: implications for the {E}uropean {C}entral {B}ank}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1997}, pages = {1375-1402}, key = {monetary}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{EsKo:85CS, author = {Eswaran, Mukesh and Kotwal, Ashok}, title = {A theory of contractual structure in agriculture}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1985}, volume = {75}, pages = {352-367}, number = {3}, month = {June}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{EsKo:85TT, author = {Eswaran, Mukesh and Kotwal, Ashok}, title = {A theory of two-tier labour markets in agrarian economies}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1985}, volume = {75}, pages = {162-177}, number = {1}, month = {March}, key = {Labour market} } @ARTICLE{Etro:98, author = {Etro, F. G.}, title = {Incidenza Fiscale e Regole Di {R}amsey con Potere Di Mercato Ed Evasione}, journal = {Rivista di Politica Economica}, year = {1998}, volume = {88}, pages = {27-59}, key = {Tax compliance - firms} } @BOOK{Euro:90, title = {Europe in Figures, Theme 3, Series C}, publisher = {Office for Official Publications of the {E}uropean Community}, year = {1990}, author = {Eurostat}, address = {Luxembourg}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{EvFaHiLG:93, author = {Evandrou, M. And Falkingham, J. And Hills, J. R. And Le Grand, J.}, title = {The distribution of welfare benefits in kind}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1993}, type = {Welfare State Programme Discussion Paper}, number = WSP/68, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Evan:05, author = {Evans,D.}, title = {The Elasticity of Marginal Utility of Consumption: Estimates for 20 OECDCountries}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2005}, volume = {26}, pages = {197-224}, abstract = {In social project appraisal, the policy profile of both distributional welfareweights and the social discount rate has risen considerably in recent years.This fact has important implications for the allocation of funds to socialprojects and policies in countries, and in unions of countries such asthe EU. A key component in the formulae for both welfare weights and thesocial discount rate is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption,e. A critical review of existing evidence on e suggests that the UK Treasury’spreferred value of unity is too low. New evidence presented in this paper,based on the structure of personal income tax rates, suggests that, onaverage, for developed countries e is close to 1.4. This particular approachto the estimation of e has previously been under-utilised by researchers.}, key = {Utility, preference} } @BOOK{EvHaPe:93, title = {Statistical Distributions}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1993}, author = {Evans, M. and Hastings, N. and Peacock, B.}, address = {New York}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{EvVi:91, author = {Evans, W. N. and Viscusi, W. K.}, title = {Estimation of State-Dependent Utility Functions Using Survey Data}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1991}, volume = {73}, pages = {94-104}, key = {health} } @BOOK{Ever:98, title = {The Cambridge Dictionary of Statistics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, author = {B. S. Everitt}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{FaWe:07, author = {Fahri, E. and Werning, I.}, title = {Inequality and Social Discounting}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2007}, volume = {115}, pages = {365-402}, abstract = {We explore steady-state inequality in an intergenerational model with altruistically linked individuals who experience privately observed taste shocks. When the welfare function depends only on the initial generation, efficiency requires immiseration: inequality grows without bound and everyone’s consumption converges to zero.We study other efficient allocations in which the welfare function values future generations directly, placing a positive but vanishing weight on their welfare. The social discount factor is then higher than the private one, and for any such difference we find that consumption exhibits mean reversion and that a steady-state, cross-sectional distribution for consumption and welfare exists, with no one trapped at misery.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{FaLeLo:02, author = {Fajnzylber, P. and Lederman, D. and Loayza, N.}, title = {What Causes Violent Crime?}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2002}, volume = {46}, pages = {1323-1357}, key = {Crime} } @ARTICLE{FaKn:04, author = {Falk, A. and Knell, M.}, title = {Choosing the {J}oneses: Endogenous Goals and Reference Standards}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {106}, pages = {417-435}, abstract = {A growing economic literature stresses the importance of relative comparisons, e.g., for savings and consumption or happiness. In this literature it is usually assumed that reference standards against which people compare themselves are exogenously given. In contrast, findings from social psychology suggest that people play an active role in determining their reference standards. We introduce a social comparison model where people choose their reference standards to serve motives of self-improvement and self-enhancement. The model predicts that reference standards increase in individuals’ abilities and that people thus tend to compare themselves to similar others. The results of a questionnaire study confirm the prediction of the model.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {Alex}, timestamp = {2006.06.22} } @ARTICLE{FaLe:98, author = {Falk, B. and Lee, B.-S.}, title = {The dynamic effects of permanent and transitory labor income on consumption}, journal = {The Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {41}, pages = {371-387}, abstract = {This paper formulates a version of the permanent income hypothesis in which households decompose labor income into permanent and transitory components to determine the allocation of disposable income into permanent consumption, transitory consumption, and saving. A procedure is developed based on this model to empirically identify these components of labor income and the effects of their innovations on consumption. The procedure, which is closely related to the Blanchard and Quah, Journal 79, 655-693 1989 approach, is applied to study US post-World War II time-series data.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{Falk:96, author = {Falkinger, Josef}, title = {Efficient private provision of public goods by rewarding deviations fromaverage}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {62}, pages = {413-422}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Falkinger1996, author = {Falkinger, Josef}, title = {Efficient private provision of public goods by rewarding deviations from average}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {62}, pages = {413-422}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Falk:91OO, author = {Falkinger, J.}, title = {On optimal public good provision with tax evasion}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {45}, pages = {127-133}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Falk:88TE, author = {Falkinger, J.}, title = {Tax evasion and equity: A theoretical analysis}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1988}, volume = {43}, pages = {388-395}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Falkinger1991, author = {Falkinger, J. and Walther, K.}, title = {Separating the small and big fish: the case of income tax evasion}, journal = {Zeitschrift f?r National"konomie}, year = {1991}, volume = {54}, pages = {55-67}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FaWa:91RV, author = {Falkinger, J. and Walther, K.}, title = {Rewards versus penalties: on a new policy against tax evasion}, journal = {Public Finance Quarterly}, year = {1991}, volume = {19}, pages = {67-79}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{FaWa:91ST, author = {Falkinger, J. and Walther, K.}, title = {Separating the small and big fish: the case of income tax evasion}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r National{\"o}konomie}, year = {1991}, volume = {54}, pages = {55-67}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Fa:98, author = {Eugene F. Fama}, title = {Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance}, journal = {Journal of Financial Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {49}, pages = {283 - 306}, number = {3}, abstract = {Market efficiency survives the challenge from the literature on long-term return anomalies. Consistent with the market efficiency hypothesis that the anomalies are chance results, apparent overreaction to information is about as common as underreaction, and post-event continuation of pre-event abnormal returns is about as frequent as post-event reversal. Most important, consistent with the market efficiency prediction that apparent anomalies can be due to methodology, most long-term return anomalies tend to disappear with reasonable changes in technique.}, doi = {DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00026-9}, issn = {0304-405X}, keywords = {Market efficiency} } @ARTICLE{Fa:70, author = {Fama, Eugene F.}, title = {Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work}, journal = {The Journal of Finance}, year = {1970}, volume = {25}, pages = {383--417}, number = {2}, copyright = {Copyright © 1970 American Finance Association}, issn = {00221082}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {May, 1970}, jstor_issuetitle = {Papers and Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association New York, N.Y. December, 28-30, 1969}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing for the American Finance Association} } @ARTICLE{FaLi:98, author = {Fan, J. Q. and Lin, S. K.}, title = {Test of significance when data are curves}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1998}, volume = {93}, pages = {1007-1021}, number = {443}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{FaNo:08, author = {Fang, Hanming and Norman, Peter}, title = {Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {13797}, abstract = {This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods when agents' valuations are private information. For a parametric class of problems with binary valuations, we demonstrate that the optimal mechanism involves bundling if a regularity condition, akin to a hazard rate condition, on the distribution of valuations is satisfied. Bundling alleviates the free riding problem in large economies in two ways: first, it may increase the asymptotic provision probability of socially efficient public goods from zero to one; second, it decreases the extent of use exclusions. If the regularity condition is violated, then the optimal solution replicates the separate provision outcome.}, key = {Public Goods}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Fara:07, author = {Faravelli, M.}, title = {How context matters: A survey based experiment on distributive justice}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {1399-1422}, month = {August}, abstract = {We explore distributive justice and perception of fairness using survey data from freshmen and senior students of economics and sociology. We analyse the impact of context and education on their preferences over a hypothetical distribution of resources between individuals which presents a trade off between efficiency and equality.With context giving minimal information, economics students are less likely to favour equality; studying economics influences the preferences of the subjects, increasing this difference. However, when the same problem is inserted into a meaningful context, the difference disappears. Four distribution mechanisms are analysed: egalitarianism, maximin, utilitarianism and utilitarianism with a floor constraint.}, key = {efficiency}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @INCOLLECTION{Farb:98, author = {Farber, H. S.}, title = {Are Lifetime Jobs Disappearing? Job Duration in the United States, 1973-1993}, booktitle = {Labor Statistics Measurement Issues}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Haltiwanger, J. and Manser, M.E. and Topel, R.}, pages = {157-203}, address = {Chicago 60637}, key = {labour} } @INCOLLECTION{Farber1998, author = {Farber, H. S.}, title = {Are Lifetime Jobs Disappearing? Job Duration in the {U}nited {S}tates}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Haltiwanger, J. and Manser, M. and Topel, R.}, volume = {60}, pages = {157-206}, key = {Labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FaGr:00, author = {Fare, R. and Grosskopf, S.}, title = {Outfoxing a Paradox}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {69}, pages = {159-163}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{FaWe:05, author = {Farhi,E. and Werning,I.}, title = {Inequality and social discounting}, institution = {Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Economics}, abstract = {To what degree should societies allow inequality to be inherited? What roleshould estate taxation play in shaping the intergenerational transmissionof welfare? We explore these ques- tions by modeling altruistically-linkedindividuals who experience privately observed taste or productivity shocks.Our positive economy is identical to models with infinite-lived individ-uals where e±ciency requires immiseration: inequality grows without boundand everyone's consumption converges to zero. However, under an intergenerationalinterpretation, previous work only characterizes a particular set of Pareto-efficientallocations: those that value only the initial generation's welfare. Westudy other e±cient allocations where the social welfare criterion valuesfuture generations directly, placing a positive weight on their welfareso that the effective social discount rate is lower than the private one.For any such difference in social and private discounting we find thatconsumption exhibits mean-reversion and that a steady- state, cross-sectionaldistribution for consumption and welfare exists, where no one is trappedat misery. The optimal allocation can then be implemented by a combinationof income and estate taxation. We find that the optimal estate tax is progressive:fortunate parents face higher average marginal tax rates on their bequests.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Fari:00, author = {Faria, J. R.}, title = {Supervision and Effort in an Intertemporal Efficiency Wage Model}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, pages = {93-98}, key = {wages} } @BOOK{Farr:62, title = {The Investment Decision under Uncertainty}, publisher = {Prentice-Hall}, year = {1962}, author = {Farrar, D. E.}, address = {Englewood CLiffs, New Jersey}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Farr:87, author = {Farrell, J.}, title = {Information and the {C}oase theorem}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1987}, volume = {1}, pages = {113-129}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{FaRa:96, author = {Farrell, J. and Rabin, M.}, title = {Cheap talk}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1996}, volume = {10}, pages = {103-118}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{FaWa:99, author = {Lisa Farrell and Ian Walker}, title = {The Welfare Effects of Lotto: Evidence from the {UK}}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {99-120}, number = {1}, key = {finance} } @ARTICLE{Farr:70, author = {Farrell, M. J.}, title = {Edgeworth bounds for oligopoly prices}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1970}, volume = {37}, pages = {341-361}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Farr:59, author = {Farrell, M. J.}, title = {The convexity assumption in the theory of competitive markets}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1959}, volume = {67}, pages = {377-391}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Fase:70, title = {An Econometric Model of Age Income Profiles, A Statistical Analysis of {D}utch Income Data}, publisher = {Rotterdam University Press}, year = {1970}, author = {Fase, M. M. G.}, address = {Rotterdam}, key = {earnings} } @ARTICLE{Fatt:91, author = {Fattorini, L.}, title = {Least squares estimates of the {L}orenz curve and {G}ini index from groupeddata}, year = {1991}, institution = {Universit{\`a} di Siena}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Fattorini1991, author = {Fattorini, L.}, title = {Least squares estimates of the {L}orenz curve and {G}ini index from grouped data}, year = {1991}, institution = {Universit\`a di Siena}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Fays:05, author = {Faysse,N.}, title = {Coping with the tragedy of the commons: Game structure and design of rules.}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {2005}, volume = {19}, pages = {239-261}, abstract = {The paper provides an assessment of some recent results of the large amountof New Institutional Economics analyses investigating a common-pool resourcesetting, with a specific focus on game theory models. Most of the studieshave used a noncooperative approach in order to explain how under-provisionfor the resource or its over-use - the so-called Tragedy of the Commons- can be avoided, within given management rules. They show how the characteristicsof the game (payoff matrix, repetition) or of the users (group size, wealth,heterogeneity and moral norms) may give incentives for the latter to playin a way that benefits all users. By contrast, much fewer articles haveused a formalized approach to assess the possibility for players to designnew rules to overcome the initial Tragedy of the Commons. The article endswith some proposals of directions for future research.}, institution = {CIRAD Research Institute}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{FeFo:99, author = {Fedeli, F. and Forte, F.}, title = {Joint Income Tax and {VAT}-Chain Evasion}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {391-415}, key = {Tax evasion} } @BOOK{FeFrMaSuUl:98, title = {{ASP} 2.0: Programmer's Reference}, publisher = {Wrox Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Fedorov, A. and Francis, B. and Maharry, D. and Sussman, D. and Ullman,C.}, address = {Birmingham, UK}, key = {computing} } @TECHREPORT{FePo:03, author = {Feenberg, Daniel and Poterba, James}, title = {The Alternative Minimum Tax and Effective Marginal Tax Rates}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2003}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {10072}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, abstract = {This paper examines the impact of the Alternative Minimum Tax on the weightedaverage marginal tax rates that apply to various components of taxableincome. It also considers the impact of several AMT reform proposals onthe number of AMT taxpayers, the total revenue collected from the AMT,and the weighted average marginal tax rates that apply to wages, capitalincome, and deductions such as state and local taxes and charitable gifts.The paper uses the NBER TAXSIM model to project federal personal incometax liabilities as well as AMT liabilities between 2003 and 2013. The AMThas only a modest impact on the average marginal tax rates for most sourcesof income because some AMT taxpayers face higher marginal tax rates, andothers lower tax rates, as a result of the tax. The projections show thatmodest increases in the AMT exclusion level have substantial effects onthe number of AMT taxpayers, and that indexing the AMT parameters wouldreduce the number of AMT payers in 2010 by more than sixty percent. Thesechanges would also reduce the AMT's impact on average marginal tax rates.}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{FePo:00, author = {Feenberg, D. R. and Poterba , J. M.}, title = {The income and tax share of very high income households, 1960-1995}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2000}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {7525}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{FeHa:96GO, author = {Feenstra, R. and Hanson, G.}, title = {Globalisation, Outsourcing, and Wage Inequality}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1996}, volume = {86}, pages = {240-245}, key = {wage inequality}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{FeFi:03, author = {Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U.}, title = {The Nature of Human Altruism}, journal = {Nature}, year = {2003}, volume = {425}, pages = {785-791}, abstract = {Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centred around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that human altruism is a powerful force and is unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals is vital to human cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of human altruism, pointing towards the importance of both theories of cultural evolution as well as gene–culture co-evolution}, key = {altruism}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.07.30} } @ARTICLE{FeFi:02, author = {Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U.}, title = {Why social preferences matter -- the impact of non-selfish motives on competition, cooperation and incentives}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2002}, volume = {112}, pages = {C1-C33}, abstract = {A substantial number of people exhibit social preferences, which means they are not solely motivated by material self-interest but also care positively or negatively for the material payoffs of relevant reference agents. We show empirically that economists fail to understand fundamental economic questions when they disregard social preferences, in particular, that without taking social preferences into account, it is not possible to understand adequately (i) effects of competition on market outcomes, (ii) laws governing cooperation and collective action, (iii) effects and the determinants of material incentives, (iv) which contracts and property rights arrangements are optimal, and (v) important forces shaping social norms and market failures.}, key = {utility, preference}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.07.30} } @ARTICLE{FeGa:00, author = {Fehr, E. and Gachter, S.}, title = {Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2000}, volume = {90}, abstract = {This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished evenif punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits forthe punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate from the group standardthe more they are punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunityfor costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels becausepotential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, thatin the presence of a costly punishment opportunity almost complete cooperationcan be achieved and maintained although, under the standard assumptionsof rationality and selfishness, there should be no cooperation at all.We also show that free riding causes strong negative emotions among cooperators.The intensity of these emotions is the stronger the more the free ridersdeviate from the group standard. Our results provide, therefore, supportfor the hypothesis that emotions are guarantors of credible threats.}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{FeGa:98, author = {Fehr, E. and G{\"a}chter, S.}, title = {Reciprocity and economics: {T}he economic implications of {H}omo {R}eciprocans}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {845-859}, number = {3-5}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{FeSm:99, author = {Fehr, Ernst and Klaus Schmidt}, title = {A Therory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {114}, pages = {817-868}, key = {behavioural}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FeSc:00, author = {Fehr, Ernst and Schmidt, Klaus M.}, title = {Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications}, year = {2000}, number = {403}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {social justice}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{FeTy:04, author = {Fehr, Ernst and Tyran, Jean-Robert}, title = {Money Illusion and Coordination Failure}, year = {2004}, number = {1141}, abstract = {Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Herewe show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibriumselection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms, choices converge tothe Pareto inefficient equilibrium; however, if we lift the veil of moneyby representing payoffs in real terms, the Pareto efficient equilibriumis selected. We also show that strategic uncertainty about the other players'behavior is key for the equilibrium selection effects of money illusion:even though money illusion vanishes over time if subjects are given learningopportunities in the context of an individual optimization problem, powerfuland persistent effects of money illusion are found when strategic uncertaintyprevails.}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {political economy}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{FeTy:01, author = {Fehr, Ernst and Tyran, Jean-Robert}, title = {Does Money Illusion Matter?}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {91}, pages = {1239--1262}, number = {5}, month = {Dec.}, abstract = {This paper shows that a small amount of individual-level money illusion may cause considerable aggregate nominal inertia after a negative nominal shock. In addition, our results indicate that negative and positive nominal shocks have asymmetric effects because of money illusion. While nominal inertia is quite substantial and long lasting after a negative shock, it is rather small after a positive shock.}, copyright = {Copyright 2001 American Economic Association}, issn = {00028282}, keywords = {C92, E32, E52}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.04.11} } @ARTICLE{Fehr, author = {Fehr, Hans and Ruocco, Anna}, title = {Equity and efficiency aspects of the {I}talian debt reduction}, journal = {Economic Modelling}, volume = {16}, pages = {569-589}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FuRo:99, author = {Fehr, Hans and Ruocco, Anna}, title = {Equity and efficiency aspects of the {I}talian debt reduction}, journal = {Economic Modelling}, year = {1999}, volume = {16}, pages = {569-589}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Fei:81, author = {Fei, J. C. H.}, title = {Equity Oriented Fiscal Programs}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1981}, volume = {49}, pages = {869-881}, key = {equity} } @BOOK{FeRaKu:79, title = {Growth with Equity: the {T}aiwan Case}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1979}, author = {Fei, J. C. H. and Ranis, G. and Kuo, S. W. Y.}, address = {London}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{FeRaKu:78, author = {Fei, J. C. H. and Ranis, G. and Kuo, S. W. Y.}, title = {Growth and family distribution of income by factor components}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1978}, volume = {92}, pages = {17-53}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{FeMc:82SS, author = {Feige, E. and McGee, R. T.}, title = {Supply-side economics and the unobserved economy: the {D}utch {L}affer curve}, journal = {Ekonomisch-statistische Berichten}, year = {1982}, month = {November}, key = {underground} } @INCOLLECTION{Feig:87TA, author = {Feige, E. L.}, title = {The anatomy of the underground economy}, booktitle = {Consequences and Perspectives: Different Economic Systems}, publisher = {Gower}, year = {1987}, editor = {Alessandrini, S. and Dallago, B.}, address = {Aldershot}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Feig:81TU, author = {Feige, E. L.}, title = {The {UK}'s unobserved economy: a preliminary assessment}, journal = {Economic Affairs}, year = {1981}, volume = {1}, pages = {205-212}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Feig:79HB, author = {Feige, E. L.}, title = {How big is the irregular economy?}, journal = {Challenge}, year = {1979}, volume = {22}, pages = {5-13}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{FeMc:83SL, author = {Feige, E. L. and McGee, R. T.}, title = {Sweden's {L}affer Curve: Taxation and the Unobserved Economy}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {84}, pages = {499-519}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{FeMc:82TU, author = {Feige, E. L. and McGee, R. T.}, title = {The unobserved economy and the {UK} Laffer curve}, journal = {Journal of Economic Affairs, October}, year = {1982}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Feinstein1991a, author = {Feinstein, J.S.}, title = {An Econometric Analysis of Income Tax Evasion and its Detection}, journal = {Rand Journal of Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {22}, pages = {14-35}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Fein:99, author = {Feinstein, J. S.}, title = {Approaches for Estimating Noncompliance: Examples from Federal Taxationin the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F360-F369}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Feinstein1999, author = {Feinstein, J. S.}, title = {Approaches for Estimating Noncompliance: Examples from Federal Taxation in the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F360-F369}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Fein:91, author = {Feinstein, J. S.}, title = {An econometric approach to income tax evasion and its detection}, journal = {Rand Journal of Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {22}, pages = {14-35}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{Feld:79DS, author = {Feldbrugge, F. J. M.}, title = {Does {S}oviet law make sense?}, booktitle = {Soviet Law After Stalin, Law in Eastern {E}urope}, publisher = {Sijthoff and Noordhoff}, year = {1979}, editor = {Barry, D. B. and Feldbrugge, G. J. M. and Ginsburgs, G. and Maggs, P. B.}, volume = {20}, pages = {399-407}, address = {Germantown, Maryland}, key = {crime}, part = {III} } @ARTICLE{Feld:84GA, author = {Feldbrugge, F. J. M.}, title = {Government and shadow economy in the {S}oviet {U}nion}, journal = {Soviet Studies}, year = {1984}, volume = {36}, pages = {528-543}, key = {underground} } @INCOLLECTION{FeKa:81TA, author = {Feldman, J. and Kay, J. A.}, title = {Tax avoidance}, booktitle = {The Economic Approach to Law}, publisher = {Butterworth's}, year = {1981}, editor = {Burrows, P. and Veljanovski, C. G.}, address = {London}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{FeSl:07, author = {Feldman,N.E. and Slemrod,J.}, title = {ESTIMATING TAX NONCOMPLIANCE WITH EVIDENCE FROM UNAUDITED TAX RETURNS}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2007}, volume = {117}, pages = {327-352}, abstract = {This article estimates the degree of tax noncompliance using evidence from unaudited tax returns. Measurements of noncompliance are derived from the relationship between reported charitable contributions and reported income from wages and salary as compared to alternative reported income sources such as self-employment, farm and other small business income. Assuming that the source of one’s income is unrelated to one’s charitable inclinations and that the ratio of true income to taxable income does not vary by income source, any difference in the relationship between charitable contributions and the source of income can be attributed to (relative) underreporting by the individual. We find that the implied amount of noncompliance is significant and that it varies by source of income, as well as between positive and negative values of each type of income.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{Feld:98, author = {Feldstein, M.}, title = {Income inequality and poverty}, institution = {NBER}, year = {1998}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {6770}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138-5398 U.S.A.}, month = {October}, abstract = {The first part of this paper argues that income inequality is not a problem in need of remedy. The common practice of interpreting a rise in the gini coefficient measure of inequality as a bad thing violates the Pareto principle and is equivalent to using a social welfare function that puts negative weight on increases in the income of high income individuals. The real distributional problem is not inequality but poverty. The paper considers three sources of poverty and asks what if anything might be done about each of them: unemployment; a low level of earning capacity; and individual choice.}, key = {Inequality} } @BOOK{Feld:98PS, title = {Privatizing Social Security}, publisher = {Chicago University Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Feldstein, Martin}, series = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Feld:78, author = {Feldstein, M.}, title = {The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1978}, volume = {86}, pages = {S29-S52}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{FeWr:98, author = {Feldstein, Martin and Wrobel, Marian Vaillant}, title = {Can state taxes redistribute income?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {68}, pages = {369-396}, number = {3}, abstract = {The evidence presented in this paper supports the basic theoretical presumption that state and local governments cannot redistribute income. Since individuals can avoid unfavorable taxes by migrating to jurisdictions that offer more favorable tax conditions, a relatively unfavorable tax will cause gross wages to adjust until the resulting net wage is equal to that available elsewhere. The current empirical findings go beyond confirming this long-run tendency and show that gross wages adjust rapidly to the changing tax environment. Thus, states cannot redistribute income for a period of even a few years. The adjustment of gross wages to tax rates implies that a more progressive tax system raises the cost to firms of hiring more highly skilled employees and reduces the cost of lower skilled labor. A more progressive tax thus induces firms to hire fewer high skilled employees and to hire more low skilled employees. Since state taxes cannot alter net wages, there can be no trade-off at the state level between distribution goals and economic efficiency. Shifts in state tax progressivity, by altering the structure of employment in the state and distorting the mix of labor inputs used by firms in the state, create deadweight efficiency losses without achieving any net redistribution.}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Feld:72, author = {Martin S. Feldstein}, title = {Distributional Equity and Optimal Structure of Public Prices}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1972}, volume = {62}, pages = {32-36}, number = {1/2}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Fell:96, author = {Felli, Leonardo}, title = {Preventing Collusion through Discretion}, institution = {Theoretical Economics Workshop, STICERD, LSE}, year = {1996}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {TE/96/303}, month = {March}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{FeHa:96LW, author = {Felli, Leonardo and Harris, Christopher}, title = {Learning, Wage Dynamics and Firm-Specific Human Capital}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1996}, volume = {104}, pages = {838-868}, number = {4}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{Fell:01, author = {Fellman, J.}, title = {Mathematical properties of classes of income redistributive policies}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2001}, volume = {17}, pages = {179-192}, abstract = {This paper considers general classes of tax and benefit policies. The properties of these classes are studied and some mathematical properties are established. Every policy generates a transformed income distribution and consequently, a transformed Lorenz curve and transformed Gini and welfare indices. We measure the broadness of the class of policies by determining the extremes of the transformed Lorenz curves and the ranges of the transformed indices. The obtained bounds indicate the attainable redistributive effects of the tax policies and the transfer policies. The economic interpretations of the inequality and welfare effects of these policies are also considered.}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.21} } @TECHREPORT{Fell:95, author = {Johan Fellman}, title = {Intrinsic Mathematical Properties of Classes of Income Redistributive Policies}, institution = {Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration}, year = {1995}, type = {Working Papers}, number = {306 (1995)}, key = {redistribution} } @TECHREPORT{Fell:80, author = {Fellman, J.}, title = {Transformations and {L}orenz curves}, institution = {Swedish school of Economics and Business Administration}, year = {1980}, type = {working paper}, number = {48}, address = {Helsinki}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Fell:76, author = {Fellman, J.}, title = {The effect of transformation on {L}orenz curves}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1976}, volume = {44}, pages = {823-824}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913450} } @ARTICLE{Fellman1970, author = {Fellman, J.}, title = {The effect of transformation on {L}orenz curves}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1970}, volume = {44}, pages = {823-824}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{FeJaLa:96, author = {Fellman, Johan and J{\"a}ntti, Markus and Lambert, Peter J.}, title = {Optimal Tax-Transfer Systems and Redistributive Policy: The {F}innish Experience}, institution = {Swedish School of Economics and Business Andministration}, year = {1996}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {324 (1996)}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Fend:99, author = {Fender, John}, title = {A general equilibrium model of crime and punishment}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1999}, volume = {39}, pages = {437-453}, number = {4}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{FeFoGuMa:69, author = {Ferber, R. and Forsythe, J. and Guthrie, H. W. and Maynes, E. S.}, title = {Validation of a national survey of consumer financial characteristics}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1969}, volume = {51}, pages = {436-444}, key = {Data} } @BOOK{FeHi:82, title = {Social Experimentation and Economic Policy}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1982}, author = {Ferber, R. and Hirsch, W. Z.}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{Fern:02, author = {Fernandez, R.}, title = {Education, Segregation and Marital Sorting: Theory and an Application tothe {UK}}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2002}, volume = {46}, pages = {993-1022}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @ARTICLE{Fernandez2002, author = {Fernandez, R.}, title = {Education, Segregation and Marital Sorting: Theory and an Application to the {UK}}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2002}, volume = {46}, pages = {993-1022}, key = {income distribution:theoretical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Fern:99, author = {Fernandez, R.}, title = {To Each According to ...? Markets, Tournaments and the Matching Problemwith Borrowing Constraints}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {799-824}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Fern:83, title = {Von Mises Calculus for Statistical Functionals}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {1983}, author = {Fernholz, L. T.}, series = {Lecture Notes in Statistics 19}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{FeMa:95, author = {Fern{\'a}ndez Morales, Antonio and Mart\'\in Reyes, Guillermina}, title = {Algunas consideraciones sobre los \'\indices de pobreza de {F}oster, {G}reery {T}horbecke}, journal = {Estad\'\istica Espa{\~n}ola}, year = {1994}, volume = {36}, pages = {205-228}, address = {M{\'a}laga, Spain}, institution = {Facultad de Ciencias Econ{\'o}micas y Empresariales, Universidad de M{\'a}laga}, key = {poverty}, type = {Papeles de Trabajo} } @ARTICLE{Fern'andezMorales1994, author = {Fern{\'a}ndez Morales, Antonio and Mart\'\in Reyes, Guillermina}, title = {Algunas consideraciones sobre los \'\indices de pobreza de {F}oster, {G}reer y {T}horbecke}, journal = {Estad\'\istica Espa\~nola}, year = {1994}, volume = {36}, pages = {205-228}, address = {M\'alaga, Spain}, institution = {Facultad de Ciencias Econ\'omicas y Empresariales, Universidad de M\'alaga}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, type = {Papeles de Trabajo} } @TECHREPORT{Fern:01, author = {Fern{\'a}ndez, R.}, title = {Educational segregation and marital sorting: theory and an Application to{UK} data}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2001}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {8377}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @ARTICLE{FeLe:08, author = {Fern{\'a}ndez, R. and Levy, G.}, title = {Diversity and redistribution}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {925-943}, abstract = {In this paper we analyze the interaction of income and preference heterogeneity in a political economy framework. We ask whether the presence of preference heterogeneity (arising, for example, from different ethnic groups or geographic locations) affects the ability of the poor to extract resources from the rich. We study the equilibrium of a game in which coalitions of individuals form parties, parties propose platforms, and all individuals vote, with the winning policy chosen by plurality. Political parties are restricted to offering platforms that are credible (in that they belong to the Pareto set of their members). The platforms specify the values of two policy tools: a general redistributive tax which is lump-sum rebated (or used to fund a general public good) and a series of taxes whose revenue is used to fund specific (targeted) goods tailored to particular preferences or localities. Our analysis demonstrates that taste conflict first dilutes but later reinforces class interests.When the degree of taste diversity is low, the equilibrium policy is characterized by some amount of general income redistribution and some targeted transfers. As taste diversity increases in society, the set of equilibrium policies becomes more and more tilted towards special interest groups and against general redistribution. As diversity increases further, however, the only policy that can emerge supports exclusively general redistribution.}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.22} } @ARTICLE{FeGuKn:05, author = {Fernández, R. and Guner, N. and Knowles, J.}, title = {Love and money: A theoretical and empirical analysis of household sorting and inequality}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {120}, pages = {273-344}, key = {household}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.12} } @BOOK{Ferr:75, title = {A Textbook of Convergence}, publisher = {The Clarendon Press Oxford}, year = {1975}, author = {Ferrar, W.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{FeCr:98, author = {Ferrari, Silvia L. P. and Cribari-Neto, Francisco}, title = {On bootstrap and analytical bias corrections}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {58}, pages = {7-15}, number = {1}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{Ferr:99, author = {Ferreira, F. H. G.}, title = {Economic Transition and the Distributions of Income and Wealth}, journal = {Economics of Transition}, year = {1999}, volume = {7}, number = {2}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @TECHREPORT{Ferr:95, author = {Ferreira, F. H. G.}, title = {Roads to equality: Wealth distribution dynamics with public-private capitalcomplementarity}, year = {1995}, type = {LSE Theoretical Economics Discussion Paper}, number = {TE/95/286}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{FeLeLi:08, author = {Ferreira, F. H. G. and Leite, P. G. and Litchfield, J. A.}, title = {The Rise and Fall of Brazilian Inequality: 1981-2004}, journal = {Macroeconomic Dynamics}, year = {2008}, volume = {12}, pages = {199–230}, abstract = {Brazil’s Gini coefficient rose from 0.57 in 1981 to 0.63 in 1989, before falling back to 0.56 in 2004. Poverty incidence rose from 0.30 in 1981 to 0.33 in 1993, before falling to 0.22 in 2004. This paper presents a preliminary investigation of the determinants of Brazil’s distributional reversal over this period. The rise in inequality in the 1980s appears to have been driven by increases in educational attainment in a context of convex returns, and by high and accelerating inflation. Although the secular decline in inequality, which began in 1993, is associated with declining inflation, it also appears to have been driven by four structural and policy changes, namely, declining returns to education; pronounced rural-urban convergence; increases in social assistance transfers targeted to the poor; and a possible decline in racial inequality. Falling inequality has made a substantial contribution to poverty reduction.}, key = {income distribution}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.10.04} } @INCOLLECTION{FeRa:09, author = {Ferreira, F. H. G. and Ravallion, M.}, title = {Global poverty and inequality : a review of the evidence}, booktitle = {Oxford Handbook on Economic Inequality}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2009}, editor = {Nolan, B. and Salverda, F. and Smeeding, T.}, address = {Oxford, UK}, abstract = {Drawing on a compilation of data from household surveys representing 130 countries, many over a period of 25 years, this paper reviews the evidence on levels and recent trends in global poverty and income inequality. It documents the negative correlations between both poverty and inequality indices, on the one hand, and mean income per capita on the other. It points to the dominant role of Asia in accounting for the bulk of the world's poverty reduction since 1981. The evolution of global inequality in the last decades is also described, with special emphasis on the different trends of inequality within and between countries. The statistical relationships between growth, inequality and poverty are discussed, as is the correlation between inequality and the growth elasticity of poverty reduction. Some of the recent literature on the drivers of distributional change in developing countries is also reviewed. Keywords: Inequality,Achieving Shared Growth,Services&Transfers to Poor,Population Policies,Poverty Impact Evaluation}, key = {inequality}, keywords = {Inequality,Achieving Shared Growth,Services&Transfers to Poor,Population Policies,Poverty Impact Evaluation}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.09.21}, url = {http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4623&r=ltv} } @ARTICLE{Ferr:05, author = {{Ferrer-i-Carbonell},A.}, title = {Income and well-being: an empirical analysis of the comparison income effect}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {997-1019}, abstract = {This paper presents an empirical analysis of the importance of dcomparisonincomeT for individual well-being or happiness. In other words, the influenceof the income of a reference group on individual well-being is examined.The main novelty is that various hypotheses are tested: the importanceof the own income, the relevance of the income of the reference group andof the distance between the own income and the income of the referencegroup, and most importantly the asymmetry of comparisons, i.e. the comparisonincome effect differing between rich and poor individuals. The analysisuses a self-reported measure of satisfaction with life as a measure ofindividual well-being. The data come from a large German panel known asGSOEP. The study concludes that the income of the reference group is aboutas important as the own income for individual happiness, that individualsare happier the larger their income is in comparison with the income ofthe reference group, and that for West Germany this comparison effect isasymmetric. This final result supports Dusenberry’s idea that comparisonsare mostly upwards.}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{Ferr:01, author = {Ferris, S. J.}, title = {The Determinants of Cross Border Shopping: Implications for Tax Revenuesand Institutional Change}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {2001}, volume = {53}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Ferris2001, author = {Ferris, S. J.}, title = {The Determinants of Cross Border Shopping: Implications for Tax Revenues and Institutional Change}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {2001}, volume = {53}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FeWi:98, author = {Fershtman, Chaim and Weiss, Yoram}, title = {Social rewards, externalities and stable preferences}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {70}, pages = {53-73}, number = {1}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{FeFeKa:06, author = {Fethi, M.D. and Fethi, S. and Katircioglu, S.T.}, title = {Estimating the size of the Cypriot underground economy: A comparison with European experience}, journal = {International Journal of Manpower}, year = {2006}, volume = {27}, pages = {515-534}, abstract = {Purpose – To measure the size of underground economy and the amount of tax evasion in Cyprus by employing monetary and non-monetary approaches over the period 1960-2003 and to compare the Cyprus figures with some European experience existing in the literature. Design/methodology/approach – Annual data covering the 1960-2003 period were applied to several approaches for measuring the size of underground economy and the amount of tax evasion in Cyprus. These approaches are: employment discrepancy; simple currency ratio; transaction and currency demand. Findings – On the basis of the results obtained from this study: firstly, in Cyprus the average ratio of the underground economy and tax evasion to official GDP is estimated at 9.41 and 0.31 percent of GDP respectively for the study period, and secondly, in the two time intervals where Cypriots figures are internationally comparable with the often quoted EU underground economy figures, the figures for Cyprus are estimated as 5.96 percent of GDP in 1994-95 and 5.67 percent of GDP in 1996-97 whereas the figures for some European Union (EU) members are 18.05 percent of GDP in 1994-95 and 18.76 percent of GDP in 1996-97. Research limitations/implications – Findings of this study suggest that the issue of the underground economy is still in need of further investigation, firstly, to reach reliable results since each approach has its own strengths and weaknesses and yield different results, secondly, to find out the best method selection on a well-established theory, and finally, to employ reliable data estimating measurement. Practical implications – Both EU and Cypriot authorities can utilize this study to analyse the extent of Cypriot underground economy with respect to the other EU members. Such attempts can be useful in developing policies and implementing actions and measures to eliminate underground economy activities. Originality/value – This study is the first of its kind with recent data to measure the size of underground economy and tax evasion for the Cypriot economy by employing various approaches.}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{Fey1996, author = {Fey, Mark and McKelvey, Robert D. and Palfrey, Thomas D.}, title = {An Experimental Study of Constant-Sum Centipede Games}, journal = {International Journal of Game Theory}, year = {1996}, volume = {25}, pages = {269-287}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.12.29} } @ARTICLE{Fias:99, author = {Fiaschi, D.}, title = {Growth and Inequality in an Endogenous Fiscal Policy Model with Taxes onLabor and Capital}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {727-746}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Fiaschi1999, author = {Fiaschi, D.}, title = {Growth and Inequality in an Endogenous Fiscal Policy Model with Taxes on Labor and Capital}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {727-746}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FiSh:88, author = {Fichtenbaum, R. and Shahidi, H.}, title = {Truncation bias and the measurement of income inequality}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1988}, volume = {6}, pages = {335-337}, key = {statistics} } @INCOLLECTION{Fieg:79, author = {Fiegehen, G. C.}, title = {Problems in measuring poverty - In Social Security Research}, booktitle = {The Definition and Measurement of Poverty}, publisher = {Her Majesty's Stationery Office}, year = {1979}, editor = {Department of Health and Social Security}, pages = {1-14}, address = {London}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{FiTo:06, author = {Fielding, D. and Torres, S.}, title = {A simultaneous equation model of economic development and income}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2005}, volume = {4}, pages = {279-301}, abstract = {The paper extends existing work on and economic development by estimating a cross-country structural model that identifies bi-directional relationships between income and other indicators of social and economic development. Overall, lower is associated with improvements in other development indicators, but this is the result of several complex interactions. The most striking feature of the structural model is the insight it provides into the reasons behind the negative FAfrica dummy_ in previous cross-country growth studies.}, key = {income }, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @INCOLLECTION{Fiel:98, author = {Fields, G. S.}, title = {Do inequality measures measure inequality?}, booktitle = {The Distribution of Welfare and Household Production: International Perspectives}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Jenkins, Stephen P. and Kapteyn, Arie and Van Praag, Bernard M. S.}, chapter = {10}, pages = {233-249}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Fiel:07, author = {Fields, G. S.}, title = {How much should we care about changing income inequality in the course of economic growth?}, journal = {Journal of Policy Modelling}, year = {2007}, volume = {29}, pages = {577-585}, abstract = {This paper asks how much we should care about changes in Lorenz curves and standard inequality measures when economic growth takes place. I conclude that these changes are of some importance but that other aspects of inequality and poverty are more important.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Inequality, Poverty, Pro-poor growth}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Fiel:03AF, author = {Fields, G. S.}, title = {Accounting for income inequality and its change: a new method with application to distribution of earnings in the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Research in Labor Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {22}, pages = {1-38}, abstract = {Accounting for income inequality and its change: a new method with application to distribution of earnings in the United States. In Polachek, S. W., editor, Research in Labour Economics, volume 22. Elsevier. This paper devises a new method for using the information contained in income-generating equations to “account for” or “decompose” the level of income inequality in a country and its change over time. In the levels decomposition, the shares attributed to each explanatory factor are independent of the particular inequality measure used. In the change decomposition, methods are presented to break down the contribution of each explanatory factor into a coefficients effect, a correlation effect, and a standard deviation effect. In an application to rising earnings inequality in the United States, it is found that schooling is the single most explanatory variable, only one other variable (occupation) has any appreciable role to play, and all of schooling’s effect was a coefficients effect.}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.05.07} } @ARTICLE{Fiel:93, author = {Fields, G. S.}, title = {Inequality in Dual Economy Models}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1993}, volume = {103}, pages = {1228-1235}, number = {103}, month = {September}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Fiel:87, author = {Fields, G. S.}, title = {Measuring inequality change in an economy with income growth}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1987}, volume = {26}, pages = {357-374}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Fiel:80, title = {Poverty Inequality and Development}, publisher = {Cambridge Press}, year = {1980}, author = {Fields, G. S.}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Fiel:79, author = {Fields, G. S.}, title = {Decomposing {LDC} inequalities}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1979}, volume = {31}, pages = {432-59}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{FiFe:78, author = {Fields, G. S. and Fei, J. C. H.}, title = {On inequality comparisons}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1978}, volume = {46}, pages = {303-316}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{FiLeOk:02, author = {Fields, G. S. and Leary, J. B. and Ok, E. A.}, title = {Stochastic Dominance in Mobility Analysis}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2002}, volume = {75}, pages = {333-339}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{FiOk:99, author = {Fields, Gary S. and Ok, Efe A.}, title = {Measuring movement of incomes}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {455-472}, key = {mobility} } @TECHREPORT{FiOk:97a, author = {Fields, Gary S. and Ok, Efe A.}, title = {The Measurement of Income Mobility: An Introduction to the Literature}, institution = {Cornell University}, year = {1997}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {mobility} } @TECHREPORT{FiOk:97b, author = {Fields, Gary S. and Ok, Efe A.}, title = {A subgroup decomposable measure of relative income mobility}, institution = {Cornell University}, year = {1997}, type = {Working Paper}, month = {January}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{FiOk:96, author = {Fields, Gary S. and Ok, Efe A.}, title = {The meaning and measurement of income mobility}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1996}, volume = {71}, pages = {349-377}, number = {2}, key = {mobility} } @TECHREPORT{FiOk:94, author = {Fields, G. S. and Ok, E. A.}, title = {The meaning and measurement of income mobility}, institution = {Cornell University}, year = {1994}, type = {mimeo}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{FiYo:00, author = {Fields, G. S. and Yoo, G.}, title = {Falling labor income inequality in {K}orea's economic growth: patterns and underlying causes}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2000}, volume = {46}, pages = {139-159}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.09.07}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2250/cgi-bin/fulltext/119037908/PDFSTART} } @TECHREPORT{Figi:96, author = {Figini, P}, title = {On the {F}ields' index of income inequality: generalisation and properties}, institution = {Trinity College, Dublin}, year = {1996}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{FiGo:06, author = {Figini,P. and Gorg,H.}, title = {Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Wage Inequality? An Empirical Investigation}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2006}, type = {Discussion paper}, number = {2336}, abstract = {We use a panel of more than 100 countries for the period 1980 to 2002 to analyse the relationship between inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and wage inequality. We particularly check whether this relationship is non-linear, in line with a theoretical discussion. We find that the effect of FDI differs according to the level of development: we depict two different patterns, one for OECD (developed) and one for non-OECD (developing) countries. Results suggest the presence of a non linear effect in developing countries; wage inequality increases with FDI inward stock but this effect diminishes with further increases in FDI. For developed countries, wage inequality decreases with FDI inward stock and there is no robust evidence to show that this effect is non-linear.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Figl:06, author = {Figlio, D.}, title = {Testing, Crime and Punishment}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {837-851}, key = {public economics}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @ARTICLE{FiJuPl:99, author = {Filer, R. K. and Jurajda, S. and Planovsky, J.}, title = {Education and Wages in the Czech and Slovak Republics During Transition}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {581-593}, key = {Wages} } @BOOK{Fine:98, title = {Labour Market Theory: A constructive reassessment}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {1998}, author = {Fine, Ben}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Fine:85, author = {Fine, B.}, title = {A note on the measurement of inequality and interpersonal comparability}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1985}, volume = {4}, pages = {273-277}, number = {3}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{FiFi:74I, author = {Fine, B. and Fine, K.}, title = {Social choice and individual ranking {I}}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1974}, volume = {41}, pages = {303-322}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{FiFi:74II, author = {Fine, B. and Fine, K.}, title = {Social choice and individual ranking {II}}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1974}, volume = {41}, pages = {459-475}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{deFi:31, author = {{d}e Finetti, B.}, title = {Sui metodi proposti per il calcolo della differenza media}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1931}, volume = {9}, pages = {47-52}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{FiKeSc:99, author = {Israel Finkelshtain and Offer Kella and Marco Scarsini}, title = {On Risk Aversion with Two Risks}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {31}, pages = {239-250}, number = {2}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{Finl:05, title = {Consumer Credit Fundamentals}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, year = {2005}, author = {Finlay, S.}, pages = {247}, key = {consumer choice}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.03.22} } @BOOK{Fiorentini1995, title = {The Economics or Organised Crime}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press and CEPR}, year = {1995}, author = {Fiorentini, G. and Peltzman, S.}, address = {Cambridge, London}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{FiSe:97, author = {Fiorentini, Gabriele and Sentana, Enrique}, title = {Conditional {M}eans of {T}imes {S}eries {P}rocesses and {T}ime {S}eriesfor {C}onditional {M}eans}, institution = {Institut Valencia D'Investigacions Economiques}, year = {1997}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {WP-AD 97-17}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{FiJe:07, author = {Fiorio, C. and Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Regression-based inequality decomposition, following Fields (2003)}, journal = {UK Stata User Group meeting, 10 September}, year = {2007}, owner = {Fiorio}, timestamp = {2008.06.10} } @TECHREPORT{Fior:05, author = {Fiorio, C. V.}, title = {Understanding Inequality Trends: Microsimulation of Decomposition for Italy}, institution = {DARP}, year = {2005}, type = {Paper is a revised version of Chapter 6 of author's PhD dissertation}, address = {Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Aziendali e Statistiche, Universitµa di Milano, 20122 Milan, Italy.}, month = {October}, abstract = {This paper suggests to overcome some limitations of traditional in- equality decomposition methods by developing a combination of Burt- less (1999) and DiNardo et al. (1996), two di®erent microsimulation methods for decomposing . Using this combination it is pos- sible to take into consideration the dispersion of income sources as well as the socio-demographic evolution of the population under study, in a single framework and across many years. This methodology maximizes clarity of results and allows one to easily perform tests on results. An application to Italian household is provided to analyze marginal and joint e®ects of demographic trends and changed dispersion of di®erent income factors between 1977 and 2002.}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{Fire:99, author = {Firebaugh, G.}, title = {Empirics of World Income Inequality}, journal = {American Journal of Sociology}, year = {1999}, volume = {104}, pages = {1597-1630}, key = {income inequality}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.03} } @BOOK{Fire:03, title = {The new geography of global income inequality}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {2003}, author = {Firebaugh.G}, key = {income distribution} } @ARTICLE{Fisch:07, author = {Fischbacher, Urs}, title = {{Z}-Tree - {Z}urich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments}, journal = {Experimental Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {10}, pages = {171-178}, number = {2}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2007.01.15} } @TECHREPORT{Fischbacher1999, author = {Fischbacher, Urs}, title = {z-Tree - Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments - Experimenter's Manual}, institution = {Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich}, year = {1999}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.09} } @TECHREPORT{FiSt:07, author = {Fischer, Manfred and Stumpner, Peter}, title = {Income Distribution Dynamics and Cross-Region Convergence in Europe - Spatial filtering and novel stochastic kernel representations}, institution = {Vienna University of Economics an Business}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, abstract = {This paper suggests an empirical framework for analysing income distribution dynamics and cross-region convergence in the European Union of 27 member states, 1995- 2003. The framework lies in the research tradition that allows the state income space to be continuous, puts emphasis on both shape and intra-distribution dynamics and uses stochastic kernels for studying transition dynamics and implied long-run behaviour. In this paper stochastic kernels are described by conditional density functions, estimated by a product kernel estimator of conditional density and represented by means of novel visualisation tools. The technique of spatial filtering is used to account for spatial effects, in order to avoid misguided inferences and interpretations caused by the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the income distributions. The results reveal a slow catching-up of the poorest regions and a process of polarisation, with a small group of very rich regions shifting away from the rest of the cross-section. This is well evidenced by both, the unfiltered and the filtered ergodic density view. Differences exist in detail, and these emphasise the importance to properly deal with the spatial autocorrelation problem.}, key = {Distribution}, keywords = {Regional income, distribution dynamics, stochastic kernel estimation, spatialfiltering, EU-27}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Fisc:85, author = {Fischhoff, B.}, title = {Managing risk perceptions}, journal = {Issues in Science and Technology}, year = {1985}, volume = {2}, pages = {83-96}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Fish:81AE, author = {Fishburn, G.}, title = {Tax evasion and inflation}, journal = {Australian Economic Papers}, year = {1981}, volume = {20}, pages = {324-332}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Fish:79OH, author = {Fishburn, G.}, title = {On how to keep tax-payers honest or almost so}, journal = {Economic Record}, year = {1979}, volume = {55}, pages = {267-270}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Fish:87, author = {Fishburn, P. C.}, title = {Reconsiderations in the foundations of decision under uncertainty}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1987}, volume = {97}, pages = {825-841}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Fish:85, author = {Fishburn, P. C.}, title = {Nontransitive preference theory and the preference reversal phenomenon}, journal = {Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali}, year = {1985}, volume = {32}, pages = {39-50}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Fish:79, author = {Fishburn, P. C.}, title = {Evaluative comparisons of distributions of a social variable}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {1979}, pages = {103-26}, number = {6}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Fish:77, author = {Fishburn, P. C.}, title = {Mean-Risk Analysis with Risk Associated with Below-Target Returns}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {67}, pages = {116-126}, key = {risk} } @BOOK{Fish:70, title = {Utility Theory for Decision Making}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1970}, author = {Fishburn, P. C.}, address = {New York}, comment = {UL: 425:01.b.1.18 South Front, Floor 6 LSE: HD30.23 F53}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{FiLa:99, author = {Peter C. Fishburn and Irving H. LaValle}, title = {Subjective Expected Lexicographic Utility with Infinite State Sets}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {30}, pages = {323-346}, number = {3}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{FiLa:88, author = {Fishburn, P. C. and LaValle, I. H.}, title = {Context-dependent choice with nonlinear and nontransitive preferences}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1988}, volume = {56}, pages = {1221-1239}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{FiWi:84, author = {Fishburn, P. C. and Willig, R. D.}, title = {Transfer principles in income redistribution}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1984}, volume = {25}, pages = {323-328}, key = {inequality} } @UNPUBLISHED{Fish:92, author = {Fishelson, G.}, title = {Does the intradecile inequality matter? A note}, year = {1992}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Fish:56, author = {Fisher, F. M.}, title = {Income distribution, value judgement and welfare}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1956}, volume = {70}, pages = {380-424}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{FiMo:92, title = {Aggregate Production Functions and Related Topics}, publisher = {MIT press}, year = {1992}, author = {Fisher , F. M. and Monz, J}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Fish:12, title = {The Nature of Capital and Income}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1912}, author = {Fisher, Irving}, address = {New York}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Fisk:61, author = {Fisk, P. R.}, title = {The Graduation of Income Distribution}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1961}, volume = {29}, pages = {171-185}, key = {distributions} } @TECHREPORT{FiWe:01, author = {Fisman, R. and Wei, S.-J.}, title = {Tax Rates And Tax Evasion: Evidence From "Missing Imports" In {C}hina}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2001}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {8551}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{FiHuMaSc:95, author = {Fitzenberger, B. and Hujer, R. and Ma{C}urdy, T. and Schnabel, R.}, title = {The dynamic structure of wages in {G}ermany 1976 - 1984; a cohort analysis}, year = {1995}, institution = {{U}niversity of {K}onstanz}, key = {wages}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{Fixl:93, author = {Fixler, D.}, title = {The {C}onsumer {P}rice {I}ndex: underlying concepts and caveats}, journal = {Monthly Labor Review}, year = {1993}, volume = {116}, pages = {3-10}, number = {12}, month = {December}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Flac:99, author = {Flachaire, Emmanuel}, title = {A better way to bootstrap pairs}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {64}, pages = {257-262}, number = {3}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{FlMi:98, author = {Flam, Sjur Didrik and Mirman, Leonard J.}, title = {Groping for optimal growth}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1998}, volume = {23}, pages = {191-207}, number = {2}, key = {growth} } @TECHREPORT{Flav:99, author = {Flavin, M.}, title = {Robust Estimation of the Joint Consumption/Asset Demand Decision}, institution = {NBER}, year = {1999}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {7011}, address = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w7011}, abstract = {She proposes an IV-version of the Huber estimator as an alternative to the IV-Krasker Welsch estimator, and uses an empirical example with consumption smoothing, using asset stocks as an IV for savings. She finds that liquidity constraint households use financial assets as income smoothing instruments, whereas liquidity constraint households use durable goods exclusively.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{Flav:81, author = {Flavin, M. A.}, title = {The adjustment of consumption to changing expectations about future income}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1981}, volume = {89}, pages = {974-1009.}, key = {savings} } @ARTICLE{FlWh:07, author = {Fleissig,A.R. and Whitney, G.A.}, title = {Testing additive separability}, journal = {Economics letters}, year = {2007}, volume = {96}, pages = {215-220}, month = {August}, abstract = {We develop a revealed preference procedure to test if violations of additivity are due to measurement error. It detects additivity for simulated data and has power to reject nonseparable data. For interwar data, additivity is detected for two “super” groups.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Flem:79, author = {Flemming, J. S.}, title = {The effects of earnings inequality imperfect capital markets and dynasticaltruism in the distribution of wealth in life cycle models}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1979}, volume = {46}, pages = {363-380}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Flemming1979, author = {Flemming, J. S.}, title = {The effects of earnings inequality imperfect capital markets and dynastic altruism in the distribution of wealth in life cycle models}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1979}, volume = {46}, pages = {363-380}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Fleu:98, author = {Fleurbaey, M.}, title = {Equality among responsible individuals}, booktitle = {Freedom in Economics: New Perspectives in Normative Analysis}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {1998}, editor = {Fleurbaey, M. and Gravel, N. and Trannoy, A.}, key = {equality} } @BOOK{Fleu:08, title = {Fairness, Responsibility and Welfare}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2008}, author = {Fleurbaey, M.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.23} } @BOOK{Fleu:96, title = {Th{\'e}ories {\'E}conomiques de la Justice}, publisher = {Economica}, year = {1996}, author = {Fleurbaey, M.}, address = {Paris}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Fleu:95EA, author = {Fleurbaey, Marc}, title = {Equality and responsibility}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {39}, pages = {683-689}, number = {3-4}, key = {equality} } @ARTICLE{Fleu:95EO, author = {Fleurbaey, Marc}, title = {Equal Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome?}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {1995}, volume = {11}, pages = {25-55}, key = {equality} } @ARTICLE{Fleu:95TS, author = {Fleurbaey, Marc}, title = {Three Solutions to the Compensation Problem}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1995}, volume = {65}, pages = {505-521}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Fleu:94, author = {Fleurbaey, Marc}, title = {On Fair Compensation}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {1994}, volume = {26}, pages = {277-307}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{FlGaMa:02, author = {Fleurbaey, M. and Gary-Bobo, R. J. and Maguain, D.}, title = {Education, Distributive Justice and Adverse Selection}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {84}, pages = {113-150}, abstract = {We consider a model of education planning in an economy in which agents differ in their costs of acquiring education. The agents’ cost parameter, called ‘talent’, is not observed. The principal is endowed with a fixed sum of money, with which two types of transfer can be made: in cash and in kind. The principal can finance transfers in kind, called ‘help’, by means of schooling expenditures, which reduce the agent’s education cost. The principal seeks to maximize a social welfare function which is a CES index of utility levels.We study the optimal allocation of individual education effort, schooling expenditures (help), and cash, under self-selection and budget constraints. Assuming first that the set of types is finite, and that help and effort are sufficiently substitutable, we find that individual education investment levels are an increasing function, and help is a decreasing function of talent. Utility levels cannot be equalized because of self-selection constraints. More aversion for inequality unequivocally leads to more inequality of educational achievements, and to more assistance through redistribution. This remains true in the limit, under strictly egalitarian preferences of the principal. The same qualitative properties hold in the general case of a continuum of types. Bunching at the lower end of the talent scale is a feature of the solution for sufficiently high degrees of inequality aversion.}, key = {Welfare} } @TECHREPORT{FlHaTr:98, author = {Fleurbaey, M. and Hagnar{\'e}, C. and Trannoy, A.}, title = {Welfare Comparisons for bounded Equivalence Scales}, institution = {THEMA}, year = {1998}, type = {Document de travail}, number = {9823}, key = {Equivalence scales} } @ARTICLE{FlHaTr:03, author = {Fleurbaey, M. and Hagner{\'e}, C. and Trannoy, A.}, title = {Welfare comparisons with bounded equivalence scales}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2003}, pages = {309-336}, abstract = {The paper considers the problem of comparing income distributions for heterogeneous populations. The ?rst contribution of this paper is a precise dominance criterion combined with a simple algorithm for implementing the criterion. This criterion is shown to be equivalent to unanimity among utilitarian social planners whose objectives are compatible with given intervals of equivalence scales. The secondcontribution of the paper is to show that this criterion is equivalent to dominance for two different families of social welfare functions, one inspiredby Atkinson andBourguignon (in: G.R. Feiwel (Ed.), Arrow andFound ation of the Theory of Economic Policy, Macmillan, London, 1987), in which household utility is a general function of income andneed s, and a secondfamily inspiredby Ebert (Soc. Choice Welfare 16 (1999) 233), in which householdutility is a function of equivalent incomes. Finally, we extend our results to the case where the distributions of needs differ between the two populations being compared.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.02.17} } @ARTICLE{FlMa:07, author = {Fleurbaey, Marc and Maniquet, Francois}, title = {Help the Low Skilled or Let the Hardworking Thrive? A Study of Fairness in Optimal Income Taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {9}, pages = {467 - 500}, abstract = {In a model where agents have unequal wages and heterogeneous preferences, we study the optimal redistribution via an income tax, when the social objective is based on a combination of efficiency and fairness principles, and when incentive issues are taken into account. We show how some fairness principles entail specific features for the optimal taxes, such as progressivity or tax exemption for incomes below the minimum wage.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Fleurbaey1998, author = {Fleurbaey, M. and Maniquet, F.}, title = {Fair allocation with unequal production skills: the no-envy approach to compensation}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1998}, volume = {32}, pages = {71-93}, key = {equity}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FlMa:98, author = {Fleurbaey, M. and Maniquet, F.}, title = {Fair allocation with unequal production skills: the no-envy approach tocompensation}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1998}, volume = {32}, pages = {71-93}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{FlMa:97, author = {Fleurbaey, M. and Maniquet, F.}, title = {Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {1215-1219}, key = {equity}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{Fleurbaey1999a, author = {Fleurbaey, M. and Michel, P.}, title = {Quelques r\'eflexions sur la croissance optimale}, journal = {Revue \'Economique}, year = {1999}, volume = {50}, pages = {715-732}, key = {growth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FlMi:99, author = {Fleurbaey, M. and Michel, P.}, title = {Quelques r{\'e}flexions sur la croissance optimale}, journal = {Revue {\'E}conomique}, year = {1999}, volume = {50}, pages = {715-732}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{FlTa:07, author = {Fleurbaey,M. and Tadenuma, K.}, title = {Do Irrelevant Commodities Matter?}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, pages = {1143-1174}, number = {4}, abstract = {We study how to evaluate allocations independently of individual preferences over unavailable commodities. We prove impossibility results that suggest that such evaluations encounter serious difficulties. This is related to the well known problem of performing international comparisons of standard of living across countries with different consumption goods. We show how possibility results can be retrieved with restrictions on the domain of preferences, on the application of the independence axiom, or on the set of allocations to be ranked. Such restrictions appear more plausible when the objects of evaluation are allocations of composite commodities, characteristics, or human functionings rather than ordinary commodities.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{FlMa:99, author = {Fleurbaey, M. Maniquet, F.}, title = {Cooperative production with unequal skills: The solidarity approach to compensation}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1999}, volume = {16}, pages = {569-583}, abstract = {We consider a simple production model and we assume that agents have unequalproduction skills which can in no way be attributed to their responsibility.We study how it is possible, if at all, to compensate for differentialskills by applying Rawls's idea of a collective sharing in the benefitsof skills. For this purpose, we introduce an axiom of solidarity, accordingto which agents should all be affected in the same direction if the profileof personal skills changes. We show that particular allocation rules arecharacterized be combining this axiom with a requirement of non-discriminationamong preferences, or with a property capturing Nozick's idea of guaranteeinga minimal benefit from one's own skill.}, key = {social choice} } @ARTICLE{Flin:93, author = {Flinn, C. J.}, title = {Cohort size and schooling choice}, journal = {Journal of Population Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {6}, pages = {31-56}, number = {1}, key = {population economics} } @ARTICLE{FlMa:02, author = {Flochel, L. and Madies, T.}, title = {Interjurisdictional Tax Competition in a Federal System of Overlapping RevenueMaximizing Governments}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2002}, volume = {9}, pages = {121-141}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Flochel2002, author = {Flochel, L. and Madies, T.}, title = {Interjurisdictional Tax Competition in a Federal System of Overlapping Revenue Maximizing Governments}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2002}, volume = {9}, pages = {121-141}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Flue:89FF, author = {Fluet, C.}, title = {Fraude fiscale et offre de travail au noir}, journal = {L'actualit{\'e} {\'E}conomique. Revue d'analyse {\'e}conomique}, year = {1989}, volume = {63}, pages = {226-242}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Fluet1989, author = {Fluet, C.}, title = {Fraude fiscale et offre de travail au noir}, journal = {L'actualit\'e \'Economique. Revue d'analyse \'economique}, year = {1989}, volume = {63}, pages = {226-242}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FlSi:94, author = {Fl{\"u}ckiger, Y. and Silber, J.}, title = {The {G}ini index and the measurement of multidimensional inequality}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1994}, volume = {56}, pages = {225-228}, number = {5}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{FoOe:08, author = {Foellmi, Reto and Oechslin, Manuel}, title = {Why progressive redistribution can hurt the poor}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {738 - 747}, abstract = {Recent macroeconomic research discusses credit market imperfections as a key channel through which inequality retards growth: With convex technologies, progressive transfers increase aggregate output because marginal returns become more equalized across investment opportunities. We argue that this reasoning may not hold in general equilibrium. Since the investment functions are concave in wealth, reducing inequality increases capital demand and the interest rate. Hence, through the impact on capital costs, shifting wealth from the rich to the middle class depletes the poorest investors' access to credit. But because the poor face the highest marginal returns, the net effect on output may be negative. We find, however, that redistributing towards the bottom-end of the distribution has a clear positive impact. Finally, we discuss the implications of our theoretical findings for future empirical research.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Capital market imperfections, Inequality; Growth, Efficiency}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Fold:06, author = {Foldvary, F. E.}, title = {The Measurement of Inequality, Concentration and Diversification}, journal = {Indian Economic Journal}, year = {2006}, volume = {54}, number = {3}, abstract = {The Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient are typically used to measure inequality. A different way to measure inequality is introduced here: I = CN, the product of concentration and number of units. The resultant index can be interpreted with reference to an inequality base where one unit owns all and the rest nothing. This inequality index also integrates the measurement of inequality, concentration, and diversification into one system, where diversification is measured as the inverse of concentration. I = CN accommodates various measures of concentration, including the Herfindahl- Hirschman and Tideman-Hall indexes. The Tideman-Hall concentration index also provides indexes of concentration, diversification and inequality as functions of Gini. As one application, the inequality index can be used to provide an index of economic development.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.22} } @ARTICLE{Fole:67, author = {Foley, D. K.}, title = {Resource Allocation and the Public Sector}, journal = {Yale Economic Essays}, year = {1967}, volume = {7}, pages = {45-98}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{FoHe:99, author = {Folster, S. and Henrekson, M.}, title = {Growth and the Public Sector: A Critique of the Critics}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {337-358}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Fong:01, author = {Fong, C.}, title = {Social Preferences, Self-Interest and the Demand for Redistribution}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {82}, pages = {225-246}, abstract = {Preferences for redistribution may be influenced by values and beliefs aboutdistributive justice as well as by self-interest. People may prefer moreredistribution to the poor if they believe that poverty is caused by circumstancesbeyond individual control. Therefore, beliefs about the causes of incomemay affect demand for redistribution. Alternatively, the effect of thesebeliefs on redistributive preferences may be spurious if they are correlatedwith income and self-interest is not properly controlled for. They mayalso measure incentive cost concerns. Using social survey data, I findthat self-interest cannot explain the effect of these beliefs on redistributivepreferences.}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Frob:00, author = {Forbes, K.}, title = {A reassessment of the relationship between and growth}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2000}, volume = {90}, pages = {869-887}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.03} } @ARTICLE{Forb:00, author = {Forbes, K. J.}, title = {A reassessment of the relationship between inequalityh and growth}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {2000}, volume = {90}, pages = {869-667}, key = {growth}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.12.07} } @ARTICLE{FoSe:80, author = {Formby, J. P. and Seaks, T. G.}, title = {Paglin's {G}ini measure of inequality: a modification}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1980}, volume = {70}, pages = {479-482}, number = {6}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Formby1984, author = {Formby, J. P. and Seaks, T. G. and Smith , W. J.}, title = {Difficulties in the measurement and comparison on tax progressivity: the case of {N}orth {A}merica}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1984}, volume = {39}, pages = {297-313}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FoSeSm:84, author = {Formby, J. P. and Seaks, T. G. and Smith , W. J.}, title = {Difficulties in the measurement and comparison on tax progressivity: thecase of {N}orth {A}merica}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1984}, volume = {39}, pages = {297-313}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Formby1987a, author = {Formby, J. P. and Smith, W. J. and Sykes, D.}, title = {On the measurement of tax progressivity: on implication of the {A}tkinson theorem}, journal = {Southern Economic Journal}, year = {1987}, volume = {53}, pages = {768-776}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FoSmSy:86, author = {Formby , J. P. and Smith , W. J. and Sykes , D.}, title = {Intersecting tax concentration curves and the measurement of tax progressivity}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1986}, volume = {39}, pages = {115-18}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{FoSmZh:04, author = {Formby, John P. and Smith, W. James and Zheng, Buhong}, title = {Mobility measurement, transition matrices and statistical inference}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2004}, volume = {120}, pages = {181-205}, abstract = {This paper develops statistical inference procedures for testing incomemobility with transition matrices. Both summary mobility measures and partialmobility orderings are considered. We .rst examine the di0erent ways thattransition matrices are constructed in the literature on mobility measurement.Di0erent approaches lead not only to distinct interpretations of mobilitybut also to di0erent sampling distributions. The large sample propertiesof the estimates of transition matrices allow us to derive testing proceduresfor both summary mobility measures and partial orders of mobility acrossincome regimes. The tests are illustrated by applying them to income mobilityin the U.S. and Germany using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and GermanSocio-Economic Panel data.}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{FoSmZh:99, author = {Formby, J. P. and Smith, W. J. and Zheng, B.}, title = {The Coefficient of Variation, Stochastic Dominance and Inequality: A New Interpretation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {62}, pages = {319-323}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{FoSmZh:96, author = {Formby, John P. and Smith, W. James and Zheng, Buhong}, title = {Inequality Orderings, Normalized Stochastic Dominance and Statistical Inference}, institution = {University of Alabama}, year = {1996}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Formby1981, author = {Formby, J. R. and Seaks, T. G. and Smith, W. J.}, title = {A comparison of two new measures of tax progressivity}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1981}, volume = {91}, pages = {1015-10}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FoSeSm:81, author = {Formby, J. R. and Seaks, T. G. and Smith, W. J.}, title = {A comparison of two new measures of tax progressivity}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1981}, volume = {91}, pages = {1015-10}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{FoSmTh:87, author = {Formby, T. P. and Smith, W. J. and Thistle, P. D.}, title = {Difficulties in the measurement of tax progressivity: further analysis}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1987}, volume = {42}, pages = {438-445}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{FoHu:87PT, author = {Fortin, B. and Hung, N. M.}, title = {Poverty trap and the hidden labor market}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1987}, volume = {25}, pages = {183}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{FoLa:97, author = {Fortin, B. and Lacroix, G.}, title = {A test of the unitary and collective models of household labour supply}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {933-955}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Fortin1997a, author = {Fortin, B. and Lacroix, G.}, title = {A test of the unitary and collective models of household labour supply}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {933-955}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FoLa:94, author = {Fortin, B. and Lacroix, G.}, title = {Labour supply, tax evasion and the marginal cost of public funds. An empiricalinvestigation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {55}, pages = {407-431}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Fortin1996, author = {Fortin, B. and Lacroix, G.}, title = {Labour supply, tax evasion and the marginal cost of public funds. An empirical investigation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {55}, pages = {407-431}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FoLaVi:07, author = {Fortin, Bernard and Lacroix, Guy and Villeval, Marie-Claire}, title = {Tax evasion and social interactions}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {2089 - 2112}, abstract = {The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In Manski's [Manski, C.F. (1993). Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem. Review of Economic Studies 60(3), 531–542.] nomenclature, our model takes into account endogenous interactions, i.e., social conformity effects, exogenous interactions, i.e., fairness effects, and correlated effects. Our model is tested using experimental data. Participants must decide how much income to report given individual and group tax rates and audit probabilities, and given a feedback on the other members' reporting behavior. Myopic and self-consistent expectations are considered in the analysis. In the latter case, the estimation is based on a two-limit simultaneous tobit with fixed group effects. A unique social equilibrium exists when the model satisfies coherency conditions. In line with Brock and Durlauf [Brock, W.A., Durlauf, S.N. (2001b). Interactions-Based Models, in J. Heckman and E. Leamer, eds., Handbook of Econometrics 5, Elsevier Science B.V., 3297–380.], the intrinsic nonlinearity between individual and group responses helps identify the model. Our results provide evidence of fairness effects but reject social conformity.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Social interactions; Tax evasion; Simultaneous tobit; Laboratory experiments}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.07} } @ARTICLE{FoMS:97, author = {Fortin, Bernard and Marceau, Nicolas and Savard, Luc}, title = {Taxation, wage controls and the informal sector}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {66}, pages = {293-312}, number = {2}, month = {November}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Foss:08, author = {Fossen, F.}, title = {Would a Flat Tax Stimulate Entrepreneurship in Germany? A Behavioural Microsimulation Analysis Allowing for Risk}, institution = {Deutsches Institut f{\"u}r Wirtschaftsforschung}, year = {2008}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {773}, address = {DIW Berlin German Institute for Economic Research Mohrenstr. 58 10117 Berlin}, abstract = {When possible income tax reforms are debated, the suspected impact on entrepreneurship is often used as an argument in favour or against a certain policy. Quantitative ex-ante evaluations of the effect of certain tax reform options on entrepreneurship based on microeconometric research have not been provided by the literature, however. This paper estimates the ex-ante effects of the German tax reform 2000 and of two hypothetical flat tax scenarios on entries into and exits out of self-employment in Germany. For the estimation I apply a microsimulation model which is based on the tax-benefit model STSM and on structural microeconometric models of transitions into and out of self-employment. These structural models include an estimated parameter of risk aversion. The simulation results indicate that flatter tax systems do not encourage, but rather discourage people from choosing self-employment. This is explained by the reduction of entrepreneurs’ income risk through progressive taxation.}, key = {tax reform}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.22} } @ARTICLE{Fost:98WI, author = {Foster,J.}, title = {What is Poverty and who are the poor? Redefinition for the {U}nited {S}tates in the 1990's Absolute versus Relative Poverty}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {88}, pages = {335-341}, abstract = {This paper evaluates the multiple notions of relative and absolute povertythat arise in choosing poverty lines and aggregating the data into an overallindex of poverty. A general taxonomy is presented, and the question ofrobust comparisons is addressed within this general framework. Specialattention is paid to distinguishing between (i) the general concept underlyingthe poverty line and (ii) the particular cutoff chose. The paper concludeswith a discussion of "hybrid" poverty lines and the associated parameterthat is likely to play a key role in future discussions: the income elasticityof the poverty line.}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{Fost:85, author = {Foster, J. E.}, title = {Inequality measurement}, booktitle = {Fair Allocation}, publisher = {American Mathematical Society}, year = {1985}, editor = {Young, H. P.}, pages = {38-61}, address = {Providence, R. I.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Fost:94, author = {Foster, J. E.}, title = {Normative measurement: is theory relevant?}, journal = {American Economic Review ,Papers and Proceedings}, year = {1994}, volume = {84}, pages = {365-370}, number = {2}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Fost:84, author = {Foster, J. E.}, title = {On economic poverty: a survey of aggregate measures}, journal = {Advances in Econometrics}, year = {1984}, volume = {3}, pages = {215-251}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Fost:83, author = {Foster, J. E.}, title = {An axiomatic characterization of the {T}heil measure of income inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1983}, volume = {31}, pages = {105-121}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{FoGT:84, author = {Foster, J. E. and Greer, J. and Thorbecke, E.}, title = {A class of decomposable poverty measures}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1984}, volume = {52}, pages = {761-776}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{FoMaMi:90, author = {Foster, James E. and Majumdar, Mukul K. and Mitra, Tapan}, title = {Inequality and welfare in market economies}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1990}, volume = {41}, pages = {351-367}, number = {3}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{FoOk:99, author = {Foster, J. E. and Ok, E. A.}, title = {Lorenz Dominance and the Variance of Logarithms}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {901-907}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2999462} } @ARTICLE{FoSh:00, author = {Foster, J. E. and Shneyerov, A. A.}, title = {Path independent inequality measures}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2000}, volume = {91}, pages = {199-222}, number = {2}, note = {33}, abstract = {This paper explores a natural decomposition property motivated by Shorrocks (1980, Econometrica 48, 613-625) and Anand (1983, "Inequality and poverty in Malaysia," Oxford University Press) that we call path indepentent decomposability. Between-group inequality is found by applying the inequality measure to the smoothed distribution, which replaces each income in a subgroup with its representative income. Within-group inequality is the measure applied to the standardized distribution, which rescales subgroup distributions to a common representative income level. Path independence requires overall inequality to be the sum of these two terms. We derive the associated class of relative inequality measures-a single parameter family containing both the second Theil measure (the mean logarithmic deviation) and the variance of logarithms. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C43, D31, D63, 015. (C) 2000 Academic Press.}, key = {inequality decomposition}, keywords = {inequality measures; decomposition; Theil measure; variance of logarithms POPULATION SUBGROUPS; UNEQUAL INEQUALITIES; DECOMPOSITION; INDEXES} } @ARTICLE{FoSh:99, author = {Foster, J. E. and Shneyerov, A. A.}, title = {A General Class of Additively Decomposable Inequality Measures}, journal = {Economic Theory}, year = {1999}, volume = {14}, pages = {89-111}, abstract = {This paper presents and characterizes a two-parameter class of inequality measures that contains the generalized entropy measures, the variance of logarithms, the path independent measures of Foster and Shneyerov (1999) and several new classes of measures. The key axiom is a generalized form of additive decomposability which defines the within-group and between-group inequality terms using a generalized mean in place of the arithmetic mean. Our characterization result is proved without invoking any regularity assumption (such as continuity) on the functional form of the inequality measure; instead, it relies on a minimal form of the transfer principle – or consistency with the Lorenz criterion – over two-person distributions.}, institution = {Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University}, key = {inequality decomposition}, type = {Working Paper} } @TECHREPORT{FoSh:97, author = {Foster, James E. and Shneyerov, Artyom A.}, title = {Path Independent Inequality Measures}, institution = {Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University}, year = {1997}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{FoSh:90, author = {Foster, J. E. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Poverty Indices and decomposability}, booktitle = {Measurement and Modelling in Economics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1990}, editor = {Myles, G. D.}, pages = {109-117}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{FoSh:91, author = {Foster, J. E. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Subgroup {C}onsistent {P}overty {I}ndices}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1991}, volume = {59}, pages = {687-709}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{FoSh:88a, author = {Foster, J. E. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Poverty orderings}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1988}, volume = {56}, pages = {173-177}, number = {1}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{FoSh:88b, author = {Foster, J. E. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Poverty orderings and welfare dominance}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1988}, volume = {5}, pages = {179-198}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Foster1988, author = {Foster, J. E. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Poverty orderings and welfare dominance}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1988}, volume = {5}, pages = {171-198}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FoSh:87IP, author = {Foster, J. E. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Inequality and poverty orderings}, journal = {European Economic Review - Papers and proceedings of the second annual congressof the, E.E.A.}, year = {1987}, volume = {22-24/8}, pages = {654-661}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{FoSh:87SC, author = {Foster, J. E. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Subgroup consistent poverty indices}, institution = {Nuffield College}, year = {1987}, type = {working paper}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Foster1987a, author = {Foster, J. E. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Inequality and poverty orderings}, journal = {European Economic Review - Papers and proceedings of the second annual congress of the, E.E.A.}, year = {1987}, volume = {22-24/8}, pages = {654-661}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FoTv:95, author = {Fox, C. R. and Tversky, A.}, title = {Ambiguity aversion and comparative ignorance}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1995}, volume = {110}, pages = {585-603}, key = {risk} } @BOOK{Fran:72FM, title = {Formal Models of {A}merican Politics: An Introduction,}, publisher = {Harper and Row}, year = {1972}, author = {Francis, W. L.}, address = {New York}, key = {politics} } @ARTICLE{Fran:00, author = {Francois, P.}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, pages = {275-299}, abstract = {A public service motivation (PSM) inclines employees to provide effort outof concern for the impact of that effort on a valued social service. Thoughdeemed to be important in the literature on public administration, thismotivation has not been formally considered by economists. When a PSM exists,thispaper establishes conditions under which government bureaucracy can betterobtain PSM motivated effort from employees than a standard profi maximizingfirm. The model also provides an efficiency rationale for low-powered incentivesin both bureaucracies and other organizations producing social services.}, key = {Public Goods} } @ARTICLE{Fran:98GD, author = {Francois, Patrick}, title = {Gender discrimination without gender difference: theory and policy responses}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {68}, pages = {1-32}, number = {1}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Fran:98GN, author = {Frank, Bjorn}, title = {Good news for experimenters: subjects do not care about your welfare}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {61}, pages = {171-174}, number = {2}, key = {Experiments} } @INCOLLECTION{Fran:87LF, author = {Frank, M.}, title = {La fraude et la sous-estimation fiscales et leur impact sur la distributiondes revenus}, booktitle = {L'Economie Informelle}, publisher = {Editions LABOR}, year = {1987}, editor = {Ginsburgh, V. and Perelman, S. and Pestieau}, address = {Brussels}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Fran:76FD, author = {Frank, M.}, title = {Fraude des revenus soumis a l'imp{\^o}t des personnes physiques et perte d'imp{\^o}t qui en r{\'e}sulte pour le Tresor - {\'e}tude m{\'e}thodologique}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1976}, volume = {31}, pages = {1-30}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Frank1976, author = {Frank, M.}, title = {Fraude des revenus soumis a l'imp\^ot des personnes physiques et perte d'imp\^o t qui en r\'esulte pour le Tresor - \'etude m\'ethodologique}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1976}, volume = {31}, pages = {1-30}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Fran:72LS, author = {Frank, M.}, title = {La sous-estimation et la fraude fiscale en Belgique: ampleur et remedes}, journal = {Cahiers {\'E}conomiques de Bruxelles}, year = {1972}, volume = {53}, pages = {5-46}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Frank1972, author = {Frank, M.}, title = {La sous-estimation et la fraude fiscale en Belgique: ampleur et remedes}, journal = {Cahiers \'Economiques de Bruxelles}, year = {1972}, volume = {53}, pages = {5-46}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FrDe:77, author = {Frank, M. and Dekeyser-Meulders, D.}, title = {A tax discrepancy coefficient resulting from tax evasion or tax expenditure}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {8}, pages = {67-78}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Fr:08, author = {Frank, M. W.}, title = {Inequality and Growth in the {U}nited {S}tates: evidence from a new state-level panel of income inequality measures}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, year = {2008}, abstract = {This paper introduces a new comprehensive panel of annual state-level income inequality measures spanning the postwar period 1945–2004. For many states, the share of income held by the top decile experienced a prolonged period of stability after World War II, followed by a substantial increase in inequality during the 1980s and 1990s. This paper also presents an examination of the long-run relationship between income inequality and economic growth. Our findings indicate that the long-run relationship between inequality and growth is positive in nature and driven principally by the concentration of income in the upper end of the income distribution.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.22} } @ARTICLE{Fran:08, author = {Frank, R. H.}, title = {Should public policy respond to positional externalities?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {1777-1786}, number = {8-9}, month = {August}, abstract = {A nice suit is one that compares favorably with those worn by others in the same local environment. More generally, a positional good is one whose utility depends strongly on how it compares with others in the same category. 1 A positional externality occurs when new purchases alter the relevant context within which an existing positional good is evaluated. 2 For example, if some job candidates begin wearing expensive custom-tailored suits, a side effect of their action is that other candidates become less likely to make favorable impressions on interviewers. From any individual job seeker's point of view, the best response might be to match the higher expenditures of others, lest her chances of landing the job fall. But this outcome may be inefficient, since when all spend more, each candidate's probability of success remains unchanged. All may agree that some form of collective restraint on expenditure would be useful. In such cases, however, it is often impractical to negotiate private solutions. Do positional externalities then become legitimate objects of public policy concern? In attempting to answer this question, I employ the classical libertarian criterion put forth by John Stuart Mill 3, who wrote the statemay not legitimately constrain any citizen's freedom of action except to prevent harm to others. I argue that many positional externalities appear to meet Mill's test, causing not just negative feelings but also large and tangible economic costs to others who are ill-equipped to avoid them. I also discuss an unintrusive policy remedy for positional externalities, one modeled after the use of effluent charges to curb environmental pollution. The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 notes the deep similarity between the conditions that give rise to positional arms races and those that give rise to conventional military arms races. Section 2 follows with a review of evidence concerning the strength of concerns about relative position. Section 3 describes some of the tangible economic costs that people experience as a result of positional externalities arising from such concerns. Section 4 takes up the question of whether collective action directed against positional externalities is consistent with respect for individual rights. Section 5 describes how a progressive consumption tax could neutralize many of the most costly effects of positional externalities.}, key = {externalities}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.21} } @ARTICLE{Fran:97, author = {Frank, R. H.}, title = {The frame of reference as a public good}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {1832-1847}, number = {445}, month = {November}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{FrGiRe:96, author = {Frank, R. H. and Gilovich, T. D. and Regan, D. T.}, title = {Do Economists Make Bad Citizens?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1996}, volume = {10}, pages = {187-192}, number = {1}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{FrGiRe:93, author = {Frank, R. H. and Gilovich, T. D. and Regan, D. T.}, title = {Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1993}, volume = {7}, pages = {159-171}, number = {2}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{Fran:87, author = {Frankfurt, Harry}, title = {Equality as a Moral Ideal}, journal = {Ethics}, year = {1987}, volume = {98}, pages = {21-43}, key = {equality} } @TECHREPORT{Fran:96, author = {Frantz, P.}, title = {Auditor's Skill, Auditing Standards, Litigation and Audit Quality}, institution = {London School of Economics}, year = {1996}, type = {Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper}, number = {235}, address = {Houghton St, London}, key = {Compliance} } @ARTICLE{Fran:85, author = {Franz, A.}, title = {Estimates of the hidden economy in Austria on the basis of official statistics}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1985}, volume = {31}, pages = {325-333}, key = {underground} } @INCOLLECTION{Franzoni1999b, author = {Franzoni, Luigi Alberto}, title = {{Tax} evasion and tax compliance}, booktitle = {Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics}, year = {1999}, editor = {Bouckaert, B. and G. {De Geest}}, pages = {52-94}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Fran:99TE, author = {Franzoni, L. A.}, title = {Tax evasion and tax compliance}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Law and Economics}, publisher = {Edward Elgar}, year = {1999}, editor = {Bouckaert, B. and {De G}eest, G.}, pages = {52-94}, address = {Cheltenham, {UK}}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Fran:00AS, author = {Franzoni, L. A.}, title = {Amnesties, settlements, and optimal tax enforcement}, journal = {Economica}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, pages = {153-176}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Fran:99, author = {Franzoni, L. A.}, title = {Negotiated Enforcement and Credible Deterrence}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {509-535}, key = {Compliance} } @ARTICLE{Fran:98, author = {Franzoni, L. A.}, title = {Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance}, journal = {Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics}, year = {1998}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Fras:96, author = {Fraser, Clive D.}, title = {On the provision of excludable public goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {60}, pages = {111-130}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Frech1987, author = {Frech, H. and Lee, W.}, title = {The Welfare Cost of Rationing-by-Queuing Across Markets: Theory and Estimates from the {US} Gasoline Crises}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1987}, volume = {101}, pages = {97-108}, key = {consumption}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FrLe:87, author = {Frech, H. and Lee, W.}, title = {The Welfare Cost of Rationing-by-Queuing Across Markets: Theory and Estimatesfrom the {US} Gasoline Crises}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1987}, volume = {101}, pages = {97-108}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{FrLo:02, author = {Frederick, S. and Loewenstein, G. and {O'D}onoghue, T.}, title = {Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2002}, volume = {40}, pages = {351-401}, key = {time use}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Fred:99, author = {Fredriksson, P.}, title = {The Political Economy of Public Employment Programs}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {487-504}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{FrPe:84a, author = {Freedman, D. A. and Peters, S. C.}, title = {Bootstrapping and Econometric Model: Some Empirical Results}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1984}, volume = {2}, pages = {150-158}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{FrPe:84b, author = {Freedman, D. A. and Peters, S. C.}, title = {Some Notes on the Bootstrap in Regression Problems}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1984}, volume = {2}, pages = {406-409}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{Free:95, author = {Freeman, Richard}, title = {Are your wages set in Beijing}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1995}, volume = {9}, pages = {15-32}, number = {3}, key = {labour} } @INCOLLECTION{FrKa:95, author = {Freeman, Richard and Katz, Lawrence}, title = {Rising Wage Inequality: The {U}nited {S}tates versus other Advanced Countries}, booktitle = {Differences and Changes in Wage Structure}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press and NBER}, year = {1995}, editor = {Freeman, Richard and Katz, Lawrence}, key = {labour} } @INCOLLECTION{FrKa:95IS, author = {Freeman, Richard and Katz, Lawrence}, title = {Introdution and Summary}, booktitle = {Differences and Changes in Wage Structure}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press and NBER}, year = {1995}, editor = {Freeman, Richard and Katz, Lawrence}, pages = {1-22}, key = {labour} } @INCOLLECTION{Free:86, author = {Freeman, Richard B.}, title = {Demand for education}, booktitle = {Handbook of Labor Economics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1986}, editor = {Ashenfelter, O. C. and Layard, P. R. G.}, volume = {1}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Free:98, author = {Freeman, Richard B.}, title = {War of the models: Which labour market institutions for the 21st century?}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {5}, pages = {1-24}, number = {1}, key = {Labour market} } @ARTICLE{FrGrMi:07, author = {Frenette,M. and Green,D.A. and Milligan,K.}, title = {The tale of the tails: Canadian income inequality in the 1980s and 1990s}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {40}, pages = {734-764}, number = {3}, abstract = {We present new evidence on levels and trends in after-tax income inequality in Canada between 1980 and 2000.We argue that existing data sources may miss changes in the tails of the income distribution, and thatmany of the changes in the income distribution have been in the tails. For this reason, we turn to an alternative source. In particular, we construct data on after-tax and transfer income using Census files augmented with predicted taxes based on information available from administrative tax data. Using these data, we find that Canadian after-tax inequality levels are substantially higher than has been previously recognized, primarily because income levels are lower at the bottom of the distribution than in commonly used survey data. We also find larger long-term increases in after-tax income inequality and far more variability over the economic cycle. This raises interesting questions about the role of the tax and transfer system in mitigating both trends and fluctuations in market income inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @BOOK{Freu:03, title = {Mathematical Statistics with Applications}, publisher = {Pearson Education}, year = {2003}, author = {Freund, J. E.}, address = {Harlow, Essex}, edition = {Seventh}, comment = {Moore: QA276 .F748 2004}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.22} } @BOOK{FrPe:07, title = {Modern Elementary Statistics}, publisher = {Pearson Prentice Hall}, year = {2007}, author = {Freund, J. E. and Perles, B. M.}, address = {Upper Saddle River, New Jersey}, edition = {Twelfth}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.22} } @ARTICLE{Freu:98, author = {Freund, Michael}, title = {On rational preferences}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {30}, pages = {215-228}, number = {2}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{FrSt:02, author = {Frey, B. and Stutzer, A.}, title = {What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2002}, volume = {40}, pages = {402-435}, key = {welfare}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @INCOLLECTION{FrHo:97, author = {Frey, Bruno S. and Holler, Manfred J.}, title = {Moral and immoral views on paying taxes}, booktitle = {Taking the Liberal Challenge Seriously}, publisher = {Ashgate}, year = {1997}, editor = {Hellsten, Sirkku and Kopperi, Marjaana and Loukola, Olli}, pages = {174-191}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{FrMe:01, author = {Frey, B. S. and Meier, S.}, title = {Political Economists Are Neither Selfish Nor Indoctrinated}, institution = {Institute for Empirical Economic Research, University of Z{\"u}rich}, year = {2001}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {Bl{\"u}mlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 Z{\"u}rich}, key = {Experiments} } @INCOLLECTION{FrPo:82, author = {Frey, B. S. and Pommerehne, W. W.}, title = {Measuring the hidden economy: though this be madness, there is method init}, booktitle = {The Underground Economy in the {U}nited {S}tates and Abroad}, publisher = {D. C. Heath}, year = {1982}, editor = {Tanzi, V.}, address = {Lexington, Massachusetts}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{FrPo:84, author = {Frey, B. S. and Pommerehne, W. W.}, title = {The hidden economy: state and prospects for measurement}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1984}, volume = {30}, pages = {1-23}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{FrSt:99, author = {Frey, B. S. and Stutzer, A.}, title = {Measuring Preferences by Subjective Well Being}, journal = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {155}, pages = {755-778}, key = {Utility, preference} } @TECHREPORT{FrTo:06, author = {Frey, B. S. and Torgler, B.}, title = {Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation}, institution = {Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper Series}, number = {286}, address = {Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Bluemlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland}, month = {April}, note = {ISSN 1424-0459}, abstract = {Why so many people pay their taxes, although fines and audit probability are low, has become a central question in the tax compliance literature. A homo economicus, with a more refined motivation structure, helps us to shed light on this puzzle. This paper provides empirical evidence for the relevance of conditional cooperation, using survey data from 30 West and East European countries. We find a high correlation between perceived tax evasion and tax morale. The results remain robust after exploiting endogeneity and conducting several robustness tests. We also observe a strong positive correlation between institutional quality and tax morale.}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, key = {taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, pages = {397-399}, timestamp = {2006.12.13}, volume = {4} } @ARTICLE{FrWe:83ET, author = {Frey, B. S. and Weck, H.}, title = {Estimating the shadow economy: a naive approach}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1983}, volume = {35}, pages = {23-44}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{FrWe:83WP, author = {Frey, B. S. and Weck, H.}, title = {What produces a hidden economy? An international cross-section analysis}, journal = {Southern Economic Journal}, year = {1983}, volume = {49}, pages = {822-832}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{FrWePo:82, author = {Frey, B. S., Weck, H. and Pommerehne, W.}, title = {Has the shadow-economy grown in {G}ermany? An exploratory study}, journal = {Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv}, year = {1982}, volume = {8}, pages = {499-524}, key = {underground} } @TECHREPORT{Fric:95, author = {Frick, J. and {others}}, title = {Income Inequality in {E}ast and {W}est {G}ermany before and after Unification}, institution = {DIW}, year = {1995}, type = {mimeo}, address = {Berlin}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Frie:99, author = {Leora Friedberg}, title = {The Effect of Old Age Assistance on Retirement}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {213-232}, number = {2}, key = {pensions} } @ARTICLE{Frie:82, author = {Friedland, N.}, title = {A note on tax evasion as a function of the quality of information aboutthe magnitude and credibility of threatened fines}, journal = {Journal of Applied Social Psychology}, year = {1982}, volume = {12}, pages = {54-59}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Friedland1982, author = {Friedland, N.}, title = {A note on tax evasion as a function of the quality of information about the magnitude and credibility of threatened fines}, journal = {Journal of Applied Social Psychology}, year = {1982}, volume = {12}, pages = {54-59}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FrMaRu:78, author = {Friedland, N., Maital, S. and Rutenberg, A.}, title = {A simulation study of tax evasion}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1978}, volume = {8}, pages = {107-116}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Frie:87, author = {Friedman, D.}, title = {Cold Houses in Warm Climates and Vice Versa: A Paradox of Rational Heating}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1987}, volume = {95}, pages = {1089-1097}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{FrOs:08, author = {Daniel Friedman and Daniel N. Ostrov}, title = {Conspicuous consumption dynamics}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {2008}, volume = {64}, pages = {121 - 145}, number = {1}, doi = {DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.008}, issn = {0899-8256}, keywords = {Veblen effects}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4S1C8D3-1/2/2f20fc1aabddfaf8ac6d572517389f74} } @BOOK{FrSu:94, title = {Experimental Methods: A primer for economists}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1994}, author = {Friedman, D. and Sunder, S.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{Friedman2000, author = {Friedman, E. and Johnson, S. and Kaufman, D. and Zoido-Lobaton, P.}, title = {Dodging the Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {76}, pages = {459-493}, key = {Underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FrJoKaZo:00, author = {Friedman, E. and Johnson, S. and Kaufman, D. and Zoido-Lobaton, P.}, title = {Dodging the Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69Countries}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {76}, pages = {459-493}, key = {Underground} } @ARTICLE{Frie:71, author = {Friedman, J.}, title = {A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1971}, volume = {38}, pages = {1-12}, key = {games} } @BOOK{Frie:62, title = {Capitalism and Freedom}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, year = {1962}, author = {Friedman, M.}, address = {Chicago}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{FrSa:48, author = {Friedman, M. and Savage, L. J.}, title = {The utility analysis of choices involving risk}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1948}, volume = {56}, pages = {1-23}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{FrBl:75, author = {Friend, I. and Blume, M. E.}, title = {The Demand for Risky Assets}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1975}, volume = {65}, pages = {900-922}, key = {finance} } @ARTICLE{FrMi:83, author = {Friesen, P. H. and Miller, D.}, title = {Annual inequality and lifetime inequality}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {98}, pages = {139-155}, number = {2}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Frij:98AM, author = {Frijters, Paul}, title = {A model of fashions and status}, journal = {Economic Modelling}, year = {1998}, volume = {15}, pages = {501-517}, number = {4}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Frij:98DA, author = {Frijters, P.}, title = {Discrimination and job-uncertainty}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {36}, pages = {433-446}, number = {4}, key = {Discrimination} } @TECHREPORT{FrGrSi:03, author = {Frisk, Joachim and Grabka, Markus and Sierminska, Eva}, title = {Representative wealth data for Germany from the German SOEP: The impact of methodological decisions around imputation and the choice of the aggregation unit}, institution = {SOEP}, year = {2003}, type = {Working Paper}, abstract = {The definition and operationalization of wealth information in population surveys and the corresponding microdata requires a wide range of more or less normative assumptions. However, the decisions made in both the pre- and post-data-collection stage may interfere considerably with the substantive research question. Looking at wealth data from the German SOEP, this paper focuses on the impact of collecting information at the individual rather than household level, and on “imputation and editing” as a means of dealing with measurement error. First, we assess how the choice of unit of aggregation or unit of analysis affects wealth distribution and inequality analysis. Obviously, when measured in “per capita household” terms, wealth is less unequally distributed than at the individual level. This is the result of significant redistribution within households, and also provides evidence of a significant persisting gender wealth gap. Secondly, we find multiple imputation to be an effective means of coping with selective nonresponse. There is a significant impact of imputation on the share of wealth holders (increasing on average by 15%) and also on aggregate wealth (plus 30%). However, with respect to inequality, the results are ambiguous. Looking at the major outcome variable for the whole population—net worth—the Gini coefficient decreases, whereas a top-sensitive measure doubles. The non-random selectivity built into the missing process and the consideration of this selectivity in the imputation process clearly contribute to this finding. Obviously, the treatment of measurement errors after data collection, especially with respect to the imputation of missing values, affects cross-national comparability and thus may require some cross-national harmonization of the imputation strategies applied to the various national datasets.}, key = {Wealth}, keywords = {Wealth, Item non-response, multiple imputation, SOEP}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.07} } @TECHREPORT{Frit:92, author = {Fritzell, J.,}, title = {Income Inequality Trends in the 1980s: A Five-Country Comparison,}, institution = {Swedish Institute for Social Research,}, year = {1992}, type = {mimeograph,}, address = {Stockholm University,}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Froh:07, author = {Frohlich,N.}, title = {A Very Short History of Distributive Justice}, journal = {Social Justice Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {20}, pages = {250-262}, key = {distributions}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @BOOK{FrOp:92, title = {Choosing Justice}, publisher = {University of California Press}, year = {1992}, author = {Frohlich, N. and Oppenheimer, J.}, address = {Berkeley, CA}, key = {social justice} } @ARTICLE{FrOpEa:87CO, author = {Frohlich, N. and Oppenheimer, J. A. and Eavey, Ch.}, title = {Choices of principles of distributive justice in experimental groups}, journal = {American Journal of Political Science}, year = {1987}, volume = {31}, pages = {606-636}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{FrOpEa:87LR, author = {Frohlich, N. and Oppenheimer, J. A. and Eavey, Ch.}, title = {Laboratory results on {R}awls' principle of distributive justice}, journal = {British Journal of Political Science}, year = {1987}, volume = {17}, pages = {1-21}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{Frohlich1987, author = {Frohlich, N. Oppenheimer, J. A. and Eavey, Ch.}, title = {Laboratory results on {R}awls' principle of distributive justice}, journal = {British Journal of Political Science}, year = {1987}, volume = {17}, pages = {1-21}, key = {economic psychology}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Frohlich1987a, author = {Frohlich, N. Oppenheimer, J. A. and Eavey, Ch.}, title = {Choices of principles of distributive justice in experimental groups}, journal = {American Journal of Political Science}, year = {1987}, volume = {31}, pages = {606-636}, key = {economic psychology}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FrOb:91, author = {Froot, Kenneth A. and Obstfeld, Maurice}, title = {Intrinsic Bubbles: The Case of Stock Prices}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1991}, volume = {81}, pages = {1189--1214}, number = {5}, abstract = {Several puzzling aspects of the behavior of United States stock prices may be explained by the presence of a specific type of rational bubble that depends exclusively on aggregate dividends. We call bubbles of this type "intrinsic" bubbles because they derive all of their variability from exogenous economic fundamentals and none from extraneous factors. Intrinsic bubbles provide a more plausible empirical account of deviations from present-value pricing than do the traditional examples of rational bubbles. Their explanatory potential comes partly from their ability to generate persistent deviations that appear to be relatively stable over long periods.}, copyright = {Copyright © 1991 American Economic Association}, issn = {00028282}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Dec., 1991}, publisher = {American Economic Association} } @INCOLLECTION{Fros:90, author = {Frosini, B. V.}, title = {Ordinal decomposition of inequality measures in case of {D}agum distributions}, booktitle = {Income and Wealth Distribution, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1990}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Zenga, M.}, pages = {215-227}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Fros:89, author = {Frosini, B. V.}, title = {Aggregate units, within group inequality and decomposition of inequality measures}, journal = {Statistica}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Fros:85, author = {Frosini, B. V.}, title = {Comparing inequality measures}, journal = {Statistica}, year = {1985}, volume = {45}, pages = {299-317}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Fros:00, author = {Frosztega, M.}, title = {Comparisons of income data between the {Family Expenditure Survey} and the {Family Resources Survey}}, institution = {Analytical Services Division, Department of Social Security}, year = {2000}, type = {Government Statistical Service Methodology Series}, number = {18}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.01}, url = {http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/hbai/gssms18.pdf} } @ARTICLE{Fryd:84, author = {Frydman, H.}, title = {Maximum Likelihood in the Mover-Stayer Model}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1984}, volume = {79}, pages = {632-638}, number = {387}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Frec:39, author = {Fr{\'e}chet, M.}, title = {Sur les Formules de R{\'e}partition des Revenus}, journal = {Revue de l'Institut International de Statistique}, year = {1939}, volume = {7}, pages = {32-38}, number = {1}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Fuchs1980, author = {Fuchs, C. and Kennet, R.}, title = {A Test for outlying cells in the {M}ultinominal {D}istribution and{T}wo-{W}ay Contingency tables}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1980}, volume = {75}, pages = {395-398}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FuKe:80, author = {Fuchs, C. and Kennet, R.}, title = {A Test for outlying cells in the {M}ultinominal {D}istribution and{T}wo-{W}ayContingency tables}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1980}, volume = {75}, pages = {395-398}, key = {statistics} } @INCOLLECTION{Fuch:69, author = {Fuchs, V. R.}, title = {Comment on measuring the size of the low- income population}, booktitle = {Six Papers on the Size Distribution of Wealth and Income}, publisher = {NBER}, year = {1969}, editor = {Soltow, L.}, address = {New York}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Fuch:97, author = {Fuchs-Selinger, Susanne}, title = {A further remark on {S}hepard's {L}emma}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {56}, pages = {359-365}, number = {3}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{FuLe:06, author = {Fudenberg, D. and Levine, D.}, title = {Superstition and Rational Learning}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {96}, pages = {630-651}, abstract = {We argue that some, but not all, superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the Code of Hammurabi. The code specified an “appeal by surviving in the river” as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. According to our theory, a mechanism that uses superstitions two or more steps off the equilibrium path, such as “appeal by surviving in the river,” is more likely to persist than a superstition where the false beliefs are only one step off the equilibrium path.}, key = {risk}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.01} } @ARTICLE{FuMa:79, author = {Fudenberg, D. and Maskin , E.}, title = {The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, volume = {54}, pages = {533-556}, key = {games} } @INCOLLECTION{FuTi:89, author = {Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J.}, title = {Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: an introductionand overview}, booktitle = {Handbook of Industrial Organization, 1}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1989}, editor = {Schmalensee, R. and Willig, R}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {industry} } @BOOK{FuTi:91, title = {Game Theory}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1991}, author = {Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J.}, address = {Cambridge, Mass.}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Fuente1999, author = {de la Fuente, A. and Naranjo, M. T.}, title = {Continuity of the Constraint Correspondence in Parameterized Kuhn-Tucker Problems with Concave Restraints}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {62}, pages = {301-305}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FuNa:99, author = {de la Fuente, A. and Naranjo, M. T.}, title = {Continuity of the Constraint Correspondence in Parameterized Kuhn-TuckerProblems with Concave Restraints}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {62}, pages = {301-305}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Fuest2001, author = {Fuest, C. and Huber, B.}, title = {Labor and Capital Income Taxation, Fiscal Competition and the Distribution of Wealth}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {70}, pages = {71-91}, key = {Wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Fuest2000a, author = {Fuest, C. and Huber, B.}, title = {Is Tax Progression Really Good for Employment? A Model with Endogenous Hours of Work}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {7}, pages = {79-93}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{FuHu:00IT, author = {Fuest, C. and Huber, B.}, title = {Is Tax Progression Really Good for Employment? A Model with Endogenous Hoursof Work}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {7}, pages = {79-93}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{FuHu:00LA, author = {Fuest, C. and Huber, B.}, title = {Labor and Capital Income Taxation, Fiscal Competition and the Distribution of Wealth}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {79}, pages = {71-91}, abstract = {This paper studies optimum income taxation in a small open economy where households differ with respect to their endowments with wealth. The government raises taxes on income from labor and wealth and a source tax on capital used in domestic production. To avoid taxes, households may, at some cost, shift capital to labor income and vice versa. The government can only observe income after shifting has taken place. It turns out that the optimal source tax on capital is negative. The optimal income tax is characterized by a positive marginal tax rate for the wealthy households, which is equal for labor income and income from wealth. For the poor households, the marginal tax rate on capital income is higher than that on labor income.We also study international tax coordination and show that a reduction in the source subsidy on capital raises welfare.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{FuHu:99, author = {Fuest, C. and Huber, B.}, title = {Tax Coordination and Unemployment}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {7-26}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{FuHuMi:03, author = {Fuest, Clemens and Huber, Bernd and Mintz, Jack}, title = {Capital Mobility and Tax Competition: A Survey}, year = {2003}, number = {956}, abstract = {This paper surveys the literature on the implications of international capitalmobility for national tax policies. Our main issue for consideration inthis survey is whether taxation of income, specifically capital incomewill survive, how border crossing investment is taxed relative to domesticinvestment and whether welfare gains can be achieved through internationaltax coordination. We develop a a “working horse model” of multinationalinvestment which allows to derive many of the key results from the literatureon international taxation in a unified framework. Moreover, we put specialemphasis on the problem of tax competition and financial arbitrage.}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {tax competition}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{FuPeSc:08, author = {Fuest, Clemens and Peichl, Andreas and Schaefer, Thilo}, title = {Does a Simpler Income Tax Yield More Equity and Efficiency?}, journal = {CESifo Economic Studies}, year = {2008}, volume = {54}, pages = {73 - 97}, abstract = {This article investigates the impact of tax simplification on various indicators of the efficiency of the tax system and on the distribution of income. The analysis is based on a simulation model (FiFoSiM) using German income tax and household survey microdata. We model tax simplification as the abolition of a set of deductions from the income tax base. We find that this form of tax base simplification leads to a reduction in the use of professional tax advice, a more equitable income distribution and an increase in tax revenue. If this is combined with a reduction of income tax rates to preserve revenue neutrality, the effects depend on the type of rate schedule adjustment. The combination with a flat rate tax increases income inequality at the expense of the middle class, but it also leads to efficiency gains because tax distortions of labour supply are reduced. The combination with a rate schedule adjustment, which preserves the directly progressive schedule reduces inequality but increases overall tax distortions. We conclude that the effects of tax base simplification on after tax income inequality and tax distortions mainly depend on the type of tax schedule adjustment.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Flat tax, income tax reform, tax simplification.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.07} } @TECHREPORT{FuPeSc:07, author = {Fuest, C. and Peichl, A. and Schaefer, T.}, title = {Is a Flat Tax Feasible in a Grown-up Welfare State?}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {3142}, abstract = {The success of the flat rate tax in Eastern Europe suggests that this concept could also be a model for the welfare states of Western Europe. The present paper uses a simulation model to analyse the effects of revenue neutral flat rate tax reforms on equity and efficiency for the case of Germany. We find that a flat rate tax with a low tax rate and a low basic allowance yields positive static welfare effects amounting to approximately 1.8 per cent of income tax revenue but increases income inequality. The increase in income inequality can be avoided by combining a higher tax rate with a higher basic allowance. But in this case the efficiency gains vanish. We conclude that, due to their limited efficiency effects and their problematic distributional impact, flat tax reforms are unlikely to spill over to the welfare states of Western Europe.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.11.13} } @TECHREPORT{Fuji:07, author = {Fujii, T.}, title = {Geographic Decomposition of Inequality in Health and Wealth: Evidence from Cambodia}, institution = {SMU Economics and Statistics}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {24-2007}, abstract = {Health and wealth are found positively correlated, but whether the spatial inequality in health and wealth necessarily exhibits a similar pattern is unclear. We apply the small-area estimation technique to the estimation of inequality in consumption poverty and undernutrition. We develop a framework to compare the wealth and health inequality, and decompose each of the health and wealth inequality into the between-area and within-area components. We found that the sizable proportion of wealth inequality is determined by geography whereas health inequality is intrinsically a local phenomenon.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Zhang Zhijun}, timestamp = {2000.09.30} } @ARTICLE{Fuku:89, author = {Fukushiga, M.}, title = {A new approach to the economic inequality based upon the permanent incomehypothesis}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1989}, volume = {29}, pages = {183-187}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Fukushiga1989, author = {Fukushiga, M.}, title = {A new approach to the economic inequality based upon the permanent income hypothesis}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1989}, volume = {29}, pages = {183-187}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Full:79, author = {Fuller, M.}, title = {The estimation of {G}ini coefficients from grouped data}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1979}, volume = {3}, pages = {187-192}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{FuGa:04, author = {Fullerton,D. and Gan,L.}, title = {A simulation-based welfare loss calculation for labor taxes with piecewise-linearbudgets}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {2339-2359}, abstract = {Graduated income tax rates and transfer programs create piecewise-linearbudget constraints that consist of budget segments and kink points. Withany change in these tax rules, each individual may switch between a kinkpoint and a budget segment, between two budget segments, or between twokink points. With errors in the estimated labor supply equation, the newchoice is uncertain, and so the welfare effects of a tax change are uncertain.We propose a simulation-based method to compute expected welfare effectsthat is easy to implement and that fully accounts for uncertainties aboutchoices around kink points. Our method also provides information aboutexpected changes in working hours.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{FuKa:94, author = {Fullerton, D. and Karayannis, M.}, title = {Tax Evasion and the Allocation of Capital}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {55}, pages = {257-278}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Funk:98, author = {Funkhouse, Edward}, title = {Tests of labor market rigidities and the {R}oy {M}odel}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {61}, pages = {243-250}, number = {2}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Furn:83, author = {Furnham, A.}, title = {The protestant work ethic, human values and attitudes towards taxation}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1983}, volume = {3}, pages = {113-128}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{FuRi:97, title = {Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New InstitutionalEconomics}, publisher = {University of Michigan}, year = {1997}, author = {Furobotn, Erik G. and Richter, Rudolf}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Furobotn1997, title = {Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics}, publisher = {University of Michigan}, year = {1997}, author = {Furobotn, Erik G. and Richter, Rudolf}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Furu:02, author = {Furuya, K.}, title = {A Socio-Economic Model of Stigma and Related Social Problems}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2002}, volume = {48}, pages = {281-290}, abstracy = {Recent years have seen a rapid expansion of economic literature on stigma,a notion that had been widely studied in sociology in relation to socialdeviance. Yet the economic literature overlooks the original sociologicalintuition that certain consequences of stigmatization could be sociallyinefficient. This paper formalizes this intuition by developing a modelof community behavior, which mimics a classic sociological setting concerningthe rehabilitation of a former criminal offender. The conditions underwhich a socially inefficient equilibrium arises are derived. Some of thoseconditions are shown to be consistent with the findings from micro-laborstudies on crime.}, key = {Welfare} } @BOOK{FuMcF:80, title = {Production Economics: A Dual Approach to Theory and Applications}, publisher = {North-Holland}, year = {1980}, author = {Fuss, M. and McFadden, D.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{FaSh:77, author = {F{\"a}re, R. and Shephard, R. W.}, title = {Ray-homothetic production functions}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1977}, volume = {45}, pages = {133-146}, key = {micro} } @INCOLLECTION{G.1984, author = {Chamberlain G.}, title = {Panel Data}, booktitle = {Handbook of Econometrics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1984}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{G.1999a, author = {Corneo G. and Olivier J.}, title = {Pecuniary Emulation, Inequality and Growth}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {1665-1678}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{G.1999, author = {Venturo G.}, title = {Flat Tax Reform: A Quantitative Exploration}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1999}, volume = {23}, pages = {1425-1458}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{GaIb:06, author = {Gabaix, J. and Ibragimov, R.}, title = {Log (Rank-1/2): A Simple Way to Improve the OLS Estimation of Tail Exponents}, institution = {Harvard Institute of Economic Reseach}, year = {2006}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {2106}, address = {http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2006papers/2006list.html}, month = {February}, abstract = {A popular way to estimate a Pareto exponent is to run an OLS regression: log (Rank) = c ¡ b log (Size), and take b as an estimate of the Pareto exponent. Unfortunately, this procedure is strongly biased in small samples. We provide a simple practical remedy for this bias, and argue that, if one wants to use an OLS regression, one should use the Rank ¡1=2, and run log (Rank ¡ 1=2) = c¡b log (Size). The shift of 1=2 is optimal, and cancels the bias to a leading order. The standard error on the Pareto exponent is not the OLS standard error, but is asymptotically (2=n)1=2b. To obtain this result, we provide asymptotic expansions for the OLS estimate in such log-log rank-size regression with arbitrary shifts in the ranks. The arguments for the asymptotic expansions rely on strong approximations to martingales with the optimal rate and demonstrate that martingale convergence methods provide a natural and conceptually simple framework for deriving the asymptotics of the tail index estimates using the log-log rank-size regressions.}, key = {statistics}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @TECHREPORT{Gaba:08, author = {Gabaix, X.}, title = {Power Laws in Economics and Finance}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {14299}, key = {income distribution:theoretical}, series = {Working Paper Series}, url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w14299} } @ARTICLE{Gaba:99, author = {Gabaix, X.}, title = {{Z}ipf's Law for Cities: An Explanation}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {114}, pages = {739-767}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{GaRo:99, author = {Gabriel, S. A. and Rosenthal, S. S.}, title = {Location and the Effect of Demographic Traits on Earnings}, journal = {Regional Science and Urban Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {29}, pages = {445-461}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{GaGa:99, author = {Shira Gabriel and Wendi L. Gardner}, title = {Are There "His" and "Hers" Types of Interdependence? The Implications ofGender Differences in Collective versus Relational Interdependence forAffect, Behavior and Cognition}, journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology}, year = {1999}, volume = {77}, pages = {642-655}, number = {3}, key = {Psychology} } @ARTICLE{GaFe:99, author = {Gachter , Simon and Fehr, Ernst}, title = {Collective action as a social exchange}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1999}, volume = {39}, pages = {341-369}, number = {3}, key = {Experiments} } @TECHREPORT{vGMaSc:98, author = {Dirk Van de Gaer and Michel Martinez and Erik Schokkaert}, title = {Measuring Intergenerational Mobility and Equality of Opportunity}, institution = {National University of Ireland, Maynooth}, year = {1998}, key = {mobility} } @INCOLLECTION{Gaer:87, author = {Gaertner, W.}, title = {Untergrundwirtschaft, Steuerhinterziehung und Moral}, booktitle = {Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Ethik}, publisher = {Dunbar and Humblot}, year = {1987}, editor = {Hesse, H.}, pages = {109-130}, address = {Berlin}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{Gaer:06, title = {A Primer in Social Choice Theory}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2006}, author = {Gaertner, W.}, key = {social choice}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.09.07} } @ARTICLE{Gaer:94, author = {Gaertner, W.}, title = {Distributive Justice: Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Findings}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1994}, volume = {38}, pages = {711-720}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Gaer:92, title = {Social Choice and Bargaining}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1992}, author = {Gaertner, W.}, series = {Lecture notes in Mathematical Economics}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{GaJu:99, author = {Gaertner, W. and Jungeilges, J.}, title = {Evaluation by extended orderings: empirical findings from West and East}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1999}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {42}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{GaJuNe:01, author = {Gaertner, W. and Jungeilges, J. and Neck, R.}, title = {Cross-cultural equity evaluations: A questionnaire-experimental approach}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {45}, pages = {953-963}, abstract = {The theoretical background of the empirical investigations to be reported in this paper are positionalist aggregation functions which are numerically representable. The broad Borda rule is proposed as an aggregation mechanism for the case of a complete profile of the so-called individual extended orderings. We modify this rule to re#ect considerations of equity. Students from Germany, Israel, the Baltic States, Austria and Slovenia were confronted with questionnaires that describe &situations', most ofwhichre#ect different aspects of needs. All situations start from the preference structure which underlies an equity axiom.We are focussing on the following three points: (a) What is the percentage of respondents satisfying the equity axiom? (b) How often do the students revise their initial decision when more and more people join the side of the more advantaged? (c) Are there major di!erences across countries and cultures?}, key = {experiments}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.20} } @ARTICLE{Gaertner2003, author = {Gaertner, W. and Namazie, C.}, title = {Income Inequality, Risk and the Transfer Principle: A Questionnaire-Experimental Approach}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2003}, volume = {45}, pages = {229-245}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GaNa:03, author = {Gaertner, W. and Namazie, C.}, title = {Income Inequality, Risk and the Transfer Principle: A Questionnaire-ExperimentalApproach}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2003}, volume = {45}, pages = {229-245}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{GaPa:88, title = {Distributive justice and inequality: A selection of papers given at a conference,{B}erlin {M}ay 1986}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {1988}, author = {Gaertner, W. and Pattanaik, P. K.}, address = {New York, Berlin, London and Tokyo}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{GaWe:85, title = {The Economics of the Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1985}, author = {Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A.}, address = {Berlin}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{GaXu:97, author = {Gaertner, Wulf and Xu, Yonsheng}, title = {Optimization and external reference; a comparison of three axiomatic systems}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {57}, pages = {57-62}, number = {1}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Gahv:07, author = {Gahvari, F.}, title = {On Optimal Commodity Taxes When Consumption Is Time Consuming}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {9}, pages = {1-27}, abstract = {This paper studies the problem of optimal taxation of commodities when consumption is a time-consuming activity. This is done under two distinct preference separability assumptions: between goods and labor supply, and between goods and leisure. It argues that with the labor separability, the traditional uniform taxation results of optimal tax theory continue to hold. With leisure separability, on the other hand, consumption time is a major ingredient of optimal tax rates. However, the relationship between consumption time and optimal tax rates depends crucially on the representation of the economy. In representative consumer economies, time differences determine the pattern of optimal tax rates so that goods whose consumption take more time are subjected to higher tax rates. When individuals have different earning abilities, redistributive, incentive, and efficiency considerations also come into play resulting in a complex relationship. The paper derives formulas for optimal commodity taxes in this case on the basis of three different tax structures: linear commodity taxes in combination with linear and nonlinear income taxes, and nonlinear commodity taxes in combination with nonlinear income taxes.}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Gahv:06, author = {Gahvari, F.}, title = {On the Marginal Cost of Public Funds and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {1251-1262}, key = {public goods}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Gahv:94, author = {Gahvari, F.}, title = {In-kind transfers, cash grants and labor supply}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {55}, pages = {495-504}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Gahvari1994, author = {Gahvari, F.}, title = {In-kind transfers, cash grants, and labor supply}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {55}, pages = {495-504}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @PHDTHESIS{Gail1977, author = {Gail, M. H.}, title = {A scale-free goodness of fit test for exponential distribution based on the sample {L}orenz curve}, year = {1977}, institution = {George Washington University}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @PHDTHESIS{Gail:77, author = {Gail, M. H.}, title = {A scale-free goodness of fit test for exponential distribution based onthe sample {L}orenz curve}, year = {1977}, institution = {George Washington University}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{GaGa:78, author = {Gail, M. H. and Gastwirth, J. L.}, title = {A scale-free goodness of fit test for the exponential distribution based on the {G}ini statistic}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B.}, year = {1978}, volume = {40}, pages = {350-357}, key = {statistics}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2984699} } @ARTICLE{GaGa:78L, author = {Gail, M. H. and Gastwirth, J. L.}, title = {A Scale-Free Goodness-of-Fit Test for Exponential Distribution Based on the {L}orenz Curve}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1978}, volume = {73}, pages = {787-793}, key = {statistics}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2286281} } @ARTICLE{GaPa:05, author = {Gailmard,S. and Palfrey,T.}, title = {An experimental comparison of collective choice procedures for excludablepublic goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {1361-1398}, abstract = {This paper compares three collective choice procedures for the provisionof excludable public goods under incomplete information. One, serial costsharing (SCS), is budget balanced, individually rational, anonymous andstrategy proof. The other two are "hybrid" procedures: voluntary cost sharingwith proportional rebates (PCS) and with no rebates (NR). PCS satisfiesall these properties except strategy proofness, and NR satisfies all theproperties except for strategy proofness and budget balance. However, PCSand NR do not exclude any potential users, and they do not require equalcost shares, thereby overcoming the two main sources of inefficiency withSCS. We characterize the Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) of the hybrid mechanismsand conduct laboratory experiments to compare the performance of the threemechanisms. We find that PCS produces significantly more efficient allocationsthan either SCS or NR.}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Gajd:04, author = {Gajdos, Thibault}, title = {Single crossing Lorenz curves and inequality comparisons}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2004}, volume = {47}, pages = {21-36}, abstract = {Since the order generated by the Lorenz criterion is partial, it is a naturalquestion to wonder how to extend this order. Most of the literature thatis concerned with that question focuses on local changes in the incomedistribution. We follow a different approach, and define uniform a-spreads,which are global changes in the income distribution. We give necessaryand sufficient conditions for an Expected Utility or Rank-Dependent ExpectedUtility maximizer to respect the principle of transfers and to be favorableto uniform a-spreads. Finally, we apply these results to inequality indices.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{GaFe:08, author = {Gajdos, T. and Feriel, K.}, title = {The ignorant observer}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2008}, volume = {31}, pages = {193-232}, abstract = {We propose an extension of Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem based on the representation of ignorance as the set of all possible probability distributions over individuals. We obtain a characterization of the observer’s preferences that, under our most restrictive conditions, is a convex combination of Harsanyi’s utilitarian and Rawls’ egalitarian criteria. This representation is ethically meaningful, in the sense that individuals’ utilities are cardinally measurable and fully comparable. This allows us to conclude that the impartiality requirement cannot be used to decide between Rawls’ and Harsanyi’s positions.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.08}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/12w505l730550306/fulltext.pdf} } @ARTICLE{GaAm:98, author = {Gal-Or, Esther and Amit, Raphael}, title = {Does empowerment lead to higher quality and profitability?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {36}, pages = {411-431}, number = {4}, key = {micro} } @INCOLLECTION{Gala:85, author = {Galasi, P.}, title = {Peculiarities and limits of the second economy in socialism}, booktitle = {The Economics of the Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1985}, editor = {Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A.}, address = {Berlin, Germany}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{GaVe:07, author = {Galbiati,R. and Vertova,P.}, title = {Horizontal Equity}, journal = {Economica}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, abstract = {The principle of horizontal equity (HE) is considered as a basic principle to follow in order to design and evaluate a redistributive policy. However, the theoretical debate has not yet clarified what exactly horizontal equity is. In this paper we aim to clarify the meaning of the principle of HE and its normative content. In particular, we establish the true status of the two fundaments of the principle of HE, defining what is meant by ‘equals’ and then treating these ‘equals’ ‘equally’. Our analysis brings forth a new and more appropriate definition of the principle of HE.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Galb:07, author = {Galbraith, James}, title = {Global inequality and global macroeconomics}, journal = {Journal of Policy Modeling}, year = {2007}, volume = {29}, pages = {587 - 607}, abstract = {This paper presents evidence for a common global pattern in the movement of inequality in national structures of pay, over the years 1963 to 1999. We find a worldwide pattern of declining inequality from 1971 until 1980, followed by a long and sharp period of increasing inequality from 1981 through the end of the century. The existence of a global pattern suggests that the study of inequality, long associated with the disparate effects of technology, trade in local or national labor markets and with national policy choices, would be better treated as a branch of a global macroeconomics, associated with the breakdown of Bretton Woods in 1971–73 and with the onset of the global debt crisis in 1981–82. The work is based on data sets developed by the University of Texas Inequality Project.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Inequality, Macroeconomic forces, Globalization, Development, Kuznets, Inverted “U” hypothesis}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.07} } @ARTICLE{GaMcCPoRo, author = {Galbraith, J. A. and McCarty, N. and Poole, K. T., and Rosenthal, H.}, title = {Polarized {A}merica. The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches.}, __markedentry = {[zhangz3]}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @ARTICLE{GaKu:05, author = {Galbraith,J. and Kum,H.}, title = {Estimating the inequality of household incomes: A statistical approach tothe creation of dense and consistent global data set}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2005}, volume = {51}, pages = {115-143}, abstract = {The deficiencies of the Deininger and Squire data set on household incomeinequality are well known to include sparse coverage, problematic measurements,and the combination of diverse data types into a single data set. Yet manystudies have relied on this data due to the lack of available alternatives.In this paper we show how the UTIP-UNIDO measures of manufacturing payinequality can be used, with other information, to estimate measures ofhousehold income inequality. We take advantage of the systematic relationshipbetween the UTIP-UNIDO estimates and those of Deininger and Squire. Theresiduals from this exercise provide a map to problematic observationsin the Deininger and Squire data, and the estimated coefficients providea way to construct a new panel data set of estimated household income inequality.This new data set provides comparable and consistent measurements acrossspace and through time.}, key = {income distribution: empirical} } @ARTICLE{Galb:98, author = {Galbraith, James K.}, title = {Inequality and unemployment: an analysis across time and countries}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, pages = {121-153}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{Galb:71, title = {Economics, Peace and Laughter, a Contemporary Guide}, publisher = {A. Deutsch Ltd}, year = {1971}, author = {Galbraith, J. K.}, address = {London}, key = {hist econ thought} } @ARTICLE{Gale:93, author = {Gale, Ian}, title = {Price Dispersion in a Market with Advance-Purchases}, journal = {Review of Indutrial Organization}, year = {1993}, volume = {8}, pages = {451--464}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.08} } @TECHREPORT{GaSl:01, author = {Gale, W. G. and Slemrod, J. B.}, title = {Rethinking the estate and gift tax: overview}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2001}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {8205}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138}, key = {wealth taxation} } @BOOK{Gall:97, title = {An Introduction to Econometric Theory: Measure-Theoretic Probability andStatistics with Applications to Economics}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1997}, author = {Gallant, A. R.}, address = {Princeton, New Jersey}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{GaTa:99, author = {Gallant, A. Ronald and Tauchen, George}, title = {The relative efficiency of method of moments estimators}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1998}, volume = {92}, pages = {149-172}, number = {1}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Galm:97, author = {Galmarini, Umberto}, title = {On the Size of the Regressive Bias in Tax Enforcement}, journal = {Economic Notes}, year = {1997}, volume = {26}, pages = {75-102}, number = {1-1997}, note = {Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{GaZe:93, author = {Galor, O. and Zeira, J.}, title = {Income distribution and macroeconomics}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1993}, volume = {60}, pages = {35-52}, key = {{income distribution:theoretical}} } @ARTICLE{Galv:31, author = {Galvani, L.}, title = {Contributi alla determinazione degli indici di variabilit{\`a} per alcuni tipidi distribuzione}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1931}, volume = {9}, pages = {3-45}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Galvani1931, author = {Galvani, L.}, title = {Contributi alla determinazione degli indici di variabilit\`a per alcuni tipi di distribuzione}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1931}, volume = {9}, pages = {3-45}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{GaGaSa:07, author = {Gamboa-Cavazos,M. and Garza-Cantu,V. and Salinas,C.}, title = {The Organization of Corruption: Political Horizons and Special Interests}, institution = {Harvard University}, year = {2007}, type = {working paper}, abstract = {We study the form by which corruption is organized between politicians and entrepreneurs. Using a large-scale survey with data on extra-official payments, and exploiting variation in the gubernatorial office terms and in the market structure across states in Mexico, we examine the manner in which political horizons and industry concentration affect the extent of corruption. Our primary finding is a non-linear relationship between corruption and political horizons. Specifically, corruption is more intense over long and short political horizons, and less intense over intermediate ones. We associate this result with a combination of horizon and capture effects. In the first, politicians prey more intensely on firms as their window of opportunity shortens, and thus command large corruption payments. In the second, entrepreneurs tend to bribe government officials over long and feasible policy horizons, and thus increase their corruption offerings. We also find evidence of a rent effect, where firms that accrue higher rents are more sensitive to the length of political horizons. In particular, firms operating in concentrated industries pay larger bribes over long horizons and lower bribes over short horizons, uncovering their special interest nature. Our investigation underscores the importance of transparency in public-private dealings, especially in constituencies where political accountability is weak.}, key = {corruption}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Gand:05, author = {Gandelman, N.}, title = {Community Tax Evasion Models: A Stochastic Dominance Test}, journal = {Journal of Applied Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {8}, pages = {279-297}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{GaHe:04, author = {Gandelman,N. and Hernandez-Murillo,R.}, title = {Tax Competition and Tax Harmonization With Evasion}, journal = {Topics in Economic Analysis \& Policy}, year = {2004}, volume = {4}, abstract = {We examine a two-jurisdiction tax competition environment where local governmentscan only imperfectly monitor where agents pay taxes and risk-averse individualsmay choose to cross borders to pay lower taxes in a neighboring location.In a game between local authorities, we find that, when communities differin size, in equilibrium the smaller community sets lower taxes and attractsagents from the larger jurisdiction. With identical communities, tax ratesmust be equal. Finally, we examine the incentives of jurisdictions to harmonizetax rates and find that, whenever the smaller community benefits from taxharmonization, the larger jurisdiction will benefit also.}, key = {tax competition} } @ARTICLE{Ga:90, author = {Garber, Peter M.}, title = {Famous First Bubbles}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1990}, volume = {4}, pages = {35--54}, number = {2}, copyright = {Copyright © 1990 American Economic Association}, issn = {08953309}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Spring, 1990}, publisher = {American Economic Association} } @TECHREPORT{GaKlRu:82, author = {Garber, S. and Klepper, S. and Rubenson, D.}, title = {Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Bringing the Theory Closer to the Evidence}, institution = {Carnegie-Mellon University}, year = {1982}, type = {Mimeo}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{GaFe:93, author = {Garc\'\ia Lizana, Antonio and Fern{\'a}ndez Morales, Antonio}, title = {La medici{\'o}n de la pobreza en {A}ndaluc\'\ia}, institution = {Facultad de Ciencias Econ{\'o}micas y Empresariales, Universidad de M{\'a}laga}, year = {1993}, type = {Papeles de Trabajo}, number = {17}, address = {M{\'a}laga, Spain}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Garc'iaLizana1993, author = {Garc\'\ia Lizana, Antonio and Fern{\'a}ndez Morales, Antonio}, title = {La medici\'on de la pobreza en {A}ndaluc\'\ia}, institution = {Facultad de Ciencias Econ\'omicas y Empresariales, Universidad de M\'alaga}, year = {1993}, type = {Papeles de Trabajo}, number = {17}, address = {M\'alaga, Spain}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Garc'ia1996, author = {Garc\'ia, Immaculada and Molina, Jos{\'e} Alberto}, title = {Joint modelling of labour supply and job characteristics demand: an inequality analysis for Spain}, institution = {University of Zaragoza, Spain}, year = {1996}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Garc:78, author = {Garcia, G.}, title = {The currency ratio and the subterranean economy}, journal = {Financial Analysts Journal}, year = {1978}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Garcia, author = {Garcia, Sophie and Henin, Pierre-Yves}, title = {Balancing budget through tax increases or expenditure cuts: Is it neutral?}, journal = {Economic Modelling}, volume = {16}, pages = {591-612}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GaHe:99, author = {Garcia, Sophie and Henin, Pierre-Yves}, title = {Balancing budget through tax increases or expenditure cuts: Is it neutral?}, journal = {Economic Modelling}, year = {1999}, volume = {16}, pages = {591-612}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{GaMo:96, author = {Garc{\'i}a, Immaculada and Molina, Jos{\'e} Alberto}, title = {Joint modelling of labour supply and job characteristics demand: an inequalityanalysis for Spain}, institution = {University of Zaragoza, Spain}, year = {1996}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{Gard:93, author = {Gardiner, Karen}, title = {A Survey of Income Inequality over the Last Twenty Years - How does the{UK} compare}, institution = {Welfare State Programme, STICERD}, year = {1993}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {WSP/100}, month = {November}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{GaHi:99, author = {Gardiner, K. and Hills, J.}, title = {Policy Implications of New Data on Income Mobility}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F91-F111}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Gardiner1999, author = {Gardiner, K. and Hills, J.}, title = {Policy Implications of New Data on Income Mobility}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F91-F111}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{GaMi:06, author = {Gardiner, K. and Millar,J.}, title = {Avoiding poverty over time: Low-paid workers, households and welfare}, institution = {University of Bath}, year = {2006}, type = {CASP Working Paper}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.03.25} } @BOOK{Gard:03, title = {Games for Business and Economics}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {2003}, author = {Gardner, R.}, address = {New York}, edition = {Second}, key = {information} } @BOOK{GaHB:77, title = {Earnings capacity, poverty and inequality}, publisher = {Academic Press}, year = {1977}, author = {Garfinkel, I and Haveman, R. H. and Betson, D.}, address = {New York}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{GaJoKo:96, author = {Garner, T. I. and Johnson, D. S. and Kokoski, M. F.}, title = {An experimental {C}onsumer {P}rice {I}ndex for the poor}, journal = {Monthly Labor Review}, year = {1996}, volume = {119}, pages = {32-42}, number = {9}, month = {September}, abstract = {In this article, experimental Laspeyres, Paasche, and Fisher price indexesare derived for poor consumers. The minimal differences between these indexesand the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) in the calculationof poverty rates indicate that the poor and the general population facesimilar price trends.}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Garo:01, author = {Garoupa, N.}, title = {Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {45}, pages = {1765-1771}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Garo:98, author = {Garoupa, Nuno}, title = {Optimal law enforcement and imperfect information when wealth varies amongindividuals}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {479-490}, number = {260}, month = {November}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{GaGo:08, author = {Garoupa, Nuno and Pomar, Fernando Gomez}, title = {Paying the Price for Being Caught: The Economics of Manifest and Non-Manifest Theft in Roman Law}, journal = {Review of Law and Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {4}, pages = {1 - 23}, abstract = {In Roman law, manifest theft (essentially, one in which a thief was caught in the act) was punished with a more severe penalty than non-manifest theft. This legal policy seems to contradict the economic theory of efficient deterrence. In this paper, we try to explore how economic analysis of criminal law and law enforcement points to several efficiency-based arguments to understand the puzzle, and allows us to tentatively conclude that technological changes in law enforcement in the broad sense might have been the major factor in the disappearance of the rule in modern legal systems.}, key = {Law and Economics}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.07} } @ARTICLE{GaRoWr:06, author = {Garratt, A. and Robertson, D. and Wright, S.}, title = {Permanent vs Transitory Components and Economic Fundamentals}, journal = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, year = {2006}, volume = {21}, pages = {521-542}, abstract = {Any non-stationary series can be decomposed into permanent (or ‘trend’) and transitory (or ‘cycle’) components. Typically some atheoretic pre-filtering procedure is applied to extract the permanent component. This paper argues that analysis of the fundamental underlying stationary economic processes should instead be central to this process. We present a new derivation of multivariate Beveridge–Nelson permanent and transitory components, whereby the latter can be derived explicitly as a weighting of observable stationary processes. This allows far clearer economic interpretations. Different assumptions on the fundamental stationary processes result in distinctly different results, but this reflects deep economic uncertainty. We illustrate with an example using Garratt et al.’s (2003a) small VECM model of the UK economy.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{Garr:05, author = {Garratt,R.}, title = {A tale of two cities and a Giffen good}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {38}, pages = {49-56}, abstract = {A scenario is provided in which a house in Eden Mills, Ontario, is a Giffengood. The conditions derived in the example apply to other indivisiblegoods as well.}, key = {consumption} } @BOOK{Garv:52, title = {Inequality of income: causes and measurement}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1952}, author = {Garvy, G.}, number = {15}, series = {Studies in Income and Wealth}, address = {Princeton, N.J.}, note = {Conference on Research in Income and Wealth}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Garvy1952, author = {Garvy, G.}, title = {Inequality of income: causes and measurement - Studies in Income and Wealth}, year = {1952}, volume = {15}, note = {Conference on Research in Income and Wealth}, address = {New York}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GaJa:00, author = {Gary-Bobo, R. J. and Jaaidane, T.}, title = {Polling Mechanisms and the Demand Revelation Problem}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {76}, pages = {203-238}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{GaGuTo:07, author = {Gasparini, L. and Guti{\'e}rrez, F. and Tornarolli, L.}, title = {Growth and Income Poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence From Household Surveys}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2007}, volume = {53}, pages = {209-245}, abstract = {This paper provides evidence on growth and income poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Results are obtained by processing microdata from household surveys of 18 LAC countries covering the 1990s and early 2000s. Over this period the LAC economies experienced heterogeneous patterns of growth and poverty changes. Most countries in the region had a rather meager performance in terms of poverty reduction. Episodes of positive, significant and unambiguously pro-poor income growth have been rare in Latin America.}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{Gasp:02, author = {Gasparini, L. C.}, title = {On the Measurement of Unfairness: An Application to High School Attendancein {A}rgentina}, journal = {Social Choice Welfare}, year = {2002}, volume = {19}, pages = {795-810}, key = {social justice} } @ARTICLE{Gasparini2002, author = {Gasparini, L. C.}, title = {On the Measurement of Unfairness: An Application to High School Attendance in {A}rgentina}, journal = {Social Choice Welfare}, year = {2002}, volume = {19}, pages = {795-810}, key = {social justice}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Gast:75, author = {Gastwirth, J. L.}, title = {The estimation of a family of measures of economic inequality}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1975}, volume = {3}, pages = {61-70}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Gast:74, author = {Gastwirth, J. L.}, title = {Large-sample theory of some measures of inequality}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1974}, volume = {42}, pages = {191-196}, key = {statistics}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913460} } @ARTICLE{Gast:74AN, author = {Gastwirth, J. L.}, title = {A new index of income inequality}, journal = {International Statistical Institute Bulletin}, year = {1974}, volume = {45}, pages = {437-41}, number = {1}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Gast:72, author = {Gastwirth, J. L.}, title = {The estimation of the {L}orenz curve and {G}ini Index}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1972}, volume = {54}, pages = {306-316}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1937992} } @ARTICLE{Gast:71, author = {Gastwirth, J. L.}, title = {A General Definition of the {L}orenz Curve}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1971}, volume = {39}, pages = {1037-1039}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1909675} } @ARTICLE{Gast:71RE, author = {Gastwirth, J. L.}, title = {Robust estimation of the {G}ini Index of income inequality}, journal = {Bull. ISI}, year = {1971}, volume = {44}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{GaGa:85, author = {Gastwirth, J. L. and Gail, M. H.}, title = {Simple asymptotically distribution-free methods for comparing {L}orenz curvesand {G}ini-indices obtained from complete data}, journal = {Advances in Econometrics}, year = {1985}, volume = {4}, pages = {229-243}, number = {4}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{GaGl:76, author = {Gastwirth, J. L. and Glauberman, M.}, title = {The interpolation of the {L}orenz curve and {G}ini index from grouped data}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1976}, volume = {44}, pages = {479-483}, key = {statistics}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913977} } @ARTICLE{Gastwirth1986a, author = {Gastwirth, J. L. and Nayak, T. and Krieger, A.}, title = {Large sample theory for the bounds on the {G}ini and related indices of inequality estimated from grouped data}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economics Statistics}, year = {1986}, volume = {4}, pages = {269-274}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GaNaKr:86, author = {Gastwirth, J. L. and Nayak, T. K and Krieger, A. N.}, title = {Large Sample Theory for the Bounds on the {G}ini and Related Indices from Grouped Data}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1986}, volume = {4}, pages = {269-273}, key = {statistics}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1391326} } @ARTICLE{GaNaWa:89, author = {Gastwirth, J. L. and Nayak, T. K. and Wang, J. L.}, title = {Statistical properties of between-group income differentials}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1989}, volume = {42}, pages = {5-19}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{GaNa:89, author = {Gastwirth, J. L. and Nayak, T. P.}, title = {The use of diversity analysis to assess the relative influence of factors affecting the income distribution.}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1989}, volume = {7}, pages = {453-460}, key = {statistics}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1391646} } @ARTICLE{GaSm:72, author = {Gastwirth, J. L. and Smith, J. T.}, title = {A New Goodness-of-Fit Test}, journal = {Proceedings of The American Statistical Association}, year = {1972}, pages = {320-322}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{GaHo:08, author = {Gatti, R. and Honorati, M.}, title = {Informality among {Formal Firms: Firm-level, Cross-country Evidence on Tax Compliance and Access to Credit}}, institution = {World Bank}, year = {2008}, type = {Policy Research Working Paper}, number = {4476}, month = {January}, abstract = {The authors use firm-level, cross-county data from Investment Climate surveys in 49 developing countries to investigate an important channel through which informality can affect productivity: access to credit and external finance. Informality is measured as selfreported lack of tax compliance in a sample of registered firms that also answered questions on a large set of other characteristics. The authors find that more tax compliance is significantly associated with more access to credit both in OLS and in country fixed effects estimates. In particular, the link between credit and formality is stronger in high-formality countries. This suggests that firms’ balance sheets are relatively more informative for financial institutions in environments where signal extraction is a less noisy process. The authors’ results are robust to the inclusion of a wide array of correlates and to two-stage estimation.}, journal = {The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper}, key = {tax compliance - firms}, owner = {rodano}, timestamp = {2008.06.12}, volume = {4476} } @ARTICLE{Gaub:07, author = {Gaube, T.}, title = {Optimum Taxation of Each Year's Income}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {9}, pages = {127-150}, abstract = {In this paper, a two-type, two-period model of optimum income taxation is investigated. I assume full commitment and that current income determines the agents’ tax burden in each period. It is shown that such a tax system does not allow one to implement the optimal long-term tax contract and that it implies positive marginal tax rates at the upper end of the income distribution.}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Gaub:01, author = {Gaube, T.}, title = {Group Size and Free Riding When Private and Public Goods are Gross Substitutes}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {(70)1}, pages = {127-132}, key = {Public goods} } @ARTICLE{Gaub:00, author = {Gaube, T.}, title = {When Do Distortionary Taxes Reduce the Optimal Supply of Public Goods?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {76}, pages = {151-180}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{GaGe:97, author = {Gauthier, Bernard and Gersovitz, Mark}, title = {Revenue erosion through exemption and evasion in Cameroon, 1993}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {407-424}, number = {3}, month = {June}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Gaya:97, author = {Jean-Paul Gayant}, title = {Decreasing Marginal Utility and Probabilistic Risk Aversion}, journal = {Revue d'Economic Politique}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {331-342}, number = {3}, note = {summary in english}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Gean:92, author = {Geanakoplos,J.}, title = {Common Knowledge}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1992}, volume = {6}, pages = {53-82}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{GePeSt:89, author = {Geanakoplos, John and Pearce, David and Stacchetti, Ennio}, title = {Psychological games and sequential rationality}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {1989}, volume = {1}, pages = {60--79}, number = {1}, month = mar, abstract = {In psychological games the payoff to each player depends not only on what every player does but also on what he thinks every player believes, and on what he thinks they believe others believe, and so on. In equilibrium, beliefs are assumed to correspond to reality. Yet psychological games and psychological equilibria allow one to model belief-dependent emotions such as anger and surprise that are problematic for conventional game theory. We are particularly interested in issues of sequential rationality for psychological games. We show that although backward induction cannot be applied, and "perfect" psychological equilibria may not exist, subgame perfect and sequential equilibria always do exist.}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.06.16} } @ARTICLE{GePo:08, author = {Geanakoplos, J. and Polemarchakis, H. M.}, title = {Pareto improving taxes}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {44}, pages = {682-696}, number = {7-8}, month = {July}, abstract = {We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by a package of anonymous commodity taxes that causes prices to adjust and markets to reclear at different levels of individual consumption. This constrained suboptimality of competitive allocations might provide a rationale for economic policy in economies with externalities. It shows that policy makers should look for good tax packages that help everybody, rather than thinking taxes must inevitably be bad for some lobby that will oppose them.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.21} } @TECHREPORT{GePo:06, author = {Geanakoplos, J. D. and Polemarchakis, H. M}, title = {Pareto Improving Taxes}, institution = {Cowles Foundation}, year = {2006}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {1576}, address = {john.geanakoplos@yale.edu; Cowles Foundation, Yale University h.polemarchakis@warwick.ac.uk; Economics, University of Warwick http://ssrn.com/abstract=928075}, month = {August}, abstract = {We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can be Pareto improved by a package of anonymous commodity taxes that cause prices to adjust and markets to reclear at different levels of individual consumption. The argument can be extended to economies with strategic interactions, incomplete asset markets or asymmetric information. This constrained suboptimality of competitive allocations might provide a rationale for economic policy in economies with externalities.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.15} } @INCOLLECTION{Geeroms1987, author = {Geeroms, H. and Mont}, title = {Evaluation de l'importance de l'\'economie souterraine en {B}elgique: Application de la m\'ethode mon\'etaire}, booktitle = {L'\'Economie Informelle}, publisher = {Editions LABOR}, year = {1987}, editor = {Ginsburgh, V. and Pestieau, P.}, address = {Brussels}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{GeMo:87, author = {Geeroms, H. and Mont}, title = {Evaluation de l'importance de l'{\'e}conomie souterraine en {B}elgique: Applicationde la m{\'e}thode mon{\'e}taire}, booktitle = {L'{\'E}conomie Informelle}, publisher = {Editions LABOR}, year = {1987}, editor = {Ginsburgh, V. and Pestieau, P.}, address = {Brussels}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{GeWi:85, author = {Geeroms, H. and Wilmots, H.}, title = {An empirical model of tax evasion and tax avoidance}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1985}, volume = {40}, pages = {190-209}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{Gehr:88, author = {Gehrig, W.}, title = {On the {S}hannon-{T}heil concentration measure and its characterizations}, booktitle = {Measurement in Economics}, publisher = {Physica Verlag}, year = {1988}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{GeHe:82, author = {Gehrig, W. and Hellwig, K.}, title = {Eine {C}harakterisierung der gewichteten {Lr}-Distanz}, journal = {OR Spektrum}, year = {1982}, volume = {3}, pages = {233-237}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{Geig:08, author = {Geiger, Gebhard}, title = {An axiomatic account of status quo-dependent non-expected utility: Pragmatic constraints on rational choice under risk}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2008}, volume = {55}, pages = {116 - 142}, abstract = {An axiomatic account of rational risky choice is given which makes the impact of the decision maker's economic situation on his preferences explicit. The constraints on rationality include the decision maker's aspirations, uncertainties of current wealth and income (status quo), and the dependence of risk attitudes on background risks. Preferences admit a unique explicit utility representation in a suitable normalisation of the utility scale. The utility functional is generally non-linear in the probabilities and non-separable, but otherwise mathematically simple. It explicates well-known empirical features of utility-oriented behaviour such as the Allais paradox, observed variations in risk attitude and systematic violations of betweenness.}, key = {Utility}, keywords = {Risk analysis, Decision theory, Utility theory, Non-expected utility, Status quo-dependent risk preferences}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.08} } @ARTICLE{GeMoPi:99, author = {Gemmell, N. and Morrissey, O. and Pinar, A.}, title = {Fiscal Illusion and the Demand for Government Expenditures in the {UK}}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {687-704}, key = {public economics} } @INCOLLECTION{Gens:98, author = {Genser, Bernd}, title = {Patterns of tax arbitrage and decentralized tax autonomy}, booktitle = {Topics in Public Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Pines, David and Sadka, Efraim and Zilcha, Itzhak}, chapter = {12}, pages = {262-287}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{GeLa:97, author = {Georgellis, Y. and Lange, T.}, title = {The effect of Further Training on Wage Growth in {W}est {G}ermany, 1984-1992}, journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1997}, pages = {165-181}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{GeJo:00, author = {Gerdtham, U.-G. and Johannesson, M.}, title = {Income-Related Inequality in Life-Years and Quality-Adjusted Life-Years}, journal = {Journal of Health Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {19}, pages = {1007-1026}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{Gero:98, author = {Geroski, P. A.}, title = {Thinking creatively about markets}, journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {16}, pages = {677-695}, number = {6}, key = {industry} } @INCOLLECTION{Gers:99, author = {Gershuny, J.}, title = {Informal Economic Activity and Time Use Evidence}, booktitle = {Time Use - Research, Data and Policy}, publisher = {NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft}, year = {1998}, editor = {Merz, J. and Ehling, M.}, pages = {13-24}, address = {NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden Baden}, key = {time use} } @TECHREPORT{Gers:06, author = {Gersovitz,M.}, title = {Size Distribution of Firms, Cournot, and Optimal Taxation}, institution = {IMF}, year = {2006}, type = {working paper}, number = {06/271}, abstract = {Tax laws and administrations often treat different size firms differently. There is, however, little research on the consequences. As modeled here, oligopolists with different efficiencies determine the size distribution of firms. A government that maximizes a weighted sum of consumer surplus, profits, and tax receipts can tax firms with different efficiencies differently and provides a reference point for other, more restricted differential tax systems. Taxes include a specific sales tax, an ad valorem sales tax, and a profits tax with imperfect deductibility of capital cost, and a combination of the last two. In general there is a pattern of tax rates by efficiency of firm. It is heavily dependent on the social valuation of tax receipts. Analytic and simulation results are provided. When both ad valorem taxes and the imperfect profits tax are combined, simulations suggest that the former rate is higher and the latter rate is lower for relatively inefficient firms.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{GeHe:87, author = {Gerstner, E. and Hess, J. D.}, title = {Why do hot dogs come in packs of 10 and buns in 8s or 12s? A demand-sideinvestigation}, journal = {Journal of Business}, year = {1987}, volume = {60}, pages = {491-517}, key = {industry} } @TECHREPORT{GeLeMo:03, author = {Gertler, P. and Levine, D.I. and Moretti, E.}, title = {Do Microfinance Programs Help Families Insure Consumption Against Illness?}, institution = {Center for International and Development Research, University of California, Berkeley}, year = {2003}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {C03-129}, address = {http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cider/C03-129/}, abstract = {The authors test whether access to microfinancial savings and lending institutions helps Indonesian families smooth consumption against risks to health in the adult and income-earning members of the household. They conclude that the presence of microfinance lending institutions are important in helping such families selfinsure against shocks to health.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{GeGlRo:79, author = {Gevers, L. and Glejser, H. and Rouyer, J.}, title = {Professed inequality aversion and its error component}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1979}, volume = {81}, pages = {238-243}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{GeKe:00, author = {Geweke, J. and Keane, M.}, title = {An Empirical Analysis of Earnings Dynamics Among Men in the {PSID}: 1968-1989}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2000}, volume = {96}, pages = {293-356}, key = {earnings} } @ARTICLE{GeMaZa:86, author = {Geweke, J. and Marshall, R. C. and Zarkin, G. A.}, title = {Mobility Indices in Continuous Time {M}arkov Chains}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1986}, volume = {54}, pages = {1407-1423}, number = {6}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{GhMaMa:04, author = {Ghirardato,P. and Maccheroni,F. and Marinacci,M.}, title = {Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2004}, volume = {118}, pages = {133-173}, abstract = {The objective of this paper is to show how ambiguity, and a decision maker(DM)’s response to it, can be modelled formally in the context of a generaldecision model. We introduce a relation derived from the DM’s preferences,called ‘‘unambiguous preference’’, and show that it can be representedby a set of probabilities. We provide such set with a simple differentialcharacterization, and argue that it is a behavioral representation of the‘‘ambiguity’’ that the DM may perceive. Given such revealed ambiguity,we provide a representation of ambiguity attitudes. We also characterizeaxiomatically a special case of our decision model, the ‘‘a-maxmin’’ expectedutility model.}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{GhMaMaMa:03, author = {Ghirardato,P. and Maccheroni,F. and Marinacci,M. and Siniscalchi,M.}, title = {Notes and comments A subject spin on Roulette Wheels}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2003}, volume = {71}, pages = {1897-1908}, abstract = {We provide a simple behavioral definition of 'subjective mixture' of actsfor a large class of (not necessarily expected-utility) preference. Subjectivemixtures enjoy the same algebraic properties as the 'objective mixtures'used to great advantage in the decision setting introduced by Anscombeand Aumann(1963). This makes it possible to formulate mixture-space axiomsin a fully subjective setting. For illustration, we present simple subjectiveaxiomatizations of some models of choice under uncertainty, including Bewley'smodel of choice with incomplete preferences.}, key = {Utility, preference} } @TECHREPORT{GhMa:01, author = {Ghirardato, P. and Marinacci, M.}, title = {Risk, Ambiguity and the Separation of Utility and Beliefs}, institution = {California Institute of Technology}, year = {2001}, type = {Social Science Working Paper}, number = {1085}, address = {Pasadena,California 91125}, abstract = {We introduce a general model of static choice under uncertainty,which isarguably the weakest model achieving a separation of cardinal utility anda unique representation of beliefs. Most of the popular non-expected utilitymodels existing in the literature are special cases of it. To prove theinterest of such a general model,we show that it has a simple and naturalaxiomatization. Elsewhere we show that it can be very helpful in the characterizationof a notion of ambiguity aversion,as the separation of utility and beliefshere achieved allows to identify and remove aspects of risk attitude fromthe decision maker 's behavior. Here we show that the model can be usedto generalize several well known results on the characterization of riskaversion in betting behavior.These generalizations are of independent interest,asthey show that some traditional results for preferences which satisfy thesubjective expected utility model can be formulated only in terms of binaryacts.}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Ghos:71, author = {Ghosh, J. K.}, title = {A {N}ew {P}roof of the {B}ahadur {R}epresentation of {Q}uantiles and an{A}pplication}, journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1971}, volume = {42}, pages = {1957-1961}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Ghosh1971, author = {Ghosh, J. K.}, title = {A {N}ew {P}roof of the {B}ahadur {R}epresentation of {Q}uantiles and an {A}pplication}, journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1971}, volume = {42}, pages = {1957-1961}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GhKaOa:07, author = {Ghosh,S. and Karaivanov, A. and Oak,M.}, title = {A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {9}, pages = {425-449}, number = {3}, abstract = {We extend the model of voluntary contributions to multiple public goods by allowing for bundling of the public goods. Specifically, we study the case where agents contribute into a common pool which is then allocated toward the financing of two pure public goods. We explore the welfare implications of allowing for such bundling vis-à-vis a separate contributions scheme. We show that for high income inequality or for identical preferences among agents bundling leads to higher joint welfare. Interestingly, a welfare improvement can in some cases occur despite a decrease in total contributions. On the contrary, when agents are heterogenous, for low income inequality bundling can lead to lower total contributions and may decrease welfare compared to a separate contribution scheme. Our findings have implications for the design of charitable institutions and international aid agencies.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Giac:50, author = {Giaccardi, F.}, title = {Un criterio per la costruzione di indici di concentrazione}, journal = {Rivista Italiana di Economia, Demografia e Statistica}, year = {1950}, volume = {4}, pages = {527-538}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Gibb:73, author = {Gibbard, A.}, title = {Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1973}, volume = {41}, pages = {587-601}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Gibb:98, author = {Gibbons,R.}, title = {Incentives in Organization}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1998}, volume = {12}, pages = {115-132}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Gibb:97, author = {Gibbons,R.}, title = {An Introductin to Applicable Game Theory}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1997}, volume = {11}, pages = {127-149}, key = {games} } @BOOK{Gibb:92, title = {A Primer in Game Theory}, publisher = {Harvester-Wheatsheaf}, year = {1992}, author = {Gibbons, R.}, address = {Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire}, comment = {Marshall:70F92}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Gibr:57, author = {Gibrat, R.}, title = {On economic inequalities}, journal = {International Economic Papers}, year = {1957}, volume = {7}, pages = {53-70}, note = {translation of chapters V-VII of Gibrat (1931)}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Gibr:31, title = {Les Inegalit{\'e}s Economiques}, publisher = {Sirey}, year = {1931}, author = {Gibrat, R.}, address = {Paris}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @ARTICLE{Gil1992, author = {Gil, M. A. and Martinez, I.}, title = {On the asymptotic optimum allocation in estimating inequality from complete data}, journal = {Kybernetika}, year = {1992}, volume = {28}, pages = {325-332}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GiMa:92, author = {Gil, M. A. and Martinez, I.}, title = {On the asymptotic optimum allocation in estimating inequality from completedata}, journal = {Kybernetika}, year = {1992}, volume = {28}, pages = {325-332}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{GiSc:04, author = {Gilboa, I. and Schmeidler, D.}, title = {Subjective Distributions}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {2004}, volume = {56}, pages = {345-357}, abstract = {A decision maker has to choose one of several random variables whose distributions are not known. As a Bayesian, she behaves as if she knew the distributions. In this paper we suggest an axiomatic derivation of these (subjective) distributions, which is more economical than the derivations by de Finetti or Savage. Whereas the latter derive the whole joint distribution of all the available random variables, our approach derives only the marginal distributions. Correspondingly, the preference questionnaire needed in our case is less smaller.}, key = {distributions}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{Gilb:87, author = {Gilboa, Itzhak and Schmeidler, David}, title = {Expected utility with with purely subjective non-additive probabilities}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1989}, volume = {16}, pages = {65-88}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{GiSc:89, author = {Gilboa, Itzhak and Schmeidler, David}, title = {Maxmin expected utility with nonunique prior}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1989}, volume = {18}, pages = {141-153}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{GiGoLaGe:97, author = {C. Giles and A. Gosling and F. Laisney and T. Geib}, title = {The distribution of income and wages in the {UK} and {G}ermany 1984 to 1992}, journal = {IFS mimeo}, year = {1997}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{GiJo:02, author = {Giles, D. and Johnson, B.}, title = {Taxes, Risk-Aversion, and the Size of the Underground Economy: A Non-Parametric Analysis with New Zealand Data}, journal = {Pacific Economic Review}, year = {2002}, volume = {7}, pages = {97-113}, key = {taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{Gile:04, author = {Giles, D. E. A.}, title = {A convenient method of computing the {G}ini index and its standard error}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2004}, volume = {66}, pages = {425-433}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.07.21} } @ARTICLE{Gile:99, author = {Giles, D. E. A.}, title = {Measuring the Hidden Economy: Implications for Econometric Modelling}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F370-F380}, key = {Underground} } @ARTICLE{Gile:99MT, author = {Giles, D. E. A.}, title = {Modelling the Hidden Economy and the Tax-Gap in New Zealand}, journal = {Empirical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {24}, key = {Underground} } @BOOK{Gill:87, title = {In The Name of Charity: The {R}ossminster Affair}, publisher = {Chatto and Windus}, year = {1987}, author = {Gillard, M.}, address = {London}, key = {crime} } @INCOLLECTION{GiSo:98, author = {Gilles, Robert P. and Scotchmer, Suzanne}, title = {Decentralization in club economies: how multiple private goods matter}, booktitle = {Topics in Public Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Pines, David and Sadka, Efraim and Zilcha, Itzhak}, chapter = {5}, pages = {121-138}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Gill:08, author = {Gillie, Alan}, title = {Identifying the poor in the 1870s and 1880s}, journal = {Economic History Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {61}, pages = {302 -325}, abstract = {Poverty lines devised throughout England andWales in the 1870s and 1880s defined ‘the poor’, a new class not recognized by the poor law. This article provides an account of the poverty lines adopted, mainly by school boards, in about 40 different places; the context in which they were developed; and what has been retrieved of the reasons determining the adoption of specific poverty lines. In particular, it examines the principal controversies surrounding them, and the challenge they posed to the poor law; and, incidentally, compares them to the poverty lines proposed, many years later, by Booth and Rowntree.}, key = {Poverty}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.08} } @BOOK{Gill:82, title = {In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1982}, author = {Gilligan, C.}, address = {Cambridge, Mass}, key = {psychology} } @TECHREPORT{GiMa:96, author = {Gines, Miguel and Marhuenda, Francisco}, title = {Efficiency, Monotonicity and Rationality in Public Goods Economies}, institution = {Institut Valencia, D'Investigacions Economiques}, year = {1996}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {WP-AD 96-12}, month = {July}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Gini:05, author = {Gini, C.}, title = {On the measurement and concentration of characters}, journal = {Metron}, year = {2005}, volume = {63}, pages = {3-38}, comment = {Originall published in Atti del reale Instituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettereed Arti 1914, vol 73, part 2, pp 1203-1248}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Gini:55, author = {Gini, C.}, title = {Memorie di Metodologia Statistica}, year = {1955}, volume = {1}, address = {Roma}, key = {statistics}, publisher = {Pizetti and Salvemini, Libreria Eredi Virgilio Veschi}, series = {Variabilit{\`a} e Concentrazione} } @TECHREPORT{Gini:36, author = {Gini, C.}, title = {On the measurement of concentration with special reference to income andwealth.}, year = {1936}, type = {Colorado College Publicatons}, address = {Colorado Springs}, note = {Cowles commission Research Conference}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Gini1921, author = {Gini, C.}, title = {Measurement of inequality of incomes}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1921}, volume = {31}, pages = {124-126}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Gini:21, author = {Gini, C.}, title = {Measurement of inequality of incomes}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1921}, volume = {31}, pages = {124-126}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Gini1912, author = {Gini, C.}, title = {Variabilit\`a e Mutabilit\`a}, journal = {Studi Economico-Giuridici dell'Universit\`a di Cagliari}, year = {1912}, volume = {3}, pages = {1-158}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Gini:12, author = {Gini, C.}, title = {Variabilit{\`a} e Mutabilit{\`a}}, journal = {Studi Economico-Giuridici dell'Universit{\`a} di Cagliari}, year = {1912}, volume = {3}, pages = {1-158}, key = {inequality} } @MISC{Gini:10, author = {Gini, C.}, title = {Indici di Concentrazione e di Dipendenza}, howpublished = {In {G}ini 1955, p. 3-120}, year = {1910}, note = {Atti della III Reunione della Sociat{\`a} Italiana per il Progresso delle Scienze}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{GiMiPaPe:85, author = {Ginsburgh, V. and Michel, Ph. and Padoa Schioppa, F. and Pestieau, P.}, title = {The Economics of the Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1985}, editor = {Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A.}, pages = {194-217}, address = {Berlin}, key = {underground} } @BOOK{GiPe:87, title = {L'{\'E}conomie Informelle}, publisher = {Editions LABOR}, year = {1987}, author = {Ginsburgh, V. and Pestieau, P.}, address = {Brussels}, key = {underground} } @INCOLLECTION{GiPePe:87, author = {Ginsburgh, V., Perelman, S. and Pestieau, P.}, title = {Le travail au noir}, booktitle = {L'{\'E}conomie Informelle}, publisher = {Editions LABOR}, year = {1987}, editor = {Ginsburgh, V. and Pestieau, P.}, address = {Brussels}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Gior:93, author = {Giorgi, G. M.}, title = {A Fresh Look at the Topical Interest of the {G}ini Concentration Ratio}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1993}, volume = {51}, pages = {83-98}, number = {n 1-2}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Gior:90, author = {Giorgi, G. M.}, title = {Bibliographic Portrait of the {G}ini Concentration Ratio}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1990}, volume = {48}, pages = {183-221}, number = {n 1-4}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Gior:84, author = {Giorgi, G. M.}, title = {A methodological survey of recent studies for the measurement of inequalityof economic welfare carried out by some {I}talian statisticians}, journal = {Economic Notes}, year = {1984}, volume = {1}, pages = {146-158}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Giorgi1984, author = {Giorgi, G. M.}, title = {A methodological survey of recent studies for the measurement of inequality of economic welfare carried out by some {I}talian statisticians}, journal = {Economic Notes}, year = {1984}, volume = {1}, pages = {146-158}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GiQu:03, author = {Giraud, Gael and Quah, John K.-H.}, title = {Homothetic or Cobb-Douglas Behavior Through Aggregation}, journal = {Contributions to Theoretical Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {3}, pages = {1-21}, number = {8}, abstract = {A common theme in the theory of demand aggregation is that market demandcan acquire properties which are not always individually present amongthe agents who make up that market, a phenomenon we call heteroiosis inthis paper. This paper focusses on the well known result that with a suitabledistribution of demand behavior (arising perhaps from the underlying distributionof preferences), market demand can become an approximately linear functionof income or even take on approximately Cobb-Douglas properties. We highlightthe mathematical arguments underpinning these models and show that in theright context, it is possible to carry the arguments further and achieveexact, rather than just approximate, results: exact Cobb-Douglas marketdemand or exact linearity of market demand with respect to income.}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{Glae:03, author = {Glaeser,E.}, title = {Psychology and the Market}, institution = {Harvard Institue of Economic Research}, year = {2003}, abstract = {Prospect theory, loss aversion, mental accounts, hyperbolic discounting,cues, and the endowment effect can all be seen as examples of situationalism-the view that people isolate decisions and overweight immediate aspectsof the situation relative to longer term concerns. But outside of the laboratory,emotionally-powerful situational factors- frames, social influence, mentalaccounts- are almost always endogenous and often the result of self-interestedentrepreneurs. As such, laboratory work and, indeed, psychology more generally,gives us little guidance as to market outcomes. Economics provides a strongerbasis for understanding the supply of emotionally-relevant situationalvariables. Paradoxically, the rise of situationalism actually increasesthe relative importance of economics.}, key = {psychology} } @TECHREPORT{GlGo:04, author = {Glaeser,E. and Goldin,C.}, title = {Corruption and Reform: An Introduction}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, abstract = {The United States today, according to most studies, is among the least corruptnations in the world. But America's past was checkered with political scandaland widespread corruption that would not seem unusual compared with themost corrupt developing nation today. We construct a "corruption and fraudindex" using word counts from a large number of newspapers for 1815 to1975, supplemented with other historical facts. The index reveals thatAmerica experienced a substantial decrease in corruption from 1870 to 1920,particularly from the late-1870s to the mid-1880s and again in the 1910s.At its peak in the 1870s the "corruption and fraud index" is about fivetimes its level from the end of the Progressive Era to the 1970s. If theUnited States was once considerably more corrupt than it is today, thenAmerica's history should offer lessons about how to reduce corruption.How did America become a less corrupt polity, economy, and society? Wereview the findings and insights from a series of essays for a conferencevolume, Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America's History, for whichthis paper is the introduction that attempt to understand the remarkableevolution of corruption and reform in U.S. history.}, key = {corruption} } @ARTICLE{GlSa:06, author = {Glaeser, E. and Saks, R.}, title = {Corruption in America}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {1053-1072}, key = {corruption}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @TECHREPORT{GlSa:04, author = {Glaeser,E. and Saks,R.}, title = {Corruption in America}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, abstract = {We use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the U.S. to investigatethe causes and consequences of corruption. More educated states, and toa less degree richer states, have less corruption. This relationship holdseven when we use historical factors like education in 1928 or Congregationalismin 1890, as instruments for the level of schooling today. The level ofcorruption is weakly correlated with the level of income inequality andracial fractionalization, and uncorrelated with the size of government.There is a weak negative relationship between corruption and employmentand income growth. These results echo the cross-country findings, and supportthe view that the correlation between development and good political outcomesoccurs because more education improves political institutions}, key = {corruption} } @ARTICLE{GlSaSc:96, author = {Glaeser, E. L. and Sacerdote, B. and Scheinkman, J. A.}, title = {Crime and Social Interactions}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {111}, pages = {507-548}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{GlLaScSo:00, author = {Glaser, E. L. and Laibson, D. I. and Scheinkman, J. A. and Soutter, C.L.}, title = {Measuring Trust}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {2000}, pages = {811-846}, key = {social capital} } @ARTICLE{Glas:62, author = {Glasser, G. J.}, title = {Variance formulas for the mean difference and the coefficient of concentration}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1962}, volume = {57}, pages = {648-654}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Glas:61, author = {Glasser, G. J.}, title = {Relationship between the mean difference and other measures of variation}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Glat:02, title = {Rich and Poor: Disparities, Perceptions, Concomitants}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {2002}, author = {Glatzer, W.}, address = {Dewenter}, abstract = {This book is concerned with the question of inequality - which points toa major structural problem in intra-national and inter-national respect.It covers the tension between the rich and poor in less developed countriesas well as within richer countries in the process of globalisation. Themain topics are the scope of disparities between the rich and poor, people'sperception of wealth and povertyand the concomitants of inequality whichshape this relationship and influence its socio-economic consequences.In the tradition of social reporting, the book brings together authorsfrom 15 countries, documenting a broad range of the international inequalitydebate. The results are related to the trends of socio-economic development,to statistical problems of measuring inequalityand to socio-political problemsof integrating society in the facing the challenge of dividing forces.The book is of interest for everybody who wants to understand the tensionsof modern world.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{GlKaPo:08, author = {Glazer, Amihail and Kanniainen, Vesa and Poutvaara, Panu}, title = {Income taxes, property values, and migration}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {915 - 923}, abstract = {We consider the effects of income redistribution when people can migrate from one country to another, and when land within each country is heterogeneous. Taxes related to income can then affect property values, and can induce migration, which further affects property values. We show that under these conditions a utilitarian government should never equalize after-tax incomes. If migration is impossible, it may even transfer income from the poor to the rich, reducing the rents earned by absentee landlords. The redistributive tax on the rich may be higher or lower when the rich can migrate than when they cannot. A Rawlsian government in the absence of mobility will equalize after-tax incomes. Under mobility, Rawlsian governments cut their taxes if and only if the relative pre-tax income of the poor is sufficiently low.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Taxes, Land rents, Property values, Migration, Redistribution}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.08} } @ARTICLE{GlKo:99, author = {Amihai Glazer and Kai A. Konrad}, title = {Taxation of Rent-Seeking Activities}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {61-72}, number = {1}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{GlNi:97, author = {Glazer, A. and Niskanen, E.}, title = {Why voters may prefer congested public clubs}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {37-44}, key = {clubs} } @ARTICLE{GlNiSc:97, author = {Glazer, A. and Niskanen, E. and Scotchmer, S.}, title = {On the issues of club theory: Preface to the club theory symposium}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {3-8}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Glejser1977, author = {Glejser, H. and Gevers, L. and Lambot, Ph. and Morales, J. A.}, title = {An econometric study of the variables determining inequality aversion among students}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {10}, pages = {173-188}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GlGeLaMo:77, author = {Glejser, H. and Gevers, L. and Lambot, Ph. and Morales, J. A.}, title = {An econometric study of the variables determining inequality aversion amongstudents}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {10}, pages = {173-188}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Ue-Ya:00, author = {Glen Ueng, G. L. and Yang, C. C.}, title = {Taxation with Little Administration}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {75}, pages = {145-156}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Glew:91, author = {Glewwe, P.}, title = {Household equivalence scales and the measurement of inequality: Transfers from the poor to the rich could decrease inequality}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {44}, pages = {211-216}, key = {Equivalence scales} } @ARTICLE{Glew:90, author = {Glewwe, P.}, title = {The measurement of income inequality under inflation}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1990}, volume = {32}, pages = {43-67}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Glew:86, author = {Glewwe, P.}, title = {The Distribution of Income in {S}ri {L}anka in 1969-70 and 1980-81.}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {24}, pages = {255-274}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{GlHa:98, author = {Glewwe, Paul and Hall, Gillette}, title = {Are some groups more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks than others? Hypothesistests based on panel data from {P}eru}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {56}, pages = {181-206}, number = {1}, key = {macro} } @ARTICLE{GlLa:99, author = {Glomm, G. and Lagunoff, R.}, title = {A Dynamic {T}iebout Theory of Voluntary vs Involuntary Provision of PublicGoods}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {659-677}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Glomm1999, author = {Glomm, G. and Lagunoff, R.}, title = {A Dynamic {T}iebout Theory of Voluntary vs Involuntary Provision of Public Goods}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {659-677}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GlLa:98, author = {Glomm, Gerhard and Lagunoff, Roger}, title = {A {T}iebout theory of public vs private provision of collective goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {68}, pages = {91-112}, number = {1}, abstract = {We study whether `coercive' public provision or voluntary private provisionof public goods can survive when individuals who `vote with their feet'can choose between communities that differ in the way that public goodsare provided. We obtain the following findings: (i) an equilibrium alwaysexists in which all individuals migrate to the community which uses voluntaryprovision; (ii) under very robust conditions on preferences and incomedistribution, an equilibrium exists in which all individuals migrate tothe community which uses coercive provision; (iii) `interior' equilibriain which collections of individuals move to both communities exist whenincome distribution is sufficiently polarized. Such equilibria are shownto be stratified-richer individuals migrate to the community with voluntaryprovision while poorer individuals reside in the public provision community.In the case where there are two types of wealth endowments, existence ofstratified equilibria seems to require a negative trade-off between thewealth ratio of the rich to the poor and the numerical ratio of rich topoor in society.}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{GnHaYa:04, author = {Gneezy, Uri and Haruvy, Ernan and Yafe, Hadas}, title = {The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2004}, volume = {114}, pages = {265-280}, abstract = {When agents are ascribed selfish motives, economic theory points to graveinefficiencies resulting from externalities. We study a restaurant settingin which groups of diners are faced with different ways of paying the bill.The two main manipulations are splitting the bill between the diners andhaving each pay individually. We find that subjects consume more when thecost is split, resulting in a substantial loss of efficiency. Diners preferthe individual pay to the inefficient split-bill method. When forced toplay according to a less preferred set of rules, they minimise their individuallosses by taking advantage of others.}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{GnLiWu:06, author = {Gneezy, U. and List, J. A. and Wu, G.}, title = {The Uncertainty Effect: When A Risky Prospect Is Valued Less Than Its Worst Possible Outcome}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {121}, pages = {1283-1309}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{GnPo:97, author = {Gneezy, U. and Potters, J.}, title = {An experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {112}, pages = {631-645}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{GnRu:00, author = {Gneezy, U. and Rustichini, A.}, title = {Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {115}, pages = {791-810}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{GoRaVa:07, author = {Gobbin, Niko and Rayp, Glen and Van de gaer, Dirk}, title = {Inequality and Growth: From Micro Theory to Macro Empirics}, journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2007}, volume = {54}, pages = {508 - 530}, abstract = {We show that the way individual income data should be aggregated into an index of inequality in order to explain countries’ growth performance is theory specific. A simulation set-up shows that the use of a wrong measure might obscure the inequality–growth relationship and that the relative performance of different measures of inequality can be informative about the channel through which inequality influences economic growth.}, key = {Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.08} } @ARTICLE{GoWi:01, author = {Goddard, J. and Wilson, J.}, title = {Cross Sectional and Panel Estimation of Convergence}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {70}, pages = {327-333}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{GoHaKaVa:77, author = {Goedhart, T. and Halberstadt, V. and Kapteyn, A. and Van Praag, B. M. S.}, title = {The poverty line: concept and measurement}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1977}, volume = {12}, pages = {503-20}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Goeree2005, author = {Goeree, Jacob and Holt, Charles and Palfrey, Thomas}, title = {Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium}, journal = {Experimental Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {8}, pages = {347--367}, number = {4}, month = dec, abstract = {The structural Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) generalizes the Nash equilibrium by augmenting payoffs with random elements that are not removed in some limit. This approach has been widely used both as a theoretical framework to study comparative statics of games and as an econometric framework to analyze experimental and field data. The framework of structural QRE is flexible: it can be applied to arbitrary finite games and incorporate very general error structures. Restrictions on the error structure are needed, however, to place testable restrictions on the data (Haile et al., 2004). This paper proposes a reduced-form approach, based on quantal response functions that replace the best-response functions underlying the Nash equilibrium. We define a regular QRE as a fixed point of quantal response functions that satisfies four axioms: continuity, interiority, responsiveness, and monotonicity. We show that these conditions are not vacuous and demonstrate with an example that they imply economically sensible restrictions on data consistent with laboratory observations. The reduced-form approach allows for a richer set of regular quantal response functions, which has proven useful for estimation purposes.}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.07.21}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-005-5374-7} } @ARTICLE{Goeree2004, author = {Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A.}, title = {A model of noisy introspection}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {2004}, volume = {46}, pages = {365--382}, number = {2}, month = feb, abstract = {We present a theoretical model of noisy introspection designed to explain behavior in games played only once. The model determines layers of beliefs about others' beliefs about ..., etc., but allows for surprises by relaxing the equilibrium requirement that belief distributions coincide with decision distributions. Noise is injected into iterated conjectures about others' decisions and beliefs, which causes the predictions to differ from those of deterministic models of iterated thinking, e.g., rationalizability. The paper contains a convergence proof that implies existence and uniqueness of the outcome of the iterated thought process. In addition, estimated introspection and noise parameters for data from 37 one-shot matrix games are reported. The accuracy of the model is compared with that of several alternatives.}, keywords = {Game theory, Introspection, Rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, Experiments, Noisy behavior, Bounded rationality}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2007.02.09} } @ARTICLE{Goeree2001, author = {Goeree, Jacob K. and Holt, Charles A.}, title = {Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {91}, pages = {1402--1422}, number = {5}, abstract = {This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case, however, a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others' decisions.}, copyright = {Copyright © 2001 American Economic Association}, issn = {00028282}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Dec., 2001}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {American Economic Association}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2677931} } @ARTICLE{GoHoLa:02, author = {Goeree, J. K. and Holt, C. A. and Laury, S. K.}, title = {Private Costs and Public Benefits: Unravelling the Effects of Altruism andNoisy Behaviour}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {83}, pages = {255-276}, key = {Externalities} } @ARTICLE{GoHoWe:98, author = {Goeree, Jacob K. and Hommes, Cars and Weddepohl, Claus}, title = {Stability and complex dynamics in a discrete tatonnement model}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {33}, pages = {395-410}, number = {3-4}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{Goer:08, author = {Goerke, Laszlo}, title = {Tax Overpayments, Tax Evasion, and Bok-Tax Differences}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2212}, abstract = {A strictly risk-averse manager makes joint decisions on a firm's tax payments and book profit declarations according to accounting standards. It is analysed how the incentives to overpay or evade taxes and to inflate book profits are influenced by (1) the composition of the manager's remuneration, (2) the ability to control the manager's actions, (3) the costs of making untruthful profit declarations, and (4) the tax rate. If the firm's owner or the government takes into account these effects when pursuing his own objectives, the changes in tax payments and book profit declarations become theoretically more ambiguous.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {executive compensation, financial accounting, tax evasion}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.08} } @ARTICLE{Goer:04, author = {Goerke, Laszlo}, title = {Tax evasion, tax progression and efficiency wages}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, pages = {35-42}, abstract = {More progressive taxes raise employment in imperfect labour markets. However,this prediction is not robust. For example, any employment effect vanishesin a constant profit efficiency wage economy. It is demonstrated that taxevasion opportunities can re-establish positive employment effects of highertax progression.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{GoRu:06, author = {Goerke, L. and Runkel, M.}, title = {Profit Tax Evasion under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {2006}, volume = {59}, pages = {851-857}, abstract = {This note investigates the impact of profit tax evasion on firms' output decisions in a Cournot oligopoly setting in which the market structure is determined endogenously. It is shown that tax evasion intensifies market entry and raises aggregate output, while production of each incumbent firm decreases. Therefore, tax evasion choices affect activity decisions and an evadable profit tax distorts the market outcome.}, key = {tax compliance - firms}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.10}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2072/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=115&sid=be8fba56-4ec3-43ce-ac5b-85cf32f47dc6%40sessionmgr107&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=buh&AN=23639633} } @ARTICLE{GoerlichGisbert2001, author = {{Goerlich Gisbert}, F. J.}, title = {On Factor Decomposition of Cross-Country Income Inequality: Some Extensions and Qualifications}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {70}, pages = {303-309}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GoGi:01, author = {{Goerlich Gisbert}, F. J.}, title = {On Factor Decomposition of Cross-Country Income Inequality: Some Extensionsand Qualifications}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {70}, pages = {303-309}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{GoFi:04, author = {Goesling, B. and Firebaugh, G.}, title = {The Trend in International Health Inequality}, journal = {Population and Development Review}, year = {30}, volume = {2004}, pages = {131–146}, key = {health}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.02.24} } @ARTICLE{Goet:68, author = {Goetz, C.}, title = {Earmarked Taxes and Majority Rule}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {58}, pages = {128-136}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Gokh:83, author = {Gokhale, D. V.}, title = {On entropy-based goodness-of-fit tests}, journal = {Computational Statistics and Data Analysis}, year = {1983}, volume = {1}, pages = {157-165}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2005.12.23} } @TECHREPORT{GoKoSeWe:98, author = {Gokhale, J. and Kotlikoff, L. and Sefton, J. and Weale, M.}, title = {Simulating the Transmission of Wealth Inequality via Bequests}, institution = {Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland}, year = {1998}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {9811}, abstract = {How much wealth inequality arises from inheritance inequality? This is a fundamental, but unresolved question. Answering it empirically requires data that is unavailable and potentially uncollectable. An alternative approach initiated by Blinder (1974, 1976) and Davies (1982), and the one taken here, is to simulate the transmission of inequality via bequests. This paper constructs, calibrates to U.S. data, and simulates a dynamic 88-period overlapping generations model with the goal of determining how much bequests and other factors affect the intragenerational distribution of wealth. The model features random death, random fertility, assortative mating, heterogeneous human capital endowments, the inheritability of human capital, progressive income taxation, and the partial annuitization through Social Security of households’ retirement savings. All bequests in the model are undesired. They arise because households are not fully annuitized. The absence of altruism or some other motivation for bequests does not preclude our achieving a realistic wealth distribution. Indeed, our model is fully capable of generating a distribution of wealth that is just as unequal and just as skewed as the actual U.S. wealth distribution (as measured with the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances). The fact that intentional bequests are not a prerequisite for explaining wealth inequality is just one of our striking findings. We also find that inheritances play an important role in increasing wealth inequality, but only in the presence of Social Security. The reason is that Social Security annuitizes all of the retirement savings of the poor and most of the retirement savings of the middle class. In so doing it eliminates inheritances by children of the poor, dramatically reduces inheritances by children of the middle class, and leaves essentially unchanged inheritances by children of the rich. Absent Social Security, inheritances actually reduce wealth inequality, albeit to a small degree. Although inheritances in the presence of social security play an important role in generating wealth inequality, the most important factors in this regard are human capital differences, assortative mating based on these differences, and the annuitization of retirement savings via social security. Interestingly, the fact that agents inherit their skills from their parents does not materially alter wealth inequality. Equally interesting is the affect of progressive income taxation on the wealth distribution. In Social Security’s presence, progressive income taxation exacerbates wealth inequality, but it reduces wealth inequality in its absence.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Alex}, timestamp = {2006.06.22} } @ARTICLE{GoKoSeWe:01, author = {Gokhale, J. and Kotlikoff, L. J. and Sefton, J. and Weale, M.}, title = {Simulating the Transmission of Wealth Inequality Via Bequests}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, pages = {93-128}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Gold:07, author = {Goldberg,D.S.}, title = {The Aches and Pains of Transition to a Consumption Tax: Can We Get There from Here?}, journal = {Virginia Tax Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {26}, pages = {447-492}, abstract = {This article discusses probably the most significant obstacle to the adoption of a consumption tax: the negative effects on existing wealth that the transition from the income tax to most forms of a consumption tax would have. The Congressional Budget Office in its 1997 study posed the question, “How to Get There from Here.” The difficulty with transition and the changes in the tax law since the CBO study, however, prompt the more basic question: “Can we get there from here?” This article deals with this question by examining the effects of transition on existing wealth under a variety of consumption tax systems and the likely responses of transition relief under each of the systems. The consumption tax proposals considered and analyzed include direct consumption taxes (like a consumed income tax and yield exemption tax), indirect consumption taxes (like a retail sales tax and various forms of value added taxes), and combinations of the two (like the Flat Tax, X Tax, and E Tax proposals), which involve a two-tier tax structure. The article explains that, as a general proposition, a consumption tax in the form of either a consumed income tax or a VAT reduces the tax on newly invested capital to zero. In contrast, a consumption tax in the form of a yield exemption tax reduces the tax on all capital - including existing capital - to zero. The difference, then, is in the treatment of existing or “old” capital. This important proposition, as well as its significance for purposes of transition, provides a substantial obstacle to the adoption of any form of consumption tax other than yield exemption, and to the extent that the current system already incorporates large elements of yield exemption, makes it less likely that any other form of consumption tax can garner sufficient support for adoption. It is possible that a gradual, phase-in approach could overcome the obstacle of the additional tax on existing wealth. The forces of reform, however, may be working against any shift to a consumption tax (other than yield exemption) even with transition relief in the form of gradual phase-in. As the income tax gradually becomes a yield exemption, wage and business tax, existing wealth owners may view the consumption tax battle as having already been won without cost and without the need to make compromises. Possessors of existing wealth may be reluctant to support an alternative consumption tax system that would erode the consumption purchasing power of some of their wealth. Reform in other consumption tax directions may then be elusive, because it would lack the group that would be its natural supporters.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{GoPa:04, author = {Goldberg,P. and Pavcnik,N.}, title = {Trade, Inequality and Poverty: What do we know? Evidence from recent tradeliberalization episodes in developing countries}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, abstract = {We review the empirical evidence on the relationship between Trade Liberalization,Inequality, and Poverty based on the analysis of micro data from severaldeveloping countries that underwent significant trade reforms in recentyears. Despite many measurement and identification difficulties and despiteconflicting evidence on some issues, empirical work based on "country casestudies" has established certain patterns that seem common across countriesand trade liberalization episodes, and may hence be informative as to howdeveloping countries adjust to trade reform.}, key = {development} } @ARTICLE{Gold:77, author = {Goldie, C. M.}, title = {Convergence theorems for empirical {L}orenz curves and their inverses}, journal = {Advances in Applied Probability}, year = {1977}, volume = {9}, pages = {765-791}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{GoKa:96, author = {Goldin, C. and Katz, L. F.}, title = {Technology, Skill, and the Wage Structure: Insights from the Past}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1996}, volume = {86}, pages = {252-257}, key = {earnings, wages}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.07.30} } @ARTICLE{GoEi:87, author = {Goldstein, W. and Einhorn, H.}, title = {Expression Theory and the Preference Reversal Phenomena}, journal = {Psychological Review}, year = {1987}, volume = {94}, pages = {236-254}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Goll:02, author = {Gollier, C.}, title = {Discounting an Uncertain Future}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {85}, pages = {149-166}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{GoSc:06, author = {Gollier, C. and Schlee E. E.}, title = {Increased Risk-Bearing with Background Risk}, journal = {Topics in Theoretical Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {6}, note = {http://www.bepress.com/bejte/topics/vol6/iss1/art3}, abstract = {Analyses of risk-bearing often assume that agents face only one risk. Agents however usually face several risks and the interaction between them can affect the willingness to bear any one of them. We consider how the introduction of background risk affects the comparative statics predictions of distribution changes in the standard two asset portfolio model. We show that such predictions are fairly robust, no matter what the correlation between the two risks. We consider changes in the conditional distributions of the risky asset's return; and changes in the marginal distribution of the asset's return. For the first question, a version of Gollier's (1995) Central Riskiness order is sufficient and necessary to increase risk-bearing. For the second question, Monotone Likelihood Ratio improvements are sufficient and necessary. Many of our proofs illustrate the "basis" approach to comparative statics under uncertainty.}, key = {risk}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.04.07} } @ARTICLE{GoJuTr:00, author = {Gollier, C. and Julien, B. and Teich, N.}, title = {Scientific Progress and Irreversibility: An Economic Interpretation of the'Precautionary Principle'}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {75}, pages = {229-253}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Gollier2000, author = {Gollier, C. and Julien, B. and Teich, N.}, title = {Scientific Progress and Irreversibility: An Economic Interpretation of the 'Precautionary Principle'}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {75}, pages = {229-253}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Gollier2003, author = {Gollier, Christian and Schlesinger, Harris}, title = {Preserving preference rankings under background risk}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2003}, volume = {80}, pages = {337-341}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GoSc:97, author = {Gollier, Christian and Schlesinger, Harris}, title = {Preserving preference rankings under background risk}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2003}, volume = {80}, pages = {337–341}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{GoTs:07, author = {Golosov,M. and Tsyvinski, A.}, title = {Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {122}, pages = {487-534}, month = {May}, abstract = {We study optimal taxation in an economy where the skills of agents evolve stochastically over time and are private information and in which agents can trade unobservably in competitive markets. We show that competitive equilibria are constrained inefficient. The government can improve welfare by distorting capital accumulation with the sign of the distortion depending on the nature of the skill process. Finally, we show that private insurance provision responds endogenously to policy, that government insurance tends to crowd out private insurance, and, in a calibrated example, that this crowding out effect is large.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Gome:00, author = {Gomez, M. A.}, title = {Welfare-maximizing tax structure in a model with human capital}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {95-99}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{G-DH-BV-P:99, author = {Gomez-Deniz, E. and Hernandez-Bastida, A. and Vazquez-Polo, F. J.}, title = {The Esscher Premium Principle in Risk Theory: A Bayesian Sensitivity Study}, journal = {Insurance, Mathematics and Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {25}, pages = {387-395}, key = {risk} } @INCOLLECTION{Gomu:92, author = {Gomulka, J.}, title = {Grossing-Up Revisited}, booktitle = {Microsimulation Models for Public Policy Analysis: New Frontiers}, publisher = {STICERD}, year = {1992}, editor = {Hancock, R. and Sutherland, H.}, volume = {53}, chapter = {6}, pages = {121-131}, address = {London School of Economics, London}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, key = {microsimulation} } @ARTICLE{GoDaKoJu:05, author = {Gonzalez,C. and Dana,J. and Koshino,H. and Just,M.}, title = {The framing effect and risky decisions:Examining cognitive functions withfMRI}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {2005}, volume = {26}, pages = {1-20}, abstract = {The ‘‘framing effect’’ is observed when the description of options in termsof gains (positive frame) rather than losses (negative frame) elicits systematicallydi.erent choices. Few theories explain the framing e.ect by using cognitiveinformation-processing principles. In this paper we present an explanatorytheory based on the cost-benefit tradeoff.s described in contingent behavior.This theory proposes that individuals examining various alternatives tryto determine how to make a good decision while expending minimal cognitivee.ort. For this study, we used brain activation functional magnetic resonanceimaging (fMRI) to evaluate individuals that we asked to choose betweenone certain alternative and one risky alternative in response to problemsframed as gains or losses. Our results indicate that the cognitive effortrequired to select a sure gain was considerably lower than the cognitivee.ort required to choose a risky gain. Conversely,the cognitive e.ort expendedin choosing a sure loss was equal to the cognitive e.ort expended in choosinga risky loss. fMRI revealed that the cognitive functions used by the decisionmakers in this study were localized in the prefrontal and parietal corticesof the brain,a .finding that suggests the involvement of working memoryand imagery in the selection process.}, key = {psychology} } @ARTICLE{Good:90, author = {Good, F. J.}, title = {Estimates of the distribution of personal wealth}, journal = {Economic Trends}, year = {1990}, pages = {137}, month = {October}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Good:81, author = {Goode, R.}, title = {Some economic aspects of tax administration}, journal = {International Monetary Fund Staff Papers}, year = {1981}, volume = {28}, pages = {249-274}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Good:92, author = {Goodfriend, M.}, title = {Information-Aggregation Bias}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1992}, volume = {82}, pages = {508-519}, abstract = {Aggregation in the presence of data-processing lags distorts the information content of data, violating orthogonality restrictions that hold at the individual level. Though the phenomenon is general, it is illustrated here for the lifecycle- permanent-income model. Cross-section and pooled-panel data induce information-aggregation bias akin to that in aggregate time series. Calculations show that information aggregation can seriously bias tests of the life-cycle model on aggregate time series, cross-section, and pooled-panel data.}, key = {data}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @BOOK{GoJoWe:97, title = {Inequality in the {UK}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1997}, author = {Goodman, Alissa and Johnson, Paul and Webb, Steven}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{GoOl:04, author = {Goodman, A. and Oldfield, Z.}, title = {Permanent Differences? {I}ncome and Expenditure Inequality in the 1990s and 2000s}, institution = {The Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {2004}, type = {IFS Report}, number = {66}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/r66.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{GoSh:02, author = {Goodman,A. and Shephard,A.}, title = {Inequality and Living Standards in {G}reat {B}ritain: Some facts}, institution = {Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {2002}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{GoWe:95, author = {Goodman, Alissa and Webb, Steven}, title = {The distribution of {UK} household expenditure, 1979-92}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1995}, volume = {16}, pages = {55-80}, number = {3}, month = {August}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{GoWe:94, author = {Goodman, A. and Webb, S.}, title = {For richer, for poorer: the changing distribution of income in the {U}nited {K}ingdom, 1961-91}, institution = {Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {1994}, type = {Commentary}, number = {42}, address = {London}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Goodman1994, author = {Goodman, A. and Webb, S. B.}, title = {For Richer, For Poorer: The Changing Distribution of Income in the {UK}, 1961-91}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1994}, volume = {15}, pages = {29-62}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.24}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2250/cgi-bin/fulltext/119275080/PDFSTART} } @ARTICLE{Good:61, author = {Goodman, L. A.}, title = {Statistical Methods for the Mover-Stayer Model}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1961}, volume = {56}, pages = {841-868}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Good:00, author = {Goodspeed, T. J.}, title = {Tax Structure in a Federation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {75}, pages = {493-506}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{GoKaDhTa:04, author = {Goodvaerts, M. and Kass, R. and Dhaene, J. and Tang, Q.}, title = {Some new classes of consistent risk measures}, journal = {Insurance, Mathematics and Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {34}, pages = {505-516}, abstract = {Many types of insurance premium principles and/or risk measures can be characterized by means of a set of axioms, which in many cases are rather arbitrarily chosen and not always in accordance with economic reality. In the present paper we generalize Yaari’s risk measure by relaxing his axioms. In addition, we derive translation invariant minimal Orlicz risk measures, which we call Haezendonck risk measures, and obtain sufficient conditions on the risk measure of Bernoulli risks to fulfill additivity and superadditivity properties for Orlicz premium principles.}, key = {risk}, owner = {Alex}, timestamp = {2006.06.22} } @ARTICLE{Gool:04TI, author = {Goolsbee, Austan}, title = {The impact of the corporate income tax: evidence from state organizationalform data}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {2283-2299}, abstract = {By taxing the income of corporate firms at a different rate than non-corporate firms, taxes can play an important role in a firm’s choice of organizational form. The sensitivity of the organizational form decision to tax rates provides a key indicator of the distortion created by the corporate income tax. This paper uses new cross-sectional data on organizational form choices across states compiled in the Census of Retail Trade to estimate this sensitivity.The results document a significant impact of the relative taxation of corporateto personal income on the share of real economic activity that is doneby corporations and that the impact is many times larger than has beenfound in the previous empirical literature based on time-series data. Theresults show little impact, however, on the actual operations of firmssuch as their labor intensity, wages and the like. They do indicate thatfirms are able to exploit the progressivity of the corporate income taxsystem by dividing into numerous firms.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Goolsbee2004, author = {Goolsbee, Austan}, title = {The impact of the corporate income tax: evidence from state organizational form data}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {2283-2299}, abstract = {By taxing the income of corporate firms at a different rate than non-corporate firms, taxes can play an important role in a firm's choice of organizational form. The sensitivity of the organizational form decision to tax rates provides a key indicator of the distortion created by the corporate income tax. This paper uses new cross-sectional data on organizational form choices across states compiled in the Census of Retail Trade to estimate this sensitivity. The results document a significant impact of the relative taxation of corporate to personal income on the share of real economic activity that is done by corporations and that the impact is many times larger than has been found in the previous empirical literature based on time-series data. The results show little impact, however, on the actual operations of firms such as their labor intensity, wages and the like. They do indicate that firms are able to exploit the progressivity of the corporate income tax system by dividing into numerous firms.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Gool:00, author = {Goolsbee, A.}, title = {What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2000}, volume = {108}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{GoKavHBa:90, title = {Effective Actuarial Methods}, publisher = {North-Holland}, year = {1990}, author = {Goovaerts, M. J. and Kaas, R. and van Heerwarden, A. E. and Bauwelinckx,T.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {finance} } @ARTICLE{Gord:89, author = {Gordon, J. P. F.}, title = {Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrants to tax evasion}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1989}, volume = {33}, pages = {797-805}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Gord:88ET, author = {Gordon, J. P. F.}, title = {Evading taxes by selling for cash}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1988}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Gordon1988, author = {Gordon, J. P. F.}, title = {Evading taxes by selling for cash}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1988}, volume = {44}, pages = {244-255}, number = {1}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GoDe:07, author = {Gordon, Robert and Dew-Becker, Ian}, title = {Selected Issues in the Rise of Income Inequality}, journal = {Brookings Papers on Economic Activity}, year = {2007}, volume = {38}, pages = {169 - 192}, key = {Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.08} } @ARTICLE{GoKaSl:04, author = {Gordon, R. and Kalambodikis, L. and Slemrod, J.}, title = {Do We Now Collect Any Revenue From Taxing Capital Income?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {981-1009}, abstract = {The U.S. income tax system has long been recognized as a hybrid of an income and consumption tax system, with elements that do not fit naturally into either pure system. What it actually is has important policy implications for, among other things, understanding the impact of moving closer to a pure consumption tax regime. In this paper, we examine the nature of the U.S. income tax system by calculating the revenue and distributional implications of switching from the current system to one form of consumption tax, a modified cash flow tax. D 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @INCOLLECTION{GoMa:98WI, author = {Gordon, Roger H. and MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.}, title = {Why is there corporate taxation in a small open economy? the role of transferpricing and income shifting}, booktitle = {Topics in Public Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Pines, David and Sadka, Efraim and Zilcha, Itzhak}, chapter = {11}, pages = {237-261}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{GoNi:97, author = {Gordon, Roger H. and Nielsen, Soren Bo}, title = {Tax evasion in an open economy: Value-added vs. income taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {66}, pages = {173-197}, number = {2}, month = {November}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{GoDe:08, author = {Gordon, R. J. and {Dew-Becker}, I.}, title = {Controversies about the rise of {A}merican inequality: a survey}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2008}, type = {Working paper}, number = {13982}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138}, month = {April}, abstract = {This paper provides a comprehensive survey of seven aspects of rising inequality that are usually discussed separately: changes in labor's share of income; inequality at the bottom of the income distribution, including labor mobility; skill-biased technical change; inequality among high incomes; consumption inequality; geographical inequality; and international differences in the income distribution, particularly at the top. We conclude that changes in labor's share play no role in rising inequality of labor income; by one measure labor's income share was almost the same in 2007 as in 1950. Within the bottom 90 percent as documented by CPS data, movements in the 50-10 ratio are consistent with a role of decreased union density for men and of a decrease in the real minimum wage for women, particularly in 1980-86. There is little evidence on the effects of imports, and an ambiguous literature on immigration which implies a small overall impact on the wages of the average native American, a significant downward effect on high-school dropouts, and potentially a large impact on previous immigrants working in occupations in which immigrants specialize. The literature on skill-biased technical change (SBTC) has been valuably enriched by a finer grid of skills, switching from a two-dimension to a three- or five-dimensional breakdown of skills. We endorse the three-way "polarization" hypothesis that seems a plausible way of explaining differentials in wage changes and also in outsourcing. To explain increased skewness at the top, we introduce a three-way distinction between market-driven superstars where audience magnification allows a performance to reach one or ten million people, a second market-driven segment consisting of occupations like lawyers and investment bankers, and a third segment consisting of top corporate officers. Our review of the CEO debate places equal emphasis on the market in showering capital gains through stock options and an arbitrary management power hypothesis based on numerous non-market aspects of executive pay. Data on consumption inequality are too fragile to reach firm conclusions. We introduce two new issues, disparities in the growth of price indexes and also of life expectancy between the rich and the poor. We conclude with a perspective on international differences that blends institutional and market-driven explanations.}, key = {inequality: empirical}, owner = {rodano}, timestamp = {2008.06.12} } @ARTICLE{Gord:76, author = {Gordon, S.}, title = {The new contractarians}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1976}, volume = {84}, pages = {573-590}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Gorm:80, author = {Gorman, W. M.}, title = {A possible procedure for analysing quality differentials in the egg market}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1980}, volume = {47}, pages = {843-856}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Gorm:68, author = {Gorman, W. M.}, title = {Conditions for additive separability}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1968}, volume = {36}, pages = {605-609}, key = {Utility, preference} } @INCOLLECTION{GoSm:08, author = {Janet C. Gornick and Timothy M. Smeeding}, title = {{The Luxembourg Income Study}}, booktitle = {International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {2008}, editor = {W. A. Jr. Darity}, pages = {419-422}, address = {Detroit}, edition = {2nd} } @TECHREPORT{GoMaSa:08, author = {Gorodnichenko, Yuriy and Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Sabirianova Peter, Klara}, title = {Myth and Reality of Flat Tax Reform: Micro Estimates of Tax Evasion Response and Welfare Effects in Russia}, institution = {Georgia State University, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {08-07}, abstract = {Using micro-level data, we examine the effects of Russia’s 2001 flat rate income tax reform on consumption, income, and tax evasion. We use the gap between household expenditures and reported earnings as a proxy for tax evasion with data from a household panel for 1998-2004. Utilizing difference-in-difference and regression-discontinuity-type approaches, we find that large and significant changes in tax evasion following the flat tax reform are associated with changes in voluntary compliance and cannot be explained by changes in tax enforcement policies. We also find the productivity response of taxpayers to the flat tax reform is small relative to the tax evasion response. Finally, we develop a novel framework to assess the deadweight loss from personal income tax in the presence of tax evasion based on the consumption response to tax changes. We show that because of the strong tax evasion response the efficiency gain from the Russian flat tax reform is at least 30% smaller than the gain implied by conventional approaches.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{GoMa:95, author = {Gosling, Amanda and Machin, Stephen}, title = {Trade Unions and the Dispersion of Earnings in British establishements,1980-90}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1995}, volume = {57}, pages = {167-84}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Gosling1995, author = {Gosling, Amanda and Machin, Stephen}, title = {Trade Unions and the Dispersion of Earnings in British establishements, 1980-90}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1995}, volume = {57}, pages = {167-84}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{GoMaMe:96, author = {Gosling, A. and Machin, S. and Meghir, C.}, title = {What has happened to the wages of men since 1966?}, booktitle = {New Inequalities: the Changing Distribution of Income and Wealth in the{U}nited {K}ingdom}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1996}, editor = {Hills , J. R.}, chapter = {6}, pages = {135-157}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{GoMaMe:94WH, author = {Gosling, A. and Machin, S. and Meghir, C.}, title = {What has happened to wages?}, institution = {Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {1994}, type = {Commentary}, number = {43}, address = {London}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Gott:85, author = {Gottlieb, D.}, title = {Tax evasion and the prisoner's dilemma}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1985}, volume = {10}, pages = {81-89}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Gott:96, author = {Gottschalk, Peter}, title = {Is the correlation in welfare participation across generations spurious?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {63}, pages = {1-25}, key = {population economics} } @ARTICLE{GoDa:05, author = {Gottschalk,P. and Danziger,S.}, title = {Inequality of Wage Rates, Earnings and Family Income in the United States,1975-2002}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2005}, volume = {51}, pages = {231-254}, abstract = {This paper analyzes distributional changes over the last quarter of thetwentieth century. We focus on four distinct distributions: the distributionof hourly wage rates, the distribution of annual earnings of individuals,the distribution of annual earnings of families, and the distribution oftotal family income adjusted for family size. Both male wage rate inequalityand family income inequality accelerated during the early 1980s, increasedat a slower rate through the early 1990s and then stabilized at a highlevel through the early 2000s. The similarity in the timing of changesin these two distributions has been used as evidence that increased familyincome inequality primarily reflects increased inequality of wage rates.We show that other important factors were also at work.}, key = {Inequality} } @TECHREPORT{GoMo:95, author = {Gottschalk, P. and Moffitt, R. A.}, title = {Trends in the covariance structure of earnings in the {US}: 1969 - 1987}, institution = {Brown University}, year = {1995}, type = {mimeo}, key = {wages} } @INCOLLECTION{GoSm:00, author = {Gottschalk, P. and Smeeding, T. M.}, title = {Empirical evidence on Income Inequality in Industrialized Countries}, booktitle = {Handbook of Income Distribution}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {2000}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Bourguignon, F.}, chapter = {3}, pages = {261-307}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{GoSm:97, author = {Gottschalk, P. and Smeeding, T. M.}, title = {Cross-National comparisons of earnings and income inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1997}, volume = {35}, pages = {633-687}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{GoSp:02, author = {Gottschalk, P. and Spolaore, E.}, title = {On the Evaluation of Economic Mobility}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2002}, volume = {96}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{GoPa:02, author = {Gourinchas, P.-O. and Parker, J.}, title = {Consumption Over the Life Cycle}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2002}, volume = {70}, pages = {47-89}, abstract = {The authors estimate a stochastic structural model of optimal life-cycle consumption expenditure. Constructing a measure of precautionary saving and wealth, they argue that wealth is accumulated early in life, and saving patterns are consistent with the life-cycle model. Young people behave “buffer-stock” consumers, switching to “certainty-equivalent life-cycle hypothesis” after 45.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @BOOK{Graa:57, title = {Theoretical Welfare Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1957}, author = {Graaff, {J. de V.}}, address = {London}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Graa:90, author = {Graafland, J. J.}, title = {Tax policies and interaction between hidden and official economy}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1990}, volume = {45}, pages = {70-89}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{GrMo:99, author = {Johan J. Graafland and Ruud A. de Mooij}, title = {Fiscal Policy and the Labour Market: An {AGE} Analysis}, journal = {Economic Modelling}, year = {1999}, volume = {16}, pages = {189-219}, number = {2}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Grabka1999, author = {Grabka, M. M. and Schwarze, J. and Wagner, G. G.}, title = {How Unification and Immigration Affected the [G]erman Income Distribution}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {867-878}, key = {migration}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GrScWa:99, author = {Grabka, M. M. and Schwarze, J. and Wagner, G. G.}, title = {How Unification and Immigration Affected the {G}erman Income Distribution}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {867-878}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Grad:07, author = {Gradstein, M.}, title = {Inequality, Democracy and the Protection of Property Rights}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {2007}, volume = {117}, pages = {252-269}, abstract = {Motivated by the observed relevance of institutional quality, such as strong property rights, for economic performance, this research considers the emergence of property rights protection as a political outcome. It argues that the support for such protection is greater the more equal income distribution and the smaller political bias. When these conditions initially hold, the politically influential rich elite may prefer to relinquish its power through democratisation in order to commit future policy makers to the enforcement of property rights, thus ensuring larger investment and faster growth along the transition path. In a very unequal economy, however, such democratisation will not take place.}, key = {income inequality}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Grad:99, author = {Gradstein, M.}, title = {Optimal Taxation and Fiscal Constitution}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {471-485}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Grad:98, author = {Gradstein, Mark}, title = {Provision of public goods in a large economy}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {61}, pages = {229-234}, number = {2}, abstract = {In this paper, I consider a large economy with a private and a public goodwhere the distribution of costs (but not the individual costs) associatedwith the provision of the public good is known. A simple tax-subsidy policy,whereby all contributors get a subsidy funded by a tax on non-contributors,is shown to attain the first best allocation provided that the sociallyoptimal amount of the public good is independent of the distribution ofindividual costs.}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Grae:07, author = {Graetz, M. J.}, title = {Tax Reform Unraveling}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2007}, volume = {21}, pages = {69-90}, abstract = {The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was widely heralded as the most significant change in our nation’s tax law since the income tax was extended to the masses during World War II. It was the crowning domestic policy achievement of President Ronald Reagan, who proclaimed it “the best antipoverty measure, the best pro-family measure and the best job-creation measure ever to come out of the Congress of the United States” (Reagan, 1986). This journal published a symposium on the Tax Reform Act in its first issue. The law’s rate reductions and base broadening reforms were mimicked throughout the countries belonging to the OECD (Sandford, 1993; Owens, 2005). Even at the time, however, reading the paeans to this legislation was like watching a Tennessee Williams play: something was terribly wrong, but nobody was talking about it. Two decades later, the changes wrought by the 1986 act have proven neither revolutionary nor stable.}, key = {tax reform}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Graetz1986, author = {Graetz, M. J. and Reinganum, J. F. and Wilde, L. L.}, title = {The Tax Compliance Game: Towards An Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement}, journal = {Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization}, year = {1986}, volume = {2}, pages = {1-32}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GrReWi:86, author = {Graetz, M. J. and Reinganum, J. F. and Wilde, L. L.}, title = {The Tax Compliance Game: Towards An Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement}, journal = {Journal of Law, Economics and Organization}, year = {1986}, volume = {2}, pages = {1-32}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{GrReWi:84, author = {Graetz, M. J. and Reinganum, J. F. and Wilde, L. L.}, title = {An equilibrium model of tax compliance with a {B}ayesian auditor and some'honest' taxpayers}, institution = {California Institute of Technology}, year = {1984}, type = {Social Science Working Paper}, number = {506}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{GrWi:85, author = {Graetz, M. J. and Wilde, L. L.}, title = {The economics of tax evasion: fact and fantasy}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1985}, volume = {38}, pages = {355-363}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{GrKe:04, author = {Graham,H. and Kelly,M.}, title = {Health inequalities: concepts, frameworks and policy}, institution = {Health Development Agency}, year = {2004}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{Grah:99, author = {Graham, J. R.}, title = {Do Personal Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {147-185}, key = {finance} } @ARTICLE{Gran:96, author = {Granaglia, Elena}, title = {Two questions to {A}martya {S}en}, journal = {notizie di Politeia}, year = {1996}, volume = {12}, pages = {31-35}, number = {43/44}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{GrMo:76, author = {Granger, C. W. J. and Morris, M. J.}, title = {Time Series Modelling and Interpretation}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society}, year = {1976}, volume = {139}, pages = {246-257}, abstract = {By considering the model generating the sum of two or more series, it is shown that the mixed ARMA model is the one most likely to occur. As most economic series are both aggregates and are measured with error it follows that such mixed models will often be found in practice. If such a model is found, the possibility of resolving the series into simple components is considered both theoretically and for simulated data.}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{GrNe:76, author = {Granger, C. W. J. and Newbold, P.}, title = {Forecasting Transformed Series}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B}, year = {1976}, volume = {38}, pages = {189-203}, abstract = {Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0035-9246%281976%2938%3A2%3C189%3AFTS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.12.23} } @ARTICLE{GrTh:99, author = {Grant, A. P. and Thomas, L. B.}, title = {Inflationary Expectations and Rationality Revisited}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {62}, pages = {331-338}, key = {macro} } @TECHREPORT{GrPe:08, author = {Grant, Charles and Peltonen, Tuomas}, title = {Housing and Equity Wealth Effects of Italian Households}, institution = {ECB}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {857}, abstract = {The study quantities stock market and housing market wealth effects on households' non- durable consumption using Italian household panel data (SHIW) of 1989-2002. We found all households react similarly to aggregate housing and stock market gains. We also found statistically and economically significant housing wealth effects with a marginal propensity to consume out of idiosyncratic housing wealth gains to be over 8 percent. The results from idiosyncratic equity wealth effects were lower, at around 0.4 percent. We also found that older households react more to changes in housing wealth.}, key = {Housing}, keywords = {Marginal Propensity to Consume, Housing, Equities}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{GrKaPo:01, author = {Grant, S. and Kajii, A. and Polak, B.}, title = {Different Notions of Disappointment Aversion}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {70}, pages = {203-208}, key = {uncertainty} } @TECHREPORT{GrKaPo:97, author = {Grant, Simon and Kajii, Atsushi and Polak, Ben}, title = {Weakening the {S}ure-{T}hing {P}rinciple: {D}ecomposable choice {U}nder{U}ncertainty}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1997}, type = {Theoretical Economics Discussion Paper}, number = {TE/97/339}, month = {October}, key = {uncertainty} } @TECHREPORT{GrKaPoSa:06, author = {Grant, S. and Kajii, A. and Polak, B. and Safra, Z.}, title = {Generalized Utilitarianism and Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem}, institution = {Cowles Foundation}, year = {2006}, abstract = {We provide an axiomatization of generalized utilitarian social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem. To do this, we reformulate Harsanyi's problem such that lotteries over identity (accidents of birth) and lotteries over outcomes (life chances) are independent. We show how to accommodate (first) Diamond's critique concerning fairness and (second) Pattanaik's critique concerning di¤ering attitudes toward risk. In each case, we show what separates them from Harsanyi by showing what extra axioms return us to Harsanyi. Thus we provide two new axiomatizations of Harsanyi's utilitarianism..}, key = {lotteries}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.15} } @ARTICLE{GrKa:04, author = {Grant, Simon and Karni, Edi}, title = {A theory of quantifiable beliefs}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {40}, pages = {515-546}, abstract = {Building upon the works of Anscombe and Amuann [Ann. Math. Stat. 34 (1963)199] and Karni and Schmeidler [An expected utility theory for state-dependentpreferences. Working Paper 48-80, Foerder Institute for Economic Research,Tel Aviv University], we develop a general axiomatic theory of quantifiablebeliefs.a form of probabilistic sophistication that does not preclude state-dependentpreferences and does not require the reduction of compound lotteries. Thetheory includes the state-dependent expected utility model of Karni andSchmeidler [An expected utility theory for state-dependent preferences.Working Paper 48-80, Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Tel AvivUniversity] and the state-independent non-expected utility model of Machinaand Schmeidler [J. Econ. Theory 67 (1995) 106] as special cases. The theoryis flexible enough to admit recursivity in the decision-making process.}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{GrQu:06, author = {Grant, S. and Quiggin, J.}, title = {The Risk Premium for Equity: Implications for Resource Allocation, Welfare and Policy}, journal = {Australian Economic Papers}, year = {2006}, volume = {45}, pages = {253-268}, abstract = {Analysis of the equity premium puzzle has focused on private sector capital markets. The object of this paper is to consider the welfare and policy implications of each of the broad classes of explanations of the equity premium puzzle. As would be expected, the greater the deviation from the first-best outcome implied by a given explanation of the equity premium puzzle, the more interventionist are the implied policy conclusions. Nevertheless, even explanations of the equity premium puzzle consistent with a general consumption-based asset pricing model have important welfare and policy implications.}, key = {risk}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Grasmick1980, author = {Grasmick, H. G. and Green, D.}, title = {Legal punishment, social disapproval and internalization as inhibitions of illegal behaviour}, journal = {Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology}, year = {1980}, volume = {71}, pages = {325-335}, key = {crime}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GrGr:80, author = {Grasmick, H. G. and Green, D.}, title = {Legal punishment, social disapproval and internalization as inhibitionsof illegal behaviour}, journal = {Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology}, year = {1980}, volume = {71}, pages = {325-335}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Grasmick1982, author = {Grasmick, H. G. and Scott, W. J.}, title = {Tax evasion and mechanism of control: a comparison with grand and petty theft}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1982}, volume = {2}, pages = {213-230}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GrSc:82, author = {Grasmick, H. G. and Scott, W. J.}, title = {Tax evasion and mechanism of control: a comparison with grand and pettytheft}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1982}, volume = {2}, pages = {213-230}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{GrRe:92, title = {Microeconomics}, publisher = {Longman}, year = {1992}, author = {Gravelle, H. and Rees, R.}, address = {London}, edition = {Second}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{Graw:01, author = {Grawe, N. D.}, title = {Quantile regression measures of mobility in the {US} and abroad}, institution = {Economics Department, Carleton College}, year = {2001}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {One North College Street. Northfield, MN 55057}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{GrMu:02, author = {Grawe, N. D. and Mulligan, C. B.}, title = {Economic Interpretations of Intergenerational Correlations}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2002}, volume = {16}, pages = {45–58}, number = {3}, key = {Mobility} } @BOOK{Gray:94, title = {Programming with Class: A Practical Introduction to Object-Oriented Programmingwith C++}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1994}, author = {Gray, N. A. B.}, address = {New York}, key = {Computing} } @ARTICLE{Degr:80CE, author = {De Grazia}, title = {Clandestine employment: a problem of our times}, journal = {International Labour Review}, year = {1980}, volume = {11}, pages = {544-583}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{GrPa:98, author = {Graziano, Clara and Parigi, Bruno M.}, title = {Do managers work harder in competitive industries?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {34}, pages = {489-498}, number = {3}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{GrJaKaMcF:98, author = {Green, Donald and Jacowitz, Karen E. and Kahneman, Daniel and McFadden,Daniel}, title = {Referendum contingent valuation, anchoring and willingness to pay for publicgoods}, journal = {Resource and Energy Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {20}, pages = {85-116}, number = {2}, key = {public goods} } @INCOLLECTION{GrHe:81, author = {Green, J. and Heller, W. P.}, title = {Mathematical analysis and convexity with applications to economics}, booktitle = {Handbook of Mathematical Economics}, publisher = {North-Holland Elsevier}, year = {1981}, editor = {Arrow, K. J. and Intiligator, M. D.}, volume = {1}, chapter = {1}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {mathematics} } @BOOK{GrLa:79II, title = {Incentives in Public Decision-making}, publisher = {North-Holland}, year = {1997}, author = {Green, J. and Laffont, J.-J.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Green1977a, author = {Green, J. and Laffont, J.-J.}, title = {Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1977}, volume = {45}, pages = {727-738}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {North-Holland}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GrLa:77CO, author = {Green, J. and Laffont, J.-J.}, title = {Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferencesfor Public Goods}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1977}, volume = {45}, pages = {727-738}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {public economics}, publisher = {North-Holland} } @BOOK{Gr:03, title = {Econometric Analyis}, publisher = {Pearson Education}, year = {2003}, author = {Green, William H.}, address = {Prentice Hall}, edition = {5th}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.06.03} } @BOOK{Gree:93, title = {Econometric Analysis}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1993}, author = {Green, W. H.}, edition = {2}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Greenberg1981, author = {Greenberg, D. and Moffit, R. and Friedmann, J.}, title = {Underreporting and experimental effects on work effort: evidence from the Gary income maintenance experiment}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1981}, volume = {63}, pages = {581-589}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GrMoFr:81, author = {Greenberg, D. and Moffit, R. and Friedmann, J.}, title = {Underreporting and experimental effects on work effort: evidence from theGary income maintenance experiment}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1981}, volume = {63}, pages = {581-589}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Gree:84, author = {Greenberg, J.}, title = {Avoiding tax avoidance: a repeated game-theoretic approach}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1984}, volume = {32}, pages = {1-13}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{GrMcWi:03, author = {Greenwood, M. J. and McDowell, J. M. and Wierman, M.}, title = {Source-Country Social Programs and the Age Composition of Legal {US} Immigrants}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {739-771}, key = {population economics} } @ARTICLE{GrHaMa:99, author = {Gregg, P. and Harkness, S. and Martin, S.}, title = {Poor kids: trends in child poverty in {B}ritain}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {163-187}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{GrMa:97, author = {Gregg, P. and Manning, A.}, title = {Skill-biased change, unemployment and wage inequality}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1997}, volume = {41}, pages = {1173-1200}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{GrPl:79, author = {Grether, D. and Plott, C.}, title = {Economic Theory, Choice and the Preference Reversal phenomenon}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1979}, volume = {69}, pages = {623-638}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{GrXi:97, author = {Griffin, J. M. and Xiong, W.}, title = {The incentive to cheat: an empirical analysis of {OPEC}}, journal = {Journal of Law and Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {40}, pages = {289-316}, key = {industry} } @INCOLLECTION{Grif:91, author = {Griffin, James P.}, title = {Against the Taste Model}, booktitle = {Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press, New York}, year = {1991}, editor = {Elster, John and Roemer, John E.}, pages = {45-69}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Grif:86, title = {Well-being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1986}, author = {Griffin, James P}, address = {Oxford}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{GrHa:07, author = {Grimm, Michael and Hartgen, Kenneth}, title = {Longer life, higher welfare?}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {2007}, volume = {60}, pages = {212 - 236}, abstract = {Whereas life expectancy continues to increase in most industrialized countries, many developing and transition countries are today confronted with decreases in life expectancy. Usual measures employed to compare welfare over time and space fail to deal with such demographic change and may lead to the so-called 'repugnant conclusion' that lower life expectancy involves higher welfare per capita. We illustrate this type of transmission channel using various welfare criteria and reference populations. We also consider feed-back effects from the demography on the economy using a neo-classical growth model. We show that the 'repugnant conclusion' can be avoided if we choose a lifetime welfare measure instead of a period (or snapshot) welfare measure. All concepts are illustrated empirically using a small sample of developed and developing countries.}, key = {Welfare}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{GrHoPr:99, author = {Grobelnik, M. and Holt, C. A. and Prasnkikar, V.}, title = {Classroom Games: Strategic Interaction on the internet}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1999}, volume = {13}, pages = {211-220}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{GrvV:83, author = {Groenland, E. A. G. and van Veldhoven, G. M.}, title = {Tax evasion behaviour - a psychological framework}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1983}, volume = {3}, pages = {129-144}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{GrBr:99, author = {Groot, W. and Maassen Van Den Brink, H.}, title = {Job Satisfaction and Preference Drift}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {63}, pages = {363-367}, key = {labour} } @TECHREPORT{GrSe:08, author = {Grosfeld, I. and Senik, C.}, title = {The Emerging Aversion to Inequality Evidence from Poland 1992-2005}, institution = {William Davidson Institute}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {919}, month = {April}, abstract = {This paper provides an illustration of the changing tolerance for inequality in a context of radical political and economic transformation and rapid economic growth. We focus on the Polish experience of transition and explore self-declared attitudes of the citizens. Using monthly representative surveys of the population, realized by the Polish poll institute (CBOS) from 1992 to 2005, we identify a structural break in the relation between income inequality and subjective evaluation of well-being. The downturn in the tolerance for inequality (1997) coincides with the increasing distrust of political elites.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.06} } @UNPUBLISHED{Grosskopf2007, author = {Grosskopf, Brit and Nagel, Rosemarie}, title = {Rational Reasoning or Adaptive Behavior{?} Evidence from Two?Person Beauty Contest Games}, note = {Universitat Pompeu Fabra Economics Working Paper No. 1068}, year = {2007}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.07.21} } @ARTICLE{Gros:77, author = {Grossman, G.}, title = {The second economy of the {USSR}}, journal = {Problems of Communism}, year = {1977}, volume = {26}, pages = {25-40}, month = {Sept-Oct}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{GrHa:83, author = {Grossman, Sanford J. and Hart, Oliver D.}, title = {An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1983}, volume = {51}, pages = {7-46}, number = {1}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{GrHa:86, author = {Grove, J. and Hannum, R.}, title = {On Measuring Intergroup Inequality}, journal = {Sociological Methods and Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {15}, pages = {142-159}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Grov:58, author = {Groves, H. M.}, title = {Empirical studies of income tax compliance}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1958}, volume = {11}, pages = {291-301}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Grov:73, author = {Groves, T.}, title = {Incentives in teams}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1977}, volume = {41}, pages = {617-631}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{GrLe:77, author = {Groves, T. and Ledyard, J.}, title = {Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the Free Rider Problem}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1977}, volume = {45}, pages = {783-809}, key = {Public goods} } @ARTICLE{Groves1977, author = {Groves, T. and Ledyard, J.}, title = {Optimal allocation of public goods: a solution to the `free-rider' problem}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1977}, volume = {45}, pages = {783-809}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Groves1975, author = {Groves, T. and Ledyard, J.}, title = {Incentives and public inputs}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1975}, volume = {4}, pages = {211-226}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GrLo:75, author = {Groves, T. and Loeb, M.}, title = {Incentives and public inputs}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1975}, volume = {4}, pages = {311-326}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Grub:00, author = {Gruber, J.}, title = {Cash Welfare as a Consumption Smoothing Mechanism for Divorced Mothers}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {75}, pages = {157-182}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Grub:97, author = {Gruber, J.}, title = {The consumption smoothing benefits of unemploiyment insurance}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1997}, volume = {87}, pages = {192-205}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.04.21} } @TECHREPORT{Grub:96, author = {Gruber, J.}, title = {Cash Welfare as a Consumption Smoothing Mechanism for Single Mothers}, institution = {NBER}, year = {1996}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {5738}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{GrSa:02, author = {Gruber, J. and Saez, E.}, title = {The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {84}, pages = {1-32}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{GrKl:07, author = {Gruen, Carola and Klasen, Stephan}, title = {Growth, inequality, and welfare: comparisons across space and time}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {2007}, volume = {60}, pages = {193 -211}, abstract = {We propose and apply several welfare measures that combine average income with a measure of inequality to undertake cross-country comparisons of aggregate welfare for the 1970 to 2000 period. Our welfare measures, which are based on theoretical and empirical findings on the role of inequality in social welfare, drastically change the impression of levels of welfare, significantly affect the welfare ranking of countries in different benchmark years, affect changes in ranking over time, and affect convergence between industrialized and developing countries. While the results are sensitive to the type of inequality and its presumed effect on welfare, the results are robust to different ways to address comparability problems inherent in the inequality data used.}, key = {Welfare}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Grun:99, author = {Grund, Christian}, title = {Stigma effects of layoffs? Evidence from {G}erman micro-data}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {64}, pages = {241-247}, number = {2}, key = {stigma} } @ARTICLE{GrKi:04, author = {Gruner,H. and Kiel,A.}, title = {Collective decisions with interdependent valuations}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2004}, volume = {48}, pages = {1147-1168}, abstract = {Many collective decision problems have in common that individuals’ desiredoutcomes are correlated but not identical. This paper studies collectivedecisions with private information about desired policies. Each agent holdsprivate information which mainly concerns his own bliss point, but privateinformation also a2ects all other agents. We concentrate on two specificmechanisms, the median and mean mechanism, establish the existence of symmetricBayesian Nash equilibria of the corresponding games and compare the performanceof the mechanisms for different degrees of interdependencies. Applicationsof our framework include the provision of public goods and the design ofdecision processes in international organizations.}, key = {information} } @TECHREPORT{Guar:99, author = {Alessandra Guariglia}, title = {Consumption and Saving Decisions of British Households}, year = {1999}, type = {mimeo}, key = {consumption} } @TECHREPORT{Guar:98, author = {Alessandra Guariglia}, title = {Understanding Saving Behaviour in the {U.K.}: Evidence from the {BHPS}}, institution = {Institute of Labour Research, University of Essex}, year = {1998}, type = {Discussion paper series}, number = {98/26}, month = {September}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{GuRo:02, author = {Guariglia, A. and Rossi, M.}, title = {Consumption, habit formation and precautionary saving: Evidence from the {British Household Panel Survey}}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {2002}, volume = {54}, pages = {1-19}, key = {saving}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.10.04} } @ARTICLE{Guenther1999, author = {Guenther, David A. and Willenborg, Michael}, title = {Capital gains tax rates and the cost of capital for Small business: evidence from the {IPO} market}, journal = {Journal of Financial Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {53}, pages = {385-408}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GuWi:99, author = {Guenther, David A. and Willenborg, Michael}, title = {Capital gains tax rates and the cost of capital for Small business: evidencefrom the {IPO} market}, journal = {Journal of Financial Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {53}, pages = {385-408}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Guer:87, author = {Guerrero, V. M.}, title = {A note on the estimation of {A}tkinson's index of inequality}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1987}, volume = {25}, pages = {379-384}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Gues:98, author = {Guesnerie, Roger}, title = {Agglomeration and incentives: some modeling problems}, booktitle = {Topics in Public Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Pines, David and Sadka, Efraim and Zilcha, Itzhak}, chapter = {6}, pages = {139-157}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{GeLa:86, author = {Guesnerie, R. and Laffont, J.-J.}, title = {Using Cost Information to Regulate Firms}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1986}, volume = {94}, pages = {614-641}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{GuSw:08, author = {Guest, Ross and Swift, Robyn}, title = {Fertility, income inequality, and labour productivity}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {2008}, abstract = {There is mounting evidence of a complex system of multi-directional links between fertility, productivity and inequality. The contribution of this study is a multi-country analysis of these three variables as a simultaneous system in a VECM framework using annual time series data for the UK, USA, Australia, Japan, and Sweden. The results highlight some differences between countries in the relationships between the variables. For the UK and Australia, the VECM analysis reveals a long run relationship between fertility and productivity to which both fertility and productivity adjust. This calls into question pro-fertility policies in these countries that aim to offset the costs of population ageing, because an increase in fertility may be associated with lower productivity in the long run. The results for the USA suggest that raising productivity in the long run will be associated with a decrease in both inequality and fertility. No significant long run relationships were found for Japan and Sweden.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @TECHREPORT{GuSe:07, author = {Guibourg, Gabriela and Segendorf, Bjorn}, title = {The Use of Cash and the Size of the Shadow Economy in Sweden}, institution = {Sveriges Riksbanl}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {204}, abstract = {We use an “unexplained demand for cash” approach to measure the size of the shadow economy in Sweden. The size of the shadow economy is found to have increased from 3.8 to 6.5 per cent of GDP from 1990 to 2004. This result is also supported by our finding of an increased residual between households’ recorded disposable income and their consumption, investments and changes in net financial positions. Moreover, the correlation between the demand for cash that cannot be explained by recorded transactions and this residual is strong.}, key = {Shadow Economy}, keywords = {Cash use, demand for cash, shadow economy, National Accounts, Financial Accounts}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{GuJaTe:92, author = {Luigi Guiso and Tullio Jappelli and Daniele Terlizzese}, title = {Earnings Uncertainty and Precautionary Saving}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1992}, volume = {30}, pages = {307-337}, key = {consumption} } @TECHREPORT{GuPa:01, author = {Guiso, L. and Paiella, M.}, title = {Risk aversion, wealth and background risk}, institution = {Centre for Economic Policy Research}, year = {2001}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {2728}, address = {90-98 Goswell Rd, London EC1V 7RR, UK}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Gul:91, author = {Gul, F.}, title = {A theory of disappointment aversion}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1991}, volume = {59}, pages = {667-686}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{GuSoWi:86, author = {Gul, Faruk and Sonnenschein, Hugo and Wilson, Robert}, title = {Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1986}, volume = {39}, pages = {155--190}, number = {1}, month = jun, abstract = {Subgame-perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period. Assume zero costs, positive interest rate, continuum of buyers, and some technical conditions. If buyers' valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique, buyers' strategies are stationary, and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere. Otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist, but at most one with analytic strategies. Coase's conjecture is verified for stationary strategies: reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation. Connections to bargaining models are described.}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2007.10.01} } @ARTICLE{GuSc:93, author = {Gully, D. and Scott, F.}, title = {The Demand for Wagering on State Operated Lotto Games}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1993}, volume = {46}, pages = {13-22}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{GuZi:03, author = {Gundersen, C. and Ziliak, J.}, title = {The Role of Food Stamps in Consumption Stabilisation}, journal = {The Journal of Human Resources}, year = {2003}, volume = {38}, pages = {1051-1079}, note = {Special Issue on Income Volatility and Implications for Food Assistance Programs}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{GuZiFi:03, author = {Gundersen, C. and Ziliak, J. and Figlio, D.N.}, title = {Food Stamp Caseloads over the Business Cycle}, journal = {Southern Economic Journal}, year = {2003}, volume = {69}, pages = {903-919}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{Guo:99, author = {Guo, Jang-Ting}, title = {Multiple equilibria and progressive taxation of labor income}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {65}, pages = {97-103}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{GuLa:99, author = {Guo, J.-T. and Lansing, K. J.}, title = {Optimal Taxation of Capital Income with Imperfectly Competitive ProductMarkets}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1999}, volume = {23}, pages = {967-995}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Guo1999, author = {Guo, J.-T., and Lansing, K. J.}, title = {Optimal Taxation of Capital Income with Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1999}, volume = {23}, pages = {967-995}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Gupt:84, author = {Gupta, M. R.}, title = {Functional Forms for Estimating the {L}orenz Curve}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1984}, volume = {52}, pages = {1313-1314}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{GuClTi:04, author = {Gupta, S. and Clements, B. and Tiongson, E.R.}, title = {Foreign Aid and Consumption Smoothing: Evidence from Global Food Aid}, journal = {Review of Development Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {8}, pages = {379-390}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @TECHREPORT{Gupt:07, author = {Gupta, Vrinda}, title = {Wealth Shock and Impact of Health on Risk Aversion and Savings}, institution = {Watson Wyatt Worldwide}, year = {2007}, type = {Technical Paper}, key = {Saving}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{GuNi:96, author = {Gustafsson, B. and Nivorozhkina, L.}, title = {Relative poverty in two egalitarian societies: a comparison between {T}aganrog,{R}ussia during the {S}oviet era and {S}weden}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1996}, volume = {42}, pages = {321-334}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Gustafsson1996, author = {Gustafsson, B. and Nivorozhkina, L.}, title = {Relative poverty in two egalitarian societies: a comparison between {T}aganrog, {R}ussia during the {S}oviet era and {S}weden}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1996}, volume = {42}, pages = {321-334}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{GuJo:08, author = {Gustavsson, Magnus and Jordahl, Henrik}, title = {Inequality and trust in Sweden: Some inequalities are more harmful than others}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {348 - 365}, abstract = {We present new evidence on the influence of income inequality on generalized trust. Using individual panel data from Swedish counties together with an instrumental variable strategy, we find that differences in disposable income, and especially differences among people in the bottom half of the income distribution, are associated with lower trust. The relationship between income inequality and trust is particularly strong for people with a strong aversion against income differentials. We also find that the proportion of people born in a foreign country is negatively associated with trust.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Trust, Social capital, Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Guth:79, author = {Guthrie, R. S.}, title = {Measurement of relative tax progressivity}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1979}, volume = {32}, pages = {93-95}, number = {3}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Gutm:77, author = {Gutmann, P. M.}, title = {The subterranean economy}, journal = {Financial Analysts Journal}, year = {1977}, volume = {33}, month = {Jan./Feb}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Gutt:98, author = {Guttman, Joel M.}, title = {Unanimity and majority rule: the calculus of consent reconsidered}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {14}, pages = {189-207}, number = {2}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Gutt:87, author = {Guttman, J. M.}, title = {A non-{C}ournot model of voluntary collective action}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1987}, volume = {54}, pages = {1-20}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Guve:07, author = {Guvenen,F.}, title = {Learning Your Earning: Are Labor Income Shocks Really Very Persistent?}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {97}, pages = {687-712}, abstract = {The current literature offers two views on the nature of the labor income process. According to the first view, individuals are subject to very persistent income shocks while facing similar life-cycle income profiles (the RIP process, Thomas MaCurdy 1982). According to the alternative, individuals are subject to shocks with modest persistence while facing individual-specific profiles (the HIP process, Lee A. Lillard and Yoram A. Weiss 1979). In this paper we study the restrictions imposed by these two processes on consumption data—in the context of a life-cycle model—to distinguish between the two views. We find that the life-cycle model with a HIP process, which has not been studied in the previous literature, is consistent with several features of consumption data, whereas the model with a RIP process is consistent with some, but not with others. We conclude that the HIP model could be a credible contender to—and along some dimensions, a more coherent alternative than—the RIP model.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{GyTr:06, author = {Gyourko, J. and Tracy, J.}, title = {Using Home Maintenace and Repairs to Smooth Variable Earnings}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2006}, volume = {88}, pages = {736-747}, abstract = {This paper continues to explore the importance of durables as a means of consumption smoothing, examining the degree to which homeowners adjust home maintenance and repair decisions in response to income shocks. The authors find a statistically significant positive elasticity of maintenance expenditure to income shocks, although home repairs adjustment only offsets 1 to 7% of transitory income loss.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @TECHREPORT{GaRi:04, author = {G{\"a}chter, S. and Riedl, A.}, title = {Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims. Normative Judgments and Actual Negotiations}, institution = {Tinbergen Institute}, year = {2004}, type = {Discussion Paper}, abstract = {Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people's impartial normative evaluations as well as their actual negotiation behavior in a bargaining with claims environment. We measure people's judgments on the normative attractiveness of solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observe actual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We nd that the proportional solution is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiation agreements are closest to the 'constrained equal award' solution.}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, key = {bargaining}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{Gard:73, author = {G{\"a}rdenfors, Peter}, title = {Positionalist voting functions}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {1973}, volume = {4}, pages = {1-24}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Gerx:07, author = {G{\"e}rxhani, K.}, title = {"Did You Pay Your Taxes?" How (Not) to Conduct Tax Evasion Surveys in Transition Countries}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {80}, pages = {555-581}, abstract = {Gathering large-scale data on tax evasion is an undisputable challenge in and of itself. Doing so in a country in transition from a communist to a democratic system is even more difficult. This paper discusses the challenges and presents a case study to show how they can be dealt with effectively. One important implication of the paper is that such a sample survey can be successful if it combines a careful sample design, research method and questionnaire design, and explicitly takes country-specific institutional and cultural features into account.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{GuKlOc:02, author = {G{\"u}th, W. and Kliemt, H. and Ockenfels, A.}, title = {Fairness versus Efficiency: An Experimental Study of Mutual Gift Giving}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2002}, volume = {50}, pages = {465-475}, key = {fairness} } @ARTICLE{GueKrNo:04, author = {G{\"u}th, Werner and Kr{\"o}ger, Sabine and Normann, Hans-Theo}, title = {Durable-goods monopoly with privately known impatience: a theoretical and experimental study.}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, year = {2004}, volume = {42}, pages = {413-425}, number = {3}, month = jul, abstract = {We analyze a durable-goods monopoly selling a single unit of a good to a buyer whose value of the good is private information. The discount factors of the buyer and the seller may differ and are also privately known. We derive the closed-form solution of a two-period game and compare it to the behavior observed in experiments. The data are to a large extent consistent with the predictions. (JEL C90, L12, C73)}, comment = {Magazine/Journal Refereed Academic OneFile}, issn = {0095-2583}, keywords = {Influence, Usage, Prices and rates, Monopolies_Influence, Durable goods_Prices and rates, Discounts (Sales)_Influence, Discounts (Sales)_Usage}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.07.22} } @ARTICLE{GuLePl:07, author = {G{\"u}th,W. and Levati,M.V. and Ploner,M.}, title = {On the Social Dimension of Time and Risk Preferences: An Experimental Study}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, year = {2007}, volume = {45}, abstract = {When explaining risk taking, intertemporal allocation, and distributing behavior, economists rely on risk, time, and other-regarding preferences but offer no guidance on how these three crucial aspects are interrelated. We report on an experiment exploring such interrelation. For this sake, we compare evaluations of several prospects, each of which allocates certain or risky and immediate or delayed payoffs to the actor and to another participant. We find that individuals are selforiented as to social allocation of risk and delay and other-regarding with respect to expected payoffs.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{GueSchSch:82, author = {G{\"u}th, Werner and Schmittberger, Rolf and Schwarze, Bernd}, title = {An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, year = {1982}, volume = {3}, pages = {367--388}, number = {4}, month = dec, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.09} } @ARTICLE{GuStSu:05, author = {G{\"u}th, W. and Strauss, S. and Sutter, M.}, title = {Tax Evasion and State Productivity: An Experimental Study}, journal = {Metroeconomica}, year = {2005}, volume = {56}, pages = {85-100}, abstract = {In an overlapping generations experiment with multiple families participants can support their parents directly and thereby reduce their tax burden or rely on tax-financed old-age support. State productivity is captured by the factor with which total tax revenues are multiplied to determine old-age support. This factor is systematically varied from 0.75 to 1.25. Tax payments depend on declared endowment. Tax evasion is possible, but monitored. Our results suggest that state productivity influences neither direct support of own parents nor tax evasion. The main effect is that rich endowment triggers relatively low support of own parents and high (and more frequent) tax evasion.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{GaRi:05, author = {Gächter, S. and Riedl, A.}, title = {Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims}, journal = {Management Science}, year = {2005}, volume = {51}, pages = {249–263}, key = {claims}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.03.12} } @ARTICLE{GueOcRi:95, author = {Güth, Werner and Ockenfels, Peter and Ritzberger, Klaus}, title = {On durable goods monopolies an experimental study of intrapersonal price competition and price discrimination over time}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1995}, volume = {16}, pages = {247--274}, number = {2}, month = jul, abstract = {In a durable monopoly market a single seller can offer his product for sale in subsequent periods. A customer, however, will buy at most once. Solutions to such games have been derived in another study (Güth and Ritzberger, 1992), both for finitely and infinitely many sales periods. We report on classroom experiments with two or three potential sales periods and different constellations of discount factors. Game theory predicts for those cases either intrapersonal price competition (Coase-conjecture) or price discrimination (Pacman-conjecture). An experimental variation is that one group of participants was introduced to the theory of durable goods monopolies, whereas another group was completely unfamiliar with this theory and game theory in general.}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.06.03} } @BOOK{Trea:97, title = {Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government: {T}reasury Guidance}, publisher = {HMSO}, year = {1997}, author = {{H. M. Treasury}}, address = {London}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Trea:91, title = {Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government}, publisher = {HMSO}, year = {1991}, author = {{H. M. Treasury}}, address = {London}, comment = {UL:OP1100.16.101}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{HaLeCh:07, author = {Ha, I.B. and Lee, B.S. and Cheong, C.C}, title = {Causes of the Korean Currency Crisis What Caused the Korean Currency Crisis in 1997? : Weak Fundamentals or Self-fulfilling Expectations}, journal = {Asian Economic Journal}, year = {2007}, volume = {21}, pages = {195-206}, number = {2}, abstract = {The present paper investigates which factor is primarily responsible for the sharp depreciation of the Korean won against the US dollar in 1997, using a bivariate vector autoregressive model of real and nominal exchange rates. In the present study, we directly identify the relative importance of fundamental and nonfundamental factors from the raw data series on exchange rates. This approach is different from most previous studies on the Korean currency crisis, which use proxy variables to represent the two factors. The empirical results show that the collapse of the Korean currency in 1997 appears to be mostly a result of the weakened macroeconomic fundamentals of the economy with, to a limited extent, some non-fundamental factors.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{HaKo:02, author = {Haan, M. and Kooreman, P.}, title = {Free Riding and the Provision of Candy Bars}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {83}, pages = {277-291}, key = {public goods} } @TECHREPORT{HaKoRi:06, author = {Haan, M. and Kooreman, P. and Riemersma, T.}, title = {Friendship in a Public Good Experiment}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2006}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {2108}, address = {P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany}, month = {April}, abstract = {We conduct a public good experiment with high school teenagers. Some groups exclusively consist of students that we know to be friends. Other groups exclusively consist of students that we know not to be friends, and that are mere classmates. We find that ‘friends’ contribute more to the public good than ‘classmates’ do. Contributions of ‘classmates’ sharply decrease in the last round, in line with the literature on public good experiments. However, contributions of ‘friends’ sharply increase in the last round.}, key = {public goods}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{HaLj:98, author = {Habib, Michel A. and Ljungqvist, Alexander P.}, title = {Underpricing and {IPO} proceeds: a note}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {61}, pages = {381-383}, number = {3}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{HaRu:69, author = {Hadar, J. and Russell, W. R.}, title = {Rules for Ordering Uncertain Prospects}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1969}, volume = {79}, pages = {25-34}, key = {risk} } @INCOLLECTION{Hage:91, author = {Hagenaars, A. J. M.}, title = {The {D}efinition and {M}easurement of {P}overty}, booktitle = {Economic {I}nequality and {P}overty: {I}nternational {P}erspectives}, publisher = {M.E.Sharpe Inc.}, year = {1991}, editor = {Osberg, L.}, pages = {134-156}, address = {Armonk, New York}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Hage:87, author = {Hagenaars, A. J. M.}, title = {A class of poverty indices}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1987}, volume = {10}, pages = {583-607}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{Hage:86, title = {The Perception of Poverty}, publisher = {North-Holland}, year = {1986}, author = {Hagenaars, A. J. M.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{HaVa:85, author = {Hagenaars, A. J. M. and Van Praag, B. M. S.}, title = {A synthesis of poverty line definitions}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1985}, volume = {31}, pages = {139-153}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Hage:77, author = {Hagerbaumer, J. B.}, title = {The {G}ini concentration ratio and the minor concentration ratio: A two-parameter index of inequality}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1977}, volume = {59}, pages = {377-379}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Hahn:82, author = {Hahn, F. H.}, title = {Stability}, booktitle = {Handbook of Mathematical Economics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1982}, editor = {Arrow, K. J. and Intriligator, M. D.}, volume = {II}, chapter = {16}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{HaGi:98, author = {Hahn, Kyungdong and Gilles, Robert P.}, title = {Efficient egalitarian-equivalence and the core of an economy with publicprojects}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {60}, pages = {173-178}, number = {2}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Hain:64, author = {Hainsworth, G. B.}, title = {The {L}orenz curve as a general tool of economic analysis}, journal = {Economic Record}, year = {1964}, volume = {40}, pages = {426-441}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Hainsworth1964, author = {Hainsworth, G. B.}, title = {The {L}orenz curve as a general tool of economic analysis}, journal = {Economic Record}, year = {1964}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Hairault2001, author = {Hairault, J-O and Langot, F. and Portier, F.}, title = {Efficiency and Stabilization: Reducing {H}arberger Triangles and {O}kun Gaps}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {70}, pages = {203-208}, key = {efficiency}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HaLaPo:01, author = {Hairault, J-O and Langot, F. and Portier, F.}, title = {Efficiency and Stabilization: Reducing {H}arberger Triangles and {O}kunGaps}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {70}, pages = {203-208}, key = {efficiency} } @ARTICLE{HaMc:98, author = {Hajivassiliou, V. A. and McFadden, D. L.}, title = {The method of simulated scores for the estimation of {LDV} models}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1998}, volume = {66}, pages = {863-896}, number = {4}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Hale:08, author = {Halevy, Y.}, title = {Strotz Meets Allais: Diminishing Impatience and the Certainty Effect}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {98}, pages = {1145-1162}, number = {3}, key = {diminishing impatience}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.06} } @ARTICLE{HaHa:01, author = {Haliassos, M. and Hassapis, C.}, title = {Non-Expected Untility, Saving and Portfolios}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2001}, volume = {111}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Hall:98, author = {Hall, John}, title = {Private opportunity, public benefit?}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {19}, pages = {121-140}, number = {2}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{HaPr:00, author = {Hall, J. and Preston, I.}, title = {Tax Price Effects on Attitudes to Hypothecated Tax Increases}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {75}, pages = {417-438}, key = {taxation} } @INCOLLECTION{Hall:94, author = {Hall, P.}, title = {Methodology and theory for the bootstrap}, booktitle = {Handbook of Econometrics}, year = {1994}, volume = {4}, pages = {2342-2381}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{Hall1990, author = {Hall, P.}, title = {Using the bootstrap to estimate mean squared error and select smoothing parameter in nonparametric problems}, journal = {Journal of Multivariate Analysis}, year = {1990}, volume = {32}, pages = {177--203}, key = {bootstrap}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Hall:90, author = {Hall, P.}, title = {Using the bootstrap to estimate mean squared error and select smoothingparameter in nonparametric problems}, journal = {Journal of Multivariate Analysis}, year = {1990}, volume = {32}, pages = {177--203}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{Hall:88TC, author = {Hall, P.}, title = {Theoretical Comparison of Bootstrap Confidence Intervals (with Discussion)}, journal = {The Annals of Statistics}, year = {1988}, volume = {16}, pages = {926-985}, key = {bootstrap} } @BOOK{Hall:92, title = {The Bootstrap and {E}dgeworth Expansion}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1982}, author = {Hall, P.}, address = {New York}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{HaDiCRo:89, author = {Hall, P. and Di{C}iccio, T. J. and Romano, J. P.}, title = {On smoothing and the bootstrap}, journal = {The Annals of Statistics}, year = {1989}, volume = {17}, pages = {692-704}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{Hall:88IS, author = {Hall, R.}, title = {Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1988}, volume = {96}, pages = {339-357}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{Hall:78, author = {Hall, R.E.}, title = {Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1978}, volume = {86}, pages = {971-987}, abstract = {Optimization of the part of consumers is shown to imply that the marginal utility of consumption evolves according to a random walk with trend. To a reasonable approximation, consumption itself should evolve in the same wa). In particular, no variable apart from current consumption should be of any value in predicting future consumption. This implication is tested with time-series data for the postwar United States. It is confirmed for real disposable income, which has no predictive power for consumption, but rejected for an index of stock prices. The paper concludes that the evidence supports a modified version of the life cyclepermanent income hypothesis.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{HaMi:82, author = {Hall, R.E. and Mishkin, F.S.}, title = {The Sensitivity of Consumption to Transitory Income: Estimates from Panel Data on Households}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1982}, volume = {50}, pages = {461-481}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @BOOK{HaRa:85TF, title = {The Flat Tax}, publisher = {Hoover Institution Press}, year = {1985}, author = {Hall, R. E. and Alvin Rabushka, A.}, address = {Stanford}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.02.02} } @BOOK{HaRa:83LT, title = {Low Tax, Simple Tax, Flat Tax}, publisher = {McGraw Hill}, year = {1983}, author = {Hall, R. E. and Alvin Rabushka, A.}, address = {New York}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.02.02} } @TECHREPORT{HaSc:08, author = {Halla, M. and Schneider, G. F.}, title = {Taxes and Benefits: Two Distinct Options to Cheat on the State?}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2008}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {3536}, address = {P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany}, month = {June}, abstract = {While there is an extensive literature on tax evasion a further aspect of cheating on the state, namely benefit fraud, has gained relatively modest attention in the economic literature. This paper seeks to fill this gap. We explore differences between benefit fraud and tax evasion due to differing social norms. We define the concepts of benefit morale and tax morale as the motivation to abstain from cheating on the state via these two offenses. Our multilevel analysis, based on a large micro data set of respondents from 29 OECD member countries, shows that benefit morale and tax morale have different determinants at an individual-level and respond differently to fiscal policy measures.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.05} } @ARTICLE{Hama:73, author = {Hamada, K.}, title = {A simple majority rule on the distribution of income}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1973}, volume = {6}, pages = {243-64}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{HaTa:78, author = {Hamada, K. and Takayama, N.}, title = {Censored income distributions and the measurement of poverty}, year = {1978}, volume = {47}, number = {1}, pages = {617-632}, institution = {Bulletin of International Statistical Institute}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Hame:06, author = {Hamermesh, Daniel}, title = {Time to Eat: Household Production under Increasing Income Inequality}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2006}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {1965}, abstract = {preparing meals and eating them, and cleaning up afterwards. Using time-diary and expenditure data for the U.S. for 1985 and 2003, I examine how income and time prices affect time and goods inputs into this household-produced commodity. Focusing on these two years, between which income and earnings inequality increased, allows examining how household production is affected by changing economic opportunities. The results demonstrate that both inputs into eating increase with income, and that higher time prices at a given level of income reduce time inputs. Over this period the goods intensity of producing this commodity increased, especially at the lower part of the income distribution, and the average time input dropped substantially. The results are consistent with goods-time substitution in eating being relatively difficult and with substitution becoming relatively more difficult as production expands. This is confirmed by direct estimates using matched time-use and food spending data on the same households for 2003 and 2004. The findings imply that projecting food expenditures alone overestimates the amount spent on food in a growing economy.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {time use, food purchases, income distribution}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @BOOK{Hame:93, title = {Labor Demand}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1993}, author = {Hamermesh, Daniel}, address = {Princeton}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Hame:99, author = {Hamermesh, D. S.}, title = {The Timing of Work Over Time}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {37-66}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Hamermesh1999, author = {Hamermesh, D. S.}, title = {The Timing of Work Over Time}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {37-66}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HaPrSm:96, author = {Shahid S. Hamid and Arun J. Prakash and Michael W. Smyser}, title = {Marginal Risk Aversion and Preferences in a Betting Market}, journal = {Applied Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {28}, pages = {371-376}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{Hami:99, title = {Time Series Analysis}, publisher = {PUP}, year = {1999}, author = {Hamilton, J. H.}, key = {time series}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @BOOK{Hami:99TS, title = {Time Series Analysis}, publisher = {PUP}, year = {1999}, author = {Hamilton, J. H.}, key = {time series}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Hami:99TC, author = {Hamilton, S. F.}, title = {The Comparative Efficiency of Ad Valorem and Specific Taxes Under Monopolyand Monopsony}, journal = {Economic Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {63}, pages = {235-238}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Hami:99TI, author = {Hamilton, S. F.}, title = {Tax Incidence under Oligopoly: A Comparison of Policy Approaches}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {233-245}, number = {2}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Hamilton1999, author = {Hamilton, S. F.}, title = {The Comparative Efficiency of Ad Valorem and Specific Taxes Under Monopoly and Monopsony}, journal = {Economic Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {63}, pages = {235-238}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Hamilton2003, author = {Hamilton, S. F. and Sunding, D. L. and Zilberman, D.}, title = {Public Goods and the Value of Product Quality Regulations: The Case of Food Safety}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {799-817}, key = {Public Goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HaSuZi:03, author = {Hamilton, S. F. and Sunding, D. L. and Zilberman, D.}, title = {Public Goods and the Value of Product Quality Regulations: The Case of FoodSafety}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {799-817}, key = {Public Goods} } @INCOLLECTION{Hamm:91, author = {Hammond, P. J.}, title = {Interpersonal comparisons of utility: why and how they are and should bemade}, booktitle = {Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1991}, editor = {Elster, J. and Roemer, J. E.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{Hamm:99NA, author = {Hammond, P. J.}, title = {Non-{A}rchimedean subjective probabilities in decision theory and games}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1999}, volume = {38}, pages = {139-156}, number = {2}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Hamm:99OF, author = {Hammond, P. J.}, title = {On F-Core Equivalence with General Widespread Externalities}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {177-184}, key = {Externalities} } @ARTICLE{Hamm:81, author = {Hammond, P. J.}, title = {Ex-ante and ex-post welfare optimality under uncertainty}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1981}, volume = {48}, pages = {235-250}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Hamm:77, author = {Hammond, P. J.}, title = {Dual interpersonal comparisons of utility and the welfare economics of incomedistribution}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {7}, pages = {51-71}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Hammond1977, author = {Hammond, P. J.}, title = {Dual interpersonal comparisons of utility and the welfare economics of income distribution}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {7}, pages = {51-71}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Hamm:76EA, author = {Hammond, P. J.}, title = {Equity, {A}rrow's conditions and {R}awls' difference principle}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1976}, volume = {44}, pages = {793-804}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Hamm:76WE, author = {Hammond, P. J.}, title = {Why ethical measures of inequality need interpersonal comparisons}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {1976}, volume = {7}, pages = {263-274}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Hamm:75, author = {Hammond, P. J.}, title = {A note on extreme inequality aversion}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1975}, volume = {11}, pages = {465-467}, key = {inequality} } @INPROCEEDINGS{Hamp:78, author = {Hampel, F. R.}, title = {Optimally Bounding the Gross-Error-Sensitivity and the Influence Positionin Factor Space}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Statistical Computing Section}, year = {1978}, pages = {59-64}, organization = {American Statistical Association}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Hamp:74, author = {Hampel, F. R.}, title = {The Influence Curve and its Role in Robust Estimation}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1974}, volume = {69}, pages = {383-393}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Hamp:71, author = {Hampel, F. R.}, title = {A General Qualitative Definition of Robustness}, journal = {The Annals of Mathematics and Statistics}, year = {1971}, volume = {42}, pages = {1887-1896}, key = {statistics} } @PHDTHESIS{Hamp:68, author = {Hampel, F. R.}, title = {Contribution to the Theory of Robust Estimation}, school = {University of California}, year = {1968}, address = {Berkeley}, key = {statistics} } @BOOK{HaRoRoSt:86, title = {Robust Statistics: The Approach Based on Influence Functions}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1986}, author = {Hampel, F. R. and Ronchetti, E. M. and Rousseeuw, P. J. and Stahel, W. A.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{HaMu:00, author = {Han, S. and Mulligan, C. B.}, title = {Human Capital, Heterogenity and Estimated Degrees of Intergenerational Mobility}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2000}, number = {7678}, address = {Cambridge, MA}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Hana:08, author = {Hanany, E.}, title = {The ordinal {N}ash social welfare function}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {44}, pages = {405-422}, abstract = {A social welfare function entitled ‘ordinal Nash’ is proposed. It is based on risk preferences and assumes a common, worst social state (origin) for all individuals. The crucial axiom in the characterization of the function is a weak version of independence of irrelevant alternatives. This axiom considers relative risk positions with respect to the origin. Thus, the resulting social preference takes into account non-expected utility risk preference intensity by directly comparing certainty equivalent probabilities. The function provides an interpretation of the Nash-utility-product preference aggregation rule. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the function to produce complete and transitive binary relations are characterized.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.22} } @ARTICLE{Hanc:98, author = {Hancock, R.}, title = {Can Housing Wealth Alleviate Poverty Among {B}ritain's Older Population?}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {19}, pages = {249-272}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Hane:94, author = {Hanemann, W. M.}, title = {Valuing the Environment Through Contingent Valuation}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1994}, volume = {8}, pages = {19-43}, key = {environment} } @ARTICLE{Hane:84, author = {Hanemann, W. M.}, title = {Welfare Evaluations in Contingent Valuation Experiments with Discrete Responses}, journal = {American Journal of Agricultural Economics}, year = {1984}, volume = {66}, pages = {332-341}, key = {Experiments} } @BOOK{HaPeLe:48, title = {Analysis of {W}isconsin Income}, publisher = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {1948}, author = {Hanna, F. A. and Pechman, J. A. and Lerner, S. M.}, address = {New York}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{HaKa:77, title = {Concentration in British Industry: Theory, Measurement and the {UK} Experience}, publisher = {MacMillan}, year = {1977}, author = {Hannah, L. and Kay, J. A.}, address = {London}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{HaLe:69, author = {Hanoch, G. and Levy, H.}, title = {The Efficiency Analysis of Choices Involving Risk}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1969}, volume = {36}, pages = {335-346}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{HaPeSl:00, author = {Hansen, C. T. and Pedersen, L. H. and Slok, T.}, title = {Ambiguous Effects of Tax Progressivity - Theory and {D}anish Evidence}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {7}, pages = {335-347}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Hans:07, author = {Hansen,D.}, title = {Liberalism and Ability Taxation}, journal = {Texas Law Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {85}, pages = {1057-1113}, abstract = {Recent tax scholarship has embraced the idea of individual endowment taxation, or taxation of human abilities, as an approach to ideal tax theory. Under endowment taxation, individuals are taxed according to their native ability to command resources, rather than according to any actual index of goods or expenditures, such as income, consumption or wealth, that otherwise might be thought relevant to the assignment of tax burdens. This Article argues that endowment taxation is generally incompatible with political theories that might broadly be described as “liberal,” whether or not these theories authorize what is called “redistribution.” The Article also suggests that under a wide array of assumptions, lump-sum taxes such as an endowment tax are not optimally efficient. Lastly, it argues that even where they represent the most efficient available alternative, lump-sum taxes generate social costs if they compel individuals to work in order to meet tax obligations.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{HaHeLi:08, author = {Hansen, L. P. and Heaton, J. C. and Li, N.}, title = {Consumption Strikes Back? Measuring Long-Run Risk}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2008}, volume = {116}, pages = {260-302}, number = {2}, abstract = {We characterize and measure a long-term risk-return trade-off for the valuation of cash flows exposed to fluctuations in macroeconomic growth. This trade-off features risk prices of cash flows that are realized far into the future but continue to be reflected in asset values. We apply this analysis to claims on aggregate cash flows and to cash flows from value and growth portfolios by imputing values to the long-run dynamic responses of cash flows to macroeconomic shocks. We explore the sensitivity of our results to features of the economic valuation model and of the model cash flow dynamics.}, key = {risk}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.23} } @BOOK{HaHuMa:53, title = {Sample Survey Methods and Theory, Volume II}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1953}, author = {Hansen, M. H. and Hurwitz, W. N. and Madow, W. G.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{Hans:08, author = {Hanson, Matthew}, title = {The Economics of Roadside Bombs}, institution = {College of William and Mary}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {68}, abstract = {The U.S. military has been criticized for its failure to stop the Iraqi insurgency’s use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which have caused most of the Coalition casualties. We use instrumental variables to estimate a microeconomic model of insurgent responses to U.S. military countermeasures. We find that insurgents increase the number of IED attacks when IEDs are made less effective, but that the insurgents’ overall capacity to inflict damage decreases. These results suggest that a major benefit of IED countermeasures comes in reducing non-IED attacks, which decrease 2% with every 1% decrease in IED effectiveness. Previous evaluations of the U.S. military’s $13 billion counter-IED effort, which have not included its causal impact on non-IED attacks, have significantly understated its success.}, key = {Instrumental Variables}, keywords = {Iraq War, Instrumental Variables, Income and Substitution Effects, Insurgency, Terrorism.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @INCOLLECTION{Hans:77, author = {Hansson, B.}, title = {The measurement of social inequality}, booktitle = {Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science}, publisher = {D. Reidel}, year = {1977}, editor = {Butts, R. and Hintikka, R.}, address = {Dordrecht}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Hans:87, author = {Hansson, I.}, title = {Optimal income taxation and the untaxed sector}, booktitle = {Consequences and Perspectives: Different Economic Systems}, publisher = {Gower}, year = {1987}, editor = {Alessandrini, S. and Dallago, B.}, address = {Aldershot}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{Hans:85, author = {Hansson, I.}, title = {Tax evasion and government policy}, booktitle = {The Economics of the Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1985}, editor = {Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A.}, address = {Berlin, Germany}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{Hans:82HT, author = {Hansson, I.}, title = {The underground economy in a high tax country: The case of {S}weden}, booktitle = {The Underground Economy in the {U}nited {S}tates and Abroad}, publisher = {D. C. Heath}, year = {1982}, editor = {Tanzi, V.}, address = {Lexington, Massachusetts}, key = {underground} } @TECHREPORT{Hans:82TU, author = {Hansson, I.}, title = {The unobserved economy in {S}weden}, year = {1982}, type = {paper presented to conference on The Unobserved Economy, Wassenaar, Netherlands}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Hans:80, author = {Hansson, I.}, title = {Sveriges svarta sektor}, journal = {Ekonomisk Debatt}, year = {1980}, volume = {8}, pages = {595-602}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Hara:97, author = {Hara, Chiaki}, title = {Welfare analysis of the coordinating role of a redundant security}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {56}, pages = {299-303}, number = {3}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{HaHuKu:07, author = {Hara, Chiaki and Huang, James and Kuzmics, Christoph}, title = {Representative consumer’s risk aversion and efficient risk-sharing rules}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {137}, pages = {652 - 672}, abstract = {We study the representative consumer’s risk attitude and efficient risk-sharing rules in a single-period, single-good economy in which consumers have homogeneous probabilistic beliefs but heterogeneous risk attitudes. We prove that if all consumers have convex absolute risk tolerance, so must the representative consumer.We also identify a relationship between the curvature of an individual consumer’s individual risk sharing rule and his absolute cautiousness, the first derivative of absolute risk-tolerance. Furthermore, we discuss some consequences of these results and refinements of these results for the class of HARA utility functions.}, key = {Risk Aversion}, keywords = {Aggregation, Heterogeneous consumers, Absolute risk tolerance, Mutual fund theorem}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Harb:98, author = {Harbaugh, William T.}, title = {What do donations buy? A model of philanthropy based on prestige and warmglow}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {67}, pages = {269-284}, number = {2}, key = {public economics} } @INCOLLECTION{Harb:64, author = {Harberger, A. C.}, title = {Taxation, resource allocation and welfare}, booktitle = {The Role of Direct and Indirect Taxes in the {F}ederal {R}evenue System}, publisher = {Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey}, year = {1964}, editor = {Due, J.}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Harb:78, author = {Harberger, A. C.}, title = {On the use of distributional weights in social cost-benefit analysis}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1978}, volume = {86}, pages = {S87-S120}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Harb:71, author = {Harberger, A. C.}, title = {Three basic postulates for applied welfare economics}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1971}, volume = {9}, pages = {785-797}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{HaLiPo:52, title = {Inequalities}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1952}, author = {Hardy, G. and Littlewood, J. and P{\'o}lya, G.}, address = {London}, edition = {second}, key = {mathematics} } @BOOK{HaLiPo:34, title = {Inequalities}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1934}, author = {Hardy, G. and Littlewood, J. and P{\'o}lya, G.}, address = {London}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{HaPi:07, author = {Hariton,C. and Piaser,G.}, title = {When Redistribution Leads to Regressive Taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {9}, pages = {589-606}, number = {4}, abstract = {We introduce labor contracts in a framework of optimal redistribution: firms have some local market power and try to discriminate among heterogeneous workers. In this setting we show that if the firms have perfect information, i.e., they perfectly discriminate against workers and take all the surplus, the best tax function is flat. If firms have imperfect information, i.e., if they offer incentive contracts, then (under some assumptions) the best redistributive taxation is regressive.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{Harj:07, author = {Harjes, Thomas}, title = {Globalization and Income Inequality: A European Perspective}, institution = {IMF}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {169}, abstract = {There is growing concern in Europe over the impact of globalization on high and evenly shared living standards. These concerns have often surfaced in response to falling labor income shares in aggregate national income data. However, these data may tell little about the underlying distribution of incomes based on household disposable incomes. While summary measures of income distributions also suggest that inequality has increased in most industrialized countries, this development was very uneven and much less pronounced in euro-area countries, suggesting that broad phenomena such as trade liberalization and technological change may not be major drivers of inequality.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Globalization, Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Hark:96, author = {Harkness, Susan}, title = {The gender earnings gap: evidence from the {UK}}, journal = {Fiscal Insitute}, year = {1996}, volume = {17}, pages = {1-36}, number = {2}, month = {May}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Harl:92AV, author = {Harless, D. W.}, title = {Actions versus prospects: the effect of problem representation on regret}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1992}, volume = {82}, pages = {634-649}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Harl:92PA, author = {Harless, D. W.}, title = {Predictions about indifference curves inside the unit triangle: a test ofvariants of expected utility theory}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1992}, volume = {18}, pages = {391-414}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Harless1992, author = {Harless, D. W.}, title = {Predictions about indifference curves inside the unit triangle: a test of variants of expected utility theory}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1992}, volume = {18}, pages = {391-414}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HaCa:95, author = {David W. Harless and Colin F. Camerer}, title = {An error rate analysis of experimental data testing Nash refinements}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {39}, pages = {649 - 660}, number = {3-4}, note = {Papers and Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Congress European Economic Association}, doi = {DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(94)00072-8}, issn = {0014-2921}, keywords = {Experiments}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-3YRSMF4-1R/2/625ea6abe7affa77e4ce32d27298a65a} } @ARTICLE{HaCa:94, author = {Harless, D. W. and Camerer, C. F.}, title = {The predictive utility of generalized expected utility theories}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1994}, volume = {62}, pages = {1251-1289}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{HaWa:99, author = {Harmon, C. and Walker, I.}, title = {The Marginal and Average Returns to Schooling in the {UK}}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {879-887}, key = {education,training} } @ARTICLE{Haro:93, author = {Haro Garc{\'{\i}}, J.}, title = {Modelos de Distribuci{\'o}n de la Renta Biparam{\'e}tricos}, journal = {Cuadernos de Cienc\'{\i}as Econ{\'o}micas y Empresariales}, year = {1993}, volume = {11}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{HaroGarc'i1993, author = {Haro Garc{\'{\i}}, J.}, title = {Modelos de Distribuci\'on de la Renta Biparam\'etricos}, journal = {Cuadernos de Cienc\'{\i}as Econ\'omicas y Empresariales}, year = {1993}, volume = {11}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HaTo:81, author = {Harris, M. and Townsend, R, M.}, title = {An alternative approach to aggregate surplus analysis}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1981}, volume = {49}, pages = {33-64}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{HaWi:85, author = {Harris, R. and Wildasin, D.}, title = {An alternative approach to aggregate surplus analysis}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1985}, volume = {26}, pages = {289-302}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Harr:81, author = {Harrison, Alan}, title = {Earnings by Size: A Tale of Two Distributions}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1981}, volume = {48}, pages = {621-631}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Harr:79, author = {Harrison, A. J.}, title = {The Upper Tail of the Earnings Distribution: {P}areto or Lognormal?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1979}, volume = {2}, pages = {191-195}, key = {Distributions} } @TECHREPORT{Harr:74, author = {Harrison, A. J.}, title = {Inequality of income and the {C}hampernowne distribution}, institution = {University of Essex, Department of Economics}, year = {1974}, type = {Discussion Paper 54}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{HaSe:94, author = {Harrison, E. and Seidl, C.}, title = {Acceptance of Distributional Axioms: Experimental Findings}, booktitle = {Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, pages = {67-99}, address = {Berlin, Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{HaSe:94AD, author = {Harrison, E. and Seidl, Ch.}, title = {Acceptance of Distributional axioms: experimental findings}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn , W. W.}, pages = {67-99}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{Harrison1994, author = {Harrison, E. and Seidl, Ch.}, title = {Perceptional inequality and preferential judgements: An empirical examination of distributional judgments}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {1994}, volume = {19}, pages = {61-81}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HaSe:94PI, author = {Harrison, E. and Seidl, Ch.}, title = {Perceptional inequality and preferential judgements: An empirical examinationof distributional judgments}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {1994}, volume = {79}, pages = {61-81}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{HaSe:92, author = {Harrison, E. and Seidl, C.}, title = {The Perception of Income Distributions: Inequality versus Preferences}, institution = {Institut f{\"u}r Finanzwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Kiel}, year = {1992}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {33}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Harrison2005, author = {Harrison, Glenn W. and Johnson, Eric and McInnes, Melayne M.and Rutstroem, Elisabet}, title = {Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: Comment.}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2005}, volume = {95}, pages = {897-901}, number = {3}, abstract = {AB- This article comments on the study conducted by Charles A. Holt and Susan K. Laury on the association between incentives and risk aversion. Holt and Laury develop an experimental design to determine the risk attitude of an individual. They use their observations to argue that increased incentives appear to change risk attitudes, leading to greater risk aversion. Popular utility functions that do not allow for such effects are therefore misspecified. Building on this finding, they estimate a flexible utility function that characterizes their aggregate data well, but that does not assume constant (absolute or relative) risk aversion. The basic Holt and Laury design should become an important tool for the interpretation and design of experiments in which risk attitudes could play a role.}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.08.16} } @BOOK{Harr:98, title = {The Economics of World War {II}}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Mark Harrison}, key = {econ history} } @INCOLLECTION{Hars:87, author = {Harsanyi, J. C.}, title = {Von {N}eumann-{M}orgenstern utilities, risk-taking and welfare}, booktitle = {Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory}, publisher = {Macmillan, London}, year = {1987}, editor = {Feiwel, G. R.}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Hars:97, author = {Harsanyi, J. C.}, title = {Utilities, preferences and substantive goods}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1997}, volume = {14}, pages = {129-145}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Harsanyi1997, author = {Harsanyi, J. C.}, title = {Utilities, preferences, and substantive goods}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1997}, volume = {14}, pages = {129-145}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Hars:78, author = {Harsanyi, J. C.}, title = {Bayesian decision theory and utilitarian ethics}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1978}, volume = {68}, pages = {223-228}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Hars:77, author = {Harsanyi, J. C.}, title = {Morality and the theory of rational behavior}, journal = {Social Research}, year = {1977}, volume = {44}, pages = {623-656}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Hars:77RB, title = {Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1977}, author = {Harsanyi, J. C.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Hars:76, title = {Essays in Ethics. Social Behaviour and Scientific Explanation}, publisher = {Reidel}, year = {1976}, author = {Harsanyi, J. C.}, address = {Dordrecht}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Hars:75, author = {Harsanyi, J. C.}, title = {Nonlinear social welfare functions}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {1975}, volume = {6}, pages = {311-322}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Hars:73, author = {Harsanyi, J. C.}, title = {Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points}, journal = {International Journal of Game Theory}, year = {1973}, volume = {2}, pages = {1-23}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Hars:67, author = {Harsanyi, J. C.}, title = {Games with incomplete information played by '{B}ayesian' players}, journal = {Management Science}, year = {1967}, volume = {14}, pages = {159-182, 320-334, 486-502}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Hars:55, author = {Harsanyi, J. C.}, title = {Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics and interpersonal comparisons of utility}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1955}, volume = {63}, pages = {309-321}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Hars:53, author = {Harsanyi, J. C.}, title = {Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of risk-taking}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1953}, volume = {61}, pages = {434-435}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{HaMa:82, author = {Harstad, R. and Maresse, M.}, title = {Behavioral Explanations of Efficient Public Good Allocations}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1982}, volume = {19}, pages = {367-383}, key = {Public goods} } @ARTICLE{Hart:85, author = {Hart, O.}, title = {Monopolistic competition in the spirit of {C}hamberlin: a general model}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1985}, volume = {62}, pages = {529-546}, key = {industry} } @TECHREPORT{HaMo:04, author = {Hart,O. and Moore,J.}, title = {Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In}, institution = {Harvard Institute of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, abstract = {We view a contract as a list of outcomes. Ex ante, the parties commit notto consider outcomes not on the list, i.e., these are "ruled out". Ex post,they freely bargain over outcomes on the list, i.e., the contract specifiesno mechanism to structure their choice; in this sense outcomes on the listare not "ruled in". A "loose" contract (long list) maximizes flexibilitybut may interfere with ex ante investment incentives. When these incentivesare important enough, the parties may write a "tight" contract (short list),even though this leads to ex post inefficiency.}, key = {bargaining} } @INCOLLECTION{Hart:81, author = {Hart, P. E.}, title = {The statics and dynamics of income distributions: a survey}, booktitle = {The Statics and Dynamics of Income}, year = {1981}, editor = {Klevmarken, N. A. and Lybeck, J. A.}, address = {Clevedon, Tieto}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Hart:96, author = {Hart, P. E.}, title = {The inequality of incomes in the {UK}: An essay in memory of {P}rofessor{S}ir {H}enry {P}helps {B}rown}, journal = {Review of Political Economy}, year = {1996}, volume = {8}, pages = {167-187}, number = {314}, institution = {University of Reading, Discussion Paper}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{Hart1995, author = {Hart, P. E.}, title = {The inequality of incomes in the {UK}: An essay in memory of {P}rofessor {S}ir {H}enry {P}helps {B}rown}, institution = {University of Reading, Discussion Paper}, year = {1995}, number = {314}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Hart:79, author = {Hart, P. E.}, title = {On Bias and Concentration}, journal = {The Journal of Industrial Economics}, year = {1979}, volume = {27}, pages = {211-226}, number = {3}, key = {industry} } @TECHREPORT{Hart:78, author = {Hart, P. E.}, title = {Redundant inequalities}, institution = {National Institute of Economic and Social Research}, year = {1978}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {18}, address = {London}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Hart1976, author = {Hart, P. E.}, title = {The dynamics of earnings, 1963-1973}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1976}, volume = {86}, pages = {551-565}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Hart:76, author = {Hart, P. E.}, title = {The comparative statics and dynamics of income distributions}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, series A}, year = {1976}, volume = {139}, pages = {198-225}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Hart:76TD, author = {Hart, P. E.}, title = {The dynamics of earnings, 1963-1973}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1976}, volume = {86}, pages = {551-565}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Hart:71, author = {Hart, P. E.}, title = {Entropy and other measures of concentration.}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A}, year = {1971}, volume = {134}, pages = {423-34}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{HaPr:56, author = {Hart, P. E. and Prais, S. J.}, title = {An Analysis of Business Concentration}, journal = {Journal of The Royal Statistical Society}, year = {1956}, volume = {A 119}, pages = {150-181}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{Hart:88, author = {Hartog, J.}, title = {Poverty and the measurement of individual welfare -A Review of {A. J. M.Hagenaars} "The Perception of Poverty"}, journal = {The Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1988}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Hartog1988, author = {Hartog, J.}, title = {Poverty and the measurement of individual welfare -A Review of {A. J. M. Hagenaars} "The Perception of Poverty"}, journal = {The Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1988}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{HaFeJo:00, author = {Hartog, J. and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. and Jonker, N.}, title = {On a simple measure of risk aversion}, institution = {Universiteit van Amsterdam}, year = {2000}, type = {mimeo}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Hart:99, author = {Hartwick, J. M.}, title = {Insuring and U (Y)}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {65}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{HaLaNo:07, author = {Haruvy, Ernan and Lahav, Yaron and Noussair, Charles N.}, title = {Traders' Expectations in Asset Markets: Experimental Evidence}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {97}, pages = {1901-1920(20)}, abstract = {We elicit traders' predictions of future price trajectories in repeated experimental markets for a 15-period-lived asset. We find that individuals' beliefs about prices are adaptive, and primarily based on past trends in the current and previous markets in which they have participated. Most traders do not anticipate market downturns the first time they participate in a market, and, when experienced, they typically over-estimate the time remaining before market peaks and downturns occur. When prices deviate from fundamental values, belief data are informative to an observer in predicting the direction of future price movements and the timing of market peaks.}, doi = {doi:10.1257/000282807783219616} } @ARTICLE{HaNo:06, author = {Haruvy, Ernan and Noussair, Charles N.}, title = {The Effect of Short Selling on Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Spot Asset Markets}, journal = {The Journal of Finance}, year = {2006}, volume = {61}, pages = {1119--1157}, number = {3}, abstract = {A series of experiments illustrate that relaxing short-selling constraints lowers prices in experimental asset markets, but does not induce prices to track fundamentals. We argue that prices in experimental asset markets are influenced by restrictions on short-selling capacity and limits on the cash available for purchases. Restrictions on short sales in the form of cash reserve requirements and quantity limits on short positions behave in a similar manner. A simulation model, based on DeLong et al. (1990), generates average price patterns that are similar to the observed data.}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.01.21} } @ARTICLE{HaBe:03, author = {Harvey, A. and Bernstein, J.}, title = {Measurement And Testing Of Inequality From Time Series Of Deciles With An Application To {U.S.} Wages}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2003}, volume = {85}, pages = {141-152}, abstract = {This article uses unobserved-components time series models to capture the underlying trends in the quarterly deciles of U.S. hourly wages. Tests of stability and divergence are developed as a means of assessing changes in inequality. The decrease in the wage gender gap is examined, and the impact of changes in the minimum wage is assessed.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.22} } @INCOLLECTION{Harv:99, author = {Harvey, A. S.}, title = {Time Use Research: The Roots to the Future}, booktitle = {Time Use - Research, Data and Policy}, publisher = {NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft}, year = {1999}, editor = {Merz, J. and Ehling, M.}, pages = {123-149}, address = {Baden Baden.}, key = {time use} } @ARTICLE{Harv:05, author = {Harvey,J.}, title = {A note on the ‘natural rate of subjective inequality’ hypothesis and theapproximate relationship between the Gini coefficient and the Atkinsonindex}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {1021-1025}, abstract = {In a recent paper in this journal, Lambert et al. [J. Public Econ. 87 (2003)1061] sought to establish the natural rate of subjective inequality (NRSI)hypothesis. Their statistical analysis, however, may have simply identifieda relationship between the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson index, ratherthan confirm the existence of a NRSI. In this note, an approximate relationshipbetween the Gini coefficient and Atkinson index is identified using simulationanalysis. This finding does not appear to overturn the NRSI hypothesisand indicates the need for further investigation of this insightful andpotentially far-reaching hypothesis.}, key = {Inequality} } @ARTICLE{HaKo:03, author = {Hasegawa, H. and Kozumi, H.}, title = {Estimation of {L}orenz curves: a {B}ayesian nonparametric approach}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2003}, volume = {115}, pages = {277-291}, abstract = {In this article, we estimate Lorenzcurves using the recent development of the Bayesian nonparametric method with Dirichlet process prior. We also consider contaminated observations of income and propose a method for removing these contaminated observations. Further, we present examples using both simulated data and real data to illustrate our approach.}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.19} } @TECHREPORT{HaMy:06, author = {Hashimzade, Nigar and Myles, Gareth}, title = {Inequality and the Choice of the Personal Tax Base}, institution = {PEUK}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {6}, abstract = {It is possible to employ either income or expenditure as the base for personal taxation. A considerable literature has developed that investigates the relative efficiency of these bases. The answer is usually in favor of the expenditure tax since it encourages capital accumulation through the avoidance of the double taxation of saving. In contrast, the literature is almost silent on the relative equity of the two bases. We investigate the redistributive consequences of the choice in models with two sources of heterogeneity: skill in employment and lump-sum endowment. The Gini coefficient is used to measure the degreee of equity achieved by the tax bases in static and dynamic settings. Income taxes and expenditure taxes that generate equal welfare (or equal revenue) are compared. In the static economy the income tax leads to lower inequality except when skill and endowment are negatively correlated. Inequality is always lower with the income tax in the dynamic economy. These results support the choice of income as the base for personal taxation if reduction in inequality is a priority of policy.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{HaHe:99, author = {Haskel, J. and Heden, Y.}, title = {Computers and the Demand for Skilled Labour: Industry- and Establishment-LevelPanel Evidence for the {UK}}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {C68-C79}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Haskel1999, author = {Haskel, J. and Heden, Y.}, title = {Computers and the Demand for Skilled Labour: Industry- and Establishment-Level Panel Evidence for the {UK}}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {C68-C79}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HaBe:91, author = {Hasseldine, D. J. and Bebbington, K. J.}, title = {Blending economic deterrence and fiscal psychology models in the designof responses to tax evasion: The New Zealand experience}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1991}, volume = {12}, pages = {399-324}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Hasseldine1991, author = {Hasseldine, D. J. and Bebbington, K. J.}, title = {Blending economic deterrence and fiscal psychology models in the design of responses to tax evasion: The New Zealand experience}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1991}, volume = {12}, pages = {399-324}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HaHi:03, author = {Hasseldine, John and Hite, Peggy A.}, title = {Framing, gender and tax compliance}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {2003}, volume = {24}, pages = {517-533}, abstract = {In the context of extensive social science research on framing, we discusshow framing objectively equivalent information can (but does not always)differentially affect individuals attitudes and behaviors. Many of theseframing effects have been found in the health communications and marketingliteratures. Using a typology of framing developed by Levin et al. [Organ.Behav. Hum. Dec. Proc. 76 (1998) 149], we are able to classify prior taxcompliance research, much of it reported in the Journal of Economic Psychology,that suggests decision frames influence tax reporting behavior. This priorresearch is now known as risky choice framing. Our study differs from thisprior literature as, using goal framing, we manipulate two objectivelyequivalent messages (one positively framed, one negatively framed) thatare communicated to adult taxpayers. We find no evidence of a main effectfor framing objectively equivalent information. However, in line with priorresearch, a significant frame by gender interaction effect was documented.We discuss our results in the light of prior framing and tax complianceresearch and suggest policy implications. A further contribution of thisstudy is that goal framing effects are demonstrated to extend beyond healthand consumer behavior settings.}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{HaMe:99IW, author = {Hassett, K. A. and Metcalf, G. E.}, title = {Investment with Uncertain Tax Policies: Does Random Tax Policy DiscourageInvestment?}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {372-393}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Hassett1999, author = {Hassett, K. A. and Metcalf, G. E.}, title = {Investment with Uncertain Tax Policies: Does Random Tax Policy Discourage Investment?}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {372-393}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HaMo:00, author = {Hassler, John and Mora, Jose V. Rodriguez}, title = {Intelligence, Social Mobility, and Growth}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2000}, volume = {90}, pages = {888-908}, number = {4}, abstract = {We develop a model where the allocation of human resources, intergenerationalsocial mobility, and technological growth are jointly determined. Highgrowth endogenously increases the equilibrium return to innate cognitiveability and makes the allocation of individuals depend more on innate abilityand less on social background. Individuals with a higher level of innatecognitive ability can deal better with less known, but more productive,technologies and thus choose a higher rate of technological growth. A socialallocation based on innate ability and high growth will thus reinforceeach other, implying the possibility of multiple endogenous growth equilibria.}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{HaMoStZi:03, author = {Hassler, John and Mora, Jose V. Rodriguez and Storesletten, Kjetil and Zilibotti,Fabrizio}, title = {The Survival of the Welfare State}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2003}, volume = {93}, pages = {87-112}, number = {1}, abstract = {This paper provides an analytical characterization of Markov perfect equilibriain a model with repeated voting, where agents vote over distortionary incomeredistribution. A key result is that the future constituency for redistributivepolicies depends positively on current redistribution, since this affectsboth private investments and the future distribution of voters. The modelfeatures multiple equilibria. In some equilibria, positive redistributionpersists forever. In other equilibria, even a majority of bene. ciariesof redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfarestate next period. Skill-biased technical change makes the survival ofthe welfare state less likely.}, key = {welfare state} } @ARTICLE{HaRoZe:07, author = {Hassler, John and Rodriguez Mora, Jse and Zeira, Joseph}, title = {Inequality and mobility}, journal = {Journal of Economic Growth}, year = {2007}, volume = {12}, pages = {235 - 5 235 - 259}, abstract = {Acknowledging that wage inequality and intergenerationalmobility are strongly interrelated, this paper presents a model in which both are jointly determined. The model enables us to study how inequality and mobility are affected by exogenous changes and what determines their correlation. A main implication of the model is that differences in the amount of public subsidies to education and educational quality produce cross-country patterns with a negative correlation between inequality and mobility. Differences in the labor market, like differences in skill-biased technology or wage compression instead produce a positive correlation. The predictions of the model are found to be consistent with various empirical observations on mobility and inequality.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Intergenerational mobility, Inequality, Educational policy}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{HaRo:99, author = {Hassler, J. and {Rodriguez Mora}, J. V.}, title = {Employment Turnover and the Public Allocation of Unemployment Insurance}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {55-83}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Hatc:08, author = {Hatchondo, J. C.}, title = {A Quantitative Study of the Role of Wealth Inequality on Asset Prices}, journal = {Economic Quarterly}, year = {2008}, volume = {94}, pages = {73-96}, number = {1}, key = {inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.21} } @ARTICLE{Hatz:99, author = {Dimitris Hatzinikolaou}, title = {Modelling Consumption: Permanent-Income or Rule-of-Thumb Behaviour?}, journal = {Economic Modelling}, year = {1999}, volume = {16}, pages = {293-306}, number = {2}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{Haub:94, author = {Haubrich,J.}, title = {Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Model}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1994}, volume = {102}, pages = {258-276}, abstract = {This paper calculates numerical solutions to the principal-agent problemand compares the results to the stylized facts of CEO compensation. Thenumerical predictions come from parameterizing the models of Gorssman andHart and of Holmstrom and Milgrom. While the correct incentives for a CEOcan greatly enhance a firm's performance, providing such incentives neednot be expensive. For many parameter values, CEO compensation need increaseonly by about $10 for every $1,000 of additional sharehold value; for somevalues, the amount is 0.003 cents.}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Hauf:99, author = {Haufler, A.}, title = {Prospects for Co-Ordination of Corporate Taxation and the Taxation of InterestIncome in the {EU}}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {133-153}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Haufler1999a, author = {Haufler, A.}, title = {Prospects for Co-Ordination of Corporate Taxation and the Taxation of Interest Income in the {EU}}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {133-153}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HaWo:99, author = {Haufler, Andreas and Wooton, Ian}, title = {Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {121-139}, number = {1}, key = {Tax competition} } @ARTICLE{Haus:85, author = {Hause, J. C.}, title = {The fine structure of earnings and on-the-job training hypothesis}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1985}, pages = {1013-1030}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{Haus:04, author = {Hauser, Richard}, title = {The Personal Distribution of Economic Welfare in {G}ermany - How the WelfareState Works}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {65}, pages = {1-25}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Hauser2004, author = {Hauser, Richard}, title = {The Personal Distribution of Economic Welfare in {G}ermany - How the Welfare State Works}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {65}, pages = {1-25}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HaDa:77, author = {Hauser, R. M. and Daymont, T. N.}, title = {Schooling, ability and earnings: cross-sectional findings 8 to 14 yearsafter graduation}, journal = {Sociology of Education}, year = {1977}, volume = {50}, pages = {182-206}, key = {education,training} } @ARTICLE{Hauser1977, author = {Hauser, R. M. and Daymont, T. N.}, title = {Schooling, ability and earnings: cross-sectional findings 8 to 14 years after graduation}, journal = {Sociology of Education}, year = {1977}, volume = {50}, pages = {182-206}, key = {education,training}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{HaMc:96, title = {Economic analysis and moral philosophy}, publisher = {Cambridge Unversity Press}, year = {1996}, author = {Hausman, Daniel M. and McPherson, Michael S.}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Haus:78, author = {Hausman, J.}, title = {Specification tests in Econometrics}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1978}, volume = {46}, pages = {1251-1271}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Hausman1978, author = {Hausman, J.}, title = {Specification tests in Econometrics}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1978}, pages = {1251-1271}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HaWo:95, author = {Haveman, R. and Wolfe, B.}, title = {The Determinants of Children's Attainments: A Review of Methods and Findings}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1995}, volume = {33}, pages = {1829-1878}, key = {household} } @ARTICLE{HaCh:67, author = {Havrda, J. and Charvat, F.}, title = {Quantification method in classification processes: concept of structural $\alpha$-entropy}, journal = {Kybernetica}, year = {1967}, volume = {3}, pages = {30-35}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{Haya:00, author = {Hayakawa, H.}, title = {Bounded Rationality, Social and Cultural Norms and Interdependence Via ReferenceGroups}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2000}, volume = {43}, pages = {1-34}, key = {social custom} } @ARTICLE{Hayakawa2000, author = {Hayakawa, H.}, title = {Bounded Rationality, Social and Cultural Norms and Interdependence Via Reference Groups}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2000}, volume = {43}, pages = {1-34}, key = {social custom}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Haya:51, author = {Hayakawa, M.}, title = {The Application of {P}areto's Law of Income to {J}apanese Data}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1951}, volume = {19}, pages = {174-183}, key = {Distributions} } @BOOK{Haya:00E, title = {Econometrics}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {2000}, author = {Hayashi, F.}, address = {Princeton, New Jersey}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Haya:82, author = {Hayashi, F.}, title = {The Permanent Income Hypothesis: Estimation and Testing by Instrumental Variables}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1982}, volume = {90}, pages = {895-916}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{HaYi:97, author = {Hayri, A. and Yilmaz, K.}, title = {Privatisation and Stock market Efficiency: The {B}ritish Experience}, journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1997}, pages = {113-133}, key = {privatisation} } @ARTICLE{He1993, author = {He, X. and Simpson, D. G.}, title = {Lower Bound For Contamination Bias: Globally Minimax Versus Locally Linear Estimation}, journal = {The Annals of Statistics}, year = {1993}, volume = {21}, pages = {314-337}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HeSi:93, author = {He, X. and Simpson, D. G.}, title = {Lower Bound For Contamination Bias: Globally Minimax Versus Locally LinearEstimation}, journal = {The Annals of Statistics}, year = {1993}, volume = {21}, pages = {314-337}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Head:92, author = {Head, J. G.}, title = {Tax Fairness Principles: A Conceptual, Historical and Practical Review}, journal = {Australian Tax Forum}, year = {1992}, volume = {9}, pages = {65-125}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Head:08, author = {Headey, B.}, title = {Poverty Is Low Consumption and Low Wealth, Not Just Low Income}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {89}, pages = {23-39}, abstract = {The purpose of this paper is to suggest an improved measure of financial poverty, based on household consumption and wealth as well as income. Data come from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics Australia (HILDA) Survey, which appears to be the first national socio-economic panel survey to provide longitudinal data on all three measures of household economic well-being. National measures of poverty in Australia and other Western countries are usually based only on low income. But this is conceptually incorrect; the measures lack validity. To be poor is to have a low material standard of living¡ªinvoluntarily. So measures of poverty should also take account of household consumption and wealth. If a household has an adequate current level of consumption, it should not be classified as poor right now, even if its current income is low. Similarly, if it has substantial wealth (net worth), it should not be viewed as poor because it could draw down on wealth to boost current consumption. The invalidity of income-based measures has long been recognised in principle (Ringen 1987, The possibility of politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press). In practical terms, the problem is to combine measures of wealth and income, and especially consumption, in the same survey. In the 2005 HILDA Survey a battery of household expenditure items was included which, benchmarked against the Australian Bureau of Statistics¡¯ Household Expenditure Survey for 2003¨C04, appeared to provide valid measurement of 53.4% of total household expenditure. These well measured items correlated 0.76 with total expenditure and, in combination with standard demographic variables, accounted for 78.3% of the variance in the total. This paper uses 2005¨C06 HILDA data to construct revised measures of financial poverty. The value of these measures for public policy and research purposes is illustrated. In particular, the new measures give much lower estimates of poverty than income-based measures. They can also be used to predict which households are at risk of future poverty.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {Zhang Zhijun}, timestamp = {2000.09.30} } @ARTICLE{HeMaWo:05, author = {Headey,B. and Marks,G. and Wooden,M.}, title = {The Structure and Distribution of Household Wealth in Australia}, journal = {The Australian Economic Review}, year = {2005}, volume = {38}, pages = {159-175}, abstract = {This article uses data from the second wave of the Household, Income andLabour Dynamics in Australia (or HILDA) Survey to provide an overview ofthe structure and distribution of household wealth in Australia. The dataconfirm that wealth is very unequally distributed, with the bottom halfof the distribution owning less than 10 per cent of total household networth, while the wealthiest 10 per cent account for 45 per cent. The articlealso includes an analysis of the factors associated with household wealththat indicates that wealth is significantly related to a range of factorsincluding age, country of birth, parental occupational status, education,marital status, working hours, income, self-reported savings behaviour,a willingness to take risks and even various lifestyle behaviours, suchas smoking and alcohol consumption.}, key = {Income distribution: empirical} } @ARTICLE{HeMuWo:08, author = {Headey, B. and Muffels, R. and Wooden, M.}, title = {Money Does not Buy Happiness: Or Does It? A Reassessment Based on the Combined Effects of Wealth, Income and Consumption}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {87}, pages = {65-82}, abstract = {The paper uses household economic panel data from five countries—Australia, Britain, Germany, Hungary and The Netherlands—to provide a reassessment of the impact of economic well-being on happiness. The main conclusion is that happiness is considerably more affected by economic circumstances than previously believed. In all five countries wealth affects life satisfaction more than income. In the countries for which consumption data are available (Britain and Hungary), non-durable consumption expenditures also prove at least as important to happiness as income.}, key = {wealth}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.23} } @TECHREPORT{HeStVi:04, author = {Heathcote,J. and Storesletten,K. and Violante,G.}, title = {Two Views of Inequality Over the Life-Cycle}, institution = {CEPR}, year = {2004}, type = {discussion paper}, number = {4728}, abstract = {Data on the life-cycle profiles of inequality in wages, earnings, hours worked and consumption contains precious information for answering questions about the ability of households to insure labor market risk and about the sources of this risk. This Paper demonstrates that the choice of whether to control for cohort effects or for time effects has a drastic impact on the estimated age profiles for inequality and, thus, on the answers to those questions. It also shows that time effects are required to account for the observed trends in inequality in thirty years of US data, whereas there is no evidence that cohort effects have been important.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{HeStVi:08, author = {Heathcote, J. and Storesletten, K. and Violante, G. L.}, title = {The Macroeconomic Implications of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {14052}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 June 2008}, key = {wage inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @ARTICLE{HeLu:00, author = {Heaton, J. and Lucas, D.}, title = {Portfolio Choice in the Presence of Background Risk}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2000}, volume = {110}, pages = {1-26}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{HeIcSmTo:98, author = {Heckman, J. and Ichimura, H. and Smith, J. and Todd, P.}, title = {Characterizing selection bias using experimental data}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1998}, volume = {66}, pages = {1017-1098}, number = {5}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{HeLoTa:98, author = {Heckman, J. and Lochner, L. and Taber, C.}, title = {Tax Policy and Human-Capital Formation}, journal = {American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Tenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association)}, year = {1998}, volume = {88}, pages = {293-297}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{Heck:98, author = {Heckman, James J.}, title = {What should be our human capital investment policy?}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {19}, pages = {103-119}, number = {2}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{HeHo:90, author = {Heckman, J. J. and Honore. B.}, title = {The Empirical Content of the {R}oy Model}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1990}, volume = {58}, pages = {1121-1150}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{HeLT:99, author = {Heckman, James J. and Lochner, Lance and Taber, Christopher}, title = {Human Capital Formation and General Equilbrium Treatment Effects: A Studyof Tax and Tuition Policy}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {25-40}, number = {1}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{HeSi:84, author = {Heckman, J. J. and Singer, B.}, title = {Econometric Duration Analysis}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1984}, pages = {32-132}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Heckman1999, author = {Heckman, J. J. and Smith, J. A.}, title = {The Pre-Programme Earnings Dip and the Determinants of Participation in a Social Programme: Implications for Simple Programme Evaluation Strategies}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {313-348}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HeSm:99, author = {Heckman, J. J. and Smith, J. A.}, title = {The Pre-Programme Earnings Dip and the Determinants of Participation ina Social Programme: Implications for Simple Programme Evaluation Strategies}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {313-348}, key = {redistribution} } @BOOK{HeAlFo:82, title = {The Black Economy}, publisher = {Pan Books}, year = {1982}, author = {Heertje, A. and Allen, M. and Cohen, H.}, address = {London}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{HeMe:04, author = {Heim, Bradley T. and Meyer, Bruce D.}, title = {Work costs and nonconvex preferences in the estimation of labor supply models}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {2323-2338}, abstract = {Works costs have not been adequately handled in labor supply estimation,likely due to their complexity. We show that, if work costs are not accountedfor in the budget and time constraints in a structural labor supply model,they will be subsumed into the data generating preferences. Even if underlyingpreferences over consumption and leisure are convex, the presence of unobservablework costs can make these preferences appear nonconvex. However, we showthat, under plausible conditions, policy relevant calculations, such asestimates of the effect of tax changes on labor supply and deadweight lossmeasures, are not affected by the fact that estimated preferences incorporatework costs.}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{Hein:78, title = {Economic Models of Criminal Behavior}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1978}, author = {Heineke, J. M.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Hein:99, author = {Eskil Heinesen}, title = {The Tax Wedge and Household Demand for Services}, journal = {Economic Modelling}, year = {1999}, volume = {16}, pages = {235-256}, number = {2}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{HeKn:88, author = {Helberger, C. and Knepel, H.}, title = {How big is the shadow economy?}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1988}, volume = {32}, pages = {965-976}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{HeSt:00CA, author = {Hellman, T. and Stiglitz. J. E.}, title = {Credit and Equity Rationing in Markets with Adverse Selection}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2000}, volume = {44}, pages = {281-304}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Hell:07, author = {Hellwig, M.F.}, title = {A Contribution to the Theory of Optimal Utilitarian Income Taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {1449-1477}, note = {hellwig@coll.mpg.de.}, abstract = {The paper provides a new formulation of the Mirrlees–Seade theorem on the positivity of the optimal marginal income tax, under weaker assumptions and in a more general model. The formulation of the theorem is independent of whether the model involves finitely many types or a continuous type distribution. The formal argument makes the underlying logic transparent, relating the mathematics to the economics and showing precisely how each assumption enters the analysis.}, key = {income taxation}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @TECHREPORT{Hell:05, author = {Hellwig, M.}, title = {A Contribution to the Theory of Optimal Utilitarian Income Taxation}, institution = {Max Planck Institute for Reseach on Collective Goods}, year = {2005}, address = {Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D - 53113 Bonn, Germany}, month = {November}, abstract = {The paper provides a new proof of the positivity of the optimal marginal income tax, in a more general model, under weaker assumptions. The analysis focusses on the (weakly) relaxed problem in which upward incentive constraints are replaced by a monotonicity condition on consumption. Without upward incentive constraints, nonnegativity of the optimal marginal income tax is straightforward; strict positivity follows from an assumption on the desirability of redistributing leisure. The resulting allocation is incentive compatible, and is optimal for the original income tax problem. The argument is the same for distributions with finitely many types and for a continuous type distribution.}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @TECHREPORT{Hell:04, author = {Hellwig, M.}, title = {Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing: A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics}, institution = {Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods}, year = {2004}, address = {Martin F. Hellwig Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D - 53113 Bonn, Germany}, month = {November}, abstract = {The paper develops an integrated model of optimal nonlinear income taxation, public-goods provision and pricing in a large economy. With asymmetric information about labour productivities and publicgoods preferences, the multidimensional mechanism design problem becomes tractable by requiring renegotiation proofness of the final allocation of private goods and admission tickets for excludable public goods. Under an affiliation assumption on the underlying distribution, optimal income taxation, public-goods provision and admission fees have the same qualitative properties as in unidimensional models. These properties are obtained for utilitarian welfare maximization and for a Ramsey-Boiteux formulation with interim participation constraints.}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @TECHREPORT{Hell:04RA, author = {Hellwig,M.}, title = {Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large When Outcomes Are Multidimensional.}, institution = {Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods}, year = {2004}, abstract = {The paper discusses criteria for comparing risk aversion of decision makerswhen outcomes are multidimensional. A weak concept, "commodity specificgreater risk aversion", is based on the comparison of risk premia paidin a specified commodity. A stronger concept, "uniformly greater risk aversion"is based on the comparison of risk premia regardless of what commoditiesare used for payment. Neither concept presumes that von Neumann-Morgensternutility functions are ordinally equivalent. Nonincreasing consumption specificrisk aversion is shown to be suffcient to make randomization undesirablein an agency problem with hidden characteristics.}, key = {risk} } @TECHREPORT{Hell:08, author = {Hellwig, M. F.}, title = {A Maximum Principle for Control Problems with Monotonicity Constraints}, institution = {Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2008/4}, address = {Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany}, abstract = {The paper develops a version of Pontryagin's maximum principle for optimal control problems with monotonicity constraints on control variables. Whereas the literature handles such constraints by imposing an assumption of piecewise smoothness on the control variable and treating the slope of this variable as a new control variable subject to a non-negativity constraint, the paper obtains the maximum principle without such an additional assumption. The result is useful for studying incentive problems with hidden characteristics when the type set is a continuum and preferences satisfy a single-crossing constraint.}, key = {economic theory}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.24} } @ARTICLE{Hell:86, author = {Hellwig, M. F.}, title = {Optimum linear income tax revisited}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {31}, pages = {163-179}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Helm:76, author = {Helmert, F. R.}, title = {Die {B}erechnung des wahrscheinlichen {B}eobachtungsfehlers aus den ersten {P}otenzen der {D}ifferenzen gleichgenauer direkter {B}eobachtungen}, journal = {Astronomische Nachrichten}, year = {1876}, volume = {88}, pages = {127-132}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Help:93, author = {Helpman, E.}, title = {Innovation, imitation and intellectual property rights}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1993}, volume = {61}, pages = {1247-1280}, key = {Trade} } @ARTICLE{HeSt:05, author = {Helsley,R. and Strange,W.}, title = {Mixed markets and crime}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {1251-1275}, abstract = {This paper specifies and solves a two-stage, game theoretic model of a mixedmarket for crime control. In the first stage of the model, private targetsand the government choose levels of policing. In the second stage, criminalschoose targets and the severity of the crimes that they commit. The paper’skey results are as follows. First, private policing can both divert crimeto targets that lack private protection and also increase the severityof the crime that these less-protected targets suffer. Second, an increasein private policing reduces the aggregate expenditure on traditional policing.This is an instance of a political incentive externality, where privatepolicing affects the objective function of the government. Specifically,it reduces the level of traditional policing that is consistent with theSamuelson condition for efficient provision of a public good. Third, thesubstitution of private for public policing carries with it a change inthe technology of policing. In effect, private policing leads to a shiftfrom enforcement and punishment towards monitoring and target hardening.This, in turn, may lead to an increase in the severity of crime. Fourth,the mixed policing equilibrium is inefficient, and, in some situations,mixing may reduce the utility of all targets.}, key = {Crime} } @ARTICLE{HeSt:00PC, author = {Helsley, R. W. and Strange, W. C.}, title = {Potential competition and public sector performance}, journal = {Regional Science and Urban Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {30}, pages = {405-428}, key = {privatisation} } @ARTICLE{HeKe:83, author = {Hemming , R. and Keen , M. J.}, title = {Single-crossing conditions in comparisons of tax progressivity}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {20}, pages = {373-380}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Hemp:84, author = {Hempenius, A. L.}, title = {Relative income position individual and social income satisfaction, and income inequality}, journal = {De Economist}, year = {1984}, volume = {32}, pages = {468-478}, abstract = {The survival probability as estimated by an individual is, ceteris paribus, supposed to depend on his relative income position in a set of reference incomes. The relative income position is thus defined in close connection to the preference formation theory of Kapteyn. It is shown that then this survival probability, called 'utility,' may be equated to the relative income position. A nice result of this approach is the possibility to formulate a utilitarian welfare function, which leads to the definition of income inequality measures. It is shown that the use of sets of reference incomes may lead to considerably smaller measured inequality.}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{HeRo:78, author = {Henderson, D. W. and Rowley, J. C. R.}, title = {Decomposition of aggregate measure of income distribution}, institution = {Economic Council of Canada}, year = {1978}, type = {Discussion Paper 107}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @TECHREPORT{HeWoZi:08, author = {Henderson, M. and Wolfers, J. and Zitzewitz, E.}, title = {Predicting Crime}, institution = {The University of Chicago}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {402}, abstract = {Prediction markets have been proposed for a variety of public policy purposes, but no one has considered their application in perhaps the most obvious policy area: crime. This paper proposes and examinesthe use of prediction markets to forecast crime rates and the impact on crime from changes to crime policy, such as resource allocation, policing strategies, sentencing, postconviction treatment, and so on. We make several contributions to the prediction markets and crime forecasting literature. First, we argue that prediction markets are especially useful in crime rate forecasting and criminal policy analysis, because information relevant to decisionmakers is voluminous, dispersed, and difficult to process efficiently. After surveying the current forecasting practices and techniques, we examine the use of standard prediction markets—such as those being used to predict everything from the weather to political elections to flu outbreaks—as a method of forecasting crime rates of various kinds. Second, we introduce some theoretical improvements to existing prediction markets that are designed to address specific issues that arise in policy-making applications, such as crime rate forecasting. Specifically, we develop the idea of prediction market event studies that can be used to test the influence of policy changes, both real and hypothetical, on crime rates. Given the high costs of changing policies, say issuing a moratorium on the death penalty or lowering mandatory minimum sentences for certain crimes, these markets provide a useful tool for policy makers operating under uncertainty. These event studies and the other policy markets we propose face a big hurdle, however, because predictions about the future imbed assumptions about the very policy choices they are designed to measure. We offer a method by which policy makers can interpret market forecasts in a way that isolates or unpacks underlying crime factors from expected policy responses, even when the responses are dependent on the crime factors. Finally, we discuss some practical issues about designing these markets, such as how to ensure liquidity, how to structure contracts, and the optimal market scope. We conclude with a modest proposal for experimenting with markets in this policy area.}, key = {crime}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.24} } @ARTICLE{Hend:07HI, author = {Hendricks, Lutz}, title = {How important is discount rate heterogeneity for wealth inequality?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {2007}, volume = {31}, pages = {3042 - 3068}, abstract = {This paper investigates the role of discount rate heterogeneity for wealth inequality. The key idea is to infer the distribution of preference parameters from the observed age profile of wealth inequality. The contribution of preference heterogeneity to wealth inequality can then be measured using a quantitative life-cycle model. I find that discount rate heterogeneity increases the Gini coefficient of wealth by around 0.07 to levels that are close to the data. The share of wealth held by the richest 1% of households rises by around 0.04, but falls short of the data by more than 10 percentage points. Discount rate heterogeneity also helps to account for the large wealth inequality observed among households with similar lifetime earnings.}, key = {Wealth Inequality}, keywords = {Wealth inequality, Preference heterogeneity}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Hend:07RW, author = {Hendricks, L.}, title = {Retirement Wealth and Lifetime Earnings}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {48}, pages = {421-456}, abstract = {This article argues that a satisfactory theory of wealth inequality should account not only for the marginal distribution of wealth, but also for the joint distribution of wealth and earnings. The article describes the joint distribution of retirement wealth and lifetime earnings in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. It then evaluates the ability of a stochastic life-cycle model to account for key features of this distribution. The life-cycle model fails to account for three key features of the data. (1) The correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth is too high. (2) The wealth gaps between earnings rich and earnings poor households are too large. (3) Wealth inequality among households with similar lifetime earnings is too small. Models in which households differ in rates of return or time preferences account much better for the joint distribution of retirement wealth and lifetime earnings.}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{Hend:99, author = {Hendricks, L.}, title = {Taxation and Long-Run Growth}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {411-434}, key = {growth} } @BOOK{Hend:97, title = {Dynamic Econometrics}, publisher = {OUP}, year = {1997}, author = {Hendry, D. F.}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{HeSc:89, author = {Henninger, C. and Schmitz, H.}, title = {Size distributions of income and expeditures testing the parametric approach}, institution = {University of Bonn}, year = {1989}, type = {Discussion Paper Series A}, address = {Bonn, Germany}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{HeBoBoCaFeGiMcE:01, author = {Henrich, J. and Boyd, R. and Bowles, S. and Camerer, C. and Fehr, E. and Gintis, H. and McElreath, R.}, title = {In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {91}, pages = {73-78}, abstract = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28200105%2991%3A2%3C73%3AISOHEB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.07.18} } @BOOK{Henr:81, title = {Can I Have It in Cash?}, publisher = {Astragal Books}, year = {1981}, author = {Henry, S.}, address = {London}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Henry1981, author = {Henry, S.}, title = {Can I Have It in Cash?}, year = {1981}, address = {London}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {Astragal Books}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Henr:78, title = {The Hidden Economy}, publisher = {Martin Robertson}, year = {1978}, author = {Henry, S.}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{HePi:97, author = {Hercowitz, Z. and Pines, D.}, title = {Migration between home country and diaspora: An economic analysis}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {45-60}, key = {public economics} } @PHDTHESIS{Herf:50, author = {Herfindahl, O. C.}, title = {Concentration in the Steel Industry}, school = {Columbia University}, year = {1950}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Heri:98, author = {Herings, P. Jean-Jacques}, title = {On the existence of a continuum of constrained equilibria}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {30}, pages = {257-273}, number = {3}, key = {micro} } @PHDTHESIS{Heri:93, author = {Heritier, S.}, title = {Contribution to Robustness in Nonlinear Models. Application to EconomicData}, school = {University of Geneva}, year = {1993}, address = {Switzerland}, note = {Thesis no 387}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{HeRo:94, author = {Heritier, S. and Ronchetti, E.}, title = {Robust Bounded-Influence Tests in General Parametric Models}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1994}, volume = {89}, pages = {897-904}, number = {427}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{HePu:07, author = {Hernandez, M. and Pudney, S.}, title = {Measurement error in models of welfare participation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {327-341}, abstract = {We consider the problem of modeling welfare participation when measurement error may affect simulated welfare entitlement. We identify a flaw in past implementations of the ML approach and develop a more appropriate ML approach. A model of welfare participation is estimated for British pensioners, linking the probability of participation to the value of benefit entitlement, incorporating the nonlinear rule relating entitlement to the household's income and financial assets. The model is used to evaluate the claim costs incurred by participants. When we allow for measurement errors in income and assets, estimated claim costs are substantially reduced.}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.15} } @ARTICLE{HeMaVi:99, author = {Herrero, Carmen and Maschler, Michael and Villar, Antonio}, title = {Individual rights and collective responsibility: the rights-egalitariansolution}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1999}, volume = {37}, pages = {59-77}, number = {1}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{HeMoPo:04, author = {Herrero,C. and Moreno-Ternero,J. and Ponti,G.}, title = {On the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims: An Experimental Study}, year = {2004}, abstract = {This paper reports an experimental study on three well known solutions forclaim problems, that is, the constrained equal-awards, the proportional,and the constrained equal-losses rules. To do this, we first let subjectsplay three games designed such that the unique equilibrium allocation coincideswith the recommendation of one of these three rules. Moreover, we alsolet subjects play an additional game, that has the property that all (andonly) strategy profiles in which players coordinate on the same rule constituea strict Nash equilibrium. While in the first three games subjects' playeasily converges to the unique equilibrium. in the last game the proportionalrule overwhelmingly prevails as a coordination device. We also administereda questionaire to a different group of students ,asking them to act asimpartial arbitrator to solve (among others) the same claims situationplayed in the lab. Also in this case, the proportional soluation was selectedby the vast majority of respondents.}, key = {Claims} } @TECHREPORT{HeMoPo:03, author = {Herrero, C. and Moreno-{T}ernero, J. and Ponti, G.}, title = {An Experiment on Bankruptcy}, institution = {IVIE}, year = {2003}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {447}, address = {Giovanni Ponti. Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Campus San Vicente del Raspeig, s/n, 03071 Alicante, Spain.}, month = {March}, abstract = {This paper reports an experimental study on three well known solutions for bankruptcy problems, that is, the constrained equal-awards, the proportional and the constrained equal-losses rule. To do this, we first let subjects play three games designed such that the unique equilibrium outcome coincides with one of these three rules. Moreover, we also let subjects play an additional game, that has the property that all (and only) strategy profiles in which players unanimously agree on the same rule constitute a strict Nash equilibrium. While in the first three games subjects' play easily converges to the unique equilibrium rule, in the last game the proportional rule overwhelmingly prevails as a coordination device.}, key = {finance}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{HeVi:01, author = {Herrero, C. and Villar, A.}, title = {The Three Musketeers: Four Classical Solutions to Bankruptcy Problems}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2001}, volume = {42}, pages = {307-328}, key = {games}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{Hers:78, author = {Herschel, F. J.}, title = {Tax evasion and its measurement in developing countries}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1978}, volume = {33}, pages = {232-268}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{HeSc:80, author = {John C. Hershey and Paul J.H. Schoemaker}, title = {Risk Taking and Problem Context in the Domain of Losses: An Expected UtilityAnalysis}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Insurance}, year = {1980}, volume = {47}, pages = {111-32}, number = {1}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{VaHeKa:81, author = {Floor G. Van Herwaarden and Arie Kapteyn}, title = {Empirical Comparison of the Shape of Welfare Functions}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1981}, volume = {15}, pages = {261-286}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Herwaarden1977, author = {Floor Van Herwaarden and Arie Kapteyn and Bernard Van Praag}, title = {Twelve Thousand Individual Welfare Functions: A Comparison of Six Samples in Belgium and The Netherlands}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {9}, pages = {283-300}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{VaHeKaVaPr:77, author = {Floor Van Herwaarden and Arie Kapteyn and Bernard Van Praag}, title = {Twelve Thousand Individual Welfare Functions: A Comparison of Six Samplesin Belgium and The Netherlands}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {9}, pages = {283-300}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{Hesh:04AR, author = {Heshmati,A.}, title = {A Review of Decomposition of Income Inequality}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2004}, abstract = {This paper is a review of recent developments of parametric and non-parametricapproaches to decompose inequality by subgroups, income sources, causalfactors and other unit characteristics. Different methods of decomposingchanges in poverty into growth, redistribution, poverty standard and residualcomponents are described. In parametric approaches the dynamics of incomeaccounting for transitory and permanent changes in individual and householdearnings conditional of various covariates are also reviewed. Statisticalinferences for inequality measurement including delta and bootstrappingand other methods to provide estimates of the sampling distribution arepresented. These issues are important in the design of policy measuresand expectations about their impacts on earnings inequality and povertyreductions.}, key = {Inequality decomposition} } @TECHREPORT{Hesh:04CA, author = {Heshmati,A.}, title = {Continental and Sub-Continental Income Inequality}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2004}, abstract = {Income inequality can be measured at different levels of aggregation suchas global, continental, international and national levels. Here we considerincome inequality at regions defined as equivalent of continental and sub-continentallevels. We investigate the economic disparity between regions of the worldand among countries within each continent or subcontinent.The empiricalresults for data availability reasons are mainly based on the second halfof the 20th century. The review covers a whole range of measures and methodsfrequently employed in empirical analysis of the global and regional incomeinequality and income distribution. Different determinant factors alongwith quantification of their impacts are presented and empirical resultsfrom different case studies are discussed. Finally, these results are contrastedto those obtained based on the WIID covering the same period and groupof countries.}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Hesh:04IA, author = {Heshmati,A.}, title = {Inequalities and Their Measurement}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2004}, abstract = {This paper is a review of the recent advances in the measurement of inequality.Inequality can have several dimensions. Economists are mostly concernedwith the income and consumption dimensions of inequality. Several inequalityindices including the most widely used index of inequality namely the Ginicoefficient is discussed. Non-income inequality includes inequality inskills, education, opportunities, happiness, health, wealth, and others.The direct and indirect effects of inequality in non-income factors onearnings and health are discussed. Results from review of the literaturesuggest relationship between inequality in income and non-income dimensions.This indicates that one should account for the interrelationship betweenthe different dimensions in the measurement and analyses of inequalities.}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Hesh:04RI, author = {Heshmati,A.}, title = {Regional Income Inequality in Selected Large Countries}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2004}, abstract = {Income inequality can be measured at different levels of aggregation suchas global, continental, international and national levels. Here we considerincome inequality at the national level but the focus is on the withincountry regional inequality. Regional inequality in income distributionin a selection of large countries measured by the size of their populationand land area with regional, provincial or federation division is examined.The empirical results reported are based on the second half of the 20thcentury. The countries considered here cover large transition, developingand industrialised countries. The review cover a whole range of measuresand methods frequently employed in empirical analysis of income inequalityand income distribution. Different determinant factors and their impactsfrom different studies are presented. Empirical results from the literatureis compared with those obtained based on the WIID data covering post 1950.}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Hesh:04TW, author = {Heshmati,A.}, title = {The World Distribution of Income and Income Inequality}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2004}, abstract = {This review covers a range of measures and methods frequently employed inempirical analysis of global income inequality and global income distribution.Different determinant factors along with quantification of their impactsand empirical results from different case studies are presented. Theseresults are further contrasted to those obtained based on the World IncomeInequality Database. A number of issues crucial to the studies of globalincome inequality are addressed. These are the concepts, measurement anddecomposition of inequality, the world distribution of income and inequalitymeasured at different levels of aggregation: global, international andintra-national. We analyse income at each of the three levels, discussthe benefit and limitations of each approach and present empirical resultsfound in the literature and compare it with those based on the World IncomeInequality Database. Research on the world income inequality supports increasedawareness of the problem, its measurement and quantification, identificationof causal factors and of policy measures to affect global income inequality.}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{HeEl:85, author = {Hessing, D. J. and Elffers, H.}, title = {Economic man or social man?: a social orientation model for individual behaviourin social dilemmas}, booktitle = {Economic Psychology}, publisher = {Trauner}, year = {1985}, editor = {Brandstaetter, H. and Kirchler, E.}, address = {Linz}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{HeElWe:88, author = {Hessing, D. J. and Elffers, H. and Weigel, R. M.}, title = {Exploring the limits of self-reports and reasoned action: an investigationof the psychology of tax evasion behavior}, journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology}, year = {1988}, volume = {54}, pages = {405-413}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Hessing1988, author = {Hessing, D. J. and Elffers, H., and Weigel, R. M.}, title = {Exploring the limits of self-reports and reasoned action: an investigation of the psychology of tax evasion behavior}, journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology}, year = {1988}, volume = {54}, pages = {405-413}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{HeyJ:91, title = {Experiments in Economics}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, year = {1991}, author = {Hey, J.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{HeLa:80, author = {Hey, J. D. and Lambert, P. J.}, title = {Relative deprivation and the {G}ini coefficient: comment}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1980}, volume = {95}, pages = {567-573}, note = {and reply by Yitzhaki}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{HeOr:94, author = {Hey, J. D. and Orme, C.}, title = {Investigating generalizations of expected utility theory using experimentaldata}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1994}, volume = {62}, pages = {1291-1326}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Hey1994, author = {Hey, J. D. and Orme, C.}, title = {Investigating generalizations of expected utility theory using experimental data}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1994}, volume = {62}, pages = {1291-1326}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Heye:01, author = {Heyes, A.}, title = {Honesty in a Regulatory Context: Good Thing or Bad?}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {45,2}, pages = {215-232}, key = {Compliance} } @BOOK{Hick:59, title = {Essays in World Economy}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, year = {1959}, author = {Hicks, J. R.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Hick:56, title = {A Revision of Demand Theory}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1956}, author = {Hicks, J. R.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Hick:46, title = {Value and Capital}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1946}, author = {Hicks, J. R.}, address = {Oxford}, edition = {2nd}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Hick:35, author = {Hicks, J. R.}, title = {A Suggestion for simplifying the Theory of Money}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1935}, volume = {2}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Hied:98, author = {Hiedemann, Bridget}, title = {A {S}tackelberg model of social security acceptance decisions in dual careerhouseholds}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {34}, pages = {263-278}, number = {2}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Hill:92, title = {The Panel Study of Income Dynamics: A User's Guide}, publisher = {Sage Publications}, year = {1992}, author = {Hill, M. S.}, address = {Newbury Park, CA.}, key = {Data} } @ARTICLE{HiNe:07IA, author = {Hill, S. A. and Neilson, W.}, title = {Inequality aversion and diminishing sensitivity}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {2007}, volume = {28}, pages = {143-153}, abstract = {We define inequality aversion as a decision-maker disliking it when his opponents’ payoffs differ from his own, diminishing sensitivity as this effect increasing less-than-proportionately as the opponents’ payoffs move further from the decision-maker’s, and a preference for Robin Hood redistributions as a preference for taking money from a high-payoff opponent and giving it to a low-payoff opponent. Existing models of inequality averse preferences are unable to accommodate all three properties. The three are not inherently inconsistent, though, and we construct a new model which exhibits all three properties.}, key = {inequality aversion}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Hill:59, author = {Hill, T. P.}, title = {An Analysis of the Distribution of Wages and Salaries in {G}reat {B}ritain}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1959}, volume = {27}, pages = {355-381}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{HiWe:99, author = {Hillman, A. L. and Weiss, A.}, title = {A Theory of Permissible Illegal Immigration}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {(15)4}, pages = {585-603}, key = {Crime} } @TECHREPORT{Hill:98, author = {John Hills}, title = {Persistent Poverty and Lifetime Inequality: The Evidence}, institution = {Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion}, year = {1998}, type = {Occasional Paper}, number = {10}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Hill:98IW, author = {Hills, John}, title = {Income and Wealth: the Latest Evidence}, institution = {Joseph Rowntree Foundation}, year = {1998}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @INCOLLECTION{Hill:98DI, author = {Hills, J. R.}, title = {Does income mobility mean that we do not have to worry about poverty?}, booktitle = {Exclusion, Employment and Opportunity}, publisher = {Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, STICERD}, year = {1998}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Hills, J. R.}, chapter = {3}, pages = {31-55}, address = {LSE, Houghton Street, London}, key = {mobility} } @BOOK{Hill:04, title = {Inequality and the State}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2004}, author = {Hills, J. R.}, address = {Oxford}, comment = {ISBN-13: 978-0-19-927664-6}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.21} } @TECHREPORT{Hill:95, author = {Hills, J. R.}, title = {Data on income and wealth Distribution}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1995}, type = {Welfare State Programme Research Note}, number = {WSP/RN/28}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Hind:01, author = {Hindriks, J.}, title = {Is There a Demand for Income Tax Progressivity?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {73}, pages = {43-50}, abstract = {Recently, Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin [Economics Letters 48 (1995) 319] have provided a popular support for progressivity theorem that says that a marginal progressive tax always defeats a marginal regressive tax as long as individuals vote for the tax scheme minimizing their tax liabilities and the median income is less than the mean income. In this paper we provide, under similar circumstances, a popular support for regressivity theorem according to which for any existing tax scheme there is always a majority support for a regressive reform reducing marginal progressivity (or increasing marginal regressivity). This regressive reform is supported by both extremes of the income distribution. Combining this result with Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin’s result implies that vote cycling between regressive and progressive tax reform is inevitable and thus that the demand for progressivity cannot be established in the standard Downsian framework with self-interested voters.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Hindriks2001, author = {Hindriks, J.}, title = {Is There a Demand for Income Tax Progressivity?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {73,1}, pages = {43-50}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Hind:99OT, author = {Hindriks, J.}, title = {On the Compatability Between Revenue Maximisation and Tax Progressivity}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {123-140}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Hind:99TC, author = {Hindriks, J.}, title = {The Consequences of Labour Mobility for Redistribution: Tax Vs. TransferCompetition}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {74}, pages = {215-234}, key = {Redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Hindriks1999a, author = {Hindriks, J.}, title = {The Consequences of Labour Mobility for Redistribution: Tax Vs. Transfer Competition}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {74}, pages = {215-234}, key = {Redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HiKeMu:99, author = {Hindriks, J. and Keen, M. and Muthoo, A.}, title = {Corruption, Extortion and Evasion}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {74}, pages = {395-430}, key = {corruption}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.02.12} } @ARTICLE{Hine:07, author = {Hines Jr., J. R.}, title = {Taxing Consumption and Other Sins}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2007}, volume = {21}, pages = {49-68}, abstract = {Federal and state governments in the United States use income and payroll taxes as their primary tools to collect revenue. In the rest of the world, governments also use income and payroll taxes, but rely much more heavily than does the United States on taxing consumption. Consumption taxes take many forms, including general sales taxes, value-added taxes, and excise taxes on the consumption of specific items including gasoline, alcohol, tobacco products, firearms, air travel, telephone communication, and others. The U.S. government does not use a value-added tax, making the United States unique among high-income countries and a rarity in the larger world. As of 2004, at least 134 countries rely on value-added taxes as a substantial source of funding. Value-added taxes are sophisticated forms of sales taxes in which taxes are withheld by businesses according to value added at every stage of production. American states do impose sales taxes on broad categories of consumer purchases, but state governments are considerably smaller than national governments, and their sales tax rates are very low compared to the value-added tax rates used in the rest of the world. The United States also imposes unusually low excise taxes even after controlling for total tax collections, which are lower in the United States than they are in most high-income countries. The deliberate social engineering that underlies the selection of certain commodities for unusually high rates of taxation appeals less to Americans than to residents of other countries. Moreover, the “sin” taxes on purchases of commodities such as gasoline, alcohol, tobacco, and firearms are not primarily imposed by the U.S. government for collecting substantial tax revenue for general spending purposes—although excise taxes have been used that way in the past. Instead, excise taxes are intended to discourage consumption of the specific taxed goods, thereby preventing some potential customers from contributing to pollution, traffic congestion, injury, and poor health. As one example, the U.S. tax on ozone-depleting chemicals is intended to provide incentives to discourage use of these chemicals. In addition, these sin taxes raise revenue that the government can use for targeted purposes like funding highway improvements, medical care, and law enforcement efforts that combat some of the consequences of gasoline, alcohol, tobacco, and firearms. For example, the federal tax on sport fishing equipment is intended to raise money to cover costs that the government incurs in supporting the taxed activity. The absence of value-added taxation in the United States, together with the very low rates of U.S. excise taxation, requires the U.S. government to rely more heavily on income taxes to finance its activities. This reliance on income taxes has three consequences. First, U.S. excise tax policy does relatively little to discourage the consumption of particular goods that damage both the environment and the individuals concerned. Second, it is difficult to tailor the income tax system to charge individuals even roughly appropriate amounts for their use of specific government services such as roads and health care. Third, and perhaps most important, is that reliance on income taxation imposes a higher tax burden on capital income than would be the case if the government instead made more extensive use of consumption taxes. Capital income taxes discourage saving and investing, and since the effects of capital income taxes compound over time, these taxes are among the most distortionary of all taxes. Even a very low rate of capital income taxation significantly increases the cost of consuming in the future relative to consuming today, and this relative price distortion grows as the saving horizon increases. While the “sin” of general consumption does not belong in quite the same category as the sin of consuming alcohol or tobacco, or other potentially harmful substances, the very low U.S. saving rate, and its consequences in reduced prosperity for the elderly and for future generations, makes marginal consumption look relatively sinful when compared to greater saving. The inefficiency associated with taxing capital income increases with an economy’s exposure to international capital flows, since rising international mobility makes a country’s capital stock more sensitive to taxation, suggesting that the cost of not making more extensive use of consumption taxes has been increasing in recent years.}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @TECHREPORT{Hine:04, author = {Hines {Jr.}, J.}, title = {Do Tax Havens Flourish?}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2004}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {10936}, address = {NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138}, month = {November}, abstract = {Tax haven countries offer foreign investors low tax rates and other tax features designed to attract investment and thereby stimulate economic activity. Major tax havens have less than one percent of the world's population (outside the United States), and 2.3 percent of world GDP, but host 5.7 percent of the foreign employment and 8.4 percent of foreign property, plant and equipment of American firms. Per capita real GDP in tax haven countries grew at an average annual rate of 3.3 percent between 1982 and 1999, which compares favorably to the world average of 1.4 percent. Tax haven governments appear to be adequately funded, with an average 25 percent ratio of government to GDP that exceeds the 20 percent ratio for the world as a whole, though the small populations and relative affluence of these countries would normally be associated with even larger governments. Whether the economic prosperity of tax haven countries comes at the expense of higher tax countries is unclear, though recent research suggests that tax haven activity stimulates investment in nearby high-tax countries.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{HiTh:95, author = {Hines, J. and Thaler, R.}, title = {The Flypaper Effect}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1995}, volume = {9}, pages = {217-226} } @ARTICLE{HiMS:89, author = {Hirschberg, J. G. and Molina, D. J. and Slottje, D. J.}, title = {A selection criterion for choosing between functional forms of income distribution}, journal = {Econometric Review}, year = {1989}, volume = {7}, pages = {183-97}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{HiRo:73, author = {Hirschman, A. and Rothschild, M.}, title = {The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of Economic Development}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1973}, volume = {87}, pages = {544-566}, key = {inequality}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @BOOK{Hirs:45, title = {National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade}, publisher = {University of California Press}, year = {1945}, author = {Hirschman, A. O.}, address = {Berkeley}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Hirs:89, title = {Time, Uncertainty and Information}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, year = {1989}, author = {Hirshleifer, Jack}, address = {Oxford}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Hirs:83, author = {Hirshleifer, J.}, title = {From Weakest Link to Best Shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {1983}, volume = {41}, pages = {371-386}, key = {public goods} } @BOOK{Hirs:70, title = {Investment, Interest and Capital}, publisher = {Prentice Hall}, year = {1970}, author = {Hirshleifer, Jack}, address = {Englewood Cliffs}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{HiWe:97, author = {Hirte, Georg and Weber, Reinhard}, title = {Pareto Improving transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded system- is it Politically feasible?}, journal = {Finanzarchiv}, year = {1997}, volume = {54}, number = {3}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Hite:90, author = {Hite, P. A.}, title = {An experimental investigation of the ffect of tax shelters on taxpayer noncompliance}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1990}, volume = {45}, pages = {90-108}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Hite:89, author = {Hite, P. A.}, title = {A positive approach to taxpayer compliance}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1989}, volume = {44}, pages = {249-267}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Hite:87, author = {Hite, P. A.}, title = {An application of attribution theory in taxpayer noncompliance research}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1987}, volume = {42}, pages = {105-118}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{HMT:03, title = {The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government (and Technical Annex), TSO, London}, publisher = {TSO}, year = {2003}, author = {{HM Treasury}}, edition = {Third}, abstract = {This new edition incorporates revised guidance from H.M Treasury which is designed to promote efficient policy development and resource allocation across government through the use of a thorough, long-term and analytically robust approach to the appraisal and evaluation of public service projects before significant funds are committed. It is the first edition to have been aided by a consultation process in order to ensure the guidance is clearer and more closely tailored to suit the needs of users.}, key = {public economics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.24}, url = {http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/3/F/green_book_260907.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{HMTr:99, author = {Treasury HM}, title = {The Modernisation of Britain's Tax and Benefit System}, institution = {HM Treasury}, year = {1999}, number = {Number Four}, month = {March}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Ho1998, author = {Ho, Teck-Hua and Colin Camerer and Weigelt, Keith}, title = {Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests"}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {88}, pages = {947--969}, number = {4}, copyright = {Copyright 1998 American Economic Association}, jstor_articletype = {Full Length Article}, jstor_date = {199809}, jstor_formatteddate = {Sep., 1998}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {American Economic Association}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HoRo:69, author = {Hochman, H. and Rodgers, J. D.}, title = {{P}areto-optimal redistribution}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1969}, volume = {59}, pages = {542-557}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Hoef:48, author = {Hoeffding, W.}, title = {A class of statistics with asymptotically normal distribution}, journal = {The Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1948}, volume = {19}, pages = {293-325}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Hoef:83, author = {Hoeflich, M. M.}, title = {Of reason, gamesmanship and taxes: a jurisprudential and games theoreticalapproach to the problem of voluntary compliance}, journal = {American Journal of Tax Policy}, year = {1983}, volume = {2}, pages = {9-88}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Hoeflich1983, author = {Hoeflich, M. M.}, title = {Of reason, gamesmanship, and taxes: a jurisprudential and games theoretical approach to the problem of voluntary compliance}, journal = {American Journal of Tax Policy}, year = {1983}, volume = {2}, pages = {9-88}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Hoel:75, author = {Michael Hoel}, title = {A Note on the Estimation of the Elasticity of the Marginal Utility of Consumption}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1975}, volume = {6}, pages = {411-415}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{HoSh:03, author = {Hoel, M. and Shapiro, P.}, title = {Population Mobility and Transboundary Environmental Problems}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1013-1024}, key = {population economics} } @BOOK{Hoel:66, title = {Elementary Statistics}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1966}, author = {Hoel, P. G.}, address = {New York}, edition = {second}, key = {statistics} } @BOOK{HoJo:94I, title = {Probability with a View Toward Statistics}, publisher = {Chapman and Hall}, year = {1994}, author = {Hoffman-J{\o}rgensen, J.}, volume = {I}, address = {London}, key = {mathematics} } @BOOK{HoJo:94II, title = {Probability with a View Toward Statistics}, publisher = {Chapman and Hall}, year = {1994}, author = {Hoffman-J{\o}rgensen, J.}, volume = {II}, address = {London}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{HoBuVi:07, author = {Hofmeyr, Andre and Burns, Justine and Visser, Martine}, title = {Income Inequality, Reciprocity and Public Good Provision: An Experimental Analysis}, journal = {South African Journal of Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, pages = {508 - 520}, abstract = {This paper analyses the impact of income inequality on public good provision in an experimental setting. A sample of secondary school students were recruited to participate in a simple linear public goods game where income heterogeneity was introduced by providing participants with unequal token endowments. The results show that endowment heterogeneity does not have any significant impact on contributions to the public good, and that consistent with models of reciprocity, low and high endowment players contribute the same fraction of their endowment to the public pool. Moreover, individuals appear to adjust their contributions in order to maintain a fair share rule.}, key = {Public Goods}, keywords = {Public goods, experimental economics, inequality, punishment, fairness}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Holm:97, author = {Holmes, J.}, title = {The path of the law}, journal = {Harvard Law Review}, year = {1897}, volume = {10}, pages = {458-478}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{HoMi:87, author = {Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P.}, title = {Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1987}, volume = {55}, pages = {303-328}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{Holm:79, author = {Holmstr{\"o}m, B.}, title = {Moral hazard and observability}, journal = {Bell Journal of Economics}, year = {1979}, volume = {10}, pages = {74-91}, key = {information} } @BOOK{HoTo:05, title = {Globalization of Capital Markets and Monetary Policy}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, year = {2005}, editor = {Holscher,J. and Tomann,H.}, author = {Holscher,J. and Tomann,H.}, key = {Economic Policy3} } @INCOLLECTION{Ho:95, author = {Charles A. Holt}, title = {Industrial Organization: A Survey of Experimental Results}, booktitle = {The Handbook of Experimental Ecnomics}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1995}, editor = {John Kagel and Roth, Alvin E.}, chapter = {5}, pages = {349-444}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.01.23} } @ARTICLE{Holt:86, author = {Holt, C. A.}, title = {Preference Reversals and the Independence Axiom}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1986}, volume = {76}, pages = {508-515}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Holt2005, author = {Holt, Charles A. and Laury, Susan K.}, title = {Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: New Data without Order Effects.}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2005}, volume = {95}, pages = {902-904}, number = {3}, month = {June}, abstract = {This article discusses the results of an experiment on the effects of incentives on risk aversion in individuals. The experiment was conducted in 2004 using 216 subjects recruited from undergraduate economics classes at the University of Virginia. As in the previous experiment, each session began with a lottery choice trainer and second unrelated experiment. In the first treatment of the new experiment, 48 subjects completed a real low-payment choice, followed by a real high-payment choice, in which all choices were scaled up by a factor of 20. When real cash payments are scaled up by a factor of 20, the average number of safe choices made by these subjects increased to 7.1. Subjects from the new experiment are somewhat more risk averse than those used in the earlier studies; however, the scale effect with cash payments is essentially the same as that of the previous experiment.}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.08.16} } @ARTICLE{Holt2002, author = {C. A. Holt and S. K. Laury}, title = {Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2002}, volume = {92}, pages = {1644-1655}, number = {5}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{HE-Ma:01, author = {Holtz-Eakin, D. and Marples, D.}, title = {Distortion costs of taxing wealth accumulation: income versus estate taxes}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2001}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {8261}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138}, key = {wealth taxation} } @ARTICLE{Homb:00, author = {Homburg, S.}, title = {Compulsory savings in the welfare state}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {77}, pages = {233-239}, key = {welfare state} } @ARTICLE{HoHu95, author = {Chew Soo Hong and Mao Mei Hui}, title = {A {S}chur-Concave Characterization of Risk Aversion for Non-Expected UtilityPreferences}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1995}, volume = {67}, pages = {402-435}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Hong1995, author = {Chew Soo Hong and Mao Mei Hui}, title = {A {S}chur-Concave Characterization of Risk Aversion for Non-Expected Utility Preferences}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1995}, volume = {67}, pages = {402-435}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{HoKuSt:01, author = {Hong, Harrison and Kubik, Jeffrey D. and Stein, Jeremy C.}, title = {Social Interaction and Stock-Market Participation}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2001}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {8358}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {finance} } @TECHREPORT{HoBo.:04, author = {Hong,K. and Bohnet,I.}, title = {Status and Distrust: Risk, Inequality and Betrayal Aversion}, institution = {Harvard University, John Kenndy School of Government}, year = {2004}, abstract = {Trust is related to people’s willingness to accept vulnerability, composedof their willingness to accept the risk of being worse off than if theyhad never trusted, the risk of being worse off than the trusted party,and the risk of being betrayed by the trusted party. We examine how people’sstatus, focusing on sex, race, age and religion, affects their willingnessto accept these three risks. We experimentally measure a person’s willingnessto accept risk in a Decision Problem, a Risky Dictator Game and a TrustGame. Groups typically considered having lower status in the US—women,minorities, younger people and non-Protestants—are averse to inequalitywhile higher status groups-male, white, older and Protestant decision makers-dislikebeing betrayed. This heterogeneity in motivation asks for different organizationalinterventions to decrease distrust depending on a group’s status.}, key = {Risk} } @ARTICLE{HoFoKi:04, author = {Hoover, G. A. and Formby, J. and Kim, H.}, title = {Poverty, Non-White Poverty, And The {S}en Index}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2004}, volume = {50}, pages = {543-559}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Horn:, author = {Horner, K.}, title = {Interpreting {P}yatt's decomposition of the {G}ini coefficient: a comment}, institution = {National Health and Welfare}, address = {Canada}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{HoMc:00, author = {Horowitz, J. K. and McConnell, K. E.}, title = {Values Elicited from Open-Ended Real Experiments}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2000}, volume = {41,3}, pages = {221-237}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{HoMaSm:08, author = {Horrace, W. and Marchand, J. and Smeeding, T.}, title = {Ranking inequality: Applications of multivariate subset selection}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2008}, volume = {6}, pages = {5-32}, abstract = {Inequality measures are often presented in the form of a rank ordering to highlight their relative magnitudes. However, a rank ordering may produce misleading inference, because the inequality measures themselves are statistical estimators with different standard errors, and because a rank ordering necessarily implies multiple comparisons across all measures. Within this setting, if differences between several inequality measures are simultaneously and statistically insignificant, the interpretation of the ranking is changed. This study uses a multivariate subset selection procedure to make simultaneous distinctions across inequality measures at a pre-specified confidence level. Three applications of this procedure are explored using country-level data from the Luxembourg Income Study. The findings show that simultaneous precision plays an important role in relative inequality comparisons and should not be ignored.}, key = {Distribution}, keywords = {income distribution, inference, poverty, subset selection}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Hors:92, author = {Horsman, G.}, title = {A "New" View of Equity in Taxation?}, journal = {Middle East Technical University Studies in Development}, year = {1992}, volume = {19}, pages = {479-94}, key = {equity} } @TECHREPORT{Hoss:99, author = {Hossain, N.}, title = {How do {B}angladeshi elites understand poverty?}, institution = {Institute for Development Studies}, year = {1999}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {83}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Hote:38, author = {Hotelling, H.}, title = {The general welfare in relation to problems of taxation and utility rates}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1938}, volume = {6}, pages = {242-269}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{Hote:32, author = {Hotelling, H.}, title = {Edgeworth's taxation paradox and the nature of demand supply functions}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1932}, volume = {40}, pages = {577-616}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{HoMy:04, author = {Hou,F. and Myles,J.}, title = {Neighbourhood Inequality, Relative Deprivation and Self-perceived HealthStatus}, institution = {Statistics Canada}, year = {2004}, abstract = {This study examines two theses concerning the relation between individualhealth status and the socio-economic composition of the neighbourhoodsin which they live. In the first variant, the claim is that more unequalcommunities will not generate the social capital/social cohesion that makesfor healthy populations irrespective of whether these communities are richor poor. At the individual level, the implication is that individuals wholive in high inequality neighbourhoods will tend to have poorer healthirrespective of their own income levels. The second variant involves testingtwo competing claims about the health advantages/disadvantages of sharingneighbourhoods with more or less affluent neighbours. On the one hand,sharing neighbourhoods with more affluent families may have negative effectson the health of the less affluent if residential proximity generates invidioussocial comparisons or competition for scarce resources. On the other hand,the less affluent may derive positive externalities by living with moreaffluent neighbours because of richer institutional resources and/or "learningeffects." This study combines individual micro-data from Statistics Canada’s1996/97 National Population Health Survey (NPHS) with neighbourhood-levelcharacteristics estimated from the 1996 Census of Canada 20% sample microdata file. We find that an overall negative association between neighbourhoodincome inequality and self-assessed health status does not persist oncecontrols are introduced for individual level socio-economic characteristics.However, individuals, regardless of their own income status, derive positivehealth benefits from sharing neighbourhoods with higher income, bettereducated, neighbours.}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{HoSh:06, author = {House, C. L. and Shapiro, M. D.}, title = {Phased-In Tax Cuts and Economic Activity}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {96}, pages = {1835-1849}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @TECHREPORT{Hous:87, author = {Houston, J.}, title = {Participation in the underground economy}, institution = {Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Research Department}, year = {1987}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {underground}, pages = {87-10} } @ARTICLE{Hout:50, author = {Houthakker, H. S.}, title = {Revealed preference and the utility function}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1950}, volume = {17}, pages = {159-174}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{Howa:07, author = {Howard, M.W.}, title = {A NAFTA Dividend: A Guaranteed Minimum Income for North America}, journal = {Basic Income Studies}, year = {2007}, volume = {2}, pages = {1-23}, number = {1}, abstract = {This paper explores the desirability and feasibility of a minimum income for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) region. I review arguments in support of a basic income or a negative income tax for the European Union (EU). Then I examine ways in which the NAFTA countries do and do not resemble the EU in aspects relevant for the desirability and feasibility of a regional basic income. I argue that a case can be made for a North American guaranteed income, grounded, with respect to desirability, in a globalist theory of justice, and with respect to feasibility, in the necessity of moderating the flow of labor migration. A universal regional basic income is a useful tool for regional development that is fair and that insures better than does the current NAFTA that cooperation benefits the least advantaged.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @INCOLLECTION{HoLa:94, author = {Howes, S. P. and Lanjouw, P.}, title = {Regional Variations in Urban Living Standards in Urban {C}hina}, booktitle = {China’s economic reforms : the costs and benefits of incrementalism}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1994}, editor = {Fan, Q. and Nolan, P.}, address = {Basingstoke}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, key = {{income distribution:empirical}} } @TECHREPORT{HoLa:91, author = {Howes, S. P. and Lanjouw, P.}, title = {Regional Variations in Urban Living Standards in Urban {C}hina}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1991}, type = {Development Economics Research Programme Discussion Paper}, number = {CP17}, address = {Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE}, key = {{income distribution:empirical}}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.09.05} } @ARTICLE{Howe:96, author = {Howes, S. R.}, title = {The influence of aggregation on the ordering of distributions}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1996}, volume = {63}, pages = {253-272}, key = {statistics} } @PHDTHESIS{Howe:93ID, author = {Howes, S. R.}, title = {Income Distribution: Measurement, Transition and Analysis of Urban {C}hina,1981 - 1990}, school = {London School of Economics}, year = {1993}, address = {UK}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{Howe:93MD, author = {Howes, S. R.}, title = {Mixed Dominance: a new criterion for poverty analysis}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1993}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {3}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Howe:93WN, author = {Howes, S. R.}, title = {Why not to aggregate up: the influence of aggregation on the ordering ofdistributions}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1993}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {2}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{HoLa:98, author = {Howes, S. R. and Lanjouw, J. O.}, title = {Poverty Comparisons and Household Survey Design}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1998}, volume = {44}, pages = {99-108}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{Hoxb:04, title = {College Choices}, publisher = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, editor = {Hoxby,C.}, author = {Hoxby,C.}, key = {education, training} } @TECHREPORT{Hoy:81, author = {Hoy, M.}, title = {The impact of imperfectly categorizing risks on income inequality and socialwelfare}, institution = {University of Western Ontario}, year = {1981}, type = {research report}, number = {81-11}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{HoLiMcReSt:01, title = {Mathematics for Economics}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {2001}, author = {Hoy, M. and Livernois, J. and McKenna, C. and Rees, R. and Stengos, T.}, address = {Cambridge, MA 02142-1493, U.S.A.}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{HoPa:06, author = {Hoynes, H. and Page, M. and Stevens, A.}, title = {Poverty in America: Trends and Explanations}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2006}, volume = {20}, pages = {47-68}, key = {poverty}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Hoyn:97, author = {Hoynes, Hilary Williamson}, title = {Does welfare play any role in female headship decisions?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {89-117}, number = {2}, month = {August}, key = {population economics} } @ARTICLE{Hoyn:96, author = {Hoynes, H. W.}, title = {Welfare transfers in two-parent families: Labour supply and welfare participationunder {AFDC-UP}}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1996}, volume = {64}, pages = {295-332}, number = {2}, key = {social security} } @TECHREPORT{Hoyo:07, author = {Hoyos,R.E.D.}, title = {Accounting for Mexican Income Inequality During the 1990s}, institution = {World Bank}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, number = {4224}, abstract = {The author implements several inequality decomposition methods to measure the extent to which total household income disparities can be attributable to sectoral asymmetries and differences in skill endowments. The results show that at least half of total household inequality in Mexico is attributable to incomes derived from entrepreneurial activities, an income source rarely scrutinized in the inequality literature. He shows that education (skills) endowments are unevenly distributed among the Mexican population, with positive shifts in the market returns to schooling associated with increases in inequality. Asymmetries in the allocation of education explain around 20 percent of overall household income disparities in Mexico during the 1990s. Moreover, the proportion of inequality attributable to education endowments increases during stable periods and reduces during the crisis. This pattern is explained by shifts in returns to schooling rather than changes in the distribution of skills. Applying the same techniques to decompose within-sector income differences, the author finds that skill endowments can account for as much as 25 percent of earnings disparities but as little as 5 percent of dispersion in other income sources.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Hrun:04, author = {Hrung,W.}, title = {Parental net wealth and personal consumption}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, year = {2004}, volume = {54}, pages = {551-560}, abstract = {This paper uses data from the 1988 to 1991 PSID to examine the relationshipbetween parental net wealth and consumption behavior of adult children.In a model where the probability of receiving a future transfer from theparent is an increasing function of the level of parental net wealth, anon-linear relationship is expected. The results in this study are consistentwith such a relationship. Parental net wealth is found to have a positiveinfluence on children’s consumption only at very high levels. In addition,this relationship appears to apply only to parental housing wealth andnot parental non-housing wealth.}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{HsWe:99, author = {Hsee, C. K. and Weber, E. U.}, title = {Cross-National Differences in Risk Preference and Lay Predictions}, journal = {Journal of Behavioral Decision Making}, year = {1999}, volume = {12}, pages = {165-179}, abstract = {This research explores whether there are systematic cross-national differences in choice-inferred risk preferences between Americans and Chinese. Study 1 found (a) that the Chinese were significantly more risk seeking than the Americans, yet (b) that both nationals predicted exactly the opposite -- that the Americans would be more risk seeking. Study 2 compared Americans' and Chinese risk preferences in investment, medical and academic decisions, and found that Chinese were more risk seeking than Americans only in the investment domain and not in the other domains. These results are explained in terms of a `cushion hypothesis', which suggests people in a collectivist society, such as China, are more likely to receive financial help if they are in need (i.e. they could be `cushioned' if they fell), and consequently, they are less risk averse than those in an individualistic society such as the USA.}, key = {risk}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.20} } @BOOK{Hsia:86, title = {The Analysis of Panel Data}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1986}, author = {Hsiao, C.}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{HsKl:07, author = {Hsieh,C.T. and Klenow,P.J.}, title = {Relative Prices and Relative Prosperity}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {97}, pages = {562-585}, abstract = {The positive correlation between real investment rates and real income levels across countries is driven largely by differences in the price of investment relative to output. The high relative price of investment in poor countries is due to the low price of consumption goods in those countries. Investment prices are no higher in poor countries. Thus, the low real investment rates in poor countries are not driven by high tax or tariff rates on investment. Poor countries, instead, appear to be plagued by low efficiency in producing investment goods and in producing consumer goods to trade for them.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Hsie:99, author = {Hsieh, Ping-Hung}, title = {Robustness of Tail Index Estimation}, journal = {Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics}, year = {1999}, volume = {8}, pages = {318--332}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Hu1995, author = {Hu, B.}, title = {A note on calculating the Gini index}, journal = {Mathematics and Computers in Simulation}, year = {1995}, volume = {39}, pages = {353-358}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HuB:95, author = {Hu, B.}, title = {A note on calculating the {G}ini index}, journal = {Mathematics and Computers in Simulation}, year = {1995}, volume = {39}, pages = {353-358}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Hu:07, author = {Hu, Kuan}, title = {U-Statistics and Their Asymptotic Results for Some Inequality and Poverty Measures}, journal = {Econometrics Reviews}, year = {2007}, volume = {26}, pages = {567 - 577}, abstract = {U-statistics form a general class of statistics that have certain important features in common. This class arises as a generalization of the sample mean and the sample variance, and typically members of the class are asymptotically normal with good consistency properties. The class encompasses some widely used income inequality and poverty measures, in particular the variance, the Gini index, the poverty rate, the average poverty gap ratios, the Foster-Greer- Thorbecke index, and the Sen index and its modified form. This paper illustrates how these measures come together within the class of U-statistics, and thereby why U-statistics are useful in econometrics.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Asymptotic theory; Inequality; Measures; Poverty; U-statistics.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{HuChYa:06, author = {Hu, T. and Chen, J. and Yao, J.}, title = {Preservation of the Location of Independent Risk Order Under Convolution}, journal = {Insurance, Mathematics \& Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {38}, pages = {406-412}, key = {risk}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @ARTICLE{HuSk:96, author = {Hubbard, R. G. and Skinner, J.}, title = {Assessing the effectiveness of savings incentives}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1996}, volume = {10}, pages = {73-90}, key = {saving} } @ARTICLE{Hube:99, author = {Huber, B.}, title = {Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in an Optimum Income Tax Model}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {441-458}, number = {3}, key = {Tax competition} } @ARTICLE{Hube:71, author = {Huber, J. R.}, title = {Effect on {J}apan's entry into world commerce after 1858}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1971}, volume = {79}, pages = {614-628}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Hube:81, title = {Robust Statistics}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1981}, author = {Huber, P. J.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Hube:73, author = {Huber, P. J.}, title = {Robust Regression: Asymptotics, Conjectures and {M}onte {C}arlo}, journal = {The Annals of Statistics}, year = {1973}, volume = {1}, pages = {799-821}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Hube:67, author = {Huber, P. J.}, title = {The Behavior of Maximum likelihood Estimates under non-standard conditions}, journal = {Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics andProbability}, year = {1967}, volume = {1}, pages = {221-233}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Huber1967, author = {Huber, P. J.}, title = {The Behavior of Maximum likelihood Estimates under non-standard conditions}, journal = {Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability}, year = {1967}, volume = {1}, pages = {221-233}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Hube:64, author = {Huber, P. J.}, title = {Robust Estimation of a Location Parameter}, journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1964}, volume = {35}, pages = {73-101}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{HuNoOe:01, author = {Huck, S. and Normann, H.-T. and Oechssler, J.}, title = {Market Volatility and Inequality in Earnings: Experimental Evidence}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {70}, pages = {363-368}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{HuNoOe:00, author = {Steffen Huck and Hans-Theo Normann and Jörg Oechssler}, title = {Does information about competitors' actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets?}, journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization}, year = {2000}, volume = {18}, pages = {39 - 57}, number = {1}, doi = {DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00033-8}, issn = {0167-7187}, keywords = {Information} } @ARTICLE{HuNoOe:99, author = {Huck, Steffen and Normann, Hans-Theo and Oechssler, Jorg}, title = {Learning in Cournot Oligopoly-An Experiment}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {C80--C95}, number = {454}, abstract = {This experiment was designed to test various learning theories in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. We derive theoretical predictions for the learning theories and test these predictions by varying the information given to subjects. The results show that some subjects imitate successful behaviour if they have the necessary information, and if they imitate, markets are more competitive. Other subjects follow a best reply process. On the aggregate level we find that more information about demand and cost conditions yields less competitive behaviour, while more information about the quantities and profits of other firms yields more competitive behaviour.}, copyright = {Copyright © 1999 Royal Economic Society}, issn = {00130133}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Mar., 1999}, jstor_issuetitle = {Conference Papers}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing for the Royal Economic Society} } @ARTICLE{Hudson2000, author = {Hudson, John and Godwin, Michael}, title = {The Compliance Costs Of Collecting Direct Tax In The {UK}: An Analysis Of {PAYE} And {N}ational {I}nsurance}, journal = {Journal Of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {77}, pages = {29-44}, key = {Compliance}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HuGo:00, author = {Hudson, John and Godwin, Michael}, title = {The Compliance Costs Of Collecting Direct Tax In The {UK}: An Analysis Of{PAYE} And {N}ational {I}nsurance}, journal = {Journal Of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {77}, pages = {29-44}, key = {Compliance} } @TECHREPORT{HuBa:04, author = {Huffman, D. and Barenstein, M.}, title = {Riches to Rags Every Month? The Fall in Consumption Expenditures Between Paydays}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2004}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {1430}, address = {P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany}, month = {December}, abstract = {This paper finds declining consumption expenditure between paydays, for a typical household in the working population of the UK. The magnitude is inconsistent with exponential time preference, but compatible with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. However, the hyperbolic model predicts that credit constraints drive the decline, and we find only mixed evidence in this regard. We also observe a method-of-payment result that suggests a role for mental accounting: households choose declining cash spending but flat credit-card spending over the pay period. We propose an alternative explanation for the results, based on cognitive costs of budgeting and perceptual biases, rather than self-control problems.}, key = {income dynamics}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{HuVe:00, author = {Huggett, M. and Ventura, G.}, title = {Understanding Why High Income Households Save More Than Low Income Households}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {45}, pages = {361-397}, key = {consumption} } @TECHREPORT{HuVeYa:07, author = {Huggett, Mark and Ventura, Gustavo and Yaron, Amir}, title = {Sources of Lifetime Inequality}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {13224}, abstract = {Is lifetime inequality mainly due to differences across people established early in life or to differences in luck experienced over the working lifetime? We answer this question within a model that features idiosyncratic shocks to human capital, estimated directly from data, as well as heterogeneity in ability to learn, initial human capital, and initial wealth -- features which are chosen to match observed properties of earnings dynamics by cohorts. We find that as of age 20, differences in initial conditions account for more of the variation in lifetime utility, lifetime earnings and lifetime wealth than do differences in shocks received over the lifetime. Among initial conditions, variation in initial human capital is substantially more important than variation in learning ability or initial wealth for determining how an agent fares in life. An increase in an agent's human capital affects expected lifetime utility by raising an agent's expected earnings profile, whereas an increase in learning ability affects expected utility by producing a steeper expected earnings profile.}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Hum1993, author = {Hum, D. and Simpson, W.}, title = {Economic response to a guaranteed annual income: experience from {C}anada and the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Journal of Labor Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {11}, pages = {S263-A296}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{HuSi:93, author = {Hum, D. and Simpson, W.}, title = {Economic response to a guaranteed annual income: experience from {C}anadaand the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Journal of Labor Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {11}, pages = {S263-A296}, key = {redistribution} } @INCOLLECTION{HuqM:99, author = {Huq, M.}, title = {The Existence Value of Unpaid Work - A Contingent Valuation {(CV)} Approach}, booktitle = {Time Use - Research, Data and Policy}, publisher = {NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft}, year = {1999}, editor = {Merz, J. and Ehling, M.}, pages = {384-392}, address = {Baden Baden}, key = {time use} } @ARTICLE{Hurd:98, author = {Hurd, Michael}, title = {Symposium on assets, incomes and retirement}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {19}, pages = {141-151}, number = {2}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Hurd:89, author = {Hurd, M.}, title = {Mortality risks and bequests}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1989}, volume = {57}, pages = {779-813}, key = {Wealth}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.01.15} } @TECHREPORT{HuRo:06, author = {Hurd,M. and Rohwedder,S.}, title = {Some Answers to the Retirement- Consumption Puzzle}, institution = {Rand}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {WR-342}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @TECHREPORT{HuRo:03, author = {Hurd,M. and Rohwedder,S.}, title = {The Retirement-Consumption Puzzle :Anticipated and Actual Declines in Spendingat Retirement}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2003}, abstract = {The simple one-good model of life-cycle consumption requires "consumptionsmoothing." However, British and U.S. households apparently reduce consumptionat retirement and the reduction cannot be explained by the life-cycle model.An interpretation is that retirees are surprised by the inadequacy of resources.This interpretation challenges the life-cycle model where consumers areforward looking. However, data on anticipated consumption changes at retirementand on realized consumption changes following retirement show that thereductions are fully anticipated. Apparently the decline is due to thecessation of work-related expenses and the substitution of home productionfor market-purchased goods and services.}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{HuVu:03, author = {Hurkens, Sjaak and Vulkan, Nir}, title = {Free entry does not imply zero profits}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, pages = {285-290}, abstract = {Traditional economic wisdom says that free entry in a market will driveprofits down to zero. This paper shows that profits may remain boundedaway from zero when firms have to make a negligible small investment tolearn the demand.}, key = {industry} } @TECHREPORT{Hurs:03, author = {Hurst, E.}, title = {Grasshoppers, Ants, And Pre-Retirement Wealth: A Test Of Permanent Income}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2003}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {10098}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {Saving} } @INCOLLECTION{Hurw:72, author = {Hurwicz, L.}, title = {On informationally decentralized systems}, booktitle = {Decision and Organization}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1972}, editor = {Radner, R. and McGuire, C.}, pages = {297-336}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {Micro} } @INCOLLECTION{Hurw:86, author = {Hurwicz, L.}, title = {On informational decentralization and efficiency in resource allocationmechanisms}, booktitle = {Studies in Mathematical Economics}, publisher = {Mathematics Association of America}, year = {1986}, editor = {Reiter, S.}, key = {Micro} } @ARTICLE{Hurw:08, author = {Hurwicz, L.}, title = {But Who Will Guard the Guardians?}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {98}, pages = {577-585}, number = {3}, key = {game theory}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.06} } @ARTICLE{HuLaSt:94, author = {Hussain, A. and Lanjouw, P. and Stern, N. H.}, title = {Income inequalities in {C}hina: Evidence from household survey data}, journal = {World Development}, year = {1994}, volume = {22}, pages = {1947-1957}, key = {{income distribution:empirical}}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.05}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2061/science?_ob=PublicationURL&_cdi=5946&_pubType=J&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=1177143&md5=9c1a2e64f8a164a06b066761f50027bf&jchunk=22#22} } @TECHREPORT{HuLaSt:91, author = {Hussain, A. and Lanjouw, P. and Stern, N. H.}, title = {Income Inequalities in {C}hina: Evidence from Household Survey Data}, institution = {STICERD,London School of Economics}, year = {1991}, type = {Development Economics Research Programme Discussion Paper}, number = {CP18}, address = {Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE}, key = {{income distribution:empirical}} } @ARTICLE{HuPoSm:08, author = {Hussam, Reshmaan N. and Porter, David and Smith, Vernon L.}, title = {Thar She Blows: Can Bubbles Be Rekindled with Experienced Subjects?}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {June 2008}, volume = {98}, pages = {924-937(14)}, abstract = {We report 28 new experiment sessions consisting of up to three experience levels to examine the robustness of learning and #error# elimination among participants in a laboratory asset market and its effect on price bubbles. Our answer to the title question is: #yes.# We impose a large increase in liquidity and dividend uncertainty to shock the environment of experienced subjects who have converged to equilibrium, and this treatment rekindles a bubble. However, in replications of that same challenging environment across three experience levels, we discover that the environment yields a rare residual tendency to bubble even in the third experience session. Therefore, a caveat must be placed on the effect of twice-experienced subjects in asset markets: in order for price bubbles to be extinguished, the environment in which the participants engage in exchange must be stationary and bounded by a range of parameters. Experience, including possible #error# elimination, is not robust to major new environment changes in determining the characteristics of a price bubble.}, doi = {doi:10.1257/aer.98.3.924} } @ARTICLE{Hutc:91, author = {Hutchens, R. M.}, title = {Segregation curves, {L}orenz curves and inequality in the distribution ofpeople across occupation}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1991}, volume = {21}, pages = {31-51}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Hutchens1991, author = {Hutchens, R. M.}, title = {Segregation curves, {L}orenz curves and inequality in the distribution of people across occupation}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1991}, volume = {21}, pages = {31-51}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Hysl:99, author = {Hyslop, D. R.}, title = {State Dependence, Serial Correlation and Heterogeneity in IntertemporalLabor Force Participation of Married Women}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {1255-1294}, key = {Labour} } @ARTICLE{Hyslop1999, author = {Hyslop, D. R.}, title = {State Dependence, Serial Correlation and Heterogeneity in Intertemporal Labor Force Participation of Married Women}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {1255-1294}, key = {Labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Haer:94, author = {H{\"a}rdle, W. and Linton, O.}, title = {Applied Non-Parametric Regression}, year = {1994}, type = {Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Ditt:99, author = {Dittman I.}, title = {How Reliable Should Auditors Be? Optimal Monitoring in Principal-Agent Relationships}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {523-546}, key = {Compliance} } @ARTICLE{I.1999, author = {Van Lelyveld I.}, title = {Inflation or Unemployment: Who Cares}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {463-484}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Iaco:08, author = {Iacoviello, M.}, title = {Household Debt and Income Inequality, 1963–2003}, journal = {Journal of Money, Credit and Banking}, year = {2008}, volume = {40}, pages = {929-965}, number = {5}, abstract = {I construct an economy with heterogeneous agents that mimics the timeseries behavior of the earnings distribution in the United States from 1963 to 2003. Agents face aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks and accumulate real and financial assets. I estimate the shocks that drive the model using data on income inequality, aggregate income, and measures of financial liberalization. I show how the model economy can replicate two empirical facts: the trend and cyclical behavior of household debt and the diverging patterns in consumption and wealth inequality over time. While business cycle fluctuations can account for the short-run changes in household debt, its prolonged rise of the 1980s and the 1990s can be quantitatively explained only by the concurrent increase in income inequality.}, key = {income inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.06} } @ARTICLE{IbIb:07, author = {Ibragimov, M. and Ibragimov, R.}, title = {Market demand elasticity and income inequality}, journal = {Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {32}, pages = {579-587}, number = {3}, abstract = {This paper deals with the analysis of the relation between aggregate demand for a consumption good and the distribution of income across consumers. We obtain sufficient conditions under which changes in income inequality lead to an increase or decrease in the market demand elasticities. The conditions are satisfied for individual demand functions commonly used in economic models, in particular, for the typical demand functions on luxury goods and necessities.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Ichiishi1999, author = {Ichiishi, T. and Idzik, A}, title = {Market Allocation of Indivisible Goods}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {457-466}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{IcId:99, author = {Ichiishi, T. and Idzik, A.}, title = {Equitable Allocation of Divisible Goods}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {389-400}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Ichino1999, author = {Ichino, A. and Winter-Ebmer, R.}, title = {Lower and Upper Bounds of Returns to Schooling: An Exercise in {IV} Estimation with Different Instruments}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {889-901}, key = {education,training}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{IcWi-Eb:99, author = {Ichino, A. and Winter-Ebmer, R.}, title = {Lower and Upper Bounds of Returns to Schooling: An Exercise in {IV} Estimationwith Different Instruments}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {889-901}, key = {education,training} } @ARTICLE{Ihor:01, author = {Ihori, T.}, title = {Wealth Taxation and Economic Growth}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {(79) 1}, pages = {129-148}, key = {wealth taxation} } @ARTICLE{Free:67, author = {A. Myrick Freeman III}, title = {Income Distribution and Planning for Public Investment}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1967}, volume = {57}, pages = {495-508}, number = {3}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Iked:06, author = {Ikeda, S.}, title = {Luxury and Wealth}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {47}, pages = {495-526}, key = {wealth}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @INCOLLECTION{IlLG:87, author = {Ilsley, R. and Le Grand, J.}, title = {Measurement of Inequality in Health}, booktitle = {Health in Economics}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1987}, editor = {Williams, A.}, address = {London}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{Im:98, author = {Im, Kyung So}, title = {Efficient estimation with grouped data}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {59}, pages = {169-174}, number = {2}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{ImPeSh:03, author = {Im, K. S. and Pesaran, M. H. and Shin, Y.}, title = {Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogenous Panels}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2003}, volume = {115}, pages = {53-74}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.03} } @ARTICLE{ImKlKrSa:07, author = {Immervoll, H. and Kleven, H. J. and Kreiner, C. T. and Saez, E.}, title = {Welfare Reform in European Countries: A Microsimulation Analysis}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {2007}, volume = {117}, pages = {1-44}, abstract = {This article compares the effects of increasing traditional welfare to introducing in-work benefits in the 15 (pre-enlargement) countries of the European Union. We use a labour supply model encompassing responses to taxes and transfers along both the intensive and extensive margins, and the EUROMOD microsimulation model to estimate current marginal and participation tax rates. We quantify the equity-efficiency trade-off for a range of elasticity parameters. In most countries, because of large existing welfare programmes with high phase-out rates, increasing traditional welfare is undesirable unless the redistributive tastes of the government are extreme. In contrast, the in-work benefit reform is desirable in a very wide set of cases.}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @TECHREPORT{ImLeNoODBe:06, author = {Immervoll, H. and Levy, H. and Nogueira, J. R. and O'{\D}onoghue, C. and Bezerra de Siqueira, R.}, title = {The Impact of Brazil's Tax-Benefit System on Inequality and Poverty}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2006}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {2114}, address = {IZA P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany}, month = {This paper can be downloaded without charge at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=900832}, abstract = {The Brazilian government raises taxes amounting to 35% of GDP and spends more than two thirds of this on social programmes. These shares are in pair with the OECD averages and well in excess of Latin America averages. However, while tax-benefit systems in most OECD countries reduce income disparities very significantly, the Brazilian government has been much less successful in alleviating inequality and poverty. Focussing on taxes and cash transfers, this paper investigates the impact of the government budget on the income distribution in Brazil, and evaluates its efficiency and effectiveness in reducing inequality and poverty. We present BRAHMS, a new tax-benefit microsimulation model for Brazil and illustrate its use by evaluating the impact of policy on economic inequality. It is argued that microsimulation provides a valuable analytical tool for policy makers in emerging and developing countries in particular.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @TECHREPORT{INeQ:01, author = {{INeQ}}, institution = {Distributional Analysis Research Programme, STICERD}, year = {2001}, type = {Software for Distributional Analysis}, address = {London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, UK}, key = {Computing} } @BOOK{BIR:81, title = {One Hundred and Twenty Third Report, Cmnd 8160}, publisher = {HMSO}, year = {1981}, author = {Board of Inland Revenue}, address = {London}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{InRu:97, author = {Inman, R. P. and Rubinfeld, D. L.}, title = {Rethinking Federalism}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1997}, volume = {11}, pages = {43-64}, month = {Fall}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{Inne:99, author = {Innes, R.}, title = {Remediation and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {379-393}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Inok:08, author = {Inoki, T.}, title = {Two or Three Problems Concerning Social Stability and Our Measures of Welfare: What Can Ecnomists Learn From Other Social Sciences?}, journal = {The Japanese Economic Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {59}, pages = {1-16}, number = {1}, month = {March}, abstract = {This paper takes up several problems that are related to psychology, political science and ethics—disciplines that we regard as neighbours on the boundaries of economics. I pay particular attention to such topics as mass psychology and social stability, democracy and economic performance and the notions of wellbeing and happiness. After laying out some of the history of academic discourse on these problems and notions, I reconsider the nature of discrepancy between microlevel motivations and macrolevel phenomena, tradeoffs between equality and liberty and the problem of measurement of social welfare and “happiness” from the perspective of “dissociation of intention and consequence”.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.24} } @TECHREPORT{INE:92, author = {{Instituto Nacional de Estadistica}}, title = {Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares 1990-1991}, year = {1992}, type = {Metodologa}, address = {Madrid}, key = {Data} } @ARTICLE{Intr:79, author = {Intriligator, M. D.}, title = {Income redistribution: A probabilistic approach}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1979}, pages = {97-105}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Intr:71, title = {Mathematical Optimization and Economic Theory}, publisher = {Prentice Hall}, year = {1971}, author = {Intriligator, M. D.}, address = {Englewood Cliffs, N.J.}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{IoLo:04, author = {Ioannides, Y. M. and Loury, L. D.}, title = {Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects, and Inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2004}, volume = {42}, pages = {1056-1093}, key = {information}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.10} } @ARTICLE{Ioff:85, author = {Ioffe, O. S.}, title = {{S}oviet Law and {S}oviet Reality}, year = {1985}, address = {Dordrecht, Netherlands}, key = {crime}, publisher = {Martinus Nijhoff} } @ARTICLE{Irel:01, author = {Ireland, N. J.}, title = {Optimal Income Tax in the Presence of Status Effects}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {81}, pages = {193-212}, abstract = {The existence of distortions from individuals competing to attain socialstatus by using consumption signals justifies some measure of income taxas a counter-acting distortion. The question posed here is whether it alsoconstitutes a reason for a more progressive income tax schedule. The answeris found to be broadly negative if progressiveness is interpreted as amore convex tax schedule, unless the rich are more concerned with status-seekingthan the poor. On the other hand, status-seeking makes the optimal taxschedule steeper so that redistribution is increased. Essentially, theanalysis of status-seeking based on a signaling approach confirms and strengthensthe existing view of an optimal tax schedule and can be incorporated intothe Diamond [American Economic Review 88 (1998) 83-95] approach.}, key = {optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{Irel:98, author = {Ireland, Norman J.}, title = {Status-seeking, income taxation and efficiency}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {70}, pages = {99-113}, number = {1}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{IrKu:83, author = {Iritani, J. and Kuga, K.}, title = {Duality between the {L}orenz curves and the income distribution functions}, journal = {Economic Studies Quarterly}, year = {1983}, volume = {34}, pages = {9-21}, number = {4}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.journalarchive.jst.go.jp/jnlpdf.php?cdjournal=economics1950&cdvol=34&noissue=1&startpage=9&lang=en&from=jnltoc} } @BOOK{IRS1983, title = {Income Tax Compliance Research: Estimates for 1973-1981}, publisher = {Internal Revenue Service}, year = {1983}, author = {IRS}, address = {Washington, DC}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Irvine2001, author = {Irvine, I. and Wang, S.}, title = {Saving Behaviour and Wealth Accumulation in a Pure Lifecycle Model with Income Uncertainty}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {45}, pages = {233-258}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{IrWa:01, author = {Irvine, I. and Wang, S.}, title = {Saving Behaviour and Wealth Accumulation in a Pure Lifecycle Model withIncome Uncertainty}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {45}, pages = {233-258}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Isaa:07, author = {Isaac, Alan}, title = {Inheriting inequality: institutional influences on the distribution of wealth}, journal = {Journal of Pst Keynesian Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {30}, pages = {187 - 204}, abstract = {This paper presents simulation results for the distribution of wealth. The object is to illustrate the importance of institutions for understanding intergenerational wealth dynamics and the asymptotic tendency of wealth inequality. The focal institutions are the family and the state. Familial institutions, particularly marriage, prove to be core determinants of wealth inequality. State tax and transfer policies also have important effects on wealth inequality. The result that reductions in the estate tax exclusion can substantially increase wealth inequality provides a context for current public policy debates.}, key = {Wealth Inequality}, keywords = {estate tax, Gini coefficient, inequality, inheritance, marriage, social insurance, transfers, wealth}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Isaa:97, author = {Isaac, John}, title = {A comment on the viability of the allowance for corporate equity}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1997}, volume = {18}, pages = {303-318}, number = {3}, month = {August}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{IsScWa:89, author = {Isaac, M. and Schmidtz, D. and Walker, J.}, title = {The Assurance Problem in a Laboratory Market}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {1989}, volume = {62}, pages = {217-236}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{IsWa:88, author = {Isaac, M. and Walker, J.}, title = {Communication and Free-Riding Behaviour: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism}, journal = {Economic Enquiry}, year = {1988}, volume = {28}, pages = {585-608}, key = {Public goods} } @ARTICLE{IsMcPl:85, author = {Isaac, R. M. and McCue, K. and Plott, C.}, title = {Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1985}, volume = {26}, pages = {51-74}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{Isaac1988, author = {Isaac, R. M. and Schmidtz, D. and Walker, J.}, title = {The Assurance Problem in a Laboratory Market}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {1988}, volume = {62}, pages = {217-236}, key = {economic psychology}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{IsWaWi:94, author = {Isaac, R. M. and Walker, J. M. and Williams, A.}, title = {Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {54}, pages = {1-36}, key = {Public Goods} } @INCOLLECTION{IsKlSt:82, author = {Isachsen, A. J. and Klovland, J. T. and Str\/om, S.}, title = {The Hidden Economy in {N}orway}, booktitle = {The Underground Economy in the {U}nited {S}tates and Abroad}, publisher = {D. C. Heath}, year = {1982}, editor = {Tanzi, V.}, chapter = {13}, address = {Lexington, Massachusetts}, key = {underground} } @INCOLLECTION{IsSaSt:85, author = {Isachsen, A. J. and Samuelsen, S. O. and Str\/om, S.}, title = {The behaviour of tax evaders}, booktitle = {The Economics of the Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1985}, editor = {Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A.}, address = {Berlin, Germany}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{IsSt:85, author = {Isachsen, A. J. and Str\/om}, title = {The size and growth of the hidden economy in {N}orway}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1985}, volume = {31}, pages = {21-38}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{IsSt:80, author = {Isachsen, A. J. and Str\/om}, title = {The hidden economy: the labour market and tax evasion}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1980}, volume = {82}, pages = {304-311}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Isac:99, author = {Isacsson, G.}, title = {Estimates of the Return to Schooling in Sweden from a Large Sample of Twins}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {471-489}, key = {Education, training} } @BOOK{Ishi:01, title = {Income and Wealth}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2001}, author = {Ishikawa, T.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Isla:03, author = {Islam, Nazrul}, title = {What have we learnt from the Convergence Debate?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {2003}, volume = {12}, pages = {309-354}, number = {3}, abstract = {This paper surveys the convergence literature. It begins by laying out differentdefinitions of convergence and by showing the link between the convergenceissue and the growth theory debate. The paper then follows the convergenceresearch conducted along four different approaches, namely the cross-section,panel, time-series, and distribution approaches. The paper shows the associationof these methodological approaches with various definitions of convergenceand highlights the connections among the convergence results. It showsthat, despite some impressions to the contrary, there is considerable agreementamong the results. Although the convergence research might not have solvedthe growth debate entirely, it has helped both the neoclassical and thenew growth theories to adapt and evolve. The research on convergence hasestablished new stylized facts regarding cross-country growth regularities.It has brought to fore the existence of large technological and institutionaldifferences across countries and has given rise to new methodologies forquantifying and analyzing these differences. This is providing a new informationbase for analysis of technological and institutional diffusion and forfurther development of growth theory in general.}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Isla:08, author = {Islamaj, E.}, title = {Why don't we observe improvements in consumption smoothing as countries get more financially integrated: Bridging theory and empirics}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2008}, volume = {100}, pages = {169-172}, number = {2}, abstract = {This study provides suggestive theoretical and empirical evidence that the productivity shock correlation between a country and the rest of the world may help explain why we do not observe more consumption smoothing as countries have become more financially liberalized.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.06} } @ARTICLE{IsMcNe:84, author = {Israelsen, L. D. and McDonald, J. B. and Newey, W. K.}, title = {The impact of measurement error on the distribution of income}, journal = {Advances in Econometrics}, year = {1984}, volume = {3}, pages = {169-189}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{ItTa:87, author = {Itaba, Y. and Tachibanaki, T.}, title = {Measurement of tax progressivity when the forms of both income distributionand tax function are given}, journal = {Economic Studies Quarterly}, year = {1987}, volume = {38}, pages = {97-106}, number = {6}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{ItDeMy:97a, author = {Itaya, Jun-Ichi and de Meza, David and Myles, Gareth D.}, title = {Optimal taxation and the private provision of public goods}, year = {1997}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {University of Exeter}, key = {public goods} } @TECHREPORT{Itaya1997, author = {Itaya, Jun-Ichi, de Meza, David and Myles, Gareth D.}, title = {Who should provide public goods?}, year = {1997}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {University of Exeter}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{ItDeMy:97b, author = {Itaya, Jun-Ichi, de Meza, David and Myles, Gareth D.}, title = {Who should provide public goods?}, institution = {University of Exeter}, year = {1997}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{IvKeKl:05, author = {Ivanova,A. and Keen,M. and Klemm,A.}, title = {Russia's flat tax}, journal = {Economic Policy}, year = {2005}, pages = {397-444}, abstract = {In 2001, Russia dramatically reduced its higher rates of personal incometax (PIT), establishing a single marginal rate at the low level of 13%.In the following year, real revenue from the PIT increased by about 26%.This ‘flat tax’ experience has attracted much attention (and emulation),making it perhaps the most important tax reform of recent years. But ithas been little studied. This paper asks whether the strong performanceof PIT revenue was itself a consequence of this reform, using both macroevidence and, in particular, micro level data on the experiences of individualsand households affected by the reform to varying degrees. It concludesthat there is no evidence of a strong supply side effect of the reform.Compliance, however, does appear to have improved quite substantially -by about one third, according to our estimates - though it remains unclearwhether this was due to the parametric tax reform or to accompanying changesin enforcement.}, key = {tax reform} } @TECHREPORT{Iyen:08, author = {Iyengar, R.}, title = {I'd rather be Hanged for a Sheep than a Lamb: The Unintended Consequences of 'Three-Strikes' Laws}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2008}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {13784}, abstract = {Strong sentences are common "tough on crime" tool used to reduce the incentives for individuals to participate in criminal activity. However, the design of such policies often ignores other margins along which individuals interested in participating in crime may adjust. I use California's Three Strikes law to identify several effects of a large increase in the penalty for a broad set of crimes. Using criminal records data, I estimate that Three Strikes reduced participation in criminal activity by 20 percent for second-strike eligible offenders and a 28 percent decline for third-strike eligible offenders. However, I find two unintended consequences of the law. First, because Three Strikes flattened the penalty gradient with respect to severity, criminals were more likely to commit more violent crimes. Among third-strike eligible offenders, the probability of committing violent crimes increased by 9 percentage points. Second, because California's law was more harsh than the laws of other nearby states, Three Strikes had a "beggar-thy-neighbor" effect increasing the migration of criminals with second and third-strike eligibility to commit crimes in neighboring states. The high cost of incarceration combined with the high cost of violent crime relative to non-violent crime implies that Three Strikes may not be a cost-effective means of reducing crime. http://www.nber.org/papers/w13784}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.03.09} } @ARTICLE{Iyen:60, author = {Iyenger, N. S.}, title = {On the standard error of the {L}orenz concentration ratio}, journal = {Sankhya}, year = {1960}, volume = {22}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{J2001, author = {Goerlich Gisbert F J}, title = {On Factor Decomposition of Cross-Country Income Inequality: Some Extensions and Qualifications}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {70}, pages = {pp. 303-309}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KrTh:02, author = {J. B. Kruse, and Thompson M.A.}, title = {Valuing Low Probability Risk: Survey and Experimental Evidence}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {April 2002}, volume = {50}, pages = {495-505}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{J.M.1999, author = {Hartwick J.M.}, title = {Insuring and U (Y)}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {65}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{JaMi:86, author = {Jackson, B. R. and Milliron, V. C.}, title = {Tax compliance research:fundings, problems and prospects}, journal = {Journal of Accounting Literature}, year = {1986}, volume = {5}, pages = {125-165}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Jackson2004, author = {Jackson, Matthew O. and Nicolo, Antonio}, title = {The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2004}, volume = {115}, pages = {278-308}, abstract = {We examine the strategy-proof provision of excludable public goods when agents care about the number of other consumers. We show that strategy-proof and efficient social choice functions satisfying an outsider independence condition must always assign a fixed number of consumers, regardless of individual desires to participate. A hierarchical rule selects participants and a generalized median rule selects the level of the public good. Under heterogeneity in agents' views on the optimal number of consumers, strategy-proof, efficient, and outsider independent social choice functions are much more limited and in an important case must be dictatorial.}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{JaNi:l04, author = {Jackson, Matthew O. and Nicolo, Antonio}, title = {The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowdingpreferences}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2004}, volume = {115}, pages = {278-308}, abstract = {We examine the strategy-proof provision of excludable public goods whenagents care about the number of other consumers. We show that strategy-proofand efficient social choice functions satisfying an outsider independencecondition must always assign a fixed number of consumers, regardless ofindividual desires to participate. A hierarchical rule selects participantsand a generalized median rule selects the level of the public good. Underheterogeneity in agents’ views on the optimal number of consumers, strategy-proof,efficient, and outsider independent social choice functions are much morelimited and in an important case must be dictatorial.}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Jacobsen2000, author = {Jacobsen, J. P. and Levin, L. M.}, title = {The Effects of Internal Migration on the Relative Economic Status of Women and Men}, journal = {Journal of Socioeconomics}, year = {2000}, volume = {29}, pages = {291-304}, key = {discrimination}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{JaLe:00, author = {Jacobsen, J. P. and Levin, L. M.}, title = {The Effects of Internal Migration on the Relative Economic Status of Womenand Men}, journal = {Journal of Socioeconomics}, year = {2000}, volume = {29}, pages = {291-304}, key = {discrimination} } @ARTICLE{JaJoBo:07, author = {Jacobsson, F. and Johannesson, M. and Borgquist, L.}, title = {Is Altruism Paternalistic?}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {2007}, volume = {117}, pages = {761-781}, abstract = {We test if altruism is paternalistic with respect to health. Subjects can donate money or nicotine patches to a smoking diabetes patient whose willingness to pay for nicotine patches is positive but below the market price. In a between-subjects treatment, average donations are 40% greater in the nicotine patches group. When subjects can donate both nicotine patches and money more than 90% of the donations are given in kind rather than cash. These results are also confirmed in three additional stability experiments that vary the framing, use food stamps instead of money, and use exercise instead of nicotine patches.}, key = {altruism}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{Jain:01, author = {Jain, A. K.}, title = {Corruption: A review}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {2001}, volume = {15}, pages = {71-121}, key = {corruption} } @BOOK{Jain:98, title = {Economics of Corruption}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, year = {1998}, author = {Arvind K. Jain}, key = {Corruption} } @TECHREPORT{Jain:86, author = {Jain, A. K.}, title = {Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion - The {I}ndian Case}, institution = {London School of Economics}, year = {1986}, type = {Mimeo.}, address = {London}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Jain:74, author = {Jain, A. K.}, title = {Tax Avoidance Through {H}indu Undivided Family in {I}ndia}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1974}, volume = {29}, pages = {121-30}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Jain:72, author = {Jain, A. K.}, title = {The problem of tax evasion in {I}ndia}, journal = {Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation}, year = {1972}, volume = {26}, pages = {276-299}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{Jain:75, title = {Size Distribution of Income. A Compilation of Data}, publisher = {World Bank}, year = {1975}, author = {Jain, S.}, address = {Washington}, key = {Data} } @ARTICLE{Jako:76, author = {Jakobsson, U.}, title = {On the measurement of the degree of progression}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1976}, volume = {5}, pages = {161-168}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{JaRa:01, author = {Jyotsna Jalan and Martin Ravallion}, title = {ABehavioral Responses to Income Risk in Rural {C}hina}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {66}, pages = {23-49}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{JaRa:99, author = {Jyotsna Jalan and Martin Ravallion}, title = {Are the Poor Less Well Insured? Evidence on Vulnerability to Income Riskin Rural {C}hina}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {58}, pages = {61-81}, number = {1}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Jame:98, author = {James Jr, Harvey S.}, title = {Are employment and managerial control equivalent? Evidence from an electronicsproducer}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {36}, pages = {447-471}, number = {4}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Jame:93, author = {James, E.}, title = {Why Do Different Countries Choose a Different Public-Private Mix of EducationalServices?}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1993}, volume = {28}, pages = {571-592}, key = {education, training} } @ARTICLE{James1993, author = {James, E.}, title = {Why Do Different Countries Choose a Different Public-Private Mix of Educational Services?}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1993}, volume = {28}, pages = {571-592}, key = {education, training}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{JaPaTh:07, author = {James, J.A. and Palumbo, G.M. and Thomas, M.}, title = {Consumption Smoothing among Working-Class American Families before Social Insurance}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {2007}, volume = {59}, pages = {606-640}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{JaleWa:81, author = {James, S. R. and Lewis, A. and Wallschutzky, I.}, title = {Fiscal fog: a comparison of the comprehensibility of tax literature in {A}ustraliaand the {UK}}, journal = {Australian Tax Review}, year = {1981}, volume = {10}, pages = {26-35}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{James1981, author = {James, S. R. and Lewis, A. and Wallschutzky, I.}, title = {Fiscal fog: a comparison of the comprehensibility of tax literature in {A}ustralia and the {UK}}, journal = {Australian Tax Review}, year = {1981}, volume = {10}, pages = {26-35}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Janeba1999, author = {Janeba, E. and Peters, W.}, title = {Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the Gains from Nondiscrimination: The Case of Interest Taxation in {E}urope}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {93-101}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{JaPe:99, author = {Janeba, E. and Peters, W.}, title = {Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the Gains from Nondiscrimination: The Case of Interest Taxation in {E}urope}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {93-101}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{JaPi:06, author = {Japelli, T. and Pistaferri, L.}, title = {Intertemporal Choice and Consumption Mobility}, journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {75-115}, key = {consumption}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{JaJe:98, author = {Jarvis, S. and Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {How much income mobility is there in {B}ritain?}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1998}, volume = {108}, pages = {428-443}, number = {447}, month = {March}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{JaJe:97LI, author = {Jarvis, Sarah and Jenkins, Stephen P.}, title = {Low income dynamics in 1990s Britain}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1997}, volume = {18}, pages = {123-142}, number = {2}, month = {May}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{JaJe:97MS, author = {Jarvis, Sarah and Jenkins, Stephen P.}, title = {Marital Splits and Income Changes: Evidence for Britain}, institution = {ESRC Research Centre on Micro-Social Change}, year = {1997}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {97-4}, month = {April}, key = {population economics} } @TECHREPORT{JaJe:96, author = {Jarvis, Sarah and Jenkins, Stephen P.}, title = {Changing Places: Income Mobility and Poverty Dynamics in Britain}, institution = {ESRC Research Centre on Micro-Social Change}, year = {1996}, number = {96-19}, month = {October}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{JaJe:95, author = {Jarvis, S. And Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Do the poor stay poor? New evidence about the income dynamics from the {B}ritish{H}ousehold {P}anel {S}urvey}, institution = {ESRC Research Centre on Micro Social Change}, year = {1995}, number = {2}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Jass:00, author = {Jasso, G.}, title = {Some of {R}obert {K}. {M}erton's contributions to justice theory}, journal = {Sociological Theory}, year = {2000}, volume = {18}, pages = {331-339}, key = {Sociology}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.05.29} } @ARTICLE{Jass:80, author = {Jasso, G.}, title = {A new theory of distributive justice}, journal = {American Sociological Review}, year = {1980}, volume = {45}, pages = {3-32}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Jass:79, author = {Jasso, G.}, title = {On {G}ini's mean difference and {G}ini's index of concentration}, journal = {American Sociological Review}, year = {1979}, volume = {44}, pages = {867-70}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{JaKo:07AN, author = {Jasso,G. and Kotz,S.}, title = {A new continuous distribution and two new families of distributions based on the exponential}, journal = {Statistica Neerlandica}, year = {2007}, volume = {61}, pages = {305-328}, number = {3}, abstract = {Recent work on social status led to derivation of a new continuous distribution based on the exponential. The new variate, termed the ring(2)-exponential, in turn leads to derivation of two closely related new families of continuous distributions, the mirror-exponential and the ring-exponential. Both the standard exponential and the ring(2)-exponential are special cases of both the new families. In this paper, we first focus on the ring(2)-exponential, describing its derivation and examining its properties, and next introduce the two new families, describing their derivation and initiating exploration of their properties. The mirror-exponential arises naturally in the study of status; the ring-exponential arises from the mathematical structure of the ring(2)-exponential. Both have the potential for broad application in diverse contexts across science and engineering. Within sociobehavioral contexts, the new mirror-exponential may have application to the problem of approximating the form and inequality of the wage distribution.}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{JaKo:07TT, author = {Jasso, G. and Kotz, S.}, title = {Two Types of Inequality: Inequality Between Persons and Inequality Between Subgroups}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {2749}, address = {P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany}, month = {April}, note = {gj1@nyu.edu}, abstract = {Social scientists study two kinds of inequality: inequality between persons (as in income inequality) and inequality between subgroups (as in racial inequality). This paper analyzes the mathematical connections between the two kinds of inequality. The paper proceeds by exploring a set of two-parameter continuous probability distributions widely used in economic and sociological applications. We define a general inequality parameter, which governs all measures of personal inequality (such as the Gini coefficient), and we link this parameter to the gap (difference or ratio) between the means of subdistributions. In this way we establish that, at least in the two-parameter distributions analyzed here, and for the case of two nonoverlapping subgroups, as personal inequality increases, so does inequality between subgroups. This general inequality parameter also governs Lorenz dominance. Further, we explore the connection between subgroup inequality (in particular, the ratio of the bottom subgroup mean to the top subgroup mean) and decomposition of personal inequality into between-subgroup and within-subgroup components, focusing on an important decomposable measure, Theil’s MLD, and its operation in the Pareto case. This allows us to establish that all the quantities in the decomposition are monotonic functions of the general inequality parameter. Thus, the general inequality parameter captures the “deep structure” of inequality. We also introduce a whole-distribution graphical tool for assessing personal and subgroup inequality. Substantively, this work suggests that in at least some societies, characterized by special income distributions, whenever inequality disrupts social harmony and social cohesion, it attacks on two fronts, via subgroup inequality as well as personal inequality.}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @INCOLLECTION{Jayn:76, author = {Jaynes, E. T.}, title = {Confidence Intervals vs. {B}ayesian Intervals}, booktitle = {Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference and StatisticalTheories of Science}, publisher = {D. Reidel Publishing}, year = {1976}, editor = {Harper, W. L. and Hooker, C. A.}, address = {Dordrecht, Holland}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Jayn:68, author = {Jaynes, E. T.}, title = {Prior probabilities}, journal = {IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics}, year = {1968}, volume = {4}, pages = {227-241}, key = {probability}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2005.12.23} } @ARTICLE{Jayn:57, author = {Jaynes, E. T.}, title = {Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics}, journal = {Physics Review}, year = {1957}, volume = {106}, pages = {620-630}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{JeMo:03, author = {Jehiel, P. and Moldovanu, B.}, title = {An economic perspective on auctions}, journal = {Economic Policy}, year = {2003}, volume = {18}, pages = {269-308}, key = {Micro} } @ARTICLE{JeMoSt:96, author = {Jehiel, P. and Moldovanu, B. and Stacchetti, E.}, title = {How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1996}, volume = {86}, pages = {814-829}, key = {econ history}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @BOOK{JeRe:00, title = {Advanced Microeconomic Theory}, publisher = {Addison-Wesley}, year = {2000}, author = {Geoffrey A. Jehle and Philip J. Reny}, edition = {second}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{JeRe:98, title = {Advanced Microeconomic Theory}, publisher = {Addison-Wesley}, year = {1998}, author = {Geoffrey A. Jehle and Philip J. Reny}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Jenc:73, title = {Inequality}, publisher = {Allen Lane}, year = {1973}, author = {Jencks, C.}, address = {London}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Jenk:00, author = {Jenkins,S.}, title = {Modelling household income dynamics}, journal = {Journal of Population Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {12}, pages = {529-567}, abstract = {This paper is about income and poverty dynamics and their socioeconomiccorrelates. The first half of the paper aims to establish some of the salientfacts for Britain, applying the pioneering methods of Bane and Ellwood(1986). Important for poverty dynamics are changes in labour earnings frompersons other than the household head, changes in non-labour income (includingbenefits), and changes in household composition, in addition to changesin the head's labour earnings. The second half of the paper is a reviewand critique of the multivariate modelling frameworks which might be usedto explain and forecast these salient facts for Britain or elsewhere.}, key = {household} } @TECHREPORT{Jenk:94WL, author = {Jenkins, S.}, title = {Winner and Losers: A portrait of the {UK} Income Distribution during the1980s}, institution = {University College of Swansea}, year = {1994}, type = {Depart of Economics Discussion paper}, number = {94-07}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{JeCaLyJaSa:06, author = {Jenkins,S.P. and Cappellari,L. and Lynn,P. and Jackle,A. and Sala,E.}, title = {Patterns of consent: evidence from a general household survey}, journal = {Journal of Royal Statistical Society}, year = {2006}, volume = {169}, pages = {701-722}, abstract = {We analyse patterns of consent and consent bias in the context of a large general household survey, the 'Improving survey measurement of income and employment' survey, also addressing issues that arise when there are multiple consent questions. A multivariate probit regression model for four binary outcomes with two incidental truncations is used. We show that there are biases in consent to data linkage with benefit and tax credit administrative records that are held by the Department for Work and Pensions, and with wage and employment data held by employers. There are also biases in respondents' willingness and ability to supply their national insurance number. The biases differ according to the question that is considered. We also show that modelling questions on consent independently rather than jointly may lead to misleading inferences about consent bias. A positive correlation between unobservable individual factors affecting consent to Department for Work and Pensions record linkage and consent to employer record linkage is suggestive of a latent individual consent propensity.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{JeMi:07, author = {Jenkins,S. and Micklewright,J.}, title = {New Directions in the Analysis of Inequality and Poverty}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion paper}, number = {2814}, abstract = {Over the last four decades, academic and wider public interest in inequality and poverty has grown substantially. In this paper we address the question: what have been the major new directions in the analysis of inequality and poverty over the last thirty to forty years? We draw attention to developments under seven headings: changes in the extent of inequality and poverty, changes in the policy environment, increased scrutiny of the concepts of 'poverty' and 'inequality' and the rise of multidimensional approaches, the use of longitudinal perspectives, an increase in availability of and access to data, developments in analytical methods of measurement, and developments in modelling.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @INCOLLECTION{Jenk:94SW, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Social Welfare Function Measures of horizontal Inequity}, booktitle = {Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, pages = {725-751}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {equity} } @INCOLLECTION{Jenk:91TM, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {The measurement of economic inequality}, booktitle = {Readings on Economic Inequality}, publisher = {M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y.}, year = {1991}, editor = {Osberg, L.}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Jenk:07, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Inequality and the {GB2} Income Distribution}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {2831}, abstract = {The generalized entropy class of inequality indices is derived for Generalized Beta of the Second Kind (GB2) income distributions, thereby providing a full range of top-sensitive and bottom-sensitive measures. An examination of British income inequality in 1994/95 and 2004/05 illustrates the analysis.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{Jenk:98, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Modelling household income dynamics}, institution = {ESRC Research Centre on Micro-Social Change}, year = {1998}, address = {University of Essex, Colchester, U.K.}, month = {May}, note = {Draft}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Jenk:97, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Trends in real income in {B}ritain: a microeconomic analysis}, journal = {Empirical Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {22}, pages = {483-500}, number = {4}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Jenk:96a, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Recent trends in the {UK} income distribution: what happened and why?}, journal = {Oxford Review of Economic Policy}, year = {1996}, volume = {12}, pages = {29-46}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Jenk:96EE, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Easy estimation methods for discrete-time duration models}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1996}, volume = {57}, pages = {129-137}, number = {1}, key = {econometrics} } @TECHREPORT{Jenk:96TI, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Trends in Real Income in Britain: A Microeconomic Analysis}, institution = {ESRC Research Centre on Micro-Social Change}, year = {1996}, address = {University of Essex, Colchester}, month = {June}, journal = {ESRC Research Centre on Micro-Social Change}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Jenk:95AF, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Accounting for Inequality Trends: Decomposition Analyses for the {UK}}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1995}, volume = {62}, pages = {29-64}, abstract = {Eight explanations for UK income inequality trends between 1971 and 1986 are assessed by pooling evidence from inequality index decompositions by population sub-group and by income source. The principal causes of the aggregate trends were a mixture of changes in earnings inequality, employment structure and unemployment, but this mixture changed over time. The impact of wage inequality changes on income inequality changes fell during the 1970s and 1980s, reflecting the secular decline in the importance of employment earnings for household income packages. Unemployment changes had their largest impact at the start of the 1980s. Between 1981 and 1986 self-employment income changes appear to have had the largest influence.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2554775} } @ARTICLE{Jenk:95DT, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Did the middle class shrink during the 1980s? {UK} evidence from kernel density estimates}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1995}, pages = {407-413}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Jenk:, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Income Inequality and Living Standards: Changes in the 1970s and 1980s}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1991}, volume = {12}, pages = {1-28}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.24}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2250/cgi-bin/fulltext/119275059/PDFSTART} } @ARTICLE{Jenk:91II, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Income Inequality and Living Standards: Changes in the 1970s and 1980s}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1991}, volume = {12}, pages = {1-27}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Jenk:88CI, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Calculating income distribution indices from micro-data}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1988}, volume = {41}, pages = {139-142}, number = {3}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Jenk:88EM, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Empirical measurement of horizontal inequity}, year = {1988}, type = {working paper}, number = {169}, address = {Australian National University}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Jenk:88RA, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Reranking and the analysis of income redistribution}, journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1988}, volume = {35}, pages = {65-76}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Jenkins1988d, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Calculating income distribution indices from micro data}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1988}, volume = {41}, pages = {139-142}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Jenk:87, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Snapshots Versus Movies, 'Lifecycle Biases' and the Estimation of IntergenerationalEarnings Inheritance}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1987}, volume = {31}, pages = {1149-1158}, key = {household} } @ARTICLE{Jenkins1987, author = {Jenkins, S. P.}, title = {Snapshots Versus Movies, 'Lifecycle Biases' and the Estimation of Intergenerational Earnings Inheritance}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1987}, volume = {31}, pages = {1149-1158}, key = {household}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{JeCo:94DA, author = {Jenkins, S. P. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Dwarfs and giants in the 1980s: The {UK} Income Distribution and How it Changed}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1994}, volume = {15}, pages = {99-118}, number = {1}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2250/cgi-bin/fulltext/119275059/PDFSTART} } @ARTICLE{JeCo:94PE, author = {Jenkins, S. P. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Parametric equivalence scales and scale relativities}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1994}, volume = {104}, pages = {891-900}, key = {Equivalence scales} } @ARTICLE{Jenkins1994, author = {Jenkins, S. P. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Parametric equivalence scales and scale relativities}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1994}, volume = {104}, pages = {891-900}, key = {household}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{JeCo:93, author = {Jenkins, S. P. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Dwarfs and Giants in the 1980s: The {UK} Income Distribution and How ItChanged}, journal = {University College of Swansea Discussion Paper Series}, year = {1993}, volume = {93-03}, pages = {52}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{JeCo:93DG, author = {Jenkins, S. P. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Dwarfs and Giants in the 1980s: The {UK} Income Distribution and How itChanged}, institution = {University College of Swansea}, year = {1993}, type = {Department of Economics, Discussion Paper}, number = {93-3}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{JeCo:93PE, author = {Jenkins, S. P. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Parametric equivalence scales and scale relativities}, institution = {University College of Swansea}, year = {1993}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {93-09}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Jenkins1993d, author = {Jenkins, S. P. and Cowell, F. A.}, title = {Dwarfs and Giants in the 1980s: The {UK} Income Distribution and How It Changed}, journal = {University College of Swansea Discussion Paper Series}, year = {1993}, volume = {93-03}, pages = {52}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{JeKe:05, author = {Jenkins, S. P. and van Kerm, P.}, title = {Accounting for income distribution trends: A density function decomposition approach}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2005}, volume = {3}, pages = {43-61}, abstract = {This paper develops methods for decomposing changes in the income distributionusing subgroup decompositions of the income density function. Overall changesare related to changes in subgroup shares and changes in subgroup densities,where the latter are broken down further using elementary transformationsof individual incomes. These density decompositions are analogous to thewidely-used decompositions of inequality indices by population subgroup,except that they summarize multiple features of the income distribution(using graphs), rather than focusing on a specific feature such as dispersion,and are not dependent on the choice of a specific summary index. Nonetheless,since inequality and poverty indices can be expressed as PDF functionals,our densitybased methods can also be used to provide numerical decompositionsof these. An application of the methods reveals the multi-faceted natureof UK income distribution trends during the 1980s.}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{JeLa:98RP, author = {Jenkins, Stephen P. and Lambert, Peter J.}, title = {Ranking Poverty Gap distributions: further tips for poverty analysis}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, pages = {31-38}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{JeLa:98TI, author = {Jenkins, Stephen P. and Lambert, Peter J.}, title = {`Three {I}'s of poverty' curves and poverty dominance: tips for povertyanalysis}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, pages = {39-56}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Jenkins1998, author = {Jenkins, Stephen P. and Lambert, Peter J.}, title = {`Three {I}'s of poverty' curves and poverty dominance: tips for poverty analysis}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, pages = {39-56}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{JeLa:97, author = {Jenkins, Stephen P. and Lambert, Peter J.}, title = {Three `{I}'s of poverty curves, with an analysis of {UK} poverty trends}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1997}, volume = {49}, pages = {317-327}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{JeLa:93, author = {Jenkins, S. P. and Lambert, P. J.}, title = {Ranking income distributions when needs differ}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1993}, volume = {39}, pages = {337-356}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{JeLa:93PO, author = {Jenkins, S. P. and Lambert, P. J.}, title = {Poverty orderings, poverty gaps and poverty lines}, institution = {University College of Swansea}, year = {1993}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {93-07}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{JeOh:89, author = {Jenkins, S. P. and O' Higgins, M.}, title = {Inequality measurement using norm incomes}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1989}, volume = {35}, pages = {245-282}, number = {9}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{JeOh:88, author = {Jenkins, S. P. and O' Higgins, M.}, title = {Normative income inequality measurement without the use of equivalent incomes}, institution = {Bath University (School of Humanities and Social Sciences)}, year = {1988}, number = {4}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Jenkins1997, author = {Jenkins, S. P. and O'Leary, N. C.}, title = {Gender Differentials in Domestic Work, Market Work, and Total Work Time: {UK} Time Budget Survey Evidence for 1974/5 and 1987}, journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1997}, pages = {153-164}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{JeOl:97, author = {Jenkins, S. P. and O'Leary, N. C.}, title = {Gender Differentials in Domestic Work, Market Work and Total Work Time:{UK} Time Budget Survey Evidence for 1974/5 and 1987}, journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1997}, pages = {153-164}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{JeOL:96, author = {Jenkins, Stephen P. and O'Leary, Nigel C.}, title = {Household Income Plus Household Production: The Distribution of extendedIncome in the {UK}}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1996}, pages = {401-419}, number = {4}, month = {December}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @INCOLLECTION{JeAmRo:82, author = {Jennings, D. L. and Amabile, T. M. and Ross, L.}, title = {Informal covariation assessment: data-based versus theory-based judgments}, booktitle = {Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1982}, editor = {Kahneman, D. and Slovic, P. and Tversky, A.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {uncertainty} } @TECHREPORT{JeMi:02, author = {Jensen,R. and Miller,N.}, title = {Giffen Behavior: Theory and Evidence}, institution = {John F.Kennedy School of Government}, year = {2002}, abstract = {Economists have long searched, unsuccessfully, for convincing evidence ofa Giffen behavior, i.e., consumers who, under some circumstances, respondto an increase in the price of a good by demanding more of it. We examineseveral theoretical approaches to the Giffen phenomenon and show that ineach case Giffen behavior is closely associated with consumers reactingto an increase in the price of a staple by consuming more of that goodin order to maintain subsistence consumption. We then use detailed, individual-leveldata panel from China to demonstrate the existence of two Giffen goods.In particular, in the south, rice, the preferred dietary staple, is a Giffengood for poor consumers. On the other hand, in the north, noodles playa larger role in diet than rice, and demand for noodles is shown to beGiffen.}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Jeon:08, author = {Jeong, H.}, title = {Assessment of Relationship Between Growth and Inequality: Micro Evidence from Thailand}, journal = {Macroeconomic Dynamics}, year = {2008}, volume = {12}, pages = {155–197}, abstract = {This paper shows that growth and income distribution dynamics are closely linked through occupation, financial intermediation, and education. We use micro data from Thailand for 1976–1996. The compositional changes across these characteristics account for half of the Thai inequality increase and 40% of the Thai growth and poverty reduction. Financial deepening and educational expansion contributed to increasing inequality, whereas occupational transformation contributed to poverty alleviation. The changes in income gaps across the income–status groups, that is, divergence and then convergence, give rise to inverted-U inequality dynamics. These two growth-related components of inequality dynamics, composition and income-gap dynamics, explain virtually all the change in overall inequality, except its initial rise. Thus, inequality dynamics can be viewed as an integral part of the wider process of growth, as Kuznets speculated.}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.10.04} } @ARTICLE{JeTo:08, author = {Jeong, H. and Townsend, R. M.}, title = {Growth and Inequality: Model Evaluation Based on an Estimation-Calibration Strategy}, journal = {Macroeconomic Dynamics}, year = {2008}, volume = {12}, pages = {231-284}, abstract = {This paper evaluates two well-known models of growth with inequality that have explicit micro underpinnings related to household choice. With incomplete markets or transactions costs, wealth can constrain investment in business and the choice of occupation and also constrain the timing of entry into the formal financial sector. Using the Thai Socio-Economic Survey (SES), we estimate the distribution of wealth and the key parameters that best fit cross-sectional data on household choices and wealth. We then simulate the model economies for two decades at the estimated initial wealth distribution and analyze whether the model economies at those micro-fit parameter estimates can explain the observed macro and sectoral aspects of income growth and inequality change. Both models capture important features of Thai reality. Anomalies and comparisons across the two distinct models yield specific suggestions for improved research on the micro foundations of growth and inequality.}, key = {growth}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.10.04} } @ARTICLE{Jewi:88, author = {Jewitt, Ian}, title = {Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1988}, volume = {56}, pages = {1177-1190}, number = {5}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{JiBe:98, author = {Nancy Ammon Jianakoplos and Alexandra Bernasek}, title = {Are Women More Risk Averse?}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, year = {1998}, volume = {36}, pages = {620-630}, key = {risk} } @TECHREPORT{JiMe:91, author = {Jianakoplos, N. A. and Menchik, P. L.}, title = {Wealth mobility in the {U}nited {S}tates}, institution = {Michigan State University}, year = {1991}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Jofr:00, author = {Jofre-Bonet, M.}, title = {Health Care: Private And/or Public Provision}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2000}, volume = {16}, pages = {469-489}, key = {Health} } @ARTICLE{JoJo:97, author = {Johanneson, Magnus and Johansson, Per-Olov}, title = {Quality of life and the {WTP} for an increased life expectancy at an advancedage}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {219-228}, number = {2}, month = {August}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Joha:77, author = {Johansen, L.}, title = {The theory of public goods: misplaced emphasis?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {7}, pages = {147-152}, key = {public goods} } @BOOK{Joha:95, title = {Likelihood-based inference in cointegrated vector auto-regressive models}, publisher = {Clarendon Press, Oxford}, year = {1995}, author = {Johansen, S.}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{JoAr:08, author = {Johansson-{S}tenman, O. and {A}ronsson, T.}, title = {When the {J}oneses' consumption hurts: {O}ptimal public good provision and nonlinear income taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {986-997}, number = {5-6}, abstract = {This paper considers a model with nonlinear income taxation and public good provision when people care about their relative consumption compared to others. The standard optimality expressions are modified by terms that reflect the extent to which people care about relative consumption. The extent to which the public good provision rule should be modified is shown to depend critically on the preference elicitation format. The modified tax formulas imply substantially higher marginal income tax rates than in the conventional case, under plausible assumptions and available empirical estimates regarding comparison consumption concerns.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.18} } @ARTICLE{MiNa:99, author = {Micklewright John and Nagy Gyula}, title = {Living standards and incentives in transition: The implications of {UI}exhaustion in {H}ungary}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {297-319}, number = {3}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Johnson1988, author = {Johnson, E. J. and Payne, J. W. and Bettman, J. R.}, title = {Information displays and preference reversals. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1988}, volume = {42}, pages = {1-21}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{JoPaBe:88, author = {Johnson, E. J. and Payne, J. W. and Bettman, J. R.}, title = {Information displays and preference reversals. Organizational Behavior andHuman Decision Processes}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1988}, volume = {42}, pages = {1-21}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{JoKo:69, title = {Discrete Distributions}, publisher = {Houghton Mifflin}, year = {1969}, author = {Johnson, N. J. and Kotz, S.}, address = {Boston}, key = {distributions} } @BOOK{JoKoBa:94, title = {Continuous Univariate Distributions}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1994}, author = {Johnson, N. L. and Kotz, S. and Balakrishnan, N.}, volume = {1}, series = {John Wiley Series in Probability and Mathematical Statistics}, address = {New York}, edition = {Second}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{John:37, author = {Johnson, N. O.}, title = {The {P}areto Law}, journal = {Review of Economic Statistics}, year = {1937}, volume = {19}, pages = {20-26}, key = {Distributions} } @ARTICLE{JoSW:98, author = {Johnson, Paul and Stears, Gary and Webb, Steven}, title = {The dynamics of incomes and occupational pensions after retirement}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {19}, pages = {197-215}, number = {2}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{JoWe:92, author = {Johnson, P. and Webb,S.}, title = {The Treatment of Housing in Official Low Income Statstics}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society}, year = {1992}, volume = {A-155}, pages = {273-290}, key = {housing}, series = {A} } @ARTICLE{JoKaMcWo:00, author = {Johnson, S. and Kaufman, D. and McMillan, J. and Woodruff, C.}, title = {Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity After Communism}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {76}, pages = {495-520}, key = {Underground} } @TECHREPORT{ThWe:99WD, author = {Johnson, Simon and Daniel Kaufmann and McMillan, John and Woodruff, Christopher}, title = {Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity after Communism}, institution = {Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology}, year = {1999}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {Massachusetts Institute of Technology , Sloan School of Management, 50 MemorialDrive, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA}, abstract = {Our survey of private manufacturing firms finds the size of Hidden "unofficial"activity to be much larger in Russia and Ukraine than in Poland, Slovakiaand Romania. A comparison of Cross-country averages shows that managersin Russia and Ukraine Face higher effective tax rates, worse bureaucraticcorruption, Greater incidence of mafia protection and have less faith inThe court system. Our firm-level regressions for the three Eastern Europeancountries find that bureaucratic corruption is Significantly associatedwith hiding output.}, comment = {. JEL Classification: H19, H26}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{John:77, author = {Johnson, W. R.}, title = {The measurement and trend of inequality: comment}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {67}, pages = {502-504}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{JoDi:97, title = {Econometrics Methods}, publisher = {McGraw-Hill}, year = {1997}, author = {Johnston, J. and DiNardo, J. E.}, address = {New York}, edition = {4th}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Johnston1996, author = {Johnston, Richard and McKinney, Martin and Stark, Tom}, title = {Regional Price level variations and real household incomes in the {U}nited {K}ingdom, 1979/80-1993}, journal = {Regional Studies}, year = {1996}, volume = {30.6}, pages = {567-578}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{JoMcKSt:96, author = {Johnston, Richard and McKinney, Martin and Stark, Tom}, title = {Regional Price level variations and real household incomes in the {U}nited{K}ingdom, 1979/80-1993}, journal = {Regional Studies}, year = {1996}, volume = {30.6}, pages = {567-578}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{Joli:96, title = {The evolutionist Economics of {L}eon {W}alras}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {1996}, author = {Jolink, A.}, address = {London}, key = {hist econ thought} } @ARTICLE{JoNi:06, author = {Jones, A. M. and Nicol{\'a}s, A. L.}, title = {Allowing for heterogeneity in the decomposition of measures in health}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {347-365}, abstract = {This paper shows how recently developed regression-based methods for the decomposition of health can be extended to incorporate heterogeneity in the responses of health to the explanatory variables. We illustrate our method with an application to the GHQ measure of psychological well-being taken from the British Household Panel Survey. The results suggest that there is an important degree of heterogeneity in the association of health to explanatory variables across birth cohorts and genders which, in turn, accounts for a substantial percentage of the in observed health.}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @ARTICLE{Jone:97, author = {Jones, C. I.}, title = {On the Evolution of the World Income Distribution}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1997}, volume = {11}, pages = {19-36}, month = {Summer}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Jone:08, author = {Jones, F.}, title = {The effects of taxes and benefits on household income, 2006/07}, journal = {Economic and Labour Market Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {2}, pages = {37-47}, abstract = {Examines how taxes and benefits redistribute income between various groups of households, showing where different types of households are in the income distribution}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.07}, url = {http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/taxbhi0608.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{Jone:07, author = {Jones, F.}, title = {The effects of taxes and benefits on household income, 2005/06}, institution = {Office for National Statistics}, year = {2007}, type = {Non-journal article}, address = {http://www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/article.asp?ID=1804}, abstract = {This analysis examines how taxes and benefits redistribute income between households in the United Kingdom. It shows where different types of households and individuals are in the income distribution and looks at the changing levels of income inequality over time. The analysis is published annually. Table 1 at the end of the summary section provides a full list of tables and figures. Published in web format: 17 May 2007 at 9:30 am}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.07} } @ARTICLE{Jone:06, author = {Jones, F.}, title = {The effects of taxes and benefits on household income, 2004/05}, journal = {Economic Trends}, year = {2006}, volume = {630}, pages = {53-97}, abstract = {Examines how taxes and benefits redistribute income between various groups of households, showing where different types of households are in the income distribution}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.07} } @ARTICLE{Jone:96, author = {Jones, J. A.}, title = {Tax Law: Rules or Principles?}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1996}, volume = {17}, pages = {63-89}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{JoMi:03, author = {Jordahl, Henrik and Micheletto, Luca}, title = {Optimal Utilitarian Taxation and Horizontal Equity}, year = {2003}, number = {977}, abstract = {We impose a horizontal equity restriction on the problem of finding theoptimal utilitarian tax mix. The horizontal equity constraint requiresthat individuals with the same ability have to pay the same amount of taxesregardless of their preferences for leisure. Contrary to normal findings,we find that a good that is complementary to leisure can be encouragedby the tax system, and that a good that normally should be discouragedby the tax system can be subsidized even if the economy is composed ofonly two private commodities plus leisure. Also, the marginal effectivetax rate can be different from zero at the top (of the ability distribution)when the tax mix obeys the horizontal equity constraint.}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {optimal taxation}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{JoSc:05, author = {Jorgensen,J. and Schroder,P.}, title = {Welfare-ranking ad valorem and specific tariffs under monopolistic competition}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {38}, pages = {228-241}, abstract = {Actual trade and tariff policy prefers ad valorem tariffs to specific tariffs.Yet in this paper we show that, in a setting of monopolistic competition,realizing a given restriction on imports via a specific tariff would generatemore consumer utility than obtaining the same restriction via an ad valoremtariff.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Jorg:96, author = {Jorgenson, D.}, title = {The Agenda for {U.S.} Tax Reform}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {29}, pages = {649-657}, key = {tax reform}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{JoSl:90, author = {Jorgenson, D. W. and Slesnick, D. T.}, title = {Inequality and the standard of living}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1990}, volume = {43}, pages = {103-120}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{JoSl:84a, author = {Jorgenson, D. W. and Slesnick, D. T.}, title = {Aggregate consumer behaviour and the measurement of inequality}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1984}, volume = {51}, pages = {369-392}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{JoSl:84b, author = {Jorgenson, D. W. and Slesnick, D. T.}, title = {Inequality in the distribution of individual welfare}, journal = {Advances in Econometrics}, year = {1984}, volume = {3}, pages = {67-130}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{JoPa:98, title = {Unequal Pay for women and men: evidence from the {B}ritish birth cohortstudies}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Joshi, Heather and Paci, Pierella}, key = {wages} } @BOOK{Joshi1998, title = {Unequal Pay for women and men: evidence from the {B}ritish birth cohort studies}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Joshi, Heather and Paci, Pierella}, key = {wages}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Jost:03, author = {Josten,S.}, title = {Inequality, Crime and Economic Growth. A Classical Argument for DistributionalEquality}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2003}, volume = {10}, pages = {435-452}, abstract = {This paper studies the dynamic general-equilibrium interactions betweeninequality, crime and economic growth by embedding the rational choice-theoreticalapproach to criminal behavior in a heterogeneous-agents endogenous-growthOLG model. Based on their respective opportunity costs, individuals chooseto specialize in either legal or criminal activities. While legal householdscontribute to aggregate goods supply over time by either working or buildinghuman capital, criminals make a living by expropriating legal citizensof part of the latter’s income. An increase in inequality lowers the economy’sgrowth rate and possesses negative welfare effects for all agents withendowments equal to or above average and for agents with endowment belowaverage that are born sufficiently far in the future.}, key = {Crime} } @ARTICLE{JoKoTo:00, author = {Jouini, E. and Koehl, P.-F. and Touzi, N.}, title = {Optimal Investment with Taxes: An Existence Result}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {33,4}, pages = {373-388}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{Joul:06, author = {Joulfaian, D.}, title = {Inheritance and Saving}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {12569}, address = {NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138}, month = {October}, abstract = {This paper explores the effects of inheritances on the saving of recipients. Information on inheritances and heirs is obtained from estate tax records of decedents which are linked to the income tax records of beneficiaries. The observed pattern of wealth mobility within two years of the receipt of inheritances and multivariate analyses show that wealth increases by less than the full amount of the inheritance received. Similarly, and consistent with previous findings, large inheritances are found to depress labor force participation.}, key = {wealth}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Joul:05, author = {Joulfaian, D.}, title = {Choosing between gifts and bequests: How taxes affect the timing of wealth transfers}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {2069-2091}, abstract = {A number of theories have been advanced to explain the size and timing of intergenerational transfers. One factor only recently explored is the effects of taxes, and in particular the estate tax, on such transfers. This paper represents the first attempt to explore how capital gains and gift taxes, in addition to the estate tax, interact to influence incentives in the timing of transfers. Using estate tax data and exploiting variations in state inheritance, gift, and capital gains tax rates, this paper finds taxes to be an important consideration in the choice between gifts and bequests. In particular, each of capital gains and gift taxes are found to be important determinants of the timing of transfers. These findings are robust to a number of specifications that control for borrowing, charitable bequests, marital status, and the portfolio composition of wealth transfers.}, key = {wealth}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.01.08} } @ARTICLE{Joul:04, author = {Joulfaian, D.}, title = {Gift taxes and lifetime transfers: time series evidence}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {1917-1929}, key = {wealth}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.01.08} } @ARTICLE{Jou:00, author = {Joulfaian, D.}, title = {Corporate Income Tax Evasion and Managerial Preferences}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2000}, volume = {82}, pages = {698-701}, month = {November}, key = {Tax compliance - firms} } @ARTICLE{Joul:00, author = {Joulfaian, D.}, title = {Corporate Income Tax Evasion and Managerial Preferences}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2000}, volume = {82}, pages = {698-701}, abstract = {This paper investigates the role of managerial preferences in shaping corporate income tax evasion. Using noncompliance with the personal income tax as a measure of taste for evasion, the empirical results from a sample of corporate income tax returns show that managerial preferences play an important role in determining noncompliance with the corporate income tax. Basic sample tabulations show that, when compared to compliant firms, noncompliant firms are three times more likely to be managed by executives who have understated personal taxes. In addition, results from multivariate analyses suggest that the amount of underreported income is significantly higher in the presence of such executives.}, key = {tax compliance - firms}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.21}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2646664} } @ARTICLE{Jous:01, author = {Jousten, A.}, title = {Life-Cycle Modeling of Bequests and their Impact on Annuity Valuation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, pages = {149-177}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Jousten2000, author = {Jousten, A.}, title = {Life-Cycle Modeling of Bequests and Their Impact on Annuity Valuation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {79}, pages = {149-177}, key = {Wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{JuMo:07, author = {Ju,B.G. and Moreno-Ternero,J.D.}, title = {On the Equivalence between Progressive Taxation and Inequality Reduction}, institution = {CORE}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {2007/2}, abstract = {We establish the precise connections between progressive taxation and inequality reduction, in a setting where the level of tax revenue to be raised is endogenously fixed and tax schemes are balanced. We show that, in contrast with the traditional literature on taxation, the equivalence between inequality reduction and the combination of progressivity and income order preservation does not always hold in this setting. However, we show that, among rules satisfying consistency and, either revenue continuity, or revenue monotonicity, the equivalence remains intact.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{JuMo:08, author = {Ju, B. and Moreno-Ternero, J. D.}, title = {On the equivalence between progressive taxation and inequality reduction}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2008}, volume = {30}, pages = {561–569}, abstract = {We establish the precise connections between progressive taxation and inequality reduction, in a setting where the level of tax revenue to be raised is exogenously fixed and tax schemes are balanced. We show that, in contrast with the traditional literature on taxation, the equivalence between inequality reduction and the combination of progressivity and income order preservation does not always hold in this setting. However, we show that, among rules satisfying consistency and, either revenue continuity, or revenue monotonicity, the equivalence remains intact.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.24} } @ARTICLE{Judd:99, author = {Judd, Kenneth L.}, title = {Optimal taxation and spending in general competitive growth models}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {1-25}, number = {1}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{Judd:98, title = {Numerical Methods in Economics}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Judd, Kenneth L.}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{Judd:85, author = {Judd, K. L.}, title = {Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1985}, volume = {28}, pages = {59-83}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Judg:95, author = {Judge, K.}, title = {Income distribution and life expectancy: a critical appraisal}, journal = {British Medical Journal}, year = {1995}, volume = {311}, pages = {1282-1285}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{JuMuPi:93, author = {Juhn, C. and Murphy, K. M. and Pierce, B.}, title = {Wage Inequality and the Rise in the Returns to Skill}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1993}, volume = {101}, pages = {410-442}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{JuSa:00, author = {Jullien, B. and Salanie, B.}, title = {Estimating Preferences under Risk: The Case of Racetrack Bettors}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2000}, volume = {108}, pages = {503}, key = {risk} } @TECHREPORT{Jung:08, author = {Jung, J}, title = {The Timing of Redistribution}, institution = {The Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2008-015}, abstract = {We investigate whether late redistribution programs that can be targeted towards low income families can “dominate” early redistribution programs that cannot be targeted due to information constraints. We use simple twoperiod OLG models with heterogenous agents under six policy regimes: A model calibrated to the U.S. economy (benchmark), two early redistribution (lump sum) regimes, two (targeted) late redistribution regimes, and finally a model without taxes and redistribution. Redistribution programs are financed by a labor tax on the young and a capital tax on the old generation. We argue that late redistribution, if the programs are small in size, can dominate early redistribution in terms of welfare but not in terms of real output. Better targeting of low income households cannot offset savings distortions. In addition we find that optimal tax policy includes a positive capital tax rate.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.21} } @ARTICLE{JuKu:91, author = {Juster, F. T. and Kuester, K. A.}, title = {Differences in the measurement of wealth, wealth inequality and wealth compositionobtained from alternative {U.S.} wealth surveys}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1991}, volume = {37}, pages = {33-62}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Juster1991, author = {Juster, F. T. and Kuester, K. A.}, title = {Differences in the measurement of wealth, wealth inequality and wealth composition obtained from alternative {U.S.} wealth surveys}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1991}, volume = {37}, pages = {33-62}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{JuSm:99, author = {Juster, F. T. and Smith, J. P. and Stafford, F.}, title = {The Measurement and Structure of Household Wealth}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {253-275}, key = {wealth} } @INCOLLECTION{Just:99, author = {Juster, T. F.}, title = {The Future of Research on Time Use}, booktitle = {Time Use - Research, Data and Policy}, publisher = {NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft}, year = {1999}, editor = {Merz, J. and Ehling, M.}, pages = {551-558}, address = {Baden Baden}, key = {time use} } @INCOLLECTION{JaDa:00, author = {J{\"a}ntti, M. and Danziger, S.}, title = {Income Poverty in Advanced Countries}, booktitle = {Handbook of Income Distribution}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {2000}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Bourguignon, F.}, chapter = {10}, pages = {309-378}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Jehi:97, author = {J{\'e}hiel, P.}, title = {Bargaining between benevolent jurisdictions or when delegation induces inefficiencies}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {61-74}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Kaas:05, author = {Kaasa, Anneli}, title = {Factors of Income Inequality and their Influence Mechanisms: A Theoretical Overview}, institution = {University of Tartu}, year = {2005}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {458}, abstract = {This paper provides the first real-world evidence of Giffen behavior, i.e., upward sloping demand. Subsidizing the prices of dietary staples for extremely poor households in two provinces of China, we find strong evidence of Giffen behavior for rice in Hunan, and weaker evidence for wheat in Gansu. The data provide new insight into the consumption behavior of the poor, who act as though maximizing utility subject to subsistence concerns, with both demand and calorie elasticities depending significantly, and non-linearly, on the severity of their poverty. Understanding this heterogeneity is important for the effective design of welfare programs for the poor.}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Kachelmeier1992, author = {Kachelmeier, S. J. and Shehata, M.}, title = {{Examining} risk preferences under high monetary incentives: experimental evidence from the {People's} {Republic} of {China}}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1992}, volume = {82}, pages = {1120-1141}, number = {5}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KaSh:92, author = {Kachelmeier, S. J. and Shehata, M.}, title = {Economic Theory, Choice and the Preference Reversal phenomenon: A Reexamination}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1992}, volume = {82}, pages = {1120-1141}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{KaZi:99, author = {Kaganovich, M. and Zilcha, I.}, title = {Education, Social Security and Growth}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {289-309}, number = {2}, key = {social security} } @BOOK{KaRo:95, title = {The Handbook of Experimental Economics}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1995}, author = {Kagel, J. H. and Roth, A. E.}, address = {Princeton, N. J.}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{Kahn:98, author = {Kahn, Matthew E.}, title = {A household level environmental {K}uznets curve}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {59}, pages = {269-273}, number = {2}, key = {household} } @ARTICLE{KaKr:06, author = {Kahneman, D. and Krueger, A.}, title = {Development in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2006}, volume = {20}, pages = {3-24}, key = {welfare}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @BOOK{KaSlTv:82, title = {Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1982}, author = {Kahneman, D. and Slovic, P. and Tversky, A.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{KaTv:79, author = {Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky}, title = {Prospect Theory : An Analysis of Decision under Risk}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, volume = {47}, pages = {263-291}, number = {2}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{KaChPi:07, author = {Kaiser, Johannes and Chmura, Thorsten and Pitz, Thomas}, title = {{The Tobin Tax - A Game-Theoretical and an Experimental Approach}}, journal = {SSRN eLibrary}, year = {2007}, keywords = {Tobin tax, behavioral finance, experiment}, language = {English}, location = {http://ssrn.com/paper=936924}, publisher = {SSRN}, type = {Working Paper Series} } @ARTICLE{Kakw:88, author = {Kakwani, N.}, title = {Income Inequality, Welfare and Poverty in a Developing Economy with applicationsto {S}ri {L}anka}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1988}, volume = {5}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Kakwani1988, author = {Kakwani, N.}, title = {Income Inequality, Welfare and Poverty in a Developing Economy with applications to {S}ri {L}anka}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1988}, volume = {5}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KaLa:99, author = {Kakwani, N. and Lambert, P.}, title = {Measuring Income Tax Discrimination}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1999}, volume = {81}, pages = {27-31}, key = {tax reform}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{KaLa:98, author = {Kakwani, Nanak and Lambert, Peter J.}, title = {On measuring inequity in taxation: a new approach}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {14}, pages = {369-380}, number = {2}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Kakwani1997, author = {Kakwani, N. and Wagstaff, A. and Van Doorslaer, E.}, title = {Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health: Measurement, Computation and Statistical Inference}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1997}, volume = {77}, pages = {87-103}, key = {health}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KaWaDo:97, author = {Kakwani, N. and Wagstaff, A. and Van Doorslaer, E.}, title = {Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health: Measurement, Computation and StatisticalInference}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1997}, volume = {77}, pages = {87-103}, key = {health} } @INCOLLECTION{Kakw:84II, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {Issues in measuring poverty}, booktitle = {Advances in Econometrics}, publisher = {Greenwich: JAI Press.}, year = {1984}, editor = {Basmann, R. L. and Rhodes, G. G.}, volume = {3}, pages = {253-282}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{Kakw:84WR, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {Welfare ranking of income distributions}, booktitle = {Advances in Econometrics}, publisher = {Greenwich: JAI Press}, year = {1984}, editor = {Basmann, R. L. and Rhodes, G. G.}, volume = {3}, pages = {191-213}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Kakw:94, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {Poverty measurement and hypothesis testing}, booktitle = {Taxation Poverty and Income Distribution}, year = {1994}, editor = {Edward Elgar}, pages = {48-68}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Kakw:87IO, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {Inequality of income derived from survey data during the inflationary period}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1987}, volume = {23}, pages = {387-388}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kakw:87MO, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {Measures of tax progressivity and redistribution effect: A comment}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1987}, volume = {42}, pages = {431-434}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Kakw:86AR, title = {Analyzing Redistribution Policies}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1986}, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kakw:86DO, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {Decomposition of normalization axiom in the measurement of poverty: a comment}, journal = {WIDER}, year = {1986}, volume = {3}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Kakw:84OT, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {On the measurement of tax progressivity and redistributive effect of taxeswith applications to horizontal and vertical equity}, journal = {Advances in Econometrics}, year = {1984}, volume = {3}, pages = {149-168}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Kakw:84TR, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {The relative deprivation curve and its applications}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1984}, volume = {2}, pages = {384-405}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kakwani1984a, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {On the measurement of tax progressivity and redistributive effect of taxes with applications to horizontal and vertical equity}, journal = {Advances in Econometrics}, year = {1984}, volume = {3}, pages = {149-168}, key = {equity}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Kakw:81, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {Note on a new measure of poverty}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1981}, volume = {49}, pages = {525-526}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{Kakw:80, title = {Income Inequality and Poverty: Methods of Estimation and Policy Applications}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1980}, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, note = {A World Bank Research Publication.}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Kakw:80FF, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {Functional forms for estimating the {L}orenz curve: A Reply}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1980}, volume = {48}, pages = {1063-1064}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Kakw:80II, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {Income Inequality and Poverty}, year = {1980}, type = {A World Bank research publication}, address = {London}, key = {inequality}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} } @ARTICLE{Kakw:80OA, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {On a class of poverty measures}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1980}, volume = {48}, pages = {437-466}, number = {3}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Kakw:79, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {Measurement of poverty and negative income tax}, journal = {Australian Economic Papers}, year = {1979}, volume = {12}, pages = {237-248}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Kakw:77, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {Applications of {L}orenz curve in economic analysis}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1977}, volume = {45}, pages = {719-729}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kakw:76, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {On the estimation of income inequality measures from grouped observations}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1976}, volume = {43}, pages = {483-92}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kakw:74, author = {Kakwani, N. C.}, title = {A note on the efficient estimation of the new measures of income inequality}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1974}, volume = {42}, pages = {597-600}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{KaLa:95, author = {Kakwani, N. C. and Lambert, P. J.}, title = {Vertical Equity and Horizontal Inequity - a new approach to measurement}, institution = {The University of New South Wales}, year = {1995}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {95/3}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Kakwani1976, author = {Kakwani, N. C. and Podder, N.}, title = {Efficient Estimation of the {L}orenz Curve and Associated Inequality Measures from Grouped Observations}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1976}, volume = {44}, pages = {137-148}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KaPo:76, author = {Kakwani, N. C. and Podder, N.}, title = {Efficient Estimation of the {L}orenz Curve and Associated Inequality Measuresfrom Grouped Observations}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1976}, volume = {44}, pages = {137-148}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911387?origin=JSTOR-pdf} } @ARTICLE{KaPo:73, author = {Kakwani, N. C. and Podder, N.}, title = {On the Estimation of the {L}orenz Curve from Grouped Observations}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1973}, volume = {14}, pages = {278-292}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{KaSm:75, author = {Kalai, E. and Smorodinsky, M.}, title = {Other solutions to {N}ash's bargaining problem}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1975}, volume = {43}, pages = {513-518}, key = {claims} } @ARTICLE{Kalb:07, author = {Kalb,G.}, title = {Interaction of the Tax and Social Security Systems in Australia: The Effect on Effective Marginal Tax Rates}, journal = {The Australian Economic Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {40}, pages = {186-193}, number = {2}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Kald:55, author = {Nicholas Kaldor}, title = {Alternative Theories of Distribution}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1955}, volume = {23}, pages = {83-100}, key = {income distribution:theoretical}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.05} } @ARTICLE{Kald:39, author = {Kaldor, N.}, title = {Welfare propositions of economics and intertemporal comparisons of utility}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1939}, volume = {49}, pages = {549-551}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Kale:39, title = {Essays in the Theory of Economic Fluctuations}, publisher = {Allen and Unwin}, year = {1939}, author = {Kalecki, M.}, address = {London}, key = {political economy}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.05} } @ARTICLE{Kali:97, author = {Kalirajan, K. P.}, title = {A measure of economic efficiency using returns to scale}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {56}, pages = {253-257}, number = {3}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Kamanou2002, author = {Kamanou, G. and Morduch, J.}, title = {Measuring Vulnerability to Poverty}, year = {2002}, pages = {1-23}, number = {58}, abstract = {Many argue that poverty is intimately linked with 'vulnerability'. Still, there is no consensus about how to define and measure 'vulnerability'. We review theory and describe strengths and limits of recently proposed measures. We then propose a definition of vulnerability and develop a general empirical framework that combines Monte Carlo and bootstrap statistical techniques. The approach estimates the expected distribution of future expenditures for each household and then calculates vulnerability measures as a function of those distributions. The approach addresses weaknesses in existing methods, and can be implemented with panel data. An application to C{\^o}te d'Ivoire in 1985-86 shows that by our definition there was considerable vulnerability in the cities outside of Abidjan, a finding obscured by existing methods.}, institution = {World Institute for Development Economics Research}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, type = {Working Paper} } @TECHREPORT{KaMo:02, author = {Kamanou,G. and Morduch,J.}, title = {Measuring Vulnerability to Poverty}, institution = {World Institute for Development Economics Research}, year = {2002}, abstract = {Many argue that poverty is intimately linked with ‘vulnerability’. Still,there is no consensus about how to define and measure ‘vulnerability’.We review theory and describe strengths and limits of recently proposedmeasures. We then propose a definition of vulnerability and develop a generalempirical framework that combines Monte Carlo and bootstrap statisticaltechniques. The approach estimates the expected distribution of futureexpenditures for each household and then calculates vulnerability measuresas a function of those distributions. The approach addresses weaknessesin existing methods, and can be implemented with panel data. An applicationto C{\^o}te d’Ivoire in 1985-86 shows that by our definition there was considerablevulnerability in the cities outside of Abidjan, a finding obscured by existingmethods.}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Kamat1961, author = {Kamat, A. R.}, title = {A note on {G}ini's mean difference}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1961}, volume = {21}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Kama:53, author = {Kamat, A. R.}, title = {The third moment of {G}ini's mean difference}, journal = {Biometrika}, year = {1953}, volume = {40}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kami:04, author = {Kaminski,M.}, title = {Social choice and information: the informational structure of uniquenesstheorems in axiomatic social theories}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2004}, volume = {48}, pages = {121-138}, abstract = {The paper introduces the category of algebraic axioms and investigates whena social rule of decision-making can be uniquely characterized with suchaxioms. The first result shows that every set of axioms that characterizea given rule is equivalent to a set of three algebraic axioms. The secondresult suggests a method for constructing an algebraic proof of uniquenessvia finding an appropriate path of maps. It says that we can characterizea rule if and only if we can find a path. Both theorems are then used toprove and analyze various characterization results in May’s binary socialchoice, Nash bargaining theory, and Sen’s social choice theory.}, key = {social choice} } @ARTICLE{Kan:96, author = {Kan, K.}, title = {Empirical Evidence on Consumption Smoothing and Intergenerational Transfers}, journal = {Southern Economic Journal}, year = {1996}, volume = {63}, pages = {76-94}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{KaHa:94, author = {Kanbur, R. and Haddad, L.}, title = {Are Better-Off Households More or Less Unequal?}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1994}, volume = {4}, pages = {445-458}, key = {household} } @ARTICLE{KaMu:07, author = {Kanbur, Ravi and Mukherjee, Diganta}, title = {Premature Mortality and Provert Measurement}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {59}, pages = {339 - 359}, abstract = {There is a glaring paradox in all commonly used measures of poverty. The death of a poor person, because of poverty, reduces poverty according to these measures. This surely violates our basic intuitions of how poverty measures should behave. It cannot be right in concept that differentially higher mortality among the poor serves to reduce poverty. This article begins the task of developing poverty measures that are not perversely mortality sensitive. A family of measures is proposed that is an intuitive modification of standard poverty measures to take into account the fact that the rich live longer than the poor.}, key = {Poverty}, keywords = {characterization, lifetime income profile, poverty measure, premature mortality, steady-state population}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{KaPiTu:06, author = {Kanbur, R. and Pirttil{\"a}, J. and Tuomala, M.}, title = {Non-Welfarist Optimal Taxation and Behavioural Public Economics}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {2006}, volume = {20}, pages = {849-868}, abstract = {Research in behavioural economics has uncovered the widespread phenomenon of people making decisions against their own good intentions. In these situations, the government might want to intervene, indeed individuals might want the government to intervene, to induce behaviour that is closer to what individuals wish they were doing. The analysis of such corrective interventions, through taxes and subsidies, might be called ‘behavioural public economics’. However, such analysis, where the government has an objective function that is different from that of individuals, is not new in public economics. In these cases the government is said to be ‘non-welfarist’ in its objectives, and there is a long tradition of non-welfarist welfare economics, especially the analysis of optimal taxation and subsidy policy where the outcomes of individual behaviour are evaluated using a preference function different from the one that generated the outcomes. First of all the object of this paper is to present a unified view of the non-welfarist optimal taxation literature and, second, to present behavioural public economics as a natural special case of this general framework.}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{KaPo:02, author = {Kanbur, R. and Pottebaum, D.}, title = {A Note on Public Goods Dependency}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2002}, volume = {77}, pages = {233-237}, key = {Public Goods} } @ARTICLE{Kanb:06, author = {Kanbur, S. M. N.}, title = {The policy significance of decompositions}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {367-374}, abstract = {Economists are now familiar with 'between' and 'within' group decompositions, for race, gender, spatial units, etc. But what exactly is the normative significance of the empirical results produced by these decompositions? This paper raises some basic questions about policy interpretations of decompositions that are found in the literature.}, key = { decomposition}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @ARTICLE{KaZh:05, author = {Kanbur, S. M. N. and Zhang, Z.}, title = {Fifty Years of Regional Inequality in {C}hina: a Journey Through Central Planning, Reform, and Openness}, journal = {Review of Development Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {8}, pages = {87-106}, abstract = {The paper constructs and analyzes a long-run time series for regional inequality in China from the Communist Revolution to the present. There have been three peaks of inequality in the last fifty years, coinciding with the Great Famine of the late 1950s, the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s and 1970s, and finally the period of openness and global integration in the late 1990s. Econometric analysis establishes that regional inequality is explained in the different phases by three key policy variables—the ratio of heavy industry to gross output value, the degree of decentralization, and the degree of openness.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.09.06}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2250/cgi-bin/fulltext/118667885/PDFSTART} } @ARTICLE{KaZh:99, author = {Kanbur, S. M. N. and Zhang, Z.}, title = {Which Regional Inequality? The Evolution of Rural-Urban and Inland-Coastal Inequality in {C}hina from 1983 to 1995}, journal = {Journal of Comparative Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {27}, pages = {686-701}, abstract = {This paper develops a unified empirical framework for describing the relative contribution of rural–urban and inland–coastal inequality to overall regional inequality in China during the 1980's and 1990's. The framework assesses rural–urban and inland–coastal inequalities from the same data set, presents results for a sufficiently long time period to transcend short-term fluctuations, allows for differential price changes, and applies a consistent notion of the contribution to inequality using a decomposition analysis. While the contribution of rural–urban inequality is much higher than that of inland–coastal inequality in terms of levels, the trend is very different. The rural–urban contribution has not changed very much over time, but the inland–coastal contribution has increased by several fold. The paper ends by investigating the role of labor migration in this outcome.}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.09.06}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6WHV-45GMTHJ-5&_user=1177143&_coverDate=12%2F31%2F1999&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=1177143&md5=6c2c06a2a6d0ce88d73be0167fe04a48} } @INCOLLECTION{Kanb:84, author = {Kanbur, S. M. R.}, title = {The measurement and decomposition of inequality and poverty}, booktitle = {Mathematical Methods in Economics}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1984}, editor = {van der Ploeg, F.}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{KaCh:07, author = {Kanji, G. and Chopra, P. K.}, title = {Poverty as a System: Human Contestability Approach to Poverty Measurement}, journal = {Journal of Applied Statistics}, year = {2007}, volume = {34}, pages = {1135–1158}, abstract = {Since Sen’s (1976) paper on poverty measurement, a substantial literature, both theoretical and empirical, has emerged. There have been several recent efforts to drive poverty measures based on different approaches and axioms. These poverty indices are based on head count ratio, poverty gaps and distribution of income. These are very narrow in approach and suffer from several drawbacks. However, the purpose of the present paper is to introduce a new poverty measure based on a holistic and system modelling approach. Based on Chopra’s human contestability (Chopra, 2003, 2007) approach to poverty, this new approach to measuring poverty has been developed using a structure equation model based on Kanji’s business excellence model (Kanji, 2002) to create the proposed poverty model. We construct a latent variable structural equation model to measure the contestability excellence within certain boundaries of the societal system. It will provide us with a measurement of poverty in a society or community in terms of human contestability. A higher human contestability index will indicate the lower poverty within the society. Strengths and weakness as of various components will also indicate that a characteristic of the individual requires extra society or government support to remove poverty. However, there remains considerable disagreement on the best way to achieve this.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.02.24} } @ARTICLE{KPLC:96, author = {Kaplan, G. A. and Pamuk, E. R. and Lynch, J. W. and Cohen, R. D. and Balfour,J. L.}, title = {Inequality in income and mortality in the {U}nited {S}tates: analysis of mortality and potential pathways}, journal = {British Medical Journal}, year = {1996}, volume = {312}, pages = {999-1003}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{KaRe:85, author = {Kaplan, S. E. and Reckers, P. M. J.}, title = {A study of tax evasion judgements}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1985}, volume = {38}, pages = {97-102}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{KaReRe:86, author = {Kaplan, S. E., Reckers, P. M. J. and Reynolds, K. D.}, title = {An application of attribution and equity theories to tax evasion behavior}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1986}, volume = {7}, pages = {461-476}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Kapl:08, author = {Kaplow, L.}, title = {Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {W14170}, abstract = {Optimal policy rules - including those regarding income taxation, commodity taxation, public goods, and externalities - are typically derived in models with homogeneous preferences. This article reconsiders many central results for the case in which preferences for commodities, public goods, and externalities are heterogeneous. When preference differences are observable, standard second-best results in basic settings are unaffected, except those for the optimal income tax. Optimal levels of income taxation may be higher, the same, or lower on types who derive more utility from various goods, depending on the nature of preference differences and the concavity of the social welfare function. When preference differences are unobservable, all policy rules may change. The determinants of even the direction of optimal rule adjustments are many and subtle.}, key = {optimal income taxation}, owner = {Zhang Zhijun}, timestamp = {2000.09.30} } @TECHREPORT{Kapl:08OP, author = {Kaplow, L.}, title = {Optimal Policy With Heterogeneous Preferences}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {14170}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 June 2008}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14}, url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w14170} } @ARTICLE{Kapl:06, author = {Kaplow, L.}, title = {On the Undesirability of Commodity Taxation Even When Income Taxation is Not Optimal}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {1235-1250}, key = {taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @TECHREPORT{Kapl:06a, author = {Kaplow, L.}, title = {Optimal Income Transfers}, institution = {John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business}, year = {2006}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {548}, address = {Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138}, month = {June}, abstract = {A substantial literature addresses the design of transfer programs and policies, including the negative income tax, other means-tested transfers, the earned income tax credit, categorical assistance, and work inducements. This work is largely independent of that on the optimal nonlinear income tax, yet formulations of such a tax necessarily address how low-income individuals should be treated. This paper draws on the optimal income taxation literature to illuminate the analysis of transfer programs, including the level and shape of marginal tax rates (including phase-outs), the structure of categorical assistance, and the role of work inducements in an optimal income transfer scheme.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @TECHREPORT{Kapl:06b, author = {Kaplow, L.}, title = {Taxation}, institution = {John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business}, year = {2006}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {542}, address = {Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138}, month = {February}, abstract = {This Handbook entry presents a conceptual, normative overview of the subject of taxation. It emphasizes the relationships among the main functions of taxation – notably, raising revenue, redistributing income, and correcting externalities – and the mapping between these functions and various forms of taxation. Different types of taxation as well as expenditures on transfers and public goods are each integrated into a common optimal tax framework with the income tax and commodity taxes at the core. Additional topics addressed include a range of dynamic issues, the unit of taxation, tax administration and enforcement, and tax equity.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Kapl:05, author = {Kaplow, L.}, title = {Why measure inequality?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2005}, volume = {3}, pages = {65-79}, key = {inequality }, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.21} } @TECHREPORT{Kapl:04, author = {Kaplow, Louis}, title = {On the Undesirability of Commodity Taxation even when Income Taxation isNot Optimal}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {10407}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, abstract = {An important result due to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) is that differentialcommodity taxation is not optimal in the presence of an optimal nonlinearincome tax (given weak separability of utility between labor and all consumptiongoods). This article demonstrates that their conclusion holds regardlessof whether the income tax is optimal. In particular, given any commoditytax and income tax system, differential commodity taxation can be eliminatedin a manner that results in a Pareto improvement. Also, differential commoditytaxation can be proportionally reduced so as to generate a Pareto improvement.In addition, for commodity tax reforms that do not eliminate or proportionallyreduce differential taxation, a simple efficiency condition is offeredfor determining whether a Pareto improvement is possible.}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{Kaplow2004, author = {Kaplow, Louis}, title = {On the Undesirability of Commodity Taxation even when Income Taxation is Not Optimal}, institution = {National Bureau for Economic Research}, year = {2004}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {10407}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, abstract = {An important result due to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) is that differential commodity taxation is not optimal in the presence of an optimal nonlinear income tax (given weak separability of utility between labor and all consumption goods). This article demonstrates that their conclusion holds regardless of whether the income tax is optimal. In particular, given any commodity tax and income tax system, differential commodity taxation can be eliminated in a manner that results in a Pareto improvement. Also, differential commodity taxation can be proportionally reduced so as to generate a Pareto improvement. In addition, for commodity tax reforms that do not eliminate or proportionally reduce differential taxation, a simple efficiency condition is offered for determining whether a Pareto improvement is possible.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Kapl:00, author = {Kaplow, L.}, title = {A framework for taxing estate and gift taxation}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2000}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {7775}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138}, key = {wealth taxation} } @TECHREPORT{Kapl:98, author = {Louis Kaplow}, title = {A Note on the Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Costof Taxation}, institution = {John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business, Harvard Law School}, year = {1998}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {230}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{KaSh:07, author = {Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S.}, title = {Moral Rules, the Moral Sentiments, and Behavior: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2007}, volume = {115}, pages = {494-514}, abstract = {How should moral sanctions and moral rewards—the moral sentiments involving feelings of guilt and of virtue—be employed to govern individuals’ behavior if the objective is to maximize social welfare? In the model that we examine, guilt is a disincentive to act and virtue is an incentive because we assume that they are negative and positive sources of utility. We also suppose that guilt and virtue are costly to inculcate and are subject to certain constraints on their use. We show that the moral sentiments should be used chiefly to control externalities and further that guilt is best to employ when most harmful acts can successfully be deterred whereas virtue is best when only a few individuals can be induced to behave well. We also contrast the optimal use of guilt and virtue to optimal Pigouvian taxation and discuss extensions of our analysis.}, key = {political economy}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{KaSh:03, author = {Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven}, title = {Fariness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2003}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {9622}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, abstract = {In Fairness versus Welfare, we advance the thesis that social policies shouldbe assessed based entirely on their effects on individuals’ well-being.This thesis implies that no independent weight should be accorded to notionsof fairness (other than many purely distributive notions). We support ourthesis in three ways: by demonstrating how notions of fairness perverselyreduce welfare, indeed, sometimes everyone’s well-being; by revealing numerousother deficiencies in the notions, including their lack of sound rationales;and by providing an account of notions of fairness that explains theirintuitive appeal in a manner that reinforces the conclusion that they shouldnot be treated as independent principles in policy assessment. In thisessay, we discuss these three themes and comment on issues raised by RichardCraswell, Lewis Kornhauser, and Jeremy Waldron.}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{KaSh:00, author = {Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S.}, title = {Notions of the Fairness versus the {P}areto Principle: On the Role of LogicalConsistency}, institution = {Harvard Law School, The Center for Economics. Law and Business}, year = {2000}, number = {Discussion Paper No. 302}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{KaSh:99, author = {Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S.}, title = {Economic Analysis of Law}, journal = {Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Center for Law}, year = {1999}, volume = {Discussion paper no. 251}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Kapteyn1980b, author = {Kapteyn, A. and van Herwaarden, F. G.}, title = {Interdependent welfare functions and optimal income distribution}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1980}, volume = {14}, pages = {375-397}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KaVaHe:80, author = {Arie Kapteyn and Floor Van Herwaarden}, title = {Interdependent Welfare Functions and Optimal Income Distribution}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1980}, volume = {14}, pages = {375-397}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{KeVaPrVaHe:78, author = {Arie Kapteyn and Bernard M. S. Van Praag and Floor G. Van Herwaarden}, title = {Individual Welfare Functions and Social Reference Spaces}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1978}, volume = {1}, pages = {173-177}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{KaSmva:08, author = {Kapteyn, A. and Smith, J. P. and van Soest, A.}, title = {Are Americans Really Less Happy with Their Incomes?}, institution = {RAND}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {WR-591}, abstract = {Recent economic research on international comparisons of subjective well-being suffers from several important biases due to the potential incomparability of response scales within and across countries. In this paper the authors concentrate on self-reported satisfaction with income in two countries: The Netherlands and the U.S. The comparability problem is addressed by using anchoring vignettes. They find that in the raw data, Americans appear decidedly less satisfied with their income than the Dutch. It turns out however that after response scale adjustment based on vignettes the distribution of satisfaction in the two countries is essentially identical. In addition, they find that the within-country cross-sectional effect of income on satisfaction - a key parameter in the recent debate in the economic literature - is significantly under-estimated especially in the US when differences in response scales are not taken into account.}, key = {happiness}, owner = {Zhang Zhijun}, timestamp = {2000.09.30} } @ARTICLE{KaWa:85, author = {Kapteyn, A. and van Wansbeek, T.}, title = {Individual welfare function: a review}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1985}, volume = {6}, pages = {333-363}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{KaWaBu:80, author = {Kapteyn, Arie and Wansbeek, Tom and Buyze, Jeannine}, title = {The Dynamics of Preference Formation}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1980}, volume = {1}, pages = {123-157}, key = {household} } @BOOK{Karc:89, title = {Lotteries}, publisher = {Transaction Publishers}, year = {1989}, author = {Karcher, A.}, address = {New Brunswick}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Karn:05, author = {Karni,E.}, title = {Subjective expected utility theory with costly actions}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {2005}, volume = {50}, pages = {28-41}, abstract = {This paper explores alternative axiomatizations of subjective expected utilitytheory for decision makers with direct preferences over actions; includinga general subjective expected utility representation with action-dependentutility, and separately additive representations. In the context of thestate-space formulation of agency theory, the results of this paper constituteaxiomatic foundations of the agent’s behavior.}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{Karn:04, author = {Karni,E.}, title = {Additive representations over actions and acts}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2004}, volume = {48}, pages = {113-119}, abstract = {This paper develops axiomatic foundations of rational decision making involvinga choice among action-acts pairs. In the context of the state-space formulationof agency theory, this paper clarifies the assumptions underlying the additiverepresentations that are often used to depict agents’ behavior in the analysisof principal-agent problems. The paper invokes the algebraic approach thatrenders the analysis general.}, key = {Micro} } @ARTICLE{Karn:98, author = {Karni, Edi}, title = {Impartiality: definition and representation}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1998}, volume = {66}, pages = {1405-1415}, number = {6}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Karn:96PA, author = {Karni, E.}, title = {Probabilities and beliefs}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1996}, volume = {13}, pages = {249-262}, number = {3}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Karn:96SW, author = {Karni, E.}, title = {Social welfare functions and fairness}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1996}, volume = {13}, pages = {487-496}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Karn:90, author = {Karni, E.}, title = {Preference Reversals}, journal = {Utility and Probability}, year = {1990}, volume = {55}, pages = {157-160}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Karni2000, author = {Karni, E. and Safra, Z.}, title = {An Extension of a Theorem of Von {N}eumann and {M}orgenstern with an Application to Social Choice Theory}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economy}, year = {2000}, volume = {34}, pages = {315-327}, key = {social choice}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KaSa:00, author = {Karni, E. and Safra, Z.}, title = {An Extension of a Theorem of Von {N}eumann and {M}orgenstern with an Applicationto Social Choice Theory}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economy}, year = {2000}, volume = {34}, pages = {315-327}, key = {social choice} } @ARTICLE{Karni1987, author = {Karni, E. and Safra, Z.}, title = {Preference Reversal and the Observability of preferences by Experimental Methods}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1987}, volume = {55}, pages = {675-685}, key = {risk}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KaSa:87, author = {Karni, E. and Safra, Z.}, title = {Preference Reversal and the Observability of preferences by ExperimentalMethods}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1987}, volume = {55}, pages = {675-685}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{KaScVi:83, author = {Karni, E. and Schmeidler, D. and Vind, K.}, title = {On State Dependent Preferences and Subjective Probabilities}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1983}, volume = {51}, pages = {1021-1032}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Karo:92, author = {Karoly, L. A.}, title = {Changes in the Distribution of Individual Earnings in the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1992}, volume = {74}, pages = {107-115}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Karp2005, author = {Larry Karp and Jeffrey M. Perloff}, title = {When Promoters Like Scalpers}, journal = {Journal of Economics \& Management Strategy}, year = {2005}, volume = {14}, pages = {477-508}, number = {2}, note = {available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jemstr/v14y2005i2p477-508.html}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Karz:83, author = {Karzon, A. U.}, title = {International tax evasion: spawned in the {U}nited {S}tates and nurturedby secrecy havens}, journal = {Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law}, year = {1983}, volume = {16}, pages = {757-832}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Karzon1983, author = {Karzon, A. U.}, title = {International tax evasion: spawned in the {U}nited {S}tates and nurtured by secrecy havens}, journal = {Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law}, year = {1983}, volume = {16}, pages = {757-832}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Kats:77, author = {Katsenelinboigen, A.}, title = {Coloured markets in the {S}oviet {U}nion}, journal = {Soviet Studies}, year = {1977}, volume = {29}, pages = {62-85}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Kats:99, author = {Katsimi, M.}, title = {Elections and the Size of the Public Sector}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {441-462}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{Katsimi2004, author = {Katsimi, Margarita and Moutos, Thomas}, title = {Inequality and Redistribution via the Public Provision of Private Goods}, year = {2004}, number = {1121}, abstract = {The relationship between inequality and redistribution is usually studied under the assumption that the government collects different amounts of taxes from each citizen (voter) but gives back the same amount (in cash or in kind) to everyone. In this paper we consider what happens if the government can redistribute through both sides of its budget (revenue and expenditure). We show that inequality may have no discernible effect on the size of redistributive programs.}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{Katz:72, author = {Katz, A.}, title = {On the social welfare function and the parameters of income distribution}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1972}, volume = {5}, pages = {377-382}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{KaAu:99, author = {Katz, L. and Autor, D.}, title = {Changes in the wage structure and earnings inequality}, booktitle = {Handbook of Labor Economics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1999}, editor = {Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{Kaun:08, author = {Kaun, David}, title = {Attitudes toward inequality: Racism and other varieties of {A}merican exceptionalism}, journal = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {37}, pages = {821 - 835}, abstract = {Thomas Frank and Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch find working class Americans differing from their European counterparts with regard to issues of economic equality. In a word, indifference if not perversity would seem to dominate the political landscape. Most recently, Lee and Roemer see a deeply ingrained racism as the essential explanation. A view similar to an earlier analysis by Alesina, Edward Glaeser and Sacerdote. Such Becker-like behavior is obviously costly to middle and low income white voters. In this paper I argue that to an extent such seemingly spiteful behavior on the part of Americans (in contrast to their European peers) can be understood by the unique nature of American education and religious practices. It is also the case however, that differential access to the polls may in fact mask the extent of egalitarian sentiment that actually exists among the population, as distinct from those able with access to the voting booth. In this latter sense, American exceptionalism may well flow from an absence of real democracy.}, key = {Inequality}, keywords = {American exceptionalism, Equality, Racism, Education, Voting and religion}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Kaun:05, author = {Kaun,D.}, title = {Income and happiness: earning and spending as sources of discontent}, journal = {The Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {34}, pages = {161-177}, abstract = {Richard Easterlin’s 1973 query, "Does Money Buy Happiness?" began what hasbecome a major source of research among social scientist. Easterlin’s initialanswerwas "no," at least in absolute terms. Subsequent research has beeninconclusive regarding the extent to which money matters, ranging froma great deal to little if any. The latter conclusions fly in the face ofmuch of human behavior, as we know it. I argue that money matters a greatdeal. Problems arise, however, in the fact that it must be earned and spent.Two areas often neglected in the literature. Changes in both the natureof work and of consumption have themselves been the source of increasingdissatisfaction, particularly in the United States over the past generation.The work of Scitvosky, Linder, and Schor, among others provides the backgroundfor the analysis.}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{KaKe:97, author = {Kawachi, Ichiro and Kennedy, Bruce P.}, title = {The relationship of income inequality to mortality: does the choice of indicatormatter?}, journal = {Soc. Sci. Med.}, year = {1997}, volume = {45}, pages = {1121-1127}, number = {7}, key = {health} } @INCOLLECTION{Kay:80, author = {Kay, J. A}, title = {The anatomy of tax avoidance}, booktitle = {Income Distribution: The Limits to Redistribution. Proceedings of the ThirtyFirst Symposium of the Colston Research Society}, publisher = {Scientechnica}, year = {1980}, editor = {Collard, D. and Lecomber, R. and Slater, M.}, address = {Bristol}, note = {A slightly revised version of Kay, 1979}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Kay:79, author = {Kay, J. A.}, title = {The anatomy of tax avoidance}, journal = {British Tax Review}, year = {1979}, pages = {354-365}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{KaUd:04, author = {Kazianga, H. and Udry, C.}, title = {Consumption Smoothing? Livestock, Insurance and Drought in rural Burkina Faso}, institution = {Economic Growth Center, Yale University}, year = {2004}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {898}, abstract = {The authors explore the extent of consumption smoothing between 1981 and 1985 in rural Burkina Faso. They examine the extent to which livestock, grain storage and interhousehold transfers are used to smooth consumption against income risk. The survey coincided with a period of severe drought, so that the results provide direct evidence on the effectiveness of these various insurance mechanisms when they are the most needed. They find little evidence of consumption smoothing. In particular, there is almost no risk sharing, and households rely almost exclusively on self-insurance in the form of adjustments to grain stocks to smooth out consumption. The outcome, however is far from complete smoothing. Hence the main risk-coping strategies, which are hypothesized in the literature (risk sharing and buffer stock), were not effective during the survey period. This paper has parallels with Rosenzweig and Stark (2003) and Rozensweig and Wolpin (1989), but the authors reach different conclusions.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{KeTa:08, author = {Keely, L. C. and Tan, C. M.}, title = {Understanding preferences for income redistribution}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {944-961}, abstract = {Recent research suggests that income redistribution preferences vary across identity groups. We employ statistical learning methods that emphasize pattern recognition; classification and regression trees (CART™) and random forests (RandomForests™), to uncover what these groups are. Using data from the General Social Survey, we find that, out of a large set of identity markers, only race, gender, age, and socioeconomic class are important classifiers for income redistribution preferences. Further, the uncovered identity groupings are characterized by complex patterns of interaction amongst these salient classifiers. We explore the extent to which existing theories of income redistribution can explain our results, but conclude that current approaches do not fully explain the findings.}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.24} } @TECHREPORT{Keen:07, author = {Keen, M.}, title = {VAT Attacks!}, institution = {International Monetary Fund}, year = {2007}, type = {IMF Working Paper}, number = {WP/07/142}, abstract = {Like the theory of the second best that the 2006 congress marks, the VAT is now fifty years old. Judged by the extent and speed of its spread around the world, and the revenue that it raises, the VAT would seem to have been a remarkable success. Over the last few years, however, it has come under a series of attacks. This paper considers three of the most prominent of these. One is the fear (raised mainly in the United States) that the VAT actually does too good a job of raising tax revenue. The second is the view that the VAT does a bad job of taxing the informal sector—and that tariffs might be a better revenue-raising instrument for many developing countries. The third attack is the most literal, by criminals rather than theorists: in the European Union and elsewhere, sophisticated VAT fraud, targeting its refund provisions, has become a serious concern.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.08} } @ARTICLE{Keen:98, author = {Keen, Michael}, title = {The balance between specific and ad valorem taxation}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {19}, pages = {1-37}, number = {1}, month = {February}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Keen:97, author = {Keen, Michael}, title = {Specific vs. Ad valorem taxation}, institution = {Dept. of Economics, University of Essex, Colchester, England}, year = {1997}, month = {July}, note = {preliminary version}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Keen:92, author = {Keen, M.}, title = {Needs and targeting}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1992}, volume = {102}, pages = {67-79}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{KeKiVa:06, author = {Keen, M. and Kim, Y. and Varsano, R.}, title = {The “Flat Tax(es)”: Principles and Evidence}, institution = {IMF}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {WP/06/218}, address = {mkeen@imf.org; ykim@imf.org; rvarsano@imf.org}, month = {September}, abstract = {One of the most striking tax developments in recent years, and one that continues to attract considerable attention, is the adoption by several countries of a form of “flat tax.” Discussion of these quite radical reforms has been marked, however, more by assertion and rhetoric than by analysis and evidence. This paper reviews experience with the flat tax, seeking to redress the balance. It stresses that the flat taxes that have been adopted differ fundamentally, and that empirical evidence on their effects is very limited. This precludes simple generalization, but several lessons emerge: there is no sign of Laffer-type behavioral responses generating revenue increases from the tax cut elements of these reforms; their impact on compliance is theoretically ambiguous, but there is evidence for Russia that compliance did improve; the distributional effects of the flat taxes are not unambiguously regressive, and in some cases they may have increased progressivity, including through the impact on compliance; adoption of the flat tax has not resolved common challenges in taxing capital income; and it may have strengthened, not weakened, the automatic stabilizers. Looking forward, the question is not so much whether more countries will adopt a flat tax as whether those that have will move away from it.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @ARTICLE{KeLi:07, author = {Keen, Michael and Ligthart, Jenny}, title = {Revenue Sharing and Information Exchange under Non-discriminatory Taxation}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {109}, pages = {487 - 504}, abstract = {The international exchange of tax information, and its merits compared to withholding taxation, has emerged as a central topic in international tax policy. We characterize and compare the outcomes that emerge, in a two-country world, with and without information exchange, under the assumption that countries are unable to tax residents and non-residents differentially. The analysis focuses on the role of asymmetries in country size (capturing a key feature of tax havens) and on the impact and potential desirability of schemes to share the revenue raised by withholding (as under the new EU savings tax arrangements) or (more innovatively) as a consequence of information exchange. We show that, irrespective of any difference in country size, it is in the interests of both countries, in terms of tax revenue, that all revenue collected from non-residents be transferred to the residence country—which would entail taking the EU practice even further from the norm, but is currently the standard in relation to information exchange. A withholding scheme with revenue fully reallocated in this way gives both countries more revenue than does information sharing, whatever the allocation under the latter.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Revenue sharing, tax information exchange, tax competition, international tax evasion, withholding taxes}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{KeMa:97, author = {Keen, Michael and Marchand, Maurice}, title = {Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {66}, pages = {33-53}, number = {1}, month = {October}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{KeMi:04, author = {Keen, Michael and Mintz, Jack}, title = {The optimal threshold for a value-added tax}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {559-576}, abstract = {One of the key features of a value-added tax—and often one of the most contentious—isthe threshold level of turnover at which firms are obliged to registerfor the tax. Despite its importance, however, the question of the appropriatelevel at which to set this threshold has received little analytical attention.This paper first develops a simple rule characterizing the optimal threshold(when firms’ sizes are fixed) in terms of a trade-off between tax revenuesand collection costs. It then considers, in principle and by simulation,the implications for the optimal threshold of the production inefficienciesimplied by the differential treatment of those above and below the threshold.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{KePaSh:00, author = {Keen, M. and Papapanagos, H. and Shorrocks, A.}, title = {Tax Reform and Progressivity}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2000}, volume = {110}, pages = {50-68}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{KeSm:07, author = {Keen, M. and Smith, S.}, title = {VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know, and What Can be Done?}, institution = {IMF}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {31}, address = {mkeen@imf.org; stephen.smith@ucl.ac.uk}, month = {February}, abstract = {Like any tax, the VAT is vulnerable to evasion and fraud. But its credit and refund mechanism does offer unique opportunities for abuse, and this has recently become an urgent concern in the European Union (EU). This paper describes the main forms of noncompliance distinctive to a VAT, considers how they can be addressed, and assesses evidence on their extent in high-income countries. While the practical significance of current difficulties in the EU should not be over-stated, administrative measures alone may prove insufficient to deal with them, and a fundamental redesign of the VAT treatment of intra-community trade required. The current difficulties in the EU largely reflect circumstances that would not apply in the United States.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{KeDe:80, author = {Keenan, A. and Dean, P. N.}, title = {Moral evaluation of tax evasion}, journal = {Social Policy and Administration}, year = {1980}, volume = {14}, pages = {209-220}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Keenan1999, author = {Keenan, D. C. and Snow, A.}, title = {A complete characterization of potential compensation tests in terms of {H}icksian welfare measures}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {215-233}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KeSn:99, author = {Keenan, D. C. and Snow, A.}, title = {A complete characterization of potential compensation tests in terms of{H}icksian welfare measures}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {215-233}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{KeWh:03, author = {Keenay, G. and Whitehouse, E.}, title = {The role of the presonal tax system in old-age support: a survey of 15 countries}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2003}, volume = {24}, pages = {1-21}, number = {1}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{Keep:62, title = {Introduction to Statistical Inference}, publisher = {Van Nostrand Reinhold}, year = {1962}, author = {Keeping, E. S.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{KePe:02, author = {Kehoe, P. J. and Perri. F.}, title = {Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement}, year = {2002}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {9077}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{KeHa:77, author = {Keller, W. J. and Hartog, J.}, title = {Income Tax Rates and Proportional Sacrifice}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1977}, volume = {32}, pages = {321-32}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Kell:78, title = {Arrow Impossibility Theorems}, publisher = {Academic Press}, year = {1978}, author = {Kelly , J. S.}, address = {New York, NY}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Kelm:01, author = {Kelman, M.}, title = {Market Discrimination and Groups}, journal = {Stanford Law Review}, year = {2001}, volume = {53}, pages = {833-896}, key = {discrimination} } @TECHREPORT{Kels:96, author = {Kelsey, D.}, title = {On the measurement of uncertainty aversion}, institution = {University of Birmingham}, year = {1996}, type = {Department of Economics, Discussion Paper}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{KeNg:79, author = {Kemp, M. C. and Ng, Y-K.}, title = {On the importance of being honest}, journal = {Economic Record}, year = {1979}, volume = {55}, pages = {41-46}, key = {crime} } @INCOLLECTION{Kena:82, author = {Kenadjian, B.}, title = {The direct approach to measuring the underground economy in the {U}nited{S}tates: {IRS} estimates of unreported income}, booktitle = {The Underground Economy in the {U}nited {S}tates and Abroad}, publisher = {D. C. Heath}, year = {1982}, editor = {Tanzi, V.}, address = {Lexington, Massachusetts}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{KePe:97, author = {Kenc, Turalay and Perraudin, William}, title = {European pension systems: a simulation analysis}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1997}, volume = {18}, pages = {249-277}, number = {3}, month = {August}, key = {pensions} } @BOOK{KeSt:77, title = {The Advanced Theory of Statistics}, publisher = {Griffin}, year = {1977}, author = {Kendall, M. and Stuart, A.}, address = {London}, key = {statistics} } @BOOK{KeStOr:94, title = {Kendall's Advanced Theory of Statistics}, publisher = {Edward Arnold}, year = {1994}, author = {Kendall, M. G. and Stuart, A. and Ord, J. K.}, volume = {1, Distribution theory}, address = {London}, edition = {6}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.26} } @BOOK{KeStOrAr:99, title = {Kendall's Advanced Theory of Statistics}, publisher = {Edward Arnold}, year = {1999}, author = {Kendall, M. G. and Stuart, A. and Ord, J. K. and Arnold, S.}, volume = {2A, Classical inference and the linear model}, address = {London}, edition = {6}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.26} } @ARTICLE{KeWi:93, author = {Kennan, J. and Wilson, R.}, title = {Bargaining with Private Information}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1993}, volume = {31}, pages = {45-104}, key = {bargaining}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{KeKaPr:96, author = {Kennedy, B. P. and Kawachi, I. and Prothrow-Stith, D.}, title = {Income distribution and mortality: cross-sectional ecological study of the{R}obin {H}ood index in the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {British Medical Journal}, year = {1996}, volume = {312}, pages = {1004-1007}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{Kennedy1996, author = {Kennedy, B. P. and Kawachi, I. and Prothrow-Stith, D.}, title = {Income distribution and mortality: cross-sectional ecological study of the {R}obin {H}ood index in the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {British Medical Journal}, year = {1996}, volume = {312}, pages = {1004-1007}, key = {health}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{KePa:04, author = {Kenniainen. V, and P\"a\"akk\"onen}, title = { Anonymous Money, Moral Sentiments and Welfare }, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2004}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1258}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, abstract = {Some markets are prone to develop shadow transactions for the purpose of tax avoidance. Moral sentiments control the allocation of consumers between the legal and illicit markets. Such sentiments include self-esteem and social disapproval. The market solution leads to fiscal externality resulting from tax avoidance and highlights the conflict between private opportunism and collective values. Shadow markets may, however, enhance consumer welfare by limiting the pricing power of firms and by controlling tax collection. The paper develops a model of endogenous segmentation of markets between moral and immoral behavior. The legal producer can price the self-esteem of honest people, who can blackmail the legal producer with their option of visiting the illicit market. The model has implications for monetary economics: moral sentiments, tax rates, illegal transactions, and probability of being caught become relevant for the demand for money. }, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @INCOLLECTION{Kenn:06, author = {Kennickell, A. B.}, title = {A rolling tide: changes in the distribution of wealth in the {US}, 1989-2001}, booktitle = {International Perspectives on Household Wealth}, publisher = {Edward Elgar in Association with the Levy Economics Institute}, year = {2006}, editor = {Wolff, E. N.}, chapter = {2}, pages = {19-88}, key = {wealth}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.12.03} } @ARTICLE{KeMc:08, author = {Kenworthy, Lane and McCall, Leslie}, title = {Inequality, public opinion and redistribution}, journal = {Socio-Economic Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {6}, pages = {35 - 68}, abstract = {According to the ‘median-voter’ hypothesis, greater inequality in the market distribution of earnings or income tends to produce greater generosity in redistributive policy. We outline the steps in the causal chain specified by the hypothesis and attempt to assess these steps empirically. Prior studies focusing on crosscountry variation have found little support for the median-voter model. We examine over-time trends in eight nations during the 1980s and 1990s. Here too the median-voter hypothesis appears to have little utility.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {welfare state, redistribution, inequality, public opinion}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09}, url = {http://ser.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/6/1/35?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=kenworthy&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT} } @BOOK{KeRi:78, title = {The C Programming Language}, publisher = {Prentice Hall}, year = {1978}, author = {Kernighan, B. W. and Ritchie, D. M.}, key = {Computing} } @ARTICLE{Kerr1989, author = {Kerr, N. L.}, title = {Illusions of Efficacy: The effects of group size on perceived efficacy in social dilemmas}, journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology}, year = {1989}, volume = {25}, pages = {287-313}, key = {economic psychology}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Kerr:89, author = {Kerr, N. L.}, title = {Illusions of Efficacy: The effects of group size on perceived efficacy insocial dilemmas}, journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology}, year = {1989}, volume = {25}, pages = {287-313}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{Kese:95, author = {Keser, C.}, title = {Learning of Cooperate in Experiments on Multi-Stage Price-Setting Duopolieswith Symmetric Costs}, journal = {Mimeo}, year = {1995}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{Keser1995, author = {Keser, C.}, title = {Learning of Cooperate in Experiments on Multi-Stage Price-Setting Duopolies with Symmetric Costs}, journal = {Mimeo}, year = {1995}, key = {Experiments}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Kess:86, author = {Kesselman, J. R}, title = {Evasion of Taxes in General Equilibrium}, institution = {University of British Columbia}, year = {1986}, type = {mimeo}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{KeKo:05, author = {Kessing,S. and Konrad,K.}, title = {Union Strategy and Optimal Income Taxation}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2005}, abstract = {Restrictions on work hours are more important in countries with a largewelfare state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent withthe strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the contextof optimal direct taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Our resultsalso apply to non-welfarist states which have income redistribution, butnot in purely extortionary states.}, key = {optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{KeLu:05, author = {Kessler, A. S. and L{\"u}lfesmann, C.}, title = {Tiebout and redistribution in a model of residential and political choice}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {501-528}, abstract = {The paper considers a two-community model with freely mobile individuals.Individuals differ not only in their incomes, but also in their tastesfor a local public good. In each jurisdiction, the amount of public servicesis determined by majority vote of the inhabitants, and local spending isfinanced by a residence-based linear income tax. When making their residentialand political choices, individuals thus face a trade-off between the provisionaryand redistributive effects of policies. We analyze this trade-off and showthat Tiebout-like sorting equilibria often exist. If the spread in tastesamong individuals is very large, an almost perfect sorting according topreferences emerges; otherwise, a partial sorting prevails and stratificationinto rich and poor communities is more pronounced. Importantly, we demonstratethat all these sorting equilibria exist whether or not individuals areallowed to relocate after voting.}, key = {local public goods} } @BOOK{KeMa:88, title = {Modelling the Accumulation and Distribution of Wealth}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1988}, author = {Kessler, D. and Masson, A.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{KeMa:87, author = {Kessler, D. and Masson, A.}, title = {On five hot issues on wealth distribution}, journal = {European Economic Review - Papers and proceedings of the second annual congressof the E.E.A.}, year = {1987}, volume = {22}, pages = {644-653}, number = {8}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Khal:99, author = {Khalil, E. L.}, title = {Sentimental Fools: A Critique of Amartya Sen's Notion of Commitment}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation}, year = {1999}, volume = {40}, pages = {373-386}, key = {Welfare} } @ARTICLE{Khalil1997, author = {Khalil, Fahad}, title = {Auditing Without Commitment}, journal = {RAND Journal of Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {28}, pages = {629-640}, number = {4}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KhLa:06, author = {Khalil, F. and Lawar{\'e}e, J.}, title = {Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment}, journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {54}, pages = {269-291}, key = {corruption}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @INBOOK{Khin:56-1, chapter = {1: Elementary Inequalities}, pages = {35-43}, title = {On the Fundamental Theorems of Information Theory}, publisher = {Usp. Mat. Nauk}, year = {1956}, author = {Khinchin, A.}, key = {information}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @BOOK{Khin:60, title = {A course of Mathematical Analysis}, publisher = {Hindustan Publishing Corporation}, year = {1960}, author = {Khinchin, A. I.}, address = {India}, key = {mathematics} } @BOOK{Khin:57, title = {Mathematical Foundations of Information Theory}, publisher = {Dover}, year = {1957}, author = {Khinchin, A. I.}, address = {New York}, comment = {Betty & Gordon Moore Library Q175 .K44 1957}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{KhPe:06, author = {Khor, N. and Pencavel, J.}, title = {Income mobility of individuals in China and the United States}, journal = {Economics of Transition}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {417–458}, abstract = {Although much has been written about annual income in China, little research has been conducted on longer-run measures of income and on income mobility. This paper compares income mobility of urban individuals in China and the United States in the 1990s. The following questions are taken up: To what extent are measures of annual income misleading indicators of long-run income ? How much income mobility was there in China in the first half of the 1990s and how did this compare with mobility in other countries? Have real income increases been greater for the poor or the rich? How important is the variation in permanent incomes in China and how has this changed?}, key = {income :empirical}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @ARTICLE{Khut:99, author = {Khutoretsky, A.}, title = {Housing Market Short-Term Equilibriums Maximizing Linear Utility Functions}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {355-364}, key = {Housing} } @ARTICLE{Kief:84, author = {Kiefer, D. W.}, title = {Distributional tax progressivity indices}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1984}, volume = {37}, pages = {497-513}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Kien:82, author = {Kienzle, E. C.}, title = {Post fisc distributions of income: measuring progressivity -with applicationto the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Public Finance Quarterly}, year = {1982}, volume = {10}, pages = {355-368}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Kienzle1982, author = {Kienzle, E. C.}, title = {Post fisc distributions of income: measuring progressivity -with application to the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Public Finance Quarterly}, year = {1982}, volume = {10}, pages = {355-368}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Kien:81, author = {Kienzle , E. C.}, title = {Measurement of progressivity of public expenditures and net fiscal incidence}, journal = {Southern Economic Journal}, year = {1981}, volume = {48}, pages = {197-203}, number = {7}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Kien:80, author = {Kienzle, E. C.}, title = {Measurement of tax progressivity: comment}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1980}, volume = {70}, pages = {208-210}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{KiRoWi:81, author = {Kihlstrom, R. E. and Romer, D. and Williams, S.}, title = {Risk Aversion with Random Initial Wealth}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1981}, volume = {49}, pages = {911-920}, key = {risk}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.20} } @ARTICLE{Klin:06, author = {Kilng, J.}, title = {Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {96}, pages = {863-876}, key = {crime}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.01} } @ARTICLE{Kim:05, author = {Kim,B.}, title = {Poverty and informal economy participation Evidence from Romania}, journal = {Economics of Transition}, year = {2005}, volume = {13}, pages = {163-185}, abstract = {This paper uses a household survey of the Romanian informal economy to analysethe effects of poverty on informal economy participation. We begin by developinga simple theoretical model, which shows that the participation is drivenby low income and the gap between desired and actual income level. We thenestimate the determinants of households’ participation in the informaleconomy. Empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction.In addition, a positive association between husbands and wives workingin the informal economy implies the deep poverty faced by a family whosehead participates in the informal economy.}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{KimC:02, author = {Kim, C. K.}, title = {Does fairness matter in tax reporting behavior?}, journal = {Social Justice Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {23}, pages = {771-785}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{KiHaBu:06, author = {Kim, K. and Hall, V.B. and Buckle, R.A.}, title = {Consumption-Smoothing in a Small, Cyclically Volatile Open Economy: Evidence from New Zealand}, journal = {Journal of International Money and Finance}, year = {2006}, volume = {25}, pages = {1277-1295}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{KiWa:84, author = {Kim, O. and Walker, M.}, title = {The free rider problem: Experimental evidence}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {1984}, volume = {43}, pages = {3-24}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{Kim:98, author = {Kim, Se-Jik}, title = {Growth effect of taxes in an endogenous growth model: to what extent dotaxes affect economic growth?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1998}, volume = {23}, pages = {125-158}, number = {1}, key = {growth} } @TECHREPORT{KiWe:03, author = {Kimball, M.S. and Weil, P.}, title = {Precautionary Saving and Consumption Smoothing Across Time and Possibilities}, institution = {CEPR}, year = {2003}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {4005}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @TECHREPORT{KiSaSh:07, author = {Kimball, M. S. and Sahm, C. R. and Shapiro, M. D.}, title = {Imputing Risk Tolerance from Survey Responses}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {13337}, abstract = {Economic theory assigns a central role to risk preferences. This paper develops a measure of relative risk tolerance using responses to hypothetical income gambles in the Health and Retirement Study. In contrast to most survey measures that produce an ordinal metric, this paper shows how to construct a cardinal proxy for the risk tolerance of each survey respondent. The paper also shows how to account for measurement error in estimating this proxy and how to obtain consistent regression estimates despite the measurement error. The risk tolerance proxy is shown to explain differences in asset allocation across households.}, key = {risk tolerance}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @ARTICLE{KiKn:98, author = {Kimmel, Jean and Kniesner, Thomas J.}, title = {New evidence on labour supply: Employment versus hours elasticities by sexand marital status}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {289-301}, number = {2}, key = {labour} } @BOOK{KiAl:05, title = {Manias, panics and crashes}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, year = {2005}, author = {Kindleberger,C. and Aliber,R.}, key = {finance} } @INCOLLECTION{King:85, author = {King, M. A.}, title = {The economics of saving: a survey of recent contributions}, booktitle = {Frontiers of Economics}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, year = {1985}, editor = {Arrow, K. J. and Honkapohja, S.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {wealth} } @INCOLLECTION{King:80, author = {King, M. A.}, title = {Savings and Taxation}, booktitle = {Public Policy and the Tax System}, publisher = {George Allen and Unwin}, year = {1980}, editor = {Hughes, G. A. and Heal, G. M.}, address = {London}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{King1983, author = {King, M. A.}, title = {An index of inequality: with applications to horizontal equity and social mobility}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1983}, volume = {51}, pages = {99-116}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{King:83, author = {King, M. A.}, title = {An index of inequality: with applications to horizontal equity and socialmobility}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1983}, volume = {51}, pages = {99-116}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{KiLe:98, author = {King, Mervyn A. and Leape, Jonathan I.}, title = {Wealth and portfolio composition: Theory and evidence}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {69}, pages = {155-193}, number = {2}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{KiSh:02, author = {King, S. and Sheffrin, S.M.}, title = {Tax Evasion and Equity Theory: An Investigative Approach}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2002}, volume = {9}, pages = {505-521}, key = {Tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Kins:84, author = {Kinsey, K. A.}, title = {Survey data on tax compliance: a compendium and a review}, institution = {American Bar Foundation}, year = {1984}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {84-1}, address = {Chicago}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Kirc:80, author = {Kirchg{\"a}ssner, G.}, title = {Size and development of the {West German} shadow economy,1955-1980}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft}, year = {1983}, volume = {9}, pages = {197-214}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Kirchgassner1983, author = {Kirchg{\"a}ssner, G.}, title = {Size and development of the {West German} shadow economy,1955-1980}, journal = {Zeitschrift f\"ur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft}, year = {1983}, volume = {9}, pages = {197-214}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KiHoWa:08, author = {Kirchler, Erich and Hoelzl, Erik and Wahl, Ingrid}, title = {Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The ‘‘slippery slope’’ framework}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {2008}, volume = {29}, pages = {210 - 225}, abstract = {A framework for tax compliance is suggested in which both the power of tax authorities and trust in the tax authorities are relevant dimensions for understanding enforced and voluntary compliance. Dynamic interactions between power and trust are considered. Using the framework as a conceptual tool, factors studied in previous research, such as fines, audit probabilities, tax rate, knowledge, attitudes, norms and fairness are reviewed and discussed with reference to the power and trust dimensions. Using the framework as an operational tool, approaches of responsive regulation to increase tax compliance are discussed.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Taxation, Compliance, Authority, Power, Trust, Social behavior}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{KiMaSc:03, author = {Kirchler, E. and Maciejovsky, B. and Schneider, F.}, title = {Everyday representations of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight:Do legal differences matter?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {2003}, volume = {24}, pages = {535–553}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Kirchler2003, author = {Kirchler, E. and Maciejovsky, B. and Schneider, F.}, title = {Everyday representations of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight: Do legal differences matter?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {2003}, volume = {24}, pages = {535-553}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KiPu:97, author = {Kirchsteiger, Georg and Puppe, Clemens}, title = {On the possibility of efficient private provision of public goods throughgovernment subsidies}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {66}, pages = {489-504}, number = {3}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{KiWe:98, author = {Kirsner, B. and Weber, E.}, title = {Reasons for rank-dependent utility evaluation}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1997}, volume = {14}, pages = {41-61}, number = {1}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{Kish:87, title = {Statistical Design for Research}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1987}, author = {Kish, L.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @BOOK{Kish:65, title = {Survey Sampling}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1965}, author = {Kish, L.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{KiFr:74, author = {Kish, L. and Frankel, M. R.}, title = {Inference from complex samples}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society}, year = {1974}, volume = {36}, pages = {1-37}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{KiFr:70, author = {Kish, L. and Frankel, M. R.}, title = {Balanced Repeated Replications for Standard Errors}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1970}, volume = {65}, pages = {1071-1093}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Kita:95, author = {Kitamura, Yuichi}, title = {Estimation of cointegrated systems with {I}(2) processes}, journal = {Econometric Theory}, year = {1995}, volume = {11}, pages = {1-24}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{KiSt:97, author = {Kitamura, Yuichi and Stutzer, Michael}, title = {An information-theoretic alternative to generalized method of moments estimation}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {861-874}, number = {4}, month = {July}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{vKvPvdB:08, author = {van Klanveren, C. and van Praag, B. and van den Brink, H. M.}, title = {A public good version of the collective household model: an empirical approach with an application to British household data}, journal = {Review of Economics of the Household}, year = {2008}, volume = {6}, pages = {169-191}, __markedentry = {[zhangz3]}, abstract = {In this paper we consider an empirical collective household model of time allocation for two-earner households. The novelty of this paper is that we estimate a version of the collective household model, where the internally produced goods and externally purchased goods are assumed to be public. The empirical results suggest that (1) Preferences of men and women differ; (2) Although there are significant individual variations, on average the utility functions of men and women are equally weighted in the household utility function; (3) Differences in the ratio of the partners’ hourly wages are explanatory for how individual utilities are weighted in the household utility function. (4) The female’s preference for household production is influenced by family size, but this does not hold for the male; (5) Both the male and the female have a backward-bending labor supply curve; (6) Labor-supply curves are forward-bending with respect to the partner’s wage rate; (7) Our model rejects the unitary Slutsky symmetry condition.}, key = {household}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @ARTICLE{KlBiLeMaSo:06, author = {Klass, O. S. and Biham, O. and Levy, M. and Malcai, O. and Solomon, S.}, title = {The {F}orbes 400 and the {P}areto Wealth Distribution}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {290-295}, abstract = {Statistical regularities at the top end of the wealth distribution are examined using the Forbes 400 lists during 1988–2003. We find that the wealth is distributed according to a Pareto (power-law) distribution with an average exponent of a =1.49.}, key = {wealth}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @TECHREPORT{KlWe:08, author = {Klautke, T. and Weichenrieder, A. J.}, title = {Interest Income Tax Evasion, the EU Savings Directive, and Capital Market Effects}, institution = {Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2300}, key = {saving directive}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @INCOLLECTION{Klei:08, author = {Kleiber, C.}, title = {The {L}orenz curve in economics and econometrics}, booktitle = {Advances on Income Inequality and Concentration Measures}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2008}, editor = {Betti, G. and Lemmi, A.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @ARTICLE{Klei:01, author = {Kleiber, C.}, title = {Finite Sample Efficiency of {OLS} in Linear Regression Models with Long-MemoryDisturbances}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {72}, pages = {131-136}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Kleiber2001, author = {Kleiber, C.}, title = {Finite Sample Efficiency of {OLS} in Linear Regression Models with Long-Memory Disturbances}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {72}, pages = {131-136}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Klei:97, author = {Kleiber, Christian}, title = {The existence of population inequality measures}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {57}, pages = {39-44}, number = {1}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{KlKo:03, title = {Statistical Size Distributions in Economics and Actuarial Sciences}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {2003}, author = {Kleiber, C. and Kotz, S.}, address = {Hoboken. N.J.}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{KlKo:02, author = {Kleiber, C. and Kotz, S.}, title = {A Characterization of Income Distributions in Terms of Generalized {G}ini Coefficients}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2002}, volume = {19}, pages = {789-794}, abstract = {Most commonly used parametric models for the size distribution of incomes possess only a few finite moments, and hence cannot be characterized by the sequence of their moments. However, all income distributions with a finite mean can be characterized by the sequence of first moments of the order statistics. This is an attractive feature since the generalized Gini coefficients of Kakwani (1980), Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983) and Yitzhaki (1983) are simple functions of expectations of sample minima. We present results which streamline these characterizations motivated by Aaberge (2000).}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kleiber2002, author = {Kleiber, C. and Kotz., S.}, title = {A Characterization of Income Distributions in Terms of Generalized {G}ini Coefficients}, journal = {Social Choice Welfare}, year = {2002}, volume = {19}, pages = {789-794}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{KlSeWa:06, author = {Kleiber, C. and Sexauer, M. and Waelde, K.}, title = {Bequests, Taxation and the Distribution of Wealth in a General Equilibrium Model}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1723}, month = {May}, note = {CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE}, abstract = {This paper examines the role of bequests and of taxation on bequests for the distribution of wealth. We investigate a model with overlapping generations and heterogenous households where parents derive utility directly from their bequests. Using the coefficient of variation as the measure of inequality, bequests per se diminish the inequality of wealth since they raise private savings and hence average wealth holdings more than the variance of wealth. From a policy perspective, taxing bequests and redistributing government revenue lump-sum among the young generation further decreases wealth inequality.}, key = {wealth}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Klei:44, author = {Klein, L.}, title = {The cost of a ``{Beveridge Plan}'' in the {United States}}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1944}, volume = {58}, pages = {423-437}, key = {welfare state} } @TECHREPORT{Klei:75, author = {Klein, R.}, title = {Social Policy and Public Expenditure 1975: Inflation and Priorities}, institution = {Centre for Studies in Social Policy}, year = {1975}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {London}, key = {social policy} } @INCOLLECTION{KlZi:91, author = {Klein, T. and Zimmermann, G.}, title = {Zur oekonomischen {M}obilitaet von {I}ndividuen und {F}amilien}, booktitle = {Lebenslagen im {W}andel: Zur {E}inkommensdynamik in {D}eutschland seit 1984}, publisher = {Campus}, year = {1991}, editor = {Rendtel, U. and Wagner, G.}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{Klem:04, title = {Auctions: Theory and Practice}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {2004}, author = {Klemperer, P.}, address = {Princeton, New Jersey}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Klem:02, author = {Klemperer, P.}, title = {What Really Matters in Auction Design}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2002}, volume = {16}, pages = {169-189}, number = {1}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Klem:99, author = {Klemperer, P.}, title = {Auction theory: A guide to the literature}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {1999}, volume = {13}, pages = {227-286}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Klem:98, author = {Klemperer, P.}, title = {Auctions with almost common values: the `Wallet Game' and its applications}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {757-769}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{KlNeWr:90, author = {Kletzer, K.M. and Newbery, D.M. and Wright, B.D.}, title = {Alternative Instruments for Smoothing the Consumption of Primary Commodity Exporters}, institution = {World Bank}, year = {1990}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {WPS 558}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @TECHREPORT{KlKrSa:07, author = {Kleven, Henrik and Kreiner, Claus and Saez, Emmanuel}, title = {The Optimal Income Taxation of Couple as a Multi-dimensional Screening Problem}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2092}, abstract = {This paper explores the optimal income tax treatment of couples. Each couple is modelled as a single agent supplying labor along two dimensions: primary-earner and secondary-earner labor supply. We consider fully general nonlinear income tax schedules which creates a multidimensional screening problem. We prove that, under regularity and separability assumptions for utility functions and for a wide class of social welfare functions, optimal tax schemes display negative jointness such that the tax rate on one person decreases in the earnings of the spouse. We also show that the tax on the secondary earner tends to zero asymptotically as the earnings of the primary earner becomes large. These results are valid both in models where secondary earners make only a binary labor supply choice (work or not work), and in models where both spouses make continuous labor supply decisions. In the latter case and in contrast to the multi-dimensional screening monopoly model, the optimal tax system is regular everywhere with no bunching for a wide set of parameters.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Klev:04OT, author = {Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen}, title = {Optimum taxation and the allocation of time}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {545-557}, abstract = {A theory of optimal taxation is presented, building upon Becker’s (1965)theory of the allocation of time. Optimal commodity taxation is governedby factor shares in household activities. Any market good which requireslittle household time, or even saves time, should carry a relatively lowtax rate. This policy rule does not require the estimation of price elasticitiesand is therefore more applicable than traditional Ramsey rule taxation.}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{KlKrSa:06, author = {Kleven, H. J. and Kreiner, C. T. and Saez, E.}, title = {The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples}, institution = {CEPR}, year = {2006}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {5978}, address = {Centre for Economic Policy Research 90–98 Goswell Rd, London EC1V 7RR, UK Tel: (44 20) 7878 2900, Fax: (44 20) 7878 2999}, month = {December}, abstract = {This paper analyzes the optimal income tax treatment of couples. Each couple is modelled as a single rational economic agent supplying labor along two dimensions: primary and secondary earnings. We consider fully general joint income tax systems. Separate taxation is never optimal if social welfare depends on total couple incomes. In a model where secondary earners make only a binary work decision (work or not work), we demonstrate that the marginal tax rate of the primary earner is lower when the spouse works. As a result, the tax distortion on the secondary earner decreases with the earnings of the primary earner and actually vanishes to zero asymptotically. Such negative jointness is optimal because redistribution from two-earner toward one-earner couples is more valuable when primary earner income is lower. We also consider a model where both spouses display intensive labor supply responses. In that context, we show that, starting from the optimal separable tax schedules, introducing some negative jointness is always desirable. Numerical simulations suggest that, in that model, it is also optimal for the marginal tax rate on one earner to decrease with the earnings of his/her spouse. We argue that many actual redistribution systems, featuring familybased transfers combined with individually-based taxes, generate schedules with negative jointness.}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @INCOLLECTION{Klev:99, author = {Klevmarken, A.}, title = {Microeconomic Analysis of Time Use Data: Did We Reach the Promised Land?}, booktitle = {Time Use - Research, Data and Policy}, publisher = {NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft}, year = {1999}, editor = {Merz, J. and Ehling, M.}, pages = {423-456}, address = {Baden Baden}, key = {time use} } @TECHREPORT{Klev:97, author = {Klevmarken, Anders}, title = {Did the Tax Cuts Increase Hours of Work? A Pre-Post Analysis of {S}wedishPanel Data}, institution = {Department of Economics, Uppsala University}, year = {1997}, type = {Working paper}, number = {1997:21}, address = {Sweden}, month = {September}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Klev:04WD, author = {Klevmarken, N. A.}, title = {On The Wealth Dynamics Of {S}wedish Families, 1984–98}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2004}, volume = {50}, pages = {469-491}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Klevmarken2004, author = {Klevmarken, N. A.}, title = {On The Wealth Dynamics Of {S}wedish Families, 1984-98}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2004}, volume = {50}, pages = {469-491}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Klev:98, author = {Klevmarken, N. Anders}, title = {Preference-based indices with subsidized commodities and income-dependentprices}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {59}, pages = {31-38}, number = {1}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{KlSt:97, author = {Klevmarken, N. Anders and Stafford, Frank P.}, title = {Time Diary Measures of Investment in Young Children}, institution = {Department of Economics, Uppsala University}, year = {1997}, number = {1997:8}, month = {February}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Klib:01, author = {Klibanoff, P.}, title = {Characterizing uncertainty aversion through preference for mixtures}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2001}, volume = {18}, pages = {289-301}, abstract = {Uncertainty aversion is often modelled as (strict) quasi-concavity of preferencesover uncertain acts. A theory of uncertainty aversion may be characterizedby the pairs of acts for which strict preference for a mixture betweenthem is permitted. This paper provides such a characterization for twoleading representations of uncertainty averse preferences; those of Schmeidler[24] (Choquet expected utility or CEU) and of Gilboa and Schmeidler [16](maxmin expected utility with a non-unique prior or MMEU). This characterizationclarifies the relation between the two theories.}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{KlVD:78, author = {Kloek, T. and Van Dijk, H. K.}, title = {Efficient Estimation of Income Distribution Parameters}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1978}, volume = {8}, pages = {61-74}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{KlVD:77, author = {Kloek, T. and Van Dijk, H. K.}, title = {Further Results on Efficient Estimation of Income Distribution Parameters}, journal = {Economie Appliqu{\'e}e}, year = {1977}, volume = {30}, pages = {439-459}, number = {3}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Klon:00, author = {Klonner, S.}, title = {The First-Order Stochastic Dominance Ordering of the {S}ingh-{M}addala Distribution}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {69,2}, pages = {123-128}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Klor:06, author = {Klor, E.}, title = {A Positive Model of Overlapping Income Taxation in a Federation of States}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {703-723}, key = {taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @TECHREPORT{Klov:83, author = {Klovland, J. T.}, title = {Tax evasion and the demand for currency in {N}orway and {S}weden; is therea hidden relationship?}, institution = {Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration}, year = {1983}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {7/83}, key = {underground} } @TECHREPORT{Klov:80, author = {Klovland, J. T.}, title = {In search of the hidden economy: tax evasion and the demand for currency,{N}orway and {S}weden}, institution = {Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration}, year = {1980}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {18/80}, key = {underground} } @TECHREPORT{Klovland1980, author = {Klovland, J. T.}, title = {In search of the hidden economy: tax evasion and the demand for currency, {N}orway and {S}weden}, institution = {Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration}, year = {1980}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {{18/80}}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{KlMaWe:95, title = {Social Justice and Political Change: Public Opinion in Capitalist and Post-CommunistStates}, publisher = {Walter de Gruyter}, year = {1995}, author = {Kluegel, J. R. and Mason, D. S. and Wegener, B.}, address = {Berlin}, comment = {UL:206.c.99.711}, key = {Social justice} } @ARTICLE{KlPa:99, author = {Klugman, S. A. and Parsa, R.}, title = {Fitting Bivariate Loss Distribution with Cupolas}, journal = {Insurance: Mathematics and Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {24}, pages = {139-148}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Kmie:84, author = {Kmietowicz, Z. W.}, title = {The Bivariate Lognormal Model for the Distribution of Household Size andIncome}, journal = {The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies}, year = {1984}, volume = {52}, pages = {196-210}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Kmietowicz1984, author = {Kmietowicz, Z. W.}, title = {The Bivariate Lognormal Model for the Distribution of Household Size and Income}, journal = {The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies}, year = {1984}, volume = {52}, pages = {196-210}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KmDi:93, author = {Kmietowicz, Z. W. and Ding, H.}, title = {Statistical analysis of income distribution in the {J}iangsu Province of{C}hina}, journal = {The Statistician}, year = {1993}, volume = {42}, pages = {107-121}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Kmietowicz1993, author = {Kmietowicz, Z. W., and Ding, H.}, title = {Statistical analysis of income distribution in the {J}iangsu Province of {C}hina}, journal = {The Statistician}, year = {1993}, volume = {42}, pages = {107-121}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Kmietowicz1975, author = {Kmietowicz, Z. W. and Webley P.}, title = {Srarisrical aalysis of income distribution in the central province of {K}enya}, journal = {Eastern Africa Economic Review}, year = {1975}, volume = {17}, pages = {1-25}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KmWe:75, author = {Kmietowicz, Z. W. and Webley, P.}, title = {Statistical analysis of income distribution in the central province of {K}enya}, journal = {Eastern Africa Economic Review}, year = {1975}, volume = {17}, pages = {1-25}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Knei:94, author = {Kneip, A.}, title = {Nonparametric estimation of common regressors for similar curve data}, journal = {Annals of Statistics}, year = {1994}, volume = {22}, pages = {1386-1427}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{KnUt:99, author = {Kneip, A. and Utikal, K. J.}, title = {Inference for density families using functional principal component analysis}, institution = {Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universit{\"a}t Bonn}, year = {1999}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {A-598}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Knez:98, author = {Knez, Marc}, title = {Precedent transfer in experimental conflict-of-interest games}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {34}, pages = {239-249}, number = {2}, key = {economic psychology} } @INCOLLECTION{KnSm:91, author = {Knez, M. and Smith, V.}, title = {Hypothetical Valuations and Preference Reversals in the Context of AssetTrading}, booktitle = {Laboratory Experimentation in Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1991}, editor = {Roth, A. E.}, pages = {120-140}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{KnZi:02, author = {Kniesner, T.J. and Ziliak, J.P.}, title = {Tax Reform and Automatic Stabilization}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {2002}, volume = {92}, pages = {590-612}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{Knig:00, author = {Knight, B.G.}, title = {Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {76}, pages = {41-67}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Knob:00, author = {Knoblauch, V.}, title = {Lexicographic Orders and Preference Representation}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {34}, pages = {255-267}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{Knud:08, author = {Knudsen, T.}, title = {Reference groups and variable risk strategies}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, year = {2008}, volume = {66}, pages = {22-36}, abstract = {The present article examines two important effects that have been given scant attention in prior studies of variable risk strategies. The first effect, reference group sensitivity, is the degree to which decision makers’ aspirations are sensitive to their reference group. In this paper we compare the performances of decision makers with alternative levels of reference group sensitivity. Second, we introduce the novel concept of community effect. This relates to mobility among multiple segregated reference groups. The performance of decision makers residing in a world with one single population is compared with that of decision makers who have the possibility, which is more or less costly, to switch between multiple populations. The results support the findings from previous studies that variable risk strategies are preferred over fixed risk. The study of a community of populations provides additional insights that both support and complement previous research.}, key = {risk}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.24} } @ARTICLE{Koch:99, author = {Kochar, A.}, title = {Smoothing Consumption by Smoothing Income: Hours-of-Work Responses to Idiosyncratic Agricultural Shocks in Rural India}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1999}, volume = {81}, pages = {50-61}, abstract = {The author attempts to explain how farmers in LDCs are able to hedge against income crop fluctuations by examining whether labour markets permit transition from farm to non-farm employment, and hypothesizes whether this can explain the low sensitivity of consumption to idiosyncratic crop fluctuations. He finds that males increase their market hours of work in response to unanticipated shocks in crop profits, and confirms that, conditional on hours of work, crop income shocks have a negative effect on consumption, confirming the original hypothesis.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{KoLe:07, author = {Koechlin,V. and Leon,G.}, title = {International Remittances and Income Inequality: An Empirical Investigation}, journal = {Journal of Economic Policy Reform}, year = {2007}, volume = {10}, pages = {123-141}, number = {2}, abstract = {Using several cross-sectional and panel data methodologies, this paper provides evidence of the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between international remittances and income inequality in a cross section of 78 countries. Our analysis supports previous theoretical work that describes how, at the first stages of migration history, there is an inequality-increasing effect of remittances on income inequality. Then, as the opportunity cost of migrating decreases due to this effect, remittances tend to lower inequality. We also show how education and the development of the financial sector can help countries reach faster the inequality-decreasing section of the curve.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Koenkar1978, author = {Koenkar, R. and Basset, G.}, title = {Regression Quantiles}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1978}, volume = {46}, pages = {107-112}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KoBa:78, author = {Koenker, R. and Bassett, G. {Jr}.}, title = {Regression Quantiles}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1978}, volume = {46}, pages = {33--50}, key = {econometrics} } @TECHREPORT{Koet:07, author = {Koethenbuerger, Marko}, title = {Revisiting the "Decentralization Theorem" - On the Role of Externalities}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2128}, abstract = {The “Decentralization Theorem” (Oates, 1972) is central to the discussion of fiscal federalism. We revisit the role of consumption spillovers in evaluating the merits of (de)centralization. Unlike the general prediction, a higher degree of spillovers may reduce the difference in utility of centralization and decentralization. The non-monotonicity result relates to the difference in expenditures on public consumption. Provided decentralized choices yield higher levels of public expenditure, a rise in the amount of spillovers allows residents to enjoy larger gains in public consumption (and thereby utility) under decentralization relative to centralization.}, key = {Public Finance}, keywords = {federalism, decentralization theorem, externality, policy uniformity}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @TECHREPORT{KoLo:07, author = {Koethenbuerger, Marko and Lockwood, Ben}, title = {Does Tax Competition Really Promote Growth?}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2102}, abstract = {This paper considers the relationship between tax competition and growth in an endogenous growth model where there are stochastic shocks to productivity, and capital taxes fund a public good which may be for final consumption or an infrastructure input. Absent stochastic shocks, decentralized tax setting (two or more jurisdictions) maximizes the rate of growth, as the constant returns to scale present with endogenous growth implies “extreme” tax competition. Stochastic shocks imply that households face a portfolio choice problem, which may dampen down tax competition and may raise taxes above the centralized level. Growth can be lower with decentralization. Our results also predict a negative relationship between output volatility and growth, consistent with the empirical evidence.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {tax competition, uncertainty, stochastic growth.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{KoPoPr:08, author = {Koethenbuerger, Marko and Poutvaara, Panu and Profeta, Paol}, title = {Why are more redistributive social security systems smaller? A median voter approach}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {2008}, volume = {60}, pages = {275 - 292}, abstract = {One of the stylized facts of unfunded social security programs is that programs are larger in size, measured relative to the GDP, the tighter the link between pension claims and past earnings. We provide a political economy explanation of this stylized fact in a median voter model, where people vote on the social security tax rate. We compare pension systems with flat-rate and earnings-related benefit formulas. Only flat-rate benefits redistribute within a generation from high to low income groups. If labor supply is endogenous, they also imply larger efficiency costs than earnings-related schemes. Using data on eight European countries, we find that the median voter is typically middle-aged with high income. For these voters, earnings-related systems are more attractive both because of less intragenerational redistribution and lower distortions in labor supply. The median voter model is also able to account for a considerable degree of cross-country variation in contribution rates.}, key = {Social Security}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Kofler1976, author = {Kofler, E. and Menges, G.}, title = {Entscheidungen bei unvollst\"andiger {I}nformation}, year = {1976}, address = {Berlin}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KoMe:76, author = {Kofler, E. and Menges, G.}, title = {Entscheidungen bei unvollst{\"a}ndiger {I}nformation}, year = {1976}, address = {Berlin}, key = {micro}, publisher = {Springer Verlag} } @ARTICLE{Kohl:86, author = {Kohli, U.}, title = {Robert {G}iffen and the {I}rish potato}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1986}, volume = {76}, pages = {539-542}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Kohn:97, author = {Kohn, R. E.}, title = {Avoidance costs and the entry-exit condition on polluting firms}, journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1997}, pages = {216-}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{KoSh:05, author = {Kolenikov,S. and Shorrocks,A.}, title = {A Decomposition Analysis of Regional Poverty in Russia}, journal = {Review of Development Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {9}, pages = {25-46}, abstract = {The paper applies a new decomposition technique to the study of variationsin poverty across the regions of Russia. The procedure, which is basedon the Shapley value in cooperative game theory, allows the deviation inregional poverty levels from the all-Russia average to be attributed tothree proximate sources: per capita income, inequality, and local prices.Contrary to expectation, regional poverty variations turn out to be duemore to differences in inequality across regions than to differences inreal income per capita. However, when real income per capita is split intonominal income and price components, differences in nominal incomes emergeas more important than either inequality or price effects for the majorityof regions.}, key = {inequality decomposition}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2250/cgi-bin/fulltext/118667882/PDFSTART} } @INCOLLECTION{Kolm:94b, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {Rational justice and equality}, booktitle = {Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Berlin, Springer-Verlag}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, pages = {970-92}, key = {equality} } @INCOLLECTION{Kolm:93, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {Distributive Justice}, booktitle = {A Companion to Political Philosophy}, publisher = {Oxford}, year = {1993}, editor = {Goodin, R. and Pettit, P.}, pages = {30-66}, address = {Basil Blackwell}, key = {welfare} } @INPROCEEDINGS{Kolm:66a, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {The Optimal Production of Social Justice}, year = {1966}, editor = {Guitton, H. and Margolis, J.}, organization = {International Economic Association Conference on Public Economics}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Kolm:69, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {The optimal production of social justice}, booktitle = {Public Economics}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1969}, editor = {Margolis, J. and Guitton, H.}, pages = {145-200}, address = {London}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Kolm:68, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {The optimal production of social justice}, booktitle = {{\'E}conomie Publique}, publisher = {CNRS}, year = {1968}, editor = {Margolis, J. and Guitton, H.}, address = {Paris}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kolm1996d, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {Intermediate Measures of Inequality}, journal = {Affaires \'Economiques}, year = {1996}, editor = {Van Praag, B. M. S.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Kolm:96IM, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {Intermediate Measures of Inequality}, journal = {Affaires {\'E}conomiques}, year = {1996}, editor = {Van Praag, B. M. S.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kolm:98, author = {Kolm, Serge-Christophe}, title = {Chance and justice: Social policies and the {H}arsanyi-{V}ickrey-{R}awlsproblem}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {1393-1416}, number = {8}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Kolm1997a, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {Macrojustice}, journal = {Avances th\'eoriques en Economie Sociale}, year = {1997}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Kolm:97a, title = {Justice and Equity}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {1997}, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, address = {Cambridge Massachusetts}, note = {English translation with new Foreword}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Kolm:97c, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {Macrojustice}, journal = {Avances th{\'e}oriques en Economie Sociale}, year = {1997}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Kolm:98RM, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {Rational Measurement of Income Inequality}, institution = {CGPC, 4eme Section, Affaires Economiques}, year = {1997}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {France}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Kolm:96c, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {Intermediate Measures of Inequality}, institution = {CGPC}, year = {1996}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kolm:96CA, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {Chance and Justice: Social Policy and the {H}arsanyi-{V}ickery-{R}awls problem}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1996}, note = {forthcoming}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Kolm:96MT, title = {Modern Theories of Justice}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {1996}, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Kolm:96TT, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {The Theory of Justice}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1996}, volume = {13}, pages = {1-32}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Kolm:95EJ, author = {Kolm, Serge-Christophe}, title = {Economic justice: The central question}, journal = {Euorpean Economic Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {39}, pages = {661-673}, number = {3-4}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Kolm:95TE, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {The Economics of Social Sentiments: The case of envy}, journal = {Japanese Economic Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {46}, pages = {63-87}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Kolm:94a, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {The Meaning of Fundamental Preferences}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1994}, volume = {11}, pages = {193-198}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Kolm:85, title = {Le contrat social lib{\'e}ral: philosophie et pratique du lib{\'e}ralisme}, publisher = {Presses Universitaires de France}, year = {1985}, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, address = {Paris}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Kolm:77, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {Multidimensional egalitarianisms}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {91}, pages = {1-13}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kolm:76I, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {Unequal Inequalities {I}}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1976}, volume = {12}, pages = {416-442}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kolm:76II, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {Unequal Inequalities {II}}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1976}, volume = {13}, pages = {82-111}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Kolm:75, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {Multidimensional inequality comparisons}, institution = {CEPREMAP, Paris}, year = {1975}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Kolm1974, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {Rectifiances et dominances int\'egrales de tous d\'egr\'es}, institution = {CEPREMAP, Paris}, year = {1974}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Kolm:74, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {Rectifiances et dominances int{\'e}grales de tous d{\'e}gr{\'e}s}, institution = {CEPREMAP, Paris}, year = {1974}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kolm:73AN, author = {Kolm, S-Ch.}, title = {A note on optimum tax evasion}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1973}, volume = {2}, pages = {265-270}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Kolm:73ME, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, title = {More equal distributions of bundles of commodities}, institution = {CEPREMAP}, year = {1973}, type = {mimeo}, address = {Paris}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Kolm:71, title = {Justice et equit{\'e}}, publisher = {CEPREMAP}, year = {1971}, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, address = {Paris}, key = {Social justice} } @BOOK{Kolm:66b, title = {Les Choix Financiers et Mon{\'e}taires: Th{\'e}orie et Technique Modernes)}, publisher = {Dunod}, year = {1966}, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, address = {Paris}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{Kolm:64, title = {Les Fondements de l'{\'E}conomie Publique: Introduction a la th{\'e}orie du r{\^o}le{\'e}conomique de l'{\'e}tat}, publisher = {IFP}, year = {1964}, author = {Kolm, S.-Ch.}, address = {Paris}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Kolm:76PS, author = {Kolm, S. Ch.}, title = {Public Safety}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1976}, volume = {66}, pages = {382-387}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Kolm:33OT, author = {Kolmogorov, A.}, title = {On the Empirical Determination of a Distribution Law}, journal = {Giorn. Ist. Ital. Attuar.}, year = {1933}, volume = {4}, pages = {139-146}, key = {distribution}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @ARTICLE{Kolm:33SD, author = {Kolmogorov, A. N.}, title = {Sulla determinazione empirica di una legge di distribuzione}, journal = {Giornale dell'Istituto Italiano degli Attuari}, year = {1933}, volume = {4}, pages = {83-91}, note = {translated as "On the empirical determination of a distribution law" in Shiryayev, A. N. (ed.) Selected Works, II. Probability Theory and Mathematical Statistics, Kluwer, 1992, pp. 139---146. Moore Library QA3.K75}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.04.07} } @UNPUBLISHED{Kond:79, author = {Kondor, Y.}, title = {Income distribution preference questionnaire}, year = {1979}, address = {Jerusalem}, institution = {Hebrew University}, key = {inequality}, language = {Hebrew} } @ARTICLE{Kond:75, author = {Kondor, Y.}, title = {Value judgement implied by the use of various measures of income inequality}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1975}, volume = {21}, pages = {309-321}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kondor1975a, author = {Kondor, Y.}, title = {Value judgement implied by the use of various measures of income inequality}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1975}, pages = {309-321}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Kond:71, author = {Kondor, Y.}, title = {An old-new measure of income inequality}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1971}, volume = {39}, pages = {1041-1042}, key = {inequality} } @PHDTHESIS{Kond:70, author = {Kondor, Y.}, title = {Inequality in the size distribution of income. Its measurement and planning}, year = {1970}, type = {D.Sc. Thesis}, note = {Hebrew, with English summary}, institution = {Technion, Haifa}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{KoMc:75, author = {Kondor, Y. and McCabe, J. L.}, title = {The {G}ini coefficient of concentration and the Kuznetz measure of inequality-A note and reply}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1975}, pages = {345-348}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kondor1975, author = {Kondor, Y. and McCabe, J. L.}, title = {The {G}ini coefficient of concentration and the Kuznetz measure of inequality- A note and reply}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1975}, pages = {345-348}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KoRi:97, author = {Koning, Ruud H. and Ridder, Geert}, title = {Rent assistance and housing demand}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {66}, pages = {1-31}, number = {1}, month = {October}, key = {housing} } @ARTICLE{Koni:95, author = {Konishi, H.}, title = {A {P}areto-Improving Commodity Tax Reform under a Smooth Nonlinear IncomeTax}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1995}, volume = {56}, pages = {413-446}, key = {Tax reform} } @ARTICLE{Konishi1995, author = {Konishi, H.}, title = {A {P}areto-Improving Commodity Tax Reform under a Smooth Nonlinear Income Tax}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1995}, volume = {56}, pages = {413-446}, key = {Tax reform}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Kono:03, author = {Konow, J.}, title = {Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2003}, volume = {41}, pages = {1188-1239}, key = {equality}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{Kono:01, author = {Konow, J.}, title = {Fair and Square: The Four Sides of Distributive Justice}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {2001}, volume = {46}, pages = {137-164}, abstract = {Recent theoretical progress on inequity has left unresolved the crucialquestion of what constitutes equity. This paper proposes a positive theoryof distributive justice, in a framework of inequity aversion, that dependson three general justice principles and context. The current study challengesthe view of many previous inquiries that justice is context-specific andinstead advances a theory in which justice is context-dependent: contextmatters, not because of the lack of general principles of justice, butdue to its effect on the interpretation of those principles. Results fromtelephone interviews and written questionnaires are presented in supportof the theory}, key = {social justice} } @ARTICLE{KoEa:08, author = {Konow, James and Earley, Joseph}, title = {The Hedonistic Paradox: Is homo economicus happier?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {1 - 33}, abstract = {The “Hedonistic Paradox” states that homo economicus, or someone who seeks happiness for him- or herself, will not find it, but the person who helps others will. This study examines two questions in connection with happiness and generosity. First, domore generous people, as identified in dictator experiments, report on average greater happiness, or subjective well-being (SWB), asmeasured by responses to various questionnaires? Second, if the answer is affirmative, what is the causal relationship between generosity and happiness? We find a favorable correlation between generosity and happiness (i.e., SWB is directly related to several measures of happiness and inversely related to unhappiness) and examine various possible explanations, including that material well-being causes both happiness and generosity. The evidence from this experiment, however, indicates that a tertiary personality variable, sometimes called psychological well-being, is the primary cause of both happiness and greater generosity. In contrast to field studies, the experimental method of this inquiry permits anonymity measures designed to minimize subject misrepresentation of intrinsic generosity (e.g., due to social approvalmotives) and of actual happiness (e.g., because of social desirability biases) and produces a rich data set with multiple measures of subjective, psychological andmaterialwell-being. The results of this and other studies raise the question of whether greater attention should be paid to the potential benefits (beyond solely thematerial ones) of policies that promote charitable donations, volunteerism, service education, and, more generally, community involvement, political action, and social institutions that foster psychological well-being.}, key = {Happiness}, keywords = {Happiness; Subjective well-being; Altruism; Generosity; Psychological well-being; Eudaimonia}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Konr:01, author = {Konrad, Kai A.}, title = {Privacy and Time-Consistent Optimal Labor Income Taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, pages = {503-519}, abstract = {Incomplete information is a commitment device for time-consistency problems.In the context of time-consistent optimal labor income taxation privacycan lead to a Pareto superior outcome and increases the effectiveness ofpublic education as a second best policy.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Konr:98, author = {Konrad, Kai A.}, title = {Local public goods and central charities}, journal = {Regional Science and Urban Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {28}, pages = {345-362}, number = {3}, key = {Local public goods} } @ARTICLE{KoSk:98, author = {Konrad, Kai A. and Skaperdas, Stergios}, title = {Extortion}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {461-477}, number = {260}, month = {November}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{KoSp:06, author = {Konrad, K. and Spadaro, A.}, title = {Education, Redistributive Taxation and Confidence}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {171-188}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{KoQR:83, author = {Koo, A. Y. C. and Quan, N. T. and Rasche, R.}, title = {Identification of the {L}orenz curve by {L}orenz coefficients: a reply}, journal = {Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv}, year = {1983}, volume = {119}, pages = {368-369}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{KoQuRa:81, author = {Koo, A. Y. C. and Quan, N. T. and Rasche, R.}, title = {Identification of the {L}orenz curve by {L}orenz coefficients}, journal = {Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv}, year = {1981}, volume = {117}, pages = {125-135}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Koop:77, author = {Koopmans, T. C.}, title = {Concept of Optimality and Their Tests}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {67}, pages = {261-274}, key = {micro}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @BOOK{Koop:57, title = {Three Essays on the State of Economic Science}, publisher = {McGraw-Hill}, year = {1957}, author = {Koopmans, T. C.}, address = {New York}, key = {micro} } @INCOLLECTION{KoDo:99, author = {Kooreman, P. and Dobbelsteen, S.}, title = {Financial Management, Bargaining and Efficiency Within the Household; AnEmpirical Analysis}, booktitle = {Time Use - Research, Data and Policy}, publisher = {NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft}, year = {1999}, editor = {Merz, J. and Ehling, M.}, pages = {331-350}, address = {Baden Baden}, key = {time use} } @ARTICLE{Kopc:07, author = {Kopczuk, Wojciech}, title = {Bequest and Tax Planning: Evidence from Estate Tax Returns}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {122}, pages = {1801- 1854}, abstract = {I study bequest and wealth accumulation behavior of the wealthy (subject to the estate tax) shortly before death. The onset of a terminal illness leads to a very significant reduction in the value of estates reported on tax returns— fifteen to twenty percent with illness lasting “months to years” and about five to ten percent in the case of illness reported as lasting “days to weeks.” I provide evidence suggesting that these findings cannot be explained by real shocks to net worth, such as medical expenses or lost income, but instead reflect “deathbed” estate planning. The results suggest that wealthy individuals actively care about disposition of their estates but that this preference is dominated by the desire to hold on to their wealth while alive.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @TECHREPORT{Kopc:03, author = {Kopczuk, Wojciech}, title = {Tax Bases, Tax Rates and The Elasticity of Reported Income}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2003}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {10044}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, abstract = {Tax reforms usually change both tax rates and tax bases. Using a panel ofincome tax returns spanning the two major U.S. tax reforms of the 1980sand a number of smaller tax law changes, I find that the elasticity ofincome reported on personal income tax returns depends on the availabledeductions. This highlights that this key behavioral elasticity is nota structural parameter but rather that it can be to some extent controlledby policy makers. The results suggest that base broadening reduces themarginal efficiency cost of taxation. The point estimates indicate thatthe Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the marginal cost of collecting a dollarof tax revenue by 2 cents, with roughly half of this reduction due to thebase broadening and the other half due to the tax rate reduction. As aby-product, the analysis in this paper offers a reconciliation of disparateestimates obtained by previous studies of the tax responsiveness of income.}, key = {Tax reform} } @ARTICLE{KoLu:07, author = {Kopczuk, W. and Lupton, J. P.}, title = {To Leave or Not to Leave: The Distribution of Bequest Motives}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, pages = {207-235}, key = {wealth}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.12} } @ARTICLE{KoPo:07, author = {Kopczuk, W. and Pop-Eleches, C.}, title = {Electronic filing, tax preparers and participation in the Earned Income Tax Credit}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {1351-1367}, month = {August}, abstract = {In 2002 more than 18 million low-income individual taxpayers received the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Despite its size, non-participation in this program is a concern and substantial effort is devoted by the IRS, local governments and many non-profits to address it. Using variation across states in the introduction of state electronic filing programs, we show that the introduction of electronic filing had a significant effect on participation in the EITC. Our results are robust to accounting for other welfare, EITC and IRS reforms introduced during the same period. We speculate that the impact of this policy change on the tax preparation industry played an important role in increasing participation.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{Kopczuk2004, author = {Kopczuk, Wojciech and Saez, Emmanuel}, title = {Top Wealth Shares in the United States, 1916-2000: Evidence from Estate Tax Returns}, institution = {National Bureau for Economic Research}, year = {2004}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {10399}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, abstract = {This paper presents new homogeneous series on top wealth shares from 1916 to 2000 in the United States using estate tax return data. Top wealth shares were very high at the beginning of the period but have been hit sharply by the Great Depression, the New Deal, and World War II shocks. Those shocks have had permanent effects. Following a decline in the 1970s, top wealth shares recovered in the early 1980s, but they are still much lower in 2000 than in the early decades of the century. Most of the changes we document are concentrated among the very top wealth holders with much smaller movements for groups below the top 0.1%. Consistent with the Survey of Consumer Finances results, top wealth shares estimated from Estate Tax Returns display no significant increase since 1995. Evidence from the Forbes 400 richest Americans suggests that only the super-rich have experienced significant gains relative to the average over the last decade. Our results are consistent with the decreased importance of capital income at the top of the income distribution documented by Piketty and Saez (2003) and suggest that the rentier class of the early century is not yet reconstituted. The most plausible explanations for the facts are perhaps the development of progressive income and estate taxation which has dramatically impaired the ability of large wealth holders to maintain their fortunes, and the democratization of stock ownership which now spreads stock market gains and losses much more widely than in the past.}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KoSa:04, author = {Kopczuk,W. and Saez,E.}, title = {Top wealth shares in the {United States}, 1916-2000: Evidence from Estate Tax Returns}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {2004}, volume = {57}, pages = {445-487}, abstract = {This paper presents new homogeneous series on top wealth shares from 1916to 2000 in the United States using estate tax return data. Top wealth shareswere very high at the beginning of the period but have been hit sharplyby the Great Depression, the New Deal, and World War II shocks. Those shockshave had permanent effects. Following a decline in the 1970s, top wealthshares recovered in the early 1980s, but they are still much lower in 2000than in the early decades of the century. Most of the changes we documentare concentrated among the very top wealth holders with much smaller movementsfor groups below the top 0.1 percent. Consistent with the Survey of ConsumerFinances results, top wealth shares estimatesd from Estate Tax Returnsdisplay no significant increase since 1995. Evidence from the Fobes 400richest Americans suggests that only the super-rich have experienced significantgains relative to the average over the last decade. Our results are consistentwith the decreased importance of capital incomes at the top of the incomedistribution documented by Piketty and Saez, and suggest that the rentierclass of the early century is not yet reconstituted. The paper proposesseveral tentative explanations to account for the facts.}, key = {income distribution: empirical}, url = {http://web.ebscohost.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/ehost/pdf?vid=4&hid=112&sid=45036687-6444-4770-a310-36180923fe9a%40sessionmgr109} } @TECHREPORT{KoSa:04NBER, author = {Kopczuk, W. and Saez, E.}, title = {Top Wealth Shares in the {United States}, 1916-2000: Evidence from EstateTax Returns}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {10399}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, abstract = {This paper presents new homogeneous series on top wealth shares from 1916to 2000 in the United States using estate tax return data. Top wealth shareswere very high at the beginning of the period but have been hit sharplyby the Great Depression, the New Deal, and World War II shocks. Those shockshave had permanent effects. Following a decline in the 1970s, top wealthshares recovered in the early 1980s, but they are still much lower in 2000than in the early decades of the century. Most of the changes we documentare concentrated among the very top wealth holders with much smaller movementsfor groups below the top 0.1%. Consistent with the Survey of Consumer Financesresults, top wealth shares estimated from Estate Tax Returns display nosignificant increase since 1995. Evidence from the Forbes 400 richest Americanssuggests that only the super-rich have experienced significant gains relativeto the average over the last decade. Our results are consistent with thedecreased importance of capital income at the top of the income distributiondocumented by Piketty and Saez (2003) and suggest that the rentier classof the early century is not yet reconstituted. The most plausible explanationsfor the facts are perhaps the development of progressive income and estatetaxation which has dramatically impaired the ability of large wealth holdersto maintain their fortunes, and the democratization of stock ownershipwhich now spreads stock market gains and losses much more widely than inthe past.}, key = {wealth} } @TECHREPORT{KoSaSo:07, author = {Kopczuk, Wojciech and Saez, Emmanuel and Song, Jae}, title = {Uncovering the American Dream: Inequlity and Mobility in Social Security Earnings Data sincw 1937}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2007}, abstract = {This paper uses Social Security Administration longitudinal earnings micro data since 1937 to analyze the evolution of inequality and mobility in the United States. Earnings inequality follows a U-shape pattern, decreasing sharply up to 1953 and increasing steadily afterwards. We find that short-term and long-term (rank based) mobility among all workers has been quite stable since 1950 (after a temporary surge during World War II). Therefore, the pattern of annual earnings inequality is very close to the pattern of inequality of longer term earnings. Mobility at the top has also been very stable and has not mitigated the dramatic increase in annual earnings concentration since the 1970s. However, the stability in long-term earnings mobility among all workers masks substantial heterogeneity across demographic groups. The decrease in the gender earnings gap and the substantial increase in upward mobility over a career for women is the driving force behind the relative stability of overall mobility measures which mask declines in mobility among men. In contrast, overall inequality and mobility patterns are not significantly influenced by the changing size and structure of immigration nor by changes in the black/white earnings gaps.}, key = {Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{KoSlYi:05, author = {Kopczuk,W. and Slemrod,J. and Yitzhaki,S.}, title = {The limitations of decentralized world redistribution: An optimal taxationapproach}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2005}, volume = {49}, pages = {1051-1079}, abstract = {A centralized scheme of world redistribution that maximizes a border-neutralsocial welfare function, subject to the disincentive e5ects it would create,generates a drastic reduction in world consumption inequality, droppingthe Gini coe8cient from 0.69 to 0.25. In contrast, an optimal decentralized(i.e., withno cross-country transfers) redistribution has a miniscule effecton world income inequality. Thus, the traditional public :nance concernabout the excess burden of redistribution cannot explain why there is solittle world redistribution. Actual foreign aid is vastly lower than thetransfers under the simulated world income tax, suggesting that voluntaryworld transfers -subject to a free-rider problem- produces an outcome thatis consistent withrichcountries suchas the United States either placinga muchlower value on the welfare of foreigners, or else expecting thata very signi:cant fraction of cross-border transfers is wasted. The productof the welfare weight and one minus the share of transfers that are wastedconstitutes the implicit weight that the United States assigns to foreigners.We calculate that value to be as low as 1/2000 of the value put on thewelfare of an American, suggesting that U.S. policy is consistent withsocial preferences that place essentially no value on the welfare of thecitizens of the poorest countries, or that implicitly assumes that essentiallyall transfers are wasted.}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{KoMiRa:06, author = {Korinek, A. and Mistiaen J. A. and Ravallion, M.}, title = {Survey nonresponse and the distribution of income}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {33–55}, abstract = {The paper examines the distributional implications of selective compliance in sample surveys, whereby households with different incomes are not equally likely to participate. Poverty and inequality measurement implications are discussed for monotonically decreasing and inverted-U compliance-income relationships. We demonstrate that the latent income effect on the probability of compliance can be estimated from information on response rates across geographic areas. On implementing the method on the Current Population Survey for the U.S. we find that the compliance probability falls monotonically as income rises. Correcting for nonresponse appreciably increases mean income and inequality, but has only a small impact on poverty incidence up to poverty lines common in the U.S.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, keywords = {income distribution, poverty and inequality measurement, survey nonresponse}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.09.21}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/content/783177460030h684/fulltext.pdf} } @ARTICLE{Kosh:95, author = {Koshevoy, G.}, title = {Multivariate {L}orenz majorization}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1995}, volume = {12}, pages = {93-102}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kosk:83AN, author = {Koskela, E.}, title = {A note on progression, penalty schemes and tax evasion}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {22}, pages = {127-133}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Kosk:83OT, author = {Koskela, E.}, title = {On the shape of the tax schedule, the probability of detection and the penaltyschemes as deterrents to tax evasion}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1983}, volume = {38}, pages = {70-80}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Koskela1983, author = {Koskela, E.}, title = {On the shape of the tax schedule, the probability of detection, and the penalty schemes as deterrents to tax evasion}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1983}, volume = {38}, pages = {70-80}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KoSc:99DT, author = {Koskela , Erkki and Schob, Ronnie}, title = {Does the composition of wage and payroll taxes matter under {N}ash bargaining?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {64}, pages = {343-349}, number = {3}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Kosk:99, author = {Koskievic, Jean-Max}, title = {An intertemporal consumption-leisure model with non-expected utility}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {64}, pages = {285-289}, number = {3}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{KoRa:07, author = {Koszegi, Botond and Rabin, Matthew}, title = {Reference-Dependent Risk Attitudes}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {97}, pages = {1047 - 1073}, abstract = {We use Koszegi and Rabin's (2006) model of reference-dependent utility, and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences, to study preferences over monetary risk. Because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes, it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest-scale risk. It replicates 'classical' prospect theory—including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses—when exposure to risk is a surprise, but implies first-order risk aversion when a risk, and the possibility of insuring it, are anticipated. A prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk. For large-scale risk, the model allows for standard 'consumption utility' to dominate reference- dependent 'gain-loss utility', generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations.}, key = {Risk Aversion}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Kotc:07, author = {Kotchen, Matthew}, title = {Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in impure public good models}, journal = {Economic Letters}, year = {2007}, volume = {97}, pages = {91 - 96}, abstract = {Despite widespread application of the impure public good model, surprisingly little attention has been given to the model's equilibrium properties. This paper presents a proof that clearly shows sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium.}, key = {Public Goods}, keywords = {Impure public goods; Equilibrium existence and uniqueness}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Kotch:06, author = {Kotchen, Matthew}, title = {Green Markets and Private Provision of Public Goods}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2006}, volume = {114}, pages = {816 - 834}, abstract = {This paper develops a general model of private provision of a public good that includes the option to consume an impure public good. The model is used to investigate the positive and normative consequences of “green markets,” which are based on technologies with joint production of a private good and an environmental public good. It is shown that under reasonable conditions green markets can have beneficial or detrimental effects on environmental quality and social welfare. The analysis applies equally to nonenvironmental choice settings, with examples ranging from socially responsible investments to commercial activities associated with charitable fund-raising.}, key = {Public Goods}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Koth:03, author = {Kothenburger, Marko}, title = {Tax Competition in a Fiscal Union with Decentralized Leadership}, journal = {CESifo Working Paper}, year = {2003}, volume = {943}, abstract = {This paper examines capital tax competition in the presence of an interstatetransfer policy without federal commitment. Lack of commitment impliesthat tax policy is chosen prior to federal transfers. The paper’s mainresult is that ex-post federal policy internalizes horizontal fiscal externalities,insulating tax policy from capital mobility. Federal policy, however, introducesa new source of inefficiency unrelated to tax competition. Specifically,ex-post transfer payments prove to be equivalent to an interstate revenue-sharingsystem which may render federal intervention in the presence of fiscalexternalities welfare-deteriorating relative to tax competition.}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {tax competition}, type = {Working Paper} } @TECHREPORT{KoRa:05, author = {Kotlikoff, L. and Rapson, D.}, title = {Would the Fair{Tax} Raise or Lower Marginal and Average Tax Rates?}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2005}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {11831}, address = {NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138}, month = {December}, abstract = {This paper compares marginal and average tax rates on working and saving under our current federal tax system with those that would arise under a federal retail sales tax, specifically the FairTax. The FairTax would replace the personal income, corporate income, payroll, and estate and gift taxes with a 23 percent effective retail sales tax plus a progressive rebate. The 23 percent rate generates more revenue than the taxes it replaces, but the rebate’s cost necessitates scaling back non-Social Security expenditures to their 2000 share of GDP. The FairTax’s effective marginal tax on labor supply is 23 percent. Its effective marginal tax on saving is zero. In contrast, for the stylized working households considered here, current effective marginal labor taxes are higher or much higher than 23 percent. Take our stylized 45 year-old, married couple earning $35,000 per year with two children. Given their federal tax bracket, the clawback of the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the FICA tax, their marginal tax is 47.6 percent. The FairTax imposes a zero marginal tax on saving meaning that reducing this year’s consumption by a dollar permits one to increase the present value of future consumption by a dollar. In contrast, the existing federal tax system imposes very high marginal taxes on future consumption. For our stylized working households foregoing a dollar’s consumption this year to uniformly raise consumption in all future years raises the present value of future consumption by only 45.8 to 77.4 cents, i.e., the effective marginal tax rates on uniformly raising future consumption via saving facing our households ranges from 22.6 percent to 54.2 percent. The FairTax also reduces most of our stylized households’ remaining average lifetime tax rates - and, often, by a lot. Consider our stylized 30 year-old, single household earning $50,000. The household’s average remaining lifetime tax rate under the current system is 21.1 percent. It’s 16.2 percent under the FairTax.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{KoSu:81, author = {Kotlikoff, L. and Summers, L.}, title = {The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1981}, volume = {89}, pages = {706-732}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{Kotl:01, title = {Essays on Saving, Bequests, Altruism and Life-Cycle Planning}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {2001}, author = {Kotlikoff, L. J.}, address = {Cambridge, MA 02142-1493, U.S.A.}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{KoScSc:05, author = {Koulovatianos,C. and Schroder,C. and Schmidt,U.}, title = {On the income dependence of equivalence scales}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {20005}, volume = {89}, pages = {967-996}, abstract = {Household consumption exhibits economies of scale as the number of householdmembers increases. We collect survey data from two countries, Germany andFrance, in order to obtain direct subjective estimates of household consumptioneconomies of scale, and, in particular, to examine an additional dimension:whether household consumption economies of scale change as living standardsgo up. Our data from both countries indicate strongly that household economiesof scale increase as the living standard goes up. We discuss the robustnessof our survey method and compare our results to these of alternative estimationmethods in the literature.}, key = {Equivalence scales} } @ARTICLE{KoSa:81, author = {Kovenock, D. and Sadka E.}, title = {Progression under the benefit approach to the theory of taxation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1981}, volume = {8}, pages = {95-99}, key = {public economics} } @INCOLLECTION{KrKuWe:83, author = {Krasker, W. S. and Kuh, E. and Welsh, R. E.}, title = {Estimation for Dirty Data and Flawed Models}, booktitle = {Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 1}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1983}, editor = {Griliches, Z. and Intriligator, M. D.}, chapter = {11}, pages = {651-698}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {measurement error} } @BOOK{KrHeSu:78IC, title = {International Comparisons of Real Product and Purchasing Power}, publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press}, year = {1978}, author = {Kravis, I. B. and Heston, A. W. and Summers, R.}, pages = {215-242}, address = {Baltimore}, institution = {World Bank}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{KrHeSu:78RG, author = {Kravis, I. B. and Heston, A. W. and Summers, R.}, title = {Real {GDP} Per Capita for More Than One Hundred Countries}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1978}, volume = {88}, pages = {215-242}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{Krep:90AC, title = {A Course in Microeconomic Theory}, publisher = {Harvester Wheatsheaf}, year = {1990}, author = {Kreps, D. M.}, address = {New York}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Krep:90GT, title = {Game Theory and Economic Modelling}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1990}, author = {Kreps, D. M.}, address = {Oxford, UK}, comment = {Marshall:70F81}, key = {Games} } @ARTICLE{Kreps1982b, author = {Kreps, D. M. and Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. and Wilson, R.}, title = {Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1982}, volume = {27}, pages = {245-252}, key = {games}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KrPo:78, author = {Kreps, David M. and Porteus, Evan L.}, title = {Temporal resolution of uncertainty and dynamic choice theory}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1978}, volume = {46}, pages = {185-200}, number = {1}, month = {January}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{KrSh:83, author = {Kreps, D. M. and Sheinkman, J.}, title = {Quantity precommitment and {B}ertrand competition yield {C}ournot outcomes}, journal = {Bell Journal of Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {14}, pages = {326-337}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{Kreps1982, author = {Kreps, D. M. and Wilson, R.}, title = {Reputation and Imperfect Information}, journal = {Journal of Econimic Theory}, year = {1982}, volume = {27}, pages = {253-279}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Kreps1982a, author = {Kreps, D. M. and Wilson, R.}, title = {Sequential Equilibrium}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1982}, volume = {50}, pages = {863-894}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KrMiRoWi:82, author = {Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. and Wilson, R.}, title = {Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1982}, volume = {27}, pages = {245-252}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{KrNi:08, author = {Kriesler, Kobi and Nitzan, Shmuel}, title = {Is Context-Based Choice Due to Context-Dependent Preferences?}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {2008}, volume = {64}, pages = {65 - 80}, abstract = {The rationalization of context-based choice is usually based on the assumption that preferences are context-dependent. In this paper, we show that context-based choice can be due to the characteristics of the choice procedure applied by the individual and not to the dependence of preferences (stochastic or deterministic) on the context. Our arguments are illustrated focusing on the much-studied dominatedalternative effects.}, key = {Choice}, keywords = {Context-based choice, Context-dependent preferences, Dominated-alternative effects, Choice probability, Stochastic preferences, Stochastic scanning.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @TECHREPORT{KrPe:97, author = {Krishna, Vijay and Perry, Motty}, title = {Efficient Mechanism Design}, institution = {The Hebrew University of Jerusalem}, year = {1997}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {133}, month = {March}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Kris:81, author = {Krishnan, P.}, title = {Measures of inequality for qualitative variables and concentration curves}, journal = {American Sociological Review}, year = {1981}, volume = {46}, pages = {368-371}, note = {comment on Allison, American Sociological Review December 1978}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095070} } @ARTICLE{Krof:08, author = {Kroft, Kory}, title = {Takeup, social multipliers and optimal social insurance}, journal = {Journal of Publc Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {722 - 737}, abstract = {This paper examines the optimal provision of unemployment insurance (UI) in a framework that accounts for behavioral responses along both the intensive and extensivemargins. Two formulations of takeup are considered: in the first, individuals face a takeup cost that is exogenous; in the second, the cost depends endogenously on the takeup rate. Such endogenous costs to takeup lead to a social multiplier, a reduced-form parameter summarizing the strength of social interactions. This paper derives a formula for the optimal replacement rate in terms of the takeup and duration elasticities, and the socialmultiplier. The formula is applied by estimating the social multiplier using policy variation in UI benefit levels. The results suggest that socialmultiplier effects account for 35%of the total effect of UI on takeup and yield an optimal replacement rate around 60% of pre-unemployment wages, 20% higher than previous estimates.}, key = {Social Security}, keywords = {Takeup; Social interactions; Social insurance; Social; Multiplier; Stigma}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{KrDa:03, author = {Kroll, Y. and Davidovitz, L.}, title = {Inequality Aversion versus Risk Aversion}, journal = {Economica}, year = {2003}, volume = {70}, pages = {19 - 29}, abstract = {Inequality aversion and risk–aversion are widely assumed in economic models;however existing economic literature fails to distinguish between the two.This paper presents methodology and a laboratory experiment, which separates inequality aversion from risk aversion. In a set of laboratory experiments,subjects had to choose between two risky alternatives which pay meaningful prizes with the same individual risk but different levels of egalitarianism.Thus, the choice of the more egalitarian alternative implies a higher levelof inequality aversion. The experiment was conducted among children, someof whom live on a communal system (kibbutz) and some in the city.}, key = {risk} } @TECHREPORT{KrDa:99, author = {Kroll, Yoram and Davidovitz, Liema}, title = {Choices in Egalitarian Distribution: Inequality Aversion versus Risk Aversion}, institution = {STICERD}, year = {1999}, type = {Distributional Analysis Research Programme Discussion Paper}, number = {43}, address = {LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Krts:94, author = {Krtscha, M.}, title = {A New Compromise Measure of Inequality}, booktitle = {Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, pages = {111-119}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Krueger1993a, author = {Krueger, A.}, title = {How Computers Have Changed the Wage Structure}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {108}, pages = {33-60}, key = {wages}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Krue:93HC, author = {Krueger, A. B.}, title = {How Computers Have Changed the Wage Structure: Evidence from Microdata}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {108}, pages = {33-60}, key = {earnings, wages}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.07.30} } @ARTICLE{Krueger1993, author = {Krueger, A. B.}, title = {How computers have changed the wage structure: evidence from micro-data 1984-1989}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1993}, pages = {33-60}, key = {wages}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{KrSc:08, author = {Krueger, A. B. and Schkade, D. A.}, title = {The reliability of subjective well-being measures}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {1833-1845}, number = {8-9}, month = {August}, abstract = {This paper studies the test–retest reliability of a standard self-reported life satisfaction measure and of affect measures collected from a diary method. The sample consists of 229 women who were interviewed on Thursdays, two weeks apart, in Spring 2005. The correlation of net affect (i.e., duration-weighted positive feelings less negative feelings) measured two weeks apart is .64, which is slightly higher than the correlation of life satisfaction (r=.59). Correlations between income, net affect and life satisfaction are presented, and adjusted for attenuation bias due to measurement error. Life satisfaction is found to correlate much more strongly with income than does net affect. Components of affect that are more person-specific are found to have a higher test–retest reliability than components of affect that are more specific to the particular situation. While reliability figures for subjective wellbeing measures are lower than those typically found for education, income and many other microeconomic variables, they are probably sufficiently high to support much of the research that is currently being undertaken on subjective well-being, particularly in studies where group means are compared (e.g., across activities or demographic groups).}, key = {Measurement error}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.21} } @ARTICLE{KrKu:06, author = {Krueger, D. and Kubler, F.}, title = {Pareto-Improving Social Security Reform when Financial Markets Are Incomplete!?}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {96}, pages = {737-755}, abstract = {This paper studies an overlapping generations model with stochastic production and incomplete markets to assess whether the introduction of an unfunded social security system leads to a Pareto improvement. When returns to capital and wages are imperfectly correlated, a system that endows retired households with claims to labor income enhances the sharing of aggregate risk between generations. Our quantitative analysis shows that, abstracting from the capital crowding-out effect, the introduction of social security represents a Pareto-improving reform, even when the economy is dynamically efficient. However, the severity of the crowding-out effect in general equilibrium tends to overturn these gains.}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.01} } @ARTICLE{KrPe:05, author = {Krueger, D. and Perri, F.}, title = {Understanding Consumption Smoothing: Evidence from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Data}, journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association}, year = {2005}, volume = {3}, pages = {340-349}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{KrVe:95, author = {Krugman, P. and Venables, A. J.}, title = {Globalization and the inequality of nations}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1995}, volume = {110}, pages = {857--880}, abstract = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199511%29110%3A4%3C857%3AGATION%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C A monopolistically competitive manufacturing sector produces goods used for final consumption and as intermediates. Intermediate usage creates cost and demand linkages between firms and a tendency for manufacturing agglomeration. How does globalization affect the location of manufacturing and gains from trade? At high transport costs all countries have some manufacturing, but when transport costs fall below a critical value, a core-periphery spontaneously forms, and nations that find themselves in the periphery suffer a decline in real income. At still lower transport costs there is convergence of real incomes, in which peripheral nations gain and core nations may lose.}, key = {inequality }, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.23} } @BOOK{KrWe:06, title = {Economics}, publisher = {Worth Publishers}, year = {2006}, author = {Krugman, P. and Wells, R.}, pages = {864}, key = {micro}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.03.22} } @INCOLLECTION{Krup:78, author = {Krupp, H. J.}, title = {Transfer policy and changes in income distribution}, booktitle = {Personal Income Distribution}, publisher = {North-Holland Publishing Company}, year = {1978}, editor = {Krelle, W. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kubi:99, author = {Kubik, J. D.}, title = {Incentives for the Identification and Treatment of Children with Disabilities:The Supplemental Security Income Program}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {187-215}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Kubik1999, author = {Kubik, J. D.}, title = {Incentives for the Identification and Treatment of Children with Disabilities: The Supplemental Security Income Program}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {187-215}, key = {social security}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Kubl:07, author = {Kubler,F.}, title = {Approximate Generalizations and Computational Experiments}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, pages = {967-992}, number = {4}, abstract = {In this paper I demonstrate how one can generalize finitely many examples to statements about (infinite) classes of economic models. If there exist upper bounds on the number of connected components of one-dimensional linear subsets of the set of parameters for which a conjecture is true, one can conclude that it is correct for all parameter values in the class considered, except for a small residual set, once one has verified the conjecture for a predetermined finite set of points. I show how to apply this insight to computational experiments and spell out assumptions on the economic fundamentals that ensure that the necessary bounds on the number of connected components exist. I argue that these methods can be fruitfully utilized in applied general equilibrium analysis. I provide general assumptions on preferences and production sets that ensure that economic conjectures define sets with a bounded number of connected components. Using the theoretical results, I give an example of how one can explore qualitative and quantitative implications of general equilibrium models using computational experiments. Finally, I show how random algorithms can be used for generalizing examples in high-dimensional problems.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Kuga:80, author = {Kuga, K.}, title = {The {G}ini index and the generalised entropy class: further results and a vindication}, journal = {Economic Studies Quarterly}, year = {1980}, volume = {31}, pages = {217-228}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kuga:79, author = {Kuga, K.}, title = {Comparison of inequality measures: a {M}onte {C}arlo study}, journal = {Economic Studies Quarterly}, year = {1979}, volume = {30}, pages = {219-235}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Kuga:73, author = {Kuga, K.}, title = {Measures of income inequality: An axiomatic approach}, institution = {Institute of Social and Economic Research}, year = {1973}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {76}, address = {Osaka University}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{KuVeZe:05, author = {Kugler,M. and Verdier,T. and Zenou,Y.}, title = {Organized crime, corruption and punishment}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {1639-1663}, abstract = {We analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizationsglobally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruptionto avoid punishment. When bribing costs are low, that is badly-paid anddishonest law enforcers work in a weak governance environment, and therents from criminal activity are sufficiently high, we find that increasingpolicing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates. Indeed, beyonda threshold, further increases in intended expected punishment create incentivesfor organized crime to extend corruption rings, and ensuing impunity resultsin a fall of actual expected punishment that yields more rather than lesscrime.}, key = {Crime} } @ARTICLE{Kuhn1998, author = {Kuhn, Kai-Uwe}, title = {Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Frictionless Durable Goods Monopolies}, journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {46}, pages = {101--114}, number = {1}, month = {Mar.}, abstract = {I show that small differences in quality and production costs between durables and non-durables in a product line allow a durable goods monopolist to intertemporally price discriminate even with continuous trading. In particular, a monopolist would want to both sell and rent out a durable to achieve price discrimination. This incentive to price discriminate simultaneously creates inefficient delay in the sale of the durable good, a finite trading period and long run efficiency of the market. The Coase conjecture fails because the non-durable good acts as an outside option that guarantees a minimum profit in the market for durables.}, copyright = {Copyright 1998 Blackwell Publishing}, issn = {00221821}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.07} } @BOOK{Kull:59, title = {Information Theory and Statistics}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1959}, author = {Kullback, S.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{KuLe:51, author = {Kullback, S. and Leibler, R. A.}, title = {On information and Sufficiency}, journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1951}, volume = {22}, pages = {79-86}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{Kunc:00, author = {Kunce, M.}, title = {A {N}ash Tax Game Extending the Generality of the Henry George Theorem}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {66}, pages = {229-233}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{KuSm:83, author = {Kundu, A. and Smith, T. R.}, title = {An impossibility theorem on poverty indices}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1983}, volume = {24}, pages = {423-434}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{KuYa:77, author = {Kurabayashi, Y. and Yatsuka, A.}, title = {Redistribution of income and measures of income inequality}, booktitle = {Resource Allocation and Division of Space}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1977}, editor = {Fuji, T. and Sato, R.}, address = {New York}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kuri:77, author = {Kurien, C. J.}, title = {The measurement and trends of inequality: Comment}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {67}, pages = {512-519}, note = {Comment on Paglin 1975}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Kuro:06, author = {Kurosaki, T.}, title = {The measurement of transient poverty: {T}heory and application to {P}akistan}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {325-345}, abstract = {The present paper investigates the measurement of transient poverty when each person’s welfare level fluctuates due to exogenous risk. The paper namely characterizes the sensitivity of transient/chronic poverty decomposition with respect to the poverty line and to the expected welfare level so that the decomposition analysis will be based on solid theoretical foundations and be robust empirically. Theoretical results show that poverty measures associated with prudent risk preferences perform better than other measures in assuring that the value of transient poverty increases with the depth of chronic poverty and that the decomposition is not highly sensitive to the poverty line. Poverty measures such as those associated with constant relative risk aversion are thus superior to popular Foster–Greer–Thorbecke (FGT) measures such as headcount, poverty gap, and squared poverty gap indices. These theoretical arguments are confirmed empirically by the application of the decomposition to a two-period household panel dataset from rural Pakistan. The relative magnitudes of transient versus chronic poverty are more robust to changes in the poverty line when poverty measures associated with constant relative risk aversion are used than when FGT poverty measures are used.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @ARTICLE{Kuru:06, author = {Kuruscu, B.}, title = {Training and Lifetime Income}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {96}, pages = {832-846}, key = {education, training}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.01} } @ARTICLE{Kurz1984, author = {Kurz, M.}, title = {Capital accumulation and the characteristics of private intergenerational transfers}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1984}, volume = {51}, pages = {1-22}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Kurz:84, author = {Kurz, M.}, title = {Capital accumulation and the characteristics of private intergenerationaltransfers}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1984}, volume = {51}, pages = {1-22}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Kurz1977, author = {Kurz, M.}, title = {Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1977}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Kurz:77, author = {Kurz, M.}, title = {Distortion of preferences, income distribution and the case for a linearincome tax}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1977}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{Kuzn:66, title = {Modern Economic Growth}, publisher = {Yale University Press}, year = {1966}, author = {Kuznets, S.}, address = {New Haven, Connecticut}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Kuzn:63, author = {Kuznets, S.}, title = {Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations:Part {VIII}, Distributionof Income by Size}, journal = {Economic Development and Cultural Change}, year = {1963}, volume = {11}, pages = {1-80}, key = {development}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1152605} } @ARTICLE{Kuznets1963, author = {Kuznets, S.}, title = {Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations:Part {VIII}, Distribution of Income by Size}, journal = {Economic Development and Cultural Change}, year = {1963}, volume = {11}, key = {development}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Kuzn:59, title = {Six Lectures on Economic Growth}, publisher = {Free Press of Glencoe}, year = {1959}, author = {Kuznets, S.}, address = {Illinois}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Kuzn:55, author = {Kuznets, S.}, title = {Economic growth and income inequality}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1955}, volume = {45}, pages = {1-28}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @ARTICLE{KoPo:06, author = {K{\"o}thenb{\"u}rger, M. and Poutvaara, P.}, title = {Social Security Reform and Investment in Education: Is There Scope for a Pareto Improvement?}, journal = {Economica}, year = {2006}, volume = {73}, pages = {1-20}, key = {social security}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{Kuns:84, author = {K{\"u}nsch, H.}, title = {Infinitesimal robustness for autoregressive processes}, journal = {The Annals of Statistics}, year = {1984}, volume = {12}, pages = {843-863}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Kuebler2004, author = {Kübler, Dorothea and Weizsäcker, Georg}, title = {Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, year = {2004}, volume = {71}, pages = {425--441}, number = {2}, abstract = {We examine the robustness of information cascades in laboratory experiments. Apart from the situation in which each player can obtain a signal for free (as in the experiment by Anderson and Holt (1997), American Economic Review, 87 (5), 847-862), the case of costly signals is studied where players decide whether or not to obtain private information, at a small but positive cost. In the equilibrium of this game, only the first player buys a signal and makes a decision based on this information whereas all following players do not buy a signal and herd behind the first player. The experimental results show that too many signals are bought and the equilibrium prediction performs poorly. To explain these observations, the depth of the subjects' reasoning process is estimated, using a statistical error-rate model. Allowing for different error rates on different levels of reasoning, we find that the subjects' inferences become significantly more noisy on higher levels of the thought process, and that only short chains of reasoning are applied by the subjects.}, copyright = {Copyright © 2004 The Review of Economic Studies Ltd.}, issn = {00346527}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Apr., 2004}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {The Review of Economic Studies Ltd.}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3700632} } @ARTICLE{L.1988, author = {Ching-Chong L. and Chang, W. -Y.}, title = {Tax evasion and tax collection: An aggregate demand-aggregate supply analysis}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1988}, volume = {43}, pages = {138-146}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{LaFe:02, author = {La Ferrara, E.}, title = {Inequality and Group Participation: Theory and Evidence from Rural {T}anzania}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {85}, pages = {235-273}, key = {social capital} } @BOOK{LaLa:00, title = {La Fleur's Lottery World}, publisher = {http://www.lafleurs.com}, year = {2000}, author = {La Fleur, T. and La Fleur, B.}, key = {Lotteries} } @TECHREPORT{Lacroix1990, author = {Lacroix, G. and Fortin, B.}, title = {Utility-based estimation of labor supply functions in the regular and irregular sectors}, institution = {D\'epartement d'\'economique, Universit\'e Laval}, year = {1990}, type = {Cahier}, number = {9020}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{LaFo:90, author = {Lacroix, G. and Fortin, B.}, title = {Utility-based estimation of labor supply functions in the regular and irregularsectors}, institution = {D{\'e}partement d'{\'e}conomique, Universit{\'e} Laval}, year = {1990}, type = {Cahier}, number = {9020}, key = {underground} } @BOOK{LaBo:98, title = {Attitudes Toward Economic Inequality}, publisher = {The AEI Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Everett Carll Ladd and Karlyn H. Bowman}, address = {Washington D.C., U.S.A.}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Laff:87, author = {Laffont, J.-J.}, title = {Incentives and the allocation of public goods}, booktitle = {Handbook of Public Economics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1987}, editor = {Auerbach, A. J. and Feldstein, M.}, volume = {2}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Laff:99, author = {Laffont, J.-J.}, title = {Political Economy, Information and Incentives}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {649-669}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{Laff:94, author = {Laffont, Jean-Jacques}, title = {The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1994}, volume = {62}, pages = {504-537}, number = {3}, key = {regulation} } @BOOK{Laff:89, title = {The Economics of Uncertainty and Information}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1989}, author = {Laffont, J.-J.}, address = {Cambridge, Mass}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{Laff:88, title = {Fundamentals of Public Economics}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {1988}, author = {Laffont, J.-J.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{LaMa:05, author = {Laffont,J. and Martimort,D.}, title = {The design of transnational public good mechanisms for developing countries}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {159-196}, abstract = {We analyze the design of incentive mechanisms for the provision of transnationalpublic goods under asymmetric information. Transnational public goods areinfrastructures that no single country can afford to build for itself.We show that the external constraints imposed by this mechanism may affectconsumption, pricing and the true redistributive concerns of local governments.We characterize the corresponding distortions. We also discuss the impactof the preferences for redistribution of the international agency in chargeof designing the mechanism and the role of its}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Laffont, author = {Laffont, Jean-Jacques and N'Guessan, Tchetche}, title = {Competition and corruption in an agency relationship}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, volume = {60}, pages = {271-295}, comment = {JEL classification: D7, H5, O12}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{LaN'G:99, author = {Laffont, Jean-Jacques and N'Guessan, Tchetche}, title = {Competition and corruption in an agency relationship}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {60}, pages = {271-295}, comment = {JEL classification: D7, H5, O12}, key = {underground} } @BOOK{LaTi:93, title = {A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1993}, author = {Laffont, J.-J. and Tirole, J.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{LaMa:02, title = {The Theory of Incentives: The Principal Agent Model}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {2002}, author = {Laffont, J. J. and Martimort, D.}, address = {Princeton, NJ}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Lafu:80, author = {Lafuente, A.}, title = {Una medici{\'o}n de la econom{\'i}a oculta en Espa{\~n}a}, journal = {Bolet{\'i}n de Estudios Econ{\'o}micos}, year = {1980}, volume = {11}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Lafuente1980, author = {Lafuente, A.}, title = {Una medici\'on de la econom\'ia oculta en Espa\~na}, journal = {Boletin de Estudios Econ\'omicos}, year = {1980}, volume = {11}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Lahi:99, author = {Somdeb Lahiri}, title = {A Comment on "The {K}aldor Compensation Test and Rational Choice"}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {311-312}, number = {2}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{LaRa:98, author = {Lahiri, Sajal and Raimondos-Moller, Pascalis}, title = {Public good provision and the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonisation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {67}, pages = {253-267}, number = {2}, month = {February}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{LaCh:88, author = {Lai, C.-C. and Chang, W.-Y.}, title = {Tax evasion and tax collections, an aggregate demand-aggregate supply analysis}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1988}, volume = {43}, pages = {138-146}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{LaHuRiKa:08, author = {Lai, D. and Huang, J. and Risser, J. M. and Kapadia, A. S.}, title = {Statistical Properties of Generalized Gini Coefficient with Application to Health Inequality Measurement}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {2008}, volume = {87}, pages = {249-258}, number = {2}, month = {June}, abstract = {In this article, we report statistical properties of two classes of generalized Gini coefficients (G1 and G2). The theoretical results were assessed via Monte Carlo simulations. Further, we used G1 and G2 on life expectancy to measure health inequalities among the provinces of China and the states of the United States. For China, the results indicated that there was statistically significant health inequality by both G1 and G2. However, for the US, the results showed that there was significant health inequality by G1 but no statistical significance was found in health inequality by G2. Overall, from our study, China has higher health inequality than the United States.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.24} } @ARTICLE{La:97, author = {Laibson, David}, title = {Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {112}, pages = {443--477}, number = {2}, abstract = {Hyperbolic discount functions induce dynamically inconsistent preferences, implying a motive for consumers to constrain their own future choices. This paper analyzes the decisions of a hyperbolic consumer who has access to an imperfect commitment technology: an illiquid asset whose sale must be initiated one period before the sale proceeds are received. The model predicts that consumption tracks income, and the model explains why consumers have asset-specific marginal propensities to consume. The model suggests that financial innovation may have caused the ongoing decline in U. S. savings rates, since financial innovation increases liquidity, eliminating commitment opportunities. Finally, the model implies that financial market innovation may reduce welfare by providing "too much" liquidity.}, copyright = {Copyright © 1997 The MIT Press}, issn = {00335533}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {May, 1997}, jstor_issuetitle = {In Memory of Amos Tversky (1937-1996)}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951242} } @TECHREPORT{Lait:01, author = {Laitner, John}, title = {Wealth Accumulation in the U.S.: Do Inheritances and Bequests Play a Significant Role?}, institution = {University of Michigan, Retirement Research Center}, year = {2001}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2001-019}, abstract = {This paper formulates an overlapping generations model with both life–cycle saving and altruistic bequests. For a given distribution of earning abilities, the model generates a stationary steady–state capital–to–labor ratio for the economy as a whole and a stationary distribution of net worth among households. We calibrate the model, using the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances to fix the distribution of earning abilities, and using total 1995 U.S. wealth and Federal estate tax revenues to fix other key parameters. The analysis specifies its version of the Federal estate tax in detail, estimating the empirical degree of tax avoidance. Simulations show that the model can reproduce the high degree of wealth concentration evident in U.S. data. Most surprisingly, the analysis also suggests that the U.S. economy’s steady–state capital–to–output ratio will be insensitive to changes in the national debt and social security.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Lait:91, author = {Laitner, J.}, title = {Modelling marital connections among family lines}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1991}, volume = {99}, pages = {1123-1141}, key = {population economics} } @ARTICLE{Lait:79, author = {Laitner, J.}, title = {Household bequests, perfect expectations and the national distribution ofwealth}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, volume = {47}, pages = {1175-1193}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Laitner1979, author = {Laitner, J.}, title = {Household bequests, perfect expectations and the national distribution of wealth}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, volume = {47}, pages = {1175-1193}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{LaOh:01, author = {Laitner, J. and Ohlsson, H.}, title = {Bequest Motives: A Comparison of {S}weden and the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {(79) 1}, pages = {205-236}, abstract = {This paper reviews four well-known theoretical models of private bequestbehavior, notes their differing implications for public policy and discussesa way of empirically dis-criminating among them. Then it implements thetest with micro data from Sweden (LLS) and the U.S. (PSID). The so-calledaltruistic (or dynastic) model, which, among the four models, has perhapsthe most wide-ranging implications for policy, receives some support. Thesign pattern is as the model predicts, while the magnitude is much smallerthan the altruistic theory implies. There is evidence of a potential complicationdue to a dependence of children's education on parents' financial statusin the case of the U.S.}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Lall:00, author = {Lally, M.}, title = {Valuation of Companies and Projects Under Differential Personal Taxation}, journal = {Pacific-Basin Finance Journal}, year = {2000}, volume = {8}, pages = {115-133}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{LaLu:08, author = {LaLumia, S.}, title = {The effects of joint taxation of married couples on labor supply and non-wage income}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {1698–1719}, abstract = {The United States changed its tax treatment of married couples in 1948, from a system in which each spouse paid taxes on his or her own income to a system in which a married couple is taxed as a unit. The switch from separate to joint taxation changed incentives for labor supply and asset ownership. This paper investigates the effects of the conversion to joint taxation, taking advantage of a natural experiment created by cross-state variation in property laws. Married individuals in states with community property laws had always been taxed as if each spouse had earned half of the couple's income, and thus were unaffected by the 1948 legal change. Comparing the behavior of highly-educated taxpayers in affected and unaffected states indicates that the tax change is associated with a decline of approximately 2 percentage points in the employment rate of married women, consistent with the higher first-dollar tax rates they faced after 1948. Women married to self-employed men were also less likely to have non-wage income after 1948, reflecting pre-1948 allocation of family assets to wives for tax purposes. The effects of joint taxation on married men's labor force participation and non-wage income holding are generally not statistically significant.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.24} } @ARTICLE{Lam:86, author = {Lam, D.}, title = {The dynamics of population growth, differential fertility and inequality}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1986}, volume = {76}, pages = {1103-1116}, number = {12}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{LaTi:96, author = {Lambert, Diane and Tierney, Luke}, title = {Nonparametric Maximum Likelihood Estimation from Samples with IrrelevantData and Verification Bias}, institution = {Bell Laboratories.}, year = {1996}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {Murray Hill, NJ 07974}, month = {November}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{LaDe:, author = {Lambert,P. and Decoster,A.}, title = {The Gini coefficient reveals more}, abstract = {We revisit the well-known decomposition of the Gini coefficient into betweengroups, within-groups and overlap terms in the context of two groups inwhich the incomes in one group may be scaled and that group's populationweight modified. In this more general setting than usual, we focus on theproperties of the overlap term, proving inter alia that overlap unambiguouslyreduces as a result of a within-group progressive transfer, and is increasedby scaling up the incomes in the group with the lower mean, reaching amaximum when the two means become the same. In the case of a socially heterogeneouspopulation and equivalized incomes, the effect on the Gini overlap of changingthe income unit is determined, along with that of adjusting the equivalencescale deflator in case the income unit is the equivalent adult (such adjustmentssimultaneously changing the weight into income units). Relationships offindings to existing literature are thoroughly explored.}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{LaRa:97, author = {Lambert, P. and Ramos, X.}, title = {Horizontal inequity and vertical redistribution}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {1997}, volume = {4}, pages = {25-37}, key = {equity} } @INCOLLECTION{Lamb:94MP, author = {Lambert, P. J.}, title = {Measuring progressibity with differences in tax treatment}, booktitle = {Taxation, Poverty and Income Distribution}, publisher = {Edward Elgar}, year = {1994}, editor = {Creedy, J.}, pages = {17-27}, key = {public economics} } @INCOLLECTION{Lamb:94RT, author = {Lambert, P. J.}, title = {Redistribution through the Income Tax}, booktitle = {Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, pages = {299-315}, key = {public economics} } @INCOLLECTION{Lamb:88, author = {Lambert , P. J.}, title = {Net fiscal incidence progressivity:Some approaches to measurement}, booktitle = {Measurement in Economics}, publisher = {Physica Verlag Heidelberg}, year = {1988}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Lamb:01TD, title = {The Distribution and Redistribution of Income}, publisher = {Manchester University Press}, year = {2001}, author = {Lambert, P. J.}, address = {Manchester}, edition = {Third}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Lamb:93EI, author = {Lambert, P. J.}, title = {Evaluating Impact Effect of Tax Reforms}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {1993}, volume = {7}, pages = {205-238}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Lamb:93IR, author = {Lambert, P. J.}, title = {Inequality reduction through the income tax}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1993}, volume = {60}, pages = {357-365}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Lamb:93TD, title = {The Distribution and Redistribution of Income}, publisher = {Manchester University Press}, year = {1993}, author = {Lambert, P. J.}, address = {Manchester}, edition = {second}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Lamb:89, title = {The Distribution and Redistribution of Income}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, year = {1989}, author = {Lambert, P. J.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Lamb:85, author = {Lambert, P. J.}, title = {Social welfare and the {G}ini coefficient revisited}, journal = {Mathematical Social Science}, year = {1985}, volume = {9}, pages = {19-26}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Lamb:85a, author = {Lambert, P. J.}, title = {On the redistributive effect of taxes and benefits}, journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1985}, volume = {2}, pages = {39-54}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Lamb:85TP, author = {Lambert, P. J.}, title = {Tax progressivity: a survey of the literature}, institution = {Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {1985}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {56}, address = {London}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Lamb:80, author = {Lambert, P. J.}, title = {Inequality and social choice}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {1980}, volume = {12}, pages = {395-398}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{LaAr:93, author = {Lambert, P. J. and Aronson, J. R.}, title = {Inequality decomposition analysis and the {G}ini coefficient revisited}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1993}, volume = {103}, pages = {1221-1227}, number = {9}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{LaLa:06, author = {Lambert, P. J. and Lanza, G.}, title = {The effect on of changing one or two incomes}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {253-277}, abstract = {We examine the effect on of increasing one income, and show that for two wide classes of indices a benchmark income level or position exists, dividing upper from lower incomes, such that if a lower income is raised, falls, and if an upper income is raised, rises. We provide a condition on the orderings implicit in two indices under which the one has a lower benchmark than the other for all unequal income distributions. We go on to examine the effect on the same indices of simultaneously increasing one income and decreasing another higher up the distribution, deriving results which quantify the extent of the Fbucket leak_ which can be tolerated without negating the beneficial effect of the transfer. Our results have implications for the and poverty impacts of different income growth patterns, and of redistributive programmes, leaky or not, which are briefly discussed.}, key = {income }, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @ARTICLE{LaMiSl:03, author = {Lambert , P. J. and Millimet , D. L. and Slottje, D. J.}, title = {Inequality aversion and the natural rate of subjective inequality}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1061-1090}, abstract = {This paper analyzes inequality aversion across countries and identifies factors which explain the empirical heterogeneity observed across these countries. We do this by hypothesizing a ‘natural rate’ of subjective inequality across countries and solving for the explicit country-specific value of the inequality aversion parameter that is consistent with the hypothesized natural rate. We present evidence consistent with the existence of a natural rate of subjective inequality by verifying that countries with low (high) tolerance for inequality have low (high) inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient as well. Finally, we explore the socio-economic factors that are consistent with observed differences in inequality aversion across these countries, finding important effects of female empowerment, public education expenditures, per capita income, economic growth, and population size.}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V76-47XWN2B-1&_user=1177143&_coverDate=05%2F31%2F2003&_alid=795234497&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_cdi=5834&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_ct=3&_acct=C000051857&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=1177143&md5=7a1e53f78a25d7d5233e38f7e87881fa} } @ARTICLE{LaPf:88, author = {Lambert, P. J. and Pf{\"a}hler, W.}, title = {On aggregate measures of the net redistributive impact of taxation and governmentexpenditure}, journal = {Public Finance Quarterly}, year = {1988}, volume = {16}, pages = {178-202}, number = {4}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{LaPf:87, author = {Lambert, P. J. and Pf{\"a}hler , W.}, title = {Intersecting tax concentration curves and the measurement of tax progressivity:a rejoinder}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1987}, volume = {40}, pages = {635-638}, number = {12}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{LaYi:95, author = {Lambert, P. J. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Equity, Equality and Welfare}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {39}, pages = {674-682}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Lamb:02, author = {Lambsdorff, J. G.}, title = {Making Corrupt Deals: Contracting in the Shadow of the Law}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2002}, volume = {48}, pages = {221-241}, key = {corruption} } @BOOK{Lamp:85, title = {Whistleblowing in the {S}oviet {U}nion}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1985}, author = {Lampert, N.}, address = {London}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Lamp:73, author = {Lampman}, title = {Measured inequality of income; What does it mean and what can it tell us?}, journal = {Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science}, year = {1973}, volume = {409}, pages = {81-91}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Lanc:66, author = {Lancaster, K.}, title = {A new approach to consumer theory}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1966}, volume = {74}, pages = {132-137}, key = {consumption} } @BOOK{Lanc:90, title = {The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data}, publisher = {Econometric Society Monographs 17, Cambridge University Press}, year = {1990}, author = {Lancaster, T.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Lanc:79, author = {Lancaster, T.}, title = {Econometric Methods for the Duration of Unemployment}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, volume = {47}, pages = {939-956}, key = {labour}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{Lancaster1979, author = {Lancaster, T.}, title = {Econometric Methods for the Duration of Unemployment}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, pages = {939-957}, number = {4}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{LaMe:90, author = {Landsberger, M. and Meilijson, I.}, title = {A tale of two tails...}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1990}, volume = {3}, pages = {65-82}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Landsberger1985, author = {Landsberger, Michael and Meilijson, Isaac}, title = {Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Sales Strategy under Incomplete Information}, journal = {The Rand Journal of Economics}, year = {1985}, volume = {16}, pages = {424--430}, number = {3}, month = {Autumn}, abstract = {This article examines intertemporal price variations to provide a theoretical explanation for them. When firms have only incomplete information about consumers' reservation prices for the commodity, we contend that some intertemporal price variations can result from attempts by the firms to discriminate among consumers. We demonstrate that such price discrimination is the optimal policy for a seller if consumers have a higher time discount rate than producers.}, copyright = {Copyright 1985 The RAND Corporation}, issn = {07416261}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.07} } @ARTICLE{LaMe:82, author = {Landsberger, M. and Meilijson, I.}, title = {Incentive-generating state-dependent penalty system}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1982}, volume = {19}, pages = {333-352}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{LaMoTa:00, author = {Landsberger, M. and Monderer, D. and Talmor, I.}, title = {Feasible Net Income Distributions Under Income Tax Evasion: An EquilibriumAnalysis}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2000}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Landsberger2000, author = {Landsberger, M. and Monderer, D. and Talmor, I.}, title = {Feasible Net Income Distributions Under Income Tax Evasion: An Equilibrium Analysis}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2000}, key = {Tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{LaPaSw:90, author = {Landskroner, Y., Paroush, J. and Swary, I.}, title = {Tax evasion and portfolio decisions}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1990}, volume = {45}, pages = {409-422}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Landsman2002, author = {Landsman, W. R. and Shackelford, D. A. and Yetman, R. J.}, title = {The Determinanants of Capital Gain Tax Compliance: Evidence from the {RJR} {N}abisco Leveraged Buyout}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {84 (1)}, pages = {47-74}, key = {Tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{LaShYe:02, author = {Landsman, W. R. and Shackelford, D. A. and Yetman, R. J.}, title = {The Determinanants of Capital Gain Tax Compliance: Evidence from the {RJR}{N}abisco Leveraged Buyout}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {84 (1)}, pages = {47-74}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{LaNS:97, author = {Lang, Oliver and N{\"o}hrab, Karl-Heinz and Stahl, Konrad}, title = {On income tax avoidance: the case of {G}ermany}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {66}, pages = {327-347}, number = {2}, month = {November}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{LaLiPr:07AF, author = {Lange, Andreas and List, John and Price, Michael}, title = {A fundraising mechanism inspired by historical tontines: Theory and experimental evidence}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {1750 - 1782}, abstract = {The tontine, which is an interesting mixture of group annuity, group life insurance, and lottery, has a peculiar place in economic history. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it played a major role in raising funds to finance public goods in Europe, but today it is rarely encountered outside of a dusty footnote in actuarial course notes or as a means to thicken the plot of a murder mystery. This study provides a formal model of individual contribution decisions under a modern variant of the historical tontine mechanism that is easily implemented by private charities. Our model incorporates desirable properties of the historical tontine to develop a mechanism to fund the private provision of a public good. The tontine-like mechanism we derive is predicted to outperformnot only the voluntary contribution mechanism but also another widely used mechanism: charitable lotteries. Our experimental test of the instrument provides some evidence of the beneficial effects associated with implementing tontine-like schemes.We find that the mechanism has particular power in cases where agents are riskaverse or in situations where substantial asymmetries characterize individual preferences for the public good.}, key = {Lottery}, keywords = {Tontines; Public goods; Fundraising; Lotteries; Experiments}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{LaLiPr:07UL, author = {Lange, Andreas and List, John and Price, Michael}, title = {Using Lotteries to Finance Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {48}, pages = {901 - 927}, abstract = {This study explores the economics of charitable fund-raising.We begin by developing theory that examines the optimal lottery design while explicitly relaxing both risk-neutrality and preference homogeneity assumptions.We test our theory using a battery of experimental treatments and find that our theoretical predictions are largely confirmed. Specifically, we find that single- and multiple-prize lotteries dominate the voluntary contribution mechanism both in total dollars raised and the number of contributors attracted. Moreover, we find that the optimal fund-raising mechanism depends critically on the risk postures of potential contributors and preference heterogeneity.}, key = {Public Goods}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @TECHREPORT{LaLiPr:04, author = {Lange,A. and List,J. and Price,M.}, title = {Using tontines to finance public goods: Back to the future?}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, abstract = {The tontine, which is an interesting mixture of group annuity, group lifeinsurance, and lottery, has a peculiar place in economic history. In theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries it played a major role in raisingfunds to finance public goods in Europe, but today it is rarely encounteredoutside of murder mysteries. This study provides a formal model of individualcontribution decisions under a tontine mechanism. We analyze the performanceof tontines and compare them to another popular fundraising scheme usedtoday by both government and charitable fundraisers: lotteries. Our majortheoretical results are that (i) the optimal tontine for agents with identicalvaluations of the public good consists of all agents receiving a fixed"prize" amount in the first period equal to a percentage of their totalcontribution, (ii) contribution levels in the optimal tontine are identicalto those of riskneutral agents in an equivalently valued single prize lottery,(iii) contribution levels for the optimal tontine are independent of risk-aversion,and thereby outperform lotteries when agents are riskaverse, (iv) if agentsare sufficiently asymmetric in their valuation of the public good, equilibriumcontribution levels are larger under tontines than any lottery. In particular,one can obtain full participation in the tontine mechanism compared toonly partial participation in a lottery. These insights highlight thatthe tontine institution can be a useful tool for fundraisers in the future.}, key = {public goods} } @TECHREPORT{LaLa:96, author = {Lanjouw, J. O. and Lanjouw, P.}, title = {Robust poverty comparisons when consumption aggregates differ: theory andillustrations}, institution = {Poverty and human resources division, World Bank}, year = {1996}, type = {mimeo}, address = {Washington,DC}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Lanjouw1995, author = {Lanjouw, Peter and Ravallion, Martin}, title = {Poverty and household size}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1995}, volume = {105}, pages = {1415-1434}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{LaRa:95, author = {Lanjouw, Peter and Ravallion, Martin}, title = {Poverty and household size}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1995}, volume = {105}, pages = {1415-1434}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{LaWa:98, author = {Lanot, G. and Walker, I.}, title = {The union/non-union wage differential: An application of semi-parametricmethods}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1998}, volume = {84}, pages = {327-349}, number = {2}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Lans:99, author = {Lansing, Kevin J.}, title = {Optimal redistributive capital taxation in a neoclassical Growth model}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {423-453}, number = {3}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{LaLe:97, author = {Laroque, Guy and Lemaire, Isabelle}, title = {Bliss and the permanent income hypothesis}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {56}, pages = {287-292}, number = {3}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{Laro:05, author = {Laroque, G. R.}, title = {Indirect taxation is superfluous under separability and taste homogeneity: A simple proof}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2005}, volume = {87}, pages = {141-144}, abstract = {Indirect taxation is of no use when nonlinear income taxation is available in an economy where everyone has the same taste for goods: an elementary proof of this result, due to Atkinson and Stiglitz [Atkinson, A., Stiglitz, J., 1976. The design of tax structure: direct versus indirect taxation. Journal of Public Economics 6, 55–75.] is provided.}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.06} } @BOOK{LaRu:62, title = {Philosophy, Politics, and Society}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {1962}, author = {Laslett, P. and Runciman, W. G.}, series = {Second series}, address = {Oxford}, key = {social justice} } @ARTICLE{Lasl:99, author = {Laslier, J.-F.}, title = {La Norme Majoritaire}, journal = {Revue {\'E}conomique}, year = {1999}, volume = {50}, pages = {669-698}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Laslier1999, author = {Laslier, J.-F.}, title = {La Norme Majoritaire}, journal = {Revue \'Economique}, year = {1999}, volume = {50}, pages = {669-698}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{LaSo:03, author = {Lasserre, P. and Soubeyran, A.}, title = {A Ricardian model of the tragedy of the commons}, journal = {Journal Of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {2003}, volume = {50}, pages = {29-45}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Lass:98, author = {Lassila, Jukka}, title = {Tax threats and wage formation}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {5}, pages = {167-183}, number = {2}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Lath:99, author = {Latham, R.}, title = {On the Difference Between the Compensating and Equivalent Variations Dueto a Change in an Exogenously Determined Commodity}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {135-145}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Latham1999, author = {Latham, R.}, title = {On the Difference Between the Compensating and Equivalent Variations Due to a Change in an Exogenously Determined Commodity}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {135-145}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Lath:88, author = {Latham, R.}, title = {Lorenz-Dominating Income Tax Functions}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1988}, volume = {29}, pages = {185-198}, key = {public economics} } @INCOLLECTION{Lato:90, author = {Latorre, G.}, title = {Asymptotic distribution of indices of concentration: Empirical verificationand applications}, booktitle = {Income and Wealth Distribution, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1990}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Zenga, M.}, pages = {149-170}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Laur:79, author = {Laurent, R. D.}, title = {Currency and the subterranean economy}, institution = {Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago}, year = {1979}, type = {Economic Perspectives}, key = {underground} } @TECHREPORT{Laur:83, author = {Laurin, U.}, title = {Tax evasion and prisoner's dilemma: some interview data and a tentativemodel for explanation}, institution = {University of Uppsala}, year = {1983}, type = {mimeo, Department of Government}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Laus:02, author = {Laussel, D.}, title = {Delegation Effects in Representative Democracies: Do They Foster Extremism?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {85}, pages = {191-205}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{LaBr:98, author = {Laussel, Didier and Le Breton, Michel}, title = {Existence of {N}ash equilibria in fiscal competition models}, journal = {Regional Science and Urban Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {28}, pages = {283-296}, number = {3}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Lauw:98, author = {Lauwers, Luc}, title = {Intertemporal objective functions: strong {P}areto versus anonymity}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1998}, volume = {35}, pages = {37-55}, number = {1}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{LaLi:97, author = {Lauwers, L. and Liedekerke, L.}, title = {Sacrificing the Patrol: Utilitarianism, Future Generations and Infinity}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {1997}, volume = {13}, pages = {159-174}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Laux2000, author = {Laux, F. L.}, title = {Addiction as a market failure: Using rational addiction results to justify tobacco regulation}, journal = {Journal of Health Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {44}, pages = {541-550}, key = {health}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Laux:00, author = {Laux, F. L.}, title = {Addiction as a market failure: Using rational addiction results to justifytobacco regulation}, journal = {Journal of Health Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {44}, pages = {541-550}, key = {health} } @BOOK{Lawl:82, title = {Statistical Models and Methods for Lifetime Data}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1982}, author = {Lawless, J. F.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{Laws:07, author = {Lawsky, Sarah}, title = {Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers}, institution = {George Washington University Law School}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {352}, abstract = {Some academics and politicians have proposed that taxpayers should be reimbursed for costs of randomly imposed tax audits, because, they argue, randomly imposing audit costs is unfair. But none of those proposing audit compensation has explained why randomly imposed audit costs are unfair, or why, if these randomly imposed costs are unfair, this unfairness necessarily means that taxpayers should be compensated. These are important questions, because explicit randomness is an essential tool for tax enforcement, and for other areas of law, but its use may be limited if randomness is equated with unfairness. The Article argues that it is fair not to compensate randomly audited taxpayers for their audit costs, because the available of insurance against random audit costs cures fairness concerns under luck egalitarianism. Fairness may nonetheless matter for a less obvious reason: notwithstanding philosophical arguments to the contrary, individuals may perceive random audits as unfair. Empirical work has shown that individuals have a taste for fairness in tax law, and that the perception that tax law is unfair may reduce tax compliance. Therefore, perceived unfairness should be of concern to welfarists, among others. Based on a comparison of random audits with other burdens randomly imposed by the government, the Article concludes that perceived unfairness may warrant nominal compensation for random audit costs. The costs of the perceived unfairness of random audits, as opposed to other types of randomly imposed burdens, may be particularly high because of general ignorance about, and negative perceptions of, our tax system. Compensation for random audit costs is therefore warranted not because it is actually unfair to impose audit costs randomly, but rather because such compensation may help to overcome perceptions of unfairness and thus to increase overall tax compliance.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Laya:80HS, author = {Layard, P. R. G.}, title = {Human satisfactions and public policy}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1980}, volume = {90}, pages = {737-730}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Layard1980b, author = {Layard, P. R. G.}, title = {Human satisfactions and public policy}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1980}, volume = {90}, pages = {737-730}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Laya:80OT, author = {Richard Layard}, title = {On the Use of Distributional Weights in Social Cost-Benefit Analysis}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1980}, volume = {88}, pages = {1041-1047}, number = {5}, key = {Cost-benefit analysis} } @ARTICLE{LaNiMa:08, author = {Layard, R. and Nickell, S. and Mayraz, G.}, title = {The marginal utility of income}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {1846-1857}, number = {8-9}, month = {August}, abstract = {In normative public economics it is crucial to know how fast the marginal utility of income declines as income increases. One needs this parameter for cost-benefit analysis, for optimal taxation and for the (Atkinson) measurement of inequality. We estimate this parameter using four large cross-sectional surveys of subjective happiness and two panel surveys. Altogether, the data cover over 50 countries and time periods between 1972 and 2005. In each of the six very different surveys, using a number of assumptions, we are able to estimate the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to income. We obtain very similar results from each survey. The highest (absolute) value is 1.34 and the lowest is 1.19, with a combined estimate of 1.26. The results are also very similar for subgroups in the population. Thus, on the basis of our estimates, the marginal utility of income declines somewhat faster than in proportion to the rise in income.}, key = {utility, preference}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.21} } @ARTICLE{Laze:06, author = {Lazear, E. P.}, title = {Speeding, Terrorism and Teaching to the Test}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {71}, pages = {1029-1061}, abstract = {Educators worry that high-stakes testing will induce teachers and their students to focus only on the test and ignore other, untested aspects of knowledge. Some counter that although this may be true, knowing something is better than knowing nothing and many students would benefit even by learning the material that is to be tested. Using the metaphor of deterring drivers from speeding, it is shown that the optimal rules for high-stakes testing depend on the costs of learning and of monitoring. Incentives need to be concentrated for those whose costs of action are high. For high cost learners this implies announcing the exact requirements of the test. For more able students, a more amorphous standard produces superior results. This is analogous to announcing where the police are when the detection costs are high. Other applications are discussed.}, key = {incentives}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Laze:86, author = {Lazear, E. P.}, title = {Retail Pricing and Clearance Sales}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1986}, volume = {76}, pages = {14-32}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{LaMi:80, author = {Lazear, M. and Michael, R.}, title = {Family size and the distribution of real percapita income}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1980}, volume = {70}, pages = {91-107}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{LeBWe:99, author = {{Le Breton }, Michel and Weymark, John A.}, title = {Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {47-85}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{Lebr:94, author = {Le Breton, M.}, title = {Inequality, Poverty Measurement and Welfare Dominance: At Attempt at Unification}, booktitle = {Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, pages = {120-140}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{LeBrSe:99, author = {Le Breton, M and Sen A.}, title = {Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness and Decomposability}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {605-628}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{LeBPu:09, author = {Le Breton, M. and Peluso, E.}, title = {Third-degree stochastic dominance and inequality measurement}, journal = {Journal Of Economic Inequality}, year = {2009}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.10}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2275/content/9xl130455q726358/fulltext.pdf} } @ARTICLE{LeTr:87, author = {Le Breton, M. and Trannoy, A.}, title = {Measures of inequality as an aggregation of individual preferances aboutincome distribution: The {A}rrowian case}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1987}, volume = {41}, pages = {248-269}, number = {4}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{LeTU:85, author = {Le Breton, M. and Trannoy, A. and Uriate, J. R.}, title = {Topological aggregation of inequality preorder}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1985}, volume = {2}, pages = {119-129}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{LeSe:99, author = {{Le Breton}, M. and Sen, A.}, title = {Separable Preferences, Strategy-Proofness and Decomposability}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67,3}, pages = {6-5-628}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{LeTaWe:87, author = {Lea, S. E. G. and Tarpy, R. M. and Webley, P.}, title = {The Individual in The Economy}, year = {1987}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {economic psychology}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} } @ARTICLE{LeMa:99, author = {Leamer, E. E. and Maul, H. and Rodriguez, S. and Schott, P. K.}, title = {Does Natural Resource Abundance Increase {L}atin {A}merican Income Inequality?}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {59}, pages = {3-42}, key = {development} } @ARTICLE{Lebe:59, author = {Lebergott, S.}, title = {The shape of the income distribution}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1959}, volume = {49}, pages = {328-347.}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{LeFaLo:02, author = {Lederman, D. and Fajnzylber, P. R. and Loayza, N.}, title = {Inequality and Violent Crime}, journal = {Journal of Law and Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {45 (1)}, abstract = {In this article we take an empirical cross-country perspective to investigatethe robustness and causality of the link between income inequality andcrime rates. First, we study the correlation between the Gini index and,respectively, homicide and robbery rates along different dimensions ofthe data (within and between countries). Second, we examine the inequality-crimelink when other potential crime determinants are controlled for. Third,we control for the likely joint endogeneity of income inequality in orderto isolate its exogenous impact on homicide and robbery rates. Fourth,we control for the measurement error in crime rates by modelling it asboth unobserved country-specific effects and random noise. Lastly, we examinethe robustness of the inequality crime-link to alternative measures ofinequality. The sample for estimation consists of panels of non-overlapping5-year averages for 39 countries over 1965-95 in the case of homicidesand 37 countries over 1970-1994 in the case of robberies. We use a varietyof statistical techniques, from simple correlation to regression analysisand from static OLS to dynamic GMM estimation. We find that crime ratesand inequality are positively correlated (within each country and, particularly,between countries) and it appears that this correlation reflects causationfrom inequality to crime rates, even controlling for other crime determinants.}, key = {Crime} } @ARTICLE{Lede:07, author = {Lederman,L.}, title = {Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance}, journal = {Stanford Law Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {60}, abstract = {Recent legal and economic scholarship has recognized that the government can use "structural" systems as an efficient way to reduce prohibited behavior. For example, speed bumps help reduce violations of posted speed limits without government monitoring of speeders. The federal tax system also uses structural mechanisms, such as withholding taxes, to foster compliance. However, unlike speed bumps, withholding relies on third parties to the taxpayer/government relationship. The use of structural systems to reduce tax evasion need not be limited to tax administration. The article argues that substantive federal income tax law can - and in many contexts does - foster compliance by making use of the structural incentives of third parties. Although this phenomenon has gone largely unnoticed, third parties are routinely used by the tax system to verify the bona fides of taxpayer claims in diverse contexts involving reimbursed amounts and other receipts. Given the importance to tax policy that a tax be enforceable, it is neither troubling nor likely accidental that although many items that implicitly have been vouched for by a third party are excludible, the deduction of comparable but unverified amounts, such as unreimbursed employee business expenses, is restricted. Yet, third parties do not always behave in ways that are helpful for tax enforcement. They certainly can facilitate tax avoidance or evasion, as the corporate tax shelter phenomenon has shown. The article therefore identifies contexts in which a third party will have an incentive to collude with the taxpayer rather than acting at arm's length. The article argues that these contexts are ones that the government needs to scrutinize closely and, in certain cases, obstruct with legislation. By contrast, the government can afford to free ride on the incentives of third parties in contexts in which the transfer of funds from a third party to the taxpayer is a zero-sum game.}, key = {tax compliance}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @INCOLLECTION{Ledy:95, author = {Ledyard, J. O.}, title = {Public goods: A survey of experimental research}, booktitle = {The {H}andbook of {E}xperimental {E}conomics}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1995}, editor = {Kagel, J. H. and Roth, A. E.}, address = {New Jersey}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{LePa:02, author = {Ledyard, J. O. and Palfrey, T. R.}, title = {The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {83}, pages = {153-171}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{LePa:99, author = {John O. Ledyard and Thomas R. Palfrey}, title = {A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {435-448}, number = {2}, key = {public goods} } @TECHREPORT{LeHi:98, author = {Anthony Lee and John Hills}, title = {New Cycles of Disadvantage? Report of a Conference Organised by {CASE} onBehalf of {ESRC} for {HM} Treasury}, institution = {Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion}, year = {1998}, type = {Case Report}, number = {1}, month = {July}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{LeSo:06, author = {Lee, C. and Solon, G.}, title = {Trends in the Intergenerational Income Mobility}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {12007}, address = {NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138}, month = {January}, abstract = {Previous studies of recent U.S. trends in intergenerational income mobility have produced widely varying results, partly because of large sampling errors. By making more efficient use of the available information in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we generate more reliable estimates of the recent time-series variation in intergenerational mobility. Our results, which pertain to the cohorts born between 1952 and 1975, do not reveal major changes in intergenerational mobility.}, key = {income distribution}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{Lee2003, author = {Lee, Gea M}, title = {Upgrading, Degrading, and Intertemporal Price Discrimination}, journal = {Contributions to Theoretical Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {3}, pages = {1056-1056}, number = {3}, note = {available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/bep/thecon/v3y2003i1p1056-1056.html}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.07} } @TECHREPORT{Lee:04, author = {Lee,J.}, title = {Prize and Risk-Taking Strategy in Tournaments: Evidence from ProfessionalPoker Players}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2004}, abstract = {This study examines whether people optimally respond to prize incentivesfor risk taking in tournaments. I exploit the television game show WorldPoker Tour as a natural experiment. The results show that professionalplayers strategically choose the degree of risk taking depending on theincentives implied by the prize structure they face. I find that they aremore sensitive to losses than to gains.}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{LeeK:01, author = {Lee, K.}, title = {Tax evasion and self-insurance}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {81}, pages = {73-81}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{LeeK:98TE, author = {Lee, K.}, title = {Tax Evasion, Monopoly and Nonneutral Profit Taxes}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1998}, volume = {51}, pages = {333-338}, key = {Tax compliance - firms} } @ARTICLE{LeeK:98UI, author = {Lee, Kangoh}, title = {Uncertain income and redistribution in a federal system}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {69}, pages = {413-433}, number = {3}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{LeGo:05, author = {Lee,Y. and Gordon,R.}, title = {Tax structure and economic growth}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {1027-1043}, abstract = {Past theoretical work predicts that higher corporate tax rates should decreaseeconomic growth rates, while the effects of high personal tax rates areless clear. In this paper, we explore how tax policies in fact affect acountry’s growth rate, using cross-country data during 1970-1997. We findthat statutory corporate tax rates are significantly negatively correlatedwith cross-sectional differences in average economic growth rates, controllingfor various other determinants of economic growth, and other standard taxvariables. In fixed-effect regressions, we again find that increases incorporate tax rates lead to lower future growth rates within countries.The coefficient estimates suggest that a cut in the corporate tax rateby 10 percentage points will raise the annual growth rate by one to twopercentage points.}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Leet:00, author = {Leete, L.}, title = {Wage Equity and Employee Motivation in Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizations}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2000}, volume = {43,4}, pages = {423-446}, key = {labour} } @BOOK{Lehm:83, title = {Theory of point estimation}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1983}, author = {Lehmann, E. L.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Lehr:98, author = {Lehrer, Ehud}, title = {Comparison of experts}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {30}, pages = {207-214}, number = {2}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{LeNoPl:01, author = {Lei, Vivian and Noussair, Charles N. and Plott, Charles R.}, title = {Nonspeculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2001}, volume = {69}, pages = {831--859}, number = {4}, abstract = {We report the results of an experiment designed to study the role of speculation in the formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets. In a setting in which speculation is not possible, bubbles and crashes are observed. The results suggest that the departures from fundamental values are not caused by the lack of common knowledge of rationality leading to speculation, but rather by behavior that itself exhibits elements of irrationality. Much of the trading activity that accompanies bubble formation, in markets where speculation is possible, is due to the fact that there is no other activity available for participants in the experiment.}, copyright = {Copyright © 2001 The Econometric Society}, issn = {00129682}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Jul., 2001}, publisher = {The Econometric Society} } @TECHREPORT{LeMoRoDo:07, author = {Leider, Stephen and Mobius, Markus and Rosenblat, Tanya and Do, Quoc-Anh}, title = {Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks: How much is a Friend Worth?}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {13135}, abstract = {We conduct field experiments in a large real-world social network to examine why decision makers treat friends more generously than strangers. Subjects are asked to divide surplus between themselves and named partners at various social distances, where only one of the decisions is implemented. In order to separate altruistic and future interaction motives, we implement an anonymous treatment where neither player is told at the end of the experiment which decision was selected for payment and a non-anonymous treatment where both players are told. Moreover, we include both games where transfers increase and decrease social surplus to distinguish between different future interaction channels including signaling one's generosity and enforced reciprocity, where the decision maker treats the partner to a favor because she can expect it to be repaid in the future. We can decompose altruistic preferences into baseline altruism towards any partner and directed altruism towards friends. Decision makers vary widely in their baseline altruism, but pass at least 50 percent more surplus to friends compared to strangers when decision making is anonymous. Under non-anonymity, transfers to friends increase by an extra 24 percent relative to strangers, but only in games where transfers increase social surplus. This effect increases with density of the network structure between both players, but does not depend on the average amount of time spent together each week. Our findings are well explained by enforced reciprocity, but not by signaling or preference-based reciprocity. We also find that partners' expectations are well calibrated to directed altruism, but that they ignore decision makers' baseline altruism. Partners with high baseline altruism have friends with higher baseline altruism and are therefore treated better.}, key = {Altruism}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Leig:07, author = {Leigh, Andrew}, title = {How Closely Do Top Income Shares Track Other Measures of Inequality?}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2007}, volume = {117}, pages = {619 - 633}, abstract = {In recent years, researchers have used taxation statistics to estimate the share of total income held by the richest groups, such as the top 10% or the top 1%. Compiling a standardised top income shares dataset for 13 developed countries, I find that there is a strong and significant relationship between top income shares and broader inequality measures, such as the Gini coefficient. This suggests that panel data on top income shares may be a useful substitute for other measures of inequality over periods when alternative income distribution measures are of low quality, or unavailable.}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @INCOLLECTION{AtPi:07AU, author = {Leigh,A. and Atkinson,A.B.}, title = {The distribution of Top Income in Australia}, booktitle = {Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @INCOLLECTION{LeAt:07NZ, author = {Leigh, A. and Atkinson,A.B}, title = {The Distribution of Top Incomes in New Zealand}, booktitle = {Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @TECHREPORT{LeEn:07, author = {Leigh,A. and van der Eng, P.}, title = {Top Incomes in Indonesia, 1920-2004}, institution = {Centre for Economic Policy Research}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion paper}, number = {DP549}, abstract = {Using taxation and household survey data, this paper estimates top income shares for Indonesia during 1920-2004. Our results suggest that top income shares grew during the 1920s and 1930s, but fell in the post-war era. In more recent decades, we observe a sharp rise in top income shares during the late-1990s, coincident with the economic downturn, and some evidence that top income shares fell in the early-2000s. For pre-war Indonesia, we decompose top income shares by income source, and find that for groups below the top 0.5 percent, a majority of income was derived from wages. Throughout the twentieth century, top income shares in Indonesia have been higher than in India, broadly comparable to Japan, and somewhat lower than levels prevailing in the United States.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Leit:97, author = {Leite-Monteiro, Manuel}, title = {Redistributive policy with labour mobility across countries}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {229-244}, number = {2}, month = {August}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{LeVe:98, author = {Lejour, Arjan M. and Verbon, Harrie A. A.}, title = {Source-based versus residence-based capital income taxes in a dynamic model}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {14}, pages = {529-541}, number = {3}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Lell:05, author = {Lelli,S.}, title = {Using Functions to Estimate Equivalence Scales}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2005}, volume = {51}, pages = {255-284}, abstract = {Equivalence scales are used to enable welfare comparisons across heterogeneoushouseholds. In this paper, we propose to use the achievement of a certainlevel of functioning as the identifying assumption for the derivation ofequivalence scales. This will allow us not only to deal with welfare comparisonsbetween households of different size and composition, but will also enableus to incorporate other characteristics (such as location and employmentstatus) in the creation of equivalence scales for welfare comparisons.The paper applies this approach to create equivalence scales for the functioning"shelter" using Belgian and Italian data. The analysis shows that the incomedifferences associated with different characteristics only play a smallrole in explaining differences in functionings. An important policy messageis therefore that compensating people for functioning shortfalls in monetaryterms may not be sensible.}, key = {Equivalence scales} } @TECHREPORT{Lemi:07, author = {Lemieux, Thomas}, title = {The Changing Nature of Wage Inequality}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {13523}, abstract = {The paper reviews recent developments in the literature on wage inequality, with a particular focus on why inequality growth has been particularly concentrated in the top end of the wage distribution over the last 15 years. Several possible institutional and demand-side explanations are discussed for the secular growth in wage inequality in the United States and other advanced industrialized countries. The paper concludes that three promising explanations for the growth in top-end wage inequality are de-unionization, the increased prevalence of pay for performance, and changes in the relative demand for the types of tasks performed by workers in high-paying occupations.}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Lemi:06, author = {Lemieux, T.}, title = {Increasing Residual Wage Inequality: Composition Effects, Noisy Data, or Rising Demand for Skill?}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {96}, pages = {461-498}, abstract = {This paper shows that a large fraction of the 1973–2003 growth in residual wage inequality is due to composition effects linked to the secular increase in experience and education, two factors associated with higher within-group wage dispersion. The level and growth in residual wage inequality are also overstated in the March Current Population Survey (CPS) because, unlike the May or Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) CPS, it does not measure directly the hourly wages of workers paid by the hour. The magnitude and timing of the growth in residual wage inequality provide little evidence of a pervasive increase in the demand for skill due to skill-biased technological change.}, key = {wage inequality}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.01} } @TECHREPORT{LeMaPa:07, author = {Lemieux,T. and MacLeod, W.B. and Parent,D.}, title = {PERFORMANCE PAY AND WAGE INEQUALITY}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, number = {13128}, abstract = {We document that an increasing fraction of jobs in the U.S. labor market explicitly pay workers for their performance using bonuses, commissions, or piece-rates. We find that compensation in performance-pay jobs is more closely tied to both observed (by the econometrician) and unobserved productive characteristics of workers. Moreover, the growing incidence of performance-pay can explain 24 percent of the growth in the variance of male wages between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, and accounts for nearly all of the top-end growth in wage dispersion(above the 80th percentile).}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @BOOK{Leni:65, title = {The Tax in Kind: The Significance Of The New Policy And Its Conditions}, publisher = {Progress Publishers}, year = {1965 [1921]}, editor = {Yuri Sdobnikov}, author = {Lenin, V. I.}, volume = {32}, address = {Moscow,} } @ARTICLE{LeShSl:03, author = {Lenter, D. and Slemrod, J. and Shackelford, D.}, title = {Public Disclosure of Corporate Tax Return Information: Accounting, Economics, and Legal Perspectives}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {2003}, volume = {56}, pages = {803-830}, abstract = {This paper offers an overview of the issues raised by disclosure of corporate tax return information by providing current and historical perspectives from the fields of accounting, economics, and law. It reaches a number of conclusions. First, we are concerned that disclosure of the entire corporate tax return could cause companies to dilute the information content of these returns, hampering tax enforcement, and might, even in diluted form, reveal proprietary information that could provide a competitive advantage to those companies that are not required to make such a disclosure. For this reason we do not support full disclosure. The case for considering limited public disclosure of corporate tax return information—revealing a small number of bottom–line items or an expanded reconciliation between tax and book concepts of income—rests on the fact that it would contribute to the transparency of the tax system by clarifying the tax payments of corporations in and of themselves, relative to other corporations, and relative to the income they report on their financial statements. The greater transparency could have several beneficial effects. First, it could put pressure on legislators to improve the tax system. Second, it could induce corporations to resist aggressive tax reduction strategies if they fear that disclosure of their low tax payments would trigger a negative consumer response; whether it would provoke negative investor response is less clear, as more transparency could conceivably induce a race to the bottom of low tax liability. Finally, it could contribute to better functioning of financial markets if it sheds new light on the information presented in financial statements. We find the case for limited disclosure to be compelling enough that we look forward to the next step of considering the best form of disclosure and the details of its implementation.}, key = {tax compliance - firms}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.21}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2072/ehost/pdf?vid=3&hid=116&sid=8d778fbe-df8f-4f3a-bbb3-abc2578d3e49%40sessionmgr102} } @ARTICLE{Leon:47AN, author = {Leontief, W. W.}, title = {A note on the interrelations of subsets of independent variables of a continuousfunction with continuous first derivatives}, journal = {Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society}, year = {1947}, volume = {53}, pages = {343-350} } @ARTICLE{Leon:47IT, author = {Leontief, W. W.}, title = {introduction to a theory of the internal structure of functional relationsips}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1947}, volume = {15}, pages = {361-373}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{LeYi:89, author = {Lerman, R. I. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Improving the accuracy of estimates of the {G}ini coefficient}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1989}, volume = {42}, pages = {43-47}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Lerman1985, author = {Lerman, R. I. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Income inequality effects by income Source: A new approach and applications to the {US}}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1985}, volume = {67}, pages = {151-156}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{LeYi:85, author = {Lerman, R. I. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Income inequality effects by income Source: A new approach and applicationsto the {US}}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1985}, volume = {67}, pages = {151-156}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{LeYi:84, author = {Lerman, R. I. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {A note on the calculation and interpretation of the {G}ini index}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1984}, volume = {15}, pages = {363-368}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{LeR:04, author = {LeRoy, Stephen F.}, title = {Rational Exuberance}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2004}, volume = {42}, pages = {783--804}, number = {3}, copyright = {Copyright © 2004 American Economic Association}, issn = {00220515}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Sep., 2004}, publisher = {American Economic Association} } @TECHREPORT{LeMe:07, author = {Levaggi, Rosella and Menoncin, Francesco}, title = {A note on optimal tax evasion in the presence of merit goods}, institution = {University of Brescia}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {0702}, abstract = {In a recent article Davidson, Lawrence and Wilson propose a model showing that, in the presence of distortionary taxation and goods of different quality, tax evasion can be an optimal device. Here, we show that this result, although quite interesting, cannot be generalised to a frameworkwhere Government activity consists of supplying merit goods and levying taxes to finance their provision}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {merit goods, tax evasion}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Levi:85, author = {Levin, D.}, title = {Taxation Within Cournot Oligopoly}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1985}, volume = {27}, pages = {281-290}, key = {taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{LePl:99, author = {Levin, J. and Plug, E. J. S.}, title = {Instrumenting Education and the Returns to Schooling in the Netherlands}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {521-534}, key = {Education, training} } @ARTICLE{LeSi:70, author = {Levine, D. and Singer, N. M.}, title = {The mathematical relation between the income density function and the measurement of income inequality}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1970}, volume = {38}, pages = {324-330}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Levi:08, author = {Leviner, Sagit}, title = {An Overview: A New Era of Tax Enforcement—From 'Big Stick' to Responsive Regulation}, institution = {University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law \& Economics}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {64}, abstract = {Recent developments in regulation and tax administration in Australia inspired this article on tax compliance and responsive regulation, a concept Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite developed and the Australian tax administration implemented, as an alternative approach to enforcement. The Article begins with a discussion on what has become the dominant approach to tax enforcement of the past three and a half decades: the economics of crime and compliance. It evaluates the key advantages and disadvantages of the economic approach as well as its application to tax. Next, the Article explores responsive regulation as a method that draws on the economic paradigm but that also supplements this approach with other theories, particularly those involving identity, conflict escalation, and procedural justice. The Article suggests that this broader, more balanced, and closely tailored method of regulating responsively may enable regulators to draw on the advantages of the economic model while alleviating some of its drawbacks and that it may therefore constitute a superior method for regulating compliance.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @TECHREPORT{Levi:07, author = {Leviner,S.}, title = {A New Era of Tax Enforcement: From 'Big Stick' to Responsive Regulation}, institution = {University of Michigan}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, number = {68}, abstract = {This paper explores one possible solution to the problem of tax compliance. It is inspired by developments in regulation and tax administration abroad (specifically in Australia), and, particularly, it presents responsive regulation - a concept developed by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite and recently implemented by the Australian tax administration - as an alternative approach to tax enforcement that is worth paying attention to. The responsive regulation approach is based on the proposition that effective enforcement requires a dynamic and gradual application of less to more severe sanctions and regulatory interventions. This range of sanctions and interventions should balance traditional authoritarian deterrence with strategies that rely on persuasion and encouragement through three states of communication: cooperation, toughness, and forgiveness. The Australian approach also advocates for a deeper understanding of the motivations, circumstances, and characteristics of taxpayers so that enforcement can be effectively tailored to deliver compliance. With responsive regulation, the intention is to preserve the basic principles of economic analysis that assume taxpayers are rational actors seeking to maximize their self-interest. But, responsive regulation also takes into consideration situations where taxpayers irrationally resist compliance; the role that social, moral, and ethical considerations play in affecting taxpaying behavior; and, particularly, the manner in which compliance can be shaped by the taxpayer-tax administration relationship. In recent years there has been a growing shift in the tax administration of the United States from emphasizing bright-line rules and regulations as well as their enforcement through penalties and audits toward a more balanced set of strategies that highlights quality of service and respectful and fair treatment of taxpayers. With the Australian tax administration taking what can be seen as the next step forward in terms of enforcement and research in compliance, the U.S. may find that the Australian approach is quite relevant and fits with the current trends in both countries.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{LeLi:07, author = {Levitt,S.D. and List,J.A.}, title = {What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2007}, volume = {21}, pages = {153-174}, number = {2}, key = {social choice}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{LeMu:92, author = {Levy, F. and Murnane, R.,}, title = {{US} Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: A Review of Recent Trade andProposed Explanations,}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature,}, year = {1992}, volume = {30,}, pages = {1333-1381}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{Levy1992, author = {Levy, F. and Murnane, R.,}, title = {{US} Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: A Review of Recent Trade and Proposed Explanations,}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature,}, year = {1992}, volume = {30,}, pages = {1333-1381}, key = {wages}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{LeTe:07, author = {Levy, F. and Temin, P.}, title = {Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2007}, type = {Working papers}, number = {13106}, abstract = {We provide a comprehensive view of widening income inequality in the United States contrasting conditions since 1980 with those in earlier postwar years. We argue that the income distribution in each period was strongly shaped by a set of economic institutions. The early postwar years were dominated by unions, a negotiating framework set in the Treaty of Detroit, progressive taxes, and a high minimum wage -- all parts of a general government effort to broadly distribute the gains from growth. More recent years have been characterized by reversals in all these dimensions in an institutional pattern known as the Washington Consensus. Other explanations for income disparities including skill-biased technical change and international trade are seen as factors operating within this broader institutional story.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Levy:08, author = {Levy, Haim}, title = {First Degree Stochastic Dominance Violations: Decision Weights and Bounded Rationality}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2008}, volume = {118}, pages = {759 - 774}, abstract = {Expected Utility Theory, Rank Dependent Expected Utility and Cumulative Prospect Theory imply no First Degree Stochastic Dominance (FSD) violations. Prospect Theory and Configural Weight models either allow for FSD violation or even predict this phenomenon. I find experimentally that FSD violations are not significant, and hence conclude that they are due to bounded rationality rather than to a systematic and predictable effect. Moreover, the more transparent the FSD, the less violations are observed, which supports the bounded rationality hypothesis. Therefore, based on the FSD violations observed in my experiments, the above three paradigms cannot be rejected.}, key = {Prospect Theory}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{Levy:94, author = {Levy, H.}, title = {Absolute and relative risk aversion: an experimental study}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1994}, volume = {8}, pages = {289-307}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Levy:77, author = {Levy, H.}, title = {The definition of risk: an extension}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1977}, volume = {14}, pages = {232-234}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{LeCh:06, author = {Levy, J. and Chemerynski, S. and Tuchmann, J.}, title = {Incorporating Concepts of Inequality and Inequity into Health Benefit Analysis}, journal = {International Journal for Equity in Health}, year = {2006}, volume = {5}, pages = {2-50}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @BOOK{Levy:95, title = {Essential Microeconomics for Public Policy Analysis}, publisher = {The Eurospan Group}, year = {1996}, author = {Levy, J. M.}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{LeLe:91, title = {Sampling of Populations: Methods and Applications}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1991}, author = {Levy, P. and Lemeshaw, S.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Levy:97, author = {Levy, R.}, title = {Risk and return: an experimental analysis}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1997}, volume = {forthcoming}, key = {uncertainty} } @INCOLLECTION{Lewb:97, author = {Lewbel, A.}, title = {Consumer demand systems and household equivalence scales}, booktitle = {Handbook of Applied Econometrics}, year = {1997}, editor = {Pesaran, M. H. and Schmidt, P.}, pages = {167-201}, key = {Equivalence scales} } @ARTICLE{Lewi:A, author = {Lewis, A.}, title = {The Psychology of Taxation}, year = {1982}, address = {Oxford}, key = {economic psychology}, publisher = {Martin Robertson} } @ARTICLE{Lewi:79, author = {Lewis, A.}, title = {An empirical assessment of tax mentality}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1979}, volume = {34}, pages = {245-257}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Lewi:78, author = {Lewis, A.}, title = {Perception of tax rates}, journal = {British Tax Review}, year = {1978}, volume = {6}, pages = {358-366}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{Lewi:84, title = {Women in {E}ngland 1870-1950}, publisher = {Wheatsheaf Books}, year = {1984}, author = {Lewis, J.}, address = {Brighton}, key = {social policy} } @ARTICLE{LeUl:88, author = {Lewis, Q. W. and Ulph, D. T.}, title = {Poverty, inequality and welfare}, journal = {Economic Journal conference papers supplement}, year = {1988}, volume = {98}, pages = {117-131}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{LiSqZo:98, author = {Li, H. and Squire, L. and Zou, H.}, title = {Explaining International and Intertemporal Variations in Income Inequality}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1998}, volume = {108}, pages = {26-43}, key = {income inequality}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.03} } @ARTICLE{LiHs:98, author = {Li, Q. and Hsiao, C.}, title = {Testing serial correlation in semiparametric panel data models}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1998}, volume = {87}, pages = {207-237}, number = {2}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Libe:01, author = {Liberati, P.}, title = {The Distributional Effects of Indirect Tax Changes in {I}taly}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2001}, volume = {8}, pages = {27-51}, abstract = {This paper evaluates the distributional and welfare effects of two recentchanges of Value Added Tax (VAT) and excise taxes in Italy applying andcomparing two related and complementary methods of analysis: the firstbased on the distributional characteristics of Feldstein (1972) and recentlyapplied by Newbery (1995); the second based on the theory of marginal dominancedeveloped by Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1996). The paper finds no evidence thatthe reforms have redistributed purchasing power among households. But themost striking result is that a simpler two-rate VAT structure, set accordingto the European directives on VAT coordination, could have replaced thepresent system producing the same revenue and increasing welfare. Thislast result provides a clear instance in which reducing the number of VATrates can be welcome even in the presence of distributional concerns.}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{LiFe:07, author = {Libman, A. and Feld, L. P.}, title = {Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralisation: The Case of Russia}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2031}, month = {June}, abstract = {In a centralized federation, where tax rates and taxation rules are set by the federal government, manipulating the thoroughness of tax auditing and the effectiveness of tax collection could be attractive for regional authorities because of a variety of reasons. These range from tax competition to principal-agent problems, state capture and benefits of fiscal equalisation. In this paper we discuss strategic tax auditing and collection from the perspective of fiscal federalism and test for strategic tax collection empirically using data of the Russian Federation. Russia’s regional authorities in the 1990s have always been suspect of tax auditing manipulations in their favour. However, in the 2000s increasing bargaining power of the centre seems to induce tax collection bodies in the regions to manipulate tax auditing in favour of the federation. We find partial evidence in favour of both of these hypotheses.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Lichtenstein1983, author = {Lichtenstein, S. and Slovic, P.}, title = {Response-Induced Reversals in Gambling: An Extended Replication in {L}as {V}egas}, journal = {Joural of Experimental Psychology}, year = {1983}, volume = {101}, pages = {16-20}, key = {risk}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{LiSl:71, author = {Lichtenstein, S. and Slovic, P.}, title = {Reversal of Preference Between Bids and Choices in Gambling Decisions}, journal = {Joural of Experimental Psychology}, year = {1983}, volume = {89}, pages = {46-55}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{LiSl:83, author = {Lichtenstein, S. and Slovic, P.}, title = {Response-Induced Reversals in Gambling: An Extended Replication in {L}as{V}egas}, journal = {Joural of Experimental Psychology}, year = {1983}, volume = {101}, pages = {16-20}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{LiSc:03, author = {Ligon, E and Schechter, L.}, title = {Measuring Vulnerability}, journal = {Economic Journal.}, year = {2003}, volume = {113}, pages = {C95-C102}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Like:69, author = {Likes, J.}, title = {Minimum Variance Unbiased Estimates of the Parameters of Power Function and {P}areto's Distribution}, journal = {Statistische Hefte}, year = {1969}, volume = {10}, pages = {104-110}, key = {Distributions} } @ARTICLE{Likh:07, author = {Likhovski}, title = {'Training in Citizenship': Tax Compliance and Modernity}, journal = {Law and Social Inquiry}, year = {2007}, volume = {32}, pages = {665 - 700}, abstract = {The last decade has witnessed the rise of a large corporate tax shelter industry, employing lawyers, accountants, and bankers. The deeds of this industry have scandalized public opinion and led to major Senate and Department of Justice investigations (U.S. Senate 2005; Bankman 1998, 2004; Southern Methodist University Law Review 2001; Tax Law Review 2002; Morse 2006). The appearance of this industry has also prompted lawmakers and scholars to suggest various nontraditional remedies to deal with the problem including publicity and shaming provisions (Posner 2000; Kirsch 2004; Kornhauser 2005).}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{LiWe:70, author = {Lillard, L. A. and Weiss, Y.}, title = {Components of variation in panel earnings data: {A}merican scientists 1960-1970}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, volume = {47}, pages = {437-454}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Lillard1978, author = {Lillard, L. A. and Willis}, title = {Earnings mobility}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1978}, pages = {9??}, key = {wages}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{LiWi:78, author = {Lillard, L. A. and Willis, R. J.}, title = {Earnings mobility}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1978}, volume = {46}, pages = {985-1012}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{LiSh:92, author = {Lim, H. L. and Shumway, R.}, title = {Profit Maximization, Returns to Scale and Measurement Error}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1992}, volume = {74}, pages = {430-438}, key = {measurement error} } @ARTICLE{Lima:06, author = {Lim{\~a}o, N.}, title = {Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the United States}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {96}, pages = {896-914}, key = {macro}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.01} } @ARTICLE{Lin:07, author = {Lin, A. C.-H.}, title = {Education Expansion, Educational Inequality, and Income Inequality: Evidence from Taiwan, 1976-2003}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {80}, pages = {601-615}, abstract = {The expansion of higher education in Taiwan starting from the late 1980s has successfully raised the average level of education. Using the concept of the education Gini, we find that the educational inequality declined as average schooling rose during the period of 1976–2003. The impacts of a rising average schooling and a declining educational inequality are also tested empirically in this paper. The evidence supports that a higher level of average schooling will generate a lower income inequality. On the other hand, a lower educational inequality, as measured by education Gini coefficient, will also cause a lower income inequality. Skill-biased technological change that shifts the labor demand from unskilled workers toward skilled workers is the most likely cause for the rising income inequality in Taiwan. However, the trend of rising income inequality could be reversed due to possible future over-education and unemployment in the labor market.}, key = {education}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Lin:98, author = {Lin, Shuanglin}, title = {Government education spending and human capital formation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {61}, pages = {391-393}, number = {3}, key = {education, training} } @ARTICLE{Lin:90, author = {Lin, T.}, title = {Relation between the {G}ini coefficient and the {K}uznets ratio of {MEP}}, journal = {Jahrbuch von National{\"o}konomie und Statistik}, year = {1990}, volume = {207}, pages = {36-46}, number = {2}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{LiZhYaLi:08, author = {Lin, T. and Zhuang, J. and Yarcia, D. and Lin, F.}, title = {Income Inequality in the {P}eople's {R}epublic of {C}hina and Its Decomposition: 1990-2004}, journal = {Asian Development Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {25}, pages = {119-136}, abstract = {This paper estimates income inequality in the People’s Republic of China at the national, regional, and provincial levels using extrapolated unit-level household income data covering urban and rural populations of 23 provinces during 1990–2004. The estimates indicate that income inequality increased significantly during the last two decades, but the extent of the increases was lower than reported in most sources by about 20 percent when regional differences in cost of living are adjusted. The major sources of the increases in inequality were found to be within urban inequality and between urban and rural inequality, with their contribution increasing, respectively, from 15.7 and 12.0 percent in 1990, to 34.0 and 30.4 percent in 2004. The betweenregion and between-province inequality only accounted for 3.8 and 11.2 percent, respectively, in 2004.}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.09.06}, url = {http://www.adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/ADR/ADR-Vol25-1-2-Yarcia.pdf} } @ARTICLE{Lind2003, author = {Lind, J. T.}, title = {Aggregation of utility and equivalence scales: A solution to the {P}angloss technique}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2003}, volume = {49}, pages = {555-568}, key = {Equivalence scales}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Lind:03, author = {Lind, J. T.}, title = {Aggregation of utility and equivalence scales: A solution to the {P}anglosstechnique}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2003}, volume = {49}, pages = {555-568}, key = {Equivalence scales} } @INCOLLECTION{Lind:19, author = {Lindahl, E.}, title = {Positive {L}{\"o}sung, die {G}erechtigkeit der {B}esteuerung, reprinted as ``Justtaxation - a positive solution"}, booktitle = {Classics in the Theory of Public Finance}, publisher = {Macmillan, London}, year = {1919}, editor = {Musgrave, R. A. and Peacock, A. T.}, key = {public goods} } @INCOLLECTION{Lindert:98, author = {Lindert, P. H.}, title = {Three centuries of Inequality in {Britain} and {A}merica}, booktitle = {Handbook of Income Distribution}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1998}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Bourguignon, F.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{LiEmRo:00, author = {Lindholm, L. A. and Emmelin, M. A. and Rosen, M. E.}, title = {Health Maximization Rejected}, journal = {European Journal of Public Health}, year = {1997}, volume = {7}, pages = {405-410}, key = {health} } @BOOK{LiMi:66, title = {Cambridge Elementary Statistical Tables}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1966}, author = {Lindley, D. V. and Miller, J. C. P.}, address = {London}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Lind:94, author = {Lindsay, B. G.}, title = {Efficienct versus {R}obustness: The {C}ase for minimum {H}ellinger distanceand related Methods}, journal = {The Annals of Statistics}, year = {1994}, volume = {22}, pages = {1081-1114}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Lindsay1994, author = {Lindsay, B. G.}, title = {Efficienct versus {R}obustness: The {C}ase for minimum {H}ellinger distance and related Methods}, journal = {The Annals of Statistics}, year = {1994}, volume = {22}, pages = {1081-1114}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Lint:96, author = {Linton, Oliver}, title = {Edgeworth approximation for minpin estimators in semiparametric regressionmodels}, journal = {Econometric Theory}, year = {1996}, volume = {12}, pages = {30-60}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Linton1996, author = {Linton, Oliver}, title = {Edgeworth approximation for minpin estimators in semiparametric regression models}, journal = {Econometric Theory}, year = {1996}, volume = {12}, pages = {30-60}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Lint:95, author = {Linton, Oliver}, title = {Second order approximation in the partially linear regression model}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1995}, volume = {63}, pages = {1079-1112}, number = {5}, month = {September}, key = {econometrics} } @TECHREPORT{LiHa:94, author = {Linton, O. B. and H{\"a}rdle, W.}, title = {Applied Nonparametric Methods}, year = {1994}, type = {Cowles Discussion Paper}, number = {1069}, address = {Yale University}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Lipm:86, author = {Lipman, B. L.}, title = {Cooperation among Egoist's in Prisoners'Dilemma and Chicken Games}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {1986}, volume = {51}, pages = {315-331}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Lipp:01, author = {Lippert-{R}asmussen, K.}, title = {Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility}, journal = {Ethics}, year = {2001}, volume = {111}, pages = {548-579}, key = {economic psychology}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @PHDTHESIS{Liso:08, author = {Lisowsky,}, title = {'Seeking Shelter': Empirically Modeling Tax Shelters and Examining Their Link to the Contingent Tax Liability Reserve}, school = {Boston University School of Management}, year = {2008}, abstract = {for inferring the likelihood that a firm engages in a tax shelter. The Treasury (1999) white paper on tax shelters is used as a conceptual guide in developing publicly available financial statement proxies for the characteristics of tax shelters. Results show that tax shelter likelihood is positively related to the presence of subsidiaries located in tax havens, material foreign operations, prior-year reported effective tax rates, financial complexity, litigation losses, and use of promoters. Validation tests on out-of-sample tax shelter observations indicate the likelihood model can be used generally by researchers, investors, and tax administrators to infer tax shelter likelihood. The use of publicly available information as inputs is central to the model’s usefulness. This paper also reports the first clear empirical link between the contingent tax liability reserve, or tax cushion, and tax shelters. Prior research finds general evidence that the tax cushion is increasing in IRS audit adjustments, suggesting the tax cushion is increasing in tax risk. Tax shelters have been suspected as a reason for this association, but until now no clear empirical link had been established. Results also show that the tax cushion is positively related to financial earnings management. Taken together, the findings suggest that the tax cushion may be subject to both tax and financial reporting pressures.}, institution = {Boston University School of Management}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @ARTICLE{List:06, author = {List, John}, title = {The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Preferences and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2006}, volume = {114}, pages = {1 - 37}, abstract = {The role of the market in mitigating and mediating various forms of behavior is perhaps the central issue facing behavioral economics today. This study designs a field experiment that is explicitly linked to a controlled laboratory experiment to examine whether, and to what extent, social preferences influence outcomes in actual market transactions. While agents drawn from a well-functioning marketplace behave in accord with social preference models in tightly controlled laboratory experiments, when they are observed in their naturally occurring settings, their behavior approaches what is predicted by selfinterest theory. In the limit, much of the observed behavior in the marketplace that is consistent with social preferences is due to reputational concerns: suppliers who expect to have future interactions with buyers provide higher product quality only when the buyer can verify quality via a third-party certifier. The data also speak to theories of how reputation effects enhance market performance. In particular, reputation and the monitoring of quality are found to be complements, and findings suggest that the private market can solve the lemons problem through third-party verification.}, key = {Experimental Economics}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @BOOK{Litt:50, title = {A Critique of Welfare Economics}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1950}, author = {Little, I. M. D.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{LiMi:74, title = {Project Appraisal and Planning in Developing Countries}, publisher = {Heinemann}, year = {1974}, author = {Little, I. M. D. and Mirrlees, J. A.}, address = {London}, key = {development} } @BOOK{Littlewood1953, title = {A Mathematician's Miscellany}, publisher = {Meuthen \& Co. Ltd}, year = {1953}, author = {Littlewood, John E.}, address = {London}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.12.22} } @ARTICLE{Litt:08, author = {Littwin, Angela}, title = {Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit Card Use and Preference Among Low-Income Consumers}, journal = {Texas Law Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {86}, abstract = {The question of whether to re-impose usury restrictions lies at the heart of the debates over consumer credit regulation. Advocates of interest rate regulations argue that creditors are exploiting low-income borrowers, making huge profits while they lure these families into financial traps from which they can never emerge. Opponents of regulation note the benefits of expanding credit to low-income consumers. This debate has continued for more than two decades, but until now no one has asked the affected families their views about access to credit or what safety features they would welcome. This paper presents original data from a study of lowincome women. The findings suggest that usury regulation may be an unnecessarily blunt instrument to provide protection for low-income families, as low-income families themselves can identify credit protection devices that would be more nuanced and more useful.}, institution = {Texas}, key = {Credit}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.09} } @TECHREPORT{Liu:99, author = {Liu, Chuanhai}, title = {Efficient {ML} Estimation of the Multivariate Normal {DistributionFrom}Incomplete Data}, institution = {Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies}, year = {1999}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {Murray Hill, NJ 07974}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{LiLu:06, author = {Liu, H. and Lu, J.}, title = {Measuring the degree of assortative mating}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2006}, volume = {92}, pages = {317-322}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.12} } @ARTICLE{LiSh:98, author = {Liu, L. and Shenoy, P.}, title = {A theory of coarse utility}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1995}, volume = {11}, pages = {17-49}, number = {1}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Liu1987, author = {Liu, P. W.}, title = {Measuring global tax progressivity as weighted deviations from proportional tax: a comment}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1987}, volume = {42}, pages = {435-437}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Liu:87, author = {Liu, P. W.}, title = {Measuring global tax progressivity as weighted deviations from proportionaltax: a comment}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1987}, volume = {42}, pages = {435-437}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Liu:86, author = {Liu, P. W.}, title = {{L}orenz domination and global tax prograssivity: a reply}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {19}, pages = {812-813}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Liu:85, author = {Liu, P. W.}, title = {{L}orenz domination and global tax progressivity}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {1985}, volume = {18}, pages = {395-399}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Liu:84, author = {Liu, P. W.}, title = {A note on two summary measures of tax progressivity}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1984}, volume = {39}, pages = {412-419}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Li:08, author = {Liu, Zhen}, title = {The Dirty Faces Problem with Unawareness}, journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, note = {Topics, Article 28}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.01.12} } @ARTICLE{Lizz:99, author = {Lizzeri, A.}, title = {Budget Deficits and Redistributive Politics}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {909-928}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{Ll-ElBe:00, author = {Lloyd-Ellis, H. and Bernhardt, D.}, title = {Enterprise, Inequality and Economic Development}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, pages = {147-168}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{LoWo:07, author = {Lo, Agnes and Wong, Raymona}, title = {Tax Compliance and Audit Adjustment—An Investigation of the Transfer Pricing Methodologies}, journal = {International Tax Journal}, year = {2007}, volume = {33}, pages = {69 - 81}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Lock:99, author = { Lockwood, }, title = {Inter-Regional Insurance}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {1-37}, number = {1}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Lock:03, author = {Lockwood, B.}, title = {Imperfect competition, the marginal cost of public funds and public goodssupply}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1719–1746}, key = {Local public goods} } @ARTICLE{Lockwood2003, author = {Lockwood, B.}, title = {Imperfect competition, the marginal cost of public funds and public goods supply}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1719-1746}, key = {Local public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Lock:01, author = {Lockwood, B.}, title = {Tax Competition and Tax Co-Ordination under Distination and Origin Principles:A Synthesis}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {81}, pages = {279-319}, key = {Tax competition} } @ARTICLE{Lockwood2001, author = {Lockwood, B.}, title = {Tax Competition and Tax Co-Ordination under Distination and Origin Principles: A Synthesis}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {81}, pages = {279-319}, key = {Tax competition}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{LoMa:79, author = {Loeb, M. and Magat, W. A.}, title = {A decentralized model for utility regulation}, journal = {Journal of Law and Economics}, year = {1979}, volume = {22}, pages = {399-404}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Loew:99, author = {Loewenstein, G.}, title = {Experimental Economics from the Vantage Point of Behavioural Economics}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F25-F34}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{Loewenstein1999, author = {Loewenstein, G.}, title = {Experimental Economics from the Vantage Point of Behavioural Economics}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F25-F34}, key = {experimental}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Loft:85, author = {Loftus, E. F.}, title = {To file, perchance to cheat}, journal = {Psychology Today}, year = {1985}, pages = {35-39}, month = {April}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Logu:06, author = {Logue,K.D.}, title = {Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law is Uncertain}, institution = {University of Michigan Law \& Economics}, year = {2006}, type = {Working paper}, number = {06-009}, abstract = {This Article examines the optimal level of tax compliance and the optimal penalty for noncompliance in circumstances in which the substance of the tax law is uncertain - that is, when the precise application of the Internal Revenue Code to a particular situation is not clear. In such situations, two interesting questions arise: First, as a normative matter, how certain should a taxpayer be before she relies on a particular interpretation of a substantively uncertain tax rule? That is, if a particular position is not clearly prohibited, but neither is it clearly allowed, what is the appropriate threshold of confidence that the taxpayer ought to have before engaging in the transaction? Second, what penalty regime would give the taxpayer the right incentive with respect to relying on substantively uncertain tax law? With these questions in mind, the Article shows that, applying standard assumptions from the economic literature on deterrence, the optimal tax penalty regime - the one that would induce the optimal reliance (or non-reliance) on uncertain tax laws depending on the circumstances - would involve (a) a rule of strict liability with respect to taxes owed as well as to the penalty, and (b) a penalty that roughly approximates the famous Bentham-Becker punitive fine, calculated by dividing the harm (here, the underpaid tax) by the ex ante probability that the harm would be detected. The Article also explains why a fault-based approach to tax penalties, under the standard assumptions of the classical deterrence model, would not work as well as the strict-liability approach.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Loll:04, author = {Lollivier,S.}, title = {Dynamics of Individual Wealth Accumulation: A Use of Simulation Methodsfor Estimating Limited Dependent-Variables Models}, journal = {Economica}, year = {2004}, volume = {71}, pages = {589-618}, abstract = {This paper presents an estimation of the behaviour of wealth accumulation,carried out on panel data. One of the aims of the study is to test someof the predictions resulting from the buffer-stock model of saving, especiallythe unit permanent income elasticity of wealth accumulation and the shapeof the age pro.le. However, in the data available the wealth variable isnot continuous. It is known only through a system of eleven intervals.Therefore, methods based on the use of the simulator by Geweke, Hajivassiliouand Keane have been implemented to obtain consistent estimators.}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Lomn:52, author = {Lomnicki, Z. A.}, title = {The standard error of {G}ini's mean difference}, journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1952}, volume = {23}, pages = {635-637}, key = {inequality}, url = {URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2236592} } @ARTICLE{Lomnicki1952, author = {Lomnicki, Z. A.}, title = {The standard error of {G}ini's mean difference}, journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1952}, volume = {23}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Long:80, title = {The Internal Revenue Service: Measuring Tax Offense and Enforcement Response}, publisher = {US Department of Justice}, year = {1980}, author = {Long, S. B.}, address = {Washington}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Loom:99, author = {Loomes, G.}, title = {Some Lessons from Past Experiments and Some Challenges for the Future}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F35-F45}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{Loomes1999, author = {Loomes, G.}, title = {Some Lessons from Past Experiments and Some Challenges for the Future}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F35-F45}, key = {experimental}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Loom:98, author = {Loomes, G.}, title = {Probability vs Money: a test off some fundamental assumption about rationaldecision making}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1998}, volume = {108}, pages = {477-489}, number = {447}, month = {March}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Loomes1990, author = {Loomes, G. and Starmer, C. and Sugden R.}, title = {Preference reversal: Information-Processing effect or rational non-transitive choice?}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1990}, volume = {99}, pages = {140-159}, key = {risk}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{LoStSu:91, author = {Loomes, G. and Starmer, C. and Sugden, R.}, title = {Observing Violations of Transitivity by Experimental Methods}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1991}, volume = {59}, pages = {425-439}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Loomes1989, author = {Loomes, G. and Starmer, C. and Sugden, R.}, title = {Preference reversal: Information-Processing effect or rational non-transitive choice?}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1989}, volume = {99}, pages = {140-159}, key = {risk}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{LoStSu:89, author = {Loomes, G. and Starmer, C. and Sugden, R.}, title = {Preference reversal: Information-Processing effect or rational non-transitivechoice?}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1989}, volume = {99}, pages = {140-159}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{LoSu:98, author = {Loomes, G. and Sugden, R.}, title = {Testing different stochastic specifications of risky choice}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {581-598}, number = {260}, month = {November}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{LoSu:83, author = {Loomes, G. and Sugden, R.}, title = {A rationale for preference reversal}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1983}, volume = {73}, pages = {428-432}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{LoSu:82, author = {Loomes, G. and Sugden, R.}, title = {Testing different stochastic specifications of risky choice}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1982}, volume = {92}, pages = {805-824}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{LoPeChBr:98, author = {Loomis, John and Peterson, George and Champ, Patricia and Brown, Thomasand Lucero, Beatrice}, title = {Paired comparison estimates of willingness to accept versus contingent valuationestimates of willingness to pay}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {35}, pages = {501-515}, number = {4}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{Lope:97, author = {Lopez-Cunat, Javier M.}, title = {Adverse Selection Under Complete Ignorance}, institution = {Institut Valencia D'Investigacions Economiques}, year = {1997}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {WP-AD 97-18}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{Lope:95, author = {Lopez-Cunat,J. M.}, title = {Multiple Adverse Selection}, institution = {Instituto Valenciano de Inestigaciones Economicas}, year = {1995}, number = {22}, address = {Spain}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Lope:98, author = {Lopez-Garcia, Miguel-Angel}, title = {On welfare and revenue effects of indirect tax harmonization}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {60}, pages = {185-193}, number = {2}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Lore:05, author = {Lorenz, M. O.}, title = {Methods for Measuring Concentration of Wealth}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1905}, volume = {9}, pages = {209-219}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Lorz:98, author = {Lorz, Oliver}, title = {Capital mobility, tax competition and lobbying for redistributive capitaltaxation}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {14}, pages = {265-279}, number = {2}, key = {Tax competition} } @ARTICLE{Lorz:97, author = {Lorz, Oliver}, title = {A {B}ertrand model of wage competition with capital mobility}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {56}, pages = {339-343}, number = {3}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{LoRo:91, author = {Lott, John R and Roberts, Russell D.}, title = {A Guide to the Pitfalls if Identifying Price Discrimination}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, year = {1991}, volume = {29}, pages = {14--23}, number = {1}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.08} } @ARTICLE{Love1976, author = {Love, R. and Wolfson, M. C.}, title = {Income inequality: statistical methodology and {C}anadian illustrations}, journal = {Statistics Canada, Catalogue 13-559 Occasional}, year = {1976}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{LoWo:76, author = {Love, R. and Wolfson, M. C.}, title = {Income inequality: statistical methodology and {C}anadian illustrations}, institution = {Statistics Canada}, year = {1976}, type = {Occasional Paper}, number = {13-559}, journal = {Statistics Canada, Catalogue 13-559 Occasional}, key = {inequality}, publisher = {Statistics Canada, Catalogue 13-559 Occasional} } @BOOK{LSE:05, title = {The Identity Project an assessment of the UK Identity Cards Bill and itsimplications}, publisher = {LSE, the department of information system}, year = {2005}, author = {LSE, the department of information system}, key = {Social Policy} } @ARTICLE{Lska:07, author = {Lskavyan, Vahe}, title = {A Rational Choice Explanation for Stalin's Great Terror}, journal = {Economics and Politics}, year = {2007}, volume = {19}, pages = {259 - 287}, abstract = {There is no agreement about the reasons for Stalin’s Great Terror of 1937–1939. This paper argues that the problem faced by Stalin was similar to the standard principal–agent problem: the country was run as one enormous firm with Stalin as the only residual claimant. The monetary incentive structure was inadequate and the threat of mass shirking by the agents was real. A simple model of a principal with two agents is developed to address the problem. Assuming that the agents can observe and can reveal each other’s shirking, it is shown that, under some assumptions, an equilibrium exists with the following strategy profiles: unless someone’s shirking is revealed, the principal is committed to randomly punishing one of the agents with positive probability; an individual agent never shirks and always reveals a co-worker’s shirking. A case study of the period is used to check the plausibility of this hypothesis.}, key = {Rational Choice}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Lubk:07, author = {Lubker, Malte}, title = {Inequality and the demand for redistribution: are the assumptions of the new growth theory valid?}, journal = {Socio-Economic Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {5}, pages = {117 - 148}, abstract = {One prominent strand of the new growth theory has identified the political process as a potential channel to link high inequality to lower long-term growth. Several authors have argued that (i) higher inequality causes higher demand for redistribution, (ii) which leads to greater redistribution and higher taxes, and (iii) which is in turn harmful to growth. This article addresses the first step of this argument, a proposition that has been widely accepted as a stylized fact. Using cross section data for 26 countries from the ISSP’s module on Social Inequality, it presents an empirical test that yields no support for the idea that public support for redistribution rises with inequality across countries. This finding is attributed to the influence of social justice norms that vary greatly between groups of culturally similar countries.}, key = {Redistribution}, keywords = {income distribution, redistribution, new growth theory, rational choice, political sociology}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Luce:66, author = {Luce, R. D.}, title = {Two extensions of coinjoint measurement}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Psychology}, year = {1966}, volume = {3}, pages = {348-370}, key = {utility, preference}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.12.20} } @ARTICLE{LuNgMaAc:08, author = {Luce, R. D. and Ng, C. T. and Marley, A. A. J. and Acz{\'e}l, J.}, title = {Utility of gambling II: risk, paradoxes, and data}, journal = {Economic Theory}, year = {2008}, volume = {36}, pages = {165-187}, number = {2}, month = {August}, abstract = {We specialize our results on entropy-modified representations of event-based gambles to representations of probability-based gambles by assuming an implicit event structure underlying the probabilities, and adding assumptions linking the qualitative properties of the former and the latter. Under segregation and under duplex decomposition, we obtain numerical representations consisting of a linear weighted utility term plus a term corresponding to information-theoretical entropies. These representations accommodate the Allais paradox and most of the data due to Birnbaum and associates. A representation of mixed event-and probability-based gambles accommodates the Ellsberg paradox. We suggest possible extensions to handle the data not accommodated.}, key = {utility, preference}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.21} } @ARTICLE{LuSo:08, author = {Luengo-Prado, Maria Jose and Sorensen, Bent}, title = {What Can Explain Excess Smoothness and Sensitivity of State-Level Consumption}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2008}, volume = {90}, pages = {65 - 80}, abstract = {This article estimates marginal propensities to consume (MPC) out of current and lagged income for U.S. states using panel data regressions that control for time-specific and state-level fixed effects. The MPCs vary across states; in particular, the MPC out of current income is higher in states where income is more persistent, and the MPC out of lagged income is lower in agricultural states. We show that the estimated MPCs can be matched by a model of forward-looking consumers that includes all of the following features: time aggregation, durable goods, impatience, credit constraints, and risk sharing.}, key = {Consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Lui:86, author = {Lui, F. T.}, title = {A Dynamic Model of Corruption Deterrence}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {31}, pages = {215-236}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{LuigiGuiso1992, author = {Luigi Guiso, Tullio Jappelli and Daniele Terlizzese}, title = {Earnings Uncertainty and Precautionary Saving}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1992}, volume = {30}, pages = {307-337}, booktitle = {Measure of Risk and}, chapter = {7}, key = {consumption}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ShSo:07, author = {Luitel, Hari Sharan and Sobel, Russell}, title = {The Revenue Impact of Repeated Tax Amnesties}, journal = {Public Budgeting and Finance}, year = {2007}, volume = {27}, pages = {19 - 38}, abstract = {Proponents argue that tax amnesties raise revenue both in the short and long run, by bringing former nonfilers back into the tax system. Opponents contend that amnesties produce little short-run revenue and weaken incentives for longrun tax compliance. However, over the last 21 years, 27 states offered tax amnesties for a second or third time. While previous research has estimated the impact of specific tax amnesties, none have estimated how the impact changes when offered repeatedly. We find that these additional tax amnesties generate less short-run revenue than predecessors and tend to magnify revenue losses associated with disincentives for long-run tax compliance.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{LuPo:07, author = {Lundberg,S. and Pollak, R.A.}, title = {The American Family and Family Economics}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2007}, volume = {21}, pages = {3-26}, number = {2}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{LuOh:00, author = {Lundholm, M. and Ohlsson, H.}, title = {Post mortem reputation, compensatory gifts and equal bequests}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {165-171}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Lusa:99, author = {Annamaria Lusardi}, title = {On the Importance of the Precautionary Saving Motive}, journal = {American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings}, year = {1999}, note = {forthcoming}, key = {consumption} } @TECHREPORT{Lusa:97, author = {Annamaria Lusardi}, title = {Precautionary Saving and Subjective Earnings Variance}, institution = {Dartmouth College}, year = {1997}, month = {June}, note = {forthcoming}, key = {consumption} } @BOOK{Lust:95, title = {Coping with Austerity: Poverty and Inequality in {L}atin {A}merica}, publisher = {The Brookings Institution}, year = {1995}, author = {Lustig, N.}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Lutt:04, author = {Luttmer,E.}, title = {Neighbors as negatives: relative earnings and well-being}, institution = {Harvard University, John F.Kennedy School of Government}, year = {2004}, abstract = {This paper investigates whether individuals feel worse off when others aroundthem earn more. In other words, do people care about relative positionand does "lagging behind the Joneses" diminish well-being? To answer thisquestion, I match individual-level panel data containing a number of indicatorsof well-being to information about local average earnings. I find that,controlling for an individual’s own income, higher earnings of neighborsare associated with lower levels of self-reported happiness. The data’spanel nature and rich set of measures of well-being and behavior indicatethat this association is not driven by selection or by changes in the waypeople define happiness. There is suggestive evidence that the negativeeffect of increases in neighbors’ earnings on own well-being is most likelycaused by interpersonal preferences, i.e. people having utility functionsthat depend on relative consumption in addition to absolute consumption.}, key = {Utility, preference} } @TECHREPORT{LuZe:08, author = {Luttmer, E. F. P. and Zeckhauser, R. J.}, title = {Schedule Selection by Agents: from Price Plans to Tax Tables}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {13808}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138}, abstract = {Requiring agents with private information to select from a menu of incentive schedules can yield efficiency gains. It will do so if, and only if, agents will receive further private information after selecting the incentive schedule but before taking the action that determines where on the incentive schedule they end up. We argue that this information structure is relevant in many applications. We develop the theory underlying optimal menus of non-linear schedules and prove that there exists a menu of schedules that offers a strict first-order interim Pareto improvement over the optimal single non-linear schedule. We quantify the gains from schedule selection in two settings. The first is a stylized example of a monopolistic utility company increasing profits by offering a menu of price plans. The second is a simulation based on U.S. earnings data, which shows that moving to a tax system that allows individuals to choose their tax schedule increases social welfare by the same amount as would occur from a 4.0 percent windfall gain in the government budget (or about $600 per filer per year). The resulting reduction in distortions accounts for about two thirds of the increase in social welfare while the remainder comes from an increase in redistribution.}, key = {information}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.24} } @BOOK{Lyda:79, title = {A Theory of Income Distribution}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1979}, author = {Lydall, H. F.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @BOOK{Lydall1979, title = {A Theory of Income Distribution}, year = {1979}, author = {Lydall, H. F.}, key = {income distribution:theoretical}, owner = {a1100971}, pulisher = {Oxford: Clarendon}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Lyda:68, title = {The Structure of Earnings.}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1968}, author = {Lydall, H. F.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Lyda:59, author = {Lydall, H. F.}, title = {The Long-Term Trend in the Size Distribution of Income}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society}, year = {1959}, volume = {A122}, pages = {1-36}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{LoRo:03, author = {L{\'o}pez-Laborda, J. and Rodrigo, F.}, title = {Tax amnesties and income tax compliance: the case of Spain}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2003}, volume = {24}, pages = {73-96}, number = {1}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{M.1999, author = {Katsimi M.}, title = {Elections and the Size of the Public Sector}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {441-462}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{M.2002, author = {Ravallion M. and Chen, S.}, title = {Measuring Pro-Poor Growth}, journal = {Economics Letters (in press)}, year = {2002}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{M.A.1999, author = {Adachi M.A.}, title = {On the Choice of Pricing Policies: Ex Ante Commitment and Prisoners' Dilemma}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {1647-1663}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{M.B.1999, author = {Ormiston M.B. and Schlee E.E.}, title = {Comparative Statics Tests Between Decision Models Under Risk}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {145-166}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{M.K.1999, author = {Richter M.K. and Wong K-C}, title = {Computable Preference and Utility}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {339-354}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{M.R.1999, author = {Pascoa M.R.}, title = {Determinancy of Equilibria in Nonsmooth Economies}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {289-302}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Ma:98, author = {Ma, Chenghu}, title = {Attitudes toward the timing of resolution of uncertainty and the existenceof recursive utility}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1998}, volume = {23}, pages = {97-112}, number = {1}, key = {uncertainty} } @INCOLLECTION{Maas:94, author = {Maasoumi, E.}, title = {Empirical Analysis of Inequality and Welfare}, booktitle = {Handbook of Applied Microeconomics}, year = {1994}, editor = {Schmidt, P. and Pesaran, H.}, chapter = {5}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Maas:99, author = {Maasoumi, Esfandiar}, title = {Multidimensioned Approaches to Welfare Analysis}, booktitle = {Handbook on Income Inequality Measurement}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1999}, editor = {Silber, J.}, address = {Dewenter}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Maas:89b, author = {Maasoumi, E.}, title = {Composite indices of income and other developmental indicators: a generalapproach}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1989}, volume = {1}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Maas:89CD, author = {Maasoumi, E.}, title = {Continuously distributed attributes and measures of multivariate inequality}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1989}, volume = {42}, pages = {131-144}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Maasoumi1989, author = {Maasoumi, E.}, title = {Composite indices of income and other developmental indicators: a general approach}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1989}, volume = {1}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Maas:86, author = {Maasoumi, E.}, title = {The measurement and decomposition of multi-dimensional inequality}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1986}, volume = {54}, pages = {991-997}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Maasoumi1986a, author = {Maasoumi, E.}, title = {The measurement and decomposition of multi- dimensional inequality}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1986}, volume = {54}, pages = {991-997}, number = {7}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Maas:79, author = {Maasoumi, E.}, title = {A multivariate index of inequality based on information theory}, institution = {University of Southern California}, year = {1979}, type = {Mimeo}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{MaMiZa:97, author = {Maasoumi, Esfandiar and Mills, Jeffrey and Zandvakili, Sourushe}, title = {Consensus Ranking of {US} income distributions: a bootstrap applicationof tests for stochastic dominance}, institution = {Department of Economics, SMU}, year = {1997}, address = {Department of Economics, SMU, Dallas}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{Maasoumi1988, author = {Maasoumi, E. and Nickelsburg, G.}, title = {Multivariate measures of well-being and an analysis of inequality in the {M}ichigan data}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1988}, volume = {6}, pages = {327-334}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{MaNi:88, author = {Maasoumi, E. and Nickelsburg, G.}, title = {Multivariate measures of well-being and an analysis of inequality in the{M}ichigan data}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1988}, volume = {6}, pages = {327-334}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{MaTh:79, author = {Maasoumi, E. and Theil, H.}, title = {The effect of the shape of the income distribution on two inequality measures}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1979}, volume = {4}, pages = {289-291}, abstract = {This letter describes the effect of skewness and kurtosis of the log-incomedistribution on two measures of income inequality. Positive skewness andleptokurtosis affect inequality positively.}, type = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Maasoumi2001, author = {Maasoumi, E. and Trede, M.}, title = {Comparing Income Mobility in {G}ermany and the {US} Using Generalized Entropy Mobility}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2001}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{MaTr:01, author = {Maasoumi, E. and Trede, M.}, title = {Comparing Income Mobility in {G}ermany and the {US} Using Generalized EntropyMobility}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2001}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Maasoumi1990, author = {Maasoumi, E. and Zandvakili, S.}, title = {Generalized entropy measures of mobility for different sexes and income levels}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1990}, volume = {43}, pages = {121-133}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{MaZa:90, author = {Maasoumi, E. and Zandvakili, S.}, title = {Generalized entropy measures of mobility for different sexes and incomelevels}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1990}, volume = {43}, pages = {121-133}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{MaZa:86, author = {Maasoumi, E. and Zandvakili, S.}, title = {A class of generalized measures of mobility with applications}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1986}, volume = {22}, pages = {97-102}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Maca:80, author = {Macafee, K.}, title = {A glimpse of the hidden economy in the national accounts}, journal = {Economic Trends}, year = {1980}, volume = {6}, pages = {81-87}, note = {reprinte in Tanz:82TU}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Macafee1980, author = {Macafee, K.}, title = {A glimpse of the hidden economy in the national accounts}, journal = {Economic Trends}, year = {1980}, volume = {6}, pages = {81-87}, note = {reprinted in Tanz:82TU}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Mace:91, author = {Mace, Barbara}, title = {Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1991}, volume = {99}, pages = {928 - 956}, abstract = {This paper tests implications of full consumption insurance. The object is to determine how much mileage can be obtained for a model with complete markets, with such features as private information or liquidity constraints omitted. The implication exploited is that individual consumption responds to aggregate risk but no to idiosyncratic risk. The test involves regressing the change in household consumption onto the change in aggregate consumption and other right-hand-side variables such as the change in household income and change in employment status. Al variables other than the change in aggregate consumption are predicted to be insignificant in explaining the change in household consumption. With observations on consumption and income for 10,695 households form the Consumer Expenditure Survey, the results are mixed The results for one specification (exponential utility) are mostly consistent with full consumption insurance: the results for the other specification (power utility) are not.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.24} } @ARTICLE{Mach:08, author = {Machin, S.}, title = {An Appraisal of Economic Research on Changes in Wage Inequality}, journal = {Labour}, year = {2008}, volume = {22}, pages = {7-26}, number = {1}, abstract = {In this paper (based on my invited lecture to the 2007 Association of Italian Labour Economists) I offer an appraisal of the large economic literature on changes in wage inequality. I describe the origins of the recent work, the sizable body of research trying to understand national and international differences, and discuss the directions in which more recent work has moved. The paper concludes with the observation that, for a number of reasons, research that tries to better understand changing patterns of wage inequality (especially in a cross-country context) is likely to remain high on the research agenda of empirical labour economists.}, key = {wage inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @TECHREPORT{Mach:02, author = {Machin, S.}, title = {Intergenerational mobility and childhood disadvantage}, institution = {Centre for Economic Performance}, year = {2002}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {London School of Economics}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Mach:96, author = {Machin, S.}, title = {Wage Inequality in the {UK}}, journal = {Oxford Review of Economic Policy}, year = {1996}, volume = {7}, pages = {47-64}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{MaRe:98, author = {Machin, S. and Van Reenen, J.}, title = {Technology and Changes in Skill Structure: Evidence from Seven {OECD} Countries}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1998}, pages = {1215-1244}, key = {Technology} } @ARTICLE{MaVi:04, author = {Machin,S. and Vignoles,A.}, title = {Educational Inequality: The Widening Socio-Economic Gap}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2004}, volume = {25}, pages = {107-128}, abstract = {In this paper, we consider research on links between higher education andfamily background, focusing particularly on the experiences of two cohortsof individuals born in 1958 and 1970. The findings point to a rise in educationalinequality during the period relevant to these two cohorts. Specifically,links between educational achievement and parental income / social classstrengthened during this period. Furthermore, a person’s actual (measured)ability became a poorer predictor of whether they would get a degree thanwas previously the case. The expansion of higher education in the UK duringthis period appears to have disproportionately benefited children fromricher families rather than the most able. Furthermore, the labour marketsuccess or failure of individuals became more closely connected to theirparents’ income, revealing a fall in the extent of intergenerational mobilityover time.}, key = {Education, training} } @ARTICLE{MaPr:97, author = {Machina, M. and Pratt, J. W.}, title = {Increasing Risk: Some Direct Constructions}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1997}, volume = {14}, pages = {103-127}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{MaSc:92, author = {Machina, M. and Schmeidler, D.}, title = {A more robust definition of Subjective Probability}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1992}, volume = {45}, pages = {745-780}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Mach:89, author = {Machina, M. J.}, title = {Dynamic consistency and non-expected utility models of choice under uncertainty}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1989}, volume = {27}, pages = {1622-1668}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Mach:87, author = {Machina, M. J.}, title = {Choice under uncertainty: problems solved and unsolved}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1987}, volume = {1}, pages = {121-154}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Machina1987, author = {Machina, Mark J.}, title = {{Choice} under uncertainty: problems solved and unsolved}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspective}, year = {1987}, volume = {1}, pages = {121-154}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Mach:82, author = {Machina, M. J.}, title = {Expected Utility Analysis Without the Independence Axiom}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1982}, volume = {50}, pages = {277-323}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Macho-Stadler1999, author = {Macho-Stadler,Ines and Olivella,Pau and Perez-Castrillo,David}, title = {Tax Amnesties In A Dynamic Model of Tax Evasion}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {1999}, volume = {1}, pages = {439-463}, number = {4}, eprint = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1097-3923.00020}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, url = {http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1097-3923.00020} } @BOOK{MaPe:97, title = {An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1997}, author = {Macho-Stadler, I. and P{\'e}rez-Castrillo, D.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{MaPe:97OA, author = {Macho-Stadler, I. and P{\'e}rez-Castrillo, J. D.}, title = {Optimal auditing with heterogeneous income sources}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1997}, volume = {38}, pages = {951-968}, number = {4}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{MaKiSc:07, author = {Maciejovsky, Boris and Kirchler, Erich and Schwarzenberger, Herbert}, title = {Misperception of chance and loss repair: On the dynamics of tax compliance}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {28}, volume = {2007}, pages = {678 - 691}, abstract = {Previous experimental studies on tax behavior have been particularly concerned with determining the absolute eVect of detection rate and punishment on tax Wling, leading to mixed results. In this paper, we shed some additional light on the eVectiveness of audit probability and sanctions by drawing upon a dynamic setting with particular focus on the time lag between audits. Our results showed that tax compliance decreased immediately after a random audit, suggesting that subjects were prone to misperception of chance. Sanctions decreased compliance to a lesser extent; they were, however, associated with the tendency of subjects to repair their losses by increasing their capital stock.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Tax evasion; Misconception of chance; Loss repair; Audits; Sanctions}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @TECHREPORT{Mack:06, author = {Mackenbach, J.}, title = {Health Inequalities: Europe in Profile}, institution = {Erasmus MC}, year = {2006}, type = {Expert Report}, address = {Department of Public Health Erasmus MC University Medical Center Rotterdam P.O. Box 1738 3000 DR ROTTERDAM The Netherlands}, month = {February}, abstract = {At the start of the 21st century, all European countries are faced with substantial inequalities in health within their populations. People with a lower level of education, a lower occupational class, or a lower level of income tend to die at a younger age, and to have a higher prevalence of most types of health problems. This report was written at the request of the UK Presidency of the European Union (EU), and aims to review the evidence on the existence of socioeconomic inequalities in health in the EU and its immediate neighbours. It presents data on inequalities in mortality in 21 countries, on inequalities in self-assessed health in 19 countries, and on inequalities in smoking in 24 countries. Rates of mortality are consistently higher among those with a lower, than among those with a higher socio-economic position. Not only is the size of these inequalities often substantial, but inequalities in mortality have also increased in many European countries in the past decades. Inequalities in mortality: • start early in life and persist into old age, • affect both men and women, but tend to be larger among men, • are found for most but not all specific causes of death. Inequalities in mortality from cardiovascular disease account for almost half of the excess mortality in lower socio-economic groups in most countries. Inequalities in cancer mortality are often less clear, particularly among women. Rates of morbidity are also usually higher among those with a lower educational, occupational, or income level. No clear trends have been found in these inequalities. Inequalities in morbidity are found for many morbidity indicators: • prevalence of less-than-‘good’ self-assessed health, • incidence and prevalence of many chronic conditions, • prevalence of most mental health problems, and • prevalence of functional limitations and disabilities. As a result, people with lower socio-economic positions not only live shorter lives, but also spend a larger number of years in ill-health. During the past decade, great progress has been made in unravelling the determinants of health inequalities. This research has shown that health inequalities are mainly caused by a higher exposure of lower socio-economic groups to a wide range of unfavourable material, psychosocial and behavioural risk factors. This report reviews the evidence on some behavioural risk factors, for which comparable data on social patterning are available from many European countries. Smoking is likely to be an important contributor to health inequalities in many European countries, because the prevalence of smoking tends to be higher in lower socioeconomic groups, particularly among men. There are important differences between countries, however, in these inequalities. According to many, socio-economic inequalities in health are unacceptable, and represent one of Europe’s greatest challenges for public health. The omnipresence and persistence of these inequalities should warn against unrealistic expectations of a substantial reduction within a short period of time, and by using conventional approaches. New and more powerful approaches need to be developed. Learning speed can be increased if countries would exchange their experiences with tackling health inequalities more systematically than in the past. The European Union can play an important role in facilitating these exchanges.}, key = {health}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @INCOLLECTION{Mack:84, author = {Mackscheidt, K.}, title = {Konsolidierung durch {E}rh{\"o}hung von {S}teuern und {A}bgaben?}, booktitle = {Finanzpolitik im {U}mbruch: zur {K}onsolidierung {\"o}ffentlicher {H}aushalte}, year = {1984}, editor = {von Arnim, H. H. and Littmann,K.}, address = {Berlin}, key = {taxation} } @INCOLLECTION{Mackscheidt1984, author = {Mackscheidt, K.}, title = {Konsolidierung durch {E}rh\"ohung von {S}teuern und {A}bgaben?}, booktitle = {Finanzpolitik im {U}mbruch: zur {K}onsolidierung \"offentlicher {H}aushalte}, year = {1984}, editor = {von Arnim, H. H. and Littmann,K.}, address = {B} # erlin, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Maddala1977, author = {Maddala, G. S. and Singh, S. K.}, title = {Estimation problems in size distribution of incomes}, journal = {Economie Appliqu\'ee}, year = {1977}, volume = {30}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{MaSi:77, author = {Maddala, G. S. and Singh, S. K.}, title = {Estimation problems in size distribution of incomes}, journal = {Economie Appliqu{\'e}e}, year = {1977}, volume = {30}, pages = {461-480}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Madd:96, author = {Madden, Paul}, title = {{S}uppes-{S}en dominance, generalized {L}orenz dominance and the welfareeconomics of competitive equilibrium: Some examples}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {61}, pages = {247-262}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Madden1996, author = {Madden, Paul}, title = {{S}uppes-{S}en dominance, generalized {L}orenz dominance and the welfare economics of competitive equilibrium: Some examples}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {61}, pages = {247-262}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Maed:03, author = {Maeda, A.}, title = {The emergence of market power in emission rights markets: the riole of theinitial permit distribution}, journal = {Journal of Regulatory Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {24}, pages = {293-314} } @ARTICLE{MaRoBu:98, author = {Magee, L. and Robb, A. L. and Burbidge, J. B.}, title = {On the use of sampling weights when estimating regression models with surveydata}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1998}, volume = {84}, pages = {251-271}, number = {2}, key = {econometrics} } @TECHREPORT{Magg:04, author = {Maggio,G.}, title = {Multidimensional analysis of poverty dynamics in Great Britain}, institution = {Institute for Social and Economic Research}, year = {2004}, abstract = {This paper investigates the multidimensional aspects of poverty in the populationof Great Britain from 1991 to 2000 focusing mainly on the longitudinalanalysis and on poverty dynamics, that is the persistence or the transienceof the staying in the state of poverty and the movements into and out ofsuch a state across the time. It examines monetary and supplementary variables,included an overview of the dimensions within the latter, by using thefuzzy approach recently proposed by Verma and Betti (2003).}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Maggs1999, author = {Maggs, P. and Hoddinott, J.}, title = {The Impact of Changes in Common Property Resource Management on Intrahousehold Allocation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {317-324}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{MaHo:99, author = {Maggs, P. and Hoddinott, J.}, title = {The Impact of Changes in Common Property Resource Management on IntrahouseholdAllocation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {317-324}, key = {micro} } @INCOLLECTION{Magg:79, author = {Maggs, P. B.}, title = {Characteristics of {S}oviet tax and budgetary law}, booktitle = {Soviet Law After {S}talin, Law in {E}astern {E}urope}, publisher = {Sijthoff and Noordhoff}, year = {1979}, editor = {Barry, D. B. and Feldbrugge, G. J. M. and Ginsburgs, G. and Maggs, P. B.}, volume = {20}, pages = {93-105}, address = {Germantown, Maryland}, key = {crime}, part = {III} } @ARTICLE{Magr:99, author = {Stefano Magrini}, title = {The Evolution of Income Disparities Among the Regions of the {E}uropean{U}nion}, journal = {Regional Science and Urban Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {29}, pages = {257-281}, number = {2}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Maha:36, author = {Mahalanobis, P. C.}, title = {on the generalized distance in statistics}, journal = {Proceedings of the National Institute of Science}, year = {1936}, volume = {2}, pages = {49-55}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2005.12.24} } @ARTICLE{Mahu:00, author = {Mahul, O.}, title = {{MAL} Insurance Design with Random Initial Wealth}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {69}, pages = {353-358}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{MaPe:99, author = {Mai, C-C and Peng, S-K,}, title = {Cooperation Vs. Competition in a Spatial Model}, journal = {Regional Science and Urban Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {29}, pages = {463-472}, key = {industry} } @TECHREPORT{MaNoWh:04, author = {Mailath,G. and Nocke,V. and White,L.}, title = {When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of SimplePenal Codes in Extensive-Form Games}, institution = {Penn Institute for Economic Research}, year = {2004}, abstract = {In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permitan elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. Weshow that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-formgames. We provide two examples illustrating that a subgame-perfect outcomemay be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuationplay after a deviation is tailored not only to the identity of the deviator,but also to the nature of the deviation.}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Mail:98, author = {Mailath, G. J.}, title = {Do People Play {N}ash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1998}, volume = {36}, pages = {1347–1374}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Mailath1998, author = {Mailath, G. J.}, title = {Do People Play {N}ash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1998}, volume = {36}, pages = {1347-1374}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{MaSa:06, title = {Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2006}, author = {Mailath, Georg J. and Larry Samuelson}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.04.28} } @BOOK{Mait:82, title = {Minds, Markets and Money}, publisher = {Basic Books}, year = {1982}, author = {Maital, S.}, address = {New York}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Mait:73, author = {Maital, S.}, title = {Public goods and income distribution: Some further results}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1973}, volume = {41}, pages = {561-68}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Maju:04, author = {Majumdar, D.}, title = {An Axiomatic Characterization of Bayes' Rule}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2004}, volume = {47}, pages = {261-273}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{MaCh:90, author = {Majumder, A. and Chakravarty, S. R.}, title = {Distribution of personal income: Development of a new model and its applicationto {U.S.} income data}, journal = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, year = {1990}, volume = {5}, pages = {189-196}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Majumder1990, author = {Majumder, A. and Chakravarty, S. R.}, title = {Distribution of Personal Income: Development of a New Model and its Application to {US} Income Data}, journal = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, year = {1990}, volume = {5}, pages = {189-196}, key = {distributions}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{MaMaMo:05, author = {Maliar,L. and Mailiar,S. and Mora,J.}, title = {Income and Wealth Distributions Along the Business Cycle: Implications fromthe Neoclassical Growth Model}, journal = {Topics in Macroeconomics}, year = {2005}, volume = {5}, number = {income distribution}, abstract = {This paper studies the business cycle dynamics of income and wealth distributionsin the context of the neoclassical growth model where agents are heterogeneousin initial wealth and non-acquired skills. Our economy admits a representativeconsumer which enables us to characterize distributive dynamics by theevolution of aggregate quantities. We show that inequality in both wealthand income follow a countercyclical pattern: the former is countercyclicalbecause labor income is more sensitive to the business cycle than capitalincome, while the latter is countercyclical due to the wealth-distributione ect. We find that the predictions of the model about the income distributiondynamics accord well with the U.S. data.} } @ARTICLE{MaSc:91, author = {Malik, A. S. and Schwab, R. M.}, title = {The Economics of Tax Amnesties}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {(46)1}, pages = {29-49}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Mali:70, author = {Malik, H. J.}, title = {Estimation of the Parameters of the {P}areto Distribution}, journal = {Metrika}, year = {1970}, volume = {15}, pages = {126-132}, key = {Distributions} } @ARTICLE{Ma:03, author = {Burton G. Malkiel}, title = {The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2003}, volume = {17}, pages = {59--82}, number = {1}, copyright = {Copyright © 2003 American Economic Association}, issn = {08953309}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Winter, 2003}, publisher = {American Economic Association} } @TECHREPORT{MaMo:02, author = {Malley, J. and Molana, H.}, title = {The Life-Cycle-Permanent-Income Model: A Reinterpretation and Supporting Evidence}, institution = {Department of Economics, University of Glasgow}, year = {2002}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2002/17}, address = {Department of Economics, Adam Smith Building, University of Glasgow, G12 8RT, United Kingdom}, month = {December}, abstract = {The consumption path associated with the life-cycle-optimising version of the permanent- income model is commonly agreed to be a random walk with drift. The persisting failure of the latter to conform to data could, however, raise questions about the suitability of the life- cycle-permanent-income framework within which the random walk model is developed. We propose an alternative interpretation of the permanent-income revision rule which implies consumption follows an ARIMA(1,1,0) with drift. We show that this path can also be derived as a solution to a life-cycle optimising problem with habit formation and precautionary saving motives. U.S. data for 1929-2001 strongly supports the model.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{Malm:70, author = {Malmquist, S.}, title = {On a method of comparing two continuous distribution functions}, journal = {Annales, Academiae Regae Scientarum Upsaliensis}, year = {1970}, address = {Stockholm}, key = {inequality}, publisher = {Almqvist and Wiksell} } @ARTICLE{Mand:61, author = {Mandelbrot, B.}, title = {Stable Random Functions and the Multiplicative Variation of Income}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1961}, volume = {29}, pages = {517-543}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Mand:60, author = {Mandelbrot, B.}, title = {The {P}areto-{L}{\'e}vy Law and the Distribution of Income}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1960}, volume = {1}, pages = {79-106}, number = {2}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Mand:05, author = {Mandler,M.}, title = {Harsanyi’s utilitarianism via linear programming}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2005}, volume = {88}, pages = {85-90}, abstract = {A simple linear programming problem permits a brief and elementary proofof Harsanyi’s utilitarianism theorem: a Paretian social welfare functionmust be a weighted (affine) sum of individual utility functions when individualutilities and social welfare all take the Neumann–Morgenstern form. Byadjusting the programming problem slightly, we conclude that the weightson individual utilities are positive or semi-positive when more demandingPareto principles hold. The reasoning extends easily to cover sets of socialchoices that equal arbitrary mixture spaces.}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Mang:95, author = {Mangahas, M.}, title = {Self-rated poverty in the {P}hilippines, 1981-1992}, journal = {International Journal of Public Opinion Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {7}, pages = {40-55}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Mang:75, author = {Mangahas, M.}, title = {Income inequality in the {P}hilippines: A decomposition analysis}, institution = {International Labor Organization}, year = {1975}, type = {Population and Employment Working Paper}, address = {Geneva}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{MaKnJe:07, author = {Mangalore, R. and Knapp, M. and Jenkins, R.}, title = {Income-related inequality in mental health in Britain: the concentration index approach}, journal = {Psychological Medicine}, year = {2007}, volume = {37}, pages = {1037-1046}, abstract = {Background. Reduction of health inequalities is a major policy goal in the UK. While there is general recognition of the disadvantaged position of people with mental health problems, the extent of inequality, particularly the association with socio-economic characteristics, has not been widely studied. We aimed to measure income-related inequality in the distribution of psychiatric disorders and to compare with inequality in other health domains. Method. The concentration index (CI) approach was used to examine income-related inequality in mental health using data from the Psychiatric Morbidity Survey 2000 for Britain. Results. There is marked inequality unfavourable to lower income groups with respect to mental health disorders. The extent of inequality increases with the severity of problems, with the greatest inequality observed for psychosis. Income-related inequality for psychiatric disorders is higher than for general health in the UK. Standardized CIs suggest that these inequalities are not due to the demographic composition of the income quintiles. Conclusions. Income-related inequalities exist in mental health in Britain. As much of the observed inequality is probably due to factors associated with income and not due to the demographic composition of the income quintiles, it may be that these inequalities are potentially ‘avoidable’.}, key = {income inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Mani:99, author = {Maniquet, F.}, title = {L {\'e}quit{\'e} en environnement {\'e}conomiquie}, journal = {Revue {\'E}conomique}, year = {1999}, volume = {50}, pages = {787-810}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Maniquet1999, author = {Maniquet, F.}, title = {L \'equit\'e en environnement \'economiquie}, journal = {Revue \'Economique}, year = {1999}, volume = {50}, pages = {787-810}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Mani:98, author = {Maniquet, F.}, title = {An equal right solution to the compensation-responsibility dilemma}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1998}, volume = {35}, pages = {185-202}, number = {2}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{MaSp:00, author = {Maniquet, F. and Sprumont, Y.}, title = {On resource monotonicity in the fair division problem}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {299-302}, number = {3}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{MaSh:85, author = {Mankiw, N.G. and Shapiro, M.D.}, title = {Trends, Random Walks, and Tests of the Permanent Income Hypothesis}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1985}, volume = {16}, pages = {165-174}, abstract = {Recent studies find that consumption is excessively sensitive to income. These studies assume that income is stationary around a deterministic trend. The data, however, do not reject the hypothesis that disposable personal income is a random walk with drift. If income is indeed a random walk, then the standard testing procedure is greatly biased toward tinding excess sensitivity. Moreover, if income follows either a more general non-stationary process or a borderline stationary process, this procedure is also seriously biased.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @BOOK{MaTa:06, title = {Economics}, publisher = {Thomson}, year = {2006}, author = {Mankiw, N. G. and Taylor, M. P}, pages = {830}, key = {micro}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.03.22} } @ARTICLE{Mann:04IV, author = {Manning,A.}, title = {Instrumental Variables for Binary Treatments with Heterogenous TreatmentEffects: A Simple Exposition}, journal = {Contributions to Economic Analysis \&Policy}, year = {2004}, volume = {3}, abstract = {This note provides a simple exposition of what IV can and cannot estimatein a model with binary treatment variable and heterogenous treatment effects.It shows how linear IV is essentially a misspecification of functionalform and the reason why linear IV estimates will generally depend on theinstrument used is because of this misspecification. It shows that if onecan estimate the correct functional form then the treatment effects areindependent of the instruments used. However, the data may not be richenough in practice to be able to identify these treatments effects withoutstrong distributional assumptions. In this case, one will have to settlefor estimations of treatment effects that are instrument-dependent.}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Mann:04MA, author = {Manning, Alan}, title = {Monopsony and the efficiency of labour}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {11}, pages = {145-163}, abstract = {Implicit in many discussions of labour market policy is the assumption that,in the absence of interventions, the operation of the labour market iswell-approximated by the perfectly competitive model. The merits or demeritsof particular policies is then seen as a trade-off between efficiency andequality. This paper analyzes the impact of a variety of policies—the minimumwage, trade unions, unemployment insurance, and progressive income taxation—onefficiency when labour markets in the absence of intervention are monopsonisticand not perfectly competitive. A simple version of the Burdett and Mortensen[Inter. Eco. Rev. 39 (1998) 257] model is used for this purpose.}, key = {labour market} } @BOOK{Mann:03, title = {Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {2003}, author = {Manning, A.}, address = {Princeton, N.J.}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.10} } @ARTICLE{Mans:00, author = {Manski, C. F.}, title = {Economic Analysis of Social Interactions}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2000}, volume = {14}, pages = {115-136}, key = {social custom}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Manz:98, author = {Manzano, Carolina}, title = {The structure of the set of critical equilibria with incomplete markets}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {30}, pages = {147-173}, number = {2}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{MaMa:04AT, author = {Manzini,P. and Mariotti,M.}, title = {A Theory of Vague Expected Utility}, journal = {Topics in Theoretical Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {4}, abstract = {We propose a new theory of choice between lotteries, which combines an ‘economic’view of decision making - based on a rational, though incomplete, ordering- with a ’psychological’ view - based on heuristics. This theory can explainobserved violations of EU theory, namely all cyclical patterns of choiceas well as violations of independence.}, key = {Utility, preference} } @TECHREPORT{MaMa:04AV, author = {Manzini,P. and Mariotti,M.}, title = {A Vague Theory of Choice over Time}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2004}, abstract = {We propose a novel approach to modelling time preferences, based on a cognitiveshortcoming of human decision makers: the perception of future events becomesincreasingly ‘blurred’ as the events are pushed further in time. We axiomatisea class of preference representations which can be specialised to rationalise‘anomalies’ such as preference reversals and cyclical preferences. We alsopresent an application to a form of time inconsistency which we dub ‘thenow or never fallacy’.}, key = {Utility, preference} } @BOOK{Mara:93, title = {Algorithms, Routines and S-Functions for Robust Statistics}, publisher = {Wadsworth and Brooks/Cole}, year = {1993}, author = {Marazzi, A.}, address = {Belmont, California}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{MaGa:99, author = {Marceau, E. and Gaillardetz, P.}, title = {On Life Insurance Reserves in a Stochastic Morality and Interest Rates Environment}, journal = {Insurance, Mathematics and Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {25}, pages = {261-280}, key = {Finance} } @TECHREPORT{Marc:06, author = {Marchese, C.}, title = {Rewarding the Consumer for Curbing the Evasion of Commodity Taxes?}, institution = {University of Eastern Piedmont}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {79}, address = {Via Cavour 84, 15100 Alessandria Italy}, month = {November}, note = {carla.marchese@unipmn.it}, abstract = {Monetary or in-kind transfers can be used as an incentive for consumers to request official receipts for goods they purchase. A novel system of in-kind transfers in the form of lottery tickets has recently been introduced in China. Price subsidies (often granted through tax deductions or refunds) are also widely used. This paper extends the standard model of commodity tax evasion for firms (in a competitive market and under the conjectural variation approach) in order to describe the effects of subsidies on tax evasion and in terms of incidence and of government revenue. The role of search costs and of enforcement costs is also taken into account.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{Marc:79, author = {Marchon, M.}, title = {Tax avoidance, progressivity and work effort}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1979}, volume = {34}, pages = {452-460}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Marc:95, author = {Marco Gil, M. C.}, title = {The Extended claim-egalitarian solution across Cardinalities}, institution = {Instituto Valenciano de Inestigaciones Economicas}, year = {1995}, number = {24}, address = {Spain}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Marc:63, author = {Marcus, M.}, title = {An introduction to information theory}, journal = {Mathematics Magazine}, year = {1963}, volume = {36}, pages = {207-218}, key = {probability}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2005.12.26} } @BOOK{MaPaRo:96, title = {The Economics of {J}oan {R}obinson}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {1996}, author = {Marcuzzo, M. C. and Pasinetti, L. L. and Roncaglia, A.}, key = {hist econ thought} } @ARTICLE{Marf:71, author = {Marfels, C.}, title = {Einige Neuere {E}ntwicklungen in der {M}essung der Industriellen {K}onzentration (Some New Developments in the Measurement of Industrial Concentration)}, journal = {Metrika}, year = {1971}, volume = {17}, pages = {753-766}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{MaOr:98, author = {Marhuenda, Francisco and Ortuno-Ortin, Ignacio}, title = {Income taxation, uncertainty and stability}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {67}, pages = {285-300}, number = {2}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{MaOr:97, author = {Marhuenda, Francisco and Ortu{\~n}o-Ortin}, title = {Income Taxation, Uncertainty and Stability}, institution = {Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Econ{\'o}micas, S. A.}, year = {1997}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {WP-AD 97-07}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{MaOr:95, author = {Marhuenda, Francisco and Ortu{\~n}o-Ortin, Ignacio}, title = {Honesty Versus Progressiveness in Income Tax Enforcement Problems}, institution = {University of Alicante}, year = {1995}, month = {February}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{MaOr:95MV, author = {Marhuenda, Francisco and Ortu{\~n}o-Ortin, Ignacio}, title = {Majority Voting and Progressivity}, journal = {Investigaciones Econ{\'o}micas}, year = {1995}, volume = {13}, pages = {469-473}, institution = {University of Alicante}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Marhuenda1995, author = {Marhuenda, Francisco and Ortu{\~n}o-Ortin, Ignacio}, title = {Majority Voting and Progressivity}, journal = {Investigaciones Econ\'omicas}, year = {1995}, volume = {13}, pages = {469-473}, institution = {University of Alicante}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Mari:99, author = {Mariotti, M.}, title = {Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and {N}ash Bargaining Theory}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {733-741}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Mariotti1999, author = {Mariotti, M.}, title = {Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and {N}ash Bargaining Theory}, journal = {Review of Eocnomic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {733-741}, key = {games}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{MaAc:03, title = {International Trade, Wage Inequality and the Developing Economy: A General Equilibrium Approach}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {2003}, author = {Marjit, S. and Acharyya, R.}, key = {international}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.23} } @ARTICLE{MaMuMu:00, author = {Marjit, S. and Mukherjee, V. and Mukherjee, A.}, title = {Harrassment, Corruption and Tax Policy}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2000}, volume = {16}, pages = {75-94}, key = {corruption} } @ARTICLE{MaRa:01, author = {Marjit, S. and Rajeev, M.}, title = {Incomplete Information as a Deterrent to Crime}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2001}, volume = {(16) 4}, pages = {763-773}, key = {Crime} } @TECHREPORT{MaRaMu:97, author = {Marjit, Sugata and Rajeev, Meenakshi and Mukherjee, Diganta}, title = {Incomplete Information as a deterrent to corruption}, institution = {Rheinische Friedrich Wilhelms Universitat}, year = {1997}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {A-555}, address = {Bonn, Germany}, month = {June}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{MaSuHe:98, author = {Marjit, Sugata and Shi, Heling}, title = {On controlling crime with corrupt officials}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {34}, pages = {163-172}, number = {1}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Mark:84, author = {Markandya, A.}, title = {The welfare measurement of changes in economic mobility}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1984}, volume = {51}, pages = {457-471}, key = {mobility} } @INCOLLECTION{MaRo:95, author = {Markatou, M. and Ronchetti, E.}, title = {Robust Inference: The Approach based on Influence Functions}, booktitle = {Handbook of Statistics Vol 15: Robust Inference}, year = {1995}, editor = {Rao, C. R.}, note = {Forthcoming}, key = {STATISTICS} } @BOOK{Mark:59, title = {Portfolio Selection}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1959}, author = {Markowitz, H. M.}, address = {New York}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Marm:99, author = {Elisabetta Marmolo}, title = {A Constitutional Theory of Public Goods}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1999}, volume = {38}, pages = {27-42}, number = {1}, abstract = {The conventional justification for public provision is market failure. Thispaper argues instead that the rationale for public provision of goods isthe existence of utility interdependencies across demanders: individualschoose what goods are public at the constitutional level based on degreesof utility interdependence in consumption. The paper first develops ananalytical argument for shifting from non-excludability and joint consumptionto utility interdependence in the analysis of public goods. It then presentsa model of the constitutional calculus concerning modes of goods provisionand applies the model to simple choice scenarios. Broad policy implicationsof the model are drawn. In particular, a constitutional theory of publicgoods asserts the need for careful institutional design and definitionof public powers more strongly than the market failure view.}, key = {public goods} } @INCOLLECTION{Marr:87, author = {Marrelli, M.}, title = {The Economic Analysis of Tax Evasion: Empirical Aspects}, booktitle = {Surveys in the Economics of Uncertainty}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, year = {1987}, editor = {Hey, J. D. and Lambert, P. J.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Marr:84EF, author = {Marrelli, M.}, title = {L'evasione fiscale delle imposte indirette: imposte specifiche e impostead valorem}, journal = {Problemi di Finanza Pubblica}, year = {1984}, volume = {6}, pages = {181-199}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Marr:84OI, author = {Marrelli, M.}, title = {On indirect tax evasion}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1984}, volume = {25}, pages = {181-196}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Marrelli1984a, author = {Marrelli, M.}, title = {L'evasione fiscale delle imposte indirette: imposte specifiche e imposte ad valorem}, journal = {Problemi di Finanza Pubblica}, year = {1984}, volume = {6}, pages = {181-199}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{MaMa:88, author = {Marrelli, M. and Martina, R.}, title = {Tax Evasion and Strategic Behaviour of the Firms}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1988}, volume = {37}, pages = {55-69}, key = {Tax compliance - firms} } @ARTICLE{Mars:50, author = {Marschak, J.}, title = {rational behavior, uncertain prospects and measurable utility}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1950}, volume = {18}, pages = {111-141}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Mars:38, author = {Marschak, J.}, title = {Money and the Theory of Assets}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1938}, volume = {6}, month = {October}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{Mars:90, title = {Principles of Economics}, publisher = {Macmillan and Co., Ltd.}, year = {1890}, author = {Marshall, A.}, address = {London}, edition = {Eighth (1920)}, abstract = {Alfred, Marshall (1842-1924) Title: Published: London: , 1920. edition.First published: .} } @BOOK{MaOl:79, title = {Inequalities: Theory and Majorization}, publisher = {Academic Press}, year = {1979}, author = {Marshall, A. W. and Olkin, I.}, address = {New York}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{MaOl:74, author = {Marshall, A. W. and Olkin, I.}, title = {Majorization in Multivariate Distributions}, journal = {The Annals of Statistics}, year = {1974}, volume = {2}, pages = {1189-1200}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.03.26} } @ARTICLE{MaRe:00, author = {Marsiliani, L. and Renstrom, T. I.}, title = {Time Inconsistency in Environmental Policy: Tax Earmarking as a CommitmentSolution}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2000}, volume = {110}, pages = {C123-C138}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Marsiliani2000, author = {Marsiliani, L. and Renstrom, T. I.}, title = {Time Inconsistency in Environmental Policy: Tax Earmarking as a Commitment Solution}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2000}, volume = {110}, pages = {C123-C138}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Mart'in-Guzman1995, author = {Mart\'in-Guzman, P. and Bellido, N.}, title = {Lineas de pobreza: una estimaci\'on de la pobreza subjetiva en {E}spa\~na}, booktitle = {I Simposio Sobre Igualdad Y Distribuci\'on de La Renta Y La Rizqueza}, publisher = {Fundaci\'on Argentaria}, year = {1995}, volume = {2}, address = {Madrid}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Mart:70, author = {Martic, L.}, title = {A geometrical note on new income inequality measures}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1970}, volume = {38}, pages = {936-7}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{MaDoVi:05, author = {Martimort,D. and Donder,P. and Villemeur,B.}, title = {An incomplete contract perspective on public good provision}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {2005}, volume = {19}, pages = {149-180}, abstract = {This paper surveys what can be learned from recent advances in the incompletecontract literature to understand how public goods are or should be provided.The paper starts with a section on the full information case that presentsand discusses the classical Samuelson condition on the optimal provisionof public goods. The rest of the paper presents results under asymmetricinformation. It is constituted of two main parts. In the first one, thesocial planner has complete contracting ability. We discuss the basic settingand assumptions of this comprehensive contracting approach and study thetrade-offs it generates. The second part of the paper is devoted to thestudy of contracting incompleteness. Such incompleteness can emerge fromvarious sources, which we present and discuss. We then study the case ofa politically chosen decision-maker and the consequences of its inabilityto commit for more than one period and of the ability for individuals toform groups. Finally, we address the problem of the choice between publicand private forms of public good provision. The concluding section summarizesthe main policy lessons.}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Mart:99, author = {Martin, P.}, title = {Public Policies, Regional Inequalities and Public Growth}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {85-105}, key = {Regional} } @INCOLLECTION{MGBe:95, author = {Mart{\'i}n-Guzman, P. and Bellido, N.}, title = {Lineas de pobreza: una estimaci{\'o}n de la pobreza subjetiva en {E}spa{\~n}a}, booktitle = {I Simposio Sobre Igualdad Y Distribuci{\'o}n de La Renta Y La Rizqueza}, publisher = {Fundaci{\'o}n Argentaria}, year = {1995}, volume = {2}, address = {Madrid}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{MaAm:81, author = {Marwell, G. And Ames, R. E.}, title = {Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?: Experiments on the provision ofpublic goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1981}, volume = {15}, pages = {295-310}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{Marwell1981, author = {Marwell, G. And Ames, R. E.}, title = {Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?: Experiments on the provision of public goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1981}, volume = {15}, pages = {295-310}, key = {economic psychology}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{MaSa:05, title = {Low-wage Employment in Europe}, publisher = {Uitgeverij Acco}, year = {2005}, editor = {Marx,I. and Salverda,W.}, author = {Marx, I. and Salverda,W.}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{MaMa:00, author = {Marx, L. and Matthews, S.}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{Mas:06, author = {Mas, A.}, title = {Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {71}, pages = {783-821}, abstract = {Several theories suggest that pay raises below a reference point will reduce job performance. Final offer arbitration for police unions provides a unique opportunity to examine these theories, as the police officers either receive their requested wage or receive a lower one. In the months after New Jersey police officers lose in arbitration, arrest rates and average sentence length decline, and crime reports rise relative to when they win. These declines in performance are larger when the awarded wage is further from the police union’s demand. The findings support the idea that considerations of fairness, disappointment, and, more generally, reference points affect workplace behavior.}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @BOOK{MCWhGr:95, title = {Microeconomic Theory}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1995}, author = {Mas-Colell, A. and Whinston, M. D. and Green, J. R.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {microeconomics} } @ARTICLE{Mask:99, author = {Maskin, E.}, title = {{N}ash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {23-38}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Maskin1999, author = {Maskin, E.}, title = {Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {23-38}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Mask:08, author = {Maskin, E. S.}, title = {Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {98}, pages = {567–576}, number = {3}, abstract = {The theory of mechanism design can be thought of as the “engineering” side of economic theory. Much theoretical work, of course, focuses on existing economic institutions. The theorist wants to explain or forecast the economic or social outcomes that these institutions generate. But in mechanism design theory the direction of inquiry is reversed. We begin by identifying our desired outcome or social goal. We then ask whether or not an appropriate institution (mechanism) could be designed to attain that goal. If the answer is yes, then we want to know what form that mechanism might take. In this paper, I offer a brief introduction to the part of mechanism design called implementation theory, which, given a social goal, characterizes when we can design a mechanism whose predicted outcomes (i.e., the set of equilibrium outcomes) coincide with the desirable outcomes, according to that goal. I try to keep technicalities to a minimum, and usually confine them to footnotes.}, key = {mechanism design}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.05} } @ARTICLE{MaPh:02, author = {Mason, C. and Phillips, O.}, title = {In Support of Trigger Strategies: Experimental Evidence from Two-Person Noncooperative Games}, journal = {Journal of Economics \& Management Strategy}, year = {2002}, volume = {11}, pages = {685-716}, key = {games}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @TECHREPORT{Maso:06, author = {Mason, R.}, title = {In Search of Internal Consistency: Tax Discrimination in the EU}, institution = {NYU Jean Monnet}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {7}, abstract = {The European Union was created to bind the countries of >Europe together economically to prevent future wars. Rigorous >enforcement of EU nationals' fundamental economic freedoms before the >European Court of Justice (ECJ) has furthered economic integration. The >fundamental freedoms prohibit tax discrimination ? harsher tax >treatment of cross-border economic activities than purely internal >activities. Critics of the ECJ argue that the Court's broad >interpretation of the EC freedoms causes it to find tax discrimination >where there is none. This tendency encroaches upon the sovereignty of >EU member states and hampers their ability to pursue economic policy >goals. In contrast, based upon a survey of all the ECJ's tax >discrimination decisions, this Article offers a more nuanced critique >that shows the ECJ's errors in tax discrimination cases go in both >directions. In addition to finding discrimination where there is none, >the Court also sometimes fails to recognize discrimination. The Court's >failure to recognize tax discrimination undermines the economic >integration of Europe and abridges EU nationals' personal rights. > >This Article is the first to identify the Court's method of review in >tax discrimination cases, the comparable internal situation test >(CIST), as a principal contributor to the Court's difficulty in tax >cases. Instead of CIST, the Article proposes that the ECJ borrow a >method developed by the U.S. Supreme Court for tax cases arising under >the Commerce Clause: the internal consistency test (ICT). Adoption of >this simpler method should enable the ECJ to make more coherent tax >decisions, which will promote economic efficiency and integration of >the European common market.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Maso:00, author = {Mason, R.}, title = {Network Externalities and the {C}oase Conjecture}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2000}, volume = {44}, pages = {1981-1992}, key = {Externalities} } @ARTICLE{MaCa:84, author = {Mason, R. and Calvin, L. D.}, title = {Public confidence and admitted tax evasion}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1984}, volume = {37}, pages = {489-496}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{MaCa:78, author = {Mason, R. and Calvin, L. D.}, title = {A study of admitted income tax evasion}, journal = {Law and Society Review}, year = {1978}, pages = {73-89}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{MaPe:97BM, author = {Masson, A. and Pestieau, P.}, title = {Bequest motives and models of inheritance: a survey of the literature}, booktitle = {Is Inheritance Legitimate? Ethical and Economic Aspects of Wealth Transfers}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1997}, editor = {Erreygers , G. and Vandevelde , T.}, pages = {54-88}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{MaGr:04, author = {Matheson, Victor A. and Grote, Kent R.}, title = {Lotto fever: do lottery players act rationally around large jackpots?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2004}, volume = {83}, pages = {233-237}, abstract = {‘‘Lotto fever’’ occurs when an increase in ticket sales reduces the expectedvalue of a lottery ticket despite a higher jackpot. An examination of 17,538lotto drawings in the United States finds that examples of lotto feverare exceedingly rare}, key = {risk} } @BOOK{MaKo:02, title = {Microeconomic Theory - an Integrated Approach}, publisher = {Pearson}, year = {2002}, author = {Mathis, S. and Kscianski, J.}, address = {New Jersey}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Mats:00, author = {Matsui, A.}, title = {Expected Utility and Case Based Reasoning}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2000}, volume = {39}, pages = {31-12}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Mats:98, author = {Matsumoto, Mutsumi}, title = {A note on tax competition and public input provision}, journal = {Regional Science and Urban Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {28}, pages = {465-473}, number = {4}, key = {Tax competition} } @ARTICLE{Mats:55, author = {Matsusita, K.}, title = {Decision rules based on distance for problems of fit, two samples and estimationn}, journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1955}, volume = {26}, pages = {631-641}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Matt:83, author = {Matthews, K. G. P.}, title = {National income and the black economy}, journal = {Economic Affairs}, year = {1983}, pages = {261-267}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Matt:82, author = {Matthews, K. G. P.}, title = {Demand for currency and the black economy in the {UK}}, journal = {Journal of Economic Studies}, year = {1982}, volume = {9}, pages = {3-22}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Maur:98, author = {Mauro, Paolo}, title = {Corruption and composition of government expenditure}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {69}, pages = {263-279}, number = {2}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{max:07, author = {Max,C.A.}, title = {Hand-Holding, Brow-Beating, and Shaming Into Compliance: A Comparative Survey of Enforcement Mechanisms for Tax Compliance}, journal = {Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law}, year = {2007}, volume = {40}, abstract = {Tax authorities and policy planners have a variety of tools at their disposal to create mechanisms to encourage and enforce compliance with revenue collection systems. Traditionally, these mechanisms include the possibility of criminal prosecution as well as civil pecuniary sanctions. Despite the dominate role that prosecution and pecuniary sanctions hold internationally, there exists a range of alternative enforcement mechanisms utilized. The United States has recently started to implement nonpecuniary enforcement devices to achieve policy goals, namely the encouragement of participating with the federal taxing system. This Note attempts to take an initial step into exploring the range of international enforcement mechanisms available to policy planners. Then, it contrasts these histories with the more recent development of taxation in the United States. It concludes that given international harmonization, the United States is more likely on the forefront rather than behind the learning curve of enforcement devices. While nonpecuniary devices may hold promise to encourage participation, further research is needed to develop refined devices which live up to that promise.}, key = {tax compliance}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Mays:90, author = {Mayshar, Joram}, title = {On measures of excess burden and their application}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1990}, volume = {43}, pages = {263-289}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{Mays:86, author = {Mayshar, J.}, title = {Taxation with Costly Administration}, institution = {University of Wisconsin - Madison}, year = {1986}, type = {SSRI Workshop Discussion Paper}, number = {8616}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{MaYi:96, author = {Mayshar, Joram and Yitzhaki, Shlomo}, title = {{D}alton-improving tax reform: When households differ in ability and needs}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {62}, pages = {399-412}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{MaYi:95, author = {Mayshar, J. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Dalton-improving indirect tax reform}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {95}, pages = {793-808}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Mays:74, title = {The Idea of Social Choice}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1974}, author = {Mayston, D. J.}, address = {London}, key = {Welfare} } @BOOK{Mayston1974, title = {The Idea of Social Choice}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1974}, author = {Mayston, D. J.}, address = {London.}, key = {Welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Mazo:04, author = {Mazocco, M.}, title = {Saving, Risk Sharing, and Preferences for Risk}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {2004}, volume = {94}, pages = {1169-1182}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{Mazu:08, author = {Mazumder, B.}, title = {Sibling similarities and economic inequality in the {U.S.}}, journal = {Journal of Population Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {21}, pages = {685-701}, number = {3}, abstract = {I use a new methodological approach and larger US samples than previous studies and estimate that the sibling correlation across a range of economic outcomes is around 0.5. This suggests that half of economic inequality in the US can be attributed to family and community influences. A comparison with noneconomic outcomes suggests that individual choices rather than a simple mechanical relationship governs the intergenerational transmission of income. A decomposition of the sibling correlation suggests that the acquisition of human capital is an important channel through which family background affects future success but that noncognitive factors also play a role.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {rodano}, timestamp = {2008.06.12} } @ARTICLE{Macu:82, author = {Ma{C}urdy, T.E.}, title = {The use of time series processes to model the error structure of earnings in a longitudinal data analysis}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1982}, volume = {18}, pages = {83-114}, abstract = {This study presents an error structure that offers a rich statistical framework for panel data analysis. It includes as special cases most of the error specifications found in longitudinal studies of wages and earnings. A general set of procedures for choosing a specification of this error structure and eslimating its parameters appears in the first part of this study. The last section applies these procedures to lit an error structure for wages and earnings of prime-age males using data from the Michigan Panel of Income Dynamics.}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{MaCurdy1982, author = {Ma{C}urdy, T.}, title = {The use of time series processes to model the error structure of earnings in longitudinal data analysis}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1982}, pages = {83-114}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{McAd:07, author = {McAdams, Richard}, title = {Economic Cost of Inequality}, institution = {University of Chicago Law School, Law \& Economics}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {370}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{McBr:06, author = {McBride, M.}, title = {Discrete Public Goods under Threshold Uncertainty}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {1181-1199}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{McBr:01, author = {McBride, M.}, title = {Relative-Income Effects on Subjective Well-Being in the Cross-Section}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation}, year = {2001}, volume = {45}, pages = {251-278}, key = {welfare}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @TECHREPORT{McCa:08, author = {McCaffery, E.}, title = {A Consumed Income Tax: A Fair and Simple Plan for Tax Reform}, institution = {University of Southern California Law School}, year = {2008}, type = {Research Paper}, number = {08-16}, abstract = {These are slides from a presentation to the President¡¯s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform, given in Washington D.C. on May 11, 2005, updated, with additional slides, and sources at the end. The principal goal is to summarize the mechanics and analytics of a consumed or cash-flow income tax, a progressive spending tax, based on a rearrangement of the Haig Simons identity, Income = Consumption + Savings, to generate Consumption = Income ¨C Savings. A consistent spending tax simply features unlimited deductions for savings, along the lines of traditional Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), plus the inclusion of debt as a cash-flow input (the fatal flaw of the 1990s USA Tax Plan was its failure to include debt in the tax base). Progressive rates can be maintained, even increased. The critical point is that such a progressive postpaid consumption, cash-flow or (all equivalently) spending tax is not equivalent to a wage tax, and does not systematically exempt the yield to savings from the tax base. Instead, a consistent progressive spending tax stands between an income tax, which double taxes all savings, and a prepaid consumption, yield exempt, or (all equivalently) wage tax, which never taxes any savings. A consistent progressive spending tax taxes the yield to capital when (but only when) it is used to elevate material lifestyles, not when capital transactions (savings, investing, borrowing) are used to smooth out, in time, a taxpayer¡¯s labor market earnings. This is an attractive ideal, as argued at greater length in McCaffery 2005a. It is also noted that such a progressive spending tax is a normatively attractive ¡°hybrid,¡± in that it taxes some but not all savings, and in a principled and appealing way, in contrast to the flawed practice of engrafting consumption tax elements (of either sort, pre or post paid) onto an income tax base. See McCaffery 2005b.}, key = {income tax}, owner = {Zhang Zhijun}, timestamp = {2000.09.30} } @TECHREPORT{McCa:07, author = {McCaffery, Edward}, title = {Where’s the Sex in Fiscal Sociology? Taxation and Gender in Comparative Perspective}, institution = {University of Southern California, Center in Law, Economics and Organization}, year = {2007}, type = {Research Paper}, number = {07-12}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @TECHREPORT{McBa:04TA, author = {McCaffery,E. and Baron,J.}, title = {Thinking About Tax}, institution = {University of Southern California CLEO}, year = {2004}, abstract = {Behavioral economics and cognitive psychology have demonstrated that peopledeviate from ideal precepts of rationality in many settings, showing inconsistentjudgement in the face of framing and other formal manipulations of thepresentation of problems. This article summarizes the findings of originalexperiments about subjects' perceptions of aspects of tax-law design andargues for the relevance of behavioral perspectives to the understandingand improvement of real-world fiscal systems.We show that in evaluatingtax systems, subjects are vulnerable to a wide range of heuristics andbiases, leading to inconsistent judgment and evaluation. The prevalenceof these biases suggests that there is room for skillful politicians tomanipulate public opinion, and that tax-system design can be volatile onaccount of the possibility of eliciting preference reversals through purelyformal rhetorical means. More troubling, the finds suggest a likely andpersistent wedge between observed and optimal public finance systems.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{McCa:76, author = {McCaleb, T. S.}, title = {Tax evasion and the differential taxation of labour and capital income}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1976}, volume = {31}, pages = {287-292}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{McCa:71, author = {J. McCall}, title = {A {M}arkovian Model of Income Dynamics}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1971}, volume = {66}, pages = {439-447}, number = {335}, key = {mobility} } @BOOK{McCPoRo:08, title = {Polarized {A}merica: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2008}, author = {McCarty, N. and Poole, K. T. and Rosenthal, H.}, key = {polarisation}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.01.29} } @BOOK{McCPoRo:06, title = {Polarized {A}merica. The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {2006}, author = {McCarty, N. and Poole, K. T., and Rosenthal, H.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, __markedentry = {[zhangz3]}, key = {polarisation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @ARTICLE{McClelland1978, author = {McClelland, G. and Rohrbaugh, J.}, title = {Who accepts the {P}areto axiom? The role of utility and equity in arbitration decisions}, journal = {Behavioural Science}, year = {1978}, volume = {23}, pages = {446-456}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{McRo:78, author = {McClelland, G. and Rohrbaugh, J.}, title = {Who accepts the {P}areto axiom? The role of utility and equity in arbitrationdecisions}, journal = {Behavioral Science}, year = {1978}, volume = {23}, pages = {446-456}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{McCl:77, author = {McClements, L.}, title = {Equivalence Scales for Children}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {8}, pages = {191-210}, key = {Equivalence scales} } @ARTICLE{McClements1977, author = {McClements, L.}, title = {Equivalence Scales for Children}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {8}, key = {Equivalence scales}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{McCu:97, author = {McCutcheon, B.}, title = {Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1997}, volume = {105}, pages = {330-350}, key = {political economy} } @INCOLLECTION{McDo:81SI, author = {McDonald, J. B.}, title = {Some issues associated with the measurement of income inequality}, booktitle = {Statistical Distributions in Scientific Work 6}, year = {1981}, editor = {Taillie, C. et al.}, pages = {161-179}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{McDo:84, author = {McDonald, J. B.}, title = {Some Generalized Functions for the Size Distribution of Income}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1984}, volume = {52}, pages = {647-664}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Mcdonald1979, author = {Mcdonald, J. B. and Jensen, B.}, title = {An analysis of some properties of alternative measures of income inequality based on the Gamma distribution function}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1979}, volume = {74}, pages = {856-60}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{McDMa:95, author = {McDonald, J. B. and Mantrala, A.}, title = {The distribution of personal income revisited}, journal = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, year = {1995}, volume = {10}, pages = {201-204}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{McDonald1995, author = {McDonald, J. B. and Mantrala, A.}, title = {The istribution of personal income revistied}, journal = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, year = {1995}, volume = {10}, pages = {201-204}, key = {distributions}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{McDonald1981, author = {McDonald, J. B. and Ransom, M. R.}, title = {An analysis of the bounds for the {G}ini coefficient}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1981}, volume = {17}, pages = {177-188}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{McDoRa:81, author = {McDonald, J. B. and Ransom, M. R.}, title = {An analysis of the bounds for the {G}ini coefficient}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1981}, volume = {17}, pages = {177-218}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{McDonald1979, author = {McDonald, J. B. and Ransom, M. R.}, title = {Functional Forms, Estimation Techniques and the Distribution of Income.}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, volume = {47}, pages = {1513-1525}, key = {distributions}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{McDoRa:79, author = {McDonald, J. B. and Ransom, M. R.}, title = {Functional Forms, Estimation Techniques and the Distribution of Income}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, volume = {47}, pages = {1513-1525}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{McDEi:95, author = {McDonough, T. and Eisenhauer, J.}, title = {Sir {R}obert {G}iffen and the great potato famine: a discussion of the roleof a legend in neoclassical economics.}, journal = {Journal of Economic Issues}, year = {1995}, volume = {29}, pages = {747-759}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{McMuSpSt:08, author = {McEvoy, D. M. and Murphy, J. J. and Spraggon, J. M. and Stranlund, J. K.}, title = {The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence}, institution = {Department of Resource Economics}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2008-2}, abstract = {This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger (and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that giving coalition members the opportunity to violate their commitments while requiring them to finance enforcement to maintain compliance reduces the overall provision of the public good. The decrease in the provision of the public good is attributed to an increase in the participation threshold for a theoretically stable coalition to form and to significant levels of noncompliance. When we abandon the strict stability conditions and require all subjects to join a coalition for it to form, the average provision of the public good increases significantly.}, owner = {Zhang Zhijun}, timestamp = {2000.09.29} } @ARTICLE{McGa:01, author = {McGarry, K.}, title = {The Cost of Equality: Unequal Bequests and Tax Avoidance}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, pages = {179-204}, key = {wealth taxation} } @ARTICLE{McGa:99, author = {McGarry, Kathleen}, title = {Inter vivos transfers and intended bequests}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {321-351}, number = {3}, key = {wealth} } @TECHREPORT{McGe:07, author = {McGee, Robert}, title = {Tax Administration Costs in Transition Economies and the OECD: A Comparative Study}, institution = {Barry University, Andreas School of Business}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @TECHREPORT{McTy:07, author = {McGee, R.W. and Tyler, M.}, title = {Tax Evasion and Ethics: A Demographic Study of 33 Countries}, institution = {Andreas School of Business, Barry University}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {Miami Shores, FL 33161 USA}, month = {October}, abstract = {Tax evasion is a worldwide phenomenon. The problem is especially acute in transition and developing economies, since they do not have an appropriate infrastructure in place to collect taxes. Attitudes of the citizenry are an important factor in the collection of taxes. The present study reviews the attitudes of taxpayers in 33 countries on the issue of the ethics of tax evasion and considers demographic differences (gender, age, education and income level) that may impact these attitudes. The data examined was collected as part of a larger study on human beliefs and values. This study found that women are more opposed to tax evasion than men; older people are more opposed to tax evasion than younger people; less educated people are more opposed to tax evasion than better educated people; and poorer people are more opposed to tax evasion than wealthier people.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @TECHREPORT{McGe:06, author = {McGee, R. W.}, title = {Ethics and Tax Evasion in Asia}, institution = {Andreas School of Business, Barry University}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper Series}, address = {Andreas School of Business Working Paper Series, Barry University, Miami Shores, FL 33161 USA}, month = {September}, abstract = {This paper analyzes the data on tax evasion that was collected as part of a much larger survey on human beliefs and values. Data from the Asian countries that were included in the survey are compared and contrasted. The opinions of participants are ranked by country in several demographic categories, including gender and age. Data gathered from some surveys of China and Thailand are also discussed.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @ARTICLE{McGe:99, author = {McGee, R. W.}, title = {Is It Unethical to Evade the Capital Gains Tax?}, journal = {Journal of Accounting, Ethics and Public Policy}, year = {1999}, volume = {2}, pages = {567-581}, key = {Tax evasion} } @BOOKLET{McGee1999, title = {Is It Unethical to Evade the Capital Gains Tax?}, author = {McGee, R. W.}, year = {1999}, journal = {Journal of Accounting, Ethics and Public Policy}, key = {Tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, pages = {567-581}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, volume = {2} } @TECHREPORT{McHoLi:06, author = {McGee, R. W. and Ho, S. S. M. and Li, A. S. Y.}, title = {A comparative study on perceived ethics of tax evasion: Hong Kong vs. The United States}, institution = {World Business Ethics Forum}, year = {2006}, type = {Conference Paper}, month = {November}, abstract = {The ethics of tax evasion has been discussed sporadically in the theological and philosophical literature for at least 500 years. Martin Crowe wrote a doctoral thesis that reviewed much of that literature in 1944. This paper begins with a review of the literature and identifies the main issues and summarizes the three main views that have emerged over the centuries. It then reports on the results of a survey of HK and US university business students who were asked 15 statements to express their opinions on the 15 main issues. The data are then analyzed to determine which of the three viewpoints is dominant among the sample population. HK scores are compared to US scores to determine the difference between the two societies. The underlying cultural differences are further explored in hope of accounting for differing perceptions of ethics of tax evasion. Policy implications for increasing people’s awareness of ethics on tax evasion are also highlighted.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @ARTICLE{McGu:72GS, author = {McGuire, M. C.}, title = {Group Segregation and optimal jurisdictions}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1972}, volume = {82}, pages = {112-182}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{McKe:89, author = {Michael McKee}, title = {Intra-Experimental Income Effects and Risk Aversion}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1989}, volume = {30}, pages = {109-115}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Mckelvey1998, author = {Mckelvey, Richard and Palfrey, Thomas}, title = {Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games}, journal = {Experimental Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {1}, pages = {9--41}, number = {1}, month = jun, abstract = {Abstract  This article investigates the use of standard econometric models for quantal choice to study equilibria of extensive form games. Players make choices based on a quantal-choice model and assume other players do so as well. We define an agent quantal response equilibrium (AQRE), which applies QRE to the agent normal form of an extensive form game and imposes a statistical version of sequential rationality. We also define a parametric specification, called logit-AQRE, in which quantal-choice probabilities are given by logit response functions. AQRE makes predictions that contradict the invariance principle in systematic ways. We show that these predictions match up with some experimental findings by Schotter et al. (1994) about the play of games that differ only with respect to inessential transformations of the extensive form. The logit-AQRE also implies a unique selection from the set of sequential equilibria in generic extensive form games. We examine data from signaling game experiments by Banks et al. (1994) and Brandts and Holt (1993). We find that the logit-AQRE selection applied to these games succeeds in predicting patterns of behavior observed in these experiments, even when our prediction conflicts with more standard equilibrium refinements, such as the intuitive criterion. We also reexamine data from the McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) centipede experiment and find that the AQRE model can account for behavior that had previously been explained in terms of altruistic behavior.}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.07.21}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1009905800005} } @ARTICLE{McKelvey1992, author = {McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas D.}, title = {An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1992}, volume = {60}, pages = {803-836}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.12.29} } @ARTICLE{McKelvey1995, author = {McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R.}, title = {Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {1995}, volume = {10}, pages = {6--38}, number = {1}, month = jul, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.07.21}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45NJFPR-10/1/4e79be26d648c4cf4dc557202baa3ff9} } @TECHREPORT{McKe:07IR, author = {McKenzie, Jordi}, title = {Increasing Returns to Information and Pareto's Law: New Australian Box Office Revenue Evidence}, institution = {University of Sydney}, year = {2007}, abstract = {Recent empirical evidence has suggested that box office revenue distributions exhibit ‘increasing returns to information’. This conclusion has been proposed as an explanation of the observed autocorrelation in box office revenue growth rates in the context of the famous Pareto law model that, among other things, has been used to model firm size. Presenting a similar theoretical model to that of Ijiri and Simon (1974), this paper tests the findings of De Vany and Walls (1996), Walls (1997) and Hand (2001) on box office revenue data using a large new data set of Australian box office revenues. Support is found for a violation of the log-linear Pareto model suggesting autocorrelation in revenue growth rates to be a feature of the ‘weekly box office revenue’ and ‘cumulative box office revenue’ distributions. This paper extends previous research by re-examining the empirical findings when the cumulative revenue distribution is disaggregated in terms of opening week number of screens and also by considering the model’s suitability for describing the distribution of ‘weekly screen average revenues’. It is observed that the autocorrelation is still evident leading to the conclusion that ‘increasing returns to information’ is a strong and general feature of demand for motion pictures.}, key = {Pareto}, keywords = {Box Office Revenue, Pareto’s law, Increasing Returns to Information}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{MKTu:78, author = {McKenzie, R. B. and Tullock, G.}, title = {The New World of Economics}, year = {1978}, address = {Homewood, Illinois}, key = {political economy}, publisher = {Irwin} } @ARTICLE{McKinney2006, author = {McKinney, C. Nicholas and Huyck, John B. Van}, title = {Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?}, journal = {Experimental Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {V9}, pages = {297--303}, number = {3}, month = sep, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2007.02.09} } @ARTICLE{McKi:98, author = {McKitrick, Ross R.}, title = {The econometric critique of computable general equilibrium modeling: therole of functional forms}, journal = {Economic Modelling}, year = {1998}, volume = {15}, pages = {543-573}, number = {4}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{McLa:98, author = {McLaren, J.}, title = {Black markets and optimal evadable taxation}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1998}, volume = {108}, pages = {665-679}, number = {448}, month = {May}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Mcle:06, author = {McLeod,D.}, title = {How fast did developing country poverty fall during the 1990s? Capabilities-based tests of rival estimates}, journal = {Economics letters}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {297-303}, abstract = {Non-nested hypothesis tests are used to rank eight widely used international per capita income and poverty measures with respect to how well they predict changes in capabilities: lower child mortality, higher enrollment rates, better nutrition, etc. National accounts based generally out-perform survey-based growth and poverty estimates in these tests.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{McWa:06, author = {McManus, J. and Warren, N.}, title = {The Case for Measuring Tax Gap}, journal = {eJournal of Tax Research}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {61-79}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{McFr:01, author = {McNeil, A. J. and Frey, R.}, title = {Estimation of Tail-Related Risk Measures for Heteroscedastic Financial TimeSeries: An Extreme Value Approach}, journal = {Journal of Empirical Finance}, year = {2001}, volume = {(7) 3-4}, pages = {271-300}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{McNeil2001, author = {McNeil, A. J. and Frey, R.}, title = {Estimation of Tail-Related Risk Measures for Heteroscedastic Financial Time Series: An Extreme Value Approach}, journal = {Journal of Empirical Finance}, year = {2001}, volume = {(7) 3-4}, pages = {271-300}, key = {risk}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{McCa:06, author = {Mc{C}affery, E.}, title = {Behavioural Economics and Fundamental Tax Reform}, institution = {USC Law School}, year = {2006}, type = {Research Paper and Legal Studies Reseach Paper}, number = {06-4}, address = {University of Southern California Law School Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071}, month = {April}, note = {This paper is being prepared for a conference, “Is it Time for Fundamental Tax Reform?” to be held at the James A. Baker III Institute at Rice University, April 2006. I thank Alan Auerbach and Colin Camerer for helpful conversations.}, key = {tax reform}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{McBa:04FA, author = {Mc{C}affery, E. and Baron, J.}, title = {Framing and Taxation: Evaluation of Tax Policies Involving Household Composition}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {2004}, volume = {25}, pages = {679-705}, abstract = {Three studies of attitudes toward tax policies were conducted on the World Wide Web. The results show several framing and other effects. In penalty aversion, subjects preferred bonuses over penalties, when policies differed only in how they were formally described. In the Schelling effect, subjects inconsistently preferred both higher bonuses (for children) for the poor than for the rich and higher penalties (for being childless) for the rich than for the poor. In the neutrality bias, subjects preferred one form of accommodation for marriage, namely separate filing – which has no marriage bonuses or penalties but violates a norm of treating equal-earning couples alike – more when it was presented in a format that emphasized the effect of marriage (where it is neutral) than in one that emphasized the effect of the number of earners in a couple (where it is not neutral). In the status-quo effect, subjects preferred the specified starting point to any change. Finally, in the metric effect, subjects favored more progression in tax burdens when taxes were expressed in percent than when they were expressed in dollars. The research suggests a framework for thinking about framing more generally. Subjects approach a given choice or decision problem with strong independent norms or ideals, such as, here, ‘‘do no harm,’’ ‘‘avoid penalties,’’ ‘‘treat likes alike,’’ ‘‘help children,’’ and ‘‘expect the rich to pay more than the not-rich.’’ They then evaluate the choice-problem based on the norm made most salient by the formal presentation, ignoring the others. This leads to preference reversals and shifts in a complex area such as tax, where independently attractive ideals are often in conflict. The research suggests that popular perceptions of tax system fairness are vulnerable to structural instability on account of the inherent incompatibility of independently attractive goals. Models of public policy formation that take into account public opinion must therefore take into account the framing of issues in the popular understanding.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{McJe:79, author = {Mc{D}onald, J. B. and Jensen, B.}, title = {An analysis of some properties of alternative measures of income inequality based on the Gamma distribution function}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1979}, volume = {74}, pages = {856-60}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2286411} } @TECHREPORT{McGe:05, author = {Mc{G}ee, R.}, title = {The Ethics of Tax Evasion: A Survey of International Business Academics}, institution = {International Atlantic Economic Conference}, year = {2005}, type = {Paper}, month = {October}, abstract = {In 1944, Martin Crowe, a Catholic priest, wrote a doctoral dissertation titled The Moral Obligation of Paying Just Taxes. His dissertation summarized and analyzed 500 years of theological and philosophical debate on this topic, much of which took place in Latin. Since Crowe’s dissertation, not much has been written on the topic of tax evasion from an ethical perspective, with a few exceptions. In 1998 and 1999, a few articles were published on the ethics of tax evasion in the Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy. An edited book on this topic was published in 1998. The present paper summarizes, updates and expands on Crowe’s work. Recent literature is reviewed and the issues discussed in the last 500 years of theological and philosophical debate are incorporated into an 18-statement survey, which was distributed to members of the Academy of International Business (AIB), the International Management Development Association (IMDA) and the International Academy of Business Disciplines (IABD). These three groups were chosen to be the sample population because members of these groups are knowledgeable about international business practices and they come from a wide variety of backgrounds. They are more cosmopolitan in outlook than the average U.S. business school professor. A large percentage of the membership of these groups have lived in more than one country and many of them were born in a country other than the United States, which reduces the U.S. bias that would result if the sample population consisted of a random sample of American business school professors. A fair percentage of the membership of these organizations presently lives outside the United States. Three basic views on the ethics of tax evasion have emerged over the centuries. The statements in the survey instrument incorporate all three views, which give respondents an opportunity to express their opinion regardless of which of the three positions they come closest to. Most statements begin with the phrase “Tax evasion is not unethical if…”, which allows the respondents to either agree or disagree with the statement. Each question is graded on a 7-point Likert scale. The responses to each question were tallied and ranked to determine under which circumstances tax evasion might be considered most or least ethical.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {kog1}, pages = {1-45}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @BOOK{Mead:76TJ, title = {The Just Economy}, publisher = {Allen and Unwin}, year = {1976}, author = {Meade, J. E.}, address = {London}, key = {welfare} } @INBOOK{Mead:76TJ-4, chapter = {4}, pages = {44-60}, title = {The Just Economy}, publisher = {Allen and Unwin}, year = {1976}, author = {Meade, J. E.}, key = {inequality} } @INBOOK{Mead:76TJ-7, chapter = {VII: Measurement and patterns of inequality}, title = {The Just Economy}, publisher = {Allen and Unwin}, year = {1976}, author = {Meade, J. E.}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Mead:73, author = {Meade, J. E.}, title = {The inheritance of inequality: some biological , demographic, social andeconomic factors}, institution = {Proceedings of the British Academy}, year = {1973}, address = {London}, key = {wealth}, organization = {Proceedings of the British Academy} } @BOOK{Mead:55, title = {Trade and welfare: Mathematical supplement}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1955}, author = {Meade, J. E.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Mead:52, author = {Meade, J. E.}, title = {External economies and diseconomies in a competitive situation}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1952}, volume = {62}, pages = {54-67}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Medin:96, title = {Perl 5 by Example}, publisher = {Que Corporation, http://www.codebits.com/p5be}, year = {1996}, author = {Medinets , D.}, address = {Indianapolis, Indiana}, key = {Computing} } @ARTICLE{MePi:04, author = {Meghir, C. and Pistaferri, L.}, title = {Income variance dynamics and heterogeneity}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2004}, volume = {72}, pages = {1-32}, abstract = {Recent theoretical work has shown the importance of measuring microeconomic uncertainty for models of both general and partial equilibrium under imperfect insurance. In this paper the assumption of i.i.d. income innovations used in previous empirical studies is removed and the focus of the analysis is placed on models for the conditional variance of income shocks, which is related to the measure of risk emphasized by the theory. We first discriminate amongst various models of earnings determination that separate income shocks into idiosyncratic transitory and permanent components. We allow for education- and time-specific differences in the stochastic process for earnings and for measurement error. The conditional variance of the income shocks is modelled as a parsimonious ARCH process with both observable and unobserved heterogeneity. The empirical analysis is conducted on data drawn from the 1967–1992 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We find strong evidence of sizeable ARCH effects as well as evidence of unobserved heterogeneity in the variances.}, key = {income dynamics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.04.12} } @ARTICLE{Mehr:76, author = {Mehran, F.}, title = {Linear measures of income inequality}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1976}, volume = {44}, pages = {805-809}, number = {7}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Mehr:75AS, author = {Mehran, F.}, title = {A statistical analysis on income inequality based on decomposition of the{G}ini index}, journal = {Proceeding of the 40th Session of ISI}, year = {1975}, address = {Warsaw}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Mehr:75BO, author = {Mehran, F.}, title = {Bounds on the {G}ini index based on observed points of the {L}orenz curve}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1975}, volume = {70}, pages = {64-66}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Mehran1975a, author = {Mehran, F.}, title = {A statistical analysis on income inequality based on decomposition of the {G}ini index}, journal = {Proceeding of the 40th Session of ISI}, year = {1975}, address = {Warsaw}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Mehr:74, author = {Mehran, F.}, title = {Decomposition of the {G}ini index: a statistical analysis of income inequality}, year = {1974}, address = {Geneva, ILO}, institution = {Income distribution and employment programme}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{MeMo:89, author = {Melamud, N. and Mookherjee, D.}, title = {Delegation as Commitment: The case of income tax audits}, journal = {Rand Journal of Economics}, year = {1989}, volume = {20}, pages = {139-163}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Mele:97, author = {Melenberg, Bertrand}, title = {Life cycle consumption models with uncertainty within periods}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {57}, pages = {1-4}, number = {1}, key = {consumption} } @INCOLLECTION{Menc:88, author = {Menchik, P.}, title = {Distributional aspects of the life cycle theory of saving}, booktitle = {Unequal estate division: Is it altruism, reverse bequests, or simply noise?}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1988}, editor = {Kessler, D. and Masson, A.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Menc:80, author = {Menchik, P.}, title = {Primogeniture: Equal sharing and the {US} distribution of wealth}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1980}, volume = {94}, pages = {299-316}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Menc:79, author = {Menchik, P.}, title = {Intergeneration transmission of inequality: an empirical study of wealthmobility}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1979}, volume = {46}, pages = {349-362}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Menchik1979, author = {Menchik, P.}, title = {Intergeneration transmission of inequality: an empirical study of wealth mobility}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1979}, volume = {46}, pages = {349-362}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Menc:81, author = {Menchik, P. L.}, title = {Some issues in the measurement of income inequality}, year = {1981}, booktitle = {Value judgment and income distribution}, editor = {Solo, A. and Anderson, C. W.}, key = {inequality}, publisher = {Praeger} } @INCOLLECTION{MeJi:98, author = {Menchik, P. L. and Jiankopolos, N. A.}, title = {Economics of Inheritance}, booktitle = {Inheritance and wealth in {A}merica}, publisher = {NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft}, year = {1998}, editor = {Miller, R. K. and McNamee, S. J.}, pages = {351-382}, address = {New York}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Mend:39, author = {Mendershausen, H.}, title = {On the measurement of the degree of inequality of income distribution}, year = {1939}, institution = {Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, University of Chicago}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{MeGeTr:80, author = {Menezes, C. and Geiss, C. and Tressler, J.}, title = {Increasing downside risk}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1980}, volume = {70}, pages = {921-931}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{MeMoTe:01, author = {Menezes, F. M. and Monteiro, P. K. and Temimi, A.}, title = {Private Provision of Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {35}, pages = {493-514}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Meng:04, author = {Meng,X.}, title = {Economic Restructuring and Income Inequality in Urban China}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2004}, volume = {50}, pages = {357-379}, abstract = {Economic transition from a planned to a market oriented economy is oftenassociated with a widening of income inequality. The nature of this change,however, may differ during different stages of the economic transition.This paper investigates the increase in income inequality in urban Chinaduring two phases of economic reform: a moderate reform era (1988-95) anda radical reform era (1995-99). It is found that although income inequalityincreased considerably during both stages, the nature and causes of theincrease are different. In the moderate reform period, the increase ininequality was a result of some parts of society sharing more of the economicgain than others, and the main cause of this inequality is regional incomedispersion. During the radical reform period income reductions at the lowerend of the distribution is observed, and it is mainly due to the large-scaleunemployment generated by labor reallocation.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Meng:98, author = {Meng, Xi}, title = {Male-female wage determination and gender wage discrimination in {C}hina'srural industrial sector}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {5}, pages = {67-89}, number = {1}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{MeGrWa:07, author = {Meng, X. and Gregory, R. and Wan, G.}, title = {Urban Poverty in China and its Contributing Factors, 1986-2000}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2007}, volume = {53}, pages = {167-189}, abstract = {Food price increases and the introduction of radical social welfare and enterprise reforms during the 1990s generated significant changes in the lives of urban households in China. During this period urban poverty increased considerably. This paper uses household level data from 1986 to 2000 to examine what determines whether households fall below the poverty line over this period and investigates how the impact of these determinants has changed through time. We find that large households and households with more nonworking members are more likely to be poor, suggesting that perhaps the change from the old implicit price subsidies, based on household size, to an explicit income subsidy, based on employment, has worsened the position of large families. Further investigation into regional poverty variation indicates that over the 1986–93 period food price increases were also a major contributing factor. Between 1994 and 2000 the worsening of the economic situation of state sector employees contributed to the poverty increase.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @TECHREPORT{MeGrWa:05, author = {Meng, X. and Gregory, R. and Wang, Y.}, title = {Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in Urban China, 1986-2000}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2005}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {1452}, address = {P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany}, month = {January}, abstract = {Although urban China has experienced spectacular income growth over the last two decades, increases in , reduction in social welfare provision, deregulation of grain prices, and increases in income uncertainty in the 1990s have increased urban poverty. Using a large repeated cross-section household survey data from 1986 to 2000, this study maps out the change in income, , and poverty over the 15 year period and investigates the determinants of poverty. It is found that the increase in the poverty rate in the 1990s is associated with the increase in the relative food price, and the need to spend on education, housing and medical care which were previously paid by the state. In addition, the increase in the saving rate of the poor due to an increase in income uncertainty contributes significantly to the increase in poverty measured in terms of expenditure. Even though income growth reduces poverty, the radical reform measures implemented in the 1990s have sufficiently offset this gain that urban poverty is higher in 2000 than in 1986.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{Mera:69, author = {Mera, K.}, title = {Experimental Determination of Relative Marginal Utilities}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1969}, volume = {83}, pages = {464-477}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{Merc:93, author = {Mercader, M.}, title = {The Low Income Population in {S}pain and a comparison with {F}rance andthe {UK}: Evidence from the household expenditure surveys}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1993}, type = {Welfare State Programme Discussion Paper}, number = {95}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Merc:98, author = {Mercader-Prats, Magda}, title = {Identifying low standards of living: Evidence from {S}pain}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, pages = {155-173}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Ythi:98, author = {Mercier Ythier, Jean}, title = {The distribution of wealth in the liberal social contract}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {329-347}, number = {2}, month = {February}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{Merk:94, author = {Merkies, A. H. Q. M.}, title = {The Scope of Inequality Coefficients}, booktitle = {Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, pages = {141-161}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Merk:90, author = {Merkies, A. H. Q. M.}, title = {The scope of inequality coefficients}, year = {1990}, type = {paper presented to the Fifth Karlsruhe Seminar on Models and Measurementof Welfare and inequality}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Merkies1990, author = {Merkies, A. H. Q. M.}, title = {The scope of inequality coefficients}, year = {1990}, type = {paper presented to the Fifth Karlsruhe Seminar on Models and Measurement of Welfare and inequality}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Mert:57, title = {Social Theory and Social Structure}, publisher = {Free Press}, year = {1957}, author = {Merton, R. K.}, address = {New York}, edition = {Second}, key = {sociology}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.05.29} } @ARTICLE{Merz:91, author = {Merz, J.}, title = {Microsimulation: A Survey of Principles, Developments and Applications}, journal = {International Journal of Forecasting}, year = {1991}, volume = {7}, pages = {77-104}, key = {Microsimulation} } @INCOLLECTION{MeKi:99, author = {Merz, J. and Kirsten, D.}, title = {Extended Income Dynamics: Valueing Household Production and its DistributionalImpacts - A Ten Years Panelanalysis for Professions, Entrepreneurs andEmployees in Germany}, booktitle = {Time Use - Research, Data and Policy}, publisher = {Plenum}, year = {1999}, editor = {Merz, J. and Ehling, M.}, pages = {45-59}, address = {Baden Baden}, key = {time use} } @INCOLLECTION{MeLa:99, author = {Merz, J. and Lang, R.}, title = {Working Hour Tension Dynamics - Professions, Entrepreneurs and Employeesin a Ten Years Panelanalysis of Desired Vs. Actual Working Hours IncorporatingNon-Market Influences}, booktitle = {Time Use - Research, Data and Policy}, publisher = {NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft}, year = {1999}, editor = {Merz, J. and Ehling, M.}, pages = {241-268}, address = {Baden Baden}, key = {time use} } @BOOK{Metc:72, title = {An Econometric Model of the Income Distribution}, publisher = {Markham}, year = {1972}, author = {Metcalf, C. E.}, address = {Chicago}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Metc:69, author = {Metcalf, C. E.}, title = {The size distribution of income during the business cycle}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1969}, volume = {59}, pages = {657-668}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Metc:99, author = {Metcalf, D.}, title = {The Low Pay Commission and the National Minimum Wage}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F46-F66}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{Metcalf1999, author = {Metcalf, D.}, title = {The Low Pay Commission and the National Minimum Wage}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F46-F66}, key = {wages}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Metc:03, author = {Metcalf, G. E.}, title = {Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxation: {P}igou, Taxation and Pollution}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {313-322}, key = {Externalities} } @ARTICLE{MeNo:03, author = {Metcalf, G. E. and Norman, G.}, title = {Oligopoly Deregulation and the Taxation of Commodities}, journal = {Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy}, year = {2003}, volume = {2}, pages = {1-16}, key = {Equivalence scales} } @ARTICLE{deMeWe:99, author = {de Meza, D. and Webb, D.}, title = {Wealth, Enterprise and Credit Policy}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {153-163}, key = {finance} } @ARTICLE{Meza1999, author = {de Meza, D. and Webb, D.}, title = {Wealth, Enterprise and Credit Policy}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {153-163}, key = {finance}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Michael1999, author = {Michael, M. S. and Hatzipanayotou, P.}, title = {General equilibrium effects of import constraints under variable labour supply, public goods and income taxation}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {389-401}, key = {international}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{MiHa:99, author = {Michael, M. S. and Hatzipanayotou, P.}, title = {General equilibrium effects of import constraints under variable laboursupply, public goods and income taxation}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {389-401}, key = {international} } @ARTICLE{MiPV:98, author = {Michel, Ph. and Pestieau, P. and Vidal, J-P.}, title = {Labor migration and redistribution with alternative assimilation policies:The small economy case}, journal = {Regional Science and Urban Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {28}, pages = {363-377}, number = {3}, key = {population economics} } @ARTICLE{Mick:99, author = {Micklewright, J.}, title = {Education, Inequality and Transition}, journal = {Economics of Transition}, year = {1999}, volume = {7}, pages = {343-376}, number = {2}, abstract = {Evidence is considered on differences in access to education and in learning achievement within the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The situation inherited from the communist period is first summarized: there were some significant disparities with, for example, family background having a strong association with tertiary enrolments, as in Western countries. Analysis of the transition period focuses on the differences in access and achievement associated with household income and geographic location. Disparities are not the same across the region; in some countries, such as Russia, there are clear grounds for serious concern, but it is unlikely that any country has cause for complacency.}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Mila:08, author = {Milanovic, B.}, title = {Even Higher Global Inequality Than Previously Thought: A Note on Global Inequality Calculations Using the 2005 International Comparison Program Results}, journal = {International Journal of Health Services}, year = {2008}, volume = {38}, pages = {421-429}, abstract = {Using the new results of the International Comparison Program 2005, the author reestimates inequalities between mean country incomes and global inequality among world citizens. All types of international inequality are found to be greater than previously thought (that is, as calculated using earlier data on countries' price levels). The main reason for the higher inequalities is that domestic price levels in most populous Asian countries (China, India, Philippines, Bangladesh) are some 40 percent higher than previously estimated. This implies not only higher global inequality but significantly greater global poverty head counts.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.09.12}, url = {http://baywood.metapress.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/media/p62kvlqutp1h2ag4rye0/contributions/4/7/2/6/47262535161l7724.pdf} } @ARTICLE{Mila:07WW, author = {Milanovic, B.}, title = {Why We All Care About Inequality (But Some of Us Are Loathe to Admit It)}, journal = {Challenge}, year = {2007}, volume = {50}, pages = {109-120}, abstract = {Many economists dismiss the relevance of inequality (if everybody’s income goes up, who cares if inequality is up too?), and argue that only poverty alleviation should matter. This note shows that we all do care about inequality, and to hold that we should be concerned with poverty solely and not with inequality is internally inconsistent.}, key = {Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @BOOK{Mila:05, title = {Worlds apart: Measuring international and global inequality}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {2005}, author = {Milanovic,B.}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Mila:04, author = {Milanovic, B.}, title = {Half a World: Regional inequality in five great federations}, institution = {World Bank and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}, year = {2004}, abstract = {The paper studies regional (spatial) inequality in five most populous countries in the world: China, India, the United States of America, Indonesia and Brazil in the period 1980-2000. They are all federations composed of entities (states or provinces) with substantial autonomy. Two types of regional inequalities are considered: Concept 1 inequality which is inequality between mean incomes (GDPs per capita) of states/provinces and Concert 2 inequality which is inequality between population-weighted regional mean incomes. The first inequality speaks to the issues of income convergence, the second, to the issue of overall inequality as perceived by citizens within a nation. China and India show rising inequality in terms of both concepts in the decade of the 1990’s; Indonesia, on the contrary, displays decreasing inequality in both from the early 1980’s up to the Asian crisis. Overall, we find that openness is negatively associated with Concept 1 regional inequality, and positively with Concept 2 inequality. Openness thus seems to help poorer regions (within nations) to catch up, but also leads to disparity in outcomes for populous states with some getting ahead and others falling behind. Maharashtra vs. Bihar, and Shandong vs. Sichuan provide nice examples of such outcomes in India and China. Higher inflation and higher real interest rate are also associated with greater Concept 2 regional inequality.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{Mila:02, author = {Milanovic, B.}, title = {True World Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993: First Calculation Based on Household Surveys Alone}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2002}, volume = {112}, pages = {51-92}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.03} } @ARTICLE{Mila:00, author = {Milanovic, B.}, title = {The Median-Voter Hypothesis, Income Inequality and Income Redistribution}, journal = {European Journal of Political Inequality}, year = {2000}, volume = {16}, pages = {367-410}, abstract = {The median-voter hypothesis has been central to an extensive literature on consequences of income redistribution. For example, it has been proposed that greater inequality is associated with lower growth, because of the greater redistribution that is sought by the median voter when income distribution is less equal. There have however been no proper tests of the median-voter hypothesis concerning redistribution, because of previous absence of data on factor-income distribution (that is, incomes before taxes and transfers) across households, and thus on the gains by poorer households from redistribution. The study reported in this paper is based on the required data, with 79 observations drawn from household budget surveys from 24 democracies. The results strongly support the conclusion that countries with greater inequality of factor income redistribute more to the poor. This is so even when we control for the share of the elderly in the population and for pension transfers. The evidence that the median-voter hypothesis adequately describes the collective-choice mechanism is however considerably weaker. Although middle-income groups gain more/or lose less through redistribution in countries where initial (factor) income distribution is more unequal, this regularity is all but lost when, by excluding pensions, we look only at explicit redistributive social transfers from which middle classes contemporaneously gain little. This leaves us searching for an alternative explanation: do middle-classes gain from transfers in the long run even if not contemporaneously?; or is the median-voter hypothesis, based on direct democracy, a proper representation of the mechanisms of collective decision making in representative democracy?}, key = {income distribution} } @ARTICLE{Milanovic2000, author = {Milanovic, B.}, title = {The Median-Voter Hypothesis, Income Inequality and Income Redistribution}, journal = {European Journal of Political Inequality}, year = {2000}, volume = {16}, key = {political economy}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Mila:98, title = {Income, Inequality and Poverty during the transition from planned to marketeconomy}, publisher = {The World Bank}, year = {1998}, author = {Milanovic, Branko}, series = {Regional and Sectoral Studies}, address = {Washington DC}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Mila:94, author = {Milanovic, B.}, title = {The {G}ini -type functions: an alternative derivation}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1994}, volume = {46}, pages = {81-90}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{MiJo:99, author = {Milanovic, Branko and Jovanovic, Branko}, title = {Change in the perception of the poverty line during time of depression:{R}ussia 1993-96}, institution = {The World Bank}, year = {1999}, type = {mimeo}, address = {Washington DC}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{MiLiWi:07, author = {Milanovic, Branko and Lindert, Peter and Williamson, Jeffrey}, title = {Measuring Ancient Inequality}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {13550}, abstract = {Is inequality largely the result of the Industrial Revolution? Or, were pre-industrial incomes and life expectancies as unequal as they are today? For want of sufficient data, these questions have not yet been answered. This paper infers inequality for 14 ancient, pre-industrial societies using what are known as social tables, stretching from the Roman Empire 14 AD, to Byzantium in 1000, to England in 1688, to Nueva España around 1790, to China in 1880 and to British India in 1947. It applies two new concepts in making those assessments -- what we call the inequality possibility frontier and the inequality extraction ratio. Rather than simply offering measures of actual inequality, we compare the latter with the maximum feasible inequality (or surplus) that could have been extracted by the elite. The results, especially when compared with modern poor countries, give new insights in to the connection between inequality and economic development in the very long run.}, key = {Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{BiYi:02, author = {Milanovic, B. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Decomposing world income distribution: does the world have a middle class?}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2002}, volume = {48}, pages = {155-178}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.24} } @ARTICLE{Mila:07PA, author = {Milarom, P.}, title = {Package Auctions and Exchanges}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2007}, volume = {75}, pages = {935-965}, number = {4}, abstract = {We report recent advances concerning the package allocation problem, in which traders seek to buy or sell combinations of goods. The problems are most difficult when some goods are not substitutes. In that case, competitive equilibrium typically fail to exist but the core is non-empty and comprises the competitive solutions. Also in that case, the Vickrey auction fails to select core allocations and yield revenues that are less than competitive. The Ausubel-Milgrom auction generally selects core allocations and, when goods are substitutes, prescribes the Vickrey allocation. We also evaluate the problems and promise of mechanisms for the package exchange problem.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Mile:97, author = {Miles, David}, title = {A Household Level Study of the Determinants of Incomes and Consumption}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {1-25}, number = {440}, month = {January}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{Milgrom1982, author = {Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J.}, title = {Predation, Reputation, and Entrance Deterrence}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1982}, volume = {27}, pages = {280-312}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Milgrom1982a, author = {Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J.}, title = {Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1982}, volume = {50}, pages = {443-460}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Mill:95, author = {Miller, D.}, title = {Beliefs about social justice: a comparative approach}, booktitle = {In the Eye of the Beholder}, publisher = {Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation}, year = {1995}, editor = {Svallfors, S.}, pages = {71-103}, address = {Ume{\aa}}, key = {Social justice} } @INCOLLECTION{Mill:70, author = {Miller, H. P.}, title = {Recent trends in family income}, booktitle = {The Logic of Social Hierarchies}, publisher = {Markham Publishing Company}, year = {1970}, editor = {Laumann, E. O. and Siegel, P. M. and Hodge, R. W.}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{MiMc:97, title = {Inheritance and Wealth in America}, publisher = {Plenum Press}, year = {1997}, author = {Miller, R. K and McNamee, S. J.}, address = {New York}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Mill:86, author = {Millett, P.}, title = {Artificial tax avoidance: the {E}nglish and {A}merican approach}, journal = {King's Counsel}, year = {1986}, volume = {36}, pages = {5-10}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{MiSlLa:08, author = {Millimet, D. and Slottje, D. and Lambert, P. J.}, title = {Inequality aversion, income inquality, and social policy in the {US}:1947-1998}, booktitle = {Advances on Income Inequality and Concentration Measures}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2008}, editor = {Betti, G. and Lemmi, A.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @ARTICLE{MiWa:06, author = {Millimet, D. and Wang, L.}, title = {A Distributional Analysis of Gender Earnings Gap in Urban China}, journal = {Contributions to Economic Analysis \& Policy}, year = {2006}, volume = {5}, pages = {1-47}, key = {distributions}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @ARTICLE{MiZa:97, author = {Mills, Jeffrey A. and Zandvakili, Sourushe}, title = {Statistical inference via bootstrapping for measures of inequality}, journal = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, year = {1997}, volume = {12}, pages = {133-150}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Mills1995, author = {Mills, J. A. and Zandvakili, S.}, title = {Statistical inference via bootstrapping for measures of inequality}, institution = {University of Cincinnati}, year = {1995}, type = {mimeo}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Mina:77, author = {Minarik, J.}, title = {The measurement and trend of inequality: comment and reply}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {67}, pages = {513-516}, number = {6}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Minc:58, author = {Mincer, Jacob}, title = {Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1958}, volume = {66}, pages = {281-302}, key = {labour} } @BOOK{Mirk:96, title = {Mathematical Classification and Clustering}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, year = {1996}, author = {Mirkin, Boris}, volume = {II}, series = {Nonconvex Optimization and its applications}, address = {Dewenter}, key = {mathematics} } @INCOLLECTION{Mirr:86, author = {Mirrlees, J. A.}, title = {The theory of optimal taxation}, booktitle = {Handbook of Mathematical Economics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1986}, editor = {Arrow, K. J. and Intrilligator, M. D..}, volume = {3}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {Optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{Mirr:99, author = {Mirrlees, J. A.}, title = {The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part {I}}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {3-21}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Mirrlees1999, author = {Mirrlees, J. A.}, title = {The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {3-21}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Mirr:97, author = {Mirrlees, J. A.}, title = {Information and incentives: the economics of carrots and sticks}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {135-208}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Mirrlees1997, author = {Mirrlees, J. A.}, title = {Information and incentives: the economics of carrots and sticks}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {135-208}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Mirr:95, author = {Mirrlees, J. A.}, title = {Private risk and public action: The economics of the welfare state}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {39}, pages = {383-397}, number = {3-4}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Mirr:76, author = {Mirrlees, J. A.}, title = {Optimal tax theory: a synthesis}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1976}, volume = {6}, pages = {327-358}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.11} } @ARTICLE{Mirr:71, author = {Mirrlees, J. A.}, title = {An exploration in the theory of the optimal income tax}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1971}, volume = {38}, pages = {135-208}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{MiSm:81, author = {Mirus, R. and Smith, R. S.}, title = {Canada's irregular economy}, journal = {Canadian Public Policy}, year = {1981}, volume = {7}, pages = {444-453}, key = {underground} } @BOOK{MiBeSc:99, title = {The State of Working {A}merica}, publisher = {Cornell University Press}, year = {1999}, author = {Mishel, L. and Bernstein, J. and Schmitt, J.}, address = {Ithaca, NY}, key = {labour} } @TECHREPORT{MiOk:95, author = {Mitra, T. and Ok, E. A.}, title = {The measurement of income mobility: a partial ordering approach}, institution = {Cornell University}, year = {1995}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{MiOk:95a, author = {Mitra, T. and Ok, E. A.}, title = {The measurement of income mobility: a partial ordering approach}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1995}, note = {forthcoming}, institution = {Cornell University}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{MiOkKo:98, author = {Mitra, Tapan and Ok, Efe A. and Ko\cckesen, Levent}, title = {Popular support for progressive taxation and the relative income hypothesis}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {58}, pages = {69-76}, number = {1}, abstract = {We show that a marginal rate progressive tax always defeats a marginal rate regressive tax under pairwise majority voting (so long as the latter collects at least as much revenue as the former one) irrespective of whether the voters care at all about their relative incomes or not.}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{MiPo:00, author = {Mitrusi, A. and Poterba, J.}, title = {The distribution of payroll and income tax burdens, 1979-1999}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2000}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {7707}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138}, month = {May}, abstract = {This paper presents new evidence on the level and distribution of income and payroll tax burdens for U.S. families over the 1979-1999 period. During this period, payroll taxes have become an increasingly important component of the tax burden for many low- and middle-income families. This paper uses a new and expanded version of the NBER TAXSIM program to analyze the impact of legislative changes in income and payroll taxes. Averaged over all families, the combined 1999 payroll and income tax burden was quite similar to what it would have been if the 1979 income and payroll tax laws had remained in force for the last two decades, with only inflation-based adjustments to tax brackets. The mix of income and payroll taxes has changed, however. As a result of the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as well as other changes in the federal personal income tax, payroll tax liabilities now exceed income tax liabilities for nearly two thirds of families. In 1979, payroll taxes exceeded income taxes for 44 percent of families.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{MiPaRa:00, author = {Mittnik, S. and Paolella, M. S. and Rachev, S. T.}, title = {Diagnosing and Treating the Fat Tails in Financial Returns Data}, journal = {Journal of Empirical Finance}, year = {2000}, volume = {7}, pages = {389-416}, key = {statistics} } @INCOLLECTION{Miya:92, author = {Miyamoto, J. M.}, title = {Generic analysis of Utility models}, booktitle = {Utility Theories: Measurement and Application}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, year = {1992}, editor = {Edwards, W.}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Miya:88, author = {Miyamoto, J. M.}, title = {``Generic Utility Theory:" measurement foundation and applications in multiattributeutility models}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Psychology}, year = {1988}, volume = {32}, pages = {357-404}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Miyamoto1988, author = {Miyamoto, J. M.}, title = {``Generic Utility Theory:" measurement foundation and applications in multiattribute utility models}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Psychology}, year = {1988}, volume = {32}, pages = {357-404}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{MoGa:06, author = {Modarres, R. and Gastwirth, J. L.}, title = {A Cautionary Note on Estimating the Standard Error of the {G}ini Index of Inequality}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics And Statistics}, year = {2006}, volume = {68}, pages = {385-390}, abstract = {We will show that the regression approach to estimating the standard error of the Gini index can produce incorrect results as it does not account for the correlations introduced in the error terms once the data are ordered. To assess the effect of ignoring the correlation in the error terms we examined two distributions and show that the regression method overestimates the standard error of the Gini index. We recommend that the more mathematically complex or computationally intensive methods be used.}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.19} } @ARTICLE{Mode:03, author = {Modesti, Paola}, title = {Lottery-Dependent Utility Via Stochastic Benchmarking}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {2003}, volume = {55}, pages = {45-57}, abstract = {The possibility to interpret expected and nonexpected utility theories inpurelyprobabilistic terms has been recentlyinvestigated. Such interpretationproposes as guideline for the Decision Maker the comparison of random variablesthrough their probabilityto outperform a stochastic benchmark. We applythis type of analysis to the model of Becker and Sarin, showing that theirutilityfunctional maybe seen as the probabilitythat an opportune randomvariable, depending on the one to be evaluated, does not outperform a non-randombenchmark Further, the consequent choice criterion is equivalent to asort of probabilityof ruin. Possible interpretations and financial examplesare discussed.}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Moen:98, author = {Moen, Espen R.}, title = {Efficient ways to finance human capital investments}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {491-505}, number = {260}, month = {November}, key = {education,training} } @TECHREPORT{MoWi:98, author = {Moffit, R. and Wilhelm, M.}, title = {Taxation and the Labor Supply Decisions of the Affluent}, institution = {NBER}, year = {1998}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {6621}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Moff:92, author = {Moffitt, R.}, title = {Incentive Effects of the {U.S.} Welfare System: A Review}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1992}, volume = {30}, pages = {1-61}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{MoRiWi:98, author = {Moffitt, Robert and Ribar, David and Wilhelm, Mark}, title = {The decline of welfare benefits in the {US}: the role of wage inequality}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {68}, pages = {421-452}, number = {3}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{MoRo:98, author = {Mohtadi, Hamid and Roe, Terry}, title = {Growth, lobbying and public goods}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {14}, pages = {453-473}, number = {3}, key = {public goods} } @INCOLLECTION{Mole:82, author = {Molefsky, B.}, title = {American underground economy}, booktitle = {The Underground Economy in the {U}nited {S}tates and Abroad}, publisher = {D. C. Heath}, year = {1982}, editor = {Tanzi, V.}, address = {Lexington, Massachusetts}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Molt'o1980, author = {Molt{\'o}, M. A.}, title = {La econom\'ia irregular. Una primera aproximaci\'on al caso espa\~nol}, journal = {Revista Espa\~nola de Economia}, year = {1980}, pages = {33-52}, month = {July}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Molt:80, author = {Molt{\'o}, M. A.}, title = {La econom{\'i}a irregular. Una primera aproximaci{\'o}n al caso espa{\~n}ol}, journal = {Revista Espa{\~n}ola de Econom{\'i}a}, year = {1980}, pages = {33-52}, month = {July}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Mong:08, author = {Mongin, P.}, title = {Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2008}, volume = {141}, pages = {100-113}, number = {1}, month = {July}, abstract = {According to a theorem recently proved in the theory of logical aggregation, any nonconstant social judgment function that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is dictatorial. We show that the strong and not very plausible IIA condition can be replaced with a minimal independence assumption plus a Pareto-like condition. This new version of the impossibility theorem likens it to Arrow’s and arguably enhances its paradoxical value.}, key = {logical aggregation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.06} } @ARTICLE{Mong:01, author = {Mongin, P.}, title = {The Impartial Observer Theorem of Social Ethics}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {71}, pages = {147-179.}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Mong:98, author = {Mongin, Philippe}, title = {The paradox of {B}ayesian experts and state-dependent utility theory}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {29}, pages = {331-361}, number = {3}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Mong:95, author = {Mongin, P.}, title = {Consistent {B}ayesian aggregation}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1995}, volume = {66}, pages = {313-351}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Mong:94, author = {Mongin, P.}, title = {Harsanyi's aggregation theorem: multi-profile version and unsettled questions}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1994}, volume = {11}, pages = {331-355}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{ModA:99, author = {Mongin, P. and {d}'Aspremont, C.}, title = {Utility Theory and Ethics}, booktitle = {Handbook of Utility Theory}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1999}, editor = {Barber{\`a}, S. and Hammond, P. and Seidl, C.}, volume = {1}, chapter = {X}, address = {Dordrecht}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{Monk:00, author = {Monks, J.}, title = {The Academic Performance of Legacies}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, pages = {99-104}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Mont:91, author = {Monti, A. C.}, title = {The Study of the {G}ini Concentration Ratio by Means of the Influence Function}, journal = {Statistica}, year = {1991}, volume = {51}, pages = {561-577}, key = {STATISTICS} } @BOOK{MoGrBo:74, title = {Introduction to the Theory of Statistics}, publisher = {McGraw-Hill}, year = {1974}, author = {Mood, A. M. and Graybill, F. and Boes, D.}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Mook:84, author = {Mookherjee, D.}, title = {Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1984}, volume = {51}, pages = {433--446}, copyright = {Copyright © 1984 The Review of Economic Studies Ltd.}, issn = {00346527}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Jul., 1984}, key = {micro}, publisher = {The Review of Economic Studies Ltd.}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2297432} } @ARTICLE{Mookherjee1984, author = {Mookherjee, Dilip}, title = {Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1984}, volume = {51}, pages = {433--446}, number = {3}, abstract = {The Grossman-Hart principal-agent model of moral hazard is extended to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive contracting. Under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agent actions as Nash equilibria, necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the optimality of independent contracts, of rank-order tournaments, and for attainability of the first-best. In this context the relation of the principal's welfare to the correlation between the underlying randomness in outputs of different agents is also investigated. Finally, some problems with the Nash equilibrium implementation assumption are discussed.}, copyright = {Copyright © 1984 The Review of Economic Studies Ltd.}, issn = {00346527}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Jul., 1984}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {The Review of Economic Studies Ltd.}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2297432} } @ARTICLE{Mook:06, author = {Mookherjee, D.}, title = {Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {44}, volume = {2006}, pages = {367-390}, abstract = {Separation of ownership from management, multidivisional firm organizations, delegation of production decisions to worker teams, delegation of pricing and advertising decisions to retail franchisers, reliance on intermediaries in trade or finance, and distribution of regulatory authority across different agencies represent examples of organizations that delegate and distribute decision-making authority instead of centralizing it. This paper reviews literature on costs and benefits of delegated decision making in hierarchical organizations or contracting networks with regard to problems of incentives and coordination. It starts by describing incentive and coordination costs of delegation in simple canonical examples of hierarchies where both information and incentives of different decisionmakers differ. One class of models pertain to contexts where the classical Revelation Principle applies, i.e., where costs of contractual complexity, information processing, or communication are absent, agents do not collude, and the mechanism designer can commit to the mechanism. Delegation may conceivably entail a loss of control and coordination arising from the divergence of information and incentives. Sufficient and necessary conditions for this loss to be mitigated entirely include risk neutrality, top-down contracting, and monitoring of transfers or production assignments between subordinates. The next class of models introduces communication costs that restrict the performance of centralized arrangements relative to delegation owing to a resulting loss of flexibility, which has to be traded off against possible control losses of delegation. Finally, consequences of collusion among agents is discussed, which typically enlarge the range of circumstances under which delegation can attain optimal second-best outcomes. The paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of this theoretical literature to recently emerging empirical studies of industrial organizations where delegated decision making plays an important role: adoption of innovative human resource management practices, new information technologies and retail franchising.}, key = {industry}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.01} } @ARTICLE{MoPn:95, author = {Mookherjee, D. and Png, I.}, title = {Corruptible law enforcers: how should they be compensated?}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1995}, volume = {105}, pages = {145–159}, key = {corruption}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.02.12} } @ARTICLE{Mookherjee1989a, author = {Mookherjee, D and Png, I.}, title = {{Optimal} auditing, insurance, and redistribution}, journal = {Quaterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1989}, volume = {104}, pages = {399-415}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{MoPn:90, author = {Mookherjee, Dilip and Png, I. P. L.}, title = {Enforcement {C}osts and the {O}ptimal {P}rogressivity of {I}ncome {T}axes}, journal = {Journal of Law, Economics, Organization}, year = {1990}, volume = {6}, pages = {411-431}, number = {2}, month = {Fall}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{MoPn:89, author = {Mookherjee, D. and Png, I. P. L.}, title = {Optimal auditing, insurance and redistribution}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1989}, volume = {104}, pages = {399-415}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{MoSh:82, author = {Mookherjee, D. and Shorrocks, A .F.}, title = {A Decomposition Analysis of the Trend in {UK} Income Inequality}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1982}, volume = {92}, pages = {886-902}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Moor:68, author = {Moore, D. S.}, title = {An elementary proof of asymptotic normality of linear functions of orderstatistics}, journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1968}, volume = {39}, pages = {263-265}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Moore1968, author = {Moore, D. S.}, title = {An elementary proof of asymptotic normality of linear functions of order statistics}, journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1968}, volume = {39}, pages = {263-265}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INBOOK{Moor:92, chapter = {Implementation, Contracts and Renegotiation in Environments with CompleteInformation}, title = {Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress, Vol.}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1992}, editor = {Laffont, J. J.}, author = {Moore, J.}, address = {New York}, key = {Micro} } @TECHREPORT{MiChNe:99, author = {Moore, Mick and Choudhary, Madhulika and Singh, Neelam}, title = {How Can We Know What They Want? Understanding Local Perceptions of Povertyand Ill-being in {A}sia}, institution = {Institute for Development Studies}, year = {1999}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {80}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Mora:77, author = {Morawetz, D.}, title = {Income distribution and self-rated happiness, some empirical evidence}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1977}, volume = {87}, pages = {511-522}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{Morawetz1977, author = {Morawetz, D.}, title = {Income distribution and self-rated happiness, some empirical evidence}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1977}, volume = {87}, pages = {511-522}, key = {economic psychology}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Mord:04, author = {Morduch, J.}, title = {Consumption Smoothing Across Space: Testing Theories of Consumption Smoothingin the {ICRISAT} Study Region of {S}outh {I}ndia}, booktitle = {Insurance Against Poverty}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2004}, editor = {Dercon, S.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {Poverty} } @ARTICLE{Mord:95, author = {Morduch, J.}, title = {Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1995}, volume = {9}, pages = {103-114}, abstract = {The author examines the ways in which farmer might find ways to self-insure, by attempting to smooth their consumption through alterations in the production method. He argues that lower income farmers might choose a strategy of lower expected income to reduce the risk to consumption from income shocks. He concludes that in the presence of severe credit restrictions, such a strategy is a likely instrument of consumption smoothing. This paper should be read together with the papers by Besley and Townsend (1995). They were published with this one by Morduch in the Symposium of Consumption Smoothing in Developping Countries, and although they are not as relevant as Morduch, they might be of some use.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{Mord:94, author = {Morduch, J.}, title = {Poverty and vulnerability}, journal = {American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings}, year = {1994}, volume = {84}, pages = {221-225}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{MoSi:02, author = {Morduch, J. and Sicular, T.}, title = {Rethinking Inequality Decomposition, with Evidence from Rural {C}hina}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2002}, volume = {112}, pages = {93-106}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @TECHREPORT{MoSi:96, author = {Morduch, Jonathan and Sicular, Terry}, title = {Rethinking Inequality Decomposition, with Evidence from Rural {C}hina}, institution = {Dept of Economics, Harvard University}, year = {1996}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @TECHREPORT{MoBa:05A, author = {Moreau, N. and Bargain, O.}, title = {Is the Collective Model of Labor Supply Useful for Tax Policy Analysis? A Simulation Exercise}, institution = {{CES}ifo}, year = {2005}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1052}, address = {Olivier Bargain IZA Bonn P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany}, month = {January}, abstract = {The literature on household behavior contains hardly any empirical research on the withinhousehold distributional effect of tax-benefit policies. We simulate this effect in the framework of a collective model of labor supply when shifting from a joint to an individual taxation system in France. We show that the net-of-tax relative earning potential of the wife is a significant determinant of intrahousehold negotiation but with very low elasticity. Consequently, the labor supply responses to the reform are entirely driven by the traditional substitution and income effects as in a unitary model. For some households only, the reform alters the intrahousehold distribution in a way that tends to change normative conclusions. A sensitivity analysis shows that the collective model would be required if the tax reform was both radical and of extended scope.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Alex}, timestamp = {2006.06.22} } @ARTICLE{More:81, author = {Moreh, J.}, title = {Income inequality and the social welfare function}, journal = {Journal of Economic Studies}, year = {1981}, volume = {8}, pages = {25-37}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{MoPoSu:04, author = {Moreira,M. and Porter,J. and Suarez,G.}, title = {Bootstrap and higher-order expansion validity when instruments may be weak}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, abstract = {It is well-known that size-adjustments based on Edgeworth expansions forthe t-statistic perform poorly when instruments are weakly correlated withthe endogenous explanatory variable. This paper shows, however, that thelack of Edgeworth expansions and bootstrap validity are not tied to theweak instrument framework, but instead depends on which test statisticis examined. In particular, Edgeworth expansions are valid for the scoreand conditional likelihood ratio approaches, even when the instrumentsare uncorrelated with the endogenous explanatory variable. Furthermore,there is a belief that the bootstrap method fails when instruments areweak, since it replaces parameters with inconsistent estimators. Contraryto this notion, we provide a theoretical proof that guarantees the validityof the bootstrap for the score test, as well as the validity of the conditionalbootstrap for many conditional tests. Monte Carlo simulations show thatthe bootstrap actually decreases size distortions in both cases.}, key = {bootstrap} } @TECHREPORT{More:96, author = {Moreno, Bernardo}, title = {The Uniform Rule in Economies With Single-Peaked Preferences, Endowmentsand Population-Monotonicity}, institution = {Institut Valencia, D'Investigacions Economiques}, year = {1996}, type = {working paper}, number = {WP-AD 96-10}, month = {July}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{MoRo:04, author = {Moreno-Ternero,J. and Roemer,J.}, title = {Impartiality, solidarity, and purity in the theory of justice}, institution = {Cowles Foundation, Yale University}, year = {2004}, abstract = {The veil of ignorance has been used often as a tool for recommending whatjustice requires with respect to the distribution of wealth. We show thatJohn Harsanyi’s and Ronald Dworkin’s conceptions of the veil, when modeledformally, recommend wealth allocations in conflict with the prominentlyespoused view that priority should be given to the worse off with respectto wealth allocation. It follows that those who believe that justice requiresimpartiality and priority must seek some method of assuring the formerother than the veil of ignorance. We propose that impartiality and solidarityare fundamentals of justice, and study the relationship among these twoaxioms and priority. We characterize axiomatically resource allocationrules that jointly satisfy impartiality, solidarity, and priority: theycomprise a class of general indices of wealth and welfare, including, aspolar cases, the classical equal-wealth and equal-welfare rules.}, key = {Social justice} } @ARTICLE{Moreno-Ternero2005a, author = {Moreno-Ternero, J. D. and Villar, A.}, title = {On the Relative Equitability of a Family of Taxation Rules}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2005}, volume = {forthcoming}, key = {claims}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{MTVi:05TT, author = {Moreno-Ternero, J. D. and Villar, A.}, title = {The {TAL}-family of rules for bankruptcy problems}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2005}, volume = {forthcoming}, key = {claims} } @ARTICLE{MoVi:06, author = {Moreno-{T}ernero, J. and Villar, A.}, title = {On the Relative Equitability of a Family of Taxation Rules}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2006}, volume = {8}, pages = {283-291}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{More:99, author = {Moresi, Serge}, title = {Uncertain Lifetime, Risk Aversion and Intertemporal Substitution}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {62}, pages = {207-212}, number = {2}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{More:98, author = {Moresi, Serge}, title = {Optimal taxation and firm formation: A model of asymmetric information}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {1525-1551}, number = {8}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Morg:00, author = {Morgan, J.}, title = {Public Goods and Lotteries}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, pages = {761-784}, key = {Lotteries} } @ARTICLE{Morgan2000, author = {Morgan, J.}, title = {Funding Public Goods with Lotteries: Experimental Evidence}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, pages = {785-810}, key = {Lotteries}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{MoSe:00, author = {Morgan, J. and Sefton, M.}, title = {Funding Public Goods with Lotteries: Experimental Evidence}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, pages = {785-810}, abstract = {Why do individuals participate in charitable gambling activities? We conducta laboratory investigation of a model that predicts risk-neutral expectedutility maximizers will participate in lotteries when they recognize thatlotteries are being used to finance public goods. As predicted by the model,we find that public goods provision is higher when financed by lotteryproceeds than when financed by voluntary contributions. We also find supportfor other comparative static predictions of the model. In particular wefind that ticket purchases vary with the size of the fixed prize and withthe return from the public good: lotteries with large prizes are more effective,and ticket purchases drop dramatically when the public good is not valuedby subjects.}, key = {Lotteries} } @ARTICLE{Morgan1996, author = {Morgan, J. and Sefton, M.}, title = {Funding Public Goods Through Lotteries: An Experiment}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1996}, volume = {67}, pages = {785-810}, key = {Lotteries}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Morg:62, author = {Morgan, J. N.}, title = {The Anatomy of Income Distribution}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1962}, volume = {44}, pages = {270-283}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Morgan1962a, author = {Morgan, J. N.}, title = {The Anatomy of Income Distribution}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1962}, volume = {44,}, pages = {270-283}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{MoDaCoBr:62, title = {Income and Welfare in The {U}nited {S}tates}, publisher = {McGraw-Hill}, year = {1962}, author = {Morgan, J. N. and David, M. H. and Cohen, W. J. and Brazer, A. E.}, address = {New York}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{MoSc:07, author = {Morgan,S.L. and Scott,J.C.}, title = {Intergenerational transfers and the prospects for increasing wealth inequality}, journal = {Social Science Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {36}, pages = {1105-1134}, abstract = {Analyzing two cohorts from the Health and Retirement Survey from 1992 to 2002, we investigate the growth of wealth inequality and the determinants of intergenerational transfers. Although wealth inequality has grown substantially, patterns of intergenerational transfers that we are able to assess have changed only modestly. Based on these results, we conclude that concerns that the level of inequality will continue to increase across its full distribution appear unwarranted. This conclusion, however, is limited in two important respects. First, it is based on a single cohort comparison which, however well-chosen, does not guarantee that other cohort comparisons would yield the same results. Second, the nature of survey research on wealth prevents any incisive analysis of the explosive growth of the wealth holdings of those at the very top of the distribution (i.e., those at the 99th percentile and beyond). Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that a comparison of those beyond the 99th percentile to everyone else would give evidence that, at this pivot point of the distribution, a new level of self-perpetuation has in fact arrived.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @BOOK{MoKaRo:06, title = {Microeconomics}, publisher = {McGraw Hill}, year = {2006}, author = {Morgan, W. and Katz, M. L. and Rosen, H. S.}, pages = {722}, edition = {European}, key = {micro}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.03.22} } @TECHREPORT{MoSa:06, author = {Moriguchi, C. and Saez, E.}, title = {The Evolution of Income Concentration in Japan, 1886-2002: Evidence of Income Tax Statistics}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {12558}, address = {NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138}, month = {October}, abstract = {This paper studies the evolution of income concentration in Japan from 1886 to 2002 by constructing long-run series of top income shares and top wage income shares, using income tax statistics. We find that (1) income concentration was extremely high throughout the pre-WWII period during which the nation underwent rapid industrialization; (2) a drastic de-concentration of income at the top took place in 1938-1945; (3) income concentration has remained low throughout the post-WWII period despite the high economic growth; and (4) top income composition in Japan has shifted dramatically from capital income to employment income over the course of the 20th century. We attribute the precipitous fall in income concentration during WWII primarily to the collapse of capital income due to wartime regulations and inflation. We argue that the change in the institutional structure under the occupational reforms made the one-time income de-concentration difficult to reverse. In contrast to the sharp increase in wage income inequality observed in the United States since 1970, the top wage income shares in Japan have remained remarkably stable over the recent decades. We show that the change in technology or tax policies alone cannot account for the comparative experience of Japan and the United States. Instead we suggest that institutional factors such as corporate governance and union structure are important determinants of wage income inequality.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Mork:75, author = {Mork, K. A.}, title = {Income tax evasion: some empirical evidence}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1975}, volume = {30}, pages = {70-76}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Morl:07, author = {Morley, J.C.}, title = {The Slow Adjustment of Aggregate Consumption to Permanent Income}, journal = {Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking}, year = {2007}, volume = {39}, pages = {615-638}, abstract = {This paper investigates the relationship between aggregate consumption and permanent income using a new approach to the estimation of cointegrated systems that builds on Stock andWatson’s common stochastic trends representation. The permanent and transitory movements in aggregate income and consumption are estimated directly using the Kalman filter and are allowed to be correlated. This approach avoids any implicit restriction that permanent income be as smooth as consumption. Instead, permanent income appears to be relatively volatile, with consumption adjusting toward it only slowly over time. These results provide a clear rejection of the standard version of the permanent income hypothesis and are suggestive of alternative theories of consumption behavior such as habit formation or precautionary savings.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{Morl:81, author = {Morley, S. A.}, title = {The effect of changes in the population on several measures of income distribution}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1981}, pages = {285-294}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Morley1981, author = {Morley, S. A.}, title = {The effect of changes in the population on several measures of income distribution}, journal = {, American Economic Review}, year = {1981}, pages = {285-294}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{MoPr:86, author = {Morris, N. and Preston, I.}, title = {Inequality, poverty and the redistribution of income}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {38}, pages = {277-344}, key = {Redistribution} } @ARTICLE{MoKa:90, author = {Morrison, Clarence C. and Kamarei, Hossein}, title = {Some Experimental Testing of the Cournot-Nash Hypothesis in Small GroupRivalry Situations}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1990}, volume = {13}, pages = {213-231}, abstract = {This study parallels a previous study by Friedman and Hoggatt (1980) butuses ‘more realistic’ information conditions. In addition to confirmingthe central tendency results of Friedman and Hoggatt, we find that in thethree to six corpora?ion range the number of corporations in the experimentseems to have no effect on the tendency to grope towards the Coumot-Nashsolution. On the other hand, it seems clear that convergence to Cournot-Nashis more likely if the subjects are experienced and less likely the higherthe Cournot-Nash markup over unit cost. Overall there is a strong tendencyto converge to Coumot-Nash.}, key = {experiments} } @ARTICLE{Morrison1990, author = {Morrison, Clarence C. and Kamarei, Hossein}, title = {Some Experimental Testing of the Cournot-Nash Hypothesis in Small Group Rivalry Situations}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1990}, volume = {13}, pages = {213-231}, abstract = {This study parallels a previous study by Friedman and Hoggatt (1980) but uses 'more realistic' information conditions. In addition to confirming the central tendency results of Friedman and Hoggatt, we find that in the three to six corpora?ion range the number of corporations in the experiment seems to have no effect on the tendency to grope towards the Coumot-Nash solution. On the other hand, it seems clear that convergence to Cournot-Nash is more likely if the subjects are experienced and less likely the higher the Cournot-Nash markup over unit cost. Overall there is a strong tendency to converge to Coumot-Nash.}, key = {experiments}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{MoMu:96, author = {Mosler, K. and Muliere, P.}, title = {Inequality indices and the starshaped principle of transfers}, journal = {Statistical Papers}, year = {1996}, volume = {37}, pages = {343-364}, number = {4}, note = {40}, abstract = {The evaluation of income distributions is usually based on the Pigou-Dalton (PD) principle which says that a transfer from any people to people who have less decreases economic inequality, i.e., increases the social evaluation index. We introduce two weaker principles of transfers which refer to a parameter theta. With the new principles, only those PD transfers increase the social evaluation index which take from the class of incomes above theta and give to the class below theta. The relative positions of individuals remain unchanged, and either no individual may cross the line theta (principle of transfers about theta) or some may do who have been situated next to it (starshaped principle of transfers at theta). theta may be a given constant, a function of mean income, or a quantile of the income distribution. The classes of indices which are consistent with these transfers are completely characterized, and examples are given.}, key = {inequality}, keywords = {inequality measurement; relative concentration; economic disparity; Pigou-Dalton transfers; starshaped functions UNEQUAL INEQUALITIES} } @ARTICLE{Moss:68, author = {Mossin, J.}, title = {Taxation and risk-taking: An expected utility approach}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1968}, volume = {35}, pages = {74-82}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Most:46, author = {Mosteller, F.}, title = {On Some Useful ``Inefficient" Statistics}, journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1946}, volume = {17}, pages = {377-408}, key = {statistics} } @BOOK{Moul:03, title = {Fair Division and Collective Welfare}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2003}, author = {Moulin, H.}, address = {Cambridge Massachusetts}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Moul:95, title = {Cooperative Microeconomics: A Game-Theoretic Introduction}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1995}, author = {Moulin, H.}, address = {Princeton}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Moul:94, author = {Moulin, H.}, title = {Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1994}, volume = {61}, pages = {305-325}, key = {public goods} } @BOOK{Moul:88, title = {Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1988}, author = {Moulin, H.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Moul:87EE, author = {Moulin, H.}, title = {Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1987}, volume = {55}, pages = {963-977}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Moul:87TP, author = {Moulin, H.}, title = {The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism versus Laissez-Fairism}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1987}, volume = {102}, pages = {769-783}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Moulin1987, author = {Moulin, H.}, title = {The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism versus Laissez-Farisim}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1987}, volume = {102}, pages = {769-783}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Moul:80, author = {Moulin, H.}, title = {On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {1980}, volume = {35}, pages = {437-455}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{MoTh:95, author = {Moulin, H. and Thompson, H.}, title = {Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation}, booktitle = {Social Choice Re-Examined}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1995}, editor = {Arrow, K. J. and Sen, A. K. and Suzumura, K.}, pages = {100-125}, address = {London}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{Moye:99, author = {Moyes, P.}, title = {Stochastic dominance and the {L}orenz curve}, booktitle = {Handbook on Income Inequality Measurement}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1999}, editor = {Silber, J.}, chapter = {8}, address = {Dewenter}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Moye:07, author = {Moyes, P.}, title = {An extended {G}ini approach to inequality measurement}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2007}, volume = {5}, pages = {279-303}, abstract = {It is well-known that, when the Lorenz curves do not cross, the ranking of distributions provided by the Gini index is identical to the one implied by the Lorenz criterion. This does not preclude inequality as measured by the Gini index to increase while the Lorenz curves cross. A suitable modification of the Gini coefficient allows the Lorenz quasi-ordering to coincide with the ranking generated by the application of unanimity over the class of extended Gini indices. Recently the Lorenz quasi-ordering and the underlying principle of transfers have come under attack, while new criteria – the differentials, deprivation and satisfaction quasiorderings – have been proposed for providing unambiguous rankings of distributions. We suggest to weaken the principle of transfers by imposing additional restrictions on the progressive transfers, which take into account the positions on the income scale of the donors and beneficiaries. We identify the subclasses of extended Gini indices that satisfy these weaker versions of the principle of transfers and we show that the application of unanimity among these classes generate rankings of distributions that coincide with those implied by the differentials, deprivation and satisfaction quasiorderings.}, key = {Gini}, keywords = {progressive transfers, income differentials, deprivation, satisfaction, Lorenz dominance, extended Gini social evaluation functions.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Moye:03, author = {Moyes, P.}, title = {Redistributive effects of minimal equal sacrifice taxation}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2003}, volume = {108}, pages = {111–140}, key = {Redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Moyes2003, author = {Moyes, P.}, title = {Redistributive effects of minimal equal sacrifice taxation}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2003}, volume = {108}, pages = {111-140}, key = {Redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Moye:94IR, author = {Moyes, P.}, title = {Inequality-reducing and inequality-preserving transformations of incomes: Symmetric and individualistic transformations}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1994}, volume = {63}, pages = {271-298}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.26} } @ARTICLE{Moye:92, author = {Moyes, P.}, title = {TheThrough-Time Redistributive Effect of Income Taxation: The IntermediateInequality View}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1992}, volume = {24}, pages = {59-71}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Moyes1992, author = {Moyes, P.}, title = {TheThrough-Time Redistributive Effect of Income Taxation: The Intermediate Inequality View}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1992}, volume = {24}, pages = {59-71}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Moye:90, author = {Moyes, P.}, title = {The through-time redistributive effect of income taxation - the intermediateinequality view}, institution = {University of Essex}, year = {1990}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {366}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Moye:89EG, author = {Moyes, P.}, title = {Equiproprortionate growth of incomes and after-tax inequality}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1989}, volume = {41}, pages = {287-293}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Moye:89SC, author = {Moyes, P.}, title = {Some classes of functions that preserve the inequality and welfare orderingsof income distribution}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {347}, number = {12}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Moye:88a, author = {Moyes, P.}, title = {A note on minimally progressive taxation and absolute income inequality}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1988}, volume = {5}, pages = {227-234}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Moye:87, author = {Moyes, P.}, title = {A new concept of {L}orenz domination}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1987}, volume = {23}, pages = {203-207}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{MoSh:98, author = {Moyes, Patrick and Shorrocks, Anthony}, title = {The impossibility of a progressive tax structure}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {69}, pages = {49-65}, number = {1}, month = {July}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{MuMa:07, author = {Muehlegger, Erich and Marion, Justin}, title = {Measuring Illegal Activity and the Effects of Regulatory Innovation: A Study of Diesel Fuel Tax Evasion}, institution = {Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {026}, abstract = {This paper examines tax evasion in the context of the diesel fuel market and the response of evaders to regulatory innovation. Diesel fuel used for on-road purposes is taxed, while other uses are untaxed, creating an incentive for firms and individuals to evade on-road diesel taxes by purchasing untaxed diesel fuel and then using or reselling it for on-road use. We examine the effects of a federal regulatory innovation in October 1993, the addition of red dye to untaxed diesel fuel at the point of distribution, which significantly lowered the cost of regulatory enforcement. We propose a model of the evasion decision that predicts that evasion increases as taxes rise and monitoring costs fall. Testing the predictions of the model, we find that sales of diesel fuel rose 26 percent following the regulatory change while sales of heating oil, which is an untaxed perfect substitute, fell by a similar amount. The effect on sales was higher in states with higher tax rates and in states likely to have higher audit costs. Heating oil sales are also found to be much less responsive to demand factors such as temperature and season prior to the dye program, indicating that a significant fraction of sales prior to dyeing was illegitimate. In addition, we find evidence that tax evaders found new methods of evading fuel dye regulations. We find that sales of kerosene and jet fuel, two undyed alternatives to untaxed diesel fuel, rose following the introduction of fuel dye. Furthermore, we find a pattern of price and tax elasticities consistent with innovation in new evasion techniques subsequent to the regulatory change. Finally, we examine the extent to which tax increases are incorporated into tax revenues, using the estimated tax and price elasticities to describe how this is affected by evasion. We estimate that the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to the tax rate was 0.60 prior to the dye program, yet would have been 0.85 in the absence of evasion.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Muel:74, author = {Muellbauer, J.}, title = {Inequality measures, prices and household composition}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1974}, volume = {41}, pages = {493-504}, number = {10}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{MuSc:89, author = {Muliere, P. and Scarsini, M.}, title = {A note on stochastic dominance and inequality measures}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {314-323}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{MuBL:98, author = {Sendhil Mullainathan and Marianne Bertrand and Erzo E. P. Luttmer}, title = {Network Effects and Welfare Cultures}, institution = {Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics}, year = {1998}, type = {Working Paper Series}, number = {98-21}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Mull:98, author = {Muller, Alfred}, title = {Comparing risks with unbounded distributions}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {30}, pages = {229-239}, number = {2}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{Mull:97, title = {Parental Priorities and Economic Inequality}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, year = {1997}, author = {Mulligan, C.}, address = {Chicago}, key = {household} } @ARTICLE{Munr:05, author = {Munro,A.}, title = {Household willingness to pay equals individual willingness to pay if andonly if the household income pools}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2005}, volume = {88}, pages = {227-230}, abstract = {I show household and individual willingness to pay are equal if and onlyif household choices satisfy income pooling, providing a test of whetherthe individual respondent speaks for the household-an assumption implicitin much stated preference practice.}, key = {household} } @ARTICLE{MuSu:03, author = {Munro, A. and Sugden, R.}, title = {On the Theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2003}, volume = {50}, pages = {407-428}, key = {utility, preference}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Munro2002, author = {Munro, A. and Sugden, R.}, title = {On the Theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {2002}, volume = {50}, pages = {407-428}, key = {Utility, preference}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Murp:59, author = {Murphy, J. H.}, title = {Selecting income tax returns for audit}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1959}, volume = {12}, pages = {232-238}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{MuWe:92, author = {Murphy, Kevin and Welsh, Finis}, title = {The Structure of Wages}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1992}, volume = {107}, pages = {285-326}, month = {February}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Murp:85, author = {Murphy, K. J.}, title = {Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis}, journal = {Journal of Accounting and Economics}, year = {1985}, volume = {7}, pages = {11-42}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{MuShVi:91, author = {Murphy, Kevin M. and Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W.}, title = {The allocation of talent: implications for growth}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1991}, pages = {503-530}, month = {May}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Murr:78, author = {Murray, D.}, title = {Extreme values for {G}ini coefficients calculated from grouped data}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1978}, volume = {1}, pages = {389-393}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{MuTi:08, author = {Murthi, M. and Tiongson, E. R.}, title = {Attitudes to Equality: The “Socialist Legacy” Revisited}, institution = {The World Bank}, year = {2008}, type = {Policy Research Working Paper}, number = {4529}, abstract = {It is routinely assumed that residents of post-socialist countries have a preference for greater income equality, other things being equal, owing to the legacy of socialism. This proposition is examined in the context of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union using data from three waves of the World Values Survey. Contrary to expectations, the authors find little evidence of a ‘socialist legacy’ en bloc. Considering the former Soviet Union separately from other post-socialist countries, the analysis finds that as a group these countries display significantly lower preference for moving toward greater income equality than both Eastern Europe and other comparator groups (developed and developing countries). These findings hold up even when controlling for the conventional determinants of attitudes such as income level and employment status of the individual respondent, as well as national factors such as per-capita income and its distribution. Moreover, the preference for greater income inequality appears to have persisted at least since the mid-1990s and possibly since the early 1990s (data difficulties preclude a robust examination of this latter question). The results are consistent with the fairly low levels of public spending on redistribution commonly found in the former Soviet Union.}, key = {socialist countries}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.05} } @ARTICLE{MuTh:48, author = {Musgrave, R .A. and Thin, T.}, title = {Income Tax Progression, 1929-48}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1948}, volume = {56}, pages = {498-514}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Musg:92, author = {Musgrave, R. A.}, title = {Social Contract, Taxation and the Standing of Deadweight Loss}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1992}, volume = {49}, pages = {369-81}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{MuRo:78, author = {Mussa, M. and Rosen, S.}, title = {Monopoly and product quality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1978}, volume = {18}, pages = {301-317}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Muto:99, author = {Muto, S.}, title = {The {B}anzhaf Index in Representative Systems with Multiple Political Parties}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {1999}, volume = {28}, pages = {73--104}, abstract = {The proposed modification of the {B}anzhaf index is used to evaluate voterpower in representative multiple-party i.e., more than two systems. Themodified index shows that a voter’s ability to affect the outcome of legislativedecisions increases asymptotically as the inverse of the square root ofthe district’s population. The square-root effect thus holds even in casesinvolving more than two parties.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{MuWi:04, author = {Mutuswami, Suresh and Winter, Eyal}, title = {Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {629-644}, abstract = {We propose two sequential mechanisms for efficient production of publicgoods. Our analysis differs from the existing literature in allowing forthe presence of multiple public goods and in also being ‘simple’. Whileboth mechanisms ensure efficiency, the payoffs in the first mechanism areasymmetric, being sensitive to the order in which agents move. The secondmechanism corrects for this through a two-stage game where the order ofmoves in the second stage is randomly determined. The payoffs from thesecond mechanism correspond to the Shapley value of a well-defined gamewhich summarizes the production opportunities available to coalitions inthe economy.}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{MyBa:06, author = {Myck, M. and Bargain, O. and Beblo, M. and Beninger, D. and Blundell, R. and Carrasco, R. and Chiuri, M. and Laisney, F. and Lechene, V. and Longobardi, E. and Moreau, N. and Ruiz-{C}astillo, J. and Vermeulen, F.}, title = {The Working Families' Tax Credit and Some European Tax Reforms in a Collective Setting}, journal = {Rev Econ Household}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {129-158}, key = {taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{MyPa:00, author = {Myers, G. M. and Papageorgiou, Y. Y.}, title = {Immigration Control and the Welfare State}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {75}, pages = {183-207}, key = {welfare state} } @ARTICLE{Myer:08, author = {Myerson, R. B.}, title = {Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {98}, pages = {586-603}, number = {3}, key = {mechanism design}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.06} } @ARTICLE{Myer:99NE, author = {Myerson, R. B.}, title = {{N}ash equilibrium and the history of economic theory}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1999}, volume = {37}, pages = {1067-1082}, key = {economic theory} } @ARTICLE{Myer:99TC, author = {Myerson, R. B.}, title = {Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {671-697}, key = {political economy} } @BOOK{Myer:91GT, title = {Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1991}, author = {Myerson, R. B.}, address = {Cambridge, Mass}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Myer:79IC, author = {Myerson, R. B.}, title = {Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, volume = {47}, pages = {61-73}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{MyNa:96, author = {Myles, G. and Naylor, R.}, title = {A Model of Tax Evasion with Group Conformity and Social Customs}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1996}, volume = {12}, pages = {49-66}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{Myle:00, author = {Myles, G. D.}, title = {On the Optimal Marginal Rate of Income Tax}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {66}, pages = {113-119}, abstract = {The paper shows that in the quasi-linear model of income taxation, the optimalmarginal rate of tax can be calculated without needing to specify the utilityof consumption. This result is used to investigate the qualitative behaviorof the marginal rate. It is shown that every possible qualitative outcomemay be achieved by appropriate selection of the skill distribution. Therefore,the model does not place any a priori restrictions on the behavior of themarginal rate and the constancy of findings in previous simulation analysisis a consequence of their restricted structures.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Myle:00TA, author = {Myles, G. D.}, title = {Taxation and Economic Growth}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2000}, volume = {21}, pages = {141-168}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Myle:00WG, author = {Myles, G. D.}, title = {Wasteful Government, Tax Evasion and the Provision of Public Goods}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2000}, volume = {16}, pages = {51-74}, abstract = {The paper considers the question of whether public goods should be providedby thegovernment or through private provision. The results cast doubt uponthe role of the government as a provider and suggest instead that it maybe better employed as a facilitator of private provision. These argumentsare strengthened if consumers can engage in tax evasion or the governmentis wasteful in its use of resources. The paper also reveals that tax evasioncan emerge as the best response to inequitable government policy.}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{Myle:95, title = {Public Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1995}, author = {Myles, G. D.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Myles1996, author = {Myles, Gareth D. and Robin A. Naylor}, title = {A Model of Tax Evasion with Group Conformity and Social Status}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1996}, volume = {12}, pages = {49-66}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{MaCo:05, author = {M{\'a}rtin, E. and Cowell, F.}, title = {Static and Dynamic Poverty in Spain 1993-2000}, institution = {DARP}, year = {2005}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {77}, address = {STICERD, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK}, key = {poverty}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.20} } @ARTICLE{Nagel1995, author = {Nagel, Rosemarie}, title = {Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {85}, pages = {1313--1326}, number = {5}, copyright = {Copyright 1995 American Economic Association}, issn = {0002-8282}, jstor_articletype = {Full Length Article}, jstor_date = {199512}, jstor_formatteddate = {Dec., 1995}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {American Economic Association}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Nagl:84, author = {Nagle, T.}, title = {Economic Foundation for Pricing}, journal = {Journal of Business}, year = {1984}, volume = {57}, pages = {3-26}, key = {micro}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{Nair1936, author = {Nair, U. S.}, title = {The standard error of {G}ini's mean difference}, journal = {Biometrika}, year = {1936}, volume = {28}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Nair:36, author = {Nair, U. S.}, title = {The standard error of {G}ini's mean difference}, journal = {Biometrika}, year = {1936}, volume = {28}, pages = {428-436}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2333957} } @ARTICLE{Nait:07, author = {Naito, H.}, title = {Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem with Endogenous Human Capital Accumulation}, journal = {The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis \& Policy}, year = {2007}, volume = {7}, pages = {Article 46}, abstract = {Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol7/iss1/art46 Recently, researchers have started to re-examine the so-called Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem on optimal commodity taxation. The essence of such research is to examine whether or not it is optimal to distort markets other than the labor market for achieving the second-best resource allocation. I examine this theorem by introducing the comparative advantage of human capital accumulation. More specifically, I assume that people with high ability obtain a higher return from skilled human capital accumulation than people with low ability. I explore the implication of this comparative advantage of human capital accumulation for the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem on optimal commodity taxation.}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.10} } @ARTICLE{Nait:99, author = {Hisahiro Naito}, title = {Re-Examination of Uniform Commodity Taxes under a Non-Linear Income TaxSystem and its Implication for Production Efficiency}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {165-188}, number = {2}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{NaHu:98, author = {Nakamura, Masao and Hubler, Olaf}, title = {The bonus share of flexible pay in {G}ermany, {J}apan and the {US}: someempirical regularities}, journal = {Japan and the World Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {10}, pages = {221-232}, number = {2}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Naka:99, author = {Yutaka Nakamura}, title = {Skew-Symmetric Additive Representations of Preferences}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {30}, pages = {367-387}, number = {3}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Nald:03, author = {Naldi, M.}, title = {Concentration Indices and {Z}ipf's Law}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2003}, volume = {78}, pages = {329-334}, key = {concentration} } @ARTICLE{NaSa:01, author = {Namazie, C. and Sanfey, P.}, title = {Happiness and Transition: the Case of Kyrgyzstan}, journal = {Review of Development Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {5}, pages = {392-405}, key = {welfare}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{NaSc:08, author = {Napel, S. and Schneider, A.}, title = {Intergenerational talent transmission, inequality, and social mobility}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2008}, volume = {99}, pages = {405-409}, number = {2}, abstract = {The paper investigates the effects of intra-family talent transmission when human capital exhibits indivisibilities and parental financing of education involves borrowing constraints. Positive talent correlation reduces social mobility but steady state inequality and macroeconomic history-dependence are not affected.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {rodano}, timestamp = {2008.06.12} } @ARTICLE{Nash:51, author = {Nash, J. F.}, title = {Non-cooperative games}, journal = {Annals of Mathematics}, year = {1951}, volume = {54}, pages = {286-295}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Nash:50, author = {Nash, J. F.}, title = {The Bargaining Problem}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1950}, volume = {18}, pages = {155-162}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{NaRiRu:08, author = {Naticchioni, P. and Ricci, A. and Rustichelli, E.}, title = {Wage Inequality, Employment Structure and Skill-biased Change in Italy}, journal = {Labour}, year = {2008}, volume = {22}, pages = {27-51}, number = {1}, abstract = {This paper investigates empirically the relation between wage inequality, employment structure, and skill-biased change in Italy between 1993 and 2004. Applying quantile decomposition analysis, we point out that changes in wage inequality are mainly driven by a decrease in educational premia over time, whereas changes in employment structure play a negligible role. This evidence suggests that changes in wage inequality in Italy can hardly be interpreted in terms of a skill-biased change, and the evidence is further reinforced by a set of descriptive statistics showing that the increasing educational attainments of the workforce might have been crowded out by a stable trend in the demand for skills.}, key = {wage inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @ARTICLE{NaScMa:96, author = {Nava, Mario and Schroyen, Fred and Marchand, Maurice}, title = {Optimal fiscal and public expenditure policy in a two-class economy}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {61}, pages = {119-137}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Naya:78, author = {Nayak, P. B.}, title = {Optimal income-tax evasion and regressive taxes}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1978}, volume = {33}, pages = {358-366}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{NeNgNgKaMa:07, author = {Ndeffo, Luc Nembot and Ngwen, Ngangue and Nguetse Tegoum, Pierre Joubert and Kamdem, Cyrille Bergaly and Makoudem, Marianne}, title = {Impact of Equivalence Scales on the Spatial Distribution of Poverty in Cameroon : A Dynamic Approach}, institution = {PMMA}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {04}, abstract = {The purpose of this study is to investigate the integration of the relative cost of children to adults and of economies of scale in the context of the evaluation of household welfare. Results derived with empirically-estimated scales show that female-headed households are poorer than male-headed households. Poverty is also found to be more prevalent in rural areas, in households whose heads are illiterate, and in households whose heads work in the informal sector. As for poverty dynamics, the results show that poverty increased in Cameroon between 1996 and 2001. Despite the fact that some results are the same as those derived from the Recommended Dietary Allowances (RDA) scales used by Cameroon’s National Institute of Statistics, many stand in stark contrast to these. The results of the present study are used to recommend specific policies in favour of poverty alleviation.}, key = {Poverty}, keywords = {Equivalence scales, poverty, harmonised data, global scale, specific scales for goods, Cameroon}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @INCOLLECTION{NeRo:00, author = {Neal, D. and Rosen, S.}, title = {Theories of the distribution of earnings}, booktitle = {Handbook of Income Distribution}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {2000}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Bourguignon, F.}, chapter = {4}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{NeRo:80, author = {Neary, J. P. and Roberts, K. W. S.}, title = {The Theory of Household Behaviour under Rationing}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1980}, volume = {13}, pages = {25-42}, key = {consumption} } @INCOLLECTION{NeScHo:89, author = {Neck, R., Schneider, F. and Hofreither, M.}, title = {The consequences of progressive income taxation for the shadow economy:sometheoretical considerations}, booktitle = {The Political Economy of Progressive Taxation}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1989}, editor = {B{\"o}s, D. and Hofreiter, M.}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{NeTo:07, author = {Neckerman, Kathryn and Torche, Florencia}, title = {Inequality: Causes and Consequences}, journal = {Annual Review of Sociology}, year = {2007}, volume = {33}, pages = {335 - 357}, abstract = {The increase in economic disparities over the past 30 years has prompted extensive research on the causes and consequences of inequality both in the United States and, more recently, globally. This review provides an update of research on the patterns and causes of economic inequality in the United States, including inequality of earnings, wealth, and opportunity.We also explore the social and political consequences of inequality, particularly in the areas of health, education, crime, social capital, and political power. Finally, we spotlight an emerging literature on world inequality, which examines inequality trends within as well as across nations. Sociologists can advance research on inequality by bringing discipline-based expertise to bear on the organization and political economy of firms and labor markets, the pathways through which inequality has an effect, and the social, political, and cultural contingencies that might modify this effect.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {disparities, income, wealth, mobility}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Need:78, author = {Needleman, L.}, title = {On the approximation of the {G}ini coefficient of concentration}, journal = {Manchester School}, year = {1978}, pages = {105-122}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Nehr:99, author = {Nehring, Klaus}, title = {Preference for flexibility in a {S}avage framework}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {97}, pages = {101-119}, number = {1}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Neil:01, author = {Neill, J. R.}, title = {The political viability of a negative income tax}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2001}, volume = {18}, pages = {747-757}, abstract = {This paper offers three propositions relating to the political viabilityof the negative income tax. One, despite its work disincentive, a majorityof households would support a linear income tax that makes cash paymentsto low income households. However two, when government consumption is sufficientlyhigh, a majority would favor a proportional tax over such a tax. Three,under certain conditions, a majority of households will prefer public provisionof a private good or an in-kind transfer to a negative income tax. Theselatter two propositions offer an explanation for the public's apparentdistaste for widespread cash transfers.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Neil:00, author = {Neill, J. R.}, title = {The benefit and sacrifice principles of taxation: A synthesis}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2000}, volume = {17}, pages = {117-124}, abstract = {The implications of equal sacrifice taxation have only been pursued in avery narrow context. This note applies this principle to the problem oflevying taxes to provide public goods. Its purpose is to determine howtaxes used to finance public goods must be structured in order to benefiteach agent equally. This tax structure may be viewed as a benchmark againstwhich to compare tax regimes with redistributive intent.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Neil:99, author = {Neilson, William S.}, title = {The economics of favors}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1999}, volume = {39}, pages = {387-397}, number = {4}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{NeBr:30, author = {von Nell-Breuning, O.}, title = {Steuerverfassung und {S}teuergewissen}, journal = {Stimmen der Zeit}, year = {1930}, volume = {11}, pages = {254-268}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Nels:87, author = {Nelson, C.R.}, title = {A Reappraisal of Recent Tests of the Permanent Income Hypothesis}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1987}, volume = {95}, pages = {641-646}, abstract = {In a landmark paper Hall (1978) showed that the permanent incornelife cycle theory of consumption implies that ( I ) consurnption follows a random walk with drift and (2) changes in consumption cannot be predicted using prior information. Hall concluded that postwar quarterly consumption data support the random walk hypothesis and that lagged incorne is only marginally useful as a predictor of consurnption in the presence of past consunlption. Subsequently, however, Flavin (1981) reported decisive rejection of the theory based on a measure of excess sensitivity of consumption to current income. This was surprising since Flavin's test is formally equivalent to Hall's except for the use of detrended data. The reappraisal of these tests presented in this paper suggests that Hall's data are more strongly at variance with the theory than his tests had suggested. A constant relative risk aversion specification is consistent with the random walk prediction of the theory, but past income is shown to have significant predictive power. If income is a random walk (in logs), then detrending will introduce the appearance of excess sensitivity of consumption to income even when there is none because detrended income becomes predictable ex post. This spurious effect of inappropriate (letrending turns out to be sufficient to account for the measured degree of excess sensitivity in detrended data.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{NePl:82, author = {Nelson, C.R. and Plosser, C.I.}, title = {Trends and random walks in macroeconomic time series: some evidence and implications}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1982}, volume = {10}, pages = {139-162}, abstract = {This paper investigates whether macroeconomic time series are better characterized as stationary fluctuations around a deterministic t&read or as non-stationary processes that have no :cndency to return to a dhrministic path. Using long historical time series for the U.S. we ale unable to reject the hypotit ls that these series are non-stationary stochastic processes with no tendency to return to a trend be. Based on these findings and an unobserved components model for output that decomposes fluctuations into a secular or growth component and a cyclical component we infer that shocks to the former, which we associate with real disturbances, contribute substantially to the variation in observed output. We conclude that macroeconomic models that focus on monetary disturbances as a source of purely transitory fluctuations may never be successful in explaining a large fraction of output variation and that stochastic variation due to real factors is an essential element of any model of macroeconomic fluctuations.}, key = {macroeconomics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{Nels:77, author = {Nelson, E. R.}, title = {The measurement and trend of inequality: Comment}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {67}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Nelson1990, author = {Nelson, R. D. and Pope, R. D.}, title = {Imprecise tail estimation and the empirical failure of stochastic dominance}, journal = {American Statistical Association Proceedings, Business and Economic Statistics Section}, year = {1990}, pages = {374-379}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{NePo:90, author = {Nelson, R. D. and Pope, R. D.}, title = {Imprecise tail estimation and the empirical failure of stochastic dominance}, journal = {American Statistical Association Proceedings, Business and Economic StatisticsSection}, year = {1990}, pages = {374-379}, key = {statistics} } @INCOLLECTION{Nerl:63, author = {Nerlove, M.}, title = {Returns to scale in the Electricity Supply}, booktitle = {Measurement in Economics: Studies in Mathematical Economics and Econometricsin Memory of {Y}ehuda {G}runfeld}, publisher = {Stanford University Press}, year = {1963}, address = {Stanford, California}, key = {micro} } @INCOLLECTION{Nerm:93, author = {Nermuth, M.}, title = {Different economic theories with the same formal structures: risk, incomeinequality, information structures, etc.}, booktitle = {Mathematical Modelling in Economics - Essays in Honour of {W}olfgang {E}ichhorn}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1993}, editor = {Diewert, W. E. and Spremann, K. and Stehling, F.}, pages = {271-277}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{vNeMo:44, title = {Theory of Games and Economic Behavior}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1944}, author = {{v}on Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O.}, address = {Princeton, New Jersey}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Neum:88, author = {Neumark, D.}, title = {Employers' discriminatory behavior and the estimation of wage discrimination}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1988}, volume = {23}, pages = {279-295}, key = {discrimination} } @ARTICLE{NePo:98, author = {Neumark, David and Postlewaite, Andrew}, title = {Relative income concerns and the rise in married women's employment}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {70}, pages = {157-183}, number = {1}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{NePo:00, author = {Neumark, D. and Powers, E.}, title = {Welfare for the Elderly: The Effects of {SS1} on Pre-Retirement Labor Supply}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {78}, pages = {51-80}, key = {social insurance} } @ARTICLE{Newb:95, author = {Newbery, David M. G.}, title = {The distributional impact of price changes in {H}ungary and the {U}nited{K}ingdom}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1995}, volume = {105}, pages = {847-863}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Newbery1995, author = {Newbery, David M. G.}, title = {The distributional impact of price changes in {H}ungary and the {U}nited {K}ingdom}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1995}, volume = {105}, pages = {847-863}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Newb:70, author = {Newbery, D. M. G.}, title = {A theorem on the measurement of inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1970}, volume = {2}, pages = {264-266}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{NeSt:81, author = {David M. G. Newbery and Joseph E. Stiglitz}, title = {Empirical Measurements of Producers' Attitudes to Risk}, booktitle = {The Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization}, publisher = {Clarendon Press, Oxford}, year = {1981}, chapter = {7}, pages = {97-551}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{NeGr:74, author = {Newbold, P. and Granger, C. W. J.}, title = {Experience with Forecasting Univariate Time Series and the Combination of Forecasts}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A}, year = {1974}, volume = {137}, pages = {131-165.}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.12.23} } @ARTICLE{Newc:86, author = {Newcity, M.}, title = {Recent changes in {S}oviet personal Taxation}, journal = {Review of Socialist Law}, year = {1986}, volume = {12}, pages = {175-196}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{NeMi:07, author = {Newell, Andrew and Socha, Mieczyslaw}, title = {The Polish wage inequality explosion}, journal = {Economics of Transition}, year = {2007}, volume = {15}, pages = {733 - 758}, abstract = {This paper presents and analyses the sharp increase in hourly wage inequality after 1998 in Poland. The increase was similar in magnitude to the much-studied increase in British wage inequality during the 1980s. Using data from the Polish Labour Force Survey, we find this increase to be associated with rising wage differentials and within-group variances at both the upper and lower ends of the wage distribution. These increases are associated with differences in wage-setting patterns between the public and private sector as well as with the rapid increase in demand for educated labour. One important difference between the sectors is the lack of an impact of local labour market conditions, or wage curve, clearly evident in private sector wages, on public sector wages.}, key = {Wage Inequality}, keywords = {Poland, wages, transition, inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{NgYK:00, author = {Ng, Y.-K.}, title = {The Optimal Size of Public Spending and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {2000}, volume = {53}, pages = {253-273}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{NgYK:97, author = {Ng, Y-K.}, title = {A case for happiness, cardinalism and interpersonal comparability}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {1848-1858}, number = {445}, month = {November}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Ng:07, author = {Ng, Y. C.}, title = {Gender Earnings Differentials and Regional Economic Development in Urban China, 1988-1997}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2007}, volume = {53}, pages = {148-166}, key = {earnings}, owner = {teytelbo}, review = {Gender earnings differentials in urban China by region and their changes during the first decade of economic reform are examined. It is found that the female–male earnings ratio increased during the early stage of reform. The male earnings premium, overall, showed an increasing trend in the later stage of reform. Decomposition of the gender earnings differential reveals that a relatively lower percentage of the differential could be explained by gender differences in productive characteristics in the fast growing regions and in regions with a rapid pace of reform. The cross-sectional results highlight the possible existence of gender discrimination, particularly in the later stages of economic reform and development. Both market competition and the effects of wage decentralization play a role in shaping the gender earnings differentials. Gender earnings differentials varied by region and over time, generally in tandem with the pace of economic reform and development. The decomposition of the over time changes in the earnings gap indicated that improvement in the productive characteristics of females during the reform period constantly enhanced the earnings of females relative to those of males. The changes over time in the return to female characteristics, however, work to counter any narrowing of the gender earnings gap.}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{LoSh:99, author = {Ngo, V. L. and Shimomura, K.}, title = {Education, Moral Hazard and Endogenous Growth}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1999}, volume = {23}, pages = {675-698}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Ngo1999, author = {Ngo, V. L. and Shimomura, K.}, title = {Education, Moral Hazard, and Endogenous Growth}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1999}, volume = {23}, pages = {675-698}, key = {growth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Nich:69, title = {Economic Statistics and Economic Problems}, publisher = {McGraw-Hill}, year = {1969}, author = {Nicholson, R. J.}, address = {London}, key = {statistics} } @BOOK{NiSn:07, title = {Theory and Application of Intermediate Microeconomics}, publisher = {Thomson South-Western}, year = {2007}, author = {Nicholson, W. and Snyder, C.}, pages = {659}, edition = {10}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.03.22} } @ARTICLE{Nick:04, author = {Nickell, Stephen}, title = {Poverty and Worklessness in {B}ritain}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2004}, volume = {114}, pages = {C1-C25}, abstract = {Relative poverty in the UK has risen massively since 1979 mainly becauseof increasing worklessness, rising earnings dispersion and benefits indexedto prices, not wages. The economic force underlying this is the significantshift in demand against the unskilled. This has substantially weakenedthe low-skill labour market which has increased both pay dispersion andworklessness, particularly among low-skilled men. Practical policies discussedinclude improving education and overall well-being for children in thelower part of the ability range, raising wage floors, New Deal policies,tax credits and benefits for the workless.}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Nick:79, author = {Nickell, S.}, title = {Estimating the Probability of Leaving Unemployment}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, volume = {47}, pages = {1249-1266}, key = {labour}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{NiBe:95, author = {Nickell, S. and Bell, B.}, title = {The Collapse in Demand for the Unskilled and Unemployment Across the {OECD}}, journal = {Oxford Review of Economic Policy}, year = {1995}, volume = {11}, pages = {40-62}, key = {labour} } @INCOLLECTION{Nick:86, author = {Nickell, S. J.}, title = {Dynamic models of labour demand}, booktitle = {Handbook of Labor Economics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1986}, editor = {Ashenfelter, O. C. and Layard, P. R. G.}, volume = {1}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Nickell1986, author = {Nickell, S. J.}, title = {Dynamic models of labour demand}, journal = {Handbook of Labor Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {1}, address = {Amsterdam}, editor = {Ashenfelter, O. C. and Layard, P. R. G.}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {North Holland}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Nico:98, author = {Nicolini, Juan Pablo}, title = {Tax evasion and the optimal inflation tax}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {55}, pages = {213-230}, number = {1}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{Nied:99, title = {Web Design in a Nutshell: A Desktop Quick Reference}, publisher = {O'Reilly}, year = {1999}, author = {Niederst, J.}, address = {Sebastopol CA}, key = {computing} } @TECHREPORT{Niel:97, author = {Lars Tyge Nielsen}, title = {Montone Risk Aversion}, institution = {Centre for Economic Policy Research}, year = {1997}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {1651}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Niel:98, author = {Nielsen, Soren Bo}, title = {On capital income tax policies under uncertainty}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {1553-1580}, number = {8}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Niem:04, author = {Niemann,R.}, title = {Tax Rate Uncertainty, Investment Decisions, and Tax Neutrality}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2004}, volume = {11}, pages = {265-281}, abstract = {This article deals with the effects of tax rate uncertainty (TRU) on individualinvestment behavior. We show that under risk neutrality as well as underrisk aversion, increased TRU has an ambiguous impact on investment, dependingon the investment project’s structure of cash flows and depreciation deductions.Although the investment effects are small the popular view that tax policyuncertainty depresses real investment is rejected. Further, tax neutralityin the light of tax policy uncertainty is defined more precisely. Neutralityresults for the Johansson- Samuelson tax and the cash flow tax that areknown from certainty are confirmed under TRU.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Niep:05, author = {Niepelt, D.}, title = {Timing tax evasion}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {1611-1637}, abstract = {Standard models of tax evasion implicitly assume that evasion is eitherfully detected, or not detected at all. Empirically, this is not the case,casting into doubt the traditional rationales for interior evasion choices.I propose two alternative, dynamic explanations for interior tax evasionrates: First, fines increasing in the duration of an evasion spell, implyingthat the expected costs of evasion increase convexly with the time spentnon-reporting, while the benefits increase linearly. Second, differentvintages of income sources subject to aggregate risk and fixed costs whenswitched between evasion states. The dynamic approach yields a transparentrepresentation of revenue losses and social costs due to tax evasion, novelfindings on the effect of policy on tax evasion, and a tractable frameworkfor the analysis of tax evasion dynamics.}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Nish:03, author = {Nishimura, Y.}, title = {Optimal Non-Linear Income Taxation for Reduction of Envy}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {363-386}, key = {optimal taxation} } @BOOK{Nisk:71, title = {Bureaucracy and Representative Government}, publisher = {Aldine-Atherton}, year = {1971}, author = {Niskanen, W. A.}, address = {Chicago}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{Nits:05, author = {Nitsch, V.}, title = {Zipf zipped}, journal = {Journal of Urban Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {57}, pages = {86-100}, abstract = {In this paper, I provide a quantitative review of the empirical literature on Zipf's law for cities; the meta-analysis combines 515 estimates from 29 studies. I find that the combined estimate of the Zipf coefficient is significantly larger than 1.0. This finding implies that cities are on average more evenly distributed than suggested by (a strict interpretation of) Zipf's law. I also identify several features that account for differences across the individual point estimates.}, key = {distributions}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.21} } @ARTICLE{Nogu:07, author = {Noguera, J.A.}, title = {Why Left Reciprocity Theories Are Inconsistent}, journal = {Basic Income Studies}, year = {2007}, volume = {2}, pages = {Article 5}, number = {1}, abstract = {The reciprocity objection is one of the most widespread criticisms against Basic Income (BI). In this article I challenge the consistency between the reciprocity principle and the preferred policy options of left reciprocity theorists. I argue that any consistent policy design for a reciprocity theory should satisfy two conditions: 1. Everyone who benefits from social resources contributes relevantly (reciprocally) to society’s efforts; and 2. Everyone who contributes relevantly to society benefits from social resources. BI is accused by reciprocity theorists of failing to satisfy Condition 1. But, surprisingly, their preferred policy pack also fails to satisfy Condition 1, and seems badly prepared to satisfy Condition 2. Significantly, left reciprocity theorists reject those options that would satisfy both conditions. I suggest that other normative values and intuitions may explain that inconsistency and indicate that the reciprocity objection to BI is wrong for principled reasons.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @INCOLLECTION{Nola:07, author = {Nolan, B.}, title = {Long-term Trends in Top Income Shares in {I}reland}, booktitle = {Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @BOOK{Nola:87, title = {Income Distribution and the Macroeconomy}, publisher = {CUP}, year = {1987}, author = {Nolan, B.}, pages = {208}, address = {Economic and Social Research Institute, Central Bank of Ireland}, key = {income distribution: empirical}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.03.22} } @ARTICLE{Nold:09, author = {Noldin, H.}, title = {Zur {E}rkl{\"a}rung des {P}enalgesetzes}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r katholische Theologie}, year = {1909}, volume = {33}, pages = {136-141}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Noldin1909, author = {Noldin, H.}, title = {Zur {E}rkl\"arung des {P}enalgesetzes}, journal = {Zeitschrift f\"ur katholische Theologie}, year = {1909}, volume = {33}, pages = {136-141}, key = {crime}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Nold:07, author = {Noldin, H.}, title = {Besprechung einer {D}issertation von {K. W}agner}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r katholische Theologie}, year = {1907}, volume = {31}, pages = {530-534}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Noldin1907, author = {Noldin, H.}, title = {Besprechung einer {D}issertation von {K. W}agner}, journal = {Zeitschrift f\"ur katholische Theologie}, year = {1907}, volume = {31}, pages = {530-534}, key = {crime}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Nopo:07, author = {Nopo,H.}, title = {An Extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition to a Continuum of Comparison Groups}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2007}, type = {discussion paper}, number = {2921}, abstract = {This paper proposes an extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition from two to a continuum of comparison groups. The proposed decomposition is then estimated for the case of racial wage differences in urban Peru, exploiting a novel data set that allows the capturing of mestizaje (racial mixtures).}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{NoOh:06, author = {Nordblom,K. and Ohlsson,H.}, title = {Tax avoidance and intra-family transfers}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {1669-1680}, abstract = {We study how taxes on intra-family transfers (bequests and gifts) affect parents’ transfers to their children. Our focus is on the incentives for tax avoidance. These issues are important for families and their welfare, as well as for governments and their possibilities of raising revenue from transfer taxes. Using a theoretical model, we show how altruistic parents avoid taxes by changing the timing of transfers when inter vivos gifts are taxed separately from bequests (which is the case in many developed countries). The excess burden per tax dollar of the transfer taxes is sometimes infinitely large because of tax avoidance. All tax avoidance is eliminated if bequests and gifts from the same donor are jointly taxed.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{NoRoRu:01, author = {Noussair, Charles and Robin, Stephane and Ruffieux, Bernard}, title = {Price bubbles in laboratory asset markets with constant fundamental values}, journal = {Experimental Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {4}, pages = {87--105}, number = {1}, month = jun, abstract = {Abstract  We construct asset markets that are similar to those studied by Smith, Suchanek and Williams (Econometrica. 56, 1119–1151) in which bubbles and crashes tended to occur. The main difference between the markets studied here and those studied by Smith et al. is that in the markets studied here, the fundamental value of the asset is constant over the entire life of the asset. In four of the eight sessions reported here, we observe bubbles, which are prices considerably higher than fundamental values. The data suggest that the frequent payment of dividends is a major cause of bubble formation. The property that the fundamental value remains constant over the course of the trading horizon is not sufficient to eliminate the possibility of a bubble.}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.01.21} } @ARTICLE{NoPo:08, author = {Noussair, Charles N and Owen Powell}, title = {Peaks and Valleys: Experimental Adsset Markets with Non-monotonic Fundamentals}, journal = {CentER Discussion Paper}, year = {2008}, volume = {2008-49}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.01.21} } @ARTICLE{Novo:07, author = {Novotn\'{y}, Josef}, title = {On the measurement of regional inequality: does spatial dimension of income inequality matter?}, journal = {The Annals of Regional Science}, year = {2007}, volume = {41}, pages = {563-580}, abstract = {The paper concerns selected theoretical and empirical aspects of the decomposition of income inequality by spatially defined subgroups. Special consideration is given to the implications for measurement and comparison of regional inequality. The decomposition by the Theil coefficient is applied at global and European levels including estimates of historical development.Additionally, the empirical evidence on the decomposition of inequality in a number of countries is reviewed, regional inequality for 46 countries is estimated, and a simple method of cross-country classification according to relative importance of spatial dimension of inequality is provided.}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Novs:85, author = {Novshek, William}, title = {On the Existence of {C}ournot Equilibrium}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1985}, volume = {52}, pages = {85--98}, number = {1}, issn = {00346527}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Jan., 1985}, key = {industry}, publisher = {The Review of Economic Studies Ltd.}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2297471} } @BOOK{Nozi:74, title = {Anarchy, State and Utopia}, publisher = {Basic Books}, year = {1974}, author = {Nozick, R.}, address = {New York}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{NurT:08, author = {Nur-tegin, K. D.}, title = {Determinants of Business Tax Compliance}, journal = {The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis \& Policy:}, year = {2008}, volume = {8}, pages = {Iss. 1 (Topics), Article 18}, abstract = {This paper provides empirical evaluation of a number of determinants of tax evasion by firms. The analysis includes both standard determinants, such as tax rates and probability of detection, and non-traditional factors, such as trust in government, compliance costs, and corruption. Firmlevel survey data from 4,538 firms in 23 transition economies are analyzed. One of the main findings is that fighting corruption is more important in deterring tax evasion than conventional measures.}, key = {tax compliance - firms}, keywords = {tax compliance, tax evasion, determinants, transition economies}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.09.09}, url = {http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol8/iss1/art18} } @ARTICLE{NuTa:08, author = {Nussim, Jacob and Tabbach, Avraham}, title = {Controlling Avoidance: Ex Ante Regulation Versus Ex Post Punishment}, journal = {Review of Law and Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {4}, pages = {45 - 63}, abstract = {Efforts to avoid punishment are socially wasteful. Not only do they limit the deterrent effect of punishment, but they may actually lead to the paradoxical result that more severe punishment for crime induces more crime. The law has therefore constantly attempted to deter avoidance efforts and has designed various enforcement measures for this purpose. This paper examines the effects of such measures on avoidance and crime. It distinguishes between two general policy tools: ex ante regulation (e.g., Pigouvian taxes) and ex post punishment of avoidance. The main results of this paper are that (1) ex ante regulation, if feasible, reduces the incentives to engage in avoidance and consequently in crime; whereas (2) ex post punishment of avoidance may induce more avoidance and more crime. The intuitive reason for the latter result is twofold: ex post punishment of avoidance increases not only the costs but also the benefits of avoidance; and avoidance and crime are generally complements. As the control of avoidance through regulation or punishment can be designed into the legal system, the results of this paper can guide policymaking. They suggest, for example, that recent trends to stiffen penalties for substantially obstructive acts might be counter productive, while imposing liability for avoidance efforts on third, economically-related parties such as lawyers and accountants may be productive in curtailing avoidance, since it acts as an ex ante regulation for the principal offender.}, key = {Crime}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{Nybe:97, author = {Nyberg, Sten}, title = {The honest society. Stability and policy considerations}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {83-100}, number = {1}, month = {April}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{NySa:89, author = {Nyg{\aa}rd, F. and Sandstr{\"o}m , A.}, title = {Income inequality measures based on sample surveys}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1989}, volume = {42}, pages = {81-95}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Nygaard1985, author = {Nyg{\aa}rd, F. and Sandstr{\"o}m , A.}, title = {Estimating {G}ini and entropy inequality parameters}, journal = {Journal of Official Statistics}, year = {1985}, volume = {1}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{NySa:80, author = {Nyg{\aa}rd, F. and Sandstr{\"o}m , A.}, title = {On the measurement of income inequality: A Review, part II.}, institution = {Department of Statistics University of Stockholm}, year = {1985}, type = {research report}, number = {2}, note = {Studies based on international statistical data}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{NySa:85, author = {Nyg{\aa}rd, F. and Sandstr{\"o}m , A.}, title = {Estimating {G}ini and entropy inequality parameters}, journal = {Journal of Official Statistics}, year = {1985}, volume = {1}, pages = {399-412}, abstract = {This paper examines two families of inequality parameters frequently used as measures of income inequality, viz the Gini family and the Generalized Entropy family. Computations in total surveys and estimations in sample surveys are discussed. The estimation procedures are made both under a fix population approach and under an auxiliary model approach. A number of variance estimators are discussed.}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jos.nu/Articles/abstract.asp?article=14399} } @BOOK{NySa:81, title = {Measuring Income Inequality}, publisher = {Almquist Wicksell International}, year = {1981}, author = {Nyg{\aa}rd, F. and Sandstr{\"o}m , A.}, address = {Stockholm, Sweden}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{OcBr:08, author = {O'Connell, A. and Brewster, K.}, title = {Combating Large-Scale Tax Evasion – Australia’s Experience}, journal = {Bulletin for International Taxation}, year = {2008}, volume = {62}, pages = {145-150}, number = {4}, month = {April}, abstract = {Since 2005, Australia has combated international tax avoidance and evasion schemes through a multi-agency arrangement called “Project Wickenby”, which combines the resources of the Serious Non-Compliance Unit of the Australian Tax Office with the resources of several other government agencies. After considering some preliminary matters, this article examines the experience of Project Wickenby and the issues arising from it. The article also discusses some recently introduced legislation designed to identify and deal with promoters of tax avoidance and evasion schemes.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @ARTICLE{ODEv:99, author = {O'Donoghue, Cathal and Evans, Martin}, title = {Cross-national microsimulation modelling: reforming social assistance inthree {E}uropean countries}, journal = {The Brazilian Electronic Journal of Economics-Beje}, year = {1999}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{ODWe:98, author = {O'Donoghue, J. and Wilkie, C.}, title = {Harmonised indices of consumer prices}, journal = {Economic Trends}, year = {1998}, pages = {34-43}, number = {532}, month = {February}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{OHea:80, author = {O'Hearn, D.}, title = {The consumer second economy: size and effects}, journal = {Soviet Studies}, year = {1980}, volume = {32}, pages = {218-234}, key = {underground} } @INCOLLECTION{OHig:85, author = {O'Higgins, M.}, title = {The relationship between the formal and hidden economies: an exploratoryanalysis for four countries}, booktitle = {The Economics of the Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1985}, editor = {Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A.}, address = {Berlin, Germany}, key = {underground} } @TECHREPORT{OHig:82, author = {O'Higgins, M.}, title = {Assessing the unobserved economy in the {U}nited {K}ingdom}, year = {1982}, type = {Paper presented at the International Conference on the Unobserved Economy}, address = {Wassenaar, Netherlands}, month = {June}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{OHig:81AM, author = {O'Higgins, M.}, title = {Aggregate measures of tax-evasion: an assessment - I}, journal = {British Tax Review}, year = {1981}, pages = {286-302}, note = {revised and updated from O'Higgins 1980}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{OHig:81TE, author = {O'Higgins, M.}, title = {Tax evasion and the self-employed - an examination of the evidence - II}, journal = {British Tax Review}, year = {1981}, pages = {367-378}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{OHig:80, title = {Measuring the Hidden Economy: A Review of Evidence and Methodology}, publisher = {Outer Circle Policy Unit}, year = {1980}, author = {O'Higgins, M.}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{ONei:82, author = {O'Neill, B.}, title = {A problem of rights arbitration from the {T}almud}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1982}, volume = {2}, pages = {345-371}, key = {claims} } @ARTICLE{ONvK:08, author = {O'Neill, Donal and Van Kerm, Philippe}, title = {An Integrated Framework for Analysing Income Convergence}, journal = {The Manchester School}, year = {2008}, volume = {76}, pages = {1 - 20}, abstract = {We develop an integrated framework for studying income convergence that incorporates traditional measures of beta-convergence and sigma-convergence. These concepts are formally linked by a measure of re-ranking (or leapfrogging). Our proposed measure of beta-convergence allows for nonlinearities in the growth process and explicitly identifies the contribution of faster growth among low-income regions to reductions in overall inequality. To develop our framework we exploit the close links that exist between studies of income convergence and studies that examine the progressivity of the tax system. We illustrate our approach by examining both cross-country and regional income dynamics.}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{BaRu:00, author = {Bajo-Rubio O.}, title = {A further generalization of the {S}olow growth model: the role of the publicsector}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {79-84}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{O.2000, author = {Bajo-Rubio O.}, title = {A further generalization of the {S}olow growth model: the role of the public sector}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {79-84}, key = {growth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{O.1993, author = {Galor O. and Zeira, J.}, title = {Income distribution and macroeconomics}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1993}, volume = {60}, pages = {35-52}, key = {income distribution:theory}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Oakl:98, author = {Oakland, William H.}, title = {The monopolistic provision of congested public goods}, booktitle = {Topics in Public Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Pines, David and Sadka, Efraim and Zilcha, Itzak}, chapter = {8}, pages = {185-196}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{OaSc:91, author = {Oates, W. and Schwab, R.}, title = {Community Composition and the Provision of Local Public Goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {44}, pages = {217-238}, key = {Local public goods} } @ARTICLE{Oate:99, author = {Oates, W. E.}, title = {An Essay on Fiscal Federalism}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1999}, volume = {37}, pages = {1120–1149}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Oates1999, author = {Oates, W. E.}, title = {An Essay on Fiscal Federalism}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1999}, volume = {37}, pages = {1120-1149}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Oaxa:73, author = {Oaxaca, R. L.}, title = {Male-female wage differentials in urban labor markets}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1973}, volume = {14}, pages = {693-709}, key = {discrimination} } @ARTICLE{OaRa:94, author = {Oaxaca, R. L. and Ransom, M. R.}, title = {On discrimination and the decomposition of wage differentials}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1994}, volume = {61}, pages = {5-21}, key = {discrimination} } @ARTICLE{OaRa:88, author = {Oaxaca, R. L. and Ransom, M. R.}, title = {Searching for the effect of unionism on the wages of union and non-unionworkers}, journal = {Journal of Labor Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {9}, pages = {139-148}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Oaxaca1988, author = {Oaxaca, R. L. and Ransom, M. R.}, title = {Searching for the effect of unionism on the wages of union and non-union workers}, journal = {Journal of Labor Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {9}, pages = {139-148}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{OfVi:80, title = {Private Sources of Income of the {S}oviet {U}nion Household}, publisher = {Rand Publications}, year = {1980}, author = {Ofer, G. and Vinakur, G.}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{Offe:97, title = {Beliefs and decision in public good games: theory and experiments}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1997}, author = {Offerman, T.}, address = {Dordrecht, Netherlands}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{ONS:99, author = {{Office for National Statistics}}, title = {The effects of taxes and benefits on household income, 1997-1998}, journal = {Economic Trends}, year = {1999}, pages = {27-63}, number = {545}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{OgZh:01, author = {Ogaki, M. and Zhang, Q.}, title = {Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion and Tests of Risk Sharing}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2001}, volume = {69}, pages = {515-526}, abstract = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28200103%2969%3A2%3C515%3ADRRAAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.02.15} } @ARTICLE{Ogwa:04, author = {Ogwang, T.}, title = {A convenient method of computing the {G}ini index and its standard error: some further results: reply}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2004}, volume = {66}, pages = {435-437}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.07.21} } @ARTICLE{Ogwa:03, author = {Ogwang, T.}, title = {Bounds Of The {G}ini Index Using Sparse Information On Mean Incomes}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2003}, volume = {49}, pages = {415-423}, abstract = {In this paper, bounds of the Gini index, based on grouped data, are proposedassuming sparse information on mean incomes in the sense that data on eitherthe overall mean income or some of the group mean incomes are not reported.It turns out that the proposed bounds are identical to those proposed.}, key = {Inequality} } @ARTICLE{Ogwa:00, author = {Ogwang, T.}, title = {A convenient method of computing the {G}ini index and its standard error}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2000}, volume = {62}, pages = {123-129}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.07.21} } @ARTICLE{OgRa:00, author = {Ogwang, T. and Rao, U. L. G.}, title = {Hybrid Models of the {L}orenz Curve}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {69}, pages = {39-44}, abstract = {In this paper hybrid Lorenz curves are proposed as a way of circumventing an important drawback of traditional models of the Lorenz curve, namely lack of satisfactory fit over the entire range of a given income distribution. Two categories of hybrid models are identified, namely the additive models and the multiplicative models. Whereas the additive models are obtained by taking convex combinations of the traditional models, the multiplicative models are obtained by taking their weighted products. A comparison of the performances of the hybrid Lorenz curves with those of the constituent Lorenz curves shows that both the additive and multiplicative models perform generally better than the constituent Lorenz curves.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Ogwang2000, author = {Ogwang, T. and Rao, U. L. G.}, title = {Hybrid Models of the Lorenz Curve}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {69}, pages = {39-44}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Ohls:07TA, author = {Ohlsson,H.}, title = {Tax Avoidance – A Natural Experiment}, institution = {Uppsala}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, number = {2007:13}, abstract = {The objective of this paper is to empirically study if and to what extent people legally reduce their tax payments. There are few empirical studies of tax avoidance although avoidance may seriously affect the possibilities to raise tax revenue. I use a sample of Swedish siblings receiving inheritances in 2004. These children of deceased had the opportunity to avoid inheritance taxes by partly or fully ceding their inheritances to the grandchildren. My first main result is that almost two thirds of the children avoid taxes. The likelihood of avoiding taxes decreases with age. The more of the taxes a child potentially can avoid, the more she avoids. Second, only one out of four minimize their tax payments. The more of the taxes a child potentially can avoid, the more likely he is to minimize taxes. And third, siblings tend to make the same choices whether or not to avoid taxes and to minimize taxes.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{Ohls:07TE, author = {Ohlsson, H.}, title = {The equal division puzzle - empirical evidence on intergenerational transfers in Sweden}, institution = {Uppsala Universitet}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {10}, address = {Department of Economics Uppsala Universitet P.O. Box 513 SE-751 20 Uppsala Sweden Fax: +46 18 471 14 78}, month = {January}, abstract = {The objective of this paper is to study to what extent parents divide their estates unequally between their children. Unequal sharing of parental transfers is, for example, a necessary condition for theories of altruistic (dynastic) behavior to hold. I use a new data set based on the estate reports for 230 widows, widowers, and divorcees from the city of Stockholm, Sweden deceased in 2004. Unequal sharing is unusual, depending on definitions only 7–25 percent of the estates are unequally divided. The data set is also used to estimate probit models for the likelihood of unequal sharing. A first main result is that the probability of unequal sharing is increasing in the size of the estate. Second, the older the children are on average the more likely is unequal sharing. Finally, unequal sharing is more common among deceased from some neighborhoods of the city compared to deceased from other neighborhoods.}, key = {bequests}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @TECHREPORT{Ohls:07TL, author = {Ohlsson, Henry}, title = {The legacy of the Swedish gift and inheritance tax, 1884–2004}, institution = {Uppsala University}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {23}, abstract = {This paper has two objectives. The first is to study the revenue from the gift, inheritance, and estate taxes in Sweden during more than a century. The second is to focus on a unique episode during the second half of the 1940s when gifts and gift tax revenue exploded. This episode has never before been discussed in the research literature. It gives an extremely clear illustration of behavioral response to taxes in general, and the impact of expectations of future tax increases in particular. It is also a very interesting episode in the economic history of Sweden. I have access to aggregate tax revenue data since 1884. Moreover, I have constructed a rich micro data set of all gifts reported during the period 1942–1949 in one county. A first main result is that gift tax revenue during the 1940s started to increase long before a new estate tax and increased wealth taxation were decided and implemented. The increase even began before the legislative process started. Second, both the number and the average values of gifts increased. Promissory notes were, in value, the most common way to give. Finally, gifts, inheritances, and estates were never important sources of tax revenue. Revenue as a share of GDP reached a peak already in the 1930s. The role of these taxes has instead primarily been equity and to provide integrity for other tax bases.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {gift tax, inheritance tax, estate tax, tax avoidance, expec- tations}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{OhTo:04, author = {Ohtake, F. and Tomioka, J.}, title = {Who Supports Redistribution?}, journal = {The Japanese Economic Review}, year = {2004}, volume = {55}, pages = {333-354}, abstract = {Using an original data set, we investigated the determinants of individual preferences over income redistribution in Japan. Although income level is negatively correlated with support for redistribution, it does not explain much; there are other important factors that relate to dynamics and uncertainty, such as income risk. Even after controlling for income, both risk-averse individuals and those who expect to be unemployed in the future favour greater redistribution. Interaction of ageing and mobility prove important. The relatively poor elderly, who presumably have few prospects of upward mobility, strongly support greater redistribution, whereas younger people are less sympathetic to such a policy.}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.20} } @ARTICLE{Oi:71, author = {Oi, W.}, title = {A {D}isneyland dilemma: two-part tariffs for a {M}ickey-{M}ouse monopoly}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1971}, volume = {85}, pages = {77-96}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Ok:99, author = {Ok, Efe. A.}, title = {Inequality-Averse Collective Choice}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {30}, pages = {301-321}, number = {3}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Ok:96, author = {Ok, Efe A.}, title = {Fuzzy measurement of income inequality: some possibility results on thefuzzification of the {L}orenz ordering}, journal = {Economic Theory}, year = {1996}, volume = {7}, pages = {513-530}, number = {3}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Ok:95, author = {Ok, E. A.}, title = {On the Principle of Equal Sacrifice in Income Taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1995}, volume = {58}, pages = {453-67}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Ok:95FM, author = {Ok, E. A.}, title = {Fuzzy measurement of income inequality: a class of fuzzy inequality measures}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1995}, volume = {12}, pages = {111-136}, number = {2}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Ok:95TC, author = {Ok, E. A.}, title = {The comparison of income distributions when needs differ}, institution = {Cornell University}, year = {1995}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{OkFo:97, author = {Ok, Efe A. and Foster, James}, title = {Lorenz dominance and the variance of logarithms}, institution = {C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics}, year = {1997}, type = {Economic Research Reports}, number = {97-22}, address = {New York University, Faculty of Arts and Science, Dept. of Economics, NewYork}, month = {May}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{OkLa:99, author = {Ok, E. A. and Lambert, P. J.}, title = {On Evaluating Social Welfare by Sequential Generalized {L}orenz Dominance}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {63}, pages = {45-53}, abstract = {The sequential generalized Lorenz (SGL) ordering is introduced by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) to rank heterogeneous income distributions. It is well-known that this ordering has a strong utilitarian support. In this note, we show that one does not have to be a utilitarian to accept this welfare ordering: the SGL ordering is supported by all increasing SWFs which record an increase in overall welfare when a (cardinal) welfare transfer is made from less needy to needier.}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{Okne:75, author = {Okner, B. A.}, title = {Individual Taxes and the Distribution of Income}, booktitle = {The Personal Distribution of Income and Wealth}, publisher = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {1975}, editor = {Smith, J. D.}, address = {New York}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Okne:72, author = {Okner, B. A.}, title = {Constructing a New Data Base from Existing Microdata Sets: The 1966 {MERGE} File}, journal = {Annals of Economic and Social Measurement}, year = {1972}, volume = {1}, pages = {325-342}, key = {Data} } @ARTICLE{Okra:87, author = {Okrasa, W.}, title = {Redistribution and the two dimensions of inequality: An East-West comparison}, journal = {European Economic Review - Papers and proceedings of the second annual congressof the E.E.A.}, year = {1987}, volume = {22-24/8}, pages = {633-634}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Okrasa1987, author = {Okrasa, W.}, title = {Redistribution and the two dimensions of inequality: An East-West comparison}, journal = {European Economic Review - Papers and proceedings of the second annual congress of the E.E.A.}, year = {1987}, volume = {22-24/8}, pages = {633-634}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{OkWe:00, author = {Okten, C. and Weisbrod, B. A.}, title = {Determinants of Donations in Private Nonprofit Markets}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {75}, pages = {255-272}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Okun1975, title = {Equality and Efficiency, The Big Trade-off}, publisher = {Brookings}, year = {1975}, author = {Okun, A. M.}, address = {Washington}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Okun:75, title = {Equality and Efficiency: the Big Trade-off}, publisher = {Brookings Institution}, year = {1975}, author = {Okun, A. M.}, address = {Washington}, institution = {The Brookings Institute}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Oldm:65, author = {Oldman, O.}, title = {Controlling income tax evasion}, booktitle = {Problems of Tax Administration in {L}atin {A}merica}, publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press}, year = {1965}, editor = {{Joint Tax Program, Organization of {A}merican States, Inter-American DevelopmentBank, Economic Commission for} {L}atin {A}merica}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Oliv:06, author = {Oliver, A.}, title = {Further evidence of preference reversals: Choice, valuation and ranking over distributions of life expectancy}, journal = {Journal of Health Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {25}, pages = {803-820}, key = {health}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.10.02} } @ARTICLE{Olke:06, author = {Olken, B.}, title = {Corruption and the Costs of Redistribution: Micro Evidence from Indonesia}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {853-870}, key = {corruption}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @ARTICLE{Olke:05, author = {Olken,B.}, title = {Revealed community equivalence scales}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {545-566}, abstract = {This paper estimates the equivalence scale revealed by discretionary communityallocations of welfare benefits to poor households. I apply the proposedapproach to a subsidized rice program in Indonesia in which villages designatedprogram beneficiaries, and estimate the equivalence scale implicit in thebeneficiaries they selected. I find that the ‘‘revealed community equivalencescale’’ for this program lies much closer to per capita expenditure thantraditional demand-based equivalence scales, particularly in the poorestcommunities. This suggests that per capita expenditure may be closer tohow poor communities actually compare households when allocating aid thanpreviously thought.}, key = {Equivalence scales} } @ARTICLE{OlYi:92, author = {Olkin, I. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {{G}ini regression analysis}, journal = {International Statistical Review}, year = {1992}, volume = {60}, pages = {185-196}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{OlOs:01, author = {Olsen, T. E. and Osmundsen, P.}, title = {Strategic Tax Competition; Implications of National Ownership}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {81}, pages = {253-277}, key = {Tax competition} } @ARTICLE{OnZa:07, author = {Ono,H. and Zavodny,M.}, title = {Digital inequality: A five country comparison using microdata}, journal = {Social Science Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {36}, pages = {1135-1155}, abstract = {This study examines patterns and determinants of information technology (IT) usage in Wve countries: the U.S., Sweden, Japan, South Korea and Singapore. We focus on cross-country diVerences in IT access and use across sex, age, education and income groups. We examine how any such diVerences have evolved over time. Our results indicate that there are diVerences in IT usage in all Wve countries, but gaps tend to be more prevalent in the three Asian nations than in the U.S. and Sweden. Our Wndings generally suggest that diVerences in IT usage along demographic and socioeconomic dimensions reXect the extent of diVerences in other areas of the economy and society.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Oogh:03, author = {Ooghe, E.}, title = {Reference type-independent heterogeneous social evaluation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2003}, volume = {80}, pages = {227–231}, key = {Welfare} } @ARTICLE{Ooghe2003, author = {Ooghe, E.}, title = {Reference type-independent heterogeneous social evaluation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2003}, volume = {80}, pages = {227-231}, key = {Welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{OoScVd:07, author = {Ooghe, E. and Schokkaert, E. and Van de gaer, D.}, title = {Equality of Opportunity versus Equality of Opportunity Sets}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2007}, volume = {28}, pages = {209-230}, abstract = {We characterize two different approaches to the idea of equality of opportunity. Roemer’s social ordering is motivated by a concern to compensate for the effects of certain (non-responsibility) factors on outcomes. Van de gaer’s social ordering is concerned with the equalization of the opportunity sets to which people have access. We show how different invariance axioms open the possibility to go beyond the simple additive specification implied by both rules. This offers scope for a broader interpretation of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism.}, key = {equality}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.10.01}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/content/2073443511441892/fulltext.pdf} } @ARTICLE{Ordover1979, author = {Ordover, J. and Phelps, E.}, title = {The Concept of Optimal Taxation in the Overlapping Generations Model of Capital and Wealth}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1979}, volume = {12}, pages = {1-26}, key = {Wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{OrPh:79, author = {Ordover, J. and Phelps, E.}, title = {The Concept of Optimal Taxation in the Overlapping Generations Model ofCapital and Wealth}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1979}, volume = {12}, pages = {1-26}, key = {wealth} } @INCOLLECTION{Orla:87, author = {Orland, L.}, title = {Perspectives on {S}oviet economic crime}, booktitle = {Soviet Law and Economy, Law in Eastern {E}urope}, year = {1987}, editor = {Ioffe, O. S. and Janis, M. W.}, volume = {32}, pages = {Sijthoff and Noordhoff}, address = {Germantown, Maryland}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{OrSc:99, author = {Ormiston, M. B. and Schlee, E. E.}, title = {Comparative Statics Tests Between Decision Models Under Risk}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {145-166}, key = {Statistics} } @ARTICLE{Orsh:66, author = {Orshansky, M.}, title = {How poverty is measured}, journal = {Social Security Bulletin}, year = {1966}, volume = {29}, pages = {37-41}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Orsh:65, author = {Orshansky, M.}, title = {Counting the poor: another look at the poverty profile}, journal = {Social Security Bulletin}, year = {1965}, volume = {28}, pages = {3-29}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Orshansky1965, author = {Orshansky, M.}, title = {Counting the poor: another look at the poverty profile}, journal = {Social Security Bulletin}, year = {1965}, volume = {28}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Ortega1991, author = {Ortega, P. and Mart\'\in Reyes, G. and Fern{\'a}ndez Morales, Antonio and Ladoux, M. and Garc\'\ia Lizana, Antonio}, title = {A new functional form for estimating {L}orenz curves}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1991}, volume = {37}, pages = {447-452}, number = {17}, address = {M\'alaga, Spain}, institution = {Facultad de Ciencias Econ\'omicas y Empresariales, Universidad de M\'alaga}, key = {distributions}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, type = {Papeles de Trabajo} } @ARTICLE{OrMaFeLaGa:91, author = {Ortega, P. and Martin, G. and Fernandez, A. and Ladoux, M. and Garcia, A.}, title = {A new functional form for estimating {L}orenz Curves}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1991}, volume = {37}, pages = {447-452}, number = {12}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{OrTi:99, author = {Ortmann, Andreas and Tichy, Lisa K.}, title = {Gender differences in the laboratory: Evidence from prisoner's dilemma games}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1999}, volume = {39}, pages = {327-339}, number = {3}, key = {Experiments} } @BOOK{Osbe:84, title = {Economic {I}nequality in the {U}nited {S}tates}, publisher = {M.E. Sharpe Inc.}, year = {1984}, author = {Osberg, L.}, address = {Armonk, New York}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{OsXu:99, author = {Osberg, L. and Xu, K.}, title = {Poverty Intensity: How Well Do Canadian Provinces Compare?}, journal = {Canadian Public Policy}, year = {1999}, volume = {25}, pages = {1-17}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{OsXu:98, author = {Osberg, L. and Xu, K.}, title = {Poverty Intensity - How Well Does {C}anada Compare?}, institution = {Department of Economics, Dalhousie University}, year = {1998}, type = {Workikng Paper}, address = {Halifax, Nova Scotia CANADA B3H 3J5}, month = {June}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{Osbo:04, title = {An Introduction to Game Theory}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2004}, author = {Osborne, M. J.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {games} } @BOOK{Osma:82, title = {Economic Inequality and Group Welfare}, publisher = {Clarendon Press Oxford}, year = {1982}, author = {Osmani, S. R.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Osma:78, author = {Osmani, S. R.}, title = {On the normative measurement of inequality}, journal = {Bangladesh Develepment Studies}, year = {1978}, volume = {6}, pages = {417-442}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Osta:93, title = {Mathematics in Economics: Models and Methods}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {1993}, author = {Ostaszewski, A.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{Oste:04, author = {Osterdal, L.}, title = {Pascal's and Tabarrok's Wagers}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {2004}, volume = {57}, pages = {1-4}, abstract = {In a recent paper A. Tabarrok [Believe in Pascal’s Wager? Have I Got a Deal for You!, Theory and Decision 48, 123–128, 2000] argued that a believer who accepts Pascal’s Wager should in addition accept payment of any given fee in return for a given increase in the probability of reaching God. However the conclusion is obtained from manipulations of infinities which are not valid in an expected utility model. In this note, an alternative model is formulated in which Tabarrok’s conclusion can be obtained.}, key = {utility, preference}, owner = {Alex}, timestamp = {2006.06.22} } @ARTICLE{Oswa:83, author = {Oswald, A.}, title = {Altruism, jealousy and the theory of optimal nonlinear taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {20}, pages = {77-87}, key = {Altruism} } @ARTICLE{Oswa:97, author = {Oswald, A. J.}, title = {Happiness and Economic performance}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {1815-1831}, number = {445}, month = {November}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{OwWe:98, author = {Owen, Ann L. and Weil, David N.}, title = {Intergenerational earnings mobility, inequality and growth}, journal = {Journal of MONETARY ECONOMICS}, year = {1998}, volume = {41}, pages = {71-104}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{ONei:08, author = {O’Neill, D.}, title = {The implications of growth regressions for equality of opportunity}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {2008}, volume = {60}, pages = {731-742}, abstract = {In this paper we consider the usefulness of alternative measures of convergence in an equality of opportunity framework. In particular we use established results from the public finance and mobility literature to show that a form of B-convergence is both a necessary and sufficient condition for a reduction in inequality of opportunity for a wide range of popular inequality measures. We illustrate our approach using regional data from the United States, Japan, and Europe.}, key = {equality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.10.01} } @ARTICLE{PaDi:98, author = {Paap, Richard, Van Dijk, Herman K.}, title = {Distribution and mobility of wealth of nations}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {1269-1293}, number = {7}, abstract = {We estimate the empirical bimodal cross-sectional distribution of real Gross Domestic Product per capita of 120 countries over the period 1960-1989 by a mixture of a Weibull and a truncated normal density. The components of the mixture represent a group of poor and a group of rich countries, while the mixing proportion describes the distribution over poor and rich. This enables us to analyse the development of the mean and variance of both groups separately and the switches of countries between the two groups over time. Empirical evidence indicates that the means of the two groups are diverging in terms of levels, but that the growth rates of the means of the two groups over the period 1960-1989 are the same.}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @ARTICLE{Pacu:98, author = {Pacula, Rosalie Liccardo}, title = {Does increasing the beer tax reduce marijuana consumption?}, journal = {Journal of Health Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {17}, pages = {557-585}, number = {5}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{PaUl:99NE, title = {Nonparametric Econometrics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1999}, author = {Pagan, A. and Ullah, A.}, series = {Themes in Modern Econometrics}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Paga:98, author = {Pagan, Jose A.}, title = {Employer sanctions on hiring illegal labor: An experimental analysis offirm compliance}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {34}, pages = {131-144}, number = {1}, abstract = {The employer sanctions provision of the 1986 Immigration Reform and ControlAct penalizesemployers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers. Under IRCA,employers are subject to civiland/or criminal penalties; however, giventhe widespread availability of counterfeit documentation,in some casesit becomes difficult to discern the employment eligibility status of someworkers.Using experimental methods, this study provides some evidence thatmarginal increases inemployer compliance rates are significantly higherwhen employers have perfect information on theemployment eligibility statusof its potential workers than when they do not. The experimentalresultssuggest that increases in government spending for employer sanctions enforcementmay bemore effective if the informational asymmetry faced by employersis solved first. A possiblesolution to this problem may lie in the adoptionof tamper-proof documentation such as a nationalidentification card.}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Page2003, author = {Page, B. R.}, title = {Bequest taxes, inter vivos gifts, and the bequest motive}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1219-1229}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Page:03, author = {Page, B. R.}, title = {Bequest taxes, inter vivos gifts, and the bequest motive}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1219–1229}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Pagl:79, author = {Paglin, M.}, title = {Reply to {W}ertz}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1979}, volume = {79}, pages = {613-77}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Pagl:75, author = {Paglin, M.}, title = {The measurement and trend of inequality: a basic revision}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1975}, volume = {65}, pages = {598-609}, number = {9}, key = {inequality} } @UNPUBLISHED{Palacios-Huerta2006, author = {Palacios-Huerta, I. and Volij, O.}, title = {Field Centipedes}, note = {mimeo}, year = {2006}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.07.21} } @ARTICLE{PaPo:91, author = {Palfrey, T. R. and Porter, R.}, title = {Guidelines for submission of manuscripts on experimental economics}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1991}, volume = {59}, pages = {1197-1198}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{PaRo:84, author = {Palfrey, T. R. and Rosenthal, H.}, title = {Participation and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods: A Strategic Analyis}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1984}, volume = {24}, pages = {171-193}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Palm:95, author = {Palme, M.}, title = {Earnings Mobility and Distribution: Comparing Statistical Models on {S}wedishData}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1995}, volume = {2}, pages = {213-247}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Palme1995, author = {Palme, M.}, title = {Earnings Mobility and Distribution: Comparing Statistical Models on {S}wedish Data}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1995}, volume = {2}, pages = {213-247}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{PaAn:98, author = {Palme, M. And Aronsson, T.}, title = {A Decade of Tax and Benefit Reforms in {S}weden - Effects on Labour Supply,Welfare and Inequality}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {39-69}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Palme1998, author = {Palme, M. And Aronsson, T.}, title = {A Decade of Tax and Benefit Reforms in {S}weden - Effects on Labour Supply, Welfare and Inequality}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {39-69}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Palme1997, author = {Palme, M. And Aronsson, T.}, title = {A Decade of Tax and Benefit Reforms in {S}weden - Effects on Labour Supply, Welfare and Inequality}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1997}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{PaCaKe:04, author = {Palmer, G. and Carr, J. and Kenway, P.}, title = {Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion 2004}, institution = {New Policy Institute Joseph Rowntree Foundation}, year = {2004}, type = {Paper}, abstract = {Overall, four key areas of concern emerge, namely working-age adults without dependent children, the economically inactive who want paid work but are not officially unemployed, the quality of jobs at the bottom of the labour market and young adults with poor or no educational qualifications: • The number of people living in low-income households continues to fall. All of this fall has been among children (and their parents) and pensioners. In contrast, the number of working-age adults without dependent children who are in low income has risen in recent years. • There has been substantial success over the last decade in reducing unemployment and in reducing worklessness among couple households. There has been much less success in reducing the numbers of people who are economically inactive but want paid work, in long-term worklessness due to sickness and disability, and in worklessness among single-adult households. There is a large overlap between these groups and they are a major challenge for future policy. • While work strongly reduces the risk of being in poverty, it does not eliminate it: twofifths of people in low-income working-age households now have someone in paid work. A quarter of all those earning less than £6.50 per hour are directly employed by the public sector. • Low pay is only one of the disadvantages of jobs at the bottom of the labour market. Two-fifths of people who find work no longer have that work six months later, the same proportion as a decade ago. More than half of employees on below-average incomes are not contributing to a non-state pension. • Progress in increasing the number of children and young adults with an adequate minimum level of educational qualification has now stalled, with no further advance since 2000 compared with significant progress during the second half of the 1990s. Around a quarter of young people at each of the ages of 11, 16 and 19 are still failing to reach a basic level of attainment.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.21} } @ARTICLE{Palu:99, author = {Palumbo, M. G.}, title = {Uncertain Medical Expenses and Precautionary Saving Near the End of theLife Cycle}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {395-421}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{Palumbo1999, author = {Palumbo, M. G.}, title = {Uncertain Medical Expenses and Precautionary Saving Near the End of the Life Cycle}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {395-421}, key = {health}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{PaNa:89, author = {Panagariya, A. and Narayana, A. V. L.}, title = {Excise tax evasion: Reply to {T}ower}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1989}, volume = {44}, pages = {510-512}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Pand:77, author = {Pandit, V.}, title = {Aggregate demand under conditions of tax evasion}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1977}, volume = {32}, pages = {333-342}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{PPPA:95, title = {Measuring Poverty: A New Approach}, publisher = {National Academy Press}, year = {1995}, author = {{Panel on Poverty and Public Assistance}}, address = {Washington, DC}, key = {poverty} } @INBOOK{PPPA:95-2, chapter = {2}, pages = {107-124,140-145}, title = {Measuring Poverty: A New Approach}, publisher = {National Academy Press}, year = {1995}, author = {{Panel on Poverty and Public Assistance}}, address = {Washington, DC}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{Pani:03, title = {Globalization and National Economic Welfare}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, year = {2003}, author = {Panic,M.}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Pani:99, author = {Panizza, Ugo}, title = {On the determinants of fiscal centralization: Theory and evidence}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {74}, pages = {97-139}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Papp:04, author = {Papps,K.}, title = {Income Inequality and Gender in New Zealand, 1998-2003}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2004}, abstract = {A number of authors have documented an increase in earnings or income inequalityin New Zealand during the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period of majoreconomic reform, however no study has evaluated changes in inequality duringthe post-reform era. This paper applies a recently-developed method fordecomposing changes in inequality to New Zealand income and earnings dataand extends it to analyse changes in inequality between men and women.Across the total working-age population, income inequality rose among bothmales and females between 1998 and 2003. In both cases, the majority ofthis was unexplained by changes in the observed determinants of income,however shifts in the distribution of education and the associated returnswere responsible for part of the increase. Among the subset of workers,earnings inequality increased significantly for both genders. Althoughchanges in the returns to measured characteristics contributed to the risein inequality, this as partially offset by changes in the distributionof these characteristics. Between-gender inequality fell with respect toboth samples. In contrast to within-gender inequality, this was largelyexplained by changes in the returns to the observed characteristics. Overall,there is evidence that the male and female income distributions are converging,although both are becoming more dispersed.}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Pare:01, author = {Pareto, V.}, title = {On the Distribution of Wealth and Income}, booktitle = {Roots of the Italian School of Economics and Finance: From Ferrara (1857) to Einaudi (1944)}, publisher = {Palgrave}, year = {2001}, editor = {Baldassarri, M. and Ciocca, P.}, volume = {2}, pages = {231-276}, address = {Houndmills: Palgrave}, key = {Distributions}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.01} } @BOOK{Pareto1972, title = {Manual of Political Economy}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1972}, editor = {Schwier, A. S. and Page, A. N.}, author = {Pareto, V.}, address = {London}, key = {Distributions}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Pare:1896, author = {Pareto, V.}, title = {La courbe de la r{\'e}partition de la richesse}, booktitle = {Recueil publi{\'e} par la Facult{\'e} de Droit {\`a} l'occasion de l'exposition nationale suisse, Geneva 1896}, publisher = {Universit{\'e} de Lausanne}, year = {1896}, editor = {Viret-Genton, Ch.}, pages = {373-387}, address = {Lausanne}, key = {distributions} } @BOOK{Pare:72, title = {Manual of Political Economy}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1972}, author = {Pareto, V.}, address = {London}, note = {Edited by Schwier, A. S. and Page, A. N.}, key = {Distributions} } @BOOK{Pare:65, title = {{\'E}crits sur La Courbe de la Repartition de la Richesse}, publisher = {Librairie Droz}, year = {1965}, author = {Pareto, V.}, volume = {3}, series = {Oeuvres Compl{\`e}tes}, address = {Geneva}, note = {Edited by Busino, G.}, key = {Distributions} } @BOOK{Pare:1897, title = {Cours d'Economie Politique}, year = {1897}, author = {Pareto, V.}, address = {Lausanne, Switzerland}, note = {Vol 2, part I, chapter 1}, key = {distributions} } @INCOLLECTION{Pare:1897III, author = {Pareto, V.}, title = {Cours d'Economie Politique}, year = {1897}, volume = {3}, chapter = {1 (Book 3)}, pages = {299-315}, address = {Lausanne, Switzerland}, note = {Vol 2, part I, chapter 1}, key = {distributions} } @BOOKLET{Pareto1897a, title = {Cours d'Economie Politique}, author = {Pareto, V.}, address = {Lausanne, Switzerland}, year = {1897}, note = {Vol 2, part I, chapter 1}, key = {distributions}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Pareto1896, author = {Pareto, V.}, title = {Ecrits sur la Courbe de la R\'epartition de la Richesse}, booktitle = {Oeuvres compl\`etes de {V}ilfredo {P}areto}, publisher = {Giovanni Busino}, year = {1896}, note = {Librairie Droz, Gen\`eve, 1965}, key = {distributions}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{PaDa:83, author = {Parikha, A. and Das, T.}, title = {Inequality index with differences in inequality aversion for income andpopulation group - Revista Int}, journal = {Econ. Com.}, year = {1983}, volume = {4-5/30}, pages = {362-374}, number = {4-5}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{PaSiSi:98, author = {Park, B. U. and Sickles, R. C. and Simar, L.}, title = {Stochastic panel frontiers: A semiparametric approach}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1998}, volume = {84}, pages = {327-301}, number = {2}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Park2000, author = {Park, E.-U.}, title = {Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: A Further Experimental Study of Framing Effects on Free-Riding}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior}, year = {2000}, key = {Experiments}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Park:00, author = {Park, E.-U.}, title = {Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: A Further Experimental Study of Framing Effectson Free-Riding}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior}, year = {2000}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{Park:99EO, author = {Jin Heum Park}, title = {Estimation of Sheepskin Effects Using the Old and the New Measures of EducationalAttainment in the {Current Population Survey}}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {62}, pages = {237-240}, number = {2}, key = {education,training} } @ARTICLE{Park:83, author = {Park, T. S.}, title = {Relationship Between Personal Income and Adjusted Gross Income, 1977-81}, journal = {Survey of Current Business}, year = {1983}, month = {April}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Park:81, author = {Park, T. S.}, title = {Relationship Between Personal Income and Adjusted Gross Income, 1947-78}, journal = {Survey of Current Business}, year = {1981}, month = {November}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{Park:07, author = {Parker, Jeffrey}, title = {Avoidance Costs in Optimal Penalties}, institution = {George Mason University, School of Law}, year = {2007}, type = {Research Paper}, number = {07-37}, key = {Crime}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Park:99TR, author = {Parker, J.A.}, title = {The Reaction of Household Consumption to Predictable Changes in Social Security Taxes}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {89}, pages = {959-973}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{Park:99TO, author = {Parker, S. C.}, title = {The Optimal Linear Taxation of Employment and Self-Employment Incomes}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {107-123}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Parker:99, author = {Parker, S. C.}, title = {The Generalised Beta as a Model for the Distribution of Earnings}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {62}, pages = {197-200}, number = {2}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Park:97, author = {Parker, Simon C.}, title = {The Distribution of Self-Employment Income in The {U}nited {K}ingdom, 1976-1991}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1996}, volume = {107}, pages = {455-466}, month = {March}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Pars:96, author = {Parsons, Donald O.}, title = {Imperfect 'tagging' in social insurance programs}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {62}, pages = {183-207}, key = {Social insurance} } @TECHREPORT{Parv:98, author = {Parviainen, Seija}, title = {Redistribution and risk sharing in {EMU}}, institution = {Government Institute for Economic Research, VATT}, year = {1998}, type = {Discussion Papers}, number = {159}, address = {Helsinki}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Pasc:99, author = {Pascoa, M.R.}, title = {Determinancy of Equilibria in Nonsmooth Economies}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {289-302}, key = {Micro} } @ARTICLE{PadaCW:99, author = {Pascoa, M. R. and Ribeiro Da Costa Werlang, S.}, title = {Determinancy of Equilibria in Nonsmooth Economies}, journal = {Technical Report}, year = {1999}, volume = {Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia}, key = {Micro} } @ARTICLE{Pash:82, author = {Pashardes, P.}, title = {The representative consumer concept and inequality}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1982}, volume = {49(196)}, pages = {461-469}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Pasi:62, author = {Pasinetti, L. L.}, title = {Rate of Profit and Income Distribution in Relation to the Rate of Economic Growth}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1962}, volume = {29}, pages = {267-279}, key = {income distribution:theoretical}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.05} } @BOOK{PaLoDa:93, title = {A Dictionary of Economics}, publisher = {Collins}, year = {1993}, author = {Pass, Ch. and Lowes, B. and Davies, L.}, address = {London}, key = {dictionary} } @ARTICLE{PaSe:08, author = {Pastor, Jose and Serrano, Lorenzo}, title = {Permanent Income, Convergence and Inequality Among Countries}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2008}, volume = {54}, pages = {105 - 115}, abstract = {The literature on inequality has generally focused on the analysis of annual per capita income. This paper adopts a different approach by considering the life-cycle dimension of inequality and convergence between economies from 1960 to 2000. We analyze the present value of the set of incomes individuals obtain throughout their whole life (permanent income). On the basis of this approach, various simulations are made to determine the effect on inequality in permanent income of variables such as survival rates and the long-run growth rates in current income. The results indicate that survival rates are an important source of inequality. Inequality in permanent income is about one third higher than in current income. The implication of this finding is that if the whole life-cycle dimension is not considered, the level of inequality among economies is being underestimated.}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Patr:86, author = {Patrizi, V.}, title = {Measures of Concealed Employment:Pitfalls and Insights}, journal = {Economia e Lavoro}, year = {1986}, volume = {20}, pages = {91-111}, key = {underground} } @TECHREPORT{PaXu:08, author = {Pattanaik, Prasanta and Reddy, Sanjay and Xu, Yongsheng}, title = {On procedures for measuring deprivation and living standards of societies in a multi-attribute framework}, institution = {Georgia State University, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {08-02}, abstract = {When a society’s overall deprivation or living standard is assessed in a multi-attribute framework, the following procedure is often used. First, for each attribute, a summary index is constructed to reflect a society’s performance in relation to this attribute. Then, an indicator of the overall performance of the society in terms of all the attributes together is constructed. This paper discusses a difficulty associated with this procedure. We show that the difficulty lies in its inability to reconcile two highly attractive ethical principles - the first reflecting a requirement of treating individuals symmetrically and the second reflecting a requirement for equity-sensitivity. This problem implies that this widely-used procedure must lead to possibly untenable conclusions, and that it is necessary to adopt alternative procedures. The alternative procedure must permit describing a society’s overall deprivation or living standard as an aggregate of the comprehensive deprivations or living standards experienced by the individuals in the society.}, key = {Poverty}, keywords = {deprivation, well being, living standards, equity, multiple attributes, anonymity, invariance, human development index, human poverty index.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @TECHREPORT{PaXu:03, author = {Pattanaik, P. and Xu, Y.}, title = {Non-welfaristic Policy Assessment and the Pareto Principle}, institution = {Andrew Young School of Policy Studies}, year = {2003}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {06-07}, address = {Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, U.S.A.}, month = {November}, abstract = {A welfaristic method of policy evaluation focuses exclusively on the e®ect of the policy on individuals' utilities. In contrast, a non-welfaristic way of assessing policies attaches some importance to factors other than the e®ects of policies on individuals' utilities. This paper develops a general framework to examine alternative approaches to policy assessment and their compatibility with the dominance rule underlying the weak Pareto principle.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @ARTICLE{Pauk:73, author = {Paukert, F.}, title = {Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development: A Survey of the Evidence}, journal = {International Labour Review}, year = {1973}, volume = {108}, pages = {97-125}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Paul:04, author = {Paul, S.}, title = {Income sources effects on inequality}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {73}, pages = {435-451}, abstract = {Based on certain desirable properties, a subset of entropy decomposition rules is proposed to assign inequality contributions to different components of income. In addition, a method of assessing the impact on inequality of marginal changes in income components originally applied to Gini index by Lerman and Yitzhaki (The Review of Economics and Statistics 67 (1985) 151) is extended to other measures of inequality. An empirical exercise based on Australian income distribution data illustrates the usefulness of the proposed analytical framework.}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.07.21}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VBV-49SWDB9-3&_user=1177143&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000051857&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=1177143&md5=b99615d64da22719de94ce9ac30681ff} } @ARTICLE{Paul:99, author = {Paul, S.}, title = {The population sub-group income effects on inequality: Analytical framework and an empirical illustration}, journal = {Economic Record}, year = {1999}, volume = {75}, pages = {149-155}, number = {229}, note = {7}, abstract = {A method is developed to examine the population sub-group income effects on inequality using the generalized Theil indices. The proposed method is illustrated by computing the effects of marginal changes in the occupation-specific incomes on per capita income inequality in Australia based on data for 7197 sample households relating to the 1988-89 Household Expenditure Survey conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). The study shows that the growth of (distribution neutral) per capita income in four occupations, namely, unemployed and pensioners, trade-persons, machine operators and laborers, is inequality reducing whereas the growth of per capita income in all other occupations is inequality augmenting. The occupation-specific income effects on between-group inequality are, however, stronger than chose on within-group inequality. These findings are invariant to the choice of alternative distributional weights used in the generalized Theil indices.}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{PaWaZh:00, author = {Paull, G. and Walker, I. and Zhu, Y.}, title = {Child Support Reform : Some Analysis of the 1999 White Paper}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2000}, volume = {21}, pages = {105-140}, key = {redistribution} } @TECHREPORT{PaPe:08, author = {Paulus, A. and Peichl, A.}, title = {Effects of flat tax reforms in Western Europe on equity and efficiency}, institution = {FiFo-CPE}, year = {2008}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {08-4}, abstract = {The flat income tax has become increasingly popular recently, yet its implementation is limited to Eastern Europe. We analyse the distributional and efficiency effects of flat tax scenarios for Western European countries. Our simulations show that flat tax rates required to attain revenue neutrality with existing basic allowances improve labour supply incentives. However, they result in higher inequality and polarisation. Flat rates necessary to keep the inequality levels unchanged allow for some scope for flat taxes to increase both equity and efficiency. Our analysis suggests that Mediterranean countries are more likely to benefit from flat taxes.}, key = {tax reform}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @ARTICLE{Paul:72, author = {Pauly, M. V.}, title = {Income redistribution as a local public good}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1973}, volume = {2}, pages = {35-58}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.02.27} } @ARTICLE{Paul:70CA, author = {Pauly, M. V.}, title = {Cores and Clubs}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {1970}, volume = {9}, pages = {53-65}, key = {clubs} } @ARTICLE{Paul:70OP, author = {Pauly, M. V.}, title = {Optimality, `Public' Goods and Local Governments: A General TheoreticalAnalysis}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1970}, volume = {78}, pages = {572-585}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Pauly1970, author = {Pauly, M. V.}, title = {Optimality, `Public' Goods and Local Governments: A General Theoretical Analysis}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1970}, volume = {78}, pages = {572-585}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Pauw:93, author = {Wilfried Pauwels}, title = {The Implicit Welfare Weights Used When Maximizing Aggregate Surplus}, journal = {Journal of Economics - Zeitschrift fur Nationalokomie}, year = {1993}, volume = {57}, pages = {261-277}, number = {3}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Paxs:93, author = {Paxson, C.H.}, title = {Consumption and Income Seasonality in Thailand}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1993}, volume = {101}, pages = {39-72}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{Paxs:92, author = {Paxson, C. H.}, title = {Using weather variability to estimate the response of savings to transitory income in Thailand}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1992}, volume = {82}, pages = {15-33}, key = {saving}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.10.05} } @ARTICLE{PaSc:74, author = {Pazner, E. A. and Schmeidler, D.}, title = {A Difficulty in the Concept of Fairness}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1974}, volume = {41}, pages = {441--443}, number = {3}, month = {July}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{PaSc:78, author = {Pazner, E. and Schmeidler, D.}, title = {Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1978}, volume = {92}, pages = {671-687}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Pazner1978, author = {Pazner, E. and Schmeidler, D.}, title = {Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity}, journal = {Quarterly Journalof Economics}, year = {1978}, volume = {92}, pages = {671-687}, key = {equity}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Pazo:94, author = {Pazos, M.}, title = {Variabilidad Semanal de los Gastos en la {EPF}}, journal = {Estad\'{\i}stica Espa{\~n}ola}, year = {1994}, volume = {36}, pages = {431-440}, key = {STATISTICS} } @ARTICLE{Pazos1994, author = {Pazos, M.}, title = {Variabilidad Semanal de los Gastos en la {EPF}}, journal = {Estad\'{\i}stica Espa\~nola}, year = {1994}, volume = {36}, pages = {431-440}, key = {STATISTICS}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Peabody1990, author = {Peabody, R. L. and Webb Hammond, S. and Torcom, J. and Brown, L. P. and Thompson, C. and Kolodny, R.}, title = {Interviewing Political Elites}, journal = {Political Science and Politics}, year = {1990}, pages = {451-455}, key = {political economy}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{PeHaToBrThKo:90, author = {Peabody, R. L. and Webb Hammond, S. and Torcom, J. and Brown, L. P. andThompson, C. and Kolodny, R.}, title = {Interviewing Political Elites}, journal = {Political Science and Politics}, year = {1990}, pages = {451-455}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{PeSh:82, author = {Peacock, A. T. and Shaw, G. K.}, title = {Tax evasion and tax revenue loss}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1982}, volume = {37}, pages = {269-278}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{Pear:83, title = {Macmillan Dictionary of Modern Economics}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1983}, author = {Pearce, D.}, address = {London}, key = {dictionary} } @ARTICLE{BeGlJa:00, author = {Pearse, P. and Glomm, G. and Janeba, E.}, title = {Why Poor Countries Rely Mostly on Redistribution In-Kind}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {75}, pages = {463-482}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Peck:98, author = {Peck, Richard M.}, title = {The inefficiency of the poll tax}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {67}, pages = {241-252}, number = {2}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Peco:99, author = {Paul Pecorino}, title = {The Effect of Group Size on Public Good Provision in a Repeated Game Setting}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {121-134}, number = {1}, abstract = {The ability to cooperate in the provision of a public good is analyzed ina repeated game. Holding the level of provision fixed, with quasi-linearutility we find that the critical value of the discount parameter convergesto 0 in the limit. Thus, cooperation is feasible in a large market. Next,we allow the level cooperation to be adjusted optimally as the group sizeincreases, both for a specific form of quasi-linear utility and for Cobb--Douglasutility. In each case, we find that there are admissible values of thediscount parameter such that cooperation may be maintained in the limit.}, key = {public goods} } @TECHREPORT{PeTe:08, author = {Pecorino, P. and Temimi, A.}, title = {Lotteries, Public Good Provision and the Degree of Rivalry}, institution = {University of Alabama}, year = {2008}, type = {Research Paper}, number = {08-08-01}, abstract = {Under the standard summation technology, pure public goods can be provided via the direct contributions mechanism, even in an arbitrarily large group. However, if the public good exhibits any degree of rivalry, individual consumption of the public good will fall to zero as group size grows large. Thus, the direct contributions mechanism is not robust to the introduction of rivalry. By contrast, Morgan's (2000) lottery mechanism is robust to the introduction of rivalry when the lottery prize is proportional to group size. The lottery mechanism can provide public goods in a large group when the public good exhibits a degree of rivalry, provided that the degree of rivalry is not too high. This suggests that the lottery mechanism can provide a broader range of public goods in a large group than the direct contributions mechanism.}, key = {public good}, owner = {Zhang Zhijun}, timestamp = {2000.09.30} } @ARTICLE{PeTe:07, author = {Pecorino, P. and Temimi,A.}, title = {Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {9}, pages = {451-465}, number = {3}, abstract = {We analyze the effect of group size on public good provision under the Morgan (2000) lottery mechanism. For a pure public good, the lottery performs quite well as public good provision is found to increase in group size, even when the lottery prize is held constant. By contrast, for fully rival public goods, per capita provision is found to decrease in group size, even when the lottery prize is proportional to group size. Further, the per capita level of provision will approach zero when group size is sufficiently large.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{PeSa:03, author = {Pedersen, C. S. and Satchell, S.}, title = {Utility Functions whose Parameters depend on Initial Wealth}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {2003}, volume = {55}, pages = {357-378}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{PeLu:07, author = {Pekkala, Sari and Lucas, Robert}, title = {Differences across Cohorts in Finnish Intergenerational Income Mobility}, journal = {Industrial Relations}, year = {2007}, volume = {46}, pages = {81- 111}, abstract = {Trends in intergenerational economic mobility in Finland are analyzed using panel data from 1950 through 1999 on more than 250,000 sons and daughters born between 1930 and 1970. A significant decline is estimated in the intergenerational transmission elasticity from the 1930 birth cohort until the baby boom cohorts of the early 1950s. After that we observed no increase in the extent of mobility for 1950s and 1960s birth cohorts, but rather the reverse. The result holds both for sons and daughters. A decomposition of the intergenerational transmission elasticities across cohorts shows that most of the early decline in transmission reflected a drop in the influence of parental income on the children’s earnings that operated through investments in the child’s schooling. This early pattern is postulated to reflect the phases of secondary educational expansion at the time. Throughout, a rise is estimated in the intergenerational transmission elasticity with age at which sons and daughters are observed. This has also been noted in prior U.S. studies and, at least in this Finnish context, this seems to result almost entirely from rising estimated returns to education with age.}, key = {Mobility}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @TECHREPORT{PeSu:98, author = {Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudholter}, title = {The Positive Prekernel of a Cooperative Game}, institution = {The Edmund Landau Center for Research in Mathematical Analysis,Instituteof Mathematics, University of Jerusalem}, year = {1998}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {No. 10}, address = {Jerusalem}, month = {February}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{PeWa:00, author = {Pelloni , Alessandra and Waldmann, Robert}, title = {Can Waste Improve Welfare?}, journal = {Journal Of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {77}, pages = {45-79}, key = {Welfare} } @ARTICLE{Pe:00, author = {Peltzman, Sam}, title = {Prices Rise Faster than They Fall}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2000}, volume = {108}, pages = {466--502}, number = {3}, abstract = {Output prices tend to respond faster to input increases than to decreases. This tendency is found in more than two of every three markets examined. It is found as frequently in producer goods markets as in consumer goods markets. In both kinds of markets the asymmetric response to cost shocks is substantial and durable. On average, the immediate response to a positive cost shock is at least twice the response to a negative shock, and that difference is sustained for at least five to eight months. Unlike past studies, which documented similar asymmetries in selected markets (gasoline, agricultural products, etc.), this one uses large samples of diverse products: 77 consumer and 165 producer goods. Accordingly, the results suggest a gap in an essential part of economic theory. As a start on filling this gap, the study finds no asymmetry in the response of an individual decision maker (a supermarket chain) to its costs, but it finds above-average asymmetry where a cost shock is filtered through a fragmented wholesale distribution system. It also finds a negative correlation between the degree of asymmetry and input price volatility and no correlation with proxies for inventory costs, asymmetric menu costs of price changes, and imperfect competition.}, copyright = {Copyright © 2000 The University of Chicago Press}, issn = {00223808}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Jun., 2000}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press} } @BOOK{Pen:74, title = {Income Distribution}, publisher = {Allen Lane, The Penguin Press}, year = {1974}, author = {Pen, J.}, address = {London}, edition = {second}, key = {inequality} } @INBOOK{Pen:74-3, chapter = {3}, pages = {48-59}, title = {Income Distribution}, publisher = {Allen Lane, The Penguin Press}, year = {1974}, author = {Pen, J.}, address = {London}, edition = {second}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Pen:71, title = {Income Distribution}, publisher = {Allen Lane, The Penguin Press}, year = {1971}, author = {Pen, J.}, address = {London}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Penc:07, author = {Pencavel,J.}, title = {Earnings Inequality, Labour Supply and Schooling in Husband-Wife Families}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {59}, pages = {83-124}, abstract = {This paper describes the association between market work and earnings inequality across families over the life cycle and over calendar time with special attention to the different experiences of collegeeducated and high-school-educated people. A concise and effective accounting framework is developed that allows for an assessment of the effect of the growing market employment of married women on family earnings inequality. Applying this framework to pseudo-panel data from successive Current Population Surveys indicates that the increase in wives’ employment has diminished the growth in family earnings inequality especially for well-educated couples. Inferences about the level and change in earnings inequality depend on the degree of labor market attachment of the people studied especially in the case of wives.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @INCOLLECTION{Penc:86, author = {Pencavel, J. H.}, title = {Labor supply of men: a survey}, booktitle = {Handbook of Labor Economics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1986}, editor = {Ashenfelter, O. C. and Layard, P. R. G.}, volume = {1}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Pencavel1986, author = {Pencavel, J. H.}, title = {Labor supply of men: a survey}, journal = {Handbook of Labor Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {1}, address = {Amsterdam}, editor = {Ashenfelter, O. C. and Layard, P. R. G.}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {North Holland}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Penc:79, author = {Pencavel, J. H.}, title = {A note on income tax evasion, labor supply and nonlinear tax schedules}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1979}, volume = {12}, pages = {115-124}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Pend:02, author = {Pendakur, K.}, title = {Taking Prices Seriously in the Measurement of Inequality}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {86}, pages = {47-69}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Penn:00, author = {Pennings, E.}, title = {Taxes and Stimuli of Investment Under Uncertainty}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2000}, volume = {44}, pages = {383-391}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Pepp:02, author = {Pepper, J. V.}, title = {Robust Inferences from Random Clustered Samples: An Application Using Datafrom the Panel Study of Income Dynamics}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2002}, volume = {75}, pages = {341-345}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Pepper2002, author = {Pepper, J. V.}, title = {Robust Inferences from Random Clustered Samples: An Application Using Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2002}, volume = {75}, pages = {341-345}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Pera:02, author = {Peragine, V.}, title = {Opportunity, Egalitarianism and Income Inequality}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2002}, volume = {44}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{PeSaSu:99, author = {Josep E. Peris and M. Carmen Sanchez and Begona Subiza}, title = {Revealed Preference Axioms for Continuous Rational Choice}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {30}, pages = {275-284}, number = {3}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Perl:98, title = {Microeconomics}, publisher = {Addison-Wesley}, year = {1998}, author = {Jeffrey M. Perloff}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{PaSo:00, author = {Perraudin, W. R. M. and Sorensen, B. E.}, title = {The demand for risky assets: Sample selection and household portfolios}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {97}, pages = {117-144}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Perr:88, author = {Perron, P.}, title = {Trends and random walks in macroeconomic time series : Further evidence from a new approach}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1988}, volume = {12}, pages = {297-332}, abstract = {This paper presents a summary of recent work on a new methodology to test for the presence of a unit root in univariate time series models. The stochastic framework is quite general. While the Dickey-Fuller approach accounts for the autocorrelation of the first-differences of a series in a parametric fashion by estimating additional nuisance parameters, this new approach deals with this phenomenon in a nonparametric way. We apply these new tests to reassess recent findings on the behavior of common macroeconomic time series, including the various series studied by Nelson and Plosser (1982).}, key = {macroeconomics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{Pers:92, author = {Persky, J.}, title = {Retrospectives: {P}areto's Law}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1992}, volume = {6}, pages = {181-192}, number = {2}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Pers:08, author = {Persons,W.}, title = {The variability in the distribution of wealth and income}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1908-9}, pages = {416-449}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Persons1908, author = {Persons, W. M.}, title = {The variability in the distribution of wealth and income}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1908}, volume = {23}, pages = {416-449}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{PeWi:84, author = {Persson, M. and Wissen, P.}, title = {Redistributional effects of tax evasion}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1984}, volume = {86}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Pers:98, author = {Persson, T.}, title = {Economic Policy and special interest politics}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1998}, volume = {108}, pages = {310-327}, number = {447}, month = {March}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{PeRoTa:98, author = {Persson, T. and Roland, G. and Tabellini, G.}, title = {Towards micropolitical foundations of public finance}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {685-694}, number = {3-5}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{PeTa:01, title = {Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {2001}, author = {Persson, T. and Tabellini, G.}, address = {Five Cambridge Center, Cambridge, MA 02142-1493, U.S.A.}, key = {economic policy} } @ARTICLE{PeTa:99, author = {Persson, T. and Tabellini, G.}, title = {The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {699-735}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{PeTa:96, author = {Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido}, title = {Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1996}, volume = {64}, pages = {623-646}, number = {3}, month = {May}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{PeTa:96a, author = {Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido}, title = {Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1996}, volume = {104}, pages = {979-1009}, number = {5}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{PeTa:94, author = {Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido}, title = {Does centralization increase the size of government?}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1994}, volume = {38}, pages = {765-773}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Pesa:04, author = {Pesaran,M.}, title = {A Pair-Wise Approach to Testing for Output and Growth Convergence}, institution = {Cambridge University}, year = {2004}, abstract = {This paper proposes a pair-wise approach to testing for output convergencethat considers all N(N -1)/2 possible pairs of log per capita output gapsacross N economies. A general probabilistic definition of output convergenceis also proposed, which suggests that all such output gap pairs must bestationary with a constant mean. The approach is compatible with individualoutput series having unit roots, does not involve the choice of a referencecountry in computation of output gaps, and can be applied when N is largerelative to T (the time dimension of the panel). The proposed test is appliedto output series in the Penn World Tables over 1950-2000, as well as toMaddion’s historical series over 1870-2000. Overall, the results do notsupport output convergence, and suggest that the findings of convergenceclubs in the literature might be spurious. However, significant evidenceof growth convergence is found, a result which is reasonably robust tothe choice of the sample period and country groupings. Non-convergenceof log per capita outputs combined with growth convergence suggests thatwhile common technological progress seems to have been di.using reasonablywidely across economies, there are nevertheless important country-specificfactors (for example, wars, famines, revolutions, regime and institutionalchanges) that render output gaps highly persistent, such that we can notbe sure that the probability for the output gaps to lie within a fixedrange will be non-zero.}, key = {growth} } @INCOLLECTION{Pest:85, author = {Pestieau, P.}, title = {Belgium's irregular economy}, booktitle = {The Economics of the Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1985}, editor = {Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A.}, address = {Berlin, Germany}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{PePoSl:98, author = {Pestieau, Pierre and Possen, Uri M. and Slutsky, Steven M.}, title = {The value of explicit randomization in the tax code}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {67}, pages = {87-103}, number = {1}, month = {January}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Pete:08a, author = {Peter, K. S.}, title = {Income Tax Flattening: Does it Help Reduce the Shadow Economy}, institution = {Andrew Young School of Policy Studies}, year = {2008}, type = {Research Paper}, number = {08-09}, abstract = {This paper examines the effect of global transition to simpler, flatter income tax systems on the size of the shadow economy. By offering a new estimation framework, the paper revives the traditional electricity consumption approach to measuring the shadow economy. It overcomes the limitations of previous literature by using a new functional form, better quality data, a larger sample of 170 countries, a longer time span of 25 years, a panel framework, and instrumental variables. Our analysis provides strong evidence of a positive relationship between income tax rates and the size of the shadow economy. The effects of structural progressivity and complexity of national tax schedules are also found to be positive and statistically significant. These positive effects are reinforced when tax changes are accompanied by improving government services and strengthening legal system. The flat tax is estimated to reduce the shadow economy in the short run, but this effect diminishes and disappears in the long run.}, key = {shadow economy}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.09.14} } @TECHREPORT{Pete:08b, author = {Peter, K. S.}, title = {Falling Tax Evasion: How Much Can Tax Rates and Labor Regulations Explain?}, institution = {Andrew Young School of Policy Studies}, year = {2008}, type = {Research Paper}, number = {08-10}, abstract = {The study examines if recent reforms in taxation and labor regulations in several transition and developing countries contributed to the observed decline in tax evasion. It uses the Business Environment and Economic Performance Survey, a unified firm survey in 33 countries conducted in 1999-2005. The paper finds a strong positive and statistically significant effect of various measures of taxation and regulation on sales underreporting.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.09.14} } @ARTICLE{Peter1996, author = {Wakker Peter}, title = {The sure-thing principle and the comonotonic sure-thing principle: An axiomatic analysis}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {25}, pages = {213-227}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Wakk:96, author = {Wakker Peter}, title = {The sure-thing principle and the comonotonic sure-thing principle: An axiomaticanalysis}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {25}, pages = {213-227}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Pete:82, author = {Petersen, H.-G.}, title = {Size of the public sector, economic growth and the informal economy}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1982}, volume = {18}, pages = {191-215}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Pfef:91, author = {Pfeffermann,D.}, title = {Estimation and Seasonal Adjustment of Population Means Using Data from RepeatedSurveys}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1991}, volume = {9}, pages = {163-175}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Pfeffermann1991, author = {Pfeffermann,D.}, title = {Estimation and Seasonal Adjustment of Population Means Using Data from Repeated Surveys}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1991}, volume = {9}, pages = {163-175}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Pfin:88MO, author = {Pfingsten, A.}, title = {Measures of tax progression: An axiomatic approach}, booktitle = {Measurement in Economics}, publisher = {Physica Verlag}, year = {1988}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Pfin:99, author = {Pfingsten, Andreas}, title = {Cheating by groups and cheating over time in surplus sharing problems}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1999}, volume = {36}, pages = {243-250}, number = {3}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{Pfin:88c, author = {Pfingsten, A.}, title = {Empirical investigation of inequality concepts: A method and first results}, institution = {Karlsruhe University}, year = {1988}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Pfin:88PT, author = {Pfingsten, A.}, title = {Progressive Taxation and Redistributive Taxation: Different Labels for theSame Product?}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1988}, volume = {5}, pages = {235-246}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Pfingsten1988, author = {Pfingsten, A.}, title = {Progressive Taxation and Redistributive Taxation: Different Labels for the Same Product?}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1988}, volume = {5}, pages = {235-246}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Pfin:87, author = {Pfingsten, A.}, title = {Axiomatically Based Local Measures of Tax Progression}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {39}, pages = {211-223}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Pfingsten1987, author = {Pfingsten, A.}, title = {Axiomatically bases local measures of tax progression}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {39}, pages = {211-223}, number = {7}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Pfin:86a, author = {Pfingsten, A.}, title = {New concepts of {L}orenz domination and risk aversion}, year = {1986}, type = {Discussion Paper 278}, address = {Karlsruhe}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Pfin:86b, author = {Pfingsten, A.}, title = {The measurement of tax progression}, journal = {Studies in Contemporary Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {20}, address = {Berlin-Heidelberg-NewYork}, key = {public economics}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag} } @ARTICLE{Pfin:85, author = {Pfingsten, A.}, title = {Distributionally neutral tax changes for different inequality concepts}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1985}, volume = {30}, pages = {385-393}, key = {public economics} } @INCOLLECTION{PfSc:94, author = {Pfingsten, A. and Schneider, J.}, title = {Retrieving Inequality Concepts and Progressivity Objectives from Tax Functionsvia Approximations}, booktitle = {Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, pages = {316-325}, key = {public economics} } @INCOLLECTION{Pfah:88, author = {Pf{\"a}hler, W.}, title = {Distributional equity and measurement of tax progressivity}, booktitle = {Measurement in Economics}, publisher = {Physica Verlag}, year = {1988}, editor = {Eichhorn , W.}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Pfah:91, author = {Pf{\"a}hler, W.}, title = {A general class of aggregate progressivity measures revisited: reply}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1991}, volume = {46}, pages = {161-162}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Pfah:87, author = {Pf{\"a}hler , W.}, title = {Redistibutive effects of tax progressivity: evaluating a general class ofaggregate measures}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1987}, volume = {42}, pages = {1-37}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Pfah:87a, author = {Pf{\"a}hler, W.}, title = {Redistribution effects of tax progressivity: a reply}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1987}, volume = {42}, pages = {446-447}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Pfahler1987a, author = {Pf{\"a}hler , W.}, title = {Redistibutive effects of tax progressivity: evaluating a general class of aggregate measures}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1987}, volume = {42}, pages = {1-37}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Pfah:85, author = {Pf{\"a}hler, W.}, title = {Relative concentration curve: Functional form and measures of non-proportionality}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {37}, pages = {201-211}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Pfah:83, author = {Pf{\"a}hler, W.}, title = {Measuring redistributional effects of tax progressivity by {L}orenz curves}, journal = {Jahrb{\"u}cher f{\"u}r National{\"o}konomie und Statistik}, year = {1983}, pages = {237-249}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Pfahler1983, author = {Pf{\"a}hler, W.}, title = {Measuring redistributional effects of tax progressivity by {L}orenz curves}, journal = {Jahrb\"ucher f\"ur National\"okonomie und Statistik}, year = {1983}, pages = {237-249}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Phel:73, author = {Phelps, E. S.}, title = {Taxation of wage income for economic justice}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1973}, volume = {87}, pages = {331-345}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Phel:73EJ, title = {Economic Justice}, publisher = {Penguin}, year = {1973}, author = {Phelps, E. S.}, address = {Harmondsworth}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{PhMa:99, author = {Philipson, T. and Malani, A.}, title = {Measurement Errors: A Principal Investigator-Agent Approach}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1999}, volume = {91}, pages = {273-298}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{PhSn:98, author = {Phillips, Kerk L. and Snow, Karl}, title = {The forward bias: is it a money tree?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {61}, pages = {373-379}, number = {3}, key = {finance} } @ARTICLE{Phip:90, author = {Phipps, S.,}, title = {The Impact of the Unemployment Insurance Reform of 1990 on Single Earners,}, journal = {Canadian Public Policy,}, year = {1990}, volume = {3,}, pages = {252-61,}, number = {16,}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{PhBu:98, author = {Phipps, Shelly A. and Burton, Peter S.}, title = {What's mine is yours? The influence of male and female incomes on patternsof household expenditure}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {599-613}, number = {260}, month = {November}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{PhGa:94, author = {Phipps, S. and Garner, T. I.}, title = {Are {E}quivalence {S}cales the {S}ame for the {U}nited {S}tates and {C}anada?}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1994}, volume = {40}, pages = {1-18}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Piac:08, author = {Piachaud, D.}, title = {Poverty and inequality: Labour in the 1970s}, journal = {Benefits}, year = {2008}, volume = {16}, pages = {147-156}, number = {2}, abstract = {The Wilson and Callaghan Labour governments of 1974-79 have been widely vilified. Their record on poverty and inequality is examined in terms of expectations and achievements. Outcomes for the elderly, children and disabled people are examined and the distribution of earnings and income and the extent of poverty are assessed. The record of a modest reduction in poverty and little change in inequality are in marked contrast with the increases of the preceding and succeeding Conservative governments. Lessons of continuing relevance are drawn concerning the central role of redistribution.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.06} } @BOOK{Pies:75, title = {Statistische {K}onzentrationsmasse}, publisher = {J.C.B. Mohr-Paul Siebeck}, year = {1975}, author = {Piesch, W.}, address = {T{\"u}bingen}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Piesch1975, title = {Statistische {K}onzentrationsmasse}, publisher = {J.C.B. Mohr-Paul Siebeck}, year = {1975}, author = {Piesch, W.}, address = {T\"ubingen}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Piet:15, author = {Pietra, G.}, title = {Delle Relazione tra Indici di Variabilit{\`a}}, journal = {Atti del Reale Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti}, year = {1915}, volume = {74}, pages = {775-804}, note = {Note I e II}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Pigo:52, title = {The Economics of Welfare}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1952}, author = {Pigou, A. C.}, address = {London}, edition = {4th}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Pigo:26, title = {A Study of Public Finance}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1926}, author = {Pigou, A. C.}, address = {London}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Pigo:12, title = {Wealth and Welfare}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1912}, author = {Pigou, A. C.}, address = {London}, key = {welfare} } @INBOOK{Pigo:12-2, chapter = {2}, pages = {14-32}, title = {Wealth and Welfare}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1912}, author = {Pigou, A. C.}, address = {London}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{Pike:00TO, author = {Piketty, T.}, title = {Theories of persistent inequalities}, booktitle = {Handbook of Income Distribution}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {2000}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Bourguignon, F.}, chapter = {6}, pages = {429-476}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @INCOLLECTION{Pike:07, author = {Piketty, T.}, title = {Top Incomes over the Twentieth Century: A Summary of the Main Findings}, booktitle = {Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast Between Continental European and English-Speaking Countries}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.07.31} } @INCOLLECTION{Pike:07IW, author = {Piketty, T.}, title = {Income, wage and wealth inequality in {F}rance, 1901-98}, booktitle = {Top Incomes over the 20th Century: A contrast between continental {E}uropean and {E}nglish-speaking countries}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, chapter = {1}, pages = {43-81}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.27} } @INCOLLECTION{Pike:07TI, author = {Piketty, T.}, title = {Top incomes over the 20th century: A summary of main findings}, booktitle = {Top Incomes over the 20th Century: A contrast between continental {E}uropean and {E}nglish-speaking countries}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, chapter = {1}, pages = {1-17}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.27} } @ARTICLE{Pike:03II, author = {Piketty, T.}, title = {Income Inequality in {F}rance, 1901-1998}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2003}, volume = {111}, pages = {1004-1042}, abstract = {This paper uses data from income tax returns (1915–98), wage tax returns(1919–98), and inheritance tax returns (1902–94) in order to compute homogeneous,yearly estimates of income, wage, and wealth inequality for twentieth-centuryFrance. The main conclusion is that the decline in income inequality thattook place during the first half of the century was mostly accidental.In France, and possibly in a number of other countries as well, wage inequalityhas been extremely stable in the long run, and the secular decline in incomeinequality is for the most part a capital income phenomenon. Holders oflarge fortunes were badly hurt by major shocks during the 1914–45 period,and they were never able to fully recover from these shocks, probably becauseof the dynamic effects of progressive taxation on capital accumulationand pretax income inequality.}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{Pike:01II, author = {Piketty, T.}, title = {Income Inequality in {F}rance, 1901-1998}, institution = {CEPR}, year = {2001}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {2876}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {Inequality} } @BOOK{Pike:01LH, title = {Les hauts revenus en {F}rance au 20eme si{\`e}cle - In{\'e}galit{\'e}s et redistributions,1901-1998}, publisher = {Editions Grasset}, year = {2001}, author = {Piketty, T.}, address = {Paris}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Pike:99CF, author = {Piketty, T.}, title = {Can Fiscal Redistribution Undo Skill-Biased Technical Change? Evidence fromthe {F}rench Experience}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {853-865}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Pike:99TI, author = {Piketty, T.}, title = {The Information-Aggregation Approach to Political Institutions}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {791-800}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{Piketty1999a, author = {Piketty, T.}, title = {Can Fiscal Redistribution Undo Skill-Biased Technical Change? Evidence from the {F}rench Experience}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {853-865}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Pike:98SB, author = {Piketty, Thomas}, title = {Self-Fulfilling Beliefs About Social Status}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {70}, pages = {115-132}, number = {1}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Pike:97, author = {Piketty, Thomas}, title = {The Dynamics of the Wealth Distribution and the Interest Rate with CreditRationing}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {173-189}, number = {2}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Pike:95, author = {Piketty, T.}, title = {Social Mobility and redistributive politics}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1995}, volume = {110}, pages = {551-583}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{PiSa:07, author = {Piketty, T. and Saez, E.}, title = {How Progressive is the {U.S.} Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2007}, volume = {21}, pages = {3-24}, abstract = {Over the last 40 years, the U.S. federal tax system has undergone three striking changes, each of which seems to move the federal tax system in the direction of less progressivity. First, there has been a dramatic decline in top marginal individual income tax rates. In the early 1960s, the statutory individual income tax rate applied to the marginal dollar of the highest incomes was 91 percent. This marginal tax rate on the highest incomes declined to 28 percent by 1988, increased significantly to 39.6 percent in 1993, and fell to 35 percent as of 2003. Second, corporate income taxes as a fraction of gross domestic product have fallen by half, from around 3.5– 4.0 percent of GDP in the early 1960s to less than 2 percent of GDP in the early 2000s (for example, Auerbach, 2006). Meanwhile, corporate profits as a share of GDP have not declined over the period, suggesting that capital owners—who are disproportionately of above-average incomes—earn relatively more net of taxes today than in the 1960s. Third, there has been a substantial increase in payroll tax rates financing Social Security retirement benefits and Medicare. The combined employee–employer payroll tax rate on labor income has increased from 6 percent in the early 1960s to over 15 percent in the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, the Social Security payroll tax applies only up to a cap—equal to $90,000 of annual earnings in 2005—and is therefore a relatively smaller tax burden as incomes rise above the cap. However, the conclusion that these three changes have reduced the progressivity of the federal tax system is less obvious than it may at first appear. For example, in the case of the individual income tax, the numerous deductions and exemptions mean that the tax rates listed in the tax tables might be a poor measure of the actual tax burden faced by each income group. In addition, some forms of income, such as capital gains, have traditionally faced lower tax rates; this benefits disproportionately high-income taxpayers. In the case of the corporate income tax, there are competing theories about who bears the burden of the tax: for example, does it reduce returns for stockholders or reduce the returns on other assets such as bonds or pensions of future retirees; is it paid by workers in the form or lower wages or is it paid by consumers in the form of higher prices? We begin this paper by using the large public micro-file tax return data to estimate the current progressivity of the U.S. federal tax system, which essentially includes individual and corporate income taxes, estate taxes, and payroll taxes. We will lay out what we think are the most plausible and simple assumptions about the incidence of taxes based on previous work. We will then look at trends in the progressivity of the U.S. tax system from 1960 to the present. Throughout this discussion, we will pay particular attention to small groups at the top of the income distribution, who often represent a significant fraction of aggregate income and aggregate taxes paid, and who often face tax rules that have their main impact at the top of the income distribution. Government agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Congressional Budget Office produce annual statistics on tax progressivity in the United States. Our approach differs from the IRS statistics (Parisi, 2004–05; Strudler, Petska, and Petska, 2005), because those statistics ignore other federal taxes such as the corporate income tax, the estate tax, or payroll taxes. Our approach differs from the Congressional Budget Office (2001) statistics because we focus primarily on top incomes while they focus primarily on income quintiles.1 Our approach also differs from classic comprehensive studies of tax progressivity like Pechman and Okner (1974), Pechman (1985), or Kasten, Sammartino, and Toder (1994), because our more basic method does not incorporate state and local taxes and we ignore government transfers. However, we provide progressivity results for over 40 years, while previous studies have focused on a few years at most. We will then contrast the U.S. results with the experience from other countries. Using a similar (if simplified) methodology, we will present progressivity results for the tax systems of France and the United Kingdom.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @TECHREPORT{PiSa:06, author = {Piketty,T. and Saez,E.}, title = {How Progressive is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2006}, type = {working paper}, number = {12404}, abstract = {This paper provides estimates of federal tax rates by income groups in the United States since 1960, with special emphasis on very top income groups. We include individual and corporate income taxes, payroll taxes, and estate and gift taxes. The progressivity of the U.S. federal tax system at the top of the income distribution has declined dramatically since the 1960s. This dramatic drop in progressivity is due primarily to a drop in corporate taxes and in estate and gift taxes combined with a sharp change in the composition of top incomes away from capital income and toward labor income. The sharp drop in statutory top marginal individual income tax rates has contributed only moderately to the decline in tax progressivity. International comparisons confirm that is it critical to take into account other taxes than the individual income tax to properly assess the extent of overall tax progressivity, both for time trends and for cross-country comparisons. The pattern for the United Kingdom is similar to the US pattern. France had less progressive taxes than the US or UK in 1970 but has experienced an increase in tax progressivity and has now a more progressive tax system than the US or the UK.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{PiSa:06ET, author = {Piketty, T. and Saez, E.}, title = {The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and International Perspective}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {11955}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138}, month = {January}, abstract = {This paper summarizes the main findings of the recent studies that have constructed top income and wealth shares series over the century for a number of countries using tax statistics. Most countries experience a dramatic drop in top income shares in the first part of the century due to a precipitous drop in large wealth holdings during the wars and depression shocks. Top income shares do not recover in the immediate post war decades. However, over the last 30 years, top income shares have increased substantially in English speaking countries but not at all in continental Europe countries or Japan. This increase is due to an unprecedented surge in top wage incomes starting in the 1970s and accelerating in the 1990s. As a result, top wage earners have replaced capital income earners at the top of the income distribution in English speaking countries. We discuss the proposed explanations and the main questions that remain open.}, key = {income distribution}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{PiSa:03, author = {Piketty, T. and Saez, E.}, title = {Income Inequality in the {United States}, 1913-1998}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {118}, pages = {1-39}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{PinRu:05, title = {Microeconomics}, publisher = {Pearson Prentice Hall}, year = {2005}, author = {Pindyck, R. S. and Rubinfeld, D. L.}, pages = {720}, edition = {6}, key = {micro}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.03.22} } @BOOK{PiSaZi:98, title = {Topics in Public Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Pines, David and Sadka, Efraim and Zilcha, Itzhak}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{PiSe:06, author = {Pirtill{\"a}, J. and Selin, H.}, title = {How Successful is the Dual Income Tax? Evidence of the Finnish Tax Reform of 1993}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1875}, month = {December}, note = {CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE}, abstract = {Dual income tax systems have become increasingly popular; yet, relatively little is known about the consequences of implementing such tax systems. This paper uses a representative panel of taxpayers from the 1993 Finnish tax reform to measure how overall taxable income and the relative shares of capital income and labour income reacted to the reform. The Finnish tax reform appears to be particularly suitable for analysing the effect of separating labour and capital income tax bases. The reform radically reduced the marginal tax rates on capital income to some, but not all, taxpayers, while the taxation of labour income was not reformed at the same time. We find that the reform led to a small positive impact on overall taxable income, but part of the positive response was probably offset by income shifting among the self-employed.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{PiTu:04, author = {Pirttila,J. and Tuomala,M.}, title = {Poverty alleviation and tax policy}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2004}, volume = {48}, pages = {1075-1090}, abstract = {This paper examines public good provision and tax policy-optimal non-linearincome taxation and linear commodity taxation-when the government departsfrom purely welfarist objective function and seeks to minimise poverty.This assumption re2ects much policy discussion and may help understandsome divergences of practical tax policy from lessons in optimal tax analysis.In contrast to Atkinson and Stiglitz (J. Public Econom. 6 (1976) 55), itmay be optimal to use differentiated commodity tax rates, including thetaxation of savings, even if preferences are separable in goods and leisure.The optimal e8ective marginal tax rate at the bottom of the distributionmay be negative, suggesting that wage subsidy schemes can be optimal. Finally,optimal provision of a public good is analysed under poverty minimisation.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Pirttila2001, author = {Pirttila, J. and Tuomala, M.}, title = {On Optimal Non-Linear Taxation and Public Good Provision in an Overlapping Generations Economy}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, pages = {485-501}, key = {Optimal taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{PiTu:01, author = {Pirttila, J. and Tuomala, M.}, title = {On Optimal Non-Linear Taxation and Public Good Provision in an OverlappingGenerations Economy}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, pages = {485-501}, key = {Optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{Pisc:95, author = {Pischke, J.-S.}, title = {Individual Income, Incomplete Information, and Aggregate Consumption}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1995}, volume = {63}, pages = {805-840}, abstract = {Individual income is much more variable than aggregate per capita income. I argue that aggregate information is therefore not very important for individual consumption decisions and study models of life-cycle consumption in which individuals react optimally to their own income process but have incomplete or no information on economy-wide variables. Since individual income is less persistent than aggregate income consumers will react too little to aggregate income variation. Aggregate consumption will be excessively smooth. Since aggregate information is slowly incorporated into consumption, aggregate consumption will be autocorrelated and correlated with lagged income. On the other hand, the model has the same prediction for micro data as the standard permanent income model. The second part of the paper provides empirical evidence on individual and aggregate income processes. Different models for individual income are fit to quarterly data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation making various adjustments for measurement error. Calibrating the consumption model using the estimated parameters for the income process yields predictions which qualitatively correspond to the empirical findings for aggregate consumption but do not match them well in magnitude.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{Pisc:95ME, author = {J.-S. Pischke}, title = {Measurement Error and Earnings Dynamics: Some Estimates from the {PSID}Validation Study}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1995}, volume = {13}, pages = {305-314}, number = {3}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{PiReWa:95, author = {Pischner, R. and Rendtel, U. and Wagner, G.}, title = {Sampling and Weighting of the {GSOEP}}, institution = {DIW}, year = {1995}, type = {mimeo}, key = {Data} } @ARTICLE{Piss:80, author = {Pissarides, C. A.}, title = {The wealth-age relation with life assurance}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1980}, volume = {47}, pages = {485-487}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{PiWe:89, author = {Pissarides, C. and Weber, G.}, title = {An Expenditure-Based Estimate of {B}ritain's Black Economy}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1989}, volume = {39}, pages = {17-32}, key = {Underground} } @ARTICLE{Pist:01, author = {Pistaferri, L.}, title = {Superior Information, Income Shocks, and the Permanent Income Hypothesis}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2001}, volume = {83}, pages = {465-476}, abstract = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6535%28200108%2983%3A3%3C465%3ASIISAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H According to the permanent income hypothesis with quadratic preferences, households save for a rainy day the transitory component of income innovations and consume entirely the permanent one. The model also rules out precautionary saving. Typically, income shock components are not separately observable, and information on the conditional variance of income is hard to come by. We show how to combine income realizations with subjective expectations to identify separately the transitory and the permanent shock to income and to obtain a measure of idiosyncratic uncertainty, thus providing a powerful test of the theory in short panels. The empirical analysis is performed on a sample of Italian households drawn from the 1989-1991 Survey of Househald Income and Wealth.}, key = {income dynamics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.05} } @INCOLLECTION{Plot:85, author = {Plotnick, R.}, title = {A comparison of measures of horizontal inequality}, booktitle = {Horizontal Equity, Uncertainty and Economic Well-being}, publisher = {Chicago: NBER and the University of Chicago Press}, year = {1985}, editor = {Martin, D. and Smeeding, T.}, number = {50}, series = {Studies in Income and Wealth}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Plot:82, author = {Plotnick, R.}, title = {The concept and measurement of horizontal inequity}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1982}, volume = {17}, pages = {373-391}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Plot:81, author = {Plotnick, R.}, title = {A measure of horizontal inequity}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1981}, volume = {63}, pages = {282-288}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Plot:80, author = {Plotnick, R.}, title = {A Comment on Measuring Horizontal Equity}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1980}, volume = {95}, pages = {383-385}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Plot:73, author = {Plott, C. R.}, title = {Path Independence, Rationality and Social Choice}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1973}, volume = {41}, pages = {1075-1091}, key = {social choice} } @BOOK{Plou:93, title = {The Psychology of Judgments and Decisions}, publisher = {McGraw-Hill}, year = {1993}, author = {Plous, S.}, address = {New York}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{PlPrHa:99, author = {Plug, E. J. S. and Van Praag, B. M. S. and Hartog, J.}, title = {If We Knew Ability, How Would We Tax Individuals?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {183-211}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{Podd:86, author = {Podder, N.}, title = {On the measurement of tax progressivity}, institution = {The University of New South Wales}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {89/5}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Podd:96, author = {Podder, N.}, title = {Relative Deprivation, Envy and Economic Inequality}, journal = {Kyklos}, year = {1996}, volume = {49}, pages = {353-376}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Podd:95, author = {Podder, N.}, title = {On the relationship of the {G}ini Coefficient and income elasticity}, journal = {Sankhya , Ser. B}, year = {1995}, volume = {57}, pages = {428-432}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Podd:93, author = {Podder, N.}, title = {A new decomposition of the {G}ini Coefficient among groups and its interpretationswith applications to {A}ustralia}, journal = {Sankhya , Ser. B}, year = {1993}, volume = {55}, pages = {262-271}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Podder1993, author = {Podder, N.}, title = {A new decomposition of the {G}ini Coefficient among groups and its interpretations with applications to {A}ustralia}, journal = {Sankhya , Ser. B}, year = {1993}, volume = {55}, pages = {262-271}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{PoCh:02, author = {Podder, N. and Chatterjee, S.}, title = {Sharing the National Cake in Post Reform {N}ew {Z}ealand: Income Inequality Trends in Terms of Income Sources}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {86}, pages = {1-27}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @TECHREPORT{PoGe:86, author = {Podder , S. N. and Genser , B.}, title = {Measurement of effective tax progression}, year = {1986}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {I/224}, address = {Konstanz}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{PoWo:74, author = {Polanyi, G. and Wood, J. B.}, title = {How much inequality?}, institution = {Institute of Economic Affairs}, year = {1974}, type = {Research Monograph}, address = {London}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Poli:04, author = {Polinsky,A.}, title = {Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe}, institution = {Stanford Law School}, abstract = {This article studies optimal fines when an offender’s wealth is privateinformation that can be obtained by the enforcement authority only aftera costly audit. I derive the optimal fine for the underlying offense, theoptimal fine for misrepresenting one’s wealth level, and the optimal auditprobability. I demonstrate that the optimal fine for misrepresenting wealthequals the fine for the offense divided by the audit probability, and thereforegenerally exceeds the fine for the offense. The optimal audit probabilityis positive, increases as the cost of an audit declines, and equals unityif the cost is sufficiently low. If the optimal audit probability is lessthan unity, there are some individuals who are capable of paying the finefor the offense who misrepresent their wealth levels. I also show thatthe optimal fine for the offense results in underdeterrence due to thecost of auditing wealth levels.}, key = {regulation} } @ARTICLE{Poli:06, author = {Polinsky, A.}, title = {The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {90}, pages = {823-835}, abstract = {This article studies the optimal use of fines and imprisonment when an offender’s level of wealth cannot be observed by the enforcement authority. I employ a model in which there are two types of offenders—a low-wealth type and a high-wealth type. The consequence of the unobservability of wealth depends on whether the enforcement authority would employ fines alone, or would also impose imprisonment sentences, if wealth were observable. In the former case, the inability to observe wealth lowers social welfare. But in the latter case, the unobservability of wealth does not lower social welfare. In both cases, offering offenders a choice of sanctions can induce high-wealth offenders to pay higher fines even though their wealth is unobservable. Specifically, a relatively high imprisonment sentence must accompany the payment of a low fine, so that high-wealth offenders will prefer to pay a higher fine and bear a lower (possibly no) imprisonment sentence.}, key = {crime}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @ARTICLE{Polinsky2000, author = {Polinsky, A. M. and Shavell, S.}, title = {The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2000}, volume = {38}, pages = {45-76}, key = {Crime}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{PoSh:00, author = {Polinsky, A. M. and Shavell, S.}, title = {The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2000}, volume = {38}, pages = {45–76}, key = {Crime} } @ARTICLE{PoSh:84, author = {Polinsky, M. and Shavell, S.}, title = {Optimal use of fines and imprisonment}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1984}, volume = {24}, pages = {89-99}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{PoSh:69, author = {Polinsky, M. and Shavell, S.}, title = {The optimal trade-off between the probability and magnitude of fines}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1979}, volume = {69}, pages = {880-891}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Poliv:98, author = {Polivka, A. E.}, title = {Using Earnings Data for the {C}urrent {P}opulation {S}urvey After the Redesign.}, institution = {US Bureau of Labour Statistics}, year = {1998}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {306}, address = {Washington, DC}, key = {wages} } @BOOK{Poll:89, title = {The Theory of the Cost-of-Living Index}, publisher = {Oxford University Ppress}, year = {1989}, author = {Pollack, R. A.}, address = {New York}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{Poll:07, author = {Pollak, Robert}, title = {Family Bargaining and Taxes: A Prolegomenon to the Analysis of Joint Taxation}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {3109}, abstract = {Does joint taxation disadvantage women? To answer that question, this paper begins by reviewing unitary and bargaining models of intrafamily allocation, and then discusses the determinants of "bargaining power" in a world without taxes. It argues that wage rates rather than earnings are determinants of bargaining power, and then argues that productivity in household production is also a source of bargaining power. In the absence of human capital effects, joint taxation does not appear to disadvantage women in either divorce threat or separate spheres bargaining. Hence, the claim that joint taxation disadvantages women, if it is correct, depends on effects that operate through the incentives to accumulate human capital. But a satisfactory analysis of the effects of taxation on human capital awaits the further development of dynamic models of family bargaining.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {joint taxation, family bargaining, household production}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Poll:73, author = {Pollak, R.}, title = {The risk independence axiom}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1973}, volume = {41}, pages = {35-39}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Poll:71, author = {Pollak, R.}, title = {On additive utility functions and linear {E}ngel curves}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1971}, volume = {38}, pages = {401-414}, key = {utility, preference}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.02.01} } @ARTICLE{PoPrPl:07, author = {Pollock,A.M. and Price,D. and Player,S.}, title = {An Examination of the UK Treasury’s Evidence Base for Cost and Time Overrun Data in UK Value-for-Money Policy and Appraisal}, journal = {Public Money and Management}, year = {2007}, volume = {27}, pages = {127-134}, abstract = {UK government procurement policy rests on Treasury claims that the private finance initiative (PFI) has reduced cost and time overruns. We review the five studies cited by the Treasury in support of this claim and find that only one purports to compare PFI with traditional procurement. The results of this single study are uninterpretable because of selection bias, small sample size (only 11 out of 451 PFI projects are included) and fundamental flaws in the analysis. There is thus no evidence to support the Treasury cost and time overrun claims of improved efficiency in PFI. We conclude that Treasury appraisal guidance, the ‘Green Book’ which compares PFI with other methods of procurement, is not evidence based but biased to favour PFI.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{PoScZw:82, author = {Pommerehne, W. and Schneider, E. and Zweifel, P.}, title = {Economic Theory, Choice and the Preference Reversal phenomenon: A Reexamination}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1982}, volume = {72}, pages = {569-574}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Pomm:85, author = {Pommerehne, W. W.}, title = {Was wissen wir eigentlich {\"u}ber {S}teuerhinterziehung?}, journal = {International Review of Economics and Business}, year = {1985}, volume = {32}, pages = {1155-1186}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Pommerehne1985, author = {Pommerehne, W. W.}, title = {Was wissen wir eigentlich \"uber {S}teuerhinterziehung?}, journal = {International Review of Economics and Business}, year = {1985}, volume = {32}, pages = {1155-1186}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Pomm:83, author = {Pommerehne, W. W.}, title = {Steuerhinterziehung und {S}chwarzarbeit als {G}renzen der {S}taatst{\"a}tigkeit}, journal = {Schweizerische Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Volkswirtschaft und Statistik}, year = {1983}, volume = {11}, pages = {261-284}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Pommerehne1983, author = {Pommerehne, W. W.}, title = {Steuerhinterziehung und {S}chwarzarbeit als {G}renzen der {S}taatst\"atigkeit}, journal = {Schweizerische Zeitschrift f\"ur Volkswirtschaft und Statistik}, year = {1983}, volume = {11}, pages = {261-284}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Pomo:79, author = {Pomorski, S.}, title = {Crimes against the central planner:'ochkovtiratel'stvo'}, booktitle = {Soviet Law After Stalin, Law in Eastern {E}urope}, publisher = {Sijthoff and Noordhoff}, year = {1979}, editor = {Barry, D. B. and Feldbrugge, G. J. M. and Ginsburgs, G. and Maggs, P. B.}, volume = {20}, pages = {291-317}, address = {Germantown, Maryland}, key = {crime}, part = {I} } @TECHREPORT{PoGi:80, author = {Pomorski, S. and Ginsburgs, G.}, title = {Enforcement of law and the second economy}, institution = {The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies}, year = {1980}, type = {Wilson Center, Occasional Paper}, number = {118}, key = {underground} } @TECHREPORT{PoHeMT:03, author = {Ponti ,G. and Herrero , C. and Moreno-Ternero, J.}, title = {An experiment on bankruptcy}, institution = {University of Alicante}, year = {2003}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {WP-AD2003-03}, address = {Departamento de Fundamentos del An{\'a}lisis Econ{\'o}mico, Campus San Vicente delRaspeig, s/n, 03071 Alicante, Spain.}, key = {claims} } @ARTICLE{Porc:88, author = {Porcano, T. M.}, title = {Correlates of tax evasion}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1988}, volume = {9}, pages = {47-67}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{PoWe:99, author = {Porter, R. D. and Weinbach, G. C.}, title = {Currency Ratios and {US} Underground Economic Activity}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {63}, pages = {355-361}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Post:98, author = {Postlewaite,A.}, title = {Social Status, Norms and Economic Performances The social basis of interdependentpreferences}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {779-800}, abstract = {Most economists are sympathetic to the idea that concerns for relative positionare an important aspect of many economic problems. There has traditionallybeen a reluctance to include such concerns primarily because models thatincluded them often allow such a broad range of behavior that there arefew, if any, restrictions on equilibrium behavior and, hence, such modelswould have little or no predictive power. In this paper we discuss howreduced form models may naturally give rise to utility functions that depend,in part, on relative standing. There are several advantages of modellingconcern for relative standing in reduced form utility functions even whenthere is no similar concern in the 'deep' preferences. It provides structureand constraints on the way that relative standing affects utility, andfurther, it can yield testable implications about the way that changesin the underlying environment affect the concern for relative standing.We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of modelling social concernsin this way and provide examples that illustrate how concerns for relativestanding can affect savings, investment and labor choice decisions.}, key = {social custom} } @ARTICLE{Postlewaite1998, author = {Postlewaite, A.}, title = {The Social Basis of Interdependent Preferences}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {779-800}, key = {Externalities}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{PoSi:04, author = {Postlewaite,A. and Silverman,D.}, title = {Social Isolation and Inequality}, institution = {Penn Institute for Economic Research}, year = {2004}, abstract = {There is an increasing interest in the concept of social exclusion and therelated concept of social isolation and their potential role in understandinginequality. We examine the degree to which voluntary separation from socialactivities during adolescence a.ects adult wages. It is well-known thatparticipation in high school athletic programs leads to higher adult wages.We present empirical evidence that this premium is not primarily due toselection on predetermined characteristics valued in the labor market.}, key = {social exclusion} } @ARTICLE{Pote:07, author = {Poterba, James}, title = {Income inequality and income taxation}, journal = {Journal of Policy Modelling}, year = {2007}, volume = {29}, pages = {623 - 633}, abstract = {This paper presents summary information on the before- and the after-tax income distribution in the United States between 1984 and 2004, along with data on effective tax rates on households in various quintiles of the income distribution. It describes two effects of tax policy on income distribution. The first involves the redistributive impact of taxes for a given pre-tax distribution of income. The second involves changes in the pre-tax distribution of income that are induced by taxpayers’ behavioral responses to the tax system.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Pre-tax income distribution; After-tax income distribution; Tax system}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Pote:01EA, author = {Poterba, J.}, title = {Estate and Gift Taxes and Incentives for Inter Vivos Giving in the {US}}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, pages = {237-264}, key = {wealth taxation} } @ARTICLE{PoRaVeWi:07, author = {Poterba, James and Rauh, Joshua and Venti, Steven and Wise, David}, title = {Defined contribution plans, defined benefit plans, and the accumulation of retirement wealth}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {2062 - 2086}, abstract = {The private pension structure in the United States, once dominated by defined benefit (DB) plans, is currently divided between defined contribution (DC) and DB plans. Wealth accumulation in DC plans depends on a participant's contribution behavior and on financial market returns, while accumulation in DB plans is sensitive to a participant's labor market experience and to plan parameters. This paper simulates the distribution of retirement wealth under representative DB and DC plans. It uses data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to explore how asset returns, earnings histories, and retirement plan characteristics contribute to the variation in retirement wealth outcomes. We simulate DC plan accumulation by randomly assigning individuals a share of wages that they and their employer contribute to the plan. We consider several possible asset allocation strategies, with asset returns drawn from the historical return distribution. Our DB plan simulations draw earnings histories from the HRS, and randomly assign each individual a pension plan drawn from a sample of large private and public defined benefit plans. The simulations yield distributions of both DC and DB wealth at retirement. Average retirement wealth accruals under current DC plans exceed average accruals under private sector DB plans, although DC plans are also more likely to generate very low retirement wealth outcomes. The comparison of current DC plans with more generous public sector DB plans is less definitive, because public sector DB plans are more generous on average than their private sector DB counterparts.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Defined benefit pension; Defined contribution pension; Retirement; Pension risk; 401(k) plan; Lifecycle fund}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @TECHREPORT{PoWe:00, author = {Poterba, J. and Weissbenner, S.}, title = {The distributional burden of taxing estates and unrealized capital gainsat the time of death}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2000}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {7811}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138}, key = {wealth taxation} } @BOOK{Pote:01TP, title = {Tax Policy and the Economy}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {2001}, author = {Poterba, J. M.}, address = {Five Cambridge Center, Cambridge, MA 02142-1493, U.S.A.}, key = {economic policy} } @TECHREPORT{Pote:98, author = {Poterba, J. M.}, title = {Estate and Gift Taxes and Incentives for Inter Vivos Giving in the {U}nited{S}tates}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {1998}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {6842}, key = {wealth taxation} } @ARTICLE{Pote:87, author = {Poterba, J. M.}, title = {Tax evasion and capital gains taxation}, journal = {American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings}, year = {1987}, volume = {77}, pages = {234-239}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Powd:07, author = {Powdthavee, N.}, title = {Feeling Richer or Poorer than Others: A Cross-section and Panel Analysis of Subjective Economic Status in Indonesia}, journal = {Asian Economic Journal}, year = {2007}, volume = {21}, pages = {169-194}, number = {2}, abstract = {This paper examines what makes us feel richer or poorer than others. It investigates cross-sectional and longitudinal determinants of individuals’ subjective economic status in Indonesia. Using two waves of Indonesian Family Life Surveys, 1997 and 2000, I show that individuals’ perceptions of where they are on the economic scale are more dependent on a number of socioeconomic characteristics, as well as their attitudes towards their future economic status, than their current spending capacities would suggest. I also find significant, albeit weaker, expenditure and income effects on individuals’ subjective economic status once individual fixed effects are controlled for in the regression.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{PoRi:02, author = {Power, L. and Rider, M.}, title = {The Effect of Tax-Based Savings Incentives on the Self-Employed}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {85}, pages = {33-52}, key = {saving} } @ARTICLE{Powe:98, author = {Powers, Elizabeth T.}, title = {Does means-testing welfare discourage saving? Evidence from a change in{AFDC} policy in the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {68}, pages = {33-53}, number = {1}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Praag1989, author = {Bernard M. S. Van Praag}, title = {Ordinal and Cardinal Utility: An Integration of the Two Dimensions of the Welfare Concept}, institution = {Econometric Institute, Erasmus university, Rotterdam}, year = {1989}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{VaPr:89, author = {Bernard M. S. Van Praag}, title = {Ordinal and Cardinal Utility: An Integration of the Two Dimensions of theWelfare Concept}, institution = {Econometric Institute, Erasmus university, Rotterdam}, year = {1989}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{VaPrKaHe:79, author = {Bernard M. S. Van Praag and Arie Kapteyn and Floor G. Van Herwaarden}, title = {The Definition and Measurement of Social Reference Spaces}, journal = {The Netherland's Journal of Sociology}, year = {1979}, volume = {15}, pages = {13-25}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{PrSaYo:03, author = {Pradhan,M. and Sahn,D. and Younger,S.}, title = {Decomposing world health inequality}, journal = {Journal of Health Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {22}, pages = {271-293}, abstract = {This study explores global inequality in health status and decomposes itinto within- and betweencountry inequality.We rely on standardized heightas our health indicator since it avoids the measurement pitfalls of moretraditional measures of health such as morbidity,mortality, and life expectancy.It also avoids measurement problems associated with using monetary variablessuch as income or expenditure across time or place to compare welfare.Our calculation of world height inequality indicates that, in contrastwith similar research on income inequality, within-country variation isthe source of most inequality, rather than the differences between countries.}, key = {health} } @BOOK{PrRa:83, title = {Nonparametric Functional Estimation}, publisher = {Academic Press}, year = {1983}, author = {Prakasa{ R}ao, B. L. S.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Prat:02, author = {Prat, A.}, title = {Should a Team Be Homogeneous?}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2002}, volume = {46}, pages = {1187-1207}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Prat:64, author = {Pratt, J. W.}, title = {Risk-aversion in the small and in the large}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1964}, volume = {32}, pages = {122-36}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{PrZe:96, author = {Pratt, John W. and Zeckhauser, Richard J.}, title = {Willingness to Pay and the distribution of risk and wealth}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1996}, volume = {104}, pages = {747-763}, number = {4}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Prei:48, author = {Preinreich, G.}, title = {Progressive Taxation and Proportionate Sacrifice}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1948}, volume = {38}, pages = {103-17}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Prel:98, author = {Prelec, D}, title = {The probability weighting function}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1998}, volume = {66}, pages = {497-527}, number = {3}, key = {uncertainty} } @INCOLLECTION{Pren:98, author = {Prendergast, C.}, title = {What Happens Within Firms? A Survey of Empirical Evidence on CompensationPolicies}, booktitle = {Labor Statistics Measurement Issues}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Haltiwanger, J. and Manser, M. E. and Topel, R.}, pages = {329-354}, address = {Chicago, 60637}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{Pren:99, author = {Prendergast,C.}, title = {The Provision of Incentives in Firms}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1999}, volume = {37}, pages = {7-63}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Pres:75, author = {Prescott, Edward C.}, title = {Efficiency of the Natural Rate}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1975}, volume = {83}, pages = {1229--1236}, number = {6}, month = {Dec.}, copyright = {Copyright 1975 The University of Chicago Press}, issn = {00223808}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.08} } @BOOK{PrTeVeFl:92, title = {Numerical Recipes in {C}}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1992}, author = {Press, W. H. and Teukolsky, S. A. and Vetterling, W. T. and Flannery, B.P.}, key = {Computing} } @ARTICLE{Prest1973, author = {Prest, A. R. and Bauer, P. T.}, title = {Income differences and inequalities}, journal = {Moorgate and Wall Street}, year = {1973}, pages = {22-43}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{PrSt:67, author = {Prest, A. R. and Stark, T.}, title = {Some Aspects of Income Distribution in the {UK} Since {W}orld {W}ar {II}}, journal = {Manchester School}, year = {1967}, volume = {35}, pages = {217-243}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Pres:07, author = {Preston, Ian}, title = {Inequality and Income Gaps}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequlaity}, year = {2007}, volume = {15}, pages = {33-56}, number = {25}, abstract = {This paper discusses inequality orderings based explicitly on clos- ing up of income gaps, demonstrating the links between these and other orderings, the classes of functions preserving the orderings and applications showing their usefulness in comparison of economic poli- cies.}, institution = {Institute for Fiscal Studies}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Inequality, income distribution}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10}, type = {Working Paper} } @TECHREPORT{Pres:06, author = {Preston, Ian}, title = {Inequality and Income Gaps}, institution = {Institute for Fiscal Studies}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {25}, abstract = {This paper discusses inequality orderings based explicitly on clos- ing up of income gaps, demonstrating the links between these and other orderings, the classes of functions preserving the orderings and applications showing their usefulness in comparison of economic poli- cies.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Inequality, income distribution}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Pres:95, author = {Preston, I.}, title = {Sampling distributions of relative poverty statistics}, journal = {Applied Statistics}, year = {1995}, volume = {44}, pages = {91-99}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{Pres:96, author = {Preston, Samuel, H.}, title = {American Longevity: Past, Present and Future}, institution = {Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs}, year = {1996}, number = {7/1995}, address = {Syracuse University, NY}, key = {population economics} } @TECHREPORT{PrVF:96, author = {Prieto-Alaiz, M. and Victoria-Feser, M. P.}, title = {Income Distribution in {S}pain: A robust parametric approach}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1996}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {20}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Prop:96, author = {Propper, Carol}, title = {Market structure and prices: The responses of hospitals in the {UK} {N}ational{H}ealth {S}ervice to competition}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {61}, pages = {307-335}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{Propper1996, author = {Propper, Carol}, title = {Market structure and prices: The responses of hospitals in the {UK} {N}ational {H}ealth {S}ervice to competition}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {61}, pages = {307-335}, key = {health}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Pryo:07, author = {Pryor, F.L.}, title = {The Anatomy of Increased Inequality of U.S. Family Incomes}, journal = {Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {36}, pages = {595-618}, number = {4}, abstract = {This essay explores various components of a measure of pretax U.S. family income after adjusting for the size of the family in the U.S. in 1975 and 2000. Using data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics, an important stylized fact is revealed: The rising inequality of property incomes, particularly dividends, interest, and rent, have played the most important role in the increase of overall income inequality. Contrary to popular belief, increasing inequality of labor income plays only a secondary role. For property incomes a simple model shows why this determining role in income inequality should continue for the next decade and, most likely, even further in the future.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Pryo:73, author = {Pryor, F. L.}, title = {Simulation of the impact of social and economic institutions on the sizedistribution of income and wealth}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1973}, volume = {63}, pages = {50-72}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Pryor1973, author = {Pryor, F. L.}, title = {Simulation of the impact of social and economic institutions on the size distribution of income and wealth}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1973}, volume = {63}, pages = {50-72}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Psacharopoulos1972, author = {Psacharopoulos, G. S. and Hinchliffe, K.}, title = {Further Evidence on the Elasticity of Substitution among Different Types of Educated Labour}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1972}, volume = {80}, pages = {786-796}, key = {labour}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{PsHi:72, author = {Psacharopoulos, G. S. and Hinchliffe, K.}, title = {Further Evidence on the Elasticity of Substitution among Different Typesof Educated Labour}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1972}, volume = {80}, pages = {786-796}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Pudn:92, author = {Pudney, S.}, title = {Income and Wealth Inequality and the Life-Cycle}, journal = {Journal of Applied Econometrics}, year = {1992}, volume = {8}, pages = {249-276}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{PuGlMe:98, author = {Pudney, S. and Glassi, F. L. and Mealli, F.}, title = {An econometric model of farm tenures in fifteenth-century {F}lorence}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {535-556}, number = {260}, month = {November}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{PuHaSu:06, author = {Pudney, S. and Hancock, R. and Sutherland, H.}, title = {Simulating the Reform of Means-tested Benefits with Endogenous Take-up and Claim Costs}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2006}, volume = {68}, pages = {135-166}, abstract = {Microsimulation models are commonly used to examine the distributional impact of reforms of the means-tested benefit system. Take-up behaviour is related to the level of entitlement, so reform may induce changes in take-up. We develop a stochastic simulation method and apply it to a probit model of ‘income support’ take-up by the UK pensioners. The method allows us to adjust net income for the welfare losses because of tangible or intangible claim costs. Endogenous take-up and claim costs both have an important impact on the simulated outcomes of the policy reform.}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @INCOLLECTION{PuSu:92, author = {Pudney, S. and Sutherland, H.}, title = {The Statistical Reliability of Micro-Simulation Estimates: Results for a{UK} Tax-Benefit Model}, booktitle = {Microsimulation Models for Public Policy Analysis: New Frontiers}, publisher = {STICERD}, year = {1992}, editor = {Hancock, R. and Sutherland, H.}, volume = {53}, chapter = {7}, pages = {133-182}, address = {London School of Economics, London}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, key = {microsimulation} } @INCOLLECTION{PuSu:96, author = {Pudney, S. and Sutherland, H.}, title = {The Statistical Reliability in Microsimulation Models with Econometrically-EtimatedBehavioural Responses}, booktitle = {Microsimulation Simulation and Public Policy}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1996}, editor = {Harding, A.}, volume = {53}, chapter = {21}, pages = {473-503}, address = {Amsterdam}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, key = {microsimulation} } @ARTICLE{Pudney1994, author = {Pudney, S. and Sutherland, H.}, title = {The Statistical Reliability of Micro-Simulation Estimates: Results for a {UK} Tax-Benefit Model}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {53}, pages = {327-365}, key = {microsimulation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{PuSu:94, author = {Pudney, S. and Sutherland, H.}, title = {The Statistical Reliability of Micro-Simulation Estimates: Results for a{UK} Tax-Benefit Model}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {53}, pages = {327-365}, key = {microsimulation} } @ARTICLE{Puga:99, author = {Diego Puga}, title = {The Rise and Fall of Regional Inequalities}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {43}, pages = {303-334}, number = {2}, key = {Regional} } @ARTICLE{PuRoSi:98, author = {Putterman, L. and Roemer, J. and Silvestre, J.}, title = {Does egalitarianism have a future?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1998}, volume = {36}, pages = {861-902}, key = {equality} } @INCOLLECTION{Pyat:85, author = {Pyatt, G.}, title = {An axiomatic approach to the {G}ini coefficient and the measurement of welfare}, booktitle = {Advances in Econometrics}, publisher = {JAI Press}, year = {1985}, editor = {Basmann, R. L. and Rhodes, G. G.}, volume = {4}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Pyat:90, author = {Pyatt, G.}, title = {Social evaluation criteria}, booktitle = {Income and Wealth Distribution, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1990}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Zenga, M.}, pages = {243-253}, address = {Berlin}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Pyat:87, author = {Pyatt, G.}, title = {Measuring welfare, poverty and inequality}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1987}, volume = {97}, pages = {459-467}, number = {6}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Pyat:80, title = {Poverty and welfare measures based on the {L}orenz curve}, year = {1980}, author = {Pyatt, G.}, institution = {Development Research Center, World Bank}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Pyat:76, author = {Pyatt, G.}, title = {On the Interpretation and Disaggregation of {G}ini Coefficients}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1976}, volume = {86}, pages = {243-255}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Pyatt1976, author = {Pyatt, G.}, title = {On the Interpretation and Disaggregation of {G}ini Coefficients}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1976}, volume = {86}, pages = {243-255}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{PyChFe:80, author = {Pyatt, G. and Chen, C. N. and Fei, J.}, title = {The distribution of income by factor components}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1980}, volume = {95}, pages = {451-473}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Pyle:87, author = {Pyle, D. J.}, title = {The Political Economy of Tax Evasion}, institution = {The David Hume Institute}, year = {1987}, type = {Hume Paper}, number = {6}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{Pyle:83, title = {The Economics of Crime and Law Enforcement}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1983}, author = {Pyle, D. J.}, address = {London}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{QuRR:97, author = {Quadrini, V. and Rios-Rull, J.-V.}, title = {Understanding the {U.S.} Distribution of Wealth}, journal = {Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review}, year = {1997}, volume = {21}, pages = {22-36}, key = {wealth} } @INCOLLECTION{Quah:03, author = {Quah, D.}, title = {One-third of the World's Inequality}, booktitle = {Growth and Inequality: Issues and Policy Implications}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2003}, editor = {Eicher, T. and Turnovsky, S.}, chapter = {2}, pages = {27-59}, key = {inequality}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.03} } @TECHREPORT{Quah1996, author = {Quah, D.}, title = {Empirics for growth and distribution: stratification, polarisation and convergence clubs}, institution = {LSE, Department of Economics}, year = {1996}, type = {mimeo}, key = {growth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Quah:96, author = {Quah, D.}, title = {Empirics for Economic Growth and Convergence}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1996}, volume = {40}, pages = {1353-1375}, abstract = {The convergence hypothesis has generated a huge empirical literature: this paper critically reviews some of the earlier key findings, clarifies their implications, and relates them to more recent results. Particular attention is devoted to interpreting convergence empirics. The main findings are: (1) The much-heralded uniform 2% rate of convergence could arise for reasons unrelated to the dynamics of economic growth. (2) Usual empirical analyses - cross-section (conditional) convergence regressions, time-series modelling, panel data analysis - can be misleading for understanding convergence; a model of polarization in economic growth clarifies those difficulties. (3) The data, more revealingly modelled, show persistence and immobility across countries: some evidence supports Baumol's idea of 'convergence clubs': some evidence shows the poor getting poorer, and the rich richer, with the middle class vanishing. (4) Convergence, unambiguous up to sampling error, is observed across US states.}, key = {growth}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.20} } @ARTICLE{Quah:96A, author = {Quah, D.}, title = {Twin Peaks: Growth and Convergence in Models of Distribution Dynamics}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1996}, volume = {106}, pages = {1045-1055}, key = {income distribution:theorerical}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @TECHREPORT{Quah:95, author = {Quah, D.}, title = {Aggregate and Regional Disaggregate Fluctuations}, institution = {LSE}, year = {1995}, type = {Econometrics Discussion Paper}, number = {EM/95/290}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{Quah:94, author = {Quah, D.}, title = {Exploiting cross section variation for unit root inference in dynamic data}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1994}, volume = {44}, pages = {9-19}, key = {regression}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.03} } @ARTICLE{Quah:93, author = {Quah, D.}, title = {Empirical Cross-Section Dynamics in Economic Growth}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1993}, volume = {37}, pages = {426-434}, key = {growth}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{Quah:93A, author = {Quah, D.}, title = {Galton's Fallacy and Tests of the Convergence Hypothesis}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {95}, pages = {427-443}, key = {income distribution}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{Quah:92, author = {Quah, D.}, title = {The Relative Importance of Permanent and Transitory Components: Identification and Some Theoretical Bounds}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1992}, volume = {60}, pages = {107-118}, abstract = {Much macroeconometric discussion has recently emphasised the economic significance of the size of the permanent component in GNP. Consequently, a large literature has developed that tries to estimate this magnitude - measured, essentially, as the spectral density of increments in GNP at frequency zero. This paper shows that unless the permanent component is a random walk this attention has been misplaced: in general, that quantity does not identify the magnitude of the permanent component. Further, by developing bounds on reasonable measures of this magnitude, the paper shows that a random walk specification is biased towards establishing the permanent component as important.}, key = {macroeconomics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{Quah1997, author = {Quah, D. T.}, title = {Empirics for Growth and Distribution: Stratification, Polarization, and Convergence Clubs}, journal = {Journal of Economic Growth}, year = {1997}, volume = {2}, pages = {27-59}, abstract = {This paper studies cross-country patterns of economic growth from the viewpoint of income distribution dynamics. Such a perspective raises new empirical and theoretical issues in growth analysis: the profound empirical regularity is an "emerging twin peaks" in the cross-sectional distribution, not simple patterns of convergence or divergence. The theoretical problems raised concern interaction patterns among subgroups of economies, not only problems of a single economy's accumulating factor inputs and technology for growth. Keywords: conditional, convergence, distribution dynamics, income distribution, inequality, trade, twin peaks}, key = {Growth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Quah:97, author = {Quah, D. T.}, title = {Empirics for Growth and Distribution: Stratification, Polarization, andConvergence Clubs}, journal = {Journal of Economic Growth}, year = {1997}, volume = {2}, pages = {27–59}, abstract = {This paper studies cross-country patterns of economic growth from the viewpointof income distribution dynamics. Such a perspective raises new empiricaland theoretical issues in growth analysis: the profound empirical regularityis an “emerging twin peaks” in the cross-sectional distribution, not simplepatterns of convergence or divergence. The theoretical problems raisedconcern interaction patterns among subgroups of economies, not only problemsof a single economy’s accumulating factor inputs and technology for growth.Keywords: conditional, convergence, distribution dynamics, income distribution,inequality, trade, twin peaks}, key = {Growth} } @ARTICLE{Quan:66, author = {Quandt, R.}, title = {Old and New Methods of Estimation and the {P}areto Distribution}, journal = {Metrika}, year = {1966}, volume = {10}, pages = {55-82}, key = {Distributions} } @ARTICLE{QuBoHeZw:06, author = {Quant, M. and Borm, P. and Hendrickx, R. and Zwikker, P.}, title = {Compromise Solutions Based on Bankruptcy}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2006}, volume = {51}, pages = {247-256}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @INBOOK{ChQu:91, chapter = {5}, pages = {239-248}, title = {Increasing Risk: Another Definition}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1991}, editor = {Chik{\'a}n, A.}, author = {Quiggin, J.}, address = {Department of Agricultural Economics University of Sydney Australia}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.04} } @INCOLLECTION{Quig:91IR, author = {Quiggin, J.}, title = {Increasing risk: another definition}, booktitle = {Progress in decision, utility and risk theory}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1991}, editor = {Chikán, A.}, pages = {239-248}, key = {risk}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.26} } @ARTICLE{Quig:91, author = {Quiggin, J.}, title = {Comparative statics for Rank-Dependent Expected Utility theory}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1991}, volume = {4}, pages = {339-350}, key = {risk}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.08.04} } @ARTICLE{Quig:82, author = {Quiggin, J.}, title = {A Theory of Anticipated Utility}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {1982}, volume = {3}, pages = {323-343}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{QuCh:06, author = {Quiggin,J. and Chambers,R.G.}, title = {Supermodularity and risk aversion}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2006}, volume = {52}, pages = {1-14}, abstract = {In this paper, we consider the relationship between supermodularity and risk aversion. We show that supermodularity of the certainty equivalent implies that the certainty equivalent of any random variable is less than its mean. We also derive conditions under which supermodularity of the certainty equivalent is equivalent to aversion to mean-preserving spreads in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{QuCh:04, author = {Quiggin,J. and Chambers,R.}, title = {Invariant risk attitudes}, journal = {Journal of EconomicTheory}, year = {2004}, volume = {117}, pages = {96-118}, abstract = {Concepts of constant absolute riskaversion and constant relative risk aversionhave proved useful in the analysis of choice under uncertainty, but arequite restrictive, particularly when they are imposed jointly. A generalizationof constant riskaversion, referred to as invariant riskaversion is developed.Invariant riskaversion is closely related to the possibility of representingpreferences over state-contingent income vectors in terms of two parameters,the mean and a linearly homogeneous, translation-invariant index of riskiness.The best-known index with such properties is the standard deviation. Theproperties of the capital asset pricing model, usually expressed in termsof the mean and standard deviation, may be extended to the case of generalinvariant preferences.}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{QuSa:62, author = {Quirk, J. D. and Saposnik, R.}, title = {Admissibility and measurable utility functions}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1962}, volume = {29}, pages = {140-146}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{QuBiMa:84, author = {Quizon, J. B. and Binswanger, H. P. and Machina, M. J.}, title = {Measuring risk aversion: further remarks}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1994}, volume = {94}, pages = {144-148}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{CaKiOz:00, author = {Casadesus-Masanell. R. and Klibanoff, P. and Ozdenoren, E.}, title = {Maxmin Expected Utility Through Statewise Combinations}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {66}, pages = {49-54}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{R.1999a, author = {Fernandez R.}, title = {To Each According to ...? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {799-824}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{MaZi:00, author = {Marimon R. and Zilibotti, F.}, title = {Employment and distributional effects of restricting working time}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2000}, volume = {44}, pages = {1291-1326}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Star:73, author = {Starr R.}, title = {Optimal production and allocation under uncertainty}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1973}, volume = {87}, pages = {81-95}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{R.1999, author = {Tourky R.}, title = {Production Equilibria in Locally Proper Economies with Unbounded and Unordered Consumers}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {303-315}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Dana:99, author = {Dana R.-A.}, title = {Existence, Uniqueness and Determinancy of Equilibrium in {CAPM} With a RisklessAssett}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {167-175}, key = {Finance} } @BOOK{Rabe-Hesketh2005, title = {Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata}, publisher = {STATA Corporation}, year = {2005}, author = {Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia and Skrondal, Anders}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2007.01.03} } @ARTICLE{RaSc:99, author = {Rabellotti, R. and Schmitz, H.}, title = {The Internal Heterogeneity of Industrial Districts in {I}taly, {B}raziland {M}exico}, journal = {Regional Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {33}, pages = {97-108}, abstract = {Industrial districts have attracted the attention of development economistsin the search for new models of industrial development. Many case studieshave shown that clustering helps local enterprises to overcome growth constraintsand compete in distant markets. However, empirical studies also revealshortcomings of the industrial district model. This paper shows that, withinthe districts, there is enormous heterogeneity by size and performance.Even though clustering ® rms feed on each other, they vary a great dealin the strategies they employ and the}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{Rabi:00, author = {Rabin, M.}, title = {Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: a calibration theorem}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {1281-1292}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Rabin2000a, author = {Rabin, Matthew}, title = {Risk Aversion and Expected Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {1281-1292}, number = {5}, key = {behavioural}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Ra:93, author = {Rabin, Matthew}, title = {Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1993}, volume = {83}, pages = {1281--1302}, number = {5}, abstract = {People like to help those who are helping them, and to hurt those who are hurting them. Outcomes reflecting such motivations are called fairness equilibria. Outcomes are mutual-max when each person maximizes the other's material payoffs, and mutual-min when each person minimizes the other's payoffs. It is shown that every mutual-max or mutual-min Nash equilibrium is a fairness equilibrium. If payoffs are small, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of mutual-max and mutual-min outcomes; if payoffs are large, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of Nash equilibria. Several economic examples are considered, and possible welfare implications of fairness are explored.}, copyright = {Copyright © 1993 American Economic Association}, issn = {00028282}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Dec., 1993}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {American Economic Association}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Rabl:08, author = {Rablen, Matthew}, title = {Relativity, Rank and the Utility of Income}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2008}, volume = {118}, pages = {801 - 821}, abstract = {Relative utility has become an important concept in several disjoint areas of economics. I present a cardinal model of income utility based on the supposition that agents care about their rank in the income distribution and that utility is subject to adaptation over time. Utility levels correspond to the Leyden Individual Welfare Function while utility differences yield a version of the prospect theory value function, thereby providing a new and shared derivation of each. I offer an explanation of some long-standing paradoxes in the wellbeing literature and an insight into the links between relative comparisons and loss aversion.}, key = {Utility}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Radf:45, author = {Radford, R. A.}, title = {The economic organisation of a {P.O.W.} camp}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1945}, volume = {12}, pages = {189-201}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Rae1981, author = {Rae, D. W. and Fessler, C.}, title = {The varieties of equality}, year = {1981}, booktitle = {Value Judgement and Income Distribution}, editor = {Solo, R. A. and Anderson, C. W.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {Praeger}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{RaFe:81, title = {The varieties of equality}, publisher = {Praeger}, year = {1981}, editor = {Solo, R. A. and Anderson, C. W.}, author = {Rae, D. W. and Fessler, C.}, booktitle = {Value Judgement and Income Distribution}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Raft:07, author = {Raft,S.}, title = {IMAGINING A PROGRESSIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE CONSUMPTION TAX}, institution = {Santa clara University School of Law}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, number = {07-23}, abstract = {The income tax system has become quite a mess. Unfortunately, the brunt of that mess falls primarily on the backs of the individual taxpayers, who are required to sift through the tens of thousands of pages of instructions and tax rules just to calculate, file, and pay what they owe. The filing burden and costs of compliance are already exorbitant, but they are only increasing. Designed primarily to relieve individual taxpayers of their filing burdens, the graduated consumption tax seeks to progressively generate revenue comparable to the income tax system at reasonable tax rates. The purpose of this article is not to offer proof, but simply to introduce the graduated consumption tax model as a possible alternative to the income tax system. This article anticipates both the potential benefits and weaknesses of implementing such a model and attempts to set the stage for further exploration and debate.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Rahm:69, author = {M. D. Anisur Rahman}, title = {Intertemporal Equity and Elasticity of Marginal Utility from Consumption}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1969}, volume = {21}, pages = {29-34}, number = {1}, key = {consumption} } @BOOK{Raif:68, title = {Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choice Under Uncertainty}, publisher = {Addison-Wesley}, year = {1968}, author = {Raiffa, H.}, address = {Reading, Mass.}, key = {uncertainty} } @TECHREPORT{RaSm:95, author = {Rainwater, L. and Smeeding, T.}, title = {Doing {P}oorly: {T}he {R}eal {I}ncome of {A}merican {C}hildren in a {C}omparative{P}erspective}, institution = {The Luxembourg Income Study}, year = {1995}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {135}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Rait:00, author = {Raith, M. G.}, title = {Fair-Negotiation Procedures}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2000}, volume = {39,3}, pages = {303-322}, key = {bargaining} } @ARTICLE{RaZi:00, author = {Rajan, R. G. and Zingales, L.}, title = {The Tyranny of Inequality}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {76}, pages = {521-558}, key = {Inequality} } @ARTICLE{Raja:75, author = {Rajaraman, I.}, title = {Poverty, Inequality and Economic Growth: Rural {P}unjab, 1960/1-1970/1}, journal = {Journal of Development Studies}, year = {1975}, volume = {11}, pages = {278-290}, key = {development} } @ARTICLE{Ram:06, author = {Ram, R.}, title = {Growth Elasticity of Poverty: Alternative Estimates and a Note of Caution}, journal = {Kyklos}, year = {2006}, volume = {59}, pages = {601-610}, key = {poverty}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Ram:92, author = {Ram, R.}, title = {International inequalities in human development and real income}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1992}, volume = {38}, pages = {351-354}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.22} } @ARTICLE{Ram:87, author = {Ram, R.}, title = {Intercountry inequalities in income and `index of net social progress`: Evidence from recent data}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1987}, volume = {24}, pages = {295-298}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.22} } @ARTICLE{Ram:84, author = {Ram, R.}, title = {Another perspective on changes in international inequality from 1950 to 1980}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1984}, volume = {16}, pages = {187-190}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.22} } @ARTICLE{Ram:79, author = {Ram, R.}, title = {International income inequality: 1970 and 1978}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1979}, volume = {4}, pages = {187-190}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.22} } @ARTICLE{RaOlSo:00, author = {Ramos, H. M. and Ollero, J. and Sordo, M. A.}, title = {A Sufficient Condition for Generalized {L}orenz Order}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2000}, volume = {90}, pages = {286-292}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Ramo:03, author = {Ramos, X.}, title = {The covariance structure of earnings in {G}reat {B}ritain, 1991-1999}, journal = {Economica}, year = {2003}, volume = {70}, pages = {353-374}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.04.12} } @TECHREPORT{RaSc:06, author = {Ramos, X. and Schluter, R.}, title = {Subjective Income Expectations and Income Risk}, institution = {Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).}, year = {2006}, type = {IZA Discussion Paper}, number = {1950}, key = {income dynamics}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.04.12} } @BOOK{Ramsay1997, title = {Functional Data Analysis}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1997}, author = {Ramsay, J. O. and Silverman, B. W.}, address = {New York} # ., key = {STATISTICS}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Rams:28, author = {Ramsey, F. P.}, title = {A mathematical theory of saving}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1928}, volume = {38}, pages = {543–559.}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Rams:27, author = {Ramsey, F. P.}, title = {A contribution to the theory of taxation}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1927}, volume = {37}, pages = {47-61}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Ramsey1927, author = {Ramsey, F. P.}, title = {A contribution to the theory of taxation}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1927}, volume = {37}, pages = {47-61}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Rana:65, author = {Ranadive, K. R.}, title = {The equality of incomes in {I}ndia}, journal = {Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Statistics}, year = {1965}, volume = {27}, pages = {119-134}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{RaCr:83, author = {Ransom, M. R. and Cramer, J. S.}, title = {Income Distribution Functions with Disturbances}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1983}, volume = {22}, pages = {363-372}, key = {distributions} } @BOOK{Rao:73, title = {Linear Statistical Inference and Its Applications}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1973}, author = {Rao, C. R.}, address = {New York}, edition = {Second}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Rao1987, author = {Rao, U. L. P. and Tam, A. Y. P.}, title = {An empirical study of selection and estimation of alternative models of the {L}orenz curve}, journal = {Journal of Applied Statistics}, year = {1987}, volume = {14}, pages = {275-280}, key = {distributions}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{RaTa:87, author = {Rao, U. L. P. and Tam, A. Y. P.}, title = {An empirical study of selection and estimation of alternative models ofthe {L}orenz curve}, journal = {Journal of Applied Statistics}, year = {1987}, volume = {14}, pages = {275-280}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Rao:69, author = {Rao, V. M.}, title = {Two decompositions of the concentration ratio}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A}, year = {1969}, volume = {132}, pages = {418-425}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{RaErZw:95, author = {Rapoport, Amnon and Erev, Ido and Zwick, Rami}, title = {An Experimental Study of Buyer-seller Negotiation with One-sided Incomplete Information and Time Discounting.}, journal = {Management Science}, year = {1995}, volume = {41}, pages = {p377 - 395}, number = {3}, abstract = {We study a multiperiod bargaining mechanism in which a seller negotiates with a buyer over the price of an indivisible good. It is common knowledge that the good has zero value to the seller. Its value to the buyer is privately known, distributed independently of the seller's value according to a distribution that is common knowledge. Bargaining proceeds as follows. The seller sets a price and offers the buyer an opportunity to purchase the good. The buyer either waits for at least one more period or agrees to purchase the good at the given price. If the buyer refuses the offer, then the process is repeated with the seller making a new offer on the next period. Our findings reveal several behavior regularities, which do not support the sequential equilibrium for this bargaining mechanism. In line with recent developments in behavioral decision theory and game theory, which assume bounded rationality, we find that subjects follow simple rules of thumb in choosing strategies, reflected }, issn = {00251909}, keywords = {RESEARCH, CONSUMER behavior, MARKETING research, GAME theory, DECISION theory, BOUNDED rationality, CHOICE (Psychology), DECISION making, RESEARCH, PRICE variance, NEGOTIATION, One-sided incomplete information}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Rapoport2003, author = {Rapoport, Amnon and Stein, William E. and Parco, James E. and Nicholas, Thomas E.}, title = {Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {2003}, volume = {43}, pages = {239--265}, number = {2}, month = may, abstract = {The two-person centipede game is one of the most celebrated paradoxes of backward induction in complete information extensive form games. An experimental investigation of a three-person centipede game shows that the paradoxical results are strongly affected by the size of the stakes. When the number of players in the game is increased from two to three and the game is played for unusually high stakes with group composition being randomly changed from trial to trial, the paradox is considerably weakened as players approach equilibrium play with multiple iterations of the stage game. When the game is played with low stakes, there is no evidence for equilibrium play or learning across iterations of the stage game. An adaptive learning model that assumes updating of the individual probabilities of choice outperforms alternative static and dynamic models in accounting for the major results observed in the high-stake experiment.}, keywords = {Centipede game, Backward induction, Experimental study, High vs. low stakes, Adaptive learning}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.07.21}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-484V9T8-9/1/03c87d7d7d62f8c4841a8c70ce690c42} } @ARTICLE{RaVi:07, author = {Rapoport, H. and Vidal, J.P.}, title = {Economic growth and endogenous intergenerational altruism}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {1231-1246}, month = {August}, abstract = {The recent literature on the endogenous formation of preferences has emphasized that while some preferences are more conducive to growth than others, economic growth also contributes to the formation of particular tastes [Becker, Gary S. (1996): Accounting for Tastes, Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press]. In this paper, we construct a neoclassical growth model where intergenerational altruism can be endogenously reinforced and entails costly sacrifices on the part of parents to acquire such trait. While the incentives to acquire altruistic traits depend on the economic conditions, in turn altruism determines the level of intergenerational bequests and ultimately the pace of capital accumulation and economic growth. It is shown that intergenerational transfers are driven by a natural degree of altruism at earlier stages of economic growth. Once individuals have satisfied their own physiological constraint in the course of economic development, they devote resources to shaping their altruistic preferences, increasing their social degree of altruism above its natural level. This in turn increases the share of intergenerational transfers and speeds up economic growth.}, key = {growth}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @INCOLLECTION{Rapp:94, author = {Rapping, Leonard A.}, title = {Causes of and Possible Responses to the recent Rise in Income Inequality}, booktitle = {Aspects of Distribution of Wealth and Income}, publisher = {The Macmillan Press Ltd}, year = {1994}, editor = {Papadimitriou, Dimitri, B.}, chapter = {9}, pages = {175-184}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{RaGaKoOb:80, author = {Rasche, R. H. and Gaffney, J. and Koo, A. Y. C. and Obst, N.}, title = {Functional Forms for Estimating the {L}orenz Curve}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1980}, volume = {48}, pages = {1061-1062}, key = {distributions} } @BOOK{Rasm:01, title = {Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {2001}, author = {Rasmusen , E.}, address = {Oxford}, edition = {3rd}, comment = {Marshall:70F75c}, key = {Games} } @ARTICLE{Rava:08, author = {Ravallion, M.}, title = {Miss-targeted or miss-measured?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2008}, volume = {100}, pages = {9-12}, number = {1}, month = {July}, abstract = {A method is proposed for testing the robustness of the assessed targeting performance of an anti-poverty program to the fact that program administrators have a broader concept of “poverty” than the economist/evaluator. An application is given to China's main urban anti-poverty program.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.21} } @TECHREPORT{Rava:07, author = {Ravallion, Martin}, title = {How Relevant is Targeting to the Success of an Antipoverty Program?}, institution = {World Bank}, year = {2007}, abstract = {Policy-oriented discussions often assume that “better targeting” implies larger impacts on poverty or more costeffective interventions. The literature on the economics of targeting warns against that assumption, but evidence has been scarce. The paper begins with a critical review of the strengths and weaknesses of the targeting measures found in practice. It then exploits an unusually large micro data set for China to estimate aggregate and local-level poverty impacts of the country’s main urban antipoverty program. Standard measures of targeting are found to be uninformative, or even deceptive, about impacts on poverty and cost-effectiveness in reducing poverty. In program design and evaluation, it would be better to focus directly on the program’s outcomes for poor people than to rely on prevailing measures of targeting.}, key = {Poverty}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Rava:05, author = {Ravallion, M.}, title = {A poverty-inequality trade off?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2005}, volume = {3}, pages = {169-181}, abstract = {The idea that developing countries face a trade off between poverty andinequality has had considerable influence on thinking about developmentpolicy. The experience of developing countries in the 1990s does not, however,reveal any sign of a systematic trade off between measures of absolutepoverty and relative inequality. Indeed, falling inequality tends to comewith falling poverty incidence. And rising inequality appears more likelyto be putting a brake on poverty reduction than to be facilitating it.However, there is evidence of a trade off for absolute inequality, suggestingthat those who want a lower absolute gap between the rich and the poormust in general be willing to see lower absolute levels of living for poorpeople.}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/content/k438w47u46156851/fulltext.pdf} } @ARTICLE{Rava:04CC, author = {Ravallion, M.}, title = {Competing Concepts of Inequality in the Globalization Debate}, journal = {Brookings Trade Forum}, year = {2004}, volume = {2004}, pages = {1-38}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.13}, url = {http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/brookings_trade_forum/v2004/2004.1ravallion.pdf} } @ARTICLE{Rava:03, author = {Ravallion, M.}, title = {Inequality convergence}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2003}, volume = {80}, pages = {351-356}, key = {Inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Rava:02IC, author = {Ravallion, M.}, title = {Inequality Convergence}, institution = {Universit{\'e} des Sciences Sociales, Toulouse}, year = {2002}, type = {Working paper}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Rava:02OT, author = {Ravallion, M.}, title = {On the Urbanization of Poverty}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {68}, pages = {435-442}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Rava:01, author = {Ravallion, M.}, title = {Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyond Averages}, journal = {World Development}, year = {2001}, volume = {29}, pages = {1803-1815}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.03} } @ARTICLE{Rava:99, author = {Ravallion, M.}, title = {Are Poorer States Worse at Targeting their Poor?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {65}, pages = {373-377}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Rava:96, author = {Ravallion, Martin}, title = {Issues in measuring and modelling poverty}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1996}, volume = {106}, pages = {1328-1348}, key = {poverty} } @UNPUBLISHED{Rava:96a, author = {Ravallion, Martin}, title = {On {P}rofessor {K}akwani's axioms}, year = {1996}, institution = {World Bank}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Ravallion1996b, author = {Ravallion, Martin}, title = {Issues in measuring and modelling poverty}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1996}, volume = {106}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Rava:94, author = {Ravallion, Martin}, title = {Poverty comparisons using noisy data on living standards}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1994}, volume = {45}, pages = {481-485}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Rava:94a, author = {Ravallion, Martin}, title = {Measuring social welfare with and without poverty lines}, journal = {American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)}, year = {1994}, volume = {84}, pages = {359-364}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{Rava:94b, title = {Poverty Comparisons: A Guide to Concepts and Methods}, publisher = {Harwood Academic Publishers}, year = {1994}, author = {Ravallion, M.}, address = {Chur, Switzerland}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Ravallion1994b, author = {Ravallion, Martin}, title = {Poverty comparisons using noisy data on living standards}, journal = {Econoomics Letters}, year = {1994}, volume = {45}, pages = {481-485}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Rava:88, author = {Ravallion, Martin}, title = {Expected poverty under risk-induced welfare variability}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1988}, volume = {98}, pages = {1171-1182}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{RaCh:97, author = {Ravallion, M. and Chaudhuri, S.}, title = {Risk and insurance in village {I}ndia: Comment}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {171-184}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{RaCh:02, author = {Ravallion, M. and Chen, S.}, title = {Measuring Pro-Poor Growth}, journal = {Economics Letters (in press)}, year = {2002}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{RaCh:96, author = {Ravallion, M. and Chen, S.}, title = {What can new survey data tell us about recent changes in distribution and poverty?}, institution = {Poverty and human resources division, World Bank}, year = {1996}, address = {Washington}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{RaLo:05, author = {Ravallion,M. and Lokshin,M.}, title = {Who Cares About Relative Deprivation?}, institution = {World Bank}, year = {2005}, type = {working paper}, abstract = {Theories of relative deprivation predict negative welfare effects when friends and neighbors become better-off. Other theories point to likely positive benefits. The authors encompass both views within a single model, which motivates their tests using a survey for Malawi that collected data on satisfaction with life, own economic welfare, and the perceived welfare of friends and neighbors. Their methods help address likely biases in past tests found in the literature. In marked contrast to research for industrial countries, the authors find that relative deprivation is generally not a concern for most of their sample, although it does appear to matter to the comparatively well off. Their results provide a welfarist explanation for the priority given to absolute poverty in poor countries. The pattern of externalities also suggests that there will be too much poverty and inequality in this economy, even judged solely from the point of view of aggregate efficiency.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{RaLo:00, author = {Ravallion, M. and Lokshin, M.}, title = {Who wants to redistribute? The tunnel effect in 1990s {R}ussia}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {76}, pages = {87-104}, key = {Redistribution} } @TECHREPORT{RaLo:98SE, author = {Ravallion, M. and Lokshin, M.}, title = {Subjective Economic Welfare}, institution = {World Bank}, year = {1998}, type = {Development Research Group Mimeo}, address = {Washington, DC}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{RaLo:98WI, author = {Ravallion, M. and Lokshin, M.}, title = {Why is Subjective Economic Welfare so Unresponsive to Income Growth: A LongitudinalAnalysis for {R}ussia}, institution = {World Bank}, year = {1998}, type = {Development Research Group Mimeo}, address = {Washington, DC}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{RaVaGa:95, author = {Ravallion, M. and Van de Walle, D. and Gautam, M.}, title = {Testing a Social Safety Net}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1995}, volume = {57}, pages = {175-199}, key = {Social insurance} } @ARTICLE{Rawl:74, author = {Rawls, J.}, title = {Some reasons for the maxi-min criterion}, journal = {American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings}, year = {1974}, volume = {64}, pages = {141-146}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Rawls1972, title = {A Theory of Justice}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1972}, author = {Rawls, J.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Rawl:71, title = {A Theory of Justice}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1971}, author = {Rawls, J.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Rawl:58, author = {Rawls, J.}, title = {Justice as Fairness}, journal = {Philosophical Review}, year = {1958}, volume = {67}, pages = {164--194}, number = {2}, month = {April}, note = {Reprinted in \cite{Olaf:61} and \cite{lLaRu:62}.}, key = {social justice} } @ARTICLE{RaVo:01, author = {Ray, Debraj and Vohra, Rajiv}, title = {Coalitional Power and Public Goods}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2001}, volume = {109}, pages = {1355--1384}, number = {6}, abstract = {We study the provision of public goods when all agents have complete information and can write binding agreements. This framework is in deliberate contrast to a traditional view of the free-rider problem based on hidden information or voluntary provision. We focus on coalition formation as a potential source of inefficiency. To this end, we develop a notion of an equilibrium coalition structure, based on the assumption that each coalition that forms does so under a rational prediction of the society-wide coalition structure. In a simple model, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium coalition structure. Only in some cases does the equilibrium involve full cooperation, resulting in efficient provision of the public good. In other cases, the equilibrium consists of several coalitions and inefficient provision. However, the degree of inefficiency and the number of possible coalitions are bounded.}, copyright = {Copyright © 2001 The University of Chicago Press}, issn = {00223808}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Dec., 2001}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press} } @TECHREPORT{Ray:94, author = {Ray, Ranjan}, title = {The reform and design of commodity taxes in the presence of tax evasionwith illustrative evidence from India}, institution = {Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University}, year = {1994}, month = {July}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Ray:89, author = {Ray, R.}, title = {A new class of decomposable poverty measures}, journal = {The Indian Economic Journal}, year = {1989}, volume = {36}, pages = {30-38}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Raym:99, author = {Raymond, M.}, title = {Enforcement Leverage When Penalties are Restricted: A Reconsideration UnderAsymmetric Information}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {289-295}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Raymond1999, author = {Raymond, M.}, title = {Enforcement Leverage When Penalties are Restricted: A Reconsideration Under Asymmetric Information}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {289-295}, key = {crime}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Raza:96, author = {Razavi, Shahrashoub}, title = {Excess female mortality: an indicator of female subordination? {A} notedrawing on village-level evidence from {S}outheastern {I}ran}, journal = {notizie di Politeia}, year = {1996}, volume = {12}, pages = {79-95}, number = {43/44}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{RaSaSw:02, author = {Razin, A. and Sadka, E. and Swagel, P.}, title = {Tax Burden and Migration: A Political Economic Theory and Evidence}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {85}, pages = {167-190}, key = {population economics} } @ARTICLE{RaYu:99, author = {Razin, A. and Yuen, C.-W.}, title = {Optimal International Taxation and Growth Rate Convergence: Tax CompetitionVs. Coordination}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {61-78}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Razin1999, author = {Razin, A. and Yuen, C.-W.}, title = {Optimal International Taxation and Growth Rate Convergence: Tax Competition Vs. Coordination}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {61-78}, key = {growth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{RaYu:97, author = {Razin, Assaf and Yuen, Chi-Wa}, title = {Income-convergence within an economic union: the role of factor mobilityand coordination}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {66}, pages = {225-245}, number = {2}, month = {November}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{ReCr:88, title = {Goodness-of-{F}it statistics for discrete multivariate data}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1988}, author = {Read, T. R. C. and Cressie, N. A. C.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{ReTr:07, author = {Rebenoks,P. and Treilons,U.}, title = {Tax Compliance, Punishment and Extradition Risks for US Company Owners in Latvia}, journal = {Public Economics:Taxation, Subsidies, \& Revenue Abstracts}, year = {2007}, volume = {2}, number = {44}, abstract = {Latvian businesspeople are increasingly using US 'offshore' company structures as tax efficient structures, for the purpose of minimizing their tax risks and exposure in international transactions. However, as USA tax laws are particularly complicated and practically all Latvian businesspeople use incorporation agents, not lawyers, to set up their US entities, these entities tend to be operated with disregard, or ignorance of the true tax liability of the entity and the attendant risks to owners and managers in that regard. These risk issues have been recently highlighted due to increasing US-European Union co-operation in respect of common interests in cross-border/transnational crime and the 'war on terror'. Furthermore, additional impetus has arisen from the increasing pressure on the US Internal Revenue Service ('IRS' - US tax authority) for more efficient collection measures as a result of an annual shortfall of some $300 billion in unpaid taxes in the USA. As a result, most Latvian banks and other banks in third countries are being ordered to make full disclosure of all financial transactions of their US company customers. Further risks of US company owners/managers in Latvia emerge from the implementation of more efficient measures in the country for extraditing those suspected of breaking US laws to the USA for trial. This paper considers the foregoing problems and risks for US company owners/managers/advisors in Latvia and presents some possible solutions for their risk minimisation.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Redd:99, author = {Lee S. Redding}, title = {Negative Nominal Interest Rates and the Liquidity Premium}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {62}, pages = {213-216}, number = {2}, key = {monetary} } @ARTICLE{Redm:99, author = {Gerry Redmond}, title = {Incomes, Incentives and the Growth of Means-Testing in Hungary}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {77-99}, number = {1}, key = {social security} } @BOOK{ReSuWi:98, title = {The arithmetic of tax and social security reform: A User's Guide to MicrosimulationMethods and Analysis}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Redmond, Gerry and Sutherland, Holly and Wilson, Moira}, series = {Department of Applied Economics Monograph}, address = {Cambridge,U.K.}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Reed:76, author = {Reeds,J. A.}, title = {On the Definition of von {M}ises Functionals}, institution = {Department of Statistics, Harvard University}, year = {1976}, type = {Research Report}, number = {S 44}, address = {Cambridge, Mass.}, key = {statistics} } @BOOK{Rees:71, title = {Equality}, publisher = {Pall Mall, London}, year = {1971}, author = {Rees, J.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Rees:85, author = {Rees, R.}, title = {The theory of principal and agent}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1985}, volume = {37}, pages = {3-25, 75-95}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Rege:04, author = {Rege, M.}, title = {Social Norms and Private Provision of Public Goods}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2004}, volume = {6}, pages = {65-77}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Rege2004, author = {Rege, Mari and Telle, Kjetil}, title = {The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {1625-1644}, abstract = {Several economists have maintained that social and internalized norms can enforce cooperation in public good situations. This experimental study investigates how two important channels for social and internalized norms, social approval and framing, affect cooperation among strangers in a public good game. The experiment has two treatment effects. Firstly, it reveals each person's identity and his contribution to the public good. Secondly, it presents the public good game in a language that suggests associations to social and internalized norms for cooperation. The first treatment effect increases voluntary contributions significantly.}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ReTe:04, author = {Rege, Mari and Telle, Kjetil}, title = {The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public goodsituations}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {1625-1644}, abstract = {Several economists have maintained that social and internalized norms canenforce cooperation in public good situations. This experimental studyinvestigates how two important channels for social and internalized norms,social approval and framing, affect cooperation among strangers in a publicgood game. The experiment has two treatment effects. Firstly, it revealseach person’s identity and his contribution to the public good. Secondly,it presents the public good game in a language that suggests associationsto social and internalized norms for cooperation. The first treatment effectincreases voluntary contributions significantly.}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Rehm:07, author = {Rehme, G.}, title = {Education, Economic Growth and Measured Income Inequality}, journal = {Economica}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, pages = {493-514}, abstract = {In this paper education simultaneously affects growth and income inequality. More education does not necessarily decrease inequality when the latter is assessed by the Lorenz dominance criterion. Increases in education first increase and then decrease growth as well as income inequality, when measured by the Gini coefficient. There is no clear functional relationship between growth and measured income inequality. The model identifies regimes of this relationship that depend crucially on the production and schooling technology. Conventional growth regressions with human capital and inequality as regressors may miss the richness of the underlying nonlinearities, but may still provide important information on the nonlinear relationship between growth and education.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Rehm:00, author = {Rehme, G.}, title = {Public Policies and Education, Economic Growth and Income Distribution}, journal = {European University Institute Working Paper}, year = {1999}, volume = {EUI Working Paper ECO no. 99/14}, pages = {1-41}, key = {growth} } @BOOK{Reic:61, title = {Use and Abuse of Statistics}, publisher = {Methuen}, year = {1961}, author = {Reichman, W. J.}, address = {London}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Reil:82, author = {Reilly, R.}, title = {Preference Reversals, their Evidence and Some Suggested Modification inExperimental Design}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1982}, volume = {72}, pages = {576-84}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Reilly1982, author = {Reilly, R.}, title = {Preference Reversals, their Evidence and Some Suggested Modification in Experimental Design}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1982}, volume = {72}, pages = {576-84}, key = {risk}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Rein:70, author = {Rein, M.}, title = {problems in the definition and measurement of poverty}, booktitle = {On The Concept of Poverty}, year = {1970}, editor = {P. Townsend.}, pages = {46-63}, address = {London:Heinemann}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Rein1974, author = {Rein, M. and Miller, S. M.}, title = {Standards of income redistribution}, journal = {Challenge}, year = {1974}, pages = {20-26}, number = {July/August}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ReMi:74, author = {Rein, M. and Miller, S. M.}, title = {Standards of Income Redistribution}, journal = {Challenge}, year = {1974}, volume = {July/August}, pages = {20-26}, month = {July/August}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Rein:84, author = {Reinganum, Jennifer F.}, title = {Microeconomics of Innovation and Productivity Growth: Practical Implicationsof Game Theoretic Models of R\&D}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1984}, volume = {74}, pages = {61-66}, number = {2}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Reinganum1986, author = {Reinganum, J. F. and Wilde, L. L.}, title = {Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1986}, volume = {27}, pages = {739-760}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ReWi:86, author = {Reinganum, J. F. and Wilde, L. L.}, title = {Equilibrium verification and reporting rolicies in a model of tax compliance}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1986}, volume = {27}, pages = {739-760}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{ReWi:85, author = {Reinganum, J. F. and Wilde, L. L.}, title = {Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1985}, volume = {26}, pages = {1-18}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{ReWi:84, author = {Reinganum, J. F. and Wilde, L. L.}, title = {Sequential equilibrium detection and reporting policies in a model of taxevasion}, year = {1984}, type = {Social Science Working Paper}, number = {525}, journal = {California Institute of Technology}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Rein:99, author = {Reinhart, R. V.}, title = {Death and Taxes: Their Implications for Endogenous Growth}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {62}, pages = {339-345}, key = {growth} } @TECHREPORT{Rend:95, author = {Rendtel, U.}, title = {Documentation of Sample Size and Panel Attrition in {GSOEP}}, institution = {DIW}, year = {1995}, type = {mimeo}, key = {Data} } @TECHREPORT{ReLaBe:92, author = {Rendtel, U. and Langeheime, R. and Bernsten, R.}, title = {The estimation of poverty-dynamics using different household income measures}, institution = {University of Essex}, year = {1992}, type = {Working Papers of the {ESF} Network on household panel studies}, address = {Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, Essex}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{ReSw:91, author = {Rendtel, U. and Schwarze, J.}, title = {Die {E}ntwicklung individueller {A}rbeitseinkommen}, booktitle = {Lebenslagen im {W}andel: Zur {E}inkommensdynamik in {D}eutschland seit 1984}, publisher = {Campus}, year = {1991}, editor = {Rendtel, U. and Wagner, G.}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{ReWi:91, author = {Rendtel, U. and Schwarze, J.}, title = {Die {E}ntwicklung individueller {A}rbeitseinkommen}, journal = {in Rendtel and Wagner (1991)}, year = {1991}, key = {wages} } @BOOK{ReWa:91, title = {Lebenslagen im {W}andel: Zur {E}inkommensdynamik in {D}eutschland seit 1984}, publisher = {Campus}, year = {1991}, author = {Rendtel, U. and Wagner, G.}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @UNPUBLISHED{ReSch:08, author = {Ludovic Renou and Schlag, Karl}, title = {Minimax Regret and Strategic Uncertainty}, note = {Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Working Paper}, year = {2008}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.01.23} } @ARTICLE{Reny:01, author = {Reny, P. J.}, title = {Arrow's Theorem and the {G}ibbard-{S}atterthwaite Theorem: A Unified Approach}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {70}, pages = {99-105}, key = {Welfare} } @INPROCEEDINGS{Reny:61, author = {Renyi, G.}, title = {On measures of entropy and information}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Fourth Berkeley Symposium on Statistics}, year = {1961}, volume = {1: Probability}, pages = {547-561}, publisher = {University of California Press}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2005.12.24} } @ARTICLE{Repu:87, author = {Repullo, R.}, title = {A simple proof of {M}askin's theorem on {N}ash implementation}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1987}, volume = {4}, pages = {39-41}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Mach:94, author = {Mark J. Machina ( Reviewer)}, title = {Review of: Generalized Expected Utility Theory: The Rank-Dependent Model}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1994}, volume = {32}, pages = {1237-1238}, number = {3}, key = {uncertainty} } @TECHREPORT{Revi:95, author = {Reville, R. T .}, title = {Intertemporal and Life Cycle Variation in Measured Intergenerational EarningsMobility}, year = {1995}, key = {mobility} } @TECHREPORT{Reville1995, author = {Reville, R. T .}, title = {Intertemporal and Life Cycle Variation in Measured Intergenerational Earnings Mobility}, year = {1995}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Rey:65, author = {Rey, M.}, title = {Estimating tax evasions: the example of the {I}talian General Sales Tax}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1965}, volume = {20}, pages = {366-386}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Reyn:07, author = {Reynolds}, title = {Has U.S. Income Inequality Really Increased?}, institution = {Cato Institute}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, number = {586}, abstract = {In recent years, both academics and public commentators have alleged that “income inequality” is increasing in the United States. These commentators typically cite federal income tax return data to support their claims. However, studies based on tax return data provide highly misleading comparisons of changes to the U.S. income distribution because of dramatic changes in tax rules and tax reporting in recent decades. This study attempts to correct for the distortions of using tax data to determine income distribution characteristics. It finds that, aside from stock option windfalls during the late-1990s stock-market boom, there is little evidence of a significant or sustained increase in the inequality of U.S. incomes, wages, consumption, or wealth over the past 20 years.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @BOOK{Reyn:06, title = {Income and Wealth}, publisher = {Greenwood Press.}, year = {2006}, author = {Reynolds, A.}, address = {Westport, Connecticut}, key = {income distribution}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.10} } @ARTICLE{Re:00, author = {Reynolds, Stanley S.}, title = {Durable-goods monopoly: laboratory market and bargaining experiments.}, journal = {RAND Journal of Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {31}, pages = {375 - 395}, number = {2}, abstract = {Results from single-period monopoly experiments (nondurable environment) are compared with results from multiperiod monopoly experiments that have features of a durable-goods environment. Average prices were below the static monopoly benchmark price in all settings. Observed initial prices were higher in multiperiod experiments than in single-period experiments, in contrast to equilibrium predictions. Prices in multiperiod experiments tended to fall over time; there was less price cutting in market experiments than in bargaining experiments. There was substantial demand withholding by buyers in multiperiod experiments. A version of bounded rationality is a promising candidate for explaining deviations from equilibrium predictions. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR Copyright of RAND Journal of Economics is the property of RAND Journal of Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However}, issn = {07416261}, keywords = {MONOPOLIES, MONOPOLISTIC competition, INDUSTRIAL concentration, COMPARATIVE advantage (International trade), COLLECTIVE bargaining, DURABLE goods, Consumer, CONSUMER goods, EQUILIBRIUM (Economics)}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Rica:19, title = {Principles of Political Economy}, publisher = {Cambridge Academic Press}, year = {1819}, author = {Ricardo, D.}, address = {London}, key = {hist econ thought} } @INCOLLECTION{Rice:92, author = {Rice, E. M.}, title = {The Corporate Tax Gap: Evidence on Tax Compliance by Small Corporations}, booktitle = {Why people pay taxes}, publisher = {The University of Michigan Press}, year = {1992}, editor = {Slemrod, J.}, pages = {125-161}, key = {Tax compliance - firms} } @BOOK{Rice:56, title = {The Business of Crime}, publisher = {Gollancz}, year = {1956}, author = {Rice, R.}, address = {London}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Rich:95II, author = {Richardson, J. D.}, title = {Income inequality and trade: How to think, what to conclude}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1995}, volume = {9}, pages = {33-55}, abstract = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28199522%299%3A3%3C33%3AIIATHT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J}, key = {inequality }, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.23} } @ARTICLE{Rich:06, author = {Richter, K.}, title = {The Well-Being of the Elderly and Wage Arrears in Russia}, journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {116-152}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @TECHREPORT{Rich:00, author = {Richter, K.}, title = {Government Cash Transfers, Household Consumption, And Poverty Alleviation- The Case Of {R}ussia}, institution = {Centre for Economic Policy Research.}, year = {2000}, type = {CEPR Discussion Paper}, number = {2422}, abstract = {The paper develops a new approach to measuring the impact of governmentcash transfers on poverty alleviation that takes into account endogenousreactions and consumption smoothing of households. We use the methodologyto study the impact of changes in government cash benefits on poverty ratesin Russia during 1994 to 1998. The methodological contribution is twofold.First, we estimate the propensity to consume from government cash transfersseparately for each transfer type and interpret the differences in thecoefficients in the light of Friedman's permanent income hypothesis. Thepropensity to consume is higher from regular than from transitory incomesources and higher for pensions than for child benefits and other income.Second, we propose a new decomposition technique to disentangle the impactof changes in government transfers and changes in the expenditure distributionexcluding cash transfers on movements in poverty rates. At least 30% ofthe rise in poverty between 1994 and 1998 was due to the changes in cashtransfer policy. Keeping benefits at the level of 1994, poverty would havebeen lower by around 20% in 1998.}, key = {income support} } @ARTICLE{Rich:79, author = {Richter, M. K.}, title = {Duality and Rationality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1979}, volume = {20}, pages = {131-181}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Richter1979, author = {Marcel K. Richter}, title = {Duality and Rationality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1979}, volume = {20}, pages = {131-181}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Rich:66, author = {Richter, M. K.}, title = {Revealed Preference Theory}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1966}, volume = {34}, pages = {635-645}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Richter1966, author = {Richter, M. K.}, title = {Duality and Rationality}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1966}, volume = {34}, pages = {635-645}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{RiWo:08, author = {Richter, M. K. and Wong, K.}, title = {Preference densities and social choices}, journal = {Economic Theory}, year = {2008}, volume = {36}, pages = {225-238}, number = {2}, abstract = {We discuss a ranking method that allows social pairwise rankings of alternatives to depend on more than just individuals’ pairwise rankings. This violates Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, but allows Borda’s rank-order counting, which provides a limited accounting for individual preference intensities. We capture Arrow’s rules (i.e., with IIA) and Borda’s method as two polar cases, and allow cases in between. Our main result provides the critical line dividing those degrees of intensity, or preference density, that yield positive results from those that yield negative results.}, key = {utility, preference}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.21} } @ARTICLE{RiWo:99, author = {Richter, M. K. and Wong, K.-C.}, title = {Computable Preference and Utility}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {339-354}, key = {Utility, preference} } @INCOLLECTION{Rich:84, author = {Richter, W. F.}, title = {Saving, taxation and income inequality}, booktitle = {Beitr{\"a}ge zur Neueren Steuertheorie-Studies in Contemporary Economics}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1984}, editor = {B{\"o}s, D. and Rose , M. and Seidl , C.}, volume = {7}, pages = {139-161}, address = {Berlin}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Rich:97, author = {Richter, Wolfram F.}, title = {An efficiency Analysis of consumption and production taxation with an applicationto value-added taxation}, institution = {University of Dortmund, Dept of Public Economics, Dortmund}, year = {1997}, month = {September}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Rich:83, author = {Richter, W. F.}, title = {From Ability to Pay to Concepts of Equal Sacrifice}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {20}, pages = {211-29}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{RiSc:01, author = {Richter, W. F. and Schneider, K.}, title = {Taxing Mobile Capital with Labor Market Imperfections}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2001}, volume = {8}, pages = {245-262}, abstract = {Taxing internationally mobile factors of production has been dismissed asan inefficient means of raising tax revenue. This paper addresses the questionof whether it is efficient to tax capital at source when labor marketsand the taxation of lumpsum income suffer from imperfections. Four reasonsfor taxing capital are identified: (i) institutional constraints renderingany taxation of profit income infeasible; (ii) market power in the demandfor labor; (iii) market power in the supply of labor if it increases withthe employment of capital; (iv) unemployment benefits that are not tiedto net real wages. It is argued that the case for taxing capital is notparticularly strong. By reinterpreting capital as energy the results areapplicable to the discussion about ecological tax reforms.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Richter1996, author = {Richter, Wolfram F. and Wellisch, Dieter}, title = {The provision of local public goods and factors in the presence of firm and household mobility}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {60}, pages = {73-93}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{RiWe:96, author = {Richter, Wolfram F. and Wellisch, Dieter}, title = {The provision of local public goods and factors in the presence of firmand household mobility}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {60}, pages = {73-93}, key = {Local public goods} } @ARTICLE{RiRuHo:82, author = {Rickard, J. A., Russell, A. M. and Howroyd, T. D.}, title = {A tax-evasion model with allowance for retroactive penalties}, journal = {Economic Record}, year = {1982}, volume = {58}, pages = {379-385}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Rick:86, author = {Ricketts, M.}, title = {The geometry of principal and agent: yet another use for the {E}dgeworthbox}, journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1986}, pages = {228-247}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Ricketts1986, author = {Ricketts, M.}, title = {The geometry of principal and agent: yet another use for the {E}dgeworth box}, journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1986}, pages = {228-247}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Rick:84, author = {Ricketts, M.}, title = {On the simple macroeconomics of tax evasion: an elaboration of the {P}eacock-{S}hawapproach}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1984}, volume = {39}, pages = {420-424}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Ricketts1984, author = {Ricketts, M.}, title = {On the simple macroeconomics of tax evasion: an elaboration of the {P}eacock-{S}haw approach}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1984}, volume = {39}, pages = {420-424}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{RiEs:97, author = {Ridca, S. De La and Espinosa, M. P.}, title = {Testing Employment Determination in Unionised Economies as a Repeated Game}, journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1997}, pages = {134-152}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Ried:98, author = {Ried, Walter}, title = {{QALY}s versus {HYE}s - what's right and what's wrong. A review of the controversy}, journal = {Journal of Health Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {17}, pages = {607-625}, number = {5}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Ries:87, author = {Riese, M.}, title = {An extension of the {L}orenz diagram with special reference to survival analysis}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1987}, volume = {49}, pages = {245-250}, number = {5}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Riet:90, author = {Rietveld, P.}, title = {Multidimensional inequality comparisons}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1990}, volume = {32}, pages = {187-192}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Riew:85, author = {Riew, J.}, title = {Equal Sacrifice Principle and Intertemporal Equity}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1985}, volume = {40}, pages = {274-79}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Rifk:08, author = {Rifkin, D.}, title = {An Overview of the “Tax Gap”}, institution = {Georgetown Law Faculty}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1162493}, abstract = {When taxpayers underreport their income, understate their income, or fail to file their tax returns the government must spend money to audit taxpayers, to assess the tax, to collect the tax, and to borrow money to cover the lost revenue. The amount of such noncompliance with the tax laws is called the "Tax Gap" and currently it is estimated to be $345 billion annually. This article describes the scope, the causes of, and the tools available to Congress and the IRS to close the Tax Gap. In particular, I examine the role enforcement and other methods play in closing the Tax Gap. Given the complexities involved, there is no single method that, by itself, will significantly reduce the Tax Gap. Instead, several methods - discussed herein - will need to be employed simultaneously to close the Tax Gap.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.10.01} } @ARTICLE{Rile:01, author = {Riley, J. G.}, title = {Silver signals: Twenty-five years of screening and signaling }, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2001}, volume = {39}, pages = {432-478}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{Rile:79, author = {Riley, J. G.}, title = {Testing the educational screening hypothesis}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1979}, volume = {87}, pages = {S227-S252}, key = {education} } @ARTICLE{Ring:98, author = {Ringuede, Sebastien}, title = {An efficiency wage model for small firms: Firms size and wages}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {59}, pages = {263-268}, number = {2}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Risager1997, author = {Risager, O. and Sorensen, J. R.}, title = {On the effects of firing costs when investment is endogenous: An extension of a model by {B}ertola}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1997}, pages = {1343-1354}, key = {macro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{RiSo:97, author = {Risager, O. and Sorensen, J. R.}, title = {On the effects of firing costs when investment is endogenous: An extensionof a model by {B}ertola}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1997}, pages = {1343-1354}, key = {macro} } @TECHREPORT{Risi:07, author = {Risinger, D.M.}, title = {Convicting the Innocent: An Empirically Justified Wrongful Conviction Rate}, institution = {Seton Hall Law Schoool}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, abstract = {That would make the error rate [in felony convictions] .027 percent - or to put it another way, a success rate of 99.973 percent. - Justice Antonin Scalia, concurring in Kansas v. Marsh, June 29, 2006 (quoting Joshua Marquis) The news about the astounding accuracy of felony convictions in the United States, delivered by Justice Scalia and Joshua Marquis in the passage set out epigrammatically above, would be cause for rejoicing if it were true. Imagine. Only 27 factually wrong felony convictions out of every 100,000! Unfortunately, it is not true, as the empirical data analyzed in this article demonstrates. To a great extent, those who believe that our criminal justice system rarely convicts the factually innocent and those who believe such miscarriages are rife have generally talked past each other for want of any empirically-justified factual innocence wrongful conviction rate. This article remedies at least a part of this problem by establishing the first such empirically justified wrongful conviction rate ever for a significant universe of real world serious crimes: capital rape-murders in the 1980's. Using DNA exonerations for capital rape-murders from 1982 through 1989 as a numerator, and a 406-member sample of the 2235 capital sentences imposed during this period, this article shows that 21.45%, or around 479 of those, were cases of capital rape murder. Data supplied by the Innocence Project of Cardozo Law School and newly developed for this article show that only 67% of those cases would be expected to yield usable DNA for analysis. Combining these figures and dividing the numerator by the resulting denominator, a minimum factually wrongful conviction rate for capital rape-murder in the 1980's emerges: 3.3%. The article goes on to consider the likely ceiling accompanying this 3.3% floor, arriving at a slightly softer number for the maximum factual error rate of around 5%. The article then goes on to analyze the implications of a factual error rate of 3.3%-5% for both those who currently claim errors are extremely rare, and those who claim they are extremely common. Extension of the 3.3%-5% to other capital and non-capital categories of crime is discussed, and standards of moral duty to support system reform in the light of such error rates is considered at length.}, journal = {Law \& Society}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06}, volume = {2} } @BOOK{Robb:91, title = {A Behavioral Simulation and Documented Behavior Approach to Income Tax Evasion}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1991}, author = {Robben, H. S. J.}, number = {8}, series = {Burger en Belastingen}, address = {Dewenter}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Robben1990, author = {Robben, H. S. J. and Webley, P. and Weigel, R. H. and W{\"a}rneryd, K. E. and Kinsey, K. A. and Hessing, D. J. and Alvira Martin, F. and Elffers, H. and Wahlund and van Langenhove, L. and Long, S. B., and Scholz, J. T.}, title = {Decision frame and opportunity as determinants of tax cheating: an international experimental study}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1990}, volume = {11}, pages = {341-364}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{RoWeWeWa:90, author = {Robben, H. S. J. and Webley, P. and Weigel, R. H. and W{\"a}rneryd, K. E. andKinsey, K. A. and Hessing, D. J. and Alvira Martin, F. and Elffers, H.and Wahlund, L. and van Langenhove, L. and Long, S. B. and Scholz, J. T.}, title = {Decision frame and opportunity as determinants of tax cheating: an internationalexperimental study}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1990}, volume = {11}, pages = {341-364}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Robb:38, author = {Robbins, L.}, title = {Interpersonal comparisons of utility}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1938}, volume = {43}, pages = {635-641}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{Robbins1938, author = {Robbins, L.}, title = {Interpersonal comparisons of utility}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1938}, volume = {43}, pages = {635-641}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Robe:99, author = {Julio R. Robeldo}, title = {Strategic Risk Taking When There is a Public Good to Be Provided Privately}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {403-414}, number = {3}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Robe:07, author = {Roberts, Kevin}, title = {The participant's curse and the perception of unequal treatment}, journal = {Economic Letters}, year = {2007}, volume = {97}, pages = {162 - 169}, abstract = {If participation is subject to congestion externalities then, conditional upon participation, the returns to activities are less than suggested by an unconditional valuation of returns. This phenomenon is investigated in general terms, and with respect to markets and auctions.}, key = {Auctions}, keywords = {Participation; Congestion; Entry; Markets; Auctions}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Robe:84, author = {Roberts, K. W. S.}, title = {The Theoretical limits to redistribution}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1984}, volume = {51}, pages = {177-195}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Roberts1984, author = {Roberts, K. W. S.}, title = {The Theoretical limits to redistribution}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1984}, pages = {177-195}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{RobK:80, author = {Roberts, K. W. S.}, title = {Price-independent welfare prescriptions}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1980}, volume = {13}, pages = {277-97}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{RobK:80a, author = {Roberts, Kevin W. S.}, title = {Interpersonal comparison and social choice theory}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1980}, volume = {47}, pages = {421-439}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Robe:76, title = {Generalized measure of inequality}, year = {1976}, author = {Roberts, K. W. S.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Robe:87, author = {Roberts, R.}, title = {Financing Public Goods}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1987}, volume = {95}, pages = {420-437}, key = {Public goods} } @BOOK{Robe:63, title = {Lectures on Economic Principles}, publisher = {Collins (Fontana)}, year = {1963}, author = {Robertson, D. H.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.02.11} } @ARTICLE{Robi:64, author = {Robinson, J. V.}, title = {Economic Philosophy}, year = {1964}, address = {London}, key = {hist econ thought}, publisher = {Pelican Books} } @ARTICLE{RoTu:98, author = {Robst, John and Turcotte, Leo}, title = {The effect of regulatory legislation on workers' earnings}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {59}, pages = {255-261}, number = {2}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{RoBr:99, author = {Rodgers, William M. and Bruhl, Sarah}, title = {Estimating the bias due to measurement error in the economic returns toschooling: evidence from the 1990 {F}ebruary {C}urrent {P}opulation {S}urvey}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {64}, pages = {233-239}, number = {2}, key = {Measurement error} } @TECHREPORT{Rodr:93, author = {Rodrigues, C.}, title = {Measurement and decomposition of inequality in Portugal 1980/81 - 1989/90}, institution = {University of Cambridge, Department of Applied Economics}, year = {1993}, type = {Microsimulation Unit Discussion Paper}, number = {MU93/02}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Rodr:06CT, author = {Rodriguez, J.C.}, title = {Consumption, the persistence of shocks, and asset price volatility}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {53}, pages = {1741-1760}, abstract = {In a general equilibrium setting, a temporary component in consumption introduces a wedge between the volatility of equity returns and the volatility of consumption growth. This paper explores the asset pricing consequences of this property in a model in which consumption is the sum of a permanent and a transitory component. Permanent shocks are assumed to be rare events, while transitory shocks follow a diffusion process. When calibrated to US annual data, the model matches first and second moments of equity and bond returns for preference parameters within acceptable bounds. Permanent and transitory shocks together explain the equity premium, while transitory shocks alone explain the excess volatility of returns.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{RoSa:03, author = {Rodriguez, J. G. and Salas, R.}, title = {Extended bi-polarization and inequality measures}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {2003}, volume = {9}, pages = {69-83}, key = {polarization}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.02.21} } @TECHREPORT{Rodr:07, author = {Rodr{\'i}guez, J.G.}, title = {Partial and Complete Equality-of-Opportunity Orderings}, institution = {ECINEQ}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2007-70}, month = {June}, note = {juangabriel.rodriguez@urjc.es}, abstract = {This paper proposes a partial equality-of-opportunity ordering based on the inequality-ofopportunity curve, a mechanism that gives preference to those who are worse in terms of opportunity. Moreover, it provides a complete ordering that depends on a sensitivity parameter representing the degree of priority in the equality-of-opportunity policy. The Moreno-Ternero approach is obtained as a particular case. This proposal is applied to a set of 11 countries to compare their degree of equality of opportunity. Results show the relevance for economic policy of observing inequality of opportunity over tranches. Denmark dominates, in terms of posttax income, all other economies.}, key = {equality of opportunity}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @TECHREPORT{Rodr:06MB, author = {Rodr{\'i}guez, J.}, title = {Measuring Bipolarization, Inequality, Welfare and Poverty}, institution = {ECINEQ}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {2006-39}, month = {April}, abstract = {This paper analyzes the relationship between bipolarization and inequality, welfare and poverty measures. First, we clarify the similarities and differences between bipolarization and inequality measures. Second, it is shown that bipolarization is the difference between the welfare levels of the richer and poorer income groups when feelings of identification between individuals are based on their utility functions. In fact, bipolarization is interpreted as the welfare of the richer group that is wasted to compensate for income bipolarization. Third, a relationship between bipolarization measurement and the normalized poverty deficit index is established. These findings are applied to the polarization measures of Wolfson (1994), Esteban and Ray (1994) and Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2006).}, key = {inequality}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{RoRoSa:08, author = {Rodr{\'i}guez, J. P. and Rodr{\'i}guez, J. G. amd Salas, R.}, title = {A study on the relationship between economic inequality and mobility}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2008}, volume = {99}, pages = {111-114}, number = {1}, month = {April}, abstract = {A significant positive relationship between inequality and income mobility, key for the theory of political redistribution, is found. Among the growth, dispersion and exchange mobility components, dispersion is the most important.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @TECHREPORT{Roem:08, author = {Roemer, John}, title = {A Positive Theory of Income Taxation Where Politicians Focus Upon Swing and Core Voters}, institution = {Cowles Foundation, Yale University}, year = {2008}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {1637}, abstract = {We construct an equilibrium model of party competition, in which parties are especially concerned with their core and swing voters, concerns which American political scientists have focused upon in their attempts to understand party behavior in general elections. Parties compete on a large policy space of possible income-tax policies. An element in this infinite-dimensional space is a function which maps pre-fisc income into post-fisc income. The only restrictions are that the function be continuous, and satisfy exogenously specified upper and lower bounds on its derivative, where it is differentiable. Only a fraction of each voter type will vote for each party, perhaps because of issues not modeled here or voter misperceptions of policies. Each party’s policy makers comprise two factions, one concerned with maximizing the welfare of its constituency, or its core, the other with winning over swing voters. An equilibrium is a pair of parties (endogenously determined), and a pair of policies, one for each party, in which neither party can deviate to another policy which will be assented to by both its core and swing factions. Formally, this is a Nash equilibrium where each party possesses only a quasi-order over the policy space. We fully characterize the equilibria. There are many. In a specially important case, each party proposes a piece-wise linear tax schedule, and these schedules coincide for a possibly large interval of middle-income voters, while the ‘left’ party gives more to the poor and the ‘right’ party more to the rich. An empirical section uses the data of Piketty and Saez on taxation in the US during the twentieth century to assess the model’s predictions. We argue that the model is roughly confirmed.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {political economy, income taxation, political equilibrium}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @TECHREPORT{Roem:04, author = {Roemer, J. E.}, title = {Distribution and politics: A brief history and prospect}, institution = {Cowles Foundation}, year = {2004}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{Roem:02, author = {Roemer, J. E.}, title = {Equality of opportunity: A progress report}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2002}, volume = {19}, pages = {455-471}, key = {equality}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/content/qtxqfbvyh571kyqu/fulltext.pdf} } @ARTICLE{Roem:99, author = {Roemer, John E.}, title = {The democratic political Economy of progressive income taxation}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {1-19}, number = {1}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{Roem:96, title = {Theories of Distributive Justice}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1996}, author = {Roemer, John E.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Roem:93, author = {Roemer, John E.}, title = {A pragmatic theory of responsibility for the egalitarian planner}, journal = {Philosophy and Public Affairs}, year = {1993}, volume = {22}, pages = {146-166}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Roemer1993, author = {Roemer, John E.}, title = {A pragmatic theory of responsibility for the egalitarian planner}, journal = {Philosophy and Public Affairs}, year = {1993}, volume = {22}, pages = {146-66}, key = {equity}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Roem:86, author = {Roemer, John E.}, title = {Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {101}, pages = {751-784}, number = {1}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Roem:85, author = {Roemer, John E.}, title = {Equality of talent}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {1985}, volume = {1}, pages = {151-87}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{RoAaCoFrJeLeMaPaPoRu:03, author = {Roemer, J. E. and Aaberge, R. and Colombino, U. and Fritzell, J. and JenkinsS. P. and Lefranc, A. and Marx, I. and Page, M., and Pommer, E. and Ruiz-Castillo,J. et al}, title = {To What Extent Do Fiscal Regimes Equalize Opportunities for Income AcquisitionAmong Citizens?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {539-565}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Roemer2003, author = {Roemer, J. E. and Aaberge, R. and Colombino, U. and Fritzell, J. and Jenkins S. P. and Lefranc, A. and Marx, I. and Page, M., and Pommer, E. and Ruiz-Castillo, J. et al}, title = {To What Extent Do Fiscal Regimes Equalize Opportunities for Income Acquisition Among Citizens?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {539-565}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Roge:85, author = {Rogerson, William P.}, title = {The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1985}, volume = {53}, pages = {1357-1368}, number = {6}, key = {information} } @TECHREPORT{RoHaHu:04, author = {Rohwedder,S. and Haider,S. and Hurd,M.}, title = {Increases in wealth among the elderly in the early 1990s: How much is dueto survey design}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, number = {income distribution: empirical}, abstract = {The Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) study shows alarge increase in reported total wealth between 1993 and 1995. Such anincrease is not found in other US household surveys around that period.This paper examines one source of this difference. We find that in AHEAD1993 ownership rates of stocks, CDs, bonds, and checking and saving accountswere underreported, resulting in under-measurement of wealth in 1993, anda substantial increase in wealth from 1993 to 1995. The explanation forthe under-reporting is a combination of question sequence and wording inthe AHEAD survey instrument.} } @ARTICLE{RoWa:08, author = {Roine, Jesper and Waldenstrom, Daniel}, title = {The evolution of top incomes in an egalitarian society: Sweden, 1903–2004}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {92}, pages = {366 - 387}, abstract = {This study presents new homogenous series of top income shares in Sweden over the period 1903–2004. We find that, starting from levels of inequality approximately equal to those in other Western countries at the time, the income share of the Swedish top decile drops sharply over the first eighty years of the twentieth century. Most of the decrease takes place before the expansion of the welfare state and by 1950 Swedish top income shares were already lower than in other countries. The fall is almost entirely due to a dramatic drop in the top percentile explained mostly by decreases in capital income, while the lower half of the top decile – consisting mainly of wage earners – experiences virtually no change over this period. In the past decades top income shares evolve very differently depending on whether capital gains are included or not. When included, Sweden's experience resembles that in the U.S. and the U.K. with sharp increases in top incomes. Excluding capital gains, Sweden looks more like the continental European countries where top income shares have remained relatively constant. A possible interpretation of our results is that Sweden over the past 20 years has become a country where it is more important to make the right financial investments than to earn a lot to become rich.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Income inequality; Income distribution; Wealth distribution; Top incomes; Welfare State; Sweden; Taxation; Capital gains}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @TECHREPORT{RoRo:07, author = {Romer, Christina and Romer, David}, title = {Do Tax Cuts Starve the Beast? The Effect of Tax Changes on Government Spending}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {13548}, abstract = {The hypothesis that decreases in taxes reduce future government spending is often cited as a reason for cutting taxes. However, because taxes change for many reasons, examinations of the relationship between overall measures of taxation and subsequent spending are plagued by problems of reverse causation and omitted variable bias. To deal with these problems, this paper examines the behavior of government expenditures following legislated tax changes that narrative sources suggest are largely uncorrelated with other factors affecting spending. The results provide no support for the hypothesis that tax cuts restrain government spending; indeed, they suggest that tax cuts may actually increase spending. The results also indicate that the main effect of tax cuts on the government budget is to induce subsequent legislated tax increases. Examination of four episodes of major tax cuts reinforces these conclusions.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{RoSt:94, author = {Ronchetti, E. and Staudte, R. G.}, title = {A robust version of {M}allows's {$C_p$}}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1994}, volume = {89}, pages = {550--559}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{RoTr:01, author = {Ronchetti, E. and Trojani, F.}, title = {Robust Inference with {GMM} Estimators}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2001}, volume = {101}, pages = {37-69}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{RoPoSc:05, author = {Rondeau,D. and Poe,G. and Schulze,W.}, title = {VCM or PPM? A comparison of the performance of two voluntary public goodsmechanisms}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {1581-1592}, abstract = {Little progress has been made toward understanding the relative performanceof the two mechanisms most widely used for fundraising: the Voluntary Contribution(VCM) and Provision Point (PPM) mechanisms. This paper provides directcomparisons of the relative performance of variants of the VCM and PPMas they are most commonly implemented in the field. The research makesuse of 1296 individual observations from 721 subjects, including 40 observationsfrom a field experiment. A meta-analysis of the determinants of contributionlevels and bootstrap estimates of the relative efficiency of the two mechanismsprovide novel analyses of public goods experimental data. Overall, thePPM is found to increase total contributions, to be more responsive tochanges in induced value, and to be generally more efficient than the VCM.For public goods with a benefit-cost ratio in the interval [1, 1.4), however,the VCM captures a greater portion of available benefits than the PPM.}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Rondeau1999, author = {Rondeau, D. and Schulze, W. D. and Poe, G. L.}, title = {Voluntary Revelation of the Demand for Public Goods Using a Provision Point Mechanism}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {455-470}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{RoScPo:99, author = {Rondeau, D. and Schulze, W. D. and Poe, G. L.}, title = {Voluntary Revelation of the Demand for Public Goods Using a Provision PointMechanism}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {455-470}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Rong:97, author = {Rongve, I.}, title = {Statistical Inference for poverty indices with fixed poverty lines}, journal = {Applied Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {29}, pages = {387-392}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{Rong:95, author = {Rongve, I.}, title = {Statistical {I}nference for {P}overty {I}ndices with {F}ixed {P}overty {L}ines}, institution = {University of Regina, Canada}, year = {1995}, type = {Economics Discussion Paper}, number = {54}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{RoSt:01, author = {Rose,A. and Stevens,B.}, title = {An Economic Analysis of Flexible Permit Trading in the {K}yoto Protocol}, journal = {International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {1}, pages = {219-242}, abstract = {This paper evaluates the relative gains from augmenting or restricting severalof the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. A nonlinear programmingmodel of international emissions trading is used to assess the net benefitsof extending trading across time periods and across countries (Joint Implementation),and including the developing world (Clean Development Mechanism). The effectof limiting permit purchases (supplementarity) is also evaluated. The analysisis intended to help guide further climate negotiations by identifying flexibilitymechanisms that contribute the most to enhancing the gains from greenhousegas mitigation and identifying restrictions that detract the most fromthese gains.}, key = {environment} } @ARTICLE{Rose:99CS, author = {Rose, E.}, title = {Consumption Smoothing and Excess Female Mortality in Rural India}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1999}, volume = {81}, pages = {41-49}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{RoMc:96, author = {Rose, R. and McAllister, I.}, title = {Is {M}oney the {M}easure of {W}elfare in {R}ussia?}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1996}, volume = {42}, pages = {75-90}, number = {1}, month = {March}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{Rose:99CA, title = {Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1999}, author = {Rose-Ackerman, S.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {underground} } @BOOK{Rose:78, title = {Corruption: A Study in Political Economy}, publisher = {Academic Press}, year = {1978}, author = {Rose-Ackerman, Susan}, address = {New York}, key = {Corruption} } @ARTICLE{Rosei2001, author = {Rosei, A. and Stevens, B.}, title = {An Economic Analysis of Flexible Permit Trading in the {K}yoto Protocol}, journal = {International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {1}, pages = {219-242}, key = {environment}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Rose:99PP, author = {Rosen, S.}, title = {Potato paradoxes}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {107}, pages = {S294-S313}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{RoMa:08, author = {Rosenblatt, J. and Martinas, K.}, title = {Inequality indicators and distinguishability in economics}, journal = {Physica A}, year = {2008}, volume = {387}, pages = {2047 - 2054}, abstract = {Money has a material counterpart, such as banknotes or coins, and an ideal expression, monetary units. In the latter case, it is boson-like: individual incomes have no a priori limit, and their units are not distinguishable from each other in economic processes. Individuals, on the other hand, usually occupy one job at a time which makes them akin to fermions.We apply to individual incomes down-to-earth statistical calculations, similar to those for quantum particles, and obtain expressions for the cumulative distribution function, probability density and Lorenz function resulting from the simultaneous use of both statistics. They provide extremely good fits to corresponding data on French income distributions. On this basis, we propose a new entropic inequality indicator.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Economics; Quantum statistics; Inequality; Income}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Rose:55, author = {Rosenbluth, G.}, title = {Measures of concentration}, booktitle = {Business Concentration and Price Policy}, publisher = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {1955}, editor = {Stigler, G. J}, address = {Princeton}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Rosenbluth1955, author = {Rosenbluth, G.}, title = {Measures of concentration}, booktitle = {Business Concentration and Price Policy}, year = {1955}, editor = {Stigler, G. J}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Rose:51, author = {Rosenbluth, G.}, title = {Note on Mr. {S}chutz's measure of income inequality}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1951}, volume = {41}, pages = {235-237}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Rose:99HP, author = {Rosenthal, Leslie}, title = {House Prices and Local Taxes in the {UK}}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {61-76}, number = {1}, key = {housing} } @ARTICLE{Rose:01, author = {Rosenzweig, M.R.}, title = {Savings Behaviour in Low-Income Countries}, journal = {Oxford Review of Economic Policy}, year = {2001}, volume = {17}, pages = {40-54}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{Rose:93, author = {Rosenzweig, M.R.}, title = {Women, Insurance Capital, and Economic Development in Rural India}, journal = {The Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1993}, volume = {28}, pages = {735-758}, note = {Special Issue: Symposium on Investments in Women's Human Capital and Development}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{RoSt:89, author = {Rosenzweig, M.R. and Stark, O.}, title = {Consumption Smoothing, Migration, and Marriage: Evidence from Rural India}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1989}, volume = {97}, pages = {905-926}, abstract = {The authors hypothesize the prevalent phenomenon of marriage migration of women in lower income countries can be seen as a way of mitigating income risk and reducing consumption variability. Examining data from rural India supports this view, and the authors conclude that marriage from migration reduces food consumption variability (through interfamily transfers), while the greater the variability of farmers’ profits, the longer-distance the marriage. This view is also supported (although argued that the contribution of interhousehold transfers play a small role in consumption smoothing) in Rosenzweig, M.R., “Women, Insurance Capital, and Economic Development in Rural India”, The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 28, No. 4, Special Issue: Symposium on Investments in Women's Human Capital and Development. (Autumn, 1993), pp. 735-758. Some similar theme in Dekker and Hoogeveen (2002). Of a related theme is Rose (1999).}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{RoWo:93, author = {Rosenzweig, M.R. and Wolpin, K.I.}, title = {Credit Market Constraints, Consumption Smoothing, and the Accumulation of Durable Production Assets in Low-Income Countries: Investments in Bullocks in India}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1993}, volume = {101}, pages = {223-244}, abstract = {The authors estimate a finite-horizon, structural dynamic model of agricultural investment behavior in India that incorporates, among other features of low income agricultural environments, the use of investment assets both to generate income and to smooth consumption. They suggest that bullocks can reasonably be treated as such an asset. They conclude that the model fits well for low and middle incomes, but not for high incomes, who are less prone to consumption variability. They assume that all consumption smoothing is done via bullock accumulation, but nonetheless argue that there exists underinvestment in bullocks, which, combined with risk aversion, borrowing constraints, and low incomes, result to output losses, lower incomes, and income volatility.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{Rosenzweig2000, author = {Rosenzweig, M. R. and Wolpin, K. I.}, title = {Natural "Natural Experiments" in Economics}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2000}, volume = {38}, pages = {827-874}, key = {Experiments}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{RoWo:00NN, author = {Rosenzweig, M. R. and Wolpin, K. I.}, title = {Natural “Natural Experiments” in Economics}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2000}, volume = {38}, pages = {827–874}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{Ross1978, author = {Ross, I.}, title = {Why the Underground Economy is Booming}, journal = {Fortune}, year = {1978}, pages = {92-98}, number = {Oct. 9}, key = {crime}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Ross:78, author = {Ross, I.}, title = {Why the Underground Economy is Booming}, journal = {Fortune}, year = {1978}, volume = {Oct. 9}, pages = {92-98}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Ross:73, author = {Ross, S. A.}, title = {The economic theory of agency: the principal's problem}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1973}, volume = {63}, pages = {193-197}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{Ross:85, author = {Rossi, J. W.}, title = {Notes on a new functional form for the {L}orenz curve}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1985}, volume = {17}, pages = {193-197}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Roth:95IN, author = {Roth, A. E.}, title = {Introduction}, booktitle = {The Handbook of Experimental Economics}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1991}, editor = {Kagel, J. H. and Roth, A. E.}, pages = {68-97}, address = {Princeton, N. J.}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{Roth:98, author = {Rothman, Philip}, title = {Is the size distribution of income stationary?}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, pages = {1-12}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{RoSt:76, author = {Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {Equilibrum in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the economics ofImperfect Information}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1976}, volume = {90}, pages = {629-649}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{Rothschild1976, author = {Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {Equilibrum in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the economics of Imperfect Information}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1976}, volume = {90}, pages = {629-649}, key = {information}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{RoSt:73, author = {Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {Some further results on the measurement of inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1973}, volume = {6}, pages = {188-203}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{RoSt:72, author = {Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {Addendum to Increasing risk: {I. A} definition}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1972}, volume = {5}, pages = {306}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{RoSt:71, author = {Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {Increasing risk: {II. I}ts economic consequences}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1971}, volume = {3}, pages = {66-84}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{RoSt:70, author = {Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {Increasing risk: {I. A} definition}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1970}, volume = {2}, pages = {225-243}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Roth:99, author = {Rothschild, R.}, title = {Cartel Stability When Costs Are Heterogeneous}, journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organisation}, year = {1999}, volume = {17}, pages = {717-734}, key = {micro}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{Rous:84, author = {Rousseeuw, P. J.}, title = {Least Median of Squares Regression}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1984}, volume = {79}, pages = {871-880}, key = {STATISTICS} } @BOOK{RoLe:87, title = {Robust Regression and Outlier Detection}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1987}, author = {Rousseeuw, P. J. and Leroy, A. M.}, address = {New York}, key = {STATISTICS} } @ARTICLE{RoyR:47, author = {Roy, R.}, title = {La distribution de revenu entre les divers biens}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1947}, volume = {15}, pages = {205-225}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{HMSO:77, title = {Third Report on the Standing Reference, Cmnd 6999}, publisher = {HMSO}, year = {1977}, author = {{Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth}}, address = {London}, key = {wealth} } @BOOK{HMSO:76, title = {Second Report on the Standing Reference, Cmnd 6626}, publisher = {HMSO}, year = {1976}, author = {{Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth}}, address = {London}, key = {wealth} } @BOOK{HMSO:75, title = {Initial Report on the Standing Reference, Cmnd 6171}, publisher = {HMSO}, year = {1975}, author = {{Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth}}, address = {London}, key = {wealth} } @BOOK{HMSO:55, title = {Final Report on the Standing Reference, Cmnd 9474}, publisher = {HMSO}, year = {1955}, author = {{Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income }}, address = {London}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Rubi:81, author = {Rubin, D. B.}, title = {The {B}ayesian Bootstrap}, journal = {Annals of Statistics}, year = {1981}, volume = {9}, pages = {130-134}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{Rubi:06, author = {Rubinstein, Ariel}, title = {A Sceptic's Comment on the Study of Economics}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2006}, volume = {116}, pages = {1 - 9}, abstract = {A survey was carried out among two groups of undergraduate economics students and four groups of students in mathematics, law, philosophy and business administration. The main survey question involved a conflict between profit maximisation and the welfare of the workers who would be fired to achieve it. Significant differences were found between the choices of the groups. The results were reinforced by a survey conducted among readers of an Israeli business newspaper and PhD students of Harvard. It is argued that the overly mathematical methods used to teach economics encourage students to lean towards profit maximisation.}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @BOOK{Rubi:00, title = {Economics and Language}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2000}, author = {Rubinstein, A.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Rubi:99, author = {Rubinstein, A.}, title = {Experience from a Course in Game Theory:Pre- and Post-Class Problem Setsas a Didactic Device}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {1999}, volume = {28}, pages = {155-170}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{Rubinstein1999, author = {Rubinstein, A.}, title = {Experience from a Course in Game Theory:Pre- and Post-Class Problem Sets as a Didactic Device}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {1999}, volume = {28}, pages = {155-170}, key = {Experiments}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Rubinstein1989, author = {Rubinstein, Ariel}, title = {The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under "Almost Common Knowledge"}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1989}, volume = {79}, pages = {385--391}, number = {3}, abstract = {The paper addresses a paradoxical game-theoretic example which is closely related to the coordinated attack problem. Two players have to play one of two possible coordination games. Only one of them receives information about the coordination game to be played. It is shown that the situation with "almost common knowledge" is very different from when the coordination game played is common knowledge.}, copyright = {Copyright 1989 American Economic Association}, jstor_articletype = {Full Length Article}, jstor_date = {198906}, jstor_formatteddate = {Jun., 1989}, language = {EN}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {American Economic Association}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Rubi:82, author = {Rubinstein, A.}, title = {Perfect equilibriuim in a bargaining game}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1982}, volume = {50}, pages = {97-109}, key = {games} } @INCOLLECTION{Rues:87, author = {{Ruesga Benito}, S. M.}, title = {La econom{\'i}a sumergida en {E}spa{\~n}a}, booktitle = {La Econom{\'i}a Sumergida}, publisher = {Instituto de Estudios Econ{\'o}micos}, year = {1987}, address = {Madrid}, key = {crime} } @INCOLLECTION{RuesgaBenito1987, author = {{Ruesga Benito}, S. M.}, title = {La econom\'ia sumergida en {E}spa\~na}, booktitle = {in La Econom\'ia Sumergida}, publisher = {Instituto de Estudios Econ\'omicos}, year = {1987}, address = {Madrid}, key = {crime}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Ru:00, author = {Ruffle, Bradley J.}, title = {Some factors affecting demand withholding in posted-offer markets}, journal = {Economic Theory}, year = {2000}, volume = {16}, pages = {529--544}, number = {3}, month = nov, abstract = {Summary. Both oligopoly theory and experiments are concerned almost uniquely with sellers' behavior. Buyers' ability to exhibit non-trivial behavior in different market institutions remains unaddressed. This paper investigates the impact of three variables (number of buyers, surplus division at the market-clearing price and information revelation) on strategic and fairness-motivated demand withholding. Demand withholding and its ability to force lower prices increase as the number of buyers or the share of surplus earned by the buyers decreases. However, increasing the information revealed to subjects about the surplus inequality favoring sellers mildly facilitates collusion among sellers rather than provoking demand withholding as conjectured.}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.11.17} } @ARTICLE{Ruff:99, author = {Ruffle, Bradley J.}, title = {Gift giving with emotions}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1999}, volume = {39}, pages = {399-420}, number = {4}, key = {social custom} } @ARTICLE{Rugg:99, author = {Giuseppe Ruggeri}, title = {The Marginal Cost of Public Funds in Closed and Small Open Economies}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {41-60}, number = {1}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{RuWi:89, author = {Ruggles, P. and Williams, R.,}, title = {Longitudinal Measures of Poverty: Accounting for Income and Assets overTime,}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1989}, volume = {3,}, pages = {225-243}, number = {35}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Ruiz:07, author = {Ruiz del Portal, X.}, title = {The Problem of Optimum Income Taxation: A Remark on its Monotonicity Constraint}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {9}, pages = {265 - 283}, abstract = {We apply a generalized version of Brito and Oakland’s (1977) approach to deal with monotonicity constraints in the nonlinear taxation problem of Mirrlees (1971). This allows removing some analytical weaknesses in the derivation of the necessary conditions that characterize the optimal income tax, impossible to handle with the type of variation used for the proof in Mirrlees (1969). The qualitative properties of the tax are thus restored provided the candidate consumption functions are restricted to be twice differentiable, except on countably many points, with no corners near the intervals where they show a strictly concave shape.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @TECHREPORT{RuizC:96, author = {Ruiz-Castillo, J.}, title = {A simplified model for social welfare analysis. An application to {S}pain1973-74 to 1980-81}, institution = {Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departmento de Econom\'{\i}a}, year = {1996}, type = {working paper}, number = {96-04}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Ruiz-Castillo1995, author = {Ruiz-Castillo, J.}, title = {Caracter\'{\i}sticas geogr\'aficas en la evoluci\'on del nivel de vida en {E}spa\~na, 1973-74 a 1980-81}, journal = {Hacienda P\'ublica Espa\~nola}, year = {1995}, volume = {133}, pages = {145-169}, key = {INCOME DISTRIBUTION:EMPIRICAL}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Ruiz-Castillo1995a, author = {Ruiz-Castillo, J.}, title = {Income Distribution and social welfare: a review essay}, journal = {Investigaciones Econ\'omicas}, year = {1995}, volume = {19}, pages = {3-34}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{RuizC:95a, author = {Ruiz-Castillo, J.}, title = {Income Distribution and social welfare: a review essay}, journal = {Investigaciones Econ{\'o}micas}, year = {1995}, volume = {19}, pages = {3-34}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{RuizC:95b, author = {Ruiz-Castillo, J.}, title = {Caracter\'{\i}sticas geogr{\'a}ficas en la evoluci{\'o}n del nivel de vida en {E}spa{\~n}a,1973-74 a 1980-81}, journal = {Hacienda P{\'u}blica Espa{\~n}ola}, year = {1995}, volume = {133}, pages = {145-169}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{RuCa:87, author = {Ruiz-Castillo, J.}, title = {La Medici{\'o}n de la Pobreza y de la Desigualdad en Espa{\~n}a}, institution = {Banco de Espa{\~n}a}, year = {1987}, type = {Estudios Econ{\'o}micos}, number = {42}, address = {Madrid}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{Ruiz-Castillo1987, author = {Ruiz-Castillo, J.}, title = {La Medici\'on de la Pobreza y de la Desigualdad en Espa\~na}, institution = {Banco de Espa\~na}, year = {1987}, type = {Estudios Econ\'omicos}, number = {42}, address = {Madrid}, key = {INCOME DISTRIBUTION:EMPIRICAL}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Ruiz-Huerta1994, author = {Ruiz-Huerta, J{\'e}sus and Mart\'inez, R.}, title = {La pobreza en {E}spa\~na: ?`{Q}u\'e nos muestran las {E}ncuestas de {P}resupuestos {F}amiliares?}, journal = {Documentaci\'on Social}, year = {1994}, volume = {96}, pages = {15-109}, key = {POVERTY}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{RHMa:94, author = {Ruiz-Huerta, J{\'e}sus and Mart{\'i}nez, R.}, title = {La pobreza en {E}spa{\~n}a: ?`{Q}u{\'e} nos muestran las {E}ncuestas de {P}resupuestos{F}amiliares?}, journal = {Documentaci{\'o}n Social}, year = {1994}, volume = {96}, pages = {15-109}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Rummery1999, author = {Rummery, S. and Vella, F. and Verbeek, M.}, title = {Estimating the Returns to Education for Australian Youth Via Rank-Order Instrumental Variables}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {491-507}, key = {Education, training}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{RuVeVe:99, author = {Rummery, S. and Vella, F. and Verbeek, M.}, title = {Estimating the Returns to Education for Australian Youth Via Rank-OrderInstrumental Variables}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {491-507}, key = {Education, training} } @BOOK{Runc:66, title = {Relative Deprivation and Social Justice}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {1966}, author = {Runciman, W. G.}, address = {London}, key = {Social justice} } @ARTICLE{Russ:85, author = {Russell, R. R.}, title = {A note on decomposable inequality measures}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1985}, volume = {52}, pages = {347-352}, number = {4}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Russ:64, author = {Russet, B. M.}, title = {Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics}, journal = {World Politics}, year = {1964}, volume = {16}, pages = {442-454}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Russ:04, author = {Russo, Benjamin}, title = {A cost-benefit analysis of R\&D tax incentives}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {37}, pages = {313-335}, number = {2}, abstract = {Although technical knowledge generates spillover benefits, production oftechnical knowledge creates congestion externalities;th us, private R&Dinvestment could be inefficient. A computable general equilibrium modelis used to rank tax incentives by their effects on research effort andmeasure welfare effects. Five results stand out: R&D tax credits producerelatively large increases in research effort and welfare. Lower corporateincome tax rates and ITCs for downstream users of high-tech productioninputs rank second. Revenue losses from lower personal income tax ratescan produce welfare losses. Ironically, ITCs for upstream producers ofinnovative inputs are ineffective. Incremental R&D credits dominate comprehensivecredits.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{RuPh:97, author = {Rust,J. and Phelan,C.}, title = {How Social Security and Medicare Affect Retirement Behavior In a World ofIncomplete Markets}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {781-831}, abstract = {This paper provides an empirical analysis of how the U.S.Social Securityand Medicare insurance system affects the labor supply of older males inthe presence of incomplete markets for loans, annuities, and health insurance.We estimate a dynamic programming (DP) model of the joint labor supplyand Social Security acceptance decision, focusing on a sample of malesin the low to middle income brackets whose only pension is Social Security.The DP model delivers a rich set of predictions about the dynamics of retirmentbehavior, and comparisons of actual vs. predicted behavior show that theDP model is able to account for a awide variety of phenomena observed inthe data, including the pronounced peaks in the distribution of retirementages at 62 anad 65 (the ages of early and normal eligibility for SocialSecurity benefits, respectively). We identify a significant fraction of"health insurance constrained" individuals who have no form of retireehealth insurance other than Medicare, and who only obtain fairly pricedprivate health insurance via their employer's group health plan. The combinationof significant individual risk aversion and a long taliled (Pareto) distributionof health care expenditures implies that there is a significant "securityvalue" for these individuals to remain employed until they are eligiblefor Medicare coverage at age 65. Overall, our model suggest that a numberof heretofore puzzling aspects of retirement behavior can viewed as artifactsof particular details of the Social Security rules, whose incentive effectsare especially strong for lower income individuals and those who do nothave access to fairly priced loans, annuities, and health insurance.}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Ruth:55, author = {Rutherford, R. S. G.}, title = {Income Distribution: A New Model}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1955}, volume = {23}, pages = {277-294}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{RuWi:00, author = {Rutstr{\"o}m , E. Elisabet and Williams, Melonie B.}, title = {Entitlements and Fairness: An Experimental Study of Distributive Preferences}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {2000}, volume = {43}, pages = {75-89}, abstract = {Under three different rules for allocation of initial income we elicit experimentalsubjects' pref-erences for income redistribution using an incentive compatibleelicitation mechanism. The three income allocation rules are designed tocapture preferences for distributive justice among sub-jects. The concernis motivated by claims in some of the experimental economics literaturethat non-self-interested motives often underlie individual behavior. Wecannot reject self-interest in fa-vor of any redistribution motives basedon our observations. Almost all individuals chose the income distributionwhich maximized their own income -high income individuals chose no redistributionand low income individuals chose perfect equality in income distribution.}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Rysc:99, title = {Income Inequality in {A}merica: An Analysis of Trends}, publisher = {M.E. Sharpe}, year = {1999}, author = {Ryscavage, P.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.10} } @ARTICLE{Roed2002, author = {R{\o}ed, K. and Str{\o}m, S.}, title = {Progressive Taxes and the Labour Market: Is the Trade-off Between Equality and Efficiency Inevitable?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {2002}, volume = {16}, pages = {227-286}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{RoSt:02, author = {R{\o}ed, K. and Str{\o}m, S.}, title = {Progressive Taxes and the Labour Market: Is the Trade-off Between Equalityand Efficiency Inevitable?}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {2002}, volume = {16}, pages = {227-286}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{HaSc:99, author = {Hamermesh D. S. and Scoones W. D.}, title = {Policy Equilibria in a Federal System: The Effects of Higher Tax Ceilingsfor Unemployment Assistance}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {74}, pages = {191-213}, key = {Public economics} } @ARTICLE{SaVa:99, author = {Saari, D. G. and Valognes, F.}, title = {The Geometry of Black's Single Peakedness and Related Conditions}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {429-456}, key = {social choice} } @ARTICLE{SaGr:00, author = {Sabelhaus, J. and Groen, J.A.}, title = {Can Permanent-Income Theory Explain Cross-Sectional Consumption Patterns?}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2000}, volume = {82}, pages = {431-438}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @TECHREPORT{Sabi:08, author = {Sabirianova Peter, Klara}, title = {Falling Tax Evasion: How Much Can Tax Rates and Labor Regulations Explain?}, institution = {Georgia State University, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {08-10}, abstract = {The study examines if recent reforms in taxation and labor regulations in several transition and developing countries contributed to the observed decline in tax evasion. It uses the Business Environment and Economic Performance Survey, a unified firm survey in 33 countries conducted in 1999-2005. The paper finds a strong positive and statistically significant effect of various measures of taxation and regulation on sales underreporting.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {tax evasion, tax rate, flat tax, labor regulation, transition}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Sadk:76OI, author = {Sadka, E.}, title = {On income distribution, incentive effects and optimal income taxation}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1976}, volume = {43}, pages = {261-268}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.11} } @ARTICLE{Sadk:76OP, author = {Sadka, E.}, title = {On income distribution, incentive effects and optimal income taxation}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1976}, volume = {66}, pages = {931-935}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Saez:04DO, author = {Saez, Emmanuel}, title = {Direct or indirect tax instruments for redistribution: short-run versus long-run}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {503-518}, abstract = {Optimal tax theory has shown that, under simple assumptions, indirect taxationsuch as production subsidies, tariffs, or differentiated commodity taxation,are sub-optimal and that redistribution should be achieved solely withthe direct income tax. However, these important results of optimal taxtheory, namely production efficiency and uniform commodity taxation undernonlinear income taxation, have been shown to break down when labor taxationis based on income only and when there is imperfect substitution of labortypes in the production function. These results in favor of indirect taxinstruments are valid in the short-run when skills are exogenous and individualscannot move from occupation to occupation. In the long-run, it is morerealistic to assume that individuals choose their occupation based on therelative after-tax rewards. This paper shows that, in that context, productionefficiency and the uniform commodity tax result are restored. Therefore,in a long-run context, direct income taxation should be preferred to indirecttax instruments to raise revenue and achieve redistribution.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Saez:04OT, author = {Saez, E.}, title = {The Optimal Treatment of Tax Expenditures}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {2657-2684}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @TECHREPORT{Saez:02OP, author = {Saez, E.}, title = {Optimal progressive capital income taxes in the infinite horizon model}, year = {2002}, type = {NBER Working Paper}, number = {9046}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Saez:02TD, author = {Saez, E.}, title = {The Desirability of Commodity Taxation under Non-linear Income Taxation and Heterogeneous Tastes}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {83}, pages = {217-230}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.10} } @ARTICLE{Saez:01, author = {Saez, E.}, title = {Using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {2001}, volume = {68}, pages = {205-229}, key = {Optimal taxation} } @INCOLLECTION{SaPi:07, author = {Saez, E. and Piketty, T.}, title = {Income and Wage Inequality in the {U}nited {S}tates, 1913-2002}, booktitle = {Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @INCOLLECTION{SaPiDe:07, author = {Saez, E. and Piketty, T. and Dell, T.}, title = {Income and Wealth Concentration in Switzerland over the Twentieth Century}, booktitle = {Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @ARTICLE{SaVe:05, author = {Saez, E. and Veall, M.R.}, title = {The Evolution of High Incomes in {N}orthern {A}merica: Lessons from {C}anadian Evidence}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {2005}, volume = {95}, pages = {831-849}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.03.28} } @ARTICLE{SaSe:01, author = {Safra, Z. and Segal, U.}, title = {Rank Dependent Preferences Without Ranking Axioms}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {35}, pages = {547-562}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{SaSeSp:90, author = {Safra, Z. and Segal, U. and Spivak A}, title = {Preference Reversal and Non-Expected Utility behavior}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1990}, volume = {80}, pages = {922-930}, key = {uncertainty} } @TECHREPORT{SaSeSp:88, author = {Safra, Z. and Segal, U. and Spivak, A.}, title = {Preference Reversal and its Relation to other 'Paradoxes': A Non-ExpectedUtility Analysis}, institution = {Foerder Institute for Economic Research}, year = {1988}, type = {Discussion Paper}, address = {Tel Aviv University}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Safra2003, author = {Safra, Zvi and Weissengrin, Einat}, title = {Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem with a restricted domain}, journal = {Social Choice Welfare}, year = {2003}, volume = {20}, pages = {177-187}, abstract = {In this paper we extend Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem by showing that the large domain of social lotteries can be significantly restricted - it is su‰cient that the domain consists only of constant extended lotteries.}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SaWe:03, author = {Safra, Zvi and Weissengrin, Einat}, title = {Harsanyi’s impartial observer theorem with a restricted domain}, journal = {Social Choice Welfare}, year = {2003}, volume = {20}, pages = {177-187}, abstract = {In this paper we extend Harsanyi’s impartial observer theorem by showingthat the large domain of social lotteries can be significantly restricted– it is su‰cient that the domain consists only of constant extended lotteries.}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{SaPo:00, author = {Saha, A. and Poole, G.}, title = {The economics of crime and punishment: An analysis of optimal penalty}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {191-196}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Saha:03, author = {Saha, Bibhas}, title = {Harassment, corruption and tax policy: a comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2003}, volume = {19}, pages = {893 - 897}, abstract = {This comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75–94] shows that their basic model can be simplified by an alternative formulation. A corrupt auditor gives two choices to a taxpayer: pay bribe and evade tax or be overtaxed. Although harassment can be redressed through court, the taxpayer chooses to pay bribe. However, as this note discovers, the bribe–income ratio will critically depend on whether the taxpayer can afford the court fees. This may lead different income groups to have different preferences for corruption.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Corruption; Harassment}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{SaYo:00, author = {Sahn, D. E. and Younger, S. D.}, title = {Expenditure incidence in {A}frica: microeconomic evidence}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2000}, volume = {21}, pages = {329-347}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{SaDi:84, author = {Said, S. E. and Dickey, D. A.}, title = {Testing for unit roots in auto-regressive moving average models of unknown order}, journal = {Biometrika}, year = {1984}, volume = {71}, pages = {599-607}, key = {tests}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Sain:96, author = {Saint-Paul, Gilles}, title = {Unemployment and increasing private returns to human capital}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {61}, pages = {1-20}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Sain:99, author = {Sainty, Barbara}, title = {Achieving greater cooperation in a noisy prisoner's dilemma: An experimentalinvestigation}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1999}, volume = {39}, pages = {421-435}, number = {4}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Sala-I-Martin1996, author = {Sala-I-Martin, X.}, title = {Regional Cohesion: Evidence and Theories of Regional Growth and Convergence}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1996}, volume = {40}, pages = {1325-1352}, key = {growth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{SaMa:02, author = {{Sala-i-Martin}, X.}, title = {The World Distribution Of Income (Estimated From Individual Country Distributions)}, institution = {National Bureau Of Economic Research}, year = {2002}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {8933}, address = {1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Sala:96, author = {Sala-{i}-Martin, X.}, title = {Regional Cohesion: Evidence and Theories of Regional Growth and Convergence}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1996}, volume = {40}, pages = {1325-1352}, key = {regional} } @ARTICLE{Sala:06, author = {Sala-{i}-{M}artin, X.}, title = {The World Distribution of Income: Falling Poverty and ... Convergence, Period}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {121}, pages = {351-397}, abstract = {We estimate the World Distribution of Income by integrating individual income distributions for 138 countries between 1970 and 2000. Country distributions are constructed by combining national accounts GDP per capita to anchor the mean with survey data to pin down the dispersion. Poverty rates and head counts are reported for four specific poverty lines. Rates in 2000 were between one-third and one-half of what they were in 1970 for all four lines. There were between 250 and 500 million fewer poor in 2000 than in 1970. We estimate eight indexes of income inequality implied by our world distribution of income. All of them show reductions in global inequality during the 1980s and 1990s.}, key = {income distribution: empirical}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @BOOK{Sala:03, title = {The Economics of Taxation}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2003}, author = {Salani{\'e}, B.}, address = {Cambridge Massachusetts}, key = {Public Economics} } @BOOK{Sala:00, title = {Microeconomics of Market Failures}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2000}, author = {Salani{\'e}, B.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Salani'e2000, title = {Microeconomics of Market Failures}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2000}, author = {Salani{\'e}, B.}, address = {Cambridge Massachusetts}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Sala:97, title = {The Economics of Contracts: A Primer}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1997}, author = {Salani{\'e}, B.}, address = {Cambridge Massachusetts}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{Sala:89, author = {Salant, S. W.}, title = {When is inducing self-selection suboptiml for a monopolist?}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1989}, volume = {104}, pages = {391-397}, key = {micro}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.04.21} } @ARTICLE{Sala:02, author = {Salas, R.}, title = {Multilevel interterritorial convergence and additive multidimensional inequality decomposition}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2002}, volume = {19}, pages = {207-218}, abstract = {In this paper we justify the use of the between-groups S-convex relative inequality indices to measure interterritorial convergence. In addition, we provide two appealing extensions to the use of the additive decomposable General Entropy inequality indices. First, multilevel decomposition along several subpartitions is satisfied and a natural application to convergence decomposition along different territorial level arises. Second, further general inequality decomposition along several dimensions is also satisfied. Thus, this framework provides a better explanation of the determinants of convergence (and inequality) when it is decomposed into different dimensions in comparison with other indices available in the literature.}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.08}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/content/gxj51p5t9efftt7a/fulltext.pdf} } @ARTICLE{Sala:98, author = {Salas, R.}, title = {Welfare-consistent inequality indices in changing populations: the marginal population replication axiom. A note}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {67}, pages = {145-150}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Salas1998, author = {Salas, Rafael}, title = {Welfare-consistent inequality indices in changing populations: the marginal population replication axiom. A note}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {67}, pages = {145-150}, number = {1}, month = {January}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SaMo:74, author = {Salem, A. B. Z. and Mount, T. D.}, title = {A Convenient Descriptive Model of Income Distribution: The {G}amma Density}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1974}, volume = {42}, pages = {1115-1127}, key = {distributions}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1914221} } @TECHREPORT{Sall:92, author = {Salles, M.}, title = {On two classes of differential inequality measures}, institution = {University of Birmingham}, year = {1992}, type = {Department of Economics, Discussion Paper}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Salt:02, author = {Saltelli , Andrea}, title = {Sensitivity Analysis for Importance Assessment}, journal = {Risk Analysis}, year = {2002}, volume = {22}, key = {risk} } @INCOLLECTION{Salv:89, author = {Salvaterra, T.}, title = {Comparison Among Concentration Curves and Indexes in Some Empirical Distributions}, booktitle = {Income and Wealth Distribution, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1989}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Zenga, M.}, pages = {194-214}, address = {New York}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Salv:07, author = {Salvatore, Dominick}, title = {Growth, international inequalities, and poverty in a globalizing world}, journal = {Journal of Policy Modeling}, year = {2007}, volume = {29}, pages = {635 - 641}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {Globalization; Per capita income; Growth; International inequalities; Poverty}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Samu:02, author = {Samuelson, L.}, title = {Evolution and Game Theory}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2002}, volume = {16}, pages = {47-66}, number = {2}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Samu:86, author = {Samuelson, P. A.}, title = {Theory of Optimal Taxation: Memorandum to the {U.S.} {T}reasury, 1951}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {30}, pages = {137-143}, key = {Optimal taxation} } @BOOK{Samu:83, title = {Foundations of Economic Analysis}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1983}, author = {Samuelson, P. A.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, edition = {Enlarged}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Samu:55, author = {Samuelson, P. A.}, title = {Diagrammatic exposition of a pure theory of public expenditure}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1955}, volume = {37}, pages = {350-356}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Samu:54, author = {Samuelson, P. A.}, title = {The pure theory of public expenditure}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1954}, volume = {36}, pages = {387-389}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Samu:48, author = {Samuelson, P. A}, title = {Consumption theory in terms of revealed preference}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1948}, volume = {15}, pages = {243-253}, key = {Utility, preference} } @BOOK{Samu:47, title = {Foundations of Economic Analysis}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1947}, author = {Samuelson, P. A.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, comment = {UL: South Front, Floor 2 Classmark: 249.c.43.80}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Samu:38, author = {Samuelson, P. A}, title = {A note on the pure theory of consumer's behaviour}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1938}, volume = {5}, pages = {353-354}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{Sanc:00, author = {Sanchez, C. M.}, title = {Rationality of Bargaining Solutions}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {33,4}, pages = {389-399}, key = {bargaining} } @ARTICLE{SaSo:93, author = {Sanchez, I. and Sobel, J.}, title = {Hierachical design and enforcement of income tax policies}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {50}, pages = {345-369}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Sanc:06, author = {Sanchez, M.}, title = {Divide and conquer: Tax evasion as a global game}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {2006}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {81}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {Tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{Sand:80TC, author = {Sandford, C. T.}, title = {Tax compliance costs, evasion and avoidance}, booktitle = {Income Distribution: The Limits to Redistribution. Proceedings of the ThirtyFirst Symposium of the Colston Research Society}, publisher = {Scientechnica}, year = {1980}, editor = {Collard, D. And Lecomber, R. and Slater, M.}, address = {Bristol}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Sand:98GA, author = {Sandler, T.}, title = {Global and Regional Public Goods: A Prognosis for Collective Action}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {19}, pages = {221-247}, key = {public goods} } @BOOK{Sand:92, title = {Collective Action}, publisher = {University of Michigan Press}, year = {1992}, author = {Sandler, T.}, address = {Ann Arbor, Michigan}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{Sand:05, author = {Sandmo, A.}, title = {The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {2005}, volume = {58}, pages = {643-663}, abstract = {The paper gives an overview of some main themes in the theory of tax evasion, starting from Allingham and Sandmo (1972). It reviews the comparative statics of the original model of individual behavior where the tax evasion decision is analogous to portfolio choice, and its extensions to incorporate socially conscious behavior, participation in the black labor market and tax evasion by firms. It also discusses the analysis of tax incidence and the problems involved in moving from individual to aggregate analysis. Finally, it reviews the issues that arise in formulating models of optimal taxation in the presence of tax evasion.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.10}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2072/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=115&sid=be8fba56-4ec3-43ce-ac5b-85cf32f47dc6%40sessionmgr107&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=buh&AN=19402930} } @ARTICLE{Sand:98, author = {Sandmo, Agnar}, title = {Redistribution and the marginal cost of public funds}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {70}, pages = {365-382}, number = {3}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Sand:86, author = {Sandmo, A.}, title = {Tax Distortions and Household Production}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1986}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Sand:84, author = {Sandmo, A.}, title = {Some results from the 'new' theory of public finance}, journal = {Empirica}, year = {1984}, volume = {2}, pages = {111-124}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Sand:83EP, author = {Sandmo, A.}, title = {Ex-post welfare economics and the theory of merit goods}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1983}, volume = {50}, pages = {19-33}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Sand:87, author = {Sandmo, A.}, title = {A reinterpretation of elasticity formulae in optimum tax theory}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1983}, volume = {54}, pages = {89-96}, key = {Optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{Sand:81, author = {Sandmo, A.}, title = {Income tax evasion, labour supply and the equity-efficiency tradeoff}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1981}, volume = {16}, pages = {265-288}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Sand:75OT, author = {Sandmo, A.}, title = {Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities}, journal = {The Swedish Journal of Economics}, year = {1975}, volume = {77}, pages = {86-98}, abstract = {This paper attempts to integrate the theory of optimal taxation with the analysis of t,he use of indirect taxation to counteract negative external effects (Pigovian taxes). A first-best solution to the problem of the optimal tax on an externality generating good is contrasted with the case where the government also needs other, distortionary taxes in order to satisfy its revenue requirements. The main result is that the Pigovian principle holds in a modified form in the latter case as well. The problem of the distributional impact of taxation is also studied for the special case of individuals with identical preferences and a utilitarian social welfare function. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0039-7318%28197503%2977%3A1%3C86%3AOTITPO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.07} } @ARTICLE{SaWi:99, author = {Sandmo, A. and Wildasin D. E.}, title = {Taxation, Migration and Pollution}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {39-59}, key = {Environment} } @ARTICLE{Sand:99, author = {Sandroni, Alvaro}, title = {Asset prices and the distribution of wealth}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {64}, pages = {203-207}, number = {2}, key = {wealth} } @TECHREPORT{Sand:83, author = {Sandstr{\"o}m, A.}, title = {Estimating Income Inequality: Large Sample Inference in Finite Populations}, institution = {Department of Statistics, University of Stockholm}, year = {1983}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1983:5}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{Sand:82, author = {Sandstr{\"o}m, A.}, title = {Estimating the {G}ini coefficient}, institution = {Department of Statistics, University of Stockholm}, year = {1982}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1982:18}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{SaWrWa:88, author = {Sandstr{\"o}m, A. and Wretman, J. H. and Walden, B.}, title = {Variance estimators of the {G}ini coefficient: probability sampling}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1988}, volume = {6}, pages = {113-120}, key = {STATISTICS} } @ARTICLE{SaWrWa:85, author = {Sandstr{\"o}m, A. and Wretman, J. H. and Walden, B.}, title = {Variance estimators of the {G}ini coefficient: simple random sampling}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1985}, volume = {43}, pages = {41-70}, key = {STATISTICS} } @ARTICLE{Sand:03, author = {Sandvik, Bjorn}, title = {Optimal Taxation and Normalisations}, journal = {CESifo Working Paper}, year = {2003}, number = {1025}, abstract = {There still seems to be some confusion about the consequences of normalisationsin the optimal taxation literature. We claim that: 1) Normalisations donot matter for the real solution of optimal taxation problem. 2) Normalisationsdo matter for good characterisations of the solutions to optimal taxationproblems. Whereas the first point is uncontroversial, the second one isless well understood. There is also a need to distinguish between the followingsenses of taxation of endowment: 1) The taxation of own consumption ofinitial endowments (e.g. leisure). 2) The taxation of the sale of initialendowments (e.g. labour). By postponing the normalisation of consumer prices,we detail how normalisations of consumer prices affect the characterisationof optimal commodity taxes, derive the preferred characterisation, andshow how it depends on the normalisation. On the way, we discuss the effectof normalisations on measures of the marginal efficiency loss of taxation.}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {optimal taxation}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{SaAl:07, author = {Sanjit, D. and Al-Nowaihi, A.}, title = {Corruption and the Provision of Public Output in a Hierarchical Asymmetric Information Relationship}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {9}, pages = {727-755}, number = {4}, month = {August}, abstract = {This paper develops a principal-agent model to explore the interaction of corruption, bribery, and political oversight of production. Under full information, an honest politician achieves the first best while a dishonest politician creates shortages and bribes. Under asymmetric information, an honest politician may create more shortages relative to a dishonest one, but the latter creates more bribes. The model identifies a tradeoff between bribery and efficiency. This helps to reconcile some conflicting results on the implications of corruption for the size of the public sector. It also provides new results on the circumstances under which an improvement in the auditing technology is beneficial. The paper identifies conditions under which corruption is welfare enhancing. However, the paper also shows that under precisely these conditions private provision, even by an unregulated monopolist, would be better than public provision.}, key = {politics}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.06.22} } @ARTICLE{Sant:07, author = {Santoro, Alessandro}, title = {Marginal Commodity Tax Reforms: A Survey}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {2007}, volume = {21}, pages = {827 - 848}, abstract = {As noted 30 years ago by Martin Feldstein, optimal taxes may be useless for practical purposes and emphasis should instead be placed on the possibility of enhancing welfare by reforming existing tax rates. In this perspective, marginal commodity tax reforms are gaining increasing attention due to political and economic constraints on large reforms of direct (or indirect) taxation. In this paper, we summarize the main features and results of the literature on marginal commodity tax reforms pioneered by Ahmad and Stern, further developed by Yitzhaki and Thirsk and recently reinterpreted by Makdissi and Wodon. We establish new links to other fields of research, namely the literature on the use of equivalence scales and on poverty measurement. We also critically examine some issues associated with the implementation of marginal tax reforms with special reference to the calculation of welfare weights and revenue effects. Finally, we suggest directions for future research on poverty-reducing commodity tax reforms.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Indirect; Tax; Reform; Poverty, Welfare}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{SaFr:06, author = {Santos,G. and Fraser,G.}, title = {Road pricing: lessons from London}, journal = {Economic Policy}, year = {2006}, volume = {21}, pages = {263-310}, abstract = {This paper assesses the original London Congestion Charging Scheme (LCCS) and its impacts, and it simulates the proposed extension which will include most of Kensington and Chelsea. It also touches upon the political economy of the congestion charge and the increase of the charge from £5 to £8 per day. The possibility of transferring the experience to Paris, Rome and New York is also discussed. The LCCS has had positive impacts. This was despite the considerable political influences on the charge level and location. It is difficult to assess the impacts of the increase of the charge from £5 to £8, which took place in July 2005, because no data have yet been released by Transport for London. The proposed extension of the charging zone does not seem to be an efficient change on economic grounds, at least for the specific boundaries, method of charging and level of charging that is currently planned. Our benefit cost ratios computed under different assumptions of costs and benefits are all below unity. Overall, the experience shows that simple methods of congestion charging, though in no way resembling first-best Pigouvian taxes, can do a remarkably good job of creating benefits from the reduction of congestion. Nevertheless, the magnitude of these benefits can be highly sensitive to the details of the scheme, which therefore need to be developed with great care.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Sanz:92, author = {Sanz, B.}, title = {La Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares 1990-1991}, journal = {Situaci{\'o}n}, year = {1992}, volume = {2}, pages = {151-166}, number = {3}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Sapo:83, author = {Saposnik, R.}, title = {On Evaluating Income Distributions: Rank Dominance, the {S}uppes-{S}en Grading Principle of Justice and {P}areto Optimality}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {1983}, volume = {40}, pages = {329-336}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Saposnik1983, author = {Saposnik, R.}, title = {On Evaluating Income Distributions: Rank Dominance, the {S}uppes-{S}en Grading Principle of Justice, and {P}areto Optimality}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {1983}, volume = {40}, pages = {329-336}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Sapo:81, author = {Saposnik, R.}, title = {Rank-Dominance in Income Distribution}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {1981}, volume = {36}, pages = {147-151}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Saposnik1992, author = {Saposnik, Rubin and Tutterow, Roger}, title = {On the rank, generalised {L}orenz and overtaking criteria for evaluating stochastic income regimes}, journal = {Southern Economic Journal}, year = {1992}, volume = {59}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SaTu:92, author = {Saposnik, Rubin and Tutterow, Roger}, title = {On the rank, generalised {L}orenz and overtaking criteria for evaluatingstochastic income regimes}, journal = {Southern Economic Journal}, year = {1992}, volume = {59}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{SaCaPaSa:07, author = {Sarabia, Jose Maria and Castillo, Enrique and Pascual, Marta and Sarabia, Maria}, title = {Bivariate income distributions with lognormal conditionals}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2007}, volume = {5}, pages = {371 - 383}, abstract = {In this paper, the most general bivariate distribution with lognormal conditionals is fully characterized, using the methodology proposed by [3]. The properties of the new family are studied in detail, including marginal and conditional distributions, regression functions, dependence measures, moments and inequality measures. The new distribution is very broad, and contains as a particular case the classical bivariate lognormal distribution. Several subfamilies are studied and a generalization of the basic model is discussed. Finally, we present an empirical application. We estimate and compare the basic model proposed in the paper with a classical model, using data from the European Community Household Panel in different periods of time.}, key = {Income Distribution}, keywords = {lognormal distribution, conditionally specified models, European community household panel}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{SaCaSl:02, author = {Sarabia, J. M. and Castillo, E. and Slottje, D. J.}, title = {Lorenz ordering between {M}c{D}onald's generalized functions of the income size distribution}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2002}, volume = {75}, pages = {265-270}, key = {income distribution:functional form}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.20} } @ARTICLE{SaCaSl:99, author = {Sarabia, J. M. and Castillo, E. and Slottje, D. J.}, title = {An Ordered Family of {L}orenz Curves}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1999}, volume = {91}, pages = {43-60}, abstract = {A general method for building parametric-functional families of Lorenz curves, generated from an initial Lorenz curve (which satisÞes some regularity conditions) is presented. It is shown that these families can be ordered in a manner which leads to a hierarchy of Lorenz curves. The method starts from a generating Lorenz curve Lo(p) and builds the family by increasing the number of parameters, which can be easily interpreted in terms of the elasticities of Lo(p). The method is applied to a family we term the Pareto family, since they use the Pareto Lorenz curves as their generating curves. The family is shown to contain an important number of classical Lorenz curves used in the existing literature. Several properties of this family are analyzed, these include the population function, inequality measures and Lorenz orderings. A general method for the estimation of these family is given and applied to the Pareto family. Finally, an application is presented for data from various countries. The results are very robust across data sources. The Pareto models Þt very well in a number of applications.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Sarg:57, author = {Sargan, J. D.}, title = {The distribution of wealth}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1957}, volume = {25}, pages = {568-590}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Sarg:99, author = {Sargent, Thomas J.}, title = {A primer on monetary and fiscal policy}, journal = {Journal of Banking and Finance}, year = {1999}, volume = {23}, pages = {1463-1482}, key = {macro} } @ARTICLE{SaWa:92, author = {Sarin, R. and Wakker, P.}, title = {A Simple Axiomatization of Non-Additive Expected Utility}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1992}, volume = {60}, pages = {1255-1272}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{SaRa:78, author = {Sarma, P. P. and Ram, P. J.}, title = {Welfare economics and income inequality}, journal = {Economic Affairs}, year = {1978}, volume = {23}, pages = {97-108}, number = {3}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Sart:97, author = {Sarte, Pierre-Daniel}, title = {Progressive taxation and income inequality in dynamic competitive equilibrium}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {66}, pages = {145-171}, number = {1}, month = {October}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Sasa:00, author = {Sasaki, K.}, title = {Local Public Goods and Their Capital-Gain Effects}, journal = {Regional Science and Urban Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {30}, pages = {45-57}, key = {Local public goods} } @ARTICLE{SaTr:02, author = {Sastre, M. and Trannoy, A.}, title = {Shapley inequality decomposition by factor components: some methodological issues}, journal = {Journal of Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {Supplement 9}, pages = {51–90}, comment = {Moyes, P., Seidl, C., Shorrocks, A.F. (eds.)}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.09.09} } @ARTICLE{SaTr:00a, author = {Mercedes Sastre and Alain Trannoy}, title = {Changing income inequality in advanced countries: a nested marginalist decomposition analysis}, journal = {mimeo}, year = {2000}, month = {December}, owner = {Fiorio}, timestamp = {2007.01.05} } @TECHREPORT{Sast:97, author = {Sastry, D. V. S.}, title = {On some aspects in measuring inequality}, year = {1997}, address = {Bombay}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{SaKe:94, author = {Sastry, D. V. S. and Kelkar, U. R.}, title = {Note on the Decomposition of {G}ini Inequality}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1994}, volume = {76}, pages = {584-586}, abstract = {Note on the Decomposition of Gini Inequality D. V. S. Sastry and Ujwala R. Kelkar The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 76, No. 3 (Aug., 1994), pp. 584-586}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.19}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2109984} } @ARTICLE{Satc:78, author = {Satchell, S. E.}, title = {Source and subgroup decomposition inequalities for the {L}orenz curve}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1978}, volume = {28}, pages = {321-329}, number = {6}, key = {inequality decomposition}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2526727} } @TECHREPORT{Satt:98, author = {Satt, E.}, title = {Ethics in the Kibbutz Economy}, institution = {Ruppin Institute}, year = {1998}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {kibbutz} } @ARTICLE{SaGi:98, author = {Satt, E. and Ginzburg, H.}, title = {On the Effects of the Kibbutz Hiring Out Its Own Labor Force: Theory andCase Studies}, journal = {Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms}, year = {1998}, volume = {6}, pages = {187-212}, key = {kibbutz} } @ARTICLE{Satt1998, author = {Satt, E. and Ginzburg, H.}, title = {On the Effects of the Kibbutz Hiring Out Its Own Labor Force: Theory and Case Studies}, journal = {Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms}, year = {1998}, volume = {6}, pages = {187-212}, key = {kibbutz}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Satt:75, author = {Satterthwaite, M. A.}, title = {Strategy-proofness and {Arrow}'s conditions}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1975}, volume = {10}, pages = {187-217}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Saun:93, author = {Saunders, Peter}, title = {Longer run changes in the distribution of Income in {A}ustralia}, journal = {The Economic Record}, year = {1993}, volume = {69}, pages = {353-366}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{Saun:94, title = {Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1993}, author = {Saunders, Peter}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{SaHo:88, author = {Saunders, Peter and Hobbes, G.}, title = {Income inequality in {A}ustralian and international comparative perspective}, journal = {Australian Economic Review}, year = {1988}, pages = {25-34}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{SaStHo:91, author = {Saunders, Peter and Stott, H. and Hobbes, G.}, title = {Income inequality in {A}ustralia and {N}ew {Z}ealand: international comparisonsand recent trends}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1991}, volume = {37}, pages = {64-69}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Saunders1991, author = {Saunders, Peter, and Stott, H. and Hobbes, G.}, title = {Income inequality in {A}ustralia and {N}ew {Z}ealand: international comparisons and recent trends}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1991}, volume = {37}, pages = {64-69}, key = {INCOME DISTRIBUTION:EMPIRICAL}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Saun:70, title = {Plato: The {L}aws}, publisher = {Penguin}, year = {1970}, author = {Saunders, T. J.}, address = {Harmondsworth}, key = {Social justice} } @BOOK{Sava:54, title = {The Foundations of Statistics}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1954}, author = {Savage, L.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Sava:06, author = {Savaglio, E.}, title = {Multidimensional inequality with variable population size}, journal = {Economic Theory}, year = {2006}, volume = {28}, pages = {85-94}, abstract = {We study inequality in a context of more than one variable by extending a celebrated result of Hardy, Littlewood and P¨olya (1934) to the case of distributions with variable population sizes, whose individuals differ in many characteristics besides income. A new ordering between rectangular matrices, representing such distributions, is provided and characterized by convexity theory.}, key = {inequality }, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.07.18} } @INCOLLECTION{SaVa:08, author = {Savaglio, E. and Vannucci, S.}, title = {On Lorenz preorders and opportunity inequality in finite environments}, booktitle = {Advances on Income Inequality and Concentration Measures}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {2008}, editor = {Betti, G. and Lemmi, A.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @INBOOK{Savi:84, title = {Multiple Hypothesis Testing}, publisher = {Handbook of Econometrics}, year = {1984}, author = {Savin, N. E.}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Savi:99, author = {Saving, Jason L.}, title = {Migration, labor-leisure choice and {P}areto suboptimal redistribution}, journal = {Regional Science and Urban Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {29}, pages = {559-573}, number = {5}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Savvi:98, author = {Savvides, Andreas}, title = {Trade policy and income inequality: new evidence}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {61}, pages = {365-372}, number = {3}, key = {international} } @BOOK{Sawi:83, title = {Income Tax Compliance}, publisher = {American Bar Association}, year = {1983}, author = {Sawicki, P.}, address = {Chicago}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Scha:99SE, author = {Scharf, K. A.}, title = {Scale Economies in Cross-Border Shopping and Commodity Taxation}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {89-99}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Scha:99TI, author = {Scharf, K. A.}, title = {Tax Incentives for Extraction and Recycling of Basic Materials in Canada}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {451-478}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{ScMO:90, title = {Elementary Survey Sampling}, publisher = {Duxbury Press}, year = {1990}, author = {Scheaffer, R. and Mendenhall, W. and Ott, L.}, address = {California}, note = {Fourth edition}, key = {STATISTICS} } @ARTICLE{Sche:91, author = {Schechtman, A.}, title = {On Estimating the Asymptotic Variance of a Function of {$U$} Statistics}, journal = {The American Statistician}, year = {1991}, volume = {45}, pages = {103-106}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{ScYi:99, author = {Schechtman, E. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {On the Proper Bounds of {G}ini Correlation}, journal = {Economic Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {63}, pages = {133-138}, abstract = {Gini correlation measures the dependence between two random variables, whose properties are a mixture of Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlations. For any given marginal distributions, the range of Gini correlation is [-1, 1]. (This property does not hold for Pearson’s correlation). Some possible applications are given.}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{ScheWe:03, author = {Scheinkman, José A. and Xiong, Wei}, title = {Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles}, journal = {The Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2003}, volume = {111}, pages = {1183--1219}, number = {6}, abstract = {Motivated by the behavior of asset prices, trading volume, and price volatility during episodes of asset price bubbles, we present a continuous-time equilibrium model in which overconfidence generates disagreements among agents regarding asset fundamentals. With short-sale constraints, an asset buyer acquires an option to sell the asset to other agents when those agents have more optimistic beliefs. As in a paper by Harrison and Kreps, agents pay prices that exceed their own valuation of future dividends because they believe that in the future they will find a buyer willing to pay even more. This causes a significant bubble component in asset prices even when small differences of beliefs are sufficient to generate a trade. In equilibrium, bubbles are accompanied by large trading volume and high price volatility. Our analysis shows that while Tobin's tax can substantially reduce speculative trading when transaction costs are small, it has only a limited impact on the size of the bubble or on price volatility.}, copyright = {Copyright © 2003 The University of Chicago Press}, issn = {00223808}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Dec., 2003}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press} } @ARTICLE{ScheXi:03, author = {Jose A. Scheinkman and Wei Xiong}, title = {Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2003}, volume = {111}, pages = {1183-1219}, number = {6}, month = {December}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v111y2003i6p1183-1219.html} } @ARTICLE{Sche:85, author = {Schenker, N.}, title = {Qualms about bootstrap confidence intervals}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1985}, volume = {80}, pages = {360-361}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{ScSh:95, author = {Schepanski, A. and Shearer, T.}, title = {A Prospect Theory Account of the Income Tax Withholding Phenomenon}, journal = {Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes}, year = {1995}, volume = {63}, pages = {174-186}, key = {Tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Schi:04, author = {Schiff,M.}, title = {On the Inefficiency of Inequality}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2004}, abstract = {A number of studies have examined the implications of preference interdependence.This paper models utility as depending on other people’s consumption levelsand shows that welfare declines with inequality, equilibrium inequalityis inefficient, and the optimal intervention leads to a more equal distribution.}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Schi:06, author = {Schindler, D.}, title = {Optimal Taxation with a Risky Asset - The Triple Income Tax}, institution = {{CES}ifo}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1834}, address = {Dirk Schindler University Konstanz Fach D 133 78457 Konstanz Germany Dirk.Schindler@uni-konstanz.de}, month = {October}, abstract = {We show in a two-period world with endogenous savings and two assets, one of them exhibiting a stochastic return, that an interest-adjusted income tax is optimal. This tax leaves a riskless component of interest income tax free and taxes the excess return with a special tax rate. There is no trade-off between risk allocation and efficiency in intertemporal consumption. Both goals are reached. As the resulting tax system divides income into three parts, the tax can also be called a Triple Income Tax. This distinction and a special tax rate on the excess return are necessary in order to have an optimal risk-shifting effect.}, key = {optimal taxation}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @ARTICLE{Schl:71, author = {Schleicher, H.}, title = {A recursive game for detecting tax law violations}, journal = {{\'E}conomies et soci{\'e}s}, year = {1971}, volume = {5}, pages = {1421-1440}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Schleicher1971, author = {Schleicher, H.}, title = {A recursive game for detecting tax law violations}, journal = {\'Economies et soci\'es}, year = {1971}, volume = {5}, pages = {1421-1440}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Schl:98OC, title = {On Custom in the Economy}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Schlicht, E.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {social custom} } @ARTICLE{Schl:75, author = {Schlicht, E.}, title = {A neoclassical theory of wealth distribution}, journal = {Jahrb{\"u}cher f{\"u}r National{\"o}konomie und Statistik}, year = {1975}, volume = {189}, pages = {78-96}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Schlicht1975, author = {Schlicht, E.}, title = {A neoclassical theory of wealth distribution}, journal = {Jahrb\"ucher f\"ur National\"okonomie und Statistik}, year = {1975}, volume = {189}, pages = {78-96}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Schl:98SI, author = {Schluter, Christian}, title = {Statistical inference with mobiity indices}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {59}, pages = {157-162}, number = {2}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Schl:97OT, author = {Schluter, C.}, title = {On the performance of social benefit systems}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Schluter1997, author = {Schluter, C.}, title = {On the performance of social benefit systems}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, key = {social security}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Schluter1997a, author = {Schluter, Christian}, title = {On The Performance of Social Benefit Systems}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {107}, pages = {489-502}, month = {March}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Schl:96, author = {Schluter, C..}, title = {Income Distribution and inequality in {G}ermany: evidence from panel data}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1996}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {16}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{Schl:95SA, author = {Schluter, C.}, title = {Social Assistance and Social security in {G}ermany}, institution = {STICERD}, year = {1995}, type = {LSE Welfare State Programme Research Note}, number = {WSP/RN/29}, address = {London}, key = {social security} } @ARTICLE{Schluter2002, author = {Schluter, C. and Trede, M.}, title = {Tails of {L}orenz curves'}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2002}, volume = {109}, pages = {151-166}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ScTr:02, author = {Schluter, C. and Trede, M.}, title = {Tails of {L}orenz curves}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2002}, volume = {109}, pages = {151-166}, abstract = {The Lorenz dominance criterion is the centre piece of inequality analysis. Yet, the appeal of this criterion, which requires considering Lorenz curves in their entirety, is undermined by the practical problem that many sample Lorenz curves intersect in the tails. The commonly used inferential methods, based on central limit theorem arguments, do not apply to the tails since these contain too few observations. By contrast, we propose a test procedure for distributions whose tails lie in the domain of attraction of the Frechet distribution, which fully takes into account the tail behaviour of Lorenz curves. Our experiments and empirical examples demonstrate the good performance of the proposed test: in many cases we are able to infer that despite sample tail crossings the population Lorenz curves do, in fact, exhibit Lorenz dominance.}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Schm:85ED, author = {Schmalensee, R.}, title = {Econometric diagnosis of competitive localisation}, journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organisation}, year = {1985}, volume = {3}, pages = {57-70}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Schm:82, author = {Schmalensee, R.}, title = {Commodity Bundling by Single-Product Monopolies}, journal = {Journal of Law and Economics}, year = {1982}, volume = {25}, pages = {67-71}, key = {micro}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{Schm:81, author = {Schmalensee, R.}, title = {Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third Degree Price Discrimination}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1981}, volume = {3}, pages = {57-70}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Schm:76, author = {Schmalensee, R.}, title = {An experimental study of expectation formation}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1976}, volume = {44}, pages = {17-41}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{Schm:89, author = {Schmeidler, D.}, title = {Subjective Probability and Expected Utility Without Additivity}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1989}, volume = {57}, pages = {571-587}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Schm:86, author = {Schmeidler, D.}, title = {Integral representations Without Additivity}, journal = {Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society}, year = {1986}, volume = {97}, pages = {255-261}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{Schm:79, author = {Schmeidler, D.}, title = {A biographical note on a theorem of {H}ardy, {L}ittlewood and {P}olya}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1980}, pages = {125-128}, number = {20}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{ScTr:96, author = {Schmid, F. and Trede, M.}, title = {Testing for First-Order Stochastic Dominance: A New Distribution-Free Test}, journal = {Statistician}, year = {1996}, volume = {45}, pages = {371-380}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{Schm:04, author = {Schmidheiny, K.}, title = {Income Segregation and Local Progressive Taxation: Empirical Evidence from Switzerland}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2004}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {1313}, address = {Kurt Schmidheiny Ecole des HEC, DEEP University of Lausanne 1015 Lausanne Switzerland}, month = {October}, note = {Category 1: Public Finance}, abstract = {This study investigates spatial segregation of the population in fiscally decentralized urban areas. The theoretical part proposes the progressivity of local income taxes as a new explanation for income segregation. The empirical part studies how income tax differentials across municipalities in the Swiss metropolitan area of Basel affect the households’ location decisions. The (multinomial) location choice of households is investigated within the framework of the random utility maximization model (RUM). The theoretical model is used to identify the household preferences applied in the RUM. The empirical results show that rich households are significantly and substantially more likely to move to low-tax municipalities than poor households.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{ScWi:89, author = {Schmidt, P. and Witte, A. D.}, title = {Predicting Criminal Recidivism using `Split Population` Survival Time Models}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1989}, volume = {40}, pages = {141-159}, number = {1}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Schmidt2001, author = {Schmidt, U. and Zank, H.}, title = {A New Axiomatization of Rank-Dependent Expected Utility with Tradeoff Consistency for Equally Likely Outcomes}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {35}, pages = {483-491}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ScZa:01, author = {Schmidt, U. and Zank, H.}, title = {A New Axiomatization of Rank-Dependent Expected Utility with Tradeoff Consistencyfor Equally Likely Outcomes}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {35}, pages = {483-491}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{SHSe:00, author = {Schmidt-Hebbel, K. and Serven, L.}, title = {Does income inequality raise aggregate saving?}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {61}, pages = {417-446}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Schm:97, author = {Schmidt-Mohr, U.}, title = {Rationing versus collateralization in competitive and monopolistic creditmarkets with asymmetric information}, journal = {European Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, pages = {1321-1342}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Schmidt-Mohr1997, author = {Schmidt-Mohr, U.}, title = {Rationing versus collateralization in competitive and monopolistic credit markets with asymmetric information}, journal = {European Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, pages = {1321-1342}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Schm:85SS, author = {Schm{\"a}hl, W.}, title = {Soziale Sicherung und Schattenwirtschaft}, booktitle = {Sozialpolitik in der Besch{\"a}ftigungskrise}, year = {1985}, editor = {Winterstein, H.}, volume = {I}, address = {Berlin}, key = {underground} } @INCOLLECTION{Schm:80, author = {Schm{\"o}lders, G.}, title = {Der {B}eitrag der {S}chattenwirtschaft}, booktitle = {Wandlungen in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, publisher = {J.C.B. Mohr}, year = {1980}, pages = {371-379}, address = {T{\"u}bingen}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Schm:59, author = {Schm{\"o}lders, G.}, title = {Fiscal psychology - a new branch of public finance}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1959}, volume = {12}, pages = {340-345}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{Schn:04, author = {Schneider, F.}, title = {The Size of the Shadow Economies of 145 Countries all over the World: First Results over the Period 1999 to 2003}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2004}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {1431}, address = {P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany}, month = {December}, abstract = {Using the DYMIMIC approach, estimates of the shadow economy in 145 developing, transition, developed OECD countries, South Pacific islands and still communist countries are presented. The average size of the shadow economy (in percent of official GDP) over 2002/2003 in developing countries is 39.1%, in transition countries 40.1%, in OECD countries 16.3%, South Pacific islands 33.4% and 4 remaining Communist countries 21.8%. An increasing burden of taxation, high unemployment and low official GDP growth are the driving forces of the shadow economy.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{RoWo:00SE, author = {Schneider, F. and Enste, D.}, title = {Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2000}, volume = {38}, pages = {77–114}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Schneider2000, author = {Schneider, F. and Enste, D.}, title = {Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2000}, volume = {38}, pages = {77-114}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ScKl:04, author = {Schneider, Friedrich and Klinglmair, Robert}, title = {Shadow Economies Around the World: What Do We Know?}, year = {2004}, number = {1167}, abstract = {Using various statistical procedures, estimates about the size of the shadoweconomy in 110 developing, transition and OECD countries are presented.The average size of the shadow economy (in percent of official GDP) over1999-2000 in developing countries is 41 percent, in transition countries38 percent and in OECD countries 18.0 percent. An increasing burden oftaxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulatoryactivities are the driving forces for the growth and size of the shadoweconomy. If the shadow economy increases by one percent the annual growthrate of the “official” GDP of a developing country (of an industrializedand/or transition country) decreases by 0.6 percent (increases by 0.8 and1.0 respectively).}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {compliance}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{ScPo:81, author = {Schneider, F. and Pommerehne, W. W.}, title = {Free riding and collective action: an experiment in public microeconomics}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1981}, volume = {96}, pages = {689-704}, key = {public economics} } @INCOLLECTION{Scho:97, author = {Schokkaert, E.}, title = {Bequest and inheritance taxation: a comment}, booktitle = {Is Inheritance Legitimate? Ethical and Economic Aspects of Wealth Transfers}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1997}, editor = {Erreygers , G. and Vandevelde , T.}, pages = {126-132}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {wealth taxation} } @INCOLLECTION{Scho:92, author = {Schokkaert, Erik}, title = {The economics of distributive justice, welfare and freedom}, booktitle = {Justice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1992}, editor = {Scherer, Klaus R.}, chapter = {3}, pages = {65-113}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{Scho:08, author = {Schokkaert, Erik}, title = {The Capabilities Approach}, institution = {Universite Catholique Louvain}, year = {2008}, abstract = {Capabilities and functionings are new and attractive concepts for assessing the wellbeing and advantage of individuals. Functionings refer to a person’s achievements, i.e. what she manages to do or to be. Capabilities refer to her real opportunities and incorporate the idea of freedom. We discuss how recent theoretical and empirical work has improved our insights in some of the key questions of the approach. How to measure opportunities and how to balance freedom and responsibility? How to formulate a list of capabilities which can be used to analyse changes over time and differences between different societies without being open to manipulation? How to construct an overall index of well-being and what should be the relative role of a priori ethical evaluations and of the opinions of the individuals themselves? What is the relationship between measures of well-being and advantage at the individual and at the aggregate level? To make further progress it is crucial, first, to estimate structural models with individual data, analysing the link between individual achievements, the socioeconomic and environmental background of the persons concerned and the specific features of the individual processes of choice and decisionmaking; and, second, to integrate the insights from these models in a coherent ethical framework specifying the role of individual preferences and the limits of personal responsibility.}, key = {Welfare}, keywords = {capabilities, opportunities}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Scho:99, author = {Schokkaert, E.}, title = {M. Tout-le-monde est "post-welfariste": opinions sur la justice redistributive}, journal = {Revue {\'E}conomique}, year = {1999}, volume = {50}, pages = {811-831}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Schokkaert1999a, author = {Schokkaert, E.}, title = {M. Tout-le-monde est "post-welfariste": opinions sur la justice redistributive}, journal = {Revue \'Economique}, year = {1999}, volume = {50}, pages = {811-831}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ScCa:91, author = {Schokkaert, E. and Capeau, B.}, title = {Interindividual Differences in Opinions about distributive justice}, journal = {Kyklos}, year = {1991}, volume = {44}, pages = {325-345}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{ScDe:98, author = {Schokkaert, E. and Devooght, K.}, title = {The empirical acceptance of compensation axioms}, booktitle = {Freedom in Economics: New Perspectives in Normative Analysis}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {1998}, editor = {Fleurbaey, M. and Gravel, N. and Trannoy, A.}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{ScDe:99, author = {Schokkaert, E. and Devooght, K.}, title = {Responsibility-sensitive fair compensation in different cultures}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1999}, type = {Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper}, number = {45}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{ScDe:95, author = {Schokkaert, E. and Devooght, K.}, title = {The Empirical Acceptance of Compensation Axioms}, institution = {Centrum Voor Economische Studien}, year = {1995}, type = {working paper}, number = {45}, address = {Leuven}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{ScLa:83, author = {Schokkaert, E. and Lagrou, L.}, title = {An Empirical Approach to Distributive Justice}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {21}, pages = {33-52}, key = {welfare}, publisher = {North-Holland} } @INCOLLECTION{ScOv:91, author = {Schokkaert, E. and Overlaet, B.}, title = {Criteria for Distributive Justice in a Productive Context}, booktitle = {Social Justice in Human Relations, Vol.2}, publisher = {Plenum Press}, year = {1991}, editor = {Steensma, H. and Vermut, R.}, pages = {197-208}, address = {New York}, key = {Social justice} } @ARTICLE{ScOv:89, author = {Schokkaert, E. And Overlaet, B.}, title = {Moral Intuitions and Economic models of distributive justice}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1989}, volume = {6}, pages = {19-31}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{ScVaVaLu:04, author = {Schokkaert,E. and Van de gaer,D. and Vandenbroucke,F. and Luttens,R.}, title = {Responsibility sensitive egalitarianism and optimal linear income taxation}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2004}, volume = {48}, pages = {151-182}, abstract = {We compute optimal linear taxes on labor income with quasilinear preferencesbetween income and labor. Agents differ in their productivity and in theirtaste for leisure. A responsibility sensitive egalitarian wants to compensatefor the former differences but not for the latter. This intuition is capturedby a social planner that wants to equalize opportunities for subjectiveutility along the lines of the criteria proposed by Roemer and Van de gaer,and by a social planner evaluating social states based on an advantagefunction representing reference preferences. Our theoretical results areillustrated with empirical data for Belgium.}, key = {optimal taxation} } @TECHREPORT{ScVeOm:97, author = {Schokkaert, E. and Verhue, M. and Omey, E.}, title = {Individual preferences concerning unemployment compensation: insurance andsolidarity}, institution = {University Gent}, year = {1997}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{ScLu:98, author = {Scholz, J. T. and Lubell, M.}, title = {Trust and taxpaying: Testing the heuristic approach to collective action}, journal = {American Journal of Political Science}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {398-417}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Schr:05, author = {Schroyen,F.}, title = {An alternative way to model merit good arguments}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {89}, pages = {957-966}, abstract = {Besley [J. Public Econ. 35 (1988) 371] uses a scaling approach to modelmerit good arguments in commodity tax policy. In this paper, I questionthis approach on the grounds that it produces ‘wrong’ recommendations-taxation(subsidisation) of merit (demerit) goods-whenever the demand for the (de)meritgood is inelastic. I propose an alternative approach that does not sufferfrom this deficiency and that allows for a straightforward interpretation.}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{Schr:97, author = {Schroyen, Fred}, title = {On marginally progressive income tax schedules}, institution = {Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Institute ofEconomics, Norway}, year = {1997}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {4/97}, month = {April}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{ScTo:02, author = {Schroyen, F. and Torsvik G.}, title = {Sticks and Carrots for the Alleviation of Long Term Poverty}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2002}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {659}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, abstract = {Work requirements can make it easier to screen the poor from the non-poor.They can also affect future poverty by changing the poor's incentive toinvest in their income capacity. The novelty of our study is the focuson long term poverty. We find that the argument for using work requirementsas a screening device is both strengthened and weakened with long termpoverty and that the possibility of using work requirements weakens theincentives to exert effort to escape poverty. We also show that the twoincentive problems, to screen poverty and deter poverty, are interwoven;the fact that the poor can exert an effort to increase their probabilityof being non-poor in the future makes it easier to separate the poor fromthe non-poor in the initial phase of the program. Finally we show thatif it is possible to commit to a long term poverty alleviation programit is almost always optimal to impose some work requirements on those thatreceive transfers.}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{ScBrGyBr:99, author = {Renate Schubert and Martin Brown and Matthias Gysler and Hans Wolfgang Brachinger}, title = {Financial Decision-Making: Are Women Really More Risk-Averse?}, journal = {American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)}, year = {1998}, volume = {88}, pages = {207-211}, number = {2}, key = {risk} } @BOOK{ScPr:81, title = {Questions and answers in attitude surveys}, publisher = {Academic Press}, year = {1981}, author = {Schuman, H. and Pressler, S.}, address = {New York}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{ScTh:97, author = {Schummer, J. and Thomson, W.}, title = {Two Derivations of the Uniform Rule and an Application to Bankruptcy}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {55}, pages = {333-337}, key = {Utility, preference}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @ARTICLE{Schu:51, author = {Schutz, R. R.}, title = {On the measurement of income inequality}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1951}, volume = {41}, pages = {107-122}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{ScTe:00, author = {Schwartz, G. and Ter-Minassian, T.}, title = {The Distributional Effects of Public Expenditure}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {2000}, volume = {14}, pages = {71-121}, key = {redistribution} } @INCOLLECTION{Schwartz1980, author = {Schwartz, J. E. and Winship, C.}, title = {The welfare approach to measuring inequality}, booktitle = {Sociological Methodology}, year = {1980}, editor = {Schuessler, K. F.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ScWi:80, author = {Schwartz, J. E. and Winship, C.}, title = {The welfare approach to measuring inequality}, journal = {Sociological Methodology}, year = {1980}, volume = {11}, pages = {1-36}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/270858.pdf} } @ARTICLE{ScOr:67, author = {Schwartz, R. D. and Orleans, S.}, title = {On legal sanctions}, journal = {Chicago Law Review}, year = {1967}, volume = {34}, pages = {274-300}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Schw:84, author = {Schweizer, U.}, title = {Welfare analysis of excise tax evasion}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r die gesamte-Staatswissenschaft}, year = {1984}, volume = {140}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Schweizer1984, author = {Schweizer, U.}, title = {Welfare analysis of excise tax evasion}, journal = {Zeitschrift f\"ur die gesamte-Staatswissenschaft}, year = {1984}, volume = {140}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Schw:82, author = {Schweizer, U.}, title = {A {L}angrangian approach to the limit theorem on the core of an economy}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Nazional{\"o}konomie}, year = {1982}, pages = {23-30}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Schw:89, author = {Schwert, G. W.}, title = {Tests for unit roots: A Monte Carlo investigation}, journal = {Journal of Business, Economics and Statistics}, year = {1989}, volume = {7}, pages = {147-159}, key = {tests}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Scit:73, author = {Scitovsky, T.}, title = {Inequalities - Open and hidden, measured and immeasurable}, journal = {Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science}, year = {1973}, volume = {409}, pages = {112-19}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Scit:50, author = {Scitovsky, T.}, title = {Ignorance as a Source of Oligopoly Power}, journal = {American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings of the Sixty-second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association)}, year = {1950}, volume = {40}, pages = {48-53}, key = {competition}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{Scit:41, author = {Scitovsky, T.}, title = {A note on welfare propositions in economics}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1941}, volume = {9}, pages = {89-110}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Scot:97, author = {Scotchmer, S.}, title = {On price-taking equilibria in club economies with nonanonymous crowding}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {65}, pages = {75-88}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Scot:92, author = {Scotchmer, S.}, title = {The Regressive Bias in Tax Enforcement}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1992}, volume = {47}, pages = {366-371}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{Scot:88, author = {Scotchmer, S.}, title = {The effect of tax advisers on tax compliance}, booktitle = {Taxpayer Compliance}, publisher = {National Academy of Sciences}, year = {1988}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Scot:87, author = {Scotchmer, S.}, title = {Audit classes and tax enforcement policy}, journal = {American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings}, year = {1987}, volume = {77}, pages = {229-233}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Scot:86, author = {Scotchmer, S.}, title = {Equity in Tax Enforcement}, institution = {Harvard Institute of Economic Research}, year = {1986}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {1233}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{ScSl:89, author = {Scotchmer, S. and Slemrod, J.}, title = {Randomness In Tax Enforcement}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1989}, volume = {38}, pages = {17-32}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{ScSl:87UI, author = {Scotchmer, S. and Slemrod, J.}, title = {Uncertainty in tax enforcement}, institution = {University of California - Berkeley}, year = {1987}, type = {mimeo}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{ScSl:87UOO, author = {Scotchmer, S. and Slemrod, J.}, title = {Optimal Obfuscationin Tax Enforcement}, institution = {University of California - Berkeley}, year = {1987}, type = {Graduate School of Public Policy, Working Paper}, number = {126}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{ScSl:87WP, author = {Scotchmer, S. and Slemrod, J.}, title = {Who profits from taxpayer confusion?}, institution = {University of California - Berkeley}, year = {1987}, type = {Graduate School of Public Policy, Working Paper}, number = {136}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Scot:00, author = {Scott, A.}, title = {Optimal Consumption When Capital Markets and Imperfect}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {66}, pages = {65-70}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Scot:99, title = {A New View of Economic Growth}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1991}, author = {Scott, M. FG.}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{ScGr:81, author = {Scott, W. J. and Grasmick, H. G.}, title = {Deterrence and income tax cheating: testing interaction hypotheses in utilitariantheories}, journal = {Journal of Applied Behavioral Science}, year = {1981}, volume = {17}, pages = {395-408}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Scott1981, author = {Scott, W. J. and Grasmick, H. G.}, title = {Deterrence and income tax cheating: testing interaction hypotheses in utilitarian theories}, journal = {Journal of Applied Behavioral Science}, year = {1981}, volume = {17}, pages = {395-408}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Scru:98, author = {Scruggs, Lyle}, title = {Political and economic inequality and the environment}, journal = {Ecological Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {26}, pages = {259-275}, number = {3}, key = {environment} } @ARTICLE{Scul:03, author = {Scully, G. W.}, title = {Optimal taxation, economic growth and income inequality}, journal = {Public Choice}, year = {115}, volume = {2003}, pages = {299–312}, abstract = {Abstract. That there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency (economic growth) is well known. Two models have been developed that link government spending and taxation to economic growth. This paper uses these models to provide estimates of the growth-maximizing tax rate. Then, a two equation structural model is developed and estimated that is used to find the trade-off rate between economic growth and income inequality and the growth-maximizing level of income inequality for the United States over the period 1960–1990.}, key = {growth}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.20} } @ARTICLE{Sead:82, author = {Seade, J.}, title = {On the sign of the optimum marginal income tax}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1982}, volume = {49}, pages = {637-643}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Sead:77, author = {Seade, J.}, title = {On the shape of optimal tax schedules}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {7}, pages = {203-236}, key = {Optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{Seat:98, author = {Seater, J.J.}, title = {Testing the Permanent-Income/Life-Cycle Hypothesis with Aggregate Data}, journal = {Macroeconomic Dynamics}, year = {1998}, volume = {2}, pages = {401-425}, abstract = {The aggregate implications of the permanent-income/life-cycle hypothesis (PILCH) are derived rigorously. Virtually all empirical rejections of PILCH based on aggregated data are shown to result from misspecifications or from characteristics of aggregate data that have been overlooked. Valid aggregate tests are proposed. Those based on a properly formulated aggregate consumption function may be superior to those based on Euler-equation methods.}, key = {macroeconomics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @ARTICLE{Seat:93, author = {Seater, J.}, title = {Ricardian Equivalence}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1993}, volume = {31}, pages = {142-190}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{SeSt:96, author = {Sefton, M. and Steinberg, R.}, title = {Reward Structures in Public Good Experiments}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {61}, pages = {263-287}, key = {Public Goods} } @ARTICLE{Sega:88, author = {Segal, U.}, title = {Does the preference reversal phenomenon necessarily contradict the independenceaxiom?}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1988}, volume = {78}, pages = {233-236}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Segal1988, author = {Segal, U.}, title = {Does the preference reversal phenomenon necessarily contradict the independence axiom?}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1988}, volume = {78}, pages = {233-236}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SeSp:90, author = {Segal, U. and Spivak, A.}, title = {First Order versus Second Order Risk Aversion}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1990}, volume = {51}, pages = {111-125}, key = {risk} } @INCOLLECTION{Seid:88, author = {Seidl, Ch}, title = {Poverty measurement: A survey}, booktitle = {Welfare and Efficiency in Public Economics}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1988}, editor = {B{\"o}s, D. and Rose, M. and Seidl, C.}, pages = {71-147}, address = {Berlin, Heidelberg}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{Seid:94, author = {Seidl, C.}, title = {Measurement of tax Progressivity with Nonconstant Income Distributions}, booktitle = {Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Spring Verlag}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, pages = {337-360}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Seid:02, author = {Seidl, C.}, title = {Preference reversal: a literature survey}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {2002}, volume = {16}, pages = {621-655}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Seid:74, author = {Seidl, C.}, title = {Normative {T}heorie der {S}teuerdisziplin der {S}elbst{\"a}ndigen: Eine {A}nalysedes {Z}ensitenverhaltens}, year = {1974}, address = {Vienna}, key = {tax evasion}, publisher = {Verlag der {\"O}sterreichischen Akadamie der Wissenschaften} } @ARTICLE{Seidl1974, author = {Seidl, C.}, title = {Normative {T}heorie der {S}teuerdisziplin der {S}elbst\"andigen: Eine {A}nalyse des {Z}ensitenverhaltens}, year = {1974}, address = {Vienna}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {Verlag der \"Osterreichischen Akadamie der Wissenschaften}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SePf:97, author = {Seidl, C. and Pfingsten, A.}, title = {Ray Invariant Inequality Measures}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1997}, address = {Greenwich}, editor = {Zandvakili, S.}, key = {inequality}, publisher = {JAI Press} } @TECHREPORT{Seidl1994a, author = {Seidl, C. and Pfingsten, A.}, title = {Ray-invariant inequality measures}, institution = {Christian-Albrechs-Universit\"at zu Kiel}, year = {1994}, type = {Diskussionsbeitrag aus dem {I}nstitut f\"ur {F}inanzwissenschaft}, address = {D-24098 Kiel, Germany}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{SePf:94, author = {Seidl, C. and Pfingsten, A.}, title = {Ray-invariant inequality measures}, institution = {Christian-Albrechs-Universit{\"a}t zu Kiel}, year = {1994}, type = {Diskussionsbeitrag aus dem {I}nstitut f{\"u}r {F}inanzwissenschaft}, address = {D-24098 Kiel, Germany}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Seidl1994, author = {Seidl, C. and Theilen, B.}, title = {Stochastic independence of distributional attitudes and social status: a comparison of {G}erman and {P}olish data}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1994}, volume = {10}, pages = {295-310}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SeTh:94, author = {Seidl, C. and Theilen, B.}, title = {Stochastic independence of distributional attitudes and social status: acomparison of {G}erman and {P}olish data}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1994}, volume = {10}, pages = {295-310}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{SeTh:92, author = {Seidl, C. and Theilen, B.}, title = {Stochastic independence of distributional attitudes and social status: acomparison of {G}erman and {P}olish data.}, journal = {European Jounal of Political Economy}, year = {1992}, number = {forthcoming}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Seld:79, title = {Tax Avoision}, publisher = {Institute of Economic Affairs}, year = {1979}, author = {Seldon, A.}, address = {London}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Se:98, author = {Reinhard Selten}, title = {Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {413 - 436}, number = {3-5}, doi = {DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00148-7}, issn = {0014-2921}, keywords = {Bounded rationality}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-3VKKB1K-1/2/d74fbeaec7ec324e23272e3ddf1b45ad} } @ARTICLE{Selt:78, author = {Selten, R.}, title = {The chain-store paradox}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {1978}, volume = {9}, pages = {127-159}, key = {Games} } @ARTICLE{Selten:78, author = {Selten, Reinhard}, title = {The Chain Store Paradox}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {1978}, volume = {9}, pages = {127--159}, number = {2}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.09} } @ARTICLE{Selt:75, author = {Selten, R.}, title = {Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensivegames}, journal = {International Journal of Game Theory}, year = {1975}, volume = {4}, pages = {25-55}, key = {Games} } @ARTICLE{Selten1975, author = {Selten, R.}, title = {Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games}, journal = {International Journal of Game Theory}, year = {1975}, volume = {4}, pages = {25-55}, key = {Games}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Selt:65, author = {Selten, R.}, title = {Spieltheoretische {B}ehandlung eines {O}ligopolmodells mit {N}achfragetr{\"a}gheit}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft}, year = {1965}, volume = {12}, pages = {310-324}, key = {Games} } @ARTICLE{SenA:02, author = {Sen, A.}, title = {Why health equity?}, journal = {Health Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {11}, pages = {659-666}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{SenA:98, author = {Sen, A.}, title = {Mortality as an indicator of economic success and failure}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1998}, volume = {108}, pages = {1-25}, number = {446}, month = {January}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{SenA:97HI, author = {Sen, Amartya}, title = {Hunger in the contemporary world}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1997}, type = {DERP Discussion paper}, number = {9}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{SenA:97IU, author = {Sen, Amartya}, title = {Inequality, unemployment and contemporary {E}urope}, institution = {STICERD, LSE}, year = {1997}, type = {DERP}, number = {7}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{SenA:96, author = {Sen, Amartya}, title = {Freedom, capabilities and public action: a response}, journal = {notizie di Politeia}, year = {1996}, volume = {12}, pages = {107-125}, number = {43/44}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{SenA:86, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Social choice theory}, booktitle = {Handbook of Mathematical Economics, 3}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1986}, editor = {Arrow, K. J. and Intriligator, M. D.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{SenA:00SJ, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Social justice and the distribution of income}, booktitle = {Handbook of Income Distribution}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {2000}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Bourguignon, F.}, chapter = {1}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {Social justice} } @INCOLLECTION{SenA:79EM, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Ethical measurement of inequality: some difficulties}, booktitle = {Personal Income Distribution}, publisher = {Amsterdam, North-Holland}, year = {1979}, editor = {Krelle, W. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{SenA:80EO, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Equality of What?}, booktitle = {Tanner Lectures on Human Values}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1980}, editor = {McMurrin, S.}, volume = {1}, address = {Cambridge}, institution = {University of Utah Press and Cambridge}, journal = {The Tanner Lectures on Human Values}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{SenA:99TP, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {The possibility of social choice}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {89}, pages = {349-378}, key = {social choice}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.23} } @ARTICLE{SenA:97FI, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {From Income Inequality to Economic Inequality}, journal = {Southern Economic Journal}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {383-401}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.07.23} } @BOOK{SenA:92, title = {Inequality Reexamined}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1992}, author = {Sen, A. K.}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{SenA:87, title = {The Standard of Living}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1987}, author = {Sen, A. K.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{SenA:85, title = {Commodities and Capabilities}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1985}, author = {Sen, A. K.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{SenA:83, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Poor, relatively speaking}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1983}, volume = {35}, pages = {153-69}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{SenA:81, title = {Poverty and famines}, publisher = {Oxford Universtity Press}, year = {1981}, author = {Sen, A. K.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Sen1980, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Equality of What?}, journal = {The Tanner Lectures on Human Values}, year = {1980}, volume = {1}, institution = {University of Utah Press and Cambridge}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {University Press}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SenA:80DA, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Description as choice}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1980}, volume = {32}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Sen1979, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Personal utilities and public judgements: or what's wrong with welfare economics?}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1979}, volume = {89}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SenA:79II, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Issues in the measurement of poverty}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1979}, volume = {91}, pages = {285-307}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{SenA:79PU, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Personal utilities and public judgements: or what's wrong with welfare economics?}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1979}, volume = {89}, pages = {537-558}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{SenA:77, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {On weights and measures: informational constraints in Social Welfare Analysis}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1977}, volume = {45}, pages = {1539-1572}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Sen1976a, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Real national income}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1976}, volume = {43}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SenA:76PA, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Poverty: An ordinal approach to measurement}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1976}, volume = {44}, pages = {219-231}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{SenA:76RN, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Real national income}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1976}, volume = {43}, pages = {19-39}, key = {welfare}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2296597} } @ARTICLE{SenA:76WI, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Welfare inequalities and {R}awlsian axiomatics}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, year = {1976}, volume = {7}, pages = {243-262}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{SenA:74, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Informational bases of alternative welfare approaches}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1974}, volume = {3}, pages = {387-403}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{SenA:73BA, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {Behaviour and the concept of preference}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1973}, volume = {40}, pages = {241-247}, key = {Utility, preference} } @BOOK{SenA:73OE, title = {On Economic Inequality}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1973}, author = {Sen, A. K.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{SenA:70, title = {Collective Choice and Social Welfare}, publisher = {Oliver and Boyd}, year = {1970}, author = {Sen, A. K.}, address = {Edinburgh}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{SenA:61, author = {Sen, A. K.}, title = {On optimising the rate of saving}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1961}, volume = {71}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{SeFo:97, title = {On Economic Inequality}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1997}, author = {Sen, A. K. and Foster, J. E.}, address = {Oxford}, edition = {Second}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{SenP:88, author = {Sen, P. K.}, title = {The harmonic {G}ini coefficient and affluence indexes}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1988}, volume = {16}, pages = {65-76}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{SenP:86, author = {Sen, P. K.}, title = {The {G}ini coefficient and poverty indexes: some reconciliations}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1986}, volume = {81}, pages = {1050-1057}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{SenP:74, author = {Sen, P. K.}, title = {Poverty, inequality and unemployment: some conceptual issues in measurement}, journal = {Sankhya: The Indian Journal of Statistics}, year = {1974}, volume = {36}, pages = {67-82}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{SenP:72, author = {Sen, P. K.}, title = {Utilitarianism and inequality}, journal = {Economic and Political Weekly}, year = {1972}, volume = {7}, pages = {54-75}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Seni:08, author = {Senik, C.}, title = {Ambition and Jealousy: Income Interactions in the Old {E}urope Versus the New {E}urope and the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Economica}, year = {2008}, volume = {75}, pages = {495-513}, abstract = {Using individual-level data from a large number of countries, this paper examines how self-reported subjective well-being depends on own income and reference income, where reference income is defined as the income of one's professional peers. It uncovers a divide between 'old'—low-mobility—European countries on the one hand, and 'new' European post-Transition countries and the United States on the other. The relative importance of comparisons ('jealousy') versus information ('ambition') seems to depend on the degree of mobility and uncertainty in the considered countries.}, key = {utility, preference}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.29}, url = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120120200/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0} } @BOOK{Serf:80, title = {Approximation Theorems in Mathematical Statistics}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1980}, author = {Serfling, W.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Seri:99, author = {Serizawa, S.}, title = {Strategyproof And Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {121-145}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{SeYi:98, author = {Sertel, Murat R. and Yildiz, Muhamet}, title = {The {L}indahl solution with changing population and resources}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1998}, volume = {35}, pages = {151-163}, number = {2}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{SeSo:03, author = {Sethi, R. and Somanathan E.}, title = {Understanding reciprocity}, journal = {Journal Of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {2003}, volume = {50}, pages = {1-27}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Shac:02, author = {Shachat, J.}, title = {Mixed Strategy Play and the Minimax Hypothesis}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2002}, volume = {104}, pages = {189-226}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @TECHREPORT{ShSlSa:07, author = {Shackelford,D.A. and Slemrod,J.B. and Sallee,J.}, title = {A Unifying Model of How the Tax System and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles Affect Corporate Behavior}, institution = {NBER}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, number = {W12873}, abstract = {This paper models the impact of the tax system and GAAP on the real and financial reporting decisions of corporations. It provides a first step toward joint evaluation of taxation and financial reporting in the standard economic analyses of corporate behavior. The key finding is that value arises from real decisions that provide firms with discretion in their tax and financial reporting. This desire for flexibility modifies the optimal decisions of firms, in theory, and we provide examples that illustrate this behavior in the real world.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @TECHREPORT{ShSi:06, author = {Shafer, William and Simmons, Richard}, title = {Social Responsibility, Machiavellianism and Tax Avoidance: A Study of Hong Kong Tax Professionals}, institution = {Monash University}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {5}, abstract = {This study investigates the effects of attitudes toward the perceived importance of corporate ethics and social responsibility and Machiavellianism on professional tax practitioners’ willingness to advocate aggressive avoidance schemes on behalf of corporate clients. We hypothesise that practitioners who perceive corporate ethics and social responsibility as more important will judge aggressive avoidance less favourably, and accordingly will estimate a lower likelihood of acquiescence in such schemes. We also hypothesise that practitioners with stronger Machiavellian orientations will be less likely to feel that corporate ethics and social responsibility are important, and more likely to judge aggressive tax avoidance schemes favourably. The findings, based on a survey of tax professionals in Hong Kong, support the hypotheses.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{Shal:00, author = {Shalev, J.}, title = {Loss aversion equilibrium}, journal = {International Journal of Game Theory}, year = {2000}, volume = {29}, pages = {269-287}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Shal:85, author = {Shalit, H.}, title = {Calculating the {G}ini index of inequality for individual data}, journal = {Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1985}, volume = {47}, pages = {185-189}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Shan:48, author = {Shannon, C. E.}, title = {A mathematical theory of communication}, journal = {Bell System Technical Journal}, year = {1948}, volume = {106}, pages = {379-423 and 623-656}, key = {information} } @BOOK{ShTu:95, title = {The Jackknife and the Bootstrap}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1995}, author = {Shao, J. and Tu, D.}, address = {New York}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{ShSt:84, author = {Shapiro, Carl and Stiglitz, Joseph E.}, title = {Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1984}, volume = {74}, pages = {433-444}, number = {3}, key = {labour market} } @ARTICLE{ShPh:94, author = {Sharif, N. and Phipps, S.}, title = {The {C}hallenge of {C}hild {P}overty: {W}hich {P}olicies {M}ight {H}elp?}, journal = {Canadian Business Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {2}, pages = {17-30}, number = {3}, month = {Spring}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Shar:83, author = {Sharma, B. D.}, title = {Measuring poverty and egalitarian trends}, journal = {Jour. of Social Sciences and Humanities}, year = {1983}, volume = {1}, pages = {1-10}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Shar:64, author = {Sharpe, William F.}, title = {Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equiliibrium under Conditions ofRisk}, journal = {Journal of Finance}, year = {1964}, volume = {29}, month = {September}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Shav:87, author = {Shavell, S.}, title = {The optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrent}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1987}, volume = {77}, pages = {584-592}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Shaw:96, author = {Kathryn L. Shaw}, title = {An Empirical Analysis of Risk Aversion and Income Growth}, journal = {Journal of Labor Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {14}, pages = {626-653}, number = {4}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Shea:00, author = {Shea, J.}, title = {Does parents' money matter?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {77}, pages = {155-184}, key = {redistribution} } @TECHREPORT{ShTr:90, author = {Sheffrin, S. M and Triest, R. K.}, title = {Can brute deterrence backfire? Perceptions and attitudes in taxpayer compliance}, year = {1990}, type = {Mimeo}, address = {University of California-Davis}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{Shep:53, title = {Cost and Production Functions}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1953}, author = {Shephard, R. W.}, address = {Princeton, New Jersey}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Shes:07, author = {Sheshinski, E.}, title = {Optimum commodity taxation in pooling equilibria}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {1565-1573}, month = {August}, abstract = {This paper extends the standard model of optimum commodity taxation (Ramsey, F., 1927. A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation. Economic Journal 37, 47–61; Diamond, P., Mirrlees, J., 1971. Optimal Taxation and Public Production, II: "Tax Rules". American Economic Review 61, 261–278) to a competitive economy in which markets are inefficient due to asymmetric information. Insurance markets are prime examples: consumers impose varying costs on suppliers but firms cannot associate costs with individual customers and consequently all are charged equal prices. In such a competitive pooling equilibrium, the price of each good is equal to the average of individual marginal costs weighted by equilibrium quantities. We derive modified Ramsey–Boiteux Conditions for optimum taxes in such an economy and show that, in addition to the standard formula, they include first-order effects which reflect the deviations of prices from marginal costs and the response of equilibrium quantities to the taxes levied. An explanation of the additional terms is provided. It is shown that a condition on the monotonicity of demand elasticities enables to sign the direction of the deviations from the standard case.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Shes:04, author = {Sheshinski, Eytan}, title = {On atmosphere externality and corrective taxes}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {727-734}, abstract = {It has been argued that in the presence of an ‘Atmosphere Externality’ andcompetitive behavior by households, a uniform commodity tax on the externality-generatinggood attains the first best. It is demonstrated, however, that if incomeredistribution is desirable then personalized taxes are required for asecond-best optimum. Each of these taxes is the sum of a uniform (acrosshouseholds) tax and a component, positive or negative, which depends onthe household’s income and demand elasticities. Second-best optimal indirecttaxes and rules for investment in externality-reducing measures are alsoconsidered.}, key = {environment} } @ARTICLE{Shes:72OL, author = {Sheshinski, E.}, title = {The optimal linear income tax}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1972}, volume = {39}, pages = {297-302}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Shes:72RB, author = {Sheshinski, E.}, title = {Relation between a social welfare function and the {G}ini index of inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1972}, volume = {4}, pages = {98-100}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Sheshinski1972a, author = {Sheshinski, E.}, title = {The optimal linear income-tax}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1972}, pages = {297-302}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ShWe:82, author = {Sheshinski, E. and Weiss, Y.}, title = {Inequality within and between families}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1982}, volume = {30}, pages = {105-127}, number = {2}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Shil:04, author = {Shiller,R.}, title = {Household Reaction to changes in housing wealth}, institution = {Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics}, year = {2004}, key = {housing} } @BOOK{Sh:05, title = {Irrational Exuberance}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {2005}, author = {Shiller, Robert J.}, edition = {2nd}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.01.22} } @ARTICLE{Shi:03, author = {Shiller, Robert J.}, title = {From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2003}, volume = {17}, pages = {83--104}, number = {1}, copyright = {Copyright © 2003 American Economic Association}, issn = {08953309}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Winter, 2003}, publisher = {American Economic Association} } @ARTICLE{Shi:90, author = {Shiller, Robert J.}, title = {Speculative Prices and Popular Models}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1990}, volume = {4}, pages = {55--65}, number = {2}, copyright = {Copyright © 1990 American Economic Association}, issn = {08953309}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Spring, 1990}, publisher = {American Economic Association} } @ARTICLE{Shil:00, author = {Shilony, Y.}, title = {Diversity and Ingenuity in Voluntary Collective Action}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2000}, volume = {16}, pages = {429-443}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{SchSu:90, author = {Shleifer, Andrei and Summers, Lawrence H.}, title = {The Noise Trader Approach to Finance}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1990}, volume = {4}, pages = {19--33}, number = {2}, copyright = {Copyright © 1990 American Economic Association}, issn = {08953309}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Spring, 1990}, publisher = {American Economic Association} } @ARTICLE{Shol:00, author = {Sholomov, L. A.}, title = {Explicit Form of Neutral Social Decision Rules for Basic Rationality Conditions}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2000}, volume = {39}, pages = {81-107}, key = {social choice} } @ARTICLE{Shor:72, author = {Shorack, G. R.}, title = {Functions of order statistics}, journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1972}, volume = {43}, pages = {412-427}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{Shor:99, author = {Shorrocks, A.F.}, title = {{Decomposition Procedures for Distributional Analysis: A Unified Framework Based on the Shapley Value}}, institution = {Department of Economics, University of Essex}, year = {1999}, type = {mimeo}, month = {June}, journal = {mimeo}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {Fiorio}, timestamp = {2007.01.05} } @INCOLLECTION{Shor:93OH, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {On the {H}art measure of income mobility}, booktitle = {Industrial Concentration and Economic Inequality}, publisher = {Edward Elgar}, year = {1993}, editor = {Casson, M. and Creedy, J.}, key = {mobility} } @INCOLLECTION{Shor:88, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Aggregation issues in inequality measurement}, booktitle = {Measurement in Economics}, publisher = {Physica Verlag Heidelberg}, year = {1988}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Shor:98, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Deprivation profiles and deprivation indices}, booktitle = {The Distribution of Welfare and Household Production: International Perspectives}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Jenkins, Stephen P. and Kapteyn, Arie and Van Praag, Bernard M. S.}, chapter = {11}, pages = {250-267}, key = {deprivation} } @ARTICLE{Shor:95, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Revisiting the {S}en poverty index}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1995}, volume = {63}, pages = {1225-1230}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Shor:84, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Inequality decomposition by population subgroups}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1984}, volume = {52}, pages = {1369-1385}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Shor:83RI, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Ranking Income Distributions}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1983}, volume = {50}, pages = {3-17}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Shor:83TI, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {The Impact of Income Components on the Distribution of Family Income}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {98}, pages = {311-326}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Shor:82b, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {On the distance between income distributions}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1982}, volume = {50}, pages = {1337-1339}, number = {9}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Shor:82ID, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Inequality decomposition by factor components}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1982}, volume = {50}, pages = {193-211}, number = {1}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Shor:80TC, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {The class of additively decomposable inequality measures}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1980}, volume = {48}, pages = {613-625}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Shor:80TI, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {The impact of income components on the distribution of family incomes}, institution = {Queen's University}, year = {1980}, type = {Discussion Paper 417}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Shor:78II, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Income inequality and income mobility}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1978}, volume = {19}, pages = {376-393}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Shor:78TM, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {The measurement of mobility}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1978}, volume = {46}, pages = {1013-1024}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Shor:76, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Income Mobility and the {M}arkov assumption}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1976}, volume = {86}, pages = {566-578}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Shorrocks1976, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Income Mobility and the {M}arkov assumption}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1976}, volume = {86}, pages = {566-578}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Shor:74, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {On Stochastic Models of Size Distributions}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1974}, volume = {86}, pages = {566-578}, key = {mobility} } @PHDTHESIS{Shor:73, author = {Shorrocks, A. F.}, title = {Aspects of the Distribution of Personal Wealth}, school = {London School of Economics}, year = {1973}, address = {UK}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{ShFo:87, author = {Shorrocks, A. F. and Foster, J. E.}, title = {Transfer-sensitive inequality measures}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1987}, volume = {54}, pages = {485-498}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{ShSl:95, author = {Shorrocks, A. F. and Slottje, D. J.}, title = {Approximating unanimity orderings: an application to {L}orenz Dominance}, institution = {University of Essex}, year = {1995}, type = {Department of Economics Discussion Paper}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{ShWa:05, author = {Shorrocks, A. F. and Wan, G.}, title = {Spatial decomposition of inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Geography}, year = {2005}, volume = {5}, pages = {59-81}, abstract = {This paper reviews the theory and application of the decomposition methods commonly used to measure the impact of spatial location on income inequality. It establishes some new theoretical results with potentially wide applicability, and examines empirical evidence drawn from a large number of countries.}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.08}, url = {http://www.swetswise.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/FullTextProxy/swproxy?url=http%3A%2F%2Fjoeg.oxfordjournals.org%2Fcgi%2Freprint%2F5%2F1%2F59.pdf&ts=1220869248563&cs=1963958696&userName=0100048.ipdirect&emCondId=100048&articleID=29063345&yevoID=1775765&titleID=112177&referer=1&remoteAddr=158.143.192.135&hostType=PRO} } @ARTICLE{ShWh:05, author = {Shoven, J. and Whalley, J.}, title = {Irving Fisher's Spendings (Consumption) Tax in Retrospect}, journal = {American Journal of Economics and Sociology}, year = {2005}, volume = {64}, pages = {215-235}, abstract = {Irving Fisher wrote a significant number of papers towards the end of his career on the design of the U.S. tax system. These writings culminated in a book that he wrote with his brother Herbert in 1942. Fisher thought that the double taxation of saving under an income tax was extremely harmful to the economy and he therefore proposed a “spendings” tax or what he referred to as a “real income” tax. Even though he disliked the terminology, he advocated what today would be referred to as a progressive consumption tax. Fisher’s analysis was both theoretical and practical. His 1942 book contained a proposed tax return that implemented his ideas. His analysis is surprisingly modern and relevant today. This paper presents the Fisher proposal and examines the current U.S. tax system in light of his tax views. We argue that Fisher would find that the U.S. tax system lacks intellectual coherence, is economically inefficient, and unnecessarily complex.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{ShTh:97, author = {Showalter, Mark H. and Thurston, Norman K.}, title = {Taxes and labor supply of high-income physicians}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {66}, pages = {73-97}, number = {1}, month = {October}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Shub:01, author = {Shubik, M. S.}, title = {Risk, Public Perception and Education: Quantitative and Qualitative Risk}, institution = {Yale School of Management}, year = {2001}, type = {Working Paper Series ES}, number = {9}, address = {New Haven Connecticut}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{ShWi:08, author = {Shupp, Robert and Williams, Arlington}, title = {Risk Preference Differentials of Small Groups and Individuals}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2008}, volume = {118}, pages = {258 - 283}, abstract = {This research compares lottery valuation decisions made by individuals with similar decisions made by small groups. There is an extensive social psychology literature addressing group versus individual decision making but few studies explore this issue in economic contexts with cash rewards. Willingness- to-pay data elicited from independent samples of individuals and three-person groups in a repeated-measures experimental design reveal that: the variance of risk preferences is generally smaller for groups than individuals and the average group is more risk averse than the average individual in high-risk situations, but groups tend to be less risk averse in low-risk situations.}, key = {Risk aversion}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @BOOK{ShyO:95, title = {Industrial Organisation: Theory and Applications}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {1995}, author = {Shy, O.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{SiXiGuSh:07, author = {Sicular, T. and Ximing, Y. and Gustaffson, B. and Shi, L.}, title = {The Urban-Rural Gap and Inequality in China}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2007}, volume = {53}, pages = {93-126}, abstract = {Using new household survey data for 1995 and 2002, we investigate the size of China’s urban–rural income gap, the gap’s contribution to overall inequality in China, and the factors underlying the gap. Our analysis improves on past estimates by using a fuller measure of income, adjusting for spatial price differences and including migrants. Our methods include inequality decomposition by population subgroup and the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition. Several key findings emerge. First, the adjustments substantially reduce China’s urban–rural income gap and its contribution to inequality. Nevertheless, the gap remains large and has increased somewhat over time. Second, after controlling for household characteristics, location of residence remains the most important factor underlying the urban–rural income gap. The only household characteristic that contributes substantially to the gap is education. Differences in the endowments of, and returns to, other household characteristics such as family size and composition, landholdings, and Communist Party membership are relatively unimportant.}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07}, url = {http://gate2.library.lse.ac.uk:2250/cgi-bin/fulltext/118503354/PDFSTART} } @BOOK{Sieb:98, title = {Redesigning Social Security}, publisher = {Institut f{\"u}r Weltwirtschaft and der Universit{\"a}t Kiel}, year = {1998}, author = {Horst Siebert}, key = {social security} } @BOOK{Siebert1998, title = {Redesigning Social Security}, publisher = {Institut f\"ur Weltwirtschaft and der Universit\"at Kiel}, year = {1998}, author = {Horst Siebert}, key = {social security}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SiBrSm:06, author = {Sierminska, E. and Brandolini, A. and Smeeding, T. M.}, title = {The {L}uxembourg {W}ealth {S}tudy - A cross-country comparable database for household wealth research}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {375-383}, abstract = {The paper describes the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS), an international project launched in 2003 by the Luxembourg Income Study and by institutions from Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The aim of the project is to assemble and to harmonise existing micro-data on household wealth, in order to provide a sounder basis for comparative research on household net worth, portfolio composition, and wealth distributions.}, key = {wealth}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @ARTICLE{Silb:95, author = {Silber, Jacques}, title = {Horizontal Inequity, The {G}ini Index and the Measurement of Distributionalchange}, journal = {Research on Inequality}, year = {1995}, volume = {6}, pages = {379-392}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Silber1995, author = {Silber, Jacques}, title = {Horizontal Inequity, The {G}ini Index, and the Measurement of Distributional change}, journal = {Research on Inequality}, year = {1995}, volume = {6}, pages = {379-392}, key = {equity}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Silb:89a, author = {Silber, J.}, title = {Factor Components, Population Subgroups and the Computation of the {G}ini Index of Inequality}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1989}, volume = {71}, pages = {107-115}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Silb:89b, author = {Silber, J.}, title = {On the measurement of employment segregation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1989}, volume = {30}, pages = {237-243}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Silb:88GI, title = {Growth, inequality, change, permutation and the measurement of change}, year = {1988}, author = {Silber, J.}, number = {9}, institution = {Bar Ilan University}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Silb:88ID, author = {Silber , J.}, title = {Income distribution, tax structure and the measurement of tax progressivity}, institution = {Bar Ilan University}, year = {1988}, number = {10}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Sill:99, author = {Sillamaa, M. A.}, title = {How Work Responds to Wage Taxation: An Experimental Test of a Zero Top MarginalTax Rate}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {125-134}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Sill:99HE, author = {Sillamaa, M. A.}, title = {How Work Effort Responds to Wage Taxation: A Non-Linear versus a LinearTax Experiment}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1999}, volume = {39}, pages = {219-233}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Sillamaa1999, author = {Sillamaa, M. A.}, title = {How Work Effort Responds to Wage Taxation: A Non-Linear versus a Linear Tax Experiment}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1999}, volume = {39}, pages = {219-233}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Sillamaa1999a, author = {Sillamaa, M. A.}, title = {How Work Responds to Wage Taxation: An Experimental Test of a Zero Top Marginal Tax Rate}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {125-134}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Sill:69, author = {Sillitto, G. P.}, title = {Derivation of approximations to inverse distribution function of a continuousunivariate population from the order statistics of a sample}, journal = {Biometrika}, year = {1969}, volume = {56}, pages = {641-650}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Sillitto1969, author = {Sillitto, G. P.}, title = {Derivation of approximations to inverse distribution function of a continuous univariate population from the order statistics of a sample}, journal = {Biometrika}, year = {1969}, volume = {56}, pages = {641-650}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Silo:07, author = {Silos, Pedro}, title = {Housing Tenure and Wealth Distribution in Life Cycle Economies}, journal = {The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics}, year = {2007}, volume = {7}, pages = {1 - 22}, abstract = {Common practice in the housing and wealth distribution literature has proceeded as if the modeling of housing rental markets was unnecessary due to renters’ relative low levels of wealth and the smaller fraction they represent in the total population. This paper shows, however, that their inclusion matters substantially when dealing with wealth concentration over the life-cycle. Renters are concentrated in the poorer and younger groups and when matching the data on wealth inequality by age groups, the model improves relative to a one asset economy and relative to a housing model with no rental markets.}, key = {life cycle}, keywords = {wealth concentration, life cycle, housing tenure}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{SiKaZh:07, author = {Silva, Emilson and Kahn, Charles and Zhu, Xie}, title = {Crime and Punishment and Corruption: Who Needs "Untouchables"?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2007}, volume = {9}, pages = {69 - 87}, abstract = {Becker’s result that fines should be maximized is also applicable to some social environments where law enforcers are corrupt. If the regulated activity is legal, the principal may efficiently deter crime without an anti-corruption unit. An opportunistic anti-corruption unit, even when corrupt, becomes useful for the principal when the activity is illegal, since the principal’s goal of maximizing fines motivates the unit to collect bribes from the enforcer, which subsequently induces the enforcer to be nearly completely honest, minimizing corruption. Therefore, we show that there is not necessarily an infinite regress originating with the puzzle of who polices the police.}, key = {Crime}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @BOOK{Silv:86, title = {Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis}, publisher = {Chapman and Hall}, year = {1986}, author = {Silverman, B. W.}, address = {London}, key = {Kernel} } @BOOK{Silverman1986, title = {Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis}, publisher = {Chapman and Hall}, year = {1986}, author = {Silverman, B. W.}, address = {London.}, key = {STATISTICS}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Silv:81, author = {Silverman, B. W.}, title = {Using Kernel Density Estimates to Investigate Multimodality}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B}, year = {1981}, volume = {43}, pages = {97-99}, key = {Kernel} } @ARTICLE{Silverman1987, author = {Silverman, B. W. and Young, G. A.}, title = {The bootstrap: to smooth or not to smooth?}, journal = Biometrika, year = {1987}, volume = {74}, pages = {469-497}, key = {STATISTICS}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SiYo:87, author = {Silverman, B. W. and Young, G. A.}, title = {The bootstrap: to smooth or not to smooth?}, journal = {Biometrika}, year = {1987}, volume = {74}, pages = {469-497}, key = {bootstrap} } @ARTICLE{SiAr:07, author = {Simler, K. R. and Arndt, C.}, title = {Poverty Comparisons with Absolute Poverty Lines Estimated from Survey Data}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2007}, volume = {53}, pages = {275-294}, note = {Early Online Article: doi: 10.1111/j.1475-4991.2007.00228.x ksimler@worldbank.org}, abstract = {The objective of measuring poverty is usually to make comparisons over time or between two or more groups. Common statistical inference methods are used to determine whether an apparent difference in measured poverty is statistically significant. Studies of relative poverty have long recognized that when the poverty line is calculated from sample survey data, both the variance of the poverty line and the variance of the welfare metric contribute to the variance of the poverty estimate. In contrast, studies using absolute poverty lines have ignored the poverty line variance, even when the poverty lines are estimated from sample survey data. Including the poverty line variance could either reduce or increase the precision of poverty estimates, depending on the specific characteristics of the data. This paper presents a general procedure for estimating the standard error of poverty measures when the poverty line is estimated from survey data. Based on bootstrap methods, the approach can be used for a wide range of poverty measures and methods for estimating poverty lines. The method is applied to recent household survey data from Mozambique. When the sampling variance of the poverty line is taken into account, the estimated standard errors of Foster–Greer–Thorbecke and Watts poverty measures increase by 15–30 percent at the national level, with considerable variability at lower levels of aggregation.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @BOOK{SiBl:94, title = {Mathematics for Economists}, publisher = {Norton}, year = {1994}, author = {Simon, C. P. and Blume, L.}, address = {New York}, key = {mathematics} } @BOOK{SiWi:82, title = {Beating the System:- The Underground Economy}, publisher = {Auburn House}, year = {1982}, author = {Simon, C. P. and Witte, A. D.}, address = {Boston, Massachusetts}, key = {underground} } @INCOLLECTION{Simo:87, author = {Simon, H. A.}, title = {Rationality in Psychology and economics}, booktitle = {Rational Choice}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, year = {1987}, editor = {Hogarth, R. M. and Reder, M. W.}, address = {Chicago}, key = {economic psychology} } @BOOK{Si:57, title = {Models of Man}, publisher = {Nwe York: Wiley}, year = {1957}, author = {Simon, Herbert A.}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.01.22} } @ARTICLE{Simo:57, author = {Simon, H. A.}, title = {The Compensation of Executives}, journal = {Sociometry}, year = {1957}, volume = {20}, pages = {32-35}, key = {earnings} } @ARTICLE{Simo:55, author = {Simon, H. A.}, title = {On a Class of Skew Distribution Functions}, journal = {Biometrika}, year = {1955}, volume = {52}, pages = {425-440}, key = {Distributions} } @ARTICLE{SiBo:58, author = {Simon, H. A. and Bonini, C. P.}, title = {The Size Distribution of Business Firms}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1958}, volume = {48}, pages = {607-617}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{Simon1958, author = {Simon, H. A. and Bonini, C. P.}, title = {The Size Distribution of Business Firms}, journal = {American Economic Review `}, year = {1958}, volume = {48}, pages = {607-617}, key = {industry}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SiGr:04, author = {Simone,A. and Graziano,M.}, title = {The pure theory of public goods: the case of many commodities}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {40}, pages = {847-868}, abstract = {The validity of the two welfare theorems is established in the context ofproduction economies with an abstract set of public projects and an infinite-dimensionalcommodity space.}, key = {public goods} } @BOOK{Simo:96SM, title = {Smoothing Methods in Statistics}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {1996}, author = {Simonoff, J. S.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.08.22} } @BOOK{Simonoff1996, title = {Smoothing Methods in Statistics}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1996}, author = {Simonoff, J. S.}, address = {New York} # ., key = {STATISTICS}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Simo:38, title = {Personal Income Taxation}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, year = {1938}, author = {Simons, H. A.}, address = {Chicago}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Simp:87, author = {Simpson, D. G.}, title = {Minimum {H}ellinger distance estimation for the analysis of {C}ount data}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1987}, volume = {82}, pages = {802-807}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{SiSp:76, author = {Singer, B. and Spilerman, S.}, title = {Some Methodological Issues in the Analysis of Longitudinal Surveys}, journal = {Annals of Economic and Social Measurement}, year = {1976}, pages = {447-474}, number = {5/4}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{SiSp:74, author = {B. Singer and S. Spilerman}, title = {The Representation of Social Processes by {M}arkov Models}, journal = {American Journal of Sociology}, year = {1974}, volume = {81}, pages = {1-54}, number = {1}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Sing:73, author = {Singh, B.}, title = {Making honesty the best policy}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1973}, volume = {2}, pages = {257-263}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{SiMa:76, author = {Singh, S. K. and Maddala, G. S.}, title = {A Function for the Size Distribution of Income}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1976}, volume = {44}, pages = {963-970}, key = {distributions} } @BOOK{Sinn:03, title = {The new systems Competition}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing}, year = {2003}, author = {Sinn,H.}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Sinn:97, author = {Sinn, Hans-Werner}, title = {The selection principle and market failure in systems competition}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {66}, pages = {247-274}, number = {2}, month = {November}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Sinn:96, author = {Sinn, H.-W.}, title = {Social insurance, incentives and risk taking}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {1996}, volume = {3}, pages = {259-280}, key = {Social insurance} } @ARTICLE{Sinn:95, author = {Sinn, Hans-Werner}, title = {A theory of the welfare state}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1995}, volume = {97}, pages = {495-526}, number = {4}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Sinn:07, author = {Sinning, Mathias}, title = {Wealth and Asset Holdings of Immigrants in Germany}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {3089}, abstract = {This paper examines the relative wealth position and the portfolio choices of immigrants in Germany. The empirical findings reveal significant differences in overall wealth and various wealth components between German natives and immigrants. Differences in real estate constitute the major part of different levels of net worth, indicating that disparities in homeownership rates are responsible for the main part of the overall wealth gap. Moreover, migrants' degree of portfolio diversification is significantly lower than that of comparable natives. The results of a decomposition analysis suggest that differences in wealth and asset holdings may be explained by disparity in educational attainment to a sizable extent, while the effects of income differentials and differences in demographic characteristics are insignificant.}, key = {Wealth}, keywords = {international migration, wealth accumulation, decomposition analysis, multiple imputation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.10} } @ARTICLE{SiYa:99, author = {Siu, Tak Kuen and Yang, Hailiang}, title = {Subjective risk measures: Bayesian predictive scenarios analysis}, journal = {Insurance: Mathematics and Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {25}, pages = {157-169}, abstract = {In this paper we study methods for measuring risk. First, we introduce aconditional risk measure and point out that it is a coherent risk measure.Using the Bayesian statistical idea a subjective risk measure is defined.In some special cases, closed form expressions for the risk measures canbe obtained. The credibility theory can be used to relax the strong assumptionson the model and prior distributions, and to obtain approximated risk measureformulas. Applications in both finance and insurance are discussed. ©1999Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Skin:88, author = {Jonathan Skinner}, title = {Risky Income, Life Cycle Consumption and Precautionary Savings}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1988}, volume = {22}, pages = {237-255}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{Skinner1988, author = {Jonathan Skinner}, title = {Risky Income, Life Cycle Consumption, and Precautionary Savings}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1988}, volume = {22}, pages = {237-255}, key = {consumption}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SkSl:85, author = {Skinner, J. and Slemrod, J.}, title = {An Economic Perspective on Tax Evasion}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1985}, volume = {38}, pages = {345-353}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{Skol:85, author = {Skolka, J.}, title = {The parallel economy in {A}ustria}, booktitle = {The Economics of the Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1985}, editor = {Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A.}, address = {Berlin, Germany}, key = {underground} } @BOOK{Skol:84, title = {Die andere {W}irtschaft: {S}chwarzarbeit und {Do-it-Yourself} in {\"O}sterreich}, publisher = {Signum Verlag}, year = {1984}, author = {Skolka, J.}, address = {Vienna}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Slem:07, author = {Slemrod, J.}, title = {Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2007}, volume = {21}, pages = {25-48}, abstract = {No government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers’ sense of duty to remit what is owed. Some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe, but many others will not. Over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink, as they see how they are being taken advantage of by the others. Thus, paying taxes must be made a legal responsibility of citizens, with penalties attendant on noncompliance. But even in the face of those penalties, substantial tax evasion exists—and always has. The history of taxation is replete with episodes of evasion, often notable for their inventiveness. During the third century, many wealthy Romans buried their jewelry or stocks of gold coin to evade the luxury tax, and homeowners in eighteenth-century England temporarily bricked up their fireplaces to escape notice of the hearth tax collector (Webber and Wildavsky, 1986, p. 141). This essay reviews what is known about the magnitude, nature, and determinants of tax evasion, with an emphasis on the U.S. income tax. Alm (1999), Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) offer more comprehensive recent reviews of the literature. It then places this information into a conceptual and policy context.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Slem:06, author = {Slemrod, J.}, title = {Taxation and Big Brother: Information, Personalisation and Privacy in 21st Century Tax Policy}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2006}, volume = {27}, pages = {1-15}, number = {1}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.09.11} } @ARTICLE{Slem:04, author = {Slemrod, J.}, title = {The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {2004}, volume = {57}, pages = {877-899}, abstract = {This paper offers an economics perspective on tax evasion and abusive avoidance done by corporations. It fi rst reviews what is known about the extent and nature of corporate tax noncompliance and the resources devoted to enforcement. It then addresses the supply side of aggressive corporate tax planning—the industrial organization of the tax shelter industry—as well as the demand for corporate tax evasion and abusive avoidance, focusing on how the standard Allingham–Sandmo approach to tax evasion needs to be modified when applied to public corporations. It then discusses the implications of a supply–and–demand approach for the analysis of the incidence and effi ciency cost of corporate income taxation, and the very justifi cation for a separate tax on corporation income. Along the way it addresses policy proposals aimed at increased disclosure of corporate tax activities to both the IRS and to the public.}, key = {tax compliance - firms}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.07.19} } @ARTICLE{Slem:01, author = {Slemrod, J.}, title = {A General Model of the Behavioural Response to Taxation}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2001}, volume = {8}, pages = {119-128}, abstract = {This paper generalizes the standard model of how taxes affect the labor-leisurechoice by allowing individuals to change both their labor supply and avoidanceeffort in response to tax changes. Doing so reveals that the income andsubstitution effect of taxes depend on both preferences and the avoidancetechnology. Econometric analysis will not in general allow one to separatelyidentify the two influences, unless one can specify observable determinantsof the cost of avoidance. The effective marginal tax rate on working mustbe modified by the addition of an avoidance-facilitating effect, whichmeasures how the cost of avoidance changes with higher income. This modelprovides a conceptual structure for evaluating to what extent and in whatsituations, the opportunities for tax avoidance mitigate the real substitutionresponse to taxation.}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Slemrod2001b, author = {Slemrod, Joel}, title = {A General Model of Behavioral Response to Taxation}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2001}, volume = {8}, pages = {119-128}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Slem:97, author = {Slemrod, J.}, title = {Deconstructing the Income Tax}, journal = {American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association)}, year = {1997}, volume = {87}, pages = {151-155}, key = {taxation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{SlBlCh:01, author = {Slemrod, J. and Blumenthal, M. and Christian, C.}, title = {Taxpayer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence from aControlled Experiment in {M}innesota}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, pages = {455-483}, abstract = {In 1995 a group of 1724 randomly selected Minnesota taxpayers was informedby letter that the returns they were about to file would be closely examined.Compared to a control group that did not receive this letter, low and middle-incometaxpayers in the treatment group on average increased tax payments comparedto the previous year, which we interpret as indicating the presence ofnoncompliance. The effect was much stronger for those with more opportunityto evade; in fact, the difference in differences is not statistically significantfor those who do not have self-employment or farm income and do not payestimated tax. Surprisingly, however, the reported tax liability of thehigh income treatment group fell sharply relative to the control group.}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Slemrod2001, author = {Slemrod, Joel and Blumenthal, Marsha and Christian, Charles}, title = {Taxpayer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {79}, pages = {455-483}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SlChLoPa:97, author = {Slemrod, J. and Christian, C. and London, R. and Parker, J. A.}, title = {April 15 Syndrome}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, year = {1997}, volume = {35}, pages = {695-709}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{SlKo:02, author = {Slemrod, J. and Kopczuk, W.}, title = {The Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {84}, pages = {91-112}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{SlSo:84, author = {Slemrod, J. and Sorum, N.}, title = {The compliance cost of the {US} individual income rax system}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1984}, volume = {37}, pages = {461-474}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{Slemrod2002, author = {Slemrod, Joel and Shlomo Yitzhaki}, title = {Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration}, booktitle = {Handbook of Public Economics Volume {III}}, year = {2002}, editor = {Auerbach, A. J. and M. Feldstein}, pages = {1425-1470}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{SlYi:02, author = {Slemrod, J. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Tax avoidance, evasion and administration}, booktitle = {Handbook of Public Economics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {2002}, editor = {Auerbach, A. J. and Feldstein, M.}, volume = {3}, pages = {1423-1470}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{SlYi:97, author = {Slemrod, Joel and Yitzhaki, Shlomo}, title = {Tax avoidance, evasion and administration}, institution = {The University of Michigan}, year = {1997}, month = {June}, note = {Draft}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{SlYi:87, author = {Slemrod, J. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {The optimal size of a tax collection agency}, journal = {Scandinavian Journal of Economics}, year = {1987}, volume = {89}, pages = {183-192}, number = {2}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{Slem:85, title = {Tax progressivity and income inequality}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1995}, author = {Slemrod, J. B.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Sles:98, author = {Slesnick, D. T.}, title = {Empirical Approaches to the Measurement of Welfare}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1998}, volume = {36}, pages = {2108 -- 2165}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Sles:93, author = {Slesnick, Daniel T.}, title = {Gaining Ground: Poverty in the Postwar {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1993}, volume = {101}, pages = {1-38}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Sles:90IR, author = {Slesnick, D. T.}, title = {Inflation, relative price variation and inequality}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1990}, volume = {43}, pages = {135-151}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Sles:90TS, author = {Slesnick, Daniel T.}, title = {The Standard of Living in the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1990}, volume = {37}, pages = {363-86}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Sles:89, author = {Slesnick, D. T.}, title = {The measurement of horizontal inequality}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1989}, volume = {71}, pages = {481-490}, number = {8}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Slot:90, author = {Slottje, D. J.}, title = {Using grouped data for constructing inequality indices: parametric vs. nonparametric methods}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1990}, volume = {32}, pages = {193-197}, number = {2}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Slot:89, title = {The Structure of Earnings and the Measurement of Income Inequality in the{US}}, publisher = {North-Holland}, year = {1989}, author = {Slottje, D. J.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Slot:87, author = {Slottje, D. J.}, title = {Relative price changes and inequality in the size distribution of various components of income: A multidimensional approach}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1987}, volume = {5}, pages = {19-26}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1391211} } @ARTICLE{Slottje1987, author = {Slottje, D. J.}, title = {Relative price changes and inequality in the size distribution of various components of income:A multidimensional approach}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1987}, volume = {5}, pages = {19-26}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Slot:84, author = {Slottje, D. J.}, title = {A measure of income inequality based upon the beta distribution of the second kind}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1984}, volume = {15}, pages = {369-375}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{SlBN:89, author = {Slottje, D. J. and Basmann, R. L. and Nieswiadomy, M.}, title = {On the empirical relationship between several well known inequality measures}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1989}, volume = {42}, pages = {49-66}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Slov:87, author = {Slovic, P.}, title = {Perception of risk}, journal = {Science}, year = {1999}, volume = {236}, pages = {280-285}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{SlLi:83, author = {Slovic, P. and Lichtenstein, S.}, title = {Preference Reversals: A Broader Perspective}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1983}, volume = {73}, pages = {596-605}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{SlLi:68, author = {Slovic, P. and Lichtenstein, S.}, title = {Relative Importance of Probabilities and Payoffs in Risk Taking}, journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology}, year = {1968}, volume = {78}, pages = {1-18}, month = {1}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{SlTv:74, author = {Slovic, P. and Tversky, A.}, title = {Who accepts {S}avage's axioms?}, journal = {Behavioral Science}, year = {1974}, volume = {19}, pages = {368-373}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Slut:15, author = {Slutsky, E.}, title = {Sulla teoria del bilancio del consumatore}, journal = {Giornale degli Economisti}, year = {1915}, volume = {51:1-26}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{Smar:07, author = {Smart, Michael}, title = {Raising Taxes Through Equalization}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2007}, abstract = {A simple theory suggests that a common form of federal horizontal equalization grants should cause subnational governments to levy higher tax rates, distorting local tax bases and so increasing federal transfers. To test this, I examine Canadian provincial tax policies in the 1972-2002 period. Consistent with the theory, provinces respond to expansions of equalization transfers by increasing their own tax rates. I estimate that on average tax rates in grant-receiving provinces were substantially and significantly higher as a consequence of the transfer formula.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{Smar:99, author = {Michael Smart}, title = {A Simple Proof of the Efficiency of the Poll Tax}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {459-465}, number = {3}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Smee:06, author = {Smeeding, T.}, title = {Poor People in Rich Nations: The United States in Comparative Perspective}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2006}, volume = {20}, pages = {69-90}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @BOOK{SmOHRa:90, title = {Poverty, Inequality and Income Distribution in Comparative Perspective}, publisher = {Harvester Wheatsheaf}, year = {1990}, author = {Smeeding, T. M. and O'Higgins, M. and Rainwater, L.}, address = {Hemel Hempstead}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Smeeding1993, author = {Smeeding, T. M. and Saunders, P. and Coder, J. and Jenkins, S. P. and Fritzell, J. and Hagenaars, A. J. M. and Hauser, R. and Wolfson, Michael}, title = {Poverty, inequality and family living standards. Impacts across seven nations: the effects of noncash subsidies for health, education and housing}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1993}, volume = {39}, pages = {229-256}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SmSaCoJeFrHaHaWo:93, author = {Smeeding, T. M. and Saunders, P. and Coder, J. and Jenkins, S. P. and Fritzell,J. and Hagenaars, A. J. M. and Hauser, R. and Wolfson, Michael}, title = {Poverty, inequality and family living standards. Impacts across seven nations:the effects of noncash subsidies for health, education and housing}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1993}, volume = {39}, pages = {229-256}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Smet:99, author = {Smetters, Kent}, title = {Ricardian equivalence: Long-run {L}eviathan}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {395-421}, number = {3}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Smit:81, author = {Smith, A.}, title = {The informal economy}, journal = {Lloyds Bank Review}, year = {1981}, key = {underground} } @BOOK{Smit:80, title = {The Informal Economy in the {E}uropean Community: a review of the conceptsand evidence}, publisher = {Commission of the {E}uropean Community}, year = {1980}, author = {Smith, A.}, key = {underground} } @BOOK{Smith1980, title = {The Informal Economy in the {E}uropean Community: a review of the concepts and evidence}, publisher = {Commission of the {E}uropean Community}, year = {1980}, author = {Smith, A.}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Smit:79, author = {Smith, G. B.}, title = {Procuratorial supervision of economic violations in the {USSR}}, booktitle = {Soviet Law After {S}talin, Law in {E}astern {E}urope}, publisher = {Sijthoff and Noordhoff}, year = {1979}, editor = {Barry, D. B. and Feldbrugge, G. J. M. and Ginsburgs, G. and Maggs, P. B.}, volume = {20}, pages = {271-290}, address = {Germantown, Maryland}, key = {crime}, part = {III} } @TECHREPORT{Smit:99, author = {Smith, G. R.}, title = {Area-Based Initiatives: The Rationale for and Options for Area Targeting}, institution = {STICERD, London School of Economics}, year = {1999}, type = {Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion Paper}, number = {25}, key = {social choice} } @ARTICLE{Smith1987, author = {Smith, K. W. and Kinsey, K. A.}, title = {Understanding Taxpaying Behavior: A Conceptual Framework with Implications for Research}, journal = {Law and Society Review}, year = {1987}, volume = {21}, pages = {639-663}, key = {Tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SmKi:87, author = {Smith, K. W. and Kinsey, K. A.}, title = {Understanding Taxpaying Behavior: A Conceptual Framework with Implicationsfor Research}, journal = {Law and Society Review}, year = {1987}, volume = {21}, pages = {639-663}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Smith1998, author = {Smith, Richard J. and Weale, Martin R. and Satchell, Steven E.}, title = {Measurement error with accounting constraints: Point and interval estimation for latent data with an application to {UK} gross domestic product}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {109-134}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SmWeSa:98, author = {Smith, Richard J. and Weale, Martin R. and Satchell, Steven E.}, title = {Measurement error with accounting constraints: Point and interval estimationfor latent data with an application to {UK} gross domestic product}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {109-134}, key = {econometrics} } @BOOK{Smit:86, title = {Britain's Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Oxford University Press, for the Institute of Fiscal Studies}, year = {1986}, author = {Smith, S.}, address = {London}, key = {underground} } @TECHREPORT{SmKe:07, author = {Smith, S. and Keen,M.}, title = {VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know, and What Can Be Done?}, institution = {IMF}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, number = {07/31}, abstract = {Like any tax, the VAT is vulnerable to evasion and fraud. But its credit and refund mechanism does offer unique opportunities for abuse, and this has recently become an urgent concern in the European Union (EU). This paper describes the main forms of noncompliance distinctive to a VAT, considers how they can be addressed, and assesses evidence on their extent in high-income countries. While the practical significance of current difficulties in the EU should not be over-stated, administrative measures alone may prove insufficient to deal with them, and a fundamental redesign of the VAT treatment of intra-community trade required. The current difficulties in the EU largely reflect circumstances that would not apply in the United States.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Smit:91, author = {Smith, V.}, title = {Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1991}, volume = {99}, pages = {877-899}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Smit:62, author = {Smith, V.}, title = {An experimental study of competitive market behavior}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1962}, volume = {70}, pages = {111-137}, abstract = {Twenty-five years ago, the only experiment that had commanded the attentionof the entire profession was Smith’s classic study of the competitive double-oral-auctionmarket. His experiment revealed—at a time when most economists thoughtperfect competition required many traders, with perfect information thatmarkets with only a few traders on each side can yield competitive outcomesand that market outcomes may actually be more competitive when tradersare imperfectly informed. The widespread impact of Smith’s results wasprobably due largely to their robustness to the details of individual behaviordetails that are the focus of experimental game theory.}, key = {experiments} } @ARTICLE{SmHa:97, author = {Smith, V. Kerry and Von Haefen, Roger}, title = {Welfare measurement and representative consumer theory}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1997}, volume = {57}, pages = {63-67}, number = {1}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Smit:89, author = {Smith, V. L.}, title = {Theory, experiment and economics}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1989}, volume = {3}, pages = {151-169}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{SmSuWi:88, author = {Vernon L. Smith and Suchanek, Gerry L. and Arlington W. Williams}, title = {Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1988}, volume = {56}, pages = {1119--1151}, number = {5}, copyright = {Copyright © 1988 The Econometric Society}, issn = {00129682}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Sep., 1988}, publisher = {The Econometric Society} } @ARTICLE{SmWa:31, author = {Smith, V. L. and Walker, J. M.}, title = {Monetary Rewards and decision cost in experimental economics}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, year = {1993}, volume = {31}, pages = {245-261}, key = {economic psychology} } @BOOK{Smit:84, title = {The Black Economy in {E}ngland Since 1914}, publisher = {Gill and Macmillan}, year = {1984}, author = {Smithies, E.}, address = {Dublin}, key = {underground} } @INCOLLECTION{StStScPl:77, author = {Smolensky, E. and Stiefel, L. and Schmundt, M. and Plotnick, R.}, title = {Transfers and the size distribution of income}, booktitle = {Improving Measures of Economic Well-Being}, publisher = {Academic press}, year = {1977}, editor = {Moon, M. and Smolensky, E.}, pages = {131-153}, address = {New York}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Snow2003, author = {Snow, A.}, title = {Substitution and income effects for increases in risk}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2003}, volume = {79}, pages = {313-317}, key = {risk}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Snow:03, author = {Snow, A.}, title = {Substitution and income effects for increases in risk}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2003}, volume = {79}, pages = {313–317}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{SnWa:05, author = {Snow,A. and Warren Jr,R.}, title = {Tax evasion under random audits with uncertain detection}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2005}, volume = {88}, pages = {97-100}, abstract = {We show that an increase in taxpayer uncertainty about the amount of taxevasion that will be detected if an audit is undertaken increases compliancefor prudent taxpayers if they believe that they will be assessed at leastthe amount of tax evaded. Thus, a policy that fosters detection uncertaintyis more likely to encourage compliance the higher is the penalty for taxevasion.}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Snyd:99, author = {Snyder, Susan K.}, title = {Testable restrictions of {P}areto optimal public good provision}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {97-119}, number = {1}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{So:08, author = {Sobel, Joel}, title = {Generous actors, selfish actions: markets with other-regarding preferences}, journal = {International Review of Economics}, year = {2009}, volume = {, in press}, abstract = {Abstract\ \ This paper points out that classical competitive outcomes arise in two different market environments even if agents have non-classical preferences. Consumers with separable, other-regarding preferences behave as if they have classical preferences in competitive equilibrium. These outcomes need not be efficient, but under plausible conditions will be efficient following a redistribution of income. In simple double-auction environments competitive outcomes arise under a wide range of assumptions on preferences even without assuming separability. I discuss the importance of the domain of definition of preferences and how the preferences present in the economy influence the performance of the trading institution.}, citeulike-article-id = {3940980}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12232-009-0061-1}, posted-at = {2009-01-25 22:50:46}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12232-009-0061-1} } @ARTICLE{So:05, author = {Sobel, Joel}, title = {Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2005}, volume = {43}, pages = {392--436}, number = {2}, copyright = {Copyright © 2005 American Economic Association}, issn = {00220515}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Jun., 2005}, publisher = {American Economic Association} } @ARTICLE{So:84, author = {Sobel, Joel}, title = {The Timing of Sales}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1984}, volume = {51}, pages = {353--368}, number = {3}, month = {Jul.}, abstract = {This paper presents a model of intertemporal price discrimination. A fixed number of sellers produce a homogeneous good. Consumers with different preferences enter the market in each period and leave when they make a purchase. The sellers typically vary their prices over time, charging a high price in most periods, but occasionally cutting the price to sell to a large group of customers with a low reservation price. In some equilibria, all stores lower their price at the same time and to the same level.}, copyright = {Copyright 1984 The Review of Economic Studies Ltd.}, issn = {00346527}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.07} } @TECHREPORT{SoZo:05, author = {Sokoloff,K.L. and Zolt,E.M.}, title = {INEQUALITY AND THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS OF TAXATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAS}, institution = {UCLA}, year = {2005}, type = {draft}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{SoHe:98, author = {Solnick, Sara J. and Hemenway, David}, title = {Is more always better? A survey on positional concerns}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {37}, pages = {373-383}, number = {3}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Solo:02, author = {Solon, G.}, title = {Cross-Country Differences in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2002}, volume = {16}, pages = {59– 66}, number = {3}, key = {Mobility} } @ARTICLE{Solo:92, author = {Solon, G.}, title = {Intergenerational income mobility in the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1992}, volume = {82}, pages = {393-408}, key = {mobility} } @INCOLLECTION{Solt:75, author = {Soltow, L.}, title = {The Wealth, Income and Social Class of Men in Large Northern Cities of the {U}nited {S}tates in 1860}, booktitle = {The Personal Distribution of Income and Wealth}, publisher = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {1975}, editor = {Smith, J. D.}, address = {New York}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{SoRu:04, author = {Somanathan, E. and Rubin, Paul H.}, title = {The evolution of honesty}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {2004}, volume = {54}, pages = {1-17}, abstract = {A model of the cultural co-evolution of honesty and capital is analyzed.It is shown that the sign of the payoff differential between honest anddishonest types depends on the ratio of benefits that an employee getsfrom shirking to the resulting loss of revenue to the firm. If this ratiodecreases with capital accumulation, then multiple equilibria in outputand honesty are possible in the long run. Small changes in government corruptibilitymay have large long-run effects on per capita output and the extent ofhonesty. The honesty and human capital of workers will be positively correlated.}, key = {social capital} } @ARTICLE{SoYa:73, author = {Song, Y. and Yarbrough, T. E.}, title = {Tax ethics and taxpayer attitude: a survey}, journal = {Public Administration Review}, year = {1973}, volume = {38}, pages = {442-452}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Sonn:00, author = {Sonnemans, J.}, title = {Decisions and Strategies in a Sequential Search Experiment}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {2000}, volume = {21}, pages = {91-102}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{SoScOf:98, author = {Sonnemans, Joep and Schram, Arthur and Offerman, Theo}, title = {Public good provision and public bad prevention: The effect of framing}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {34}, pages = {143-161}, number = {1}, key = {public goods} } @TECHREPORT{SoBo:06, author = {Sorensen,P.B. and Bovenberg,A.L.}, title = {Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance in a Lifetime Perspective}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2006}, type = {working paper}, number = {1690}, abstract = {Advances in information technology have improved the administrative feasibility of redistribution based on lifetime earnings recorded at the time of retirement. We study optimal lifetime income taxation and social insurance in an economy in which redistributive taxation and social insurance serve to insure (ex ante) against skill heterogeneity as well as disability risk. Optimal disability benefits rise with previous earnings so that public transfers depend not only on current earnings but also on earnings in the past. Hence, lifetime taxation rather than annual taxation is optimal. The optimal tax-transfer system does not provide full disability insurance. By offering imperfect insurance and structuring disability benefits so as to enable workers to insure against disability by working harder, social insurance is designed to offset the distortionary impact of the redistributive labor income tax on labor supply.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Sore:99, author = {Sorensen, P. B.}, title = {Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {435-452}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Sorg:98, author = {Sorger, Gerhard}, title = {Imperfect foresight and chaos: an example of a self-fulfilling mistake}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {33}, pages = {363-383}, number = {3-4}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Soul:02, author = {Souleles, N. S.}, title = {Consumer Response to the {R}eagan Tax Cuts}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {85}, pages = {99-120}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{Span:99, title = {Probability Theory and Statistical Inference}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1999}, author = {Spanos, A.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{SpTh:97, author = {Speight, A. and Thomas, D.}, title = {Arbitrator decision-making in the transfer market: An empirical analysis}, journal = {Scottish Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1997}, pages = {198-215}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Spen:77, author = {Spence, A. M.}, title = {Entry, capacity, investment and oligopolistic pricing}, journal = {Bell Journal of Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {2}, pages = {534-544}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{Spen:76, author = {Spence, A. M.}, title = {Product selection, fixed costs and monopolistic competition}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1976}, volume = {43}, pages = {217-235}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{Spen:73, author = {Spence, A. M.}, title = {Job Market Signalling}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1973}, volume = {87}, pages = {366-374}, key = {information} } @ARTICLE{Spen:97, author = {Spencer, P.}, title = {Monetary integration and currency substitution in the {EMS}: The case fora {E}uropean monetary aggregate}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1997}, pages = {1403-1420}, key = {monetary} } @ARTICLE{Spencer1997, author = {Spencer, P.}, title = {Monetary integration and currency substitution in the {EMS}: The case for a {E}uropean monetary aggregate}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1997}, pages = {1403-1420}, key = {monetary}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Spic:90, author = {Spicer, M. W.}, title = {On the desirability of tax evasion: conventional versus consitutional taxperspectives}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1990}, volume = {45}, pages = {118-127}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Spicer1990, author = {Spicer, M. W.}, title = {On the desirability of tax evasion: conventional versus consitutional tax perspectives}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1990}, volume = {45}, pages = {118-127}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Spic:87, author = {Spicer, M. W.}, title = {The effect of tax evasion on tax rates under {L}eviathan}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1987}, volume = {40}, pages = {625-628}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Spicer1987, author = {Spicer, M. W.}, title = {The effect of tax evasion on tax rates under Leviathan}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1987}, volume = {40}, pages = {625-628}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Spic:86, author = {Spicer, M. W.}, title = {Civilization at a discount: the problem of tax evasion}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1986}, volume = {39}, pages = {13-14}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Spic:75, author = {Spicer, M. W.}, title = {New approaches to the problem of tax evasion}, journal = {British Tax Review}, year = {1975}, pages = {152-154}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{SpBe:80, author = {Spicer, M. W. and Becker, L. A.}, title = {Fiscal inequity and tax evasion - an experimental approach}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1980}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Spicer1980, author = {Spicer, M. W. and Becker, L. A.}, title = {Fiscal inequity and tax evasion - an experimental approach}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1980}, volume = {33}, pages = {171-175}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SpHe:85, author = {Spicer, M. W. and Hero, R. E.}, title = {Tax evasion and heuristics}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1985}, volume = {26}, pages = {263-267}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{SpLu:76, author = {Spicer, M. W. and Lundstedt, S. B.}, title = {Understanding tax evasion}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1976}, volume = {31}, pages = {295-305}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{SpTo:82, author = {Spicer, M. W. and Thomas, J. E.}, title = {Audit probabilities and the tax evasion decision: an experimental approach}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1982}, volume = {2}, pages = {241-245}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Spilimbergo1999, author = {Spilimbergo, A., and Londono, J. L., and Szekely, M.}, title = {Income Distribution, Factor Endowments, and Trade Openness}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {59}, pages = {77-101}, key = {international}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SpLoSz:99, author = {Spilimbergo, A. and Londono, J. L. and Szekely, M.}, title = {Income Distribution, Factor Endowments and Trade Openness}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {59}, pages = {77-101}, key = {international} } @ARTICLE{Spro:85, author = {Sproule, R. A.}, title = {Tax evasion and labor supply under imperfect information about individualparameters ofthe tax system}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1985}, volume = {40}, pages = {441-486}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Sproule1985, author = {Sproule, R. A.}, title = {Tax evasion and labor supply under imperfect information about individual parameters ofthe tax system}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1985}, volume = {40}, pages = {441-486}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SpKoTs:80, author = {Sproule, R. A. and Komus, D. and Tsang, E.}, title = {Optimal tax evasion, risk-neutral behaviour under a negative income tax}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1980}, volume = {35}, pages = {309-317}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{Spul:97, title = {Redefining the State: Privatization and Welfare Reform in Industrial andTransitional Economies}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1997}, author = {Spulber, Nicolas}, key = {privatisation} } @BOOK{Spulber1997, title = {Redefining the State: Privatization and Welfare Reform in Industrial and Transitional Economies}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1997}, author = {Spulber, Nicolas}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Srin:77, author = {Srinivasan, T. N.}, title = {Poverty: some measurement problems}, journal = {Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute}, year = {1977}, volume = {47}, number = {1}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Srin:73, author = {Srinivasan, T. N.}, title = {Tax evasion: a model}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1973}, pages = {339-346}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{vSta:34, title = {Marktform und Gleichgewicht}, publisher = {Julius Springer}, year = {1934}, author = {{v}on Stackelberg, H.}, address = {Vienna}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{vdSt:85, author = {van de Stadt, H. and Kapteyn, A. and van de Geer, S}, title = {The Relativity of Utility: Evidence from Panel Data}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1985}, volume = {67}, pages = {179-187}, key = {utility preference}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{Stadt1985, author = {Huib Van de Stadt and Arie Kapteyn and Sara Van de Gaer}, title = {The Relativity of Utility: Evidence from Panel Data}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1985}, volume = {67}, pages = {179-187}, number = {2}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{St:89, author = {Dale O. {Stahl II}}, title = {Oligopolistic Pricing with Sequential Consumer Search}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1989}, volume = {79}, pages = {700--712}, number = {4}, abstract = {N-identical stores compete by choosing prices for a homogeneous good with constant marginal costs. Consumers search sequentially with perfect recall. Some consumers have zero search costs, while all others have a positive search cost, c. There is a unique symmetric Nash Equilibrium price distribution that changes smoothly from "marginal cost pricing" to "monopoly pricing" as search cost and population parameters change. Remarkably, as the number of stores increases, the NE becomes more monopolistic.}, copyright = {Copyright 1989 American Economic Association}, issn = {00028282}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.05.04} } @ARTICLE{Stahl1995, author = {Stahl, Dale O. and Wilson, Paul W.}, title = {On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {1995}, volume = {10}, pages = {218--254}, number = {1}, month = jul, abstract = {We develop and test a theory of human behavior in 3 × 3 symmetric games. The theory hypothesizes a family of five boundedly rational archetypes distinguished by their model of other players and their ability to identify optimal choices given their priors. We designed and conducted an experiment to detect these archetypes as well as a rational expectations type and to estimate parameters which define these types. The experimental evidence rejects the rational expectations type but confirms the boundedly rational theory. We consider this a stepping stone toward a descriptive and prescriptive theory of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: B41, C14, C51, C72, C90.}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.07.21}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45NJFPR-18/1/d4aaba42c9aa070c40c38138bb98ab58} } @ARTICLE{Stahl1994, author = {Stahl, Dale O. and Wilson, Paul W.}, title = {Experimental evidence on players' models of other players}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization}, year = {1994}, volume = {25}, pages = {309--327}, number = {3}, month = dec, keywords = {Game theory, Laboratory experiments, Semi-parametric methods}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2007.07.31} } @ARTICLE{Stah:00, author = {Stahn, H.}, title = {A Remark on Rational Expectation Equilibria with Incomplete Markets andReal Assets}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {33,4}, pages = {441-448}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Stahn2000, author = {Stahn, H.}, title = {A Remark on Rational Expectation Equilibria with Incomplete Markets and Real Assets}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {33,4}, pages = {441-448}, key = {micro}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Stamp36, author = {Stamp, Josiah}, title = {The Influence of the Price Level on the Higher Incomes}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society}, year = {1936}, volume = {99}, pages = {627-673}, number = {4}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Stan:92, author = {Stanobnik, T.}, title = {Perception of poverty and income satisfaction - An empirical analysis ofSlovene households}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1992}, volume = {13}, pages = {57-69}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Stanobnik1992, author = {Stanobnik, T.}, title = {Perception of poverty and income satisfaction - An empirical analysis of Slovene households}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1992}, volume = {13}, pages = {57-69}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{StYo:84, author = {Stapleton, D. C. and Young, D. J.}, title = {Censored Normal Regression with Measurement Error on the Dependent Variable}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1984}, volume = {52}, pages = {737-760}, key = {measurement error} } @ARTICLE{StGa:07, author = {Stapleton, Lee and Garrod, Guy}, title = {Keeping things simple: why the Human Development Index should not diverge from its equal weights assumption}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {2007}, volume = {84}, pages = {179 - 188}, abstract = {Using a range of statistical criteria rooted in Information Theory we show that there is little justification for relaxing the equal weights assumption underlying the United Nation’s Human Development Index (HDI) even if the true HDI diverges significantly from this assumption. Put differently, the additional model complexity that unequal weights add to the HDI more than counteracts the improvement in goodness-of-fit. This suggests that, in some cases, there may be limited validity in increasing the complexity of a range of other composite sustainability indices.}, key = {HDI}, keywords = {Complexity, Composite indices, Human Development Index, Information Theory, Sustainable development, Well-being}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{Star:99SS, author = {Stark, O.}, title = {Siblings, Strangers and the Surge of Altruism}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {65}, pages = {135-142}, key = {Altruism} } @ARTICLE{Stark1999, author = {Stark, O.}, title = {Siblings, Strangers, and the Surge of Altruism}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {65}, pages = {135-142}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Star:98, author = {Stark, O.}, title = {Equal bequests and parental altruism: compatibility or orthogonality?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {60}, pages = {167-171}, key = {wealth} } @BOOK{Star:95, title = {Altruism and Beyond. An economic analysis of transfers and exchanges withinfamilies and groups}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1995}, author = {Stark, O.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {Altruism} } @ARTICLE{StTY:88, author = {Stark, O. and Taylor, J. E. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Migration, Remittances and Inequality}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1988}, volume = {28}, pages = {309-322}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Stark1986, author = {Stark, O. and Taylor, J. E. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Remittances and inequality}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1986}, volume = {96}, pages = {722-740}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{StTY:86, author = {Stark, O. and Taylor, J. E. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Remittances and inequality}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1986}, volume = {96}, pages = {722-740}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{StYi:88, author = {Stark, O. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {The migration response to relative deprivation}, journal = {Journal of Population Economics}, year = {1988}, volume = {1}, key = {deprivation} } @TECHREPORT{StYi:87, author = {Stark, O. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Merging populations, stochastic dominance and {L}orenz curves}, institution = {Harvard University}, year = {1987}, type = {Discussion Paper 29}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{StYi:82, author = {Stark, O. and Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Migration, growth, distribution and welfare}, journal = {Economic Letters}, year = {1982}, volume = {10}, pages = {243-249}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Star:72TD, title = {The Distribution of Personal Income in The {U}nited {K}ingdom 1949-1963}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1972}, author = {Stark, T.}, address = {London}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Star:00DI, author = {Starmer, C.}, title = {Developments in non-expected utility theory: the hunt for a descriptivetheory of choice under risk}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2000}, volume = {38}, pages = {332-82}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Starmer2000, author = {Starmer, Chris}, title = {Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2000}, volume = {38}, pages = {332-382}, abstract = {HOW MANY THEORIES of decision making under risk and uncertainty can you think of? Readers of this article will no doubt be familiar with Expected Utility Theory (EUT), the standard theory of individual choice in economics. Many, I expect, will know of a few alternatives to this model. But how many, I wonder, will be aware that these socalled non-expected utility models now number well into double figures? An enormous amount of theoretical effort has been devoted towards developing alternatives to EUT, and this has run hand-in-hand with an ongoing experimental program aimed at testing those theories. The good and proper division of labor suggests that a relatively small group of specialists will be fully aware of the details of this literature. At the same time, the implications of developments in this field are of more than passing interest to the general economist, since what stimulated developments in non-EU is surely of widespread concern: put bluntly, the standard theory did not fit the facts.}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Star:99EE, author = {Starmer, C.}, title = {Experimental Economics: Hard Science or Wasteful Tinkering?}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F5-F15}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{Star:72FN, author = {Starrett, D. A.}, title = {Fundamental nonconvexities in the theory of externalities}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1972}, volume = {4}, pages = {180-199}, key = {public goods} } @BOOK{Statistics1966, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1966}, author = {Elementary Statistics}, address = {New York}, edition = {second}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{OCSTAT:96, author = {Office Cantonal de la Statistique}, title = {Document de Travail: Description du Fichier de Donn{\'e}es}, year = {1996}, address = {Geneva}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{St:01, author = {Stavins, Joanna}, title = {Price Discrimination in the Airline Market: The Effect of Market Concentration}, journal = {The Review or Economics and Statistics}, year = {2001}, volume = {83}, pages = {200--202}, number = {1}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.08} } @ARTICLE{Steg:07, author = {Stegman, M. A.}, title = {Payday Lending}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {2007}, volume = {21}, pages = {169-190}, abstract = {A“payday loan” is a short-term loan made for seven to 30 days for a small amount. Eighty percent of all payday loans across the country are reportedly less than $300. Fees charged on payday loans generally range from $15 to $30 on each $100 advanced. Thus, a typical example would be that in exchange for a $300 advance until the next payday, the borrower writes a postdated check for $300 and receives $255 in cash—the lender taking a $45 fee off the top. The lender then holds on to the check until the following payday, before depositing it in its own account. Qualifying for a payday loan doesn’t require a credit check, the application is simple, and the entire transaction can take less than an hour. All that a prospective borrower typically needs is a home address; a valid checking account; a driver’s license and Social Security number; a couple of pay stubs to verify employment; wages and pay dates; and minimum earnings of at least $1,000 a month.}, key = {loans}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{StPfFr:87, author = {Stein, W. E. and Pfaffenberger, R. C. and French, D. W.}, title = {Sampling error in first-order stochastic dominance}, journal = {Journal of Financial Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {10}, pages = {259-269}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Stei:89, author = {Steinberg, D.}, title = {Induced work participation and the returns to experience for welfare women:Evidence from a social experiment}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1989}, volume = {41}, pages = {321-340}, number = {3}, key = {labour} } @BOOK{Stei:65, title = {Random Processes and the Growth of Firms: A Study of the {P}areto Law}, publisher = {Hafner Press}, year = {1965}, author = {Steindl, J.}, address = {New York}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{Stel:93, author = {Stella, P.}, title = {Tax Farming: A Radical Solution for Developing Country Tax Problems?}, journal = {IMF Staff Papers}, year = {1993}, volume = {40}, pages = {217-225}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.02.12} } @ARTICLE{Stel:91, author = {Stella, P.}, title = {An Economic Analysis of Tax Amnesties}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {(46)3}, pages = {383-400}, key = {Tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Sten:99, author = {Stennek, J.}, title = {The Expected Consumer's Surplus as a Welfare Measure}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {73}, pages = {265-288}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Step:03, author = {Stephens, M.J.}, title = {"3rd of tha Month": Do Social Security Recipients Smooth Consumption between Checks}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {2003}, volume = {93}, pages = {406-422}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @INCOLLECTION{Ster:77, author = {Stern, N. H.}, title = {Welfare weights and the elasticity of the marginal valuation of income}, booktitle = {Studies in Modern Economic Analysis}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, year = {1977}, editor = {Artis, M. and Nobay, A. R.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {public economics} } @INCOLLECTION{Ster:78OT, author = {Stern, N. H.}, title = {On the economic theory of policy towards crime}, booktitle = {Economic Models of Criminal Behavior}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1978}, editor = {Heineke, J. M.}, pages = {123-152}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Ster:76, author = {Stern, N. H.}, title = {On the specification of models of optimum income taxation}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1976}, volume = {6}, pages = {123-162}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Steu:86, title = {Who Should Pay for Collecting Taxes? Financing The {IRS}}, publisher = {American Enterprise Institute}, year = {1986}, author = {Steuerle, E. C.}, address = {Washington, D.C.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Steuerle1986, author = {Steuerle, E. C.}, title = {Who Should Pay for Collecting Taxes? Financing The {IRS}}, year = {1986}, address = {Washington, D.C.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {a1100971}, publisher = {American Enterprise Institute}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Stev:95, author = {Stevens, A. H.}, title = {Climbing out of poverty, falling back in: measuring the persistence of spellsof poverty over multiple spells}, institution = {NBER}, year = {1995}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {5390}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Stevens1995, author = {Stevens, A. H.}, title = {Climbing out of poverty, falling back in: measuring the persistence of spells of poverty over multiple spells}, year = {1995}, number = {5390}, institution = {NBER}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, type = {Working Paper} } @TECHREPORT{StWo:08, author = {Stevenson, B. and Wolfers, J.}, title = {Happiness Inequality in the {U}nited {S}tates}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {14220}, month = {August}, abstract = {This paper examines how the level and dispersion of self-reported happiness has evolved over the period 1972-2006. While there has been no increase in aggregate happiness, inequality in happiness has fallen substantially since the 1970s. There have been large changes in the level of happiness across groups: Two-thirds of the black-white happiness gap has been eroded, and the gender happiness gap has disappeared entirely. Paralleling changes in the income distribution, differences in happiness by education have widened substantially. We develop an integrated approach to measuring inequality and decomposing changes in the distribution of happiness, finding a pervasive decline in within-group inequality during the 1970s and 1980s that was experienced by even narrowly-defined demographic groups. Around one-third of this decline has subsequently been unwound. Juxtaposing these changes with large rises in income inequality suggests an important role for non-pecuniary factors in shaping the well-being distribution.}, key = {inequality}, series = {Working Paper Series}, url = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w14220.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{Stew:97, author = {Stewart, Kitty}, title = {Are intergovernmental transfers in {R}ussia equalizing?}, institution = {UNICEF, Florence}, year = {1997}, type = {Occasional Paper}, number = {EPS 59}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{StRe:99, author = {Stewart, K. J. and Reed, S. B.}, title = {{CPI} Research Series Using Current Methods, 1978-1998}, journal = {Monthly Labor Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {122}, pages = {29-38}, number = {6}, month = {June}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Stew:83, author = {Stewart, M.}, title = {On Least Squares Estimation when the Dependent Variable is Grouped}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1983}, volume = {50}, pages = {737-753}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Stic:96, author = {Stich, A.}, title = {Inequality and negative income}, institution = {Universit{\"a}t zu K{\"o}ln}, year = {1996}, type = {Discussion paper in Statistics and Econometrics}, number = {04/96}, address = {K{\"o}ln, Germany}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Stich1996, author = {Stich, A.}, title = {Inequality and negative income}, institution = {Universit\"at zu K\"oln}, year = {1996}, type = {Discussion paper in Statistics and Econometrics}, number = {04/96}, address = {K\"oln, Germany}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{StCh:07, author = {Stifel, D. and Christiaensen, L.}, title = {Tracking Poverty Over Time in the Absence of Comparable Consumption Data}, journal = {The World Bank Economic Review}, year = {2007}, volume = {21}, pages = {1-25}, month = {June}, abstract = {Following the endorsement by the international community of the Millennium Development Goals, there has been an increasing demand for practical methods for steadily tracking poverty. An economically intuitive and inexpensive methodology is explored for doing so in the absence of regular, comparable data on household consumption. The minimum data requirements for this methodology are the availability of a household budget survey and a series of surveys with a comparable set of asset data also contained in the budget survey. This method is illustrated using a series of Demographic and Health Surveys for Kenya.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Stig:70, author = {Stigler, G. J.}, title = {The optimum enforcement of laws}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1970}, volume = {78}, pages = {526-536}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Stig:74, author = {Stigler, S. M.}, title = {Linear Functions of Order Statistics with Smooth Weight Functions}, journal = {Annals of Statistics}, year = {1974}, volume = {2}, pages = {676-693}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Stig:77, author = {Stigler, S. M.}, title = {Linear Functions of Order Statistics with Smooth Weight Functions: Correction}, journal = {Annals of Statistics}, year = {1974}, volume = {7}, pages = {466}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Stig:69DR, author = {Stigler, S. M.}, title = {Do Robust Estimators Work with Real Data}, journal = {Annals of Statistics}, year = {1969}, volume = {5}, pages = {1055-1098}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Stig:69LF, author = {Stigler, S. M.}, title = {Linear Functions of Order Statistics}, journal = {Annals of Mathematical Statistics}, year = {1969}, volume = {40}, pages = {770-788}, key = {statistics} } @UNPUBLISHED{StEm:07, author = {Stiglitz,J.E. and Emran,M.S.}, title = {Equity and Effciency in Tax Reform in Developing Countries}, abstract = {This paper provides a critical analysis of the current consensus on tax reform in developing countries in terms of both efficiency and equity objectives. Drawing on the recent theoretical advances it shows that the emphasis on value-added tax (VAT) as the main instrument for indirect taxation is likely to result in inefficiency in resource allocation due to production and consumption substitutions in favor of the informal/shadow economy. Such a reform can also have adverse effects on the long-run growth as a small formal sector reduces the scope for technological progress in the economy. Imposition of VAT may also retard the development of markets, especially in the rural areas. The tax reform policies implemented in a large number of developing countries that reduce the tariff and shifts the burden of raising revenue to VAT are also likely to be undesirable in terms of equity. The available evidence shows that the current emphasis on uniform VAT is especially regressive. The prevalence of corruption in tax administration is likely to make the incidence of tax reform more inequitable as compliance with VAT is information-intensive, and thus it places the poor in a disadvantage in the bargaining against a corrupt tax collector given their lack of education and record-keeping.}, key = {equity}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @INCOLLECTION{Stig:77TT, author = {Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {The theory of local public goods}, booktitle = {The Economics of Public Services}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {1977}, editor = {Feldstein, M. S. and Inman, R. P.}, address = {London, {UK}}, key = {Local public goods} } @INCOLLECTION{Stig:78, author = {Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {Equality, taxation and inheritance}, booktitle = {Personal income distribution}, publisher = {Amsterdam, North-Holland}, year = {1978}, editor = {Krelle, W. and Shorrocks , A. F.}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{Stig:94, title = {Whither Socialism}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1994}, author = {Stiglitz, J. E.}, pages = {338}, series = {The Wicksell Lectures}, key = {political economy}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.03.22} } @ARTICLE{Stig:85, author = {Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {A general theory of tax avoidance}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1985}, volume = {38}, pages = {325-337}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Stig:82, author = {Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {Utilitarianism and horizontal equity}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1982}, volume = {18}, pages = {1-33}, key = {equity} } @TECHREPORT{Stig:76, author = {Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {Simple formula for optimal income taxation and the measurement of inequality}, institution = {IMSS}, year = {1976}, type = {working paper}, number = {215}, address = {Stanford, California}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Stig:69DO, author = {Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {Distribution of income and wealth among individuals}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1969}, volume = {37}, pages = {382-397}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Stig:69TE, author = {Stiglitz, J. E.}, title = {The effect of income, wealth and capital gains taxation on risk-taking}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1969}, volume = {83}, pages = {263-83}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{StWe:81, author = {Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Weiss, Andrew}, title = {Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1981}, volume = {71}, pages = {393-410}, number = {3}, key = {information} } @TECHREPORT{Stof:75, author = {Stoft, S.}, title = {A new positive measure of inequality}, institution = {University of California Berkeley}, year = {1975}, type = {mimeo}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{St:81, author = {Stokey, Nancy L.}, title = {Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing}, journal = {The Bell Journal of Economics}, year = {1981}, volume = {12}, pages = {112--128}, number = {1}, month = {Spring}, abstract = {The market for a durable good sold by a monopolist is examined by using both continuous-time and discrete-time versions of the same model. The requirement that buyers' expectations must be fulfilled along the realized path of production is shown to place no restrictions on that path. Even the stronger requirement that buyers' expectations must continue to be fulfilled in the presence of any unexpected, exogenous perturbation to the stock places no restrictions, if expectations are allowed to depend discontinuously on the current stock. However, if expectations must depend continuously on the current stock, there is a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium is stationary, and the seller's strategy is the one described by Coase (1972): to keep the market saturated at all dates. Hence, the path for output is the one for a competitive market and profit is zero. Stationary equilibria are then examined using the discrete-time model and it is shown that the path for output is very sensitive to the length of the period. As the period shrinks, the equilibrium approaches the one described above. But as the period grows, the path for output approaches the one chosen by a monopolist renter and profit approaches a maximum.}, copyright = {Copyright 1981 The RAND Corporation}, issn = {0361915x}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.07} } @ARTICLE{St:79, author = {Stokey, Nancy L.}, title = {Intertemporal Price Discrimination}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1979}, volume = {93}, pages = {355--371}, number = {3}, month = {Aug.}, abstract = {I. Introduction, 355.--II. No production costs: "pure" discrimination, 357.--III. Positive production costs, 363.--IV. Conclusion, 367.}, copyright = {Copyright 1979 The MIT Press}, issn = {00335533}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.07} } @ARTICLE{Ston:54, author = {Stone, J. R. N}, title = {Linear expenditure systems and demand analysis:}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1954}, volume = {64}, pages = {511-527}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{StChMe:42, author = {Stone, Richard and Champernowne, D. G. and Meade, J. E.}, title = {The Precision of National Income Estimates}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1942}, volume = {9}, pages = {111-125}, number = {2}, key = {income} } @ARTICLE{Stra:90, author = {Stratmenn, T.}, title = {A diagrammatic representation of inequality}, journal = {Public Finance Quarterly}, year = {1990}, volume = {18}, pages = {47-64}, number = {1}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Stra:99, author = {Strawczynski, M.}, title = {Income Uncertainty and the Demand for Annuities}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {63}, pages = {91-96}, key = {finance} } @ARTICLE{Stra:98, author = {Strawczynski, Michel}, title = {Social insurance and the optimum piecewise linear income tax}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {69}, pages = {371-388}, number = {3}, key = {Social insurance} } @ARTICLE{Stro:05, author = {Stroup,M.}, title = {An index for measuring tax progressivity}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2005}, volume = {86}, pages = {205-213}, abstract = {A simple index is proposed that relates tax burden distribution to incomedistribution across all levels of income for a comprehensive indicatorof tax policy progressivity. When federal income tax data are used to estimatethis index over the last two decades, the index responds predictably tomajor changes in the U.S. income tax rate structure.}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{Stro:91, title = {The C++ Programming Language}, publisher = {Addison Wesley}, year = {1991}, author = {Stroustrup, S.}, address = {Reading, Mass.}, edition = {Second}, key = {Computing} } @INCOLLECTION{Stru:69, author = {Str{\"u}mpel, B.}, title = {Quantitative Analysis in Public Finance}, publisher = {Praeger}, year = {1969}, editor = {Peacock, A. T.}, address = {New York}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Stua:54, author = {Stuart, A.}, title = {The correlation between variate values and ranks in samples from a continuousdstribution}, journal = {British Journal of Statistical Psychology}, year = {1954}, volume = {7}, pages = {37-44}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Stuart1954, author = {Stuart, A.}, title = {The correlation between variate values and ranks in samples from a continuous dstribution}, journal = {British Journal of Statistical Psychology}, year = {1954}, volume = {7}, pages = {37-44}, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Stut:98RW, author = {Stuttard, N.}, title = {Re-weighting the {FES }}, institution = {Rowntree Poverty Conference}, year = {1998}, type = {Conference Paper}, address = {York}, month = {March}, key = {STATISTICS} } @ARTICLE{Stut:98TE, author = {Stuttard, N.}, title = {The effects of taxes and benefits on household income, 1996-1997}, journal = {Economic Trends}, year = {1998}, pages = {33-67}, number = {533}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Stut:04, author = {Stutzer, A.}, title = {The Role of Income Aspirations in Individual Happiness}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2004}, volume = {54}, pages = {89-109}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Stutzer2004, author = {Stutzer, Alois}, title = {The role of income aspirations in individual happiness}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {2004}, volume = {54}, pages = {89-109}, abstract = {Does individual well-being depend on the absolute level of income and consumption or is it relative to one¡¯s aspirations? In a direct empirical test, it is found that higher income aspirations reduce people¡¯s utility, ceteris paribus. Individual data on reported satisfaction with life are used as a proxy measure for utility, and income evaluation measures are applied as proxies for people¡¯s aspiration levels. Consistent with processes of adaptation and social comparison, income aspirations increase with people¡¯s income as well as with the average income in the community they live in.}, key = {happiness}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Stah:72BT, title = {Bargaining Theory}, publisher = {EFI: The Economic Research Institute}, year = {1972}, author = {St{\aa}hl, I.}, address = {Stockholm}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Subr:87, author = {Subramanian, S.}, title = {On a simple transfer-sensitive index of inequality}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1987}, volume = {23}, pages = {389-392}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{SuKa:04, author = {Subramanian,S. and Kawachi,I.}, title = {Income Inequality and Health: What Have We Learned So Far?}, journal = {Epidemiologic Reviews}, year = {2004}, volume = {26}, pages = {78-91}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{Suen:04, author = {Suen, Wing}, title = {The Self-Perpetuation of Biased Beliefs}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2004}, volume = {114}, pages = {377-396}, abstract = {To overcome strong prior beliefs, strong evidence to the contrary is needed.If a person is predisposed to choosing a certain action, the advice froman advisor who sets a low threshold for recommending the alternative actionis not of much use. The preference for like-minded advisors who supplycoarse information implies that the advice a person receives is likelyto reinforce his existing priors. This effect can lead to polarisationof opinion and the emergence of self-serving beliefs. The learning processis prolonged and the induced short run bias can become perpetual if informationis costly.}, key = {beliefs} } @ARTICLE{Sugd:03, author = {Sugden, R.}, title = {Reference-dependent subjective expected utility}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2003}, volume = {111}, pages = {172–191}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Sugden2003, author = {Sugden, R.}, title = {Reference-dependent subjective expected utility}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2003}, volume = {111}, pages = {172-191}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Sugd:86ND, author = {Sugden, R.}, title = {New developments in the theory of choice under uncertainty}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {1986}, volume = {38}, pages = {1-24}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{Sugd:86TE, title = {The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {1986}, author = {Sugden, R.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{Sugi:07, author = {Sugin, Linda}, title = {Why Endowment Taxation is Unjust}, institution = {Fordham University School of Law}, year = {2007}, type = {Research Paper}, number = {959710}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{Suit:80, author = {Suits, D. B.}, title = {Measurement of tax progressivity: Reply}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1980}, volume = {70}, pages = {211}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Suit:77, author = {Suits, D. B.}, title = {Measurement of tax progressivity}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {67}, pages = {747-752}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{SuHe:91, author = {Summers, R. and Heston, A.}, title = {The {P}enn World Table (Mark 5): an expanded set of international comparisons 1950-1988}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {106}, pages = {327-368}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{SuHe:88, author = {Summers, R. and Heston, A.}, title = {A new set of international comparisons of real product and price levels: estimates for 130 countries, 1950-1985}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1988}, volume = {34}, pages = {1-25}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{SuTe:95, author = {Sundaram, K. and Tendulkar, S.}, title = {On Measuring Shelter Deprivation in {I}ndia}, journal = {Indian Economic Review}, year = {1995}, volume = {30}, pages = {131- 165}, key = {deprivation} } @BOOK{Sund:96, title = {A First Course in Optimization Theory}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {2002}, author = {Sundaram , R. K.}, address = {Princeton, NJ}, key = {micro} } @INCOLLECTION{Supp:77, author = {Suppes, P.}, title = {The distributive justice of income inequality}, booktitle = {Decision Theory and Social Ethics}, publisher = {Dordrecht, D. Reidel}, year = {1977}, editor = {Gottinger, H. W. and Leinfellner, W.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Supp:66, author = {Suppes, P.}, title = {Some Formal Models of Grading Principles}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {1966}, volume = {6}, pages = {264-306}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Suth:97, author = {Sutherland, H.}, title = {Women, Men and the Redistribution of Income}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1997}, volume = {18}, pages = {1-22}, number = {1}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{SuTaGo:03, author = {Sutherland, H. and Taylor, R. and Gomulka, J.}, title = {Combining Household Income and Expenditure Data in Policy Simulations}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2003}, volume = {48}, pages = {517}, key = {microsimulation} } @ARTICLE{Sutt:97, author = {Sutton, J.}, title = {Gibrat’s Legacy}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1997}, volume = {35}, pages = {40–59}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{Sutton1997, author = {Sutton, J.}, title = {Gibrat's Legacy}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1997}, volume = {35}, pages = {40-59}, key = {industry}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Sutt:91, title = {Sunk Costs}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {1991}, author = {Sutton, John}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{Sutt:86, author = {Sutton, J.}, title = {Non-cooperative bargaining theory: an introduction}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1986}, volume = {53}, pages = {709-724}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Suzu:01, author = {Suzumura, K.}, title = {Pareto Principles from Inch to Ell}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2001}, volume = {70}, pages = {95-98}, key = {Welfare} } @ARTICLE{Suzu:99, author = {Suzumura, K.}, title = {Paretian welfare judgments and {B}ergsonian social choice}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {204-220}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Suzumura1999, author = {Suzumura, K.}, title = {Paretian welfare judgments and {B}ergsonian social choice}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {204-220}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Suzu:83, title = {Rational Choice, Collective Decisions and Social Welfare}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1983}, author = {Suzumura, K.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Sven:80, author = {Svensson, L. G.}, title = {Equity Among Generations}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1980}, volume = {48}, pages = {1251-1256}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Swam:70, author = {Swamy, P. A. V. B.}, title = {Efficient Inference in a Random Coefficient Regression Model}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1970}, volume = {38}, pages = {311-323}, key = {econometrics} } @TECHREPORT{SwJa:01, author = {Swope, K. J. and Janeba, E.}, title = {Taxes or fees? The political economy of providing excludable public goods}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2001}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {542}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, key = {Public goods} } @BOOK{Syds:81, title = {Topics in Mathematical Analysis for Economists}, publisher = {Academic Press}, year = {1981}, author = {Syds{\ae}ter, K.}, address = {New York}, key = {mathematics} } @BOOK{SyHa:95, title = {Mathematics for Economic Analysis}, publisher = {Prentice-Hall International}, year = {1995}, author = {Syds{\ae}ter, K. and Hammond, P. J.}, address = {Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey}, edition = {Third}, key = {mathematics} } @BOOK{SyStBe:99, title = {Economists' Mathematical Manual}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {1999}, author = {Syds{\ae}ter, K. and Str{\o}m, A. and Berck, P.}, address = {Berlin}, edition = {Third}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{Sykes1987, author = {Sykes, D. and Smith, W. J. and Formby, J. P.}, title = {On the measurement of tax progressivity: an implication of the {A}tkinson theorem}, journal = {Southern Economic Journal}, year = {1987}, volume = {53}, pages = {768-776}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{SySmFo:87, author = {Sykes, D. and Smith, W. J. and Formby, J. P.}, title = {On the measurement of tax progressivity: an implication of the {A}tkinsontheorem}, journal = {Southern Economic Journal}, year = {1987}, volume = {53}, pages = {768-776}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Sylw:00, author = {Sylwester, K.}, title = {Income Inequality: Education Expenditures and Growth}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {63,2}, pages = {379-398}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Sypi:87, author = {Sypiro, G. G.}, title = {Hirschman versus Herfindahl: some topological properties for the use ofcncentration indexes}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1987}, volume = {14}, pages = {299-302}, number = {12}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{SzRo:77, author = {Szal, R. and Robinson, S.}, title = {Measuring income inequality}, booktitle = {Income Distribution and Growth in Less-Developed Countries}, year = {1977}, editor = {Frank, C. R. and Webb, R. C.}, address = {Washington DC}, institution = {The Brookings Institute}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Szal:77, author = {Szal, R. J.}, title = {Poverty: measurement and analysis}, institution = {International Labour Office}, year = {1977}, type = {World Employment Programme, working paper}, number = {2-23}, address = Geneva, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Szpi:94, author = {Szpiro, G. G.}, title = {Measuring risk aversion: an alternative approach}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1994}, volume = {68}, pages = {156-159}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Szymanski2003, author = {Szymanski, Stefan}, title = {The Economic Design of Sporting Contests}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2003}, volume = {XLI}, pages = {1137-1187}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Szek:98, title = {The Economics of Poverty, Inequality and Wealth Accumulation in {M}exico}, publisher = {St Antony's Series}, year = {1998}, author = {Sz{\'e}kely, M.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Tagu:73, author = {Taguchi, T.}, title = {On the two dimensional concentration surface and extension of the concentrationcoefficient and {P}areto distribution to the two dimensional case III}, journal = {The Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics}, year = {1973}, volume = {25}, pages = {215-237}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Taguchi1973, author = {Taguchi, T.}, title = {On the two dimensional concentration surface and extension of the concentration coefficient and {P}areto distribution to the two dimensional case III}, journal = {The Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics}, year = {1973}, volume = {25}, pages = {215-237}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Tagu:72I, author = {Taguchi, T.}, title = {On the two dimensional concentration surface and extension of the concentrationcoefficient and {P}areto distribution to the two dimensional case I}, journal = {The Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics}, year = {1972}, volume = {24}, pages = {355-382}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Tagu:72II, author = {Taguchi, T.}, title = {On the two dimensional concentration surface and extension of the concentrationcoefficient and {P}areto distribution to the two dimensional case II}, journal = {The Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics}, year = {1972}, volume = {24}, pages = {599-619}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Taguchi1972, author = {Taguchi, T.}, title = {On the two dimensional concentration surface and extension of the concentration coefficient and {P}areto distribution to the two dimensional case II}, journal = {The Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics}, year = {1972}, volume = {24}, pages = {599-619}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Taguchi1972a, author = {Taguchi, T.}, title = {On the two dimensional concentration surface and extension of the concentration coefficient and {P}areto distribution to the two dimensional case I}, journal = {The Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics}, year = {1972}, volume = {24}, pages = {355-382}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Tagu:68CC, author = {Taguchi, T.}, title = {Concentration Curve Methods and Structures of Skew Populations}, journal = {Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics}, year = {1968}, volume = {20}, pages = {107-141}, key = {inequality}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.04} } @ARTICLE{Taguchi1968, author = {Taguchi, T.}, title = {Concentration curve methods and structure of skew population}, journal = {Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics}, year = {1968}, volume = {20}, pages = {107-141}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Tagu:67, author = {Taguchi, T.}, title = {On some properties of concentration curve and its applications}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1967}, volume = {26}, pages = {381-395}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Tail:81, author = {Taille, C.}, title = {{L}orenz ordering within the generalized gamma family of income distributions}, booktitle = {Statistical Distributions in Scientific Work}, publisher = {Reidel}, year = {1981}, editor = {Taille, P. and Patil, G. P. and Baldessari, B.}, address = {Boston}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Taka:99, author = {Takagi, Shingo}, title = {Bias in maximum likelihood estimator of disequilibrium and sample selectionmodel with error-ridden observations}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {64}, pages = {161-165}, number = {2}, key = {Measurement error} } @BOOK{Taka:59, title = {Dynamic Changes of Income and its Distribution in {J}apan}, publisher = {Kinokuniya Bookstore Co.}, year = {1959}, author = {Takahashi, C.}, address = {Tokyo}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{Takahashi1959, title = {Dtnamic Changes of Income and its Distribution in {J}apan}, year = {1959}, author = {Takahashi, C.}, address = {Tokyo}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Taka:79, author = {Takayama, N.}, title = {Poverty, income inequality and their measures: {P}rofessor {S}en's axiomaticapproach reconsidered}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, volume = {47}, pages = {747-59}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Takayama1979, author = {Takayama, N.}, title = {Poverty, income inequality and their measures: {P}rofessor {S}en's axiomatic approach reconsidered}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1979}, volume = {47}, pages = {747-59}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{TaZh:96, author = {Tam, M. Y. S. and Zhang, R.}, title = {Ranking income distributions: the tradeoff between efficiency and equality}, journal = {Economica}, year = {1996}, volume = {63}, pages = {239-252}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Tamu:91, author = {Tamura, R.}, title = {Income Convergence in an Endogenous Growth Model}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1991}, volume = {99}, pages = {522-540}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Tann:98, author = {Tanner, Sarah}, title = {The dynamics of male retirement behaviour}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {19}, pages = {175-196}, number = {2}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Tanz:83, author = {Tanzi, V.}, title = {The underground economy}, journal = {Finance and Development}, year = {1983}, pages = {10-13}, month = {December}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Tanz:82AE, author = {Tanzi, V.}, title = {The underground economy in the {United States}: annual estimates, 1930-80}, journal = {IMF Staff Papers}, year = {1982}, pages = {283-305}, key = {underground} } @BOOK{Tanz:82TU, title = {The Underground Economy in the {U}nited {S}tates and Abroad}, publisher = {D. C. Heath}, year = {1982}, author = {Tanzi, V.}, address = {Lexington, Massachusetts}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Tanz:99, author = {Tanzi, V .}, title = {Uses and Abuses of Estimates of the Underground Economy}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F388-F347}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Tanzi1999, author = {Tanzi, V .}, title = {Uses and Abuses of Estimates of the Underground Economy}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F388-F347}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Tapk:04, author = {Tapking,J.}, title = {Axioms for preferences revealing subjective uncertainty and uncertaintyaversion}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {40}, pages = {771-797}, abstract = {This article analyzes a decision maker’s preferences and their updatingin situations with uncertainty. Axioms for a list containing a prior preferencerelation and an updated preference relation for different information arepresented, such that (1) each preference relation in this list is a Choquetexpected utility preference relation as axiomatized by [Econometrica 57(1989) 571] and (2) the list reveals both the decision maker’s subjectiveuncertainty and his uncertainty aversion.}, key = {uncertainty} } @INCOLLECTION{Tars:90, author = {Tarsitano, A.}, title = {The Bonferroni index of income inequality}, booktitle = {Income and Wealth Distribution, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1990}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Zenga, M.}, pages = {228-242}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Tars:55, author = {Tarski, A.}, title = {A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications}, journal = {Pacific Journal of Mathematics}, year = {1955}, volume = {5}, pages = {285-309}, key = {mathematics}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.05.18} } @ARTICLE{Tarski1955, author = {Tarski, A.}, title = {A lattice-theoretical fixedpoint theorem and its applications}, journal = {Pacific Journal of Mathematics}, year = {1955}, volume = {5}, pages = {285-308}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Taskin2000, author = {Taskin, F. and Zaim, O.}, title = {Searching for a {K}uznets curve in environmental efficiency using kernel estimation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {217-223}, key = {kernel}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{TaZa:00, author = {Taskin, F. and Zaim, O.}, title = {Searching for a {K}uznets curve in environmental efficiency using kernelestimation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {217-223}, key = {kernel} } @ARTICLE{TaWi:85, author = {Tauchen, H. and Witte, A. D.}, title = {Economic Models of How Audit Policies Affect Voluntary Tax Compliance}, journal = {Proceedings of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1985}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{Tawn:64, title = {Equality}, publisher = {Allen and Unwin}, year = {1964}, author = {Tawney, H. R.}, address = {London}, key = {equality} } @ARTICLE{Taxa:84, author = {Taxation}, title = {News Digest}, journal = {Taxation}, year = {1984}, volume = {3}, pages = {325}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{TaTsZh:03, author = {Taylor , G. A. and Tsui , K. and Zhu, L.}, title = {Lottery or waiting-line auction?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1313–1334}, key = {Lotteries} } @ARTICLE{Taylor2003, author = {Taylor , G. A. and Tsui , K. and Zhu, L.}, title = {Lottery or waiting-line auction?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {1313-1334}, key = {Lotteries}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Tayl:87, title = {The Possibility of Cooperation}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1987}, author = {Taylor, M.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {political economy} } @TECHREPORT{Lind:07, author = {Tedds, Lindsay}, title = {Keeping it off the Books: An Empirical Investigation of Firms that Engage in Tax Evasion}, institution = {MPRA}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {4213}, abstract = {This paper uses a unique and recently available dataset that contains detailed information on firms from around the world to investigate factors that affect under-reporting behaviour by firms. The empirical strategy employed exploits the nature of the dependent variable, which is interval coded, and uses interval regression which provides an asymptotically more efficient estimator than the ordered probit, provided that the classical linear model assumptions hold. These assumptions are investigated using standard diagnostic tests that have been modified for the interval regression model. Evidence is presented that shows that firms in all regions around the world engage in under-reporting. Regression results indicate that government corruption has the single largest causal effect on under-reporting, resulting in the percentage of sales not reported to the tax authority being 53.4 percent higher. Taxes have the second single largest causal effect on under-reporting, resulting in the percentage of sales not reported to the tax authority being 20.2 percent higher. Access to financing, organized crime, political instability and the fairness of the legal system were found to have no effect on under-reporting. It is also found that there is a significant correlation between under-reporting and the legal organization of the business, size, age, ownership, competition and audit controls.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Underground Economy, Tax Non-compliance, Firm Characteristics, Interval Regression}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @TECHREPORT{Tedd:08, author = {Tedds, L. M.}, title = {Estimating the Income Reporting Function for the Self-Employed}, institution = {SSRN}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, __markedentry = {[zhangz3]}, abstract = {There is considerable interest in measuring tax noncompliance using microeconomic data. One such method estimates income under-reporting by self-employed households by assuming a known, parametric form of the Engel curve and making the further parametric assumption that self-employed households under-report their income by a constant fraction, independent of income. This paper proposes a nonparametric approach which avoids functional form restrictions and allows the form of the reporting function to be uncovered rather than being imposed a priori. The approach is illustrated by estimating the effect of the Canadian Goods and Services Tax on income under-reporting by a sample of self-employed households.}, key = {income under-reporting}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.08.05} } @BOOK{Temk:93, title = {Inequality}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1993}, author = {Temkin, L. S.}, address = {Oxford}, comment = {UL: 200.c.99.551}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Temk:86, author = {Temkin, L. S.}, title = {Inequality}, journal = {Philosophy and Public Affairs}, year = {1986}, volume = {15}, pages = {99-121}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Temp:05, author = {Temple,J.}, title = {Growth and wage inequality in a dual economy}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {2005}, volume = {57}, pages = {145-169}, abstract = {Who benefits from economic growth? This paper analyses the distributionalimpact of different types of growth within a twosector model. The paperfirst presents necessaryand sufficient conditions for unambiguous changesin wage inequalityin a dual economy, based on analysis of the entire Lorenzcurve. These conditions are then applied to the Harris-Todaro model withan urban non-agricultural sector and rural agriculture. It is shown thatcapital accumulation or technical progress in agriculture can shift theLorenz curve inwards and reduce wage inequality, while the effects of developmentin non-agriculture are typically ambiguous.}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Temp:03, author = {Temple, J.}, title = {The Long-Run Implications of Growth Theories}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {2003}, volume = {17}, pages = {497-510}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{TeVo:98, author = {Temple, Jonathan and Voth, Hans-Joachim}, title = {Human capital, equipment investment and industrialization}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {1343-1362}, number = {7}, key = {wages} } @INCOLLECTION{Tend:83, author = {Tendulkar, S.}, title = {Economic inequality in an {I}ndian perspective}, booktitle = {Equality and Inequality}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1983}, editor = {Beteille, A.}, address = {Delhi}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Teva:08, author = {Teulings, Coen and van Rens, Thijs}, title = {Education, Growth, and Income Inequality}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2008}, volume = {90}, pages = {89 - 104}, abstract = {Estimates of the effect of education on GDP (the social return) have been hard to reconcile with micro evidence on the private return to schooling. We present a simple explanation combining two ideas: imperfect substitution and endogenous skill-biased technological progress and use cross-country panel data on inequality and GDP to test these ideas. A one-year increase in the level of education reduces the private return by 2 percentage points, consistent with Katz-Murphy's (1992) elasticity of substitution. We find no evidence for reversal of this initial effect as in Acemoglu (2002). In the short run, the social return equals the private return.}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{Tew:99, author = {Tew, B.}, title = {Kalecki's ``Essays in the Theory of Economic Fluctuations''}, journal = {Review of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {11}, pages = {273-282}, abstract = {This paper compares Kalecki"s 1939 book, "Essays in the Theory of Economic Fluctuations" with the analysis of Keynes in the "General Theory" and subsequent articles. It argues that the work of Kalecki lends strong support to Keynes"s crusade against contemporary macroeconomic theory; where Keynes and Kalecki differed, it was generally due to the Keynesian assumption of perfect competition, which Kalecki rejected.}, key = {hist econ thought}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.05} } @ARTICLE{Thad:97, author = {Thadden, E. L. von}, title = {The term structure of investment and the banks' insurance function}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1997}, pages = {1355-1374}, key = {monetary} } @BOOK{Thai:97, title = {Les {M}odeles {T}heoriques {D}'{O}ffre {D}e {T}ravails}, publisher = {Economica}, year = {1997}, author = {Thaize-Challier, Marie-Christine}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Thal:80, author = {Thaler, R. H.}, title = {Toward a positive theory of consumer choice}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1980}, volume = {1}, pages = {39-60}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{That:68, author = {Thatcher, A. R.}, title = {The Distribution of Earnings of Employees in {G}reat {B}ritain}, journal = {Journal of The Royal Statistical Society}, year = {1968}, volume = {A131}, pages = {133-170}, key = {earnings}, series = {A} } @TECHREPORT{Lomb:01, author = {{The Lombardi Program on Measuring University Performance}}, title = {Top {A}merican Universities}, institution = {The Center, University of Florida}, year = {2001}, type = {Annual Report}, address = {http://thecenter.ufl.edu/research2001.pdf}, key = {education} } @ARTICLE{Thei:89TD, author = {Theil, H.}, title = {The development of international inequality 1960-1985}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1989}, volume = {42}, pages = {145-155}, abstract = {Data from the International Comparison Project are used to assess the economicdevelopment in five regions of the non-Communist world: the North, the South, and three regions in the Tropical Middle (in America, Asia, and Africa). The use of an additively decomposable inequality measure is emphasized.A convenient Lorenz-type graphical procedure is presented.}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Theil1989, author = {Theil, H.}, title = {The Development of International Inequality}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1989}, volume = {42}, pages = {145-155}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Thei:79TM, author = {Theil, H.}, title = {The measurement of inequality by components of income}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1979}, volume = {2}, pages = {197-199}, abstract = {Cowell (1977) considered the inequality by components of income (wages,property income, welfare, etc.). This note shows that this measurementproblem can be elegantly handled in terms of informational inequality measures.}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Thei:79WI, author = {Theil, H.}, title = {World income inequality and its components}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1979}, volume = {2}, pages = {99-102}, abstract = {About 65 percent of total income inequality in the non-communist world isaccounted for by international inequality, and about 35 percent by inequalitywithin nations. More than 70 percent of international inequality is accountedfor by the inequality of two major regions.}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Theil1979, author = {Theil, H.}, title = {The measurement of inequality by components of income}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1979}, volume = {2}, pages = {197-9}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Thei:72, title = {Statistical Decomposition Analysis}, publisher = {North-Holland}, year = {1972}, author = {Theil, H.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {statistics} } @BOOK{Thei:67, title = {Economics and Information Theory}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1967}, author = {Theil, H.}, address = {Amsterdam}, comment = {Cambridge UL: South Wing, Floor 6 Classmark: 220.c.96.1189}, key = {inequality} } @INBOOK{Thei:67-4, chapter = {4}, pages = {91-134}, title = {Economics and Information Theory}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1967}, author = {Theil, H.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{ThFrWa:74, author = {Thibaut, J. and Friedland, N. and Walker, L.}, title = {Compliance with rules: some social determinants}, journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology}, year = {1974}, volume = {30}, pages = {792-801}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{This:90, author = {Thistle, P. D.}, title = {Large sample properties of two inequality indices}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1990}, volume = {58}, pages = {725-728}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{This:89a, author = {Thistle, P. D.}, title = {Ranking distributions with generalized {L}orenz curves}, journal = {Southern Economic Journal}, year = {1989}, volume = {56}, pages = {1-12}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{This:89b, author = {Thistle, P. D.}, title = {Duality between generalized {L}orenz curves and distribution functions}, journal = {Economic Studies Quarterly.}, year = {1989}, volume = {40}, pages = {183-187}, number = {6}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.journalarchive.jst.go.jp/jnlpdf.php?cdjournal=economics1986&cdvol=40&noissue=2&startpage=183&lang=en&from=jnltoc} } @TECHREPORT{This:87, author = {Thistle, P. D.}, title = {Uniform progressivity residual progression and single crossing}, year = {1987}, type = {working paper}, address = {University of Alabama}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Thom:99, author = {Thomas,J.J.}, title = {Quantifying the Black Economy: ``Measurement Without Theory" Yet Again?}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1999}, volume = {109}, pages = {F381-F390}, key = {Underground} } @ARTICLE{Thom:92, author = {Thomas, J. J.}, title = {Income Distribution and the Estimation of the Consumption Function: A HistoricalAnalysis of the Early Arguments}, journal = {History of Political Economy}, year = {1992}, volume = {24}, pages = {153-181}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Thomas1992, author = {Thomas, J. J.}, title = {Income Distribution and the Estimation of the Consumption Function: A Historical Analysis of the Early Arguments}, journal = {History of Political Economy}, year = {1992}, volume = {24}, pages = {153-181}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Thom:85, author = {Thomas, J. J.}, title = {Incorporating the informal sector into a Macroeconomic Model}, year = {1985}, type = {mimeo}, address = {London School of Economics}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Thomas1985, author = {Thomas, J. J.}, title = {Incorporating the informal sector into a Macroeconomic Model}, year = {1985}, address = {London School of Economics}, key = {underground}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, type = {mimeo} } @ARTICLE{Thom:00, author = {Thompson, P.}, title = {Learning from the experience of others: Parameter uncertainty and economicgrowth in a model of creative destruction}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {2000}, volume = {24}, pages = {1285-1313}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Thompson2000, author = {Thompson, P.}, title = {Learning from the experience of others: Parameter uncertainty and economic growth in a model of creative destruction}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {2000}, volume = {24}, pages = {1285-1313}, key = {growth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Thom:03, author = {Thomson, W.}, title = {Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems:a survey}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2003}, volume = {45}, pages = {249-297}, key = {Claims} } @ARTICLE{Thomson2003, author = {Thomson, W.}, title = {Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey}, journal = {Mathematical Socal Sciences}, year = {2003}, volume = {45}, pages = {249-297}, key = {Claims}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Thon:84, author = {Thon, D.}, title = {A poverty measure}, journal = {Indian Economic Journal}, year = {1984}, volume = {30}, pages = {55-70}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Thon1983, author = {Thon, D.}, title = {A note on a troublesome axiom for poverty indices}, journal = {Economic Journal}, year = {1983}, volume = {93}, pages = {199-200}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Thon1983a, author = {Thon, D.}, title = {{L}orenz curves and {L}orenz coefficient: a sceptical note}, journal = {Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv}, year = {1983}, pages = {364-367}, note = {Band 119}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Thon:83a, author = {Thon, D.}, title = {{L}orenz curves and {L}orenz coefficient: a sceptical note}, journal = {Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv}, year = {1983}, volume = {119}, pages = {364-367}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Thon:83b, author = {Thon, D.}, title = {A note on a troublesome axiom for poverty indices}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {1983}, volume = {93}, pages = {199-200}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Thon1982, author = {Thon, D.}, title = {On measuring poverty}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1982}, volume = {25}, pages = {429-439}, key = {POVERTY}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Thon:82AA, author = {Thon, D.}, title = {An axiomatization of the {G}ini coefficient}, journal = {Mathematical Social Science}, year = {1982}, volume = {2}, pages = {131-143}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Thon:81, author = {Thon, D.}, title = {Income inequality and poverty; Some problems}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1981}, volume = {27}, pages = {207-210}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Thon:79, author = {Thon, D.}, title = {On measuring poverty}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1979}, volume = {25}, pages = {429-439}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{ThWa:04, author = {Thon,D. and Wallace,S.}, title = {Dalton transfers, inequality and altruism}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2004}, volume = {22}, pages = {447-465}, abstract = {This paper characterizes the set of income allocations attainable througha sequence of equalizing decentralized pair-wise transfers that each preservethe original ranking of the donor and the recipient. This kind of transferhas been considered in the literature on income distribution followingDalton’s famous 1920 article, and the concept is often attributed to him.We provide a description of the set of allocations attainable through asequence of such transfers. This paper argues that, although those transfersare often mentioned in the literature on income inequality, they do notreally play any role there. It also argues that such a transfer conceptis, on the other hand, of great interest in modeling altruism and its consequences.}, key = {Altruism} } @ARTICLE{Thorlund-Petersen2001, author = {Thorlund-Petersen, L.}, title = {Third-degree stochastic dominance and axioms for a convex marginal utility function}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2001}, volume = {41}, pages = {167-199}, key = {risk}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ThPe:01, author = {Thorlund-Petersen, L.}, title = {Third-degree stochastic dominance and axioms for a convex marginal utilityfunction}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2001}, volume = {41}, pages = {167-199}, key = {risk} } @TECHREPORT{ThWe:99TD, author = {Thum, Claudio and Weichenrieder, Alfons}, title = {The Distributional Impact of Public Goods Provision: A Veil of IgnoranceApproach}, institution = {CES ,University of Munich}, year = {1999}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {Department of Economics, Schackstr. 4, 80539 Munich, GERMANY}, abstract = {This paper considers the redistribution implied by different Tax-benefitsystems by using the 'veil of ignorance' approach. Redistribution fromrich to poor is interpreted as an insurance From a (hypothetical) ex antesituation in which individuals Lack any knowledge about their future incomesituation. Taking Redistribution and insurance as synonymous, the paperderives Cases of redistributionally neutral systems of taxation and Publicgood provision.}, comment = {claudio.thum@ces.vwl.uni-muenchen.de. JEL Classification: H23, D30, H41}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Thur:88, author = {Thurman, Q.}, title = {Taxpayer noncompliance and attribution theory: an experimental vignetteapproach}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1988}, volume = {43}, pages = {147-156}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Thurman1988, author = {Thurman, Q.}, title = {Taxpayer noncompliance and attribution theory: an experimental vignette approach}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1988}, volume = {43}, pages = {147-156}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ThSJRi:84, author = {Thurman, Q. and {St. John}, C. and Riggs, L.}, title = {Neutralization and tax evasion: how effective would a moral appeal be inimproving compliance to tax laws?}, journal = {Law and Policy}, year = {1984}, volume = {6}, pages = {309-327}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Thurman1984, author = {Thurman, Q. and {St. John}, C. and Riggs, L.}, title = {Neutralization and tax evasion: how effective would a moral appeal be in improving compliance to tax laws?}, journal = {Law and Policy}, year = {1984}, volume = {6}, pages = {309-327}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Thur:75, title = {Generating Inequality}, publisher = {Basic Books}, year = {1975}, author = {Thurow, L. C.}, address = {New York}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Thur:71, author = {Thurow, L. C.}, title = {The income distribution as a pure public good}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1971}, volume = {85}, pages = {327-36}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Thur:70, author = {Thurow, L. C.}, title = {Analysing the {A}merican Income Distribution}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1970}, volume = {60}, pages = {261-269}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Thuy:08, author = {Thuysbaert, Bram}, title = {Inference for the measurement of poverty in the presence of a stochastic weighting variable}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2008}, volume = {6}, pages = {33 - 55}, abstract = {Empirical applications of poverty measurement often have to deal with a stochastic weighting variable such as household size. Within the framework of a bivariate distribution function defined over income and weight, I derive the limiting distributions of the decomposable poverty measures and of the ordinates of stochastic dominance curves. The poverty line is allowed to depend on the income distribution. It is shown how the results can be used to test hypotheses concerning changes in poverty. The inference procedures are briefly illustrated using Belgian data.}, key = {Poverty}, keywords = {Decomposable poverty measure, Stochastic dominance, Statistical inference}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{Tian2003, author = {Tian, G.}, title = {A solution to the problem of consumption externalities}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {39}, pages = {831-847}, key = {externalities}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Tian:03, author = {Tian, G.}, title = {A solution to the problem of consumption externalities}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {39}, pages = {831–847}, key = {externalities} } @ARTICLE{Tieb:56, author = {Tiebout, C. M.}, title = {A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1956}, volume = {64}, pages = {416-424}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Tiet:03, author = {Tietenberg,T.}, title = {The tradable-permits approach to protecting the commons: lessons for climatechange}, journal = {Oxford review of economic policy}, year = {2004}, volume = {19}, pages = {400-419}, abstract = {Tradable-permit approaches for rationing access to the commons have beenapplied to many different types of resources in many different countries.This essay reviews the experience with three main applications of tradable-permitsystems-air-pollution control, water supply, and fisheries management-aswell as some unique related programmes. The purpose of the review is todraw together what we have learned about tradable permits in practice thatmight offer some useful insights for the implementation of the three tradablepermitmechanisms that are part of the Kyoto Protocol.}, key = {regulation} } @INCOLLECTION{Till:94, author = {Tillmann, G.}, title = {Income Equality and Income Taxation}, booktitle = {Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, pages = {396-418}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Tinb:70, title = {Income Distribution: Analysis and Policy}, publisher = {North-Holland}, year = {1970}, author = {Tinbergen, J.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {income distribution:theoretical} } @ARTICLE{Tiro:99, author = {Tirole, J.}, title = {Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {741-781}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Tiro:88, title = {The Theory of Industrial Organization}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1988}, author = {Tirole, J.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{Ti:82, author = {Tirole, Jean}, title = {On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1982}, volume = {50}, pages = {1163--1181}, number = {5}, abstract = {This paper considers the possibility of static and dynamic speculation when traders have rational expectations. Its central theme is that, unless traders have different priors or are able to obtain insurance in the market, speculation relies on inconsistent plans, and thus is ruled out by rational expectations. Its main contribution lies in the integration of the rational expectations equilibrium concept into a model of dynamic asset trading and in the study of the speculation created by potential capital gains. Price bubbles and their martingale properties are examined. It is argued that price bubbles rely on the myopia of traders and that they disappear if traders adopt a truly dynamic maximizing behavior.}, copyright = {Copyright © 1982 The Econometric Society}, issn = {00129682}, jstor_articletype = {primary_article}, jstor_formatteddate = {Sep., 1982}, publisher = {The Econometric Society} } @ARTICLE{TiRo:73, author = {Tittle, C. and Rowe, A. R.}, title = {Moral appeal, sanction threat and deviance: an experimental approach}, journal = {Social Problems}, year = {1973}, volume = {20}, pages = {488-498}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Tobin1973, author = {Tobin, J.}, title = {On limiting the domain of inequality}, journal = {Journal of Law and Economics}, year = {1973}, volume = {13}, pages = {263-277}, note = {Reprinted in Phelps}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Tobi:70, author = {Tobin, J.}, title = {On limiting the domain of inequality}, journal = {Journal of Law and Economics}, year = {1970}, volume = {13}, pages = {263-277}, note = {Reprinted in Phelps (1973)}, key = {inequality}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/725025} } @ARTICLE{Tobi:58, author = {Tobin, James}, title = {Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward Risk}, journal = {Review of Economic Studies}, year = {1958}, volume = {25}, pages = {65-86.}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Tobi:52, author = {Tobin, J.}, title = {A Survey of the Theory of Rationing}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1952}, volume = {20}, pages = {521-553}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{ToFa:98, author = {Tolley, George S. and Fabian, Robert G.}, title = {Issues in improvement of the valuation of non-market goods}, journal = {Resource and Energy Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {20}, pages = {75-83}, number = {2}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{Toma:07, author = {Tomat, Maria Gian}, title = {Revisiting poverty and welfare dominance}, institution = {Banca D'Italia}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {651}, abstract = {The paper reviews the theory of the measurement of poverty. The axiomatic theory is described and the axiomatic properties of poverty indexes are related to assumptions on the functional form of the poverty index function. The notion of poverty ordering is then introduced and followed by a review of the relations between the poverty orderings than can be defined from classes of poverty index functions with well-defined functional form properties and the notions of first order and second order stochastic dominance. The analysis applies the results used in the theory of economic inequality to study the relationship between welfare orderings and Lorenz dominance. The theory is used to analyze poverty patterns in Italy in 1997-2005.}, key = {Inequality}, keywords = {economic inequality, poverty, poverty ordering, stochastic dominance}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{Tome:81, author = {Tomes, N.}, title = {The family, inheritance and the intergenerational transmission of inequality}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1981}, volume = {89}, pages = {925-958}, number = {10}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Tomm:99, author = {Tommasi, M.}, title = {On High Inflation and the Allocation of Resources}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {44}, pages = {401-421}, key = {Macro} } @TECHREPORT{Toni:07, author = {Tonin,M.}, title = {Minimum Wage and Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence}, institution = {William Davidson Institute Working Paper No.865}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {865}, abstract = {The paper investigates the role of the minimum wage in a competitive economy in which there is underreporting of earnings by employed labour. The minimum wage induces higher compliance by some low-productivity workers and transforms a nominally neutral fiscal system into a regressive one. A spike in the wage distribution at the minimum wage level appears and a positive correlation between the size of the spike and the size of the informal economy is predicted and documented using cross-country data for Europe. A further result is that employees whose officially declared earnings appear to be boosted by a minimum wage hike actually experience a decline in their true income. This prediction finds support in an empirical test using the massive increase in the minimum wage that took place in Hungary in 2001 as a quasi-natural experiment.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @INCOLLECTION{Tope:98AN, author = {Topel, R.}, title = {Analytical Needs and Empirical Knowledge in Labour Economics}, booktitle = {Labor Statistics Measurement Issues}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Haltiwanger, J. and Manser, M. E. and Topel, R.}, pages = {51-70}, address = {Chicago 60637}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Torg:03, author = {Torgler, B.}, title = {To evade taxes or not to evade: that is the question}, journal = {Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {32}, pages = {283–302}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Torgler2003, author = {Torgler, B.}, title = {To evade taxes or not to evade: that is the question}, journal = {Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {32}, pages = {283-302}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{ToSc:06, author = {Torgler, B. and Schneider, F.}, title = {What Shapes Attitude Toward Paying Taxes? Evidence from Multicultural European Countries}, institution = {IZA}, year = {2006}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {2117}, address = {P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany}, month = {May}, abstract = {Considerable evidence suggests that enforcement efforts cannot fully explain the high degree of tax compliance. To resolve this puzzle of tax compliance several researchers have argued that citizens’ attitudes toward paying taxes defined as tax morale helps to explain the high degree of tax compliance. However, most studies have treated tax morale as a black box without discussing which factors shape it. Additionally, the tax compliance literature provides little empirical research that investigates attitudes toward paying taxes in Europe. Thus, this paper is unique in its examination of citizen tax morale within three multicultural European countries, Switzerland, Belgium and Spain, a choice that allows far more detailed examination of the impact of culture and institutions using datasets from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey.}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Tour:99, author = {Tourky, R.}, title = {Production Equilibria in Locally Proper Economies with Unbounded and UnorderedConsumers}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {303-315}, key = {Micro} } @ARTICLE{Towe:89, author = {Tower, E.}, title = {Excise tax evasion: Comment on {P}anagariya and {N}arayana}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1989}, volume = {44}, pages = {506-509}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{Town:79PI, title = {Poverty in the {U}nited {K}ingdom}, publisher = {Penguin Books}, year = {1979}, author = {Townsend, P.}, address = {Harmondsworth, Middlesex}, key = {poverty} } @INBOOK{Town:79PI-1, chapter = {1}, pages = {31-60}, title = {Poverty in the {U}nited {K}ingdom}, publisher = {Penguin Books}, year = {1979}, author = {Townsend, P.}, address = {Harmondsworth, Middlesex}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Town:62, author = {Townsend, P.}, title = {The meaning of poverty}, journal = {British Journal of Sociology}, year = {1962}, volume = {13}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Town:54, author = {Townsend, P.}, title = {Measuring poverty}, journal = {British Journal of Sociology}, year = {1954}, volume = {5}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Town:95, author = {Townsend, R.M.}, title = {Consumption Insurance: An Evaluation of Risk-Bearing Systems in Low-Income Economies}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1995}, volume = {9}, pages = {83-102}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{Town:08, author = {Townsend, R. M.}, title = {Introduction to Macroeconomic Dynamics Special Issue: Inequality}, journal = {Macroeconomic Dynamics}, year = {2008}, volume = {12}, pages = {149–153}, abstract = {This special issue features inequality. This is a subject that rightly draws immediate attention from both the profession and the popular press. The numbers themselves are intrinsically interesting, if not disturbing. There is, on the one hand, great variety in the distribution of earnings and an enormously right-skewed distribution of wealth. On the other hand, there is absolute and relative poverty. In developing countries there are extremes coexisting on both ends of the distribution. But developing economies also feature growth with time-varying levels of inequality. Macroeconomic growth, stability, and social policies seem correlated with poverty reduction in some instances.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.10.04} } @ARTICLE{Town:94, author = {Townsend, R. M.}, title = {Risk and insurance in village {I}ndia}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1994}, volume = {62}, pages = {539-591}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Town:79OC, author = {Townsend, R. M.}, title = {Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1979}, volume = {21}, pages = {265-293}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Toyo:80, author = {Toyoda, T.}, title = {Decomposability of inequality measures}, journal = {Economic Studies Quarterly}, year = {1980}, volume = {31}, pages = {207-246}, number = {12}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Toyo:75, author = {Toyoda, T.}, title = {Inequalities of income distributions: their comparisons and inequality measures}, journal = {Kokumin Keizai}, year = {1975}, volume = {134}, pages = {15-41}, note = {In Japanese}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{TNEvWa:00, author = {Tran-Nam, B. and Evans, C. and Walpole, M.}, title = {Tax Compliance Costs: Research Methodology and Empirical Evidence from {A}ustralia}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {2000}, volume = {53}, abstract = {The issue of tax compliance costs continues to attract public attentionthroughout the OECD. This is particularly true in Australia, where majortax reforms are taking place. This paper reports on an ongoing researchproject on federal tax compliance costs conducted by a research team fromthe Australian Taxation Studies Program (ATAX) of the University of NewSouth Wales. The focus of this paper is on the methodology of estimatingtaxation compliance costs. Some aggregate empirical findings, based onseveral large-scale mail surveys of over 10,000 personal and business taxpayers,will be reported. Major differences between the Australian and U.S. taxsystems, as well as comparison with results obtained in previous UK andU.S. studies, will also be highlighted.}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{TrSn:99, author = {Greg Trandel and Arthur Snow}, title = {Progressive Income Taxation and the Underground Economy}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {62}, pages = {217-222}, number = {2}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Tran:03, author = {Trannoy, Alain}, title = {About the right weights of the social welfare function when needs differ}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2003}, volume = {81}, pages = {383-387}, abstract = {When equivalence scales are used to compute the well-being of individuals,using them as weights has been proposed by Ebert. The criticism againstthis method, on the grounds that it does not respect anonymity, vanishesin the standard microeconomic setting.}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Tran:99, author = {Trannoy, A.}, title = {{\'E}galitarisme de la Dominance et Utilitarisme}, journal = {Revue {\'E}conomique}, year = {1999}, volume = {50}, pages = {733-755}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Trannoy1999, author = {Trannoy, A.}, title = {\'Egalitarisme de la Dominance et Utilitarisme}, journal = {Revue \'Economique}, year = {1999}, volume = {50}, pages = {733-755}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Tran:86, author = {Trannoy, A.}, title = {On {T}hon's axiomatization of the {G}ini index}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1986}, volume = {11}, pages = {191-194}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Tran:84, author = {Trannoy, A.}, title = {Social inequality indices}, institution = {L.E.M.E Universit{\'e} de Rennes I}, year = {1984}, type = {Discussion Paper 8401}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Tras:90, author = {Trasitano, A.}, title = {The {B}onferroni index of income inequality}, booktitle = {Income and Wealth Distribution, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1990}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Zenga, M.}, pages = {228-242}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Tred:98, author = {Trede, Mark}, title = {Making mobility visible: a graphical device}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {59}, pages = {77-82}, number = {1}, abstract = {This paper suggests a method of depicting mobility processes of income or earnings. It makes use of nonparametric quantile regression based on bivariate kernel density estimation. The method is illustrated with a comparison of German and US income mobility.}, key = {mobility} } @TECHREPORT{Tred:95, author = {Trede, M.}, title = {Statistical Inference in Mobility Measurement: Sex Difference in EarningsMobility}, year = {1995}, type = {University of Cologne, mimeo}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Trei:00, author = {Treisman, D.}, title = {The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {76}, pages = {399-457}, key = {Underground} } @ARTICLE{TrMe:80, author = {Tressler, J. H. and Menezes, C. F.}, title = {Labor supply and wage-rate uncertainty}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1980}, volume = {23}, pages = {425-437}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Trie:90, author = {Triest, R. K.}, title = {The effect of income taxation on labor supply in the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1990}, volume = {25}, pages = {491-516}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Troc:08, author = {Trockel, W.}, title = {The {N}ash product is a utility representation of the {P}areto ordering}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2008}, volume = {99}, pages = {220-222}, number = {2}, abstract = {The paper deals with different completions of partial orderings on finite dimensional compact sets and an application to bargaining games. In particular, the Nash product turns out to be a continuous utility representation of the Pareto ordering in the sense of [Peleg, B., Econometrica 38 (1970) 93–96.] and [Sondermann, D., Journal of Economic Theory 23 (1980) 183–188.]. This provides an interesting “straightforward interpretation” that the Nash product according to [Osborne, M.J. and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory (1994), MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts., p. 303] is lacking. For each payoff allocation admissible in the bargaining problem, it measures the set of admissible allocations Pareto dominated by it. The two sets of resulting maximal elements of the two completions are the Pareto efficient boundary and the Nash bargaining solution, respectively.}, key = {utility, preference}, owner = {rodano}, timestamp = {2008.06.12} } @ARTICLE{Tsui:07, author = {Tsui, K.}, title = {Forces Shaping {C}hina's Interprovincial Inequality}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2007}, volume = {53}, pages = {60-92}, abstract = {This paper explores the forces that shaped China’s interprovincial inequality in the last five decades of Communist rule. In so far as the change in interprovincial inequality is the result of differential growth in provincial GDP per capita and provincial economic growth, it may be decomposed into contributions by total factor productivity (TFP) and other factor inputs. A new method is introduced to make this decomposition. Care is exercised in taking into account problems of Chinese official data when implementing the decomposition analysis. The findings suggest that TFP and factor inputs exerted different and sometimes opposing effects on interprovincial inequality in the Maoist and reform era. The increase in inequality from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s is due to the contribution of TFP overwhelming that of physical capital. The opposite is true for the 1980s. The increase in the 1990s is mainly driven by the skewed distribution of investments in favor of the richer coastal provinces reinforced by the increasing contribution of TFP.}, key = {inequality}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Tsui:95, author = {Tsui, K.-Y.}, title = {Multidimensional generalizations of the relative and absolute inequality indices: the {A}tkinson-{K}olm-{S}en Approach}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1995}, volume = {67}, pages = {251-265}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Tsun:07, author = {Tsunaki, Atsushi}, title = {The Measurement of Social Welfare}, institution = {Osaka University, The Institute of Social and Economic Research}, year = {2007}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {698}, abstract = {This paper derives a basic formula for the measure of social welfare, a second order approximation to the difference of the value of the Bergson - Samuelson social welfare function between the socially optimal resource allocation and the one in the present suboptimal economy. We discuss pros and cons of our approach for the measurement of welfare compared with other approaches to applied welfare economics, especially the measurement of deadweight loss.}, key = {Welfare}, keywords = {Social Welfare, Deadweight Loss, Measurement, Second Order Approximation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{Tuck:80, author = {Tucker, M.}, title = {The underground economy in {A}ustralia}, journal = {Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd, Economic Review}, year = {1980}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Tull:99, author = {Tullock, Gordon}, title = {Non-prisoner's dilemma}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1999}, volume = {39}, pages = {455-458}, number = {4}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Tull:98, author = {Tullock, Gordon}, title = {Reply to {G}uttman}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {14}, pages = {215-218}, number = {2}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Tull:67, author = {Tullock, G.}, title = {The welfare economics of tariffs, monopolies and theft}, journal = {Western Economic Journal}, year = {1967}, volume = {5}, pages = {224-232}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{Tung:01, author = {Tungodden,B.}, title = {Responsibility and redistribution: the case of first best taxation}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2001}, abstract = {It is not straightforward to define the ethics of responsibility in caseswhere the consequences of changes in factors within our control are partlydetermined by factors beyond our control. In this paper, we suggest thatone plausible view is to keep us responsible for the parts of the consequencesthat are independent of the factors beyond our control. Within the frameworkof a first best taxation problem, we present and characterise a redistributivemechanism that both satisfies this interpretation of the ethics of responsibilityand the ethics of compensation within a broad class of economic environments.However, on a general basis, even this weaker version of the ethics ofresponsibility is not compatible with the ethics of compensation, and wereport an impossibility result that clarifies the source of this conflict.}, key = {redistribution} } @TECHREPORT{Tungodden2001, author = {Tungodden, B.}, title = {Responsibility and redistribution: the case of first best taxation}, institution = {CESifo}, year = {2001}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {545}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, key = {redistribution}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Tung:00, author = {Tungodden , B.}, title = {Egalitarianism: Is Leximin the Only Option?}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {16}, pages = {229-245}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Tung:99, author = {Tungodden, B.}, title = {The distribution problem and {R}awlsian reasoning}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1999}, volume = {16}, pages = {599-614}, abstract = {The difference principle of Rawls has been wrongly translated in the formal literature on welfare economics and social choice theory. The differenc eprinciple is concerned with the welfare of the members of the least advantaged segment and, thus, does not - as frequently argued - assign dictatorialpower to the person in the worst off position in society. This distinction is important and the focus on a leximin group rule makes the Rawlsian positionmore plausible than it is in the `disguise' of the conventional leximinrule. However, there is a difficulty with this approach, to wit how tounderstand the least advantaged segment in society. Various definitionsare considered in the paper, but it turns out that in most cases thesedefinitions imply that we have to accept the leximin rule. We suggest oneline of reasoning that makes the Rawlsian leximin group rule a genuine alternativeto the leximin rule. In this approach, an independent norm level is imposedon the analysis (i.e. a cut off line that is independent of the distributionof welfare under consideration) and the least advantaged segment is identified as those who have less than this minimum stipend.}, key = {social choice} } @BOOK{Tuom:90, title = {Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1990}, author = {Tuomala, M.}, address = {London}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Tuomala1990, title = {Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1990}, author = {Tuomala, M.}, address = London, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Tuom:84, author = {Tuomala, M.}, title = {On the Optimal Income Taxation: Some Further Numerical Results}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1984}, volume = {23}, pages = {351-366}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Turn:99, author = {Turnovec, F.}, title = {Privatization, Ownership Structure and Transparency: How the Measure theTrue Involvement of the State}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {605-618}, key = {privatisation} } @ARTICLE{Turnovec1999, author = {Turnovec, F.}, title = {Privatization, Ownership Structure and Transparency: How the Measure the True Involvement of the State}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {605-618}, key = {privatisation}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Turn:98, title = {International Macroeconomic Dynamics}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Stephen J. Turnovsky}, key = {macro} } @ARTICLE{Turr:98, author = {Turrini, Alessandro}, title = {Endogenous education policy and increasing income inequality between skilledand unskilled workers}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1998}, volume = {14}, pages = {303-326}, number = {2}, key = {labour} } @BOOK{Tutt:85, title = {The Tax Raiders: the {R}ossminster Affair}, publisher = {Financial Training Publications}, year = {1985}, author = {Tutt, N.}, address = {London}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{TuGa:06, author = {Tuttle, M.H. and Gauger, J.}, title = {Wealth and the Distributuon of Income: Permanent and Transitory Effects}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2006}, volume = {52}, pages = {493-508}, note = {mht001@shsu.edu}, abstract = {This paper examines the permanent and transitory effects of changes in wealth, the top federal marginal income tax rate, and capital gains tax rate on the distribution of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). This paper establishes the importance of wealth in determining the distribution of AGI, and results here suggest that its effects can negate the permanent effect of a change in both tax rates. Of the two tax rates, the capital gains tax rate is the most important for AGI distribution. The marginal income tax rate is notably less important for long run behavior, but does have short run impacts.}, key = {income distribution}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @ARTICLE{Tver:72, author = {Tversky, A.}, title = {Elimination by aspects: a theory of choice}, journal = {Psychological Review}, year = {1972}, volume = {89}, pages = {281-299}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Tver:69, author = {Tversky, A.}, title = {Intransitivity of Preferences}, journal = {Psychological Review}, year = {1969}, volume = {76}, pages = {31-48}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Tver:67, author = {Tversky, A.}, title = {Utility theory, additivity analysis and decision making under risk}, journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology}, year = {1967}, volume = {75}, pages = {27-36}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Tversky1967, author = {Tversky, A.}, title = {Utility theory, additivity analysis and decision making under risk}, journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology}, year = {1967}, pages = {27-36}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{TvKa:88, author = {Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D.}, title = {Rational Choice and the Forming of Decisions}, booktitle = {Decision making: descriptive, normative and prescriptive interactions}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1988}, editor = {Bell, D. E. and Raiffa, H. and Tversky, A.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{TvKa:91, author = {Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D.}, title = {Loss aversion in riskless choice: a reference-dependent model}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {106}, pages = {1039-1061}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{TvKa:81, author = {Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D.}, title = {The framing of decision and the psychology of choice}, journal = {Science}, year = {1981}, volume = {211}, pages = {453-458}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{TvKa:74, author = {Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D.}, title = {Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and biases}, journal = {Science}, year = {1974}, volume = {185}, pages = {1124-1131}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{TvSaSl:88, author = {Tversky, A. and Sattath, S. and Slovic, P.}, title = {Contingent weighting in judgement and choice}, journal = {Psychological Review}, year = {1988}, volume = {95}, pages = {371-384}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{TvSlKa:90, author = {Tversky, A and Slovic, P. and Kahnemann, D.}, title = {The Causes of Preference Reversal}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1990}, volume = {80}, pages = {204-217}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{TvTh:90, author = {Tversky, A. and Thaler, R. H.}, title = {Anomalies: Preference Reversals}, journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1990}, volume = {4}, pages = {201-211}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{TvWa:95, author = {Tversky, A. and Wakker, P.}, title = {Risk attitudes and decision weights}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1995}, volume = {63}, pages = {1255-1280}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{TyFe:02, author = {Tyran, Jean-Robert and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of PublicGoods}, year = {2002}, pages = {1-34}, number = {651}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {experiments}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{Tyran2002, author = {Tyran, Jean-Robert and Feld, Lars P.}, title = {Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods}, journal = {CESifo Working Paper No 651}, year = {2002}, pages = {1-34}, number = {651}, address = {Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich}, institution = {CESifo}, key = {experiments}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10}, type = {Working Paper} } @ARTICLE{Ulla:02, author = {Ullah, A.}, title = {Uses of Entropy and Divergence Measures for Evaluating Economic Appoximations and Inference}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2002}, volume = {107}, pages = {313-326}, abstract = {This paper provides the uses of the Kullback and Leibler divergence measure in two directions. First a new result on the asymptotic expansion of the Kullback and Leibler divergence is provided which can be used for comparing two distributions. An application to compare two alternative approximate distributions from the unknown true exact distribution of a Student t-statistic in a dynamic regression is given. Second we explore the application of the Kullback and Leibler divergence measure to non-parametric estimation and speci-cation testing in regression models. A non-parametric speci-cation test is proposed.}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{Ulla:96, author = {Ullah, A.}, title = {Entropy, divergence and distance measures with econometric applications}, journal = {Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference}, year = {1996}, volume = {49}, pages = {137-162}, key = {ECONOMETRICS} } @ARTICLE{Ulph:78, author = {Ulph, D.}, title = {On the labour supply and the measurement of inequality}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1978}, volume = {19}, pages = {492-512}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{UN:57, title = {Economic Survey of {E}urope in 1956}, publisher = {United Nations}, year = {1957}, author = {{United Nations Economic Commission for Europe}}, address = {Geneva}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @TECHREPORT{GAO:99, author = {{United States General Accounting Office}}, title = {Tax Administration: {IRS}' Return Selection}, institution = {GAO/GGD}, year = {1999}, number = {99-33}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.04.28} } @ARTICLE{Unse:00, author = {Unser, M.}, title = {Lower Partial Moments as Measures of Perceived Risk: An Experimental Study}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {2000}, volume = {21}, pages = {253-280}, key = {risk} } @TECHREPORT{Unuw:05, author = {UNU-WIDER}, title = {World Income Inequality Database, Version 2.0a}, institution = {UNU-WIDER}, year = {2005}, comment = {June}, key = {income inequality: empirical}, owner = {TEYTELBO}, timestamp = {2006.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Ushe:87, author = {Usher, D.}, title = {Theft a a paradigm for departures from efficiency}, journal = {Oxford Economic Papers}, year = {1987}, volume = {39}, pages = {235-252}, key = {crime} } @ARTICLE{Ushe:86, author = {Usher, D.}, title = {Tax Evasion and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds}, journal = {Economic Inquiry}, year = {1986}, volume = {24}, pages = {563-586}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Ushe:82, author = {Usher, D.}, title = {The private cost of public funds: variations in themes by {B}rowning, {A}tkinsonand {S}tern}, institution = {Queen's University, Institute for Economic Research}, year = {1982}, key = {public economics} } @TECHREPORT{Usher1982, author = {Usher, D.}, title = {The private cost of public funds: variations in themes by {B}rowning, {A}tkinson and {S}tern}, institution = {Queen's University, Institute for Economic Research}, year = {1982}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Uusi:99, author = {Uusitalo, R.}, title = {Return to Education in Finland}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {569-580}, key = {education, training} } @ARTICLE{Vall:00, author = {Vallentyne, P.}, title = {Equality, Efficiency and the Priority of the Worse-Off}, journal = {Economics and Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {16}, pages = {1-19}, key = {equality} } @ARTICLE{VaMoBa:98, author = {Valley, Kathleen L. and Moag, Joseph and Bazerman, Max H.}, title = {`A matter of trust' - Effect of communication on the efficiency and distributionof outcomes}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {34}, pages = {211-238}, number = {2}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{VaVa:80, author = {Van Batenburg, P. C. and Van Praag, B. M. S.}, title = {The perception of welfare inequality: a correction note}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1980}, volume = {13}, pages = {259-261}, number = {3}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{VBoWiLMa:93, author = {Mark V. {Van Boening} and Arlington W. Williams and Shawn LaMaster}, title = {Price bubbles and crashes in experimental call markets}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1993}, volume = {41}, pages = {179 - 185}, number = {2}, abstract = {Price bubbles relative to intrinsic dividend value are observed using a call market trading institution. Market prices tend to track intrinsic value only when the same group of highly experienced traders participate in three consecutive 15-round markets.}, doi = {DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(93)90194-H}, issn = {0165-1765} } @TECHREPORT{VaSc:96, author = {Van De Gaer, Dirk and Schokkaert, Erik}, title = {Taxes and the Investment in Human Capital:Distribution, Growth and IntergenerationalMobility}, institution = {Centrum Voor Economische Studien, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven}, year = {1996}, number = {49}, month = {April}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{VaScMa:01, author = {Van de gaer,D. and Schokkaert,E. and Martinez,M.}, title = {Three Meanings of Intergenerational Mobility}, journal = {Economica}, year = {2001}, volume = {68}, pages = {519-537}, abstract = {We axiomatize three different motivations for being concerned about intergenerationalmobility: mobility as a description of movement, as an indication of equalityof opportunity, and as an indication of equality of life chances. Thesethree motivations are shown to be incompatible. None of the existing measuresis acceptable as an indicator of equality of opportunity or equality oflife chances. We propose two new measures of intergenerational mobilitywhich more adequately refect these concerns.}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{VdgFuMcC:99, author = {{Van de gaer}, Dirk and Funnell, Nicola and McCarthy, Tom}, title = {Statistical inference for two measures of inequality when incomes are correlated}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {64}, pages = {295-300}, number = {3}, key = {statistics} } @BOOK{VanDeWalle1995, title = {Public spending and the poor: Theory and Evidence}, publisher = {The World Bank}, year = {1995}, author = {Van De Walle, D. and Nead, K.}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{WaNe:95, title = {Public Spending and the Poor: Theory and Evidence}, publisher = {Johns Hopkins Press}, year = {1995}, author = {Van de Walle, D. and Nead, K.}, address = {Baltimore}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{BeRi:98, author = {Van Den Berg, G. J. and Ridder, G.}, title = {An empirical equilibrium search model of the labour market}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1998}, volume = {66}, pages = {1183-1221}, number = {5}, key = {Labour market} } @ARTICLE{HeNePoVe:98, author = {Van der Heijden, E. C. M. and Nelissen, J. H. M. and Potters, J. J. M. andVerbon, H. A. A.}, title = {Transfers and the effect of monitoring in an overlapping-generations experiment}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {1363-1391}, number = {7}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{HoSh:01, author = {Van der Hoek, J. and Sherris, M.}, title = {A Class of Non-Expected Utility Risk Measures and Implications for AssetAllocations}, journal = {Insurance, Mathematics and Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {28}, pages = {69-82}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{VanderHoek2001, author = {Van der Hoek, J. and Sherris, M.}, title = {A Class of Non-Expected Utility Risk Measures and Implications for Asset Allocations}, journal = {Insurance, Mathematics and Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {28}, pages = {69-82}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{DiWi:97, author = {Van Dijk, Frans and Van Winden, Frans}, title = {Dynamics of social ties and local public good provision}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {323-341}, number = {3}, month = {June}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{vDWa:97, author = {Van Doorslaer, E. and Wagstaff, A. and others}, title = {Income-Related Inequalities in Health: Some International Comparisons}, journal = {Journal of Health Economics}, year = {1997}, volume = {16}, pages = {93-112}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{DiSoVaW:02, author = {{Van D}ijk, F. and Sonnemans, J. and {Van W}inden, F.}, title = {Social Ties in a Public Good Experiment}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {85}, pages = {275-299}, key = {Public Goods} } @ARTICLE{vEKa:88, author = {Van Eck, R. and Kazemier}, title = {Features of the hidden economy in the {N}etherlands}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1988}, volume = {34}, pages = {251-273}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{VanHerwaarden1977, author = {Van Herwaarden, F. G. and Kapteyn, A. and Van Praag, B. M. S.}, title = {12,000 individual welfare functions of income: a comparison of six samples in {B}elgium and the {N}etherlands}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {9}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Lely:99, author = {Van Lelyveld, I.}, title = {Inflation or Unemployment: Who Cares}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {15}, pages = {463-484}, key = {Macro} } @ARTICLE{MaVe:93, author = {Van Marrewijk, C. and Verbeek, J.}, title = {On opulence driven poverty traps}, journal = {Journal of Population Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {6}, pages = {67-82}, number = {1}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{VanP:78, author = {Van Praag, B. M. S.}, title = {The perception of income inequality}, booktitle = {Personal Income Distribution}, publisher = {North Holland, Amsterdam}, year = {1978}, editor = {Krelle, W. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{VanP:77, author = {Van Praag, B. M. S.}, title = {The perception of welfare inequality}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1977}, volume = {10}, pages = {189-207}, number = {11}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{VaBa:90, author = {Van Praag, B. M. S. and Baye, M. R.}, title = {The poverty concept when prices are income -dependent}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1990}, volume = {43}, pages = {153-166}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{VaGoKa:80, author = {Van Praag, B. M. S. and Goedhart, T. and Kapteyn, A.}, title = {The poverty line - A pilot survey in {E}urope}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1980}, volume = {62}, pages = {461-465}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{VanPraag1983, author = {Van Praag, B. M. S. and Hagenaars, A. J. M. and Van Eck, W.}, title = {The Influence of Classification and Observation Errors on the Measurement of Income Inequality}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1983}, volume = {51}, pages = {1093-1108}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{VPHaVE:83, author = {Van Praag, B. M. S. and Hagenaars, A. J. M. and Van Eck, W.}, title = {The Influence of Classification and Observation Errors on the Measurementof Income Inequality}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1983}, volume = {51}, pages = {1093-1108}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{vPrHavWe:82, author = {Van Praag, Bernard M. S. and Hagenaars, Aldi J. M. and van Weeren, J.}, title = {Poverty in {E}urope}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1982}, volume = {28}, pages = {345-359}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{VaPrVaSa88, author = {Van Praag, B. M. S. and Van der Sar, N. L.}, title = {Household Cost Functions and Equivalence Scales}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1988}, volume = {XXIII}, pages = {193-210}, number = {2}, key = {Equivalence scales} } @BOOK{vanP:91, title = {Qu'est-ce Qu'une Soci{\'e}t{\'e} Juste ?}, publisher = {{\'E}ditions du Seuil}, year = {1991}, author = {{Van P}arijs, P.}, address = {Paris}, key = {social justice} } @ARTICLE{WiEs:99, author = {Van Wijnbergen, Sweder and Estache, Antonio}, title = {Evaluating the minimum asset tax on corporations: an option pricing approach}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {71}, pages = {75-95}, number = {1}, key = {taxation} } @BOOK{Vari:02, title = {Intermediate Microeconomics - A Modern Approach}, publisher = {Norton}, year = {2002}, author = {Varian, H. R.}, address = {New York}, edition = {Sixth}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Vari:96, title = {Intermediate Microeconomics - A Modern Approach}, publisher = {Norton}, year = {1996}, author = {Varian, H. R.}, address = {New York}, edition = {Fourth}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Vari:92, title = {Microeconomic Analysis}, publisher = {Norton}, year = {1992}, author = {Varian, H. R.}, address = {New York}, edition = {Third}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Varian1985, author = {Varian, Hal R.}, title = {Price Discrimination and Social Welfare}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, year = {1985}, volume = {75}, pages = {870--875}, number = {4}, month = {Sep.}, copyright = {Copyright 1985 American Economic Association}, issn = {00028282}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.02.07} } @ARTICLE{Vari:80, author = {Varian, H. R.}, title = {Redistributive taxation as social insurance}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1980}, key = {Social insurance} } @ARTICLE{Vari:80AM, author = {Varian, H. R.}, title = {A model of sales}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1980}, volume = {70}, pages = {651-656}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Vari:74, author = {Varian, H. R.}, title = {Equity, Envy and Efficiency}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1974}, volume = {9}, pages = {63-91}, key = {equity} } @INCOLLECTION{Vaug:88, author = {Vaughan, R.}, title = {Distributional aspects of the life cycle theory of saving}, booktitle = {Modelling the Accumulation and Distribution of Wealth}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1988}, editor = {Kessler, D. and Masson, A.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {wealth} } @TECHREPORT{Vaug:99, author = {Robert N Vaughan}, title = {Distributional Issues in Welfare Assessment and Consumer Affairs Policy}, institution = {Office of Fair Trading}, year = {1999}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {OFT 255}, note = {Appendix 1 of Vulnerable Consumers and Financial Services}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Vaug:87, author = {Vaughan, R. N.}, title = {Welfare approaches to the measurement of poverty}, journal = {Economic Journal (Supplement 1987)}, year = {1987}, volume = {97}, pages = {160-170}, key = {poverty} } @INCOLLECTION{VeSa:07, author = {Veall, M. R. and Saez, E}, title = {The Evolution of High Incomes in {C}anada,1920-2000}, booktitle = {Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @ARTICLE{VeZi:96, author = {Veall, M. R. and Zimmermann, K. F.}, title = {Pseudo-R2 measures for some common limited dependent variable models}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {1996}, volume = {10}, pages = {241-259}, key = {econometrics} } @TECHREPORT{Veen:92, author = {Veenhoven,Ruut}, title = {Social Equality and State-Welfare-Effort: More income-equality, no moreequality of life}, institution = {Erasmus University, Dept. of Sociology, Rotterdam}, year = {1992}, type = {Conference Paper}, month = {June}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Veenhoven1995, author = {Veenhoven, Ruut and Ouweneel, Piet}, title = {Livability of the welfare-state: Appreciation-of-life and length-of-life in nations varying in state-welfare-effort}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {36}, pages = {1-48}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{VeOu:95, author = {Veenhoven, Ruut and Ouweneel, Piet}, title = {Livability of the welfare-state: Appreciation-of-life and length-of-lifein nations varying in state-welfare-effort}, journal = {Social Indicators Research}, year = {1995}, volume = {36}, pages = {1-48}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{VeRe:03, title = {Economics and the Theory of Games}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2003}, author = {Vega-Redondo, F.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {games} } @ARTICLE{Venc:98, author = {Vencatachellum, Desire}, title = {Endogenous growth with strategic interactions}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, year = {1998}, volume = {23}, pages = {233-254}, number = {2}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{VeWo:07, author = {Vendrick, M.C.M. and Woltjer, G.B.}, title = {Happiness and Loss Aversion: Is Utility Concave Or Convex in Relative Income?}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2007}, volume = {91}, pages = {1423-1448}, note = {M.Vendrik@algec.unimaas.nl Geert.Woltjer@wur.nl}, abstract = {A central finding in happiness research is that a person's life satisfaction depends on the level of her income relative to the average income in her social reference group. This dependence of life satisfaction on relative income can be related to the reference dependence of the value function in Kahneman and Tversky's [Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., 1979. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47, 263–291] prospect theory. In this paper we investigate whether the characteristics of the value function like concavity for gains, convexity for losses, and loss aversion apply to the dependence of life satisfaction on relative income. This is tested with an improved measure for the reference income for a large German panel spanning the years 1984–2001. We find concavity of life satisfaction in positive relative income, but unexpectedly strongly significant concavity of life satisfaction in negative relative income as well. We also present a new method to show the robustness of these concavity results to extreme distortions of the reported-life-satisfaction scale. The concavity for negative relative income implies a rising marginal sensitivity of life satisfaction to more negative values of relative income, and hence loss aversion (in a wide sense). This may be explained in terms of increasing financial obstacles to social participation.}, key = {loss aversion}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.06.06} } @TECHREPORT{Vene:98, author = {Roberto Veneziani}, title = {Some Egalitarian Principles Compared}, institution = {Centre for The Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences, London Schoolof Economics}, year = {1998}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {DP 35/98}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{VeWi:00, author = {Venti, S. F. and Wise, D. A.}, title = {Choice, Chance and Wealth Dispersion at Retirement}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2000}, number = {Working Paper 7521}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{VeWi:91, author = {Venti, S. F. and Wise, D. A.}, title = {Aging and the Income Value of Housing Wealth}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1991}, volume = {44}, pages = {371-397}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Vent:99, author = {Ventura, G.}, title = {Flat Tax Reform: A Quantitative Exploration}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control}, year = {1999}, volume = {23}, pages = {1425-1458}, abstract = {This paper explores quantitatively the general equilibrium implications of a revenue neutral tax reform in which the current income and capital income tax structure in the U.S. is replaced by a #at tax, as proposed by Hall and Rabushka (1995), (The Flat Tax, 2nd ed. Hoover). The central aspects of such reform, the impact of tax reform on capital accumulation and labor supply, as well as its distributional consequences, are analyzed in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Main results are that, (i) the elimination of the actual taxation of capital income has an important and positive e!ect on capital accumulation; (ii) mean labor hours are relatively constant across tax systems, but aggregate labor in e$ciency units increases; (iii) in all circumstances analyzed, the distributions of earnings, income and especially wealth become more concentrated.}, key = {tax reform}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{VerE:02, author = {{Ver Eecke}, W.}, title = {Adam {S}mith and {M}usgrave's Concept of Merit Good}, journal = {Journal of Socio-Economics}, year = {2002}, abstract = {In this paper I claim that Adam Smith distinguished between economic activitieswithout labeling these distinctions and that those distinctions correspondwith the modern concepts of private, public and merit good. Musgrave introducedthe concept of merit good, but he himself (and several commentators) limitedthe applicability of the concept merit good. I argue that a close readingof Adam Smith solidifies the distinction conceptualized by the modern ideasof public and merit good; gives the concept merit good a broader domainof applicability; and makes of the ideas of public and merit good concepts,which are ideal conceptsand can therefore be applicable jointly and indegrees to particular economic activities.}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Veva:07, author = {Verboon, Peter and van Dijke, Marius}, title = {A self-interest analysis of justice and tax compliance: How distributive justice moderates the effect of outcome favorability}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {2007}, volume = {28}, pages = {704 - 727}, abstract = {Compliance with tax authorities has been studied mainly in the fields of economics and psychology. The focus has respectively been on self-interest motives and justice concerns in tax compliance. We argue that both concerns are less divergent than is often thought. Specifically, we studied the moderating role of distributive justice on the relationship between outcome favorability and tax compliance in two cross-sectional surveys. It is generally believed that favorable outcomes increase compliance because they decrease what can be gained from non-compliance. The present research addresses the role of distributive justice in this process. Since people believe that distributive fairness guarantees their long-term outcomes, favorable present outcomes now imply favorable future outcomes and unfavorable present outcomes now imply unfavorable future outcomes. Thus, we expected fair outcomes to result in a strong relationship between outcome favorability and compliance. On the basis that unfair outcomes are believed to result from chance, outcome favorability should have a weaker relationship with compliance when outcomes are unfair. Even when controlling for other variables, this prediction was supported by both studies.}, key = {Taxation}, keywords = {Tax compliance; Distributive justice; Outcome favorability; Self-interest}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{Verb:00, author = {Verbrugge, R.}, title = {Risk aversion, learning spillovers and path-dependent economic growth}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {197-202}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{VeMyBaBeBeBlCaChLaLeMoRu:06, author = {Vermeulen, F. and Myck, M. and Bargain, O. and Beblo, M. and Beninger, D. and Blundell, R. and Carrasco, R. and Chiuri, M. and Laisney, F. and Lechene, V. and Moreau, N. and Ruiz-{C}astillo, J.}, title = {Collective Methods of Labour Supply with Nonconvex Budget Sets and Nonparticipation: A Calibration Approach}, journal = {Rev Econ Household}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {113-127}, key = {labour market}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{Veum:92, author = {J. R. Veum}, title = {Accounting for income mobility in the {US}}, journal = {Social Science Quarterly}, year = {1992}, pages = {773-785}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Vica:04, author = {Vicary, Simon}, title = {Factor Endowments and the Private Provision of Public Goods}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {56}, pages = {171-188}, number = {2}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Vica:90, author = {Vicary, S.}, title = {Transfers and the Weakest-Link: An Extension of {H}irshleifer's Analysis}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1990}, volume = {43}, pages = {375-394}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Vick:05, author = {Vickers,J.}, title = {Abuse of market power}, journal = {The Economic Journal}, year = {2005}, volume = {115}, pages = {244-261}, abstract = {How should competition law deal with anti-competitive behaviour by firmswith market power? In the light of recent EC and US cases, this is perhapsthe most controversial current issue for competition policy. Lax policywould jeopardise the competitiveness of markets, but rigid policy wouldchill pro-competitive, pro-consumer conduct. This paper gives an economicassessment of evolving legal standards in the area. The importance of developinga stronger economic basis for EC law on abuse of market dominance is stressed.}, key = {micro} } @INCOLLECTION{Vick:94, author = {Willam Vickrey}, title = {Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to Risk}, booktitle = {Public Economics: Selected Papers by William Vickery}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1994}, editor = {Richard Arnott et al.}, pages = {15-28}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Vick:61, author = {Vickrey, W.}, title = {Counterspeculation auctions and sealed tenders}, journal = {Journal of Finance}, year = {1961}, volume = {16}, pages = {8-37}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Vickrey1961, author = {Vickrey, W.}, title = {Risk, utility and social policy}, journal = {Social Research}, year = {1961}, volume = {28}, pages = {205-217}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Vick:60, author = {Vickrey, W.}, title = {Utility, strategy and social decision rules}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1960}, volume = {74}, pages = {507-535}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Vick:45, author = {Vickrey, W.}, title = {Measuring marginal utility by reaction to risk}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1945}, volume = {13}, pages = {319-333}, key = {uncertainty} } @INCOLLECTION{ViFe:95a, author = {Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Robust Methods for Personal Income Distribution Models with applicationto {D}agum's Model}, booktitle = {Income Distribution, Social Welfare, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {JAI-Press of Greenwich}, year = {1995}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Lemmi, A.}, address = {CT USA}, note = {To appear}, key = {STATISTICS} } @INCOLLECTION{ViFe:95c, author = {Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Robust methods for personal income distribution models with application to {D}agum's model}, booktitle = {Research on Economic Inequality, Volume 6: Income Distribution, Social Welfare, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {JAI Press}, year = {1995}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Lemmi, A.}, pages = {225--239}, address = {Greenwich}, key = {statistics} } @INCOLLECTION{ViFe:99SP, author = {Victoria-Feser, Maria-Pia}, title = {The Sampling Properties of Inequality Indices: Comment}, booktitle = {Handbook on Income Inequality Measurement}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1999}, editor = {Silber, J.}, pages = {260-267}, address = {Dewenter}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{ViFe:99AG, author = {Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {A General Robust Approach to the Analysis of Income Distribution, Inequalityand Poverty}, institution = {Universit{\'e} de Gen{\`e}ve}, year = {1999}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {Geneva, Switzerland}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{ViFe:97, author = {Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {A Robust Test for Non-Nested Hypotheses}, journal = {Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B}, year = {1997}, volume = {59}, pages = {715-727}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{ViFe:94a, author = {Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Robust Estimates of Income Distribution Models}, institution = {London School of Economics}, year = {1994}, type = {{DARP} Discussion Paper no 4, {STICERD}}, address = {London WC2A 2AE, {UK}}, key = {STATISTICS} } @PHDTHESIS{ViFe:93, author = {Victoria-Feser, M.-P.}, title = {Robust Methods for Personal Income Distribution Models}, school = {University of Geneva}, year = {1993}, address = {Switzerland}, note = {Thesis no 384}, key = {STATISTICS} } @TECHREPORT{VFDu:03, author = {Victoria-Feser, M.-P. and Dupuis, D.}, title = {A Prediction Error Criterion for Choosing the Lower Quantile in {P}aretoIndex Estimation}, institution = {University of Geneva}, year = {2003}, type = {Working paper}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{VFRo:97, author = {Victoria-Feser, Maria-Pia and Ronchetti, Elvezio}, title = {Robust Estimation for Grouped Data}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1997}, volume = {92}, pages = {333-340}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{VFRo:96a, author = {Victoria-Feser, M.-P. and Ronchetti, E.}, title = {Robust Estimation for Grouped Data}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1996}, note = {Under revision}, key = {STATISTICS} } @TECHREPORT{VFRo:96b, author = {Victoria-Feser, M.-P. and Ronchetti, E.}, title = {Robust Testing for Grouped Data}, institution = {London School of Economics}, year = {1996}, type = {Working paper}, address = {London WC2A 2AE}, key = {STATISTICS} } @ARTICLE{VFRo:94RM, author = {Victoria-Feser, M.-P. and Ronchetti, E.}, title = {Robust Methods for Personal Income Distribution Models}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Statistics}, year = {1994}, volume = {22}, pages = {247-258}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{ViOw:06, author = {Videras, J. and Owen, A.}, title = {Public Goods Provision and Well-Being: Empirical Evidence Consistent with the Warm Glow Theory}, journal = {Contributions to Economic Analysis \& Policy}, year = {2006}, volume = {5}, pages = {1-38}, abstract = {Using a broad multi-country sample, we find that individuals who contribute to the public good of environmental protection report higher levels of life satisfaction and happiness. We show that this result is robust to the use of an instrumental variables technique and provide several pieces of evidence that this positive relationship between contributions and well-being is due to a warmglow motive. First, well-being does not increase proportionally with contributions, consistent with the warm-glow model that it is the act of giving that generates utility. Second, individuals who think of themselves as socially responsible derive greater satisfaction from their contribution to environmental protection as would be the case if the contribution reinforces a favorable self image. Interestingly, conforming to a social norm may be a motivation for some individuals, but the presence of this motive depends on individual attitudes towards social responsibility. Among those who express the highest level of social responsibility, conforming to the norm makes them less satisfied with life. However, individuals with a moderate level of social responsibility do report higher levels of happiness when their public goods contributions conform to societal norms.}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{Viei:99, author = {Vieira, J. A. C.}, title = {Returns to Education in Portugal}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {535-541}, key = {education, training} } @ARTICLE{Vill:05, author = {Villanueva, E.}, title = {Gifts and Bequests: Inter Vivos Transfers and Beguests in three {OECD} Countries}, journal = {Economic Policy}, year = {2005}, volume = {43}, pages = {505-565}, abstract = {Reforms reducing the generosity of pensions have distributional effects on future generations if individuals care about their descendants’ welfare, but only affect elderly individuals if bequests are the unintentional result of precautionary savings. And safety-net programmes such as unemployment insurance may displace sources of private help, such as that provided by living parents to their children in need. This paper provides comparable measures of how expected bequests and transfers vary with cumulated parental earnings in the United States, West Germany and the United Kingdom. The strength of bequest motives is empirically very weak in the available data. Private inter vivos transfers, which appear to depend on the recipients’ economic situation, are partly crowded out by public unemployment insurance programmes. Together, involuntary bequests and intentional inter vivos transfers appear to be an important channel of intergenerational transmission, and strengthen substantially the relationship between an individual’s and his parents’ economic status.}, key = {macro}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{ViAr:89, author = {Villase{\~n}or, J. A. and Arnold, B. C.}, title = {Elliptical {L}orenz Curves}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1989}, volume = {40}, pages = {327-338}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Vinc:21, author = {Vinci, F.}, title = {Nuovi Contributi allo Studio della Distribuzione dei Redditi}, journal = {Giornale degli Economisti e Rivista di Statistica}, year = {1921}, volume = {18}, pages = {309-348}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Virm:89, author = {Virmani, A.}, title = {Indirect Tax Evasion and Production Inefficiency}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1989}, volume = {39}, pages = {223-237}, key = {Tax compliance - firms} } @TECHREPORT{Virm:87, author = {Virmani, Arvind}, title = {Tax Evasion, Corruption and Administration: Monitoring the People's Agentsunder Symmetric Dishonesty}, institution = {The World Bank}, year = {1987}, number = {87-10}, journal = {Provisional Papers in Public Economics}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Visc:05, author = {Viscusi, W.}, title = {The Value of Life}, institution = {John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business}, year = {2005}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {517}, address = {Cogan Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, Hauser 302, Cambridge, MA 02138}, month = {June}, abstract = {The economic approach to valuing risks to life focuses on risk-money tradeoffs for very small risks of death, or the value of statistical life (VSL). These VSL levels will generally exceed the optimal insurance amounts. A substantial literature has estimated the wage-fatality risk tradeoffs, implying a median VSL of $7 million for U.S. workers. International evidence often indicates a lower VSL, which is consistent with the lower income levels in less developed countries. Preference heterogeneity also generates different tradeoff rates across the population as people who are more willing to bear risk will exhibit lower wage-risk tradeoffs.}, key = {welfare, utility}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.07.03} } @ARTICLE{Visc:93, author = {Viscusi, W. K.}, title = {The Value of Risks to Life and Health}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {1993}, volume = {31}, pages = {1912-1946}, key = {health} } @BOOK{Visc:92, title = {Fatal tradeoffs: public and private responsibilities for risk}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1992}, author = {Viscusi, W. K.}, address = {New York}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{Visc:91, author = {Viscusi, W. K.}, title = {Age Variations in Risk Perceptions and Smoking Decisions}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {1991}, volume = {73}, pages = {577-588}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{Visc:90DS, author = {Viscusi, W. K.}, title = {Do Smokers Underestimate Risks?}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1990}, volume = {98}, pages = {1253-1269}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{Visc:90SO, author = {Viscusi, W. K.}, title = {Sources of Inconsistency in Societal Responses to Health Risks}, journal = {American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings}, year = {1990}, volume = {80}, pages = {257-261}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{ViEv:90, author = {Viscusi, W. K. and Evans, W. N.}, title = {Utility Functions That Depend on Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implications}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1990}, volume = {80}, pages = {353-374}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{Vita:77, author = {Vitaliano, D. F.}, title = {The Tax Sacrifice Rules under Alternate Definitions of Progressivity}, journal = {Public Finance Quarterly}, year = {1977}, volume = {5}, pages = {489-94}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Vive:05, author = {Vives, X.}, title = {Complementarities and games: New developments.}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2005}, volume = {43}, pages = {437-479}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{Vives2005, author = {Vives, Xavier}, title = {Complementarities and Games: New Developments}, journal = {Journal of Economic Literature}, year = {2005}, volume = {XLIII}, pages = {437-479}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{Vive:99, title = {Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {1999}, author = {Vives, X.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{Voge:74, author = {Vogel, J.}, title = {Taxation and public opinion in Sweden: an interpretation of recent surveydata}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1974}, volume = {27}, pages = {499-513}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Vogel1974, author = {Vogel, J.}, title = {Taxation and public opinion in Sweden: an interpretation of recent survey data}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1974}, volume = {27}, pages = {499-513}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{VonW:78, author = {Von Weizs{\"a}cker, C. C.}, title = {Annual income lifetime income and other income concepts in measuring incomedistribution}, booktitle = {Personal Income Distribution}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1978}, editor = {Krelle, W. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Hard:91, title = {Smoothing techniques. {W}ith implementation in {S}}, publisher = {Sringer Verlag, New York}, year = {1991}, author = {H{\"a}rdle W.}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{WPHa:98, author = {{Waddams Price}, C. and Hancock, R.}, title = {Distributional Effects of Liberalising {UK} Residential Utility Markets}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {19}, pages = {295-319}, key = {redistribution} } @INCOLLECTION{Wagn:78, author = {Wagner, M.}, title = {On comparison of distribution processes}, booktitle = {Personal Income Distribution}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1978}, editor = {Krelle, W. and Shorrocks, A. F.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Wags:02, author = {Wagstaff, A.}, title = {Inequality aversion, health inequalities and health achievement}, journal = {Journal of Health Economics}, year = {2002}, volume = {21}, pages = {627-641}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{WDBC:99, author = {Adam Wagstaff and Eddy Van Doorslaer and Hattem Van der Burg and Samuel Calonge and Terkel Christiansen and Guido Citoni and Ulf-G. Gerdtham andMichael Gerfin and Lorna Gross and Unto Hakinnen and Jurgen John and PaulJohnson and Jan Klavus and Claire Lachaud and Jorgen Lauridsen and Robert E. Leu and Brian Nolan and Encarna Peran and Carol Propper and Frank Pufferand Lise Rochaix and Marisol Rodriguez and Martin Schellhorn and Gun Sundbergand Olaf Winkelhake}, title = {Redistributive Effect, Progressivity and Differential Tax Treatment: PersonalIncome Taxes in Twelve {OECD} Countries}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {72}, pages = {73-98}, number = {1}, abstract = {This paper decomposes the redistributive effect of the personal income taxes (PITs) of twelve OECD countries into four components: (i) an average rate effect, (ii) a departurefrom- proportionality or progressivity effect, (iii) a horizontal equity effect and (iv) a reranking effect. The product of (i) and (ii) indicates the vertical redistribution associated with the PIT and the sum of (iii) and (iv) indicates the impact on the distribution of income of differential tax treatment. The average tax rate is found to be low in France and high in the Nordic countries, and the PIT is found to be most progressive in France, Ireland and Spain, and least progressive in Denmark and Sweden. Taking (i) and (ii) together, Denmark and the US achieve broadly similar levels of vertical redistributive effect. Differential treatment is found to have a much smaller effect on income redistribution (as a proportion of redistributive effect) than the vertical redistribution caused by progressivity, though there are differences between countries. These differences appear to be due principally to a different emphasis on deductions, such as tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments and insurance premiums, and on local income tax.}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{WaDo:01, author = {Wagstaff, A. and Van Doorslaer, E.}, title = {What Makes the Personal Income Tax Progressive? A Comparative Analysis for Fifteen {OECD} Countries}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {2001}, volume = {8}, pages = {299-316}, abstract = {In this paper, we explore the roles of tax credits, rate structures, allowancesand deductions in determining the overall progressivity of net income taxliabilities in fifteen OECD countries. Three clusters emerge: (i) the rate-structurecountries, Australia, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, where therate effect is the dominant (but not the only) source of progressivityof gross and net tax liabilities; (ii) the allowance countries, the English-speakingcountries other than Australia, where allowances are the dominant sourceof progressivity; and (iii) the mixed structure countries, Belgium, Finland,Germany and Sweden, where roughly half of the progressivity of gross taxliabilities is attributable to the rate structure.}, key = {taxation} } @INCOLLECTION{Wahl:89, author = {Wahlund, Richard}, title = {Perception aqnd {J}udgment of {M}arginal {T}ax {R}ates {A}fter a {T}ax {R}eduction}, booktitle = {Understanding {E}conomic {B}ehaviour}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, year = {1989}, editor = {Grunert, Klaus G. and Olander, Folke}, pages = {135-179}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{Wakk:04, author = {Wakker,P.}, title = {Decision-foundations for properties of nonadditive measures: general statespaces or general outcome spaces}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, year = {2005}, volume = {50}, pages = {107-125}, abstract = {This paper characterizes properties of chance attitudes (nonadditive measures).It does so for decision under uncertainty (unknown probabilities), whereit assumes Choquet expected utility, and for decision under risk (knownprobabilities), where it assumes rank-dependent utility. It analyzes chanceattitude independently from utility. All preference conditions concernsimple violations of the sure-thing principle. Earlier results along theselines assumed richness of both outcomes and events. This paper generalizessuch results to general state spaces as in Schmeidler’s model of Choquetexpected utility, and to general outcome spaces as in Gilboa’s model ofChoquet expected utility.}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Wakk:93, author = {Wakker, Peter}, title = {Additive representations on rank-ordered sets: II. The topological approach}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1993}, volume = {22}, pages = {1-26}, number = {1}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Wakker2002, author = {Wakker, P. P. and Zank, H.}, title = {A Simple Preference Foundation of Cumulative Prospect Theory with Power Utility}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2002}, volume = {46}, pages = {1253-1271}, key = {Utility, preference}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{WaZa:02, author = {Wakker, P. P. and Zank, H.}, title = {A Simple Preference Foundation of Cumulative Prospect Theory with PowerUtility}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2002}, volume = {46}, pages = {1253-1271}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{Wakker1999, author = {Wakker, Peter P. and Zank, Horst}, title = {A unified derivation of classical subjective expected utility Models through cardinal utility}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {1-19}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{WaZa:99, author = {Wakker, Peter P. and Zank, Horst}, title = {A unified derivation of classical subjective expected utility Models throughcardinal utility}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {1-19}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Wald:00, author = {Walde, K.}, title = {Egalitarian and Elitist Education Systems as the Basis for InternationalDifferences in Wage Inequality}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2000}, volume = {16}, pages = {445-468}, key = {Education, training} } @ARTICLE{Walde2000, author = {Walde, K.}, title = {Egalitarian and Elitist Education Systems as the Basis for International Differences in Wage Inequality}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2000}, volume = {16}, pages = {445-468}, key = {Education, training}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Wald:77, author = {Waldman, L. K.}, title = {Types and measures of inequality}, journal = {Social Science Quarterly}, year = {1977}, volume = {58}, pages = {229-241}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Walk:07, author = {Walker, Douglas}, title = {Patterns of income distribution among world region}, journal = {Journal of Policy Modeling}, year = {2007}, volume = {29}, pages = {643 - 655}, abstract = {Individual country ratios of income shares of the highest 20 percent of income recipients to that of the lowest 20 percent are reviewed to identify proximate relationships between key economic variables and broad patterns of income inequality across the world. First, the importance of the question of the relationship between income distribution and economic development is highlighted. Second, the Kuznets inverted U hypothesis suggesting a relationship during the process of development between the degree of inequality in income distribution and the level of per capita income is summarized. Then, statistical and other problems that arise when measuring income distribution and considering changes taking place in income inequality are discussed. Finally, patterns of income distribution in a large sample of countries are presented with the view to identifying relationships between income inequality and levels of living, rates of growth, and world regions. Income distribution patterns are found to be diverse across countries and unrelated in any obvious way to per capita GDP or the rate of GDP growth. Some limited relationship may be seen when the country data are arranged by geographic region. These results imply that there is no inherent conflict between the objective of faster economic growth and that of a more even distribution of income over the longer-term.}, key = {Inequality}, keywords = {Poverty; Growth; Inequality; Kuznets inverted U hypothesis; Income distribution}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{Walk:86, author = {Walker, M.}, title = {The Waking Giant}, year = {1986}, address = {London}, key = {politics}, publisher = {Abacus Press} } @ARTICLE{Walk:81, author = {Walker, M.}, title = {A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1981}, volume = {49}, pages = {65-71}, key = {Public goods} } @ARTICLE{WaWi:97, author = {Walker, Robert and Wiseman, Michael}, title = {The possibility of {B}ritish Earned income tax credit}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1997}, volume = {18}, pages = {401-425}, number = {4}, month = {November}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Wall:88, title = {The Effects of Tax Reform on Tax Evasion}, publisher = {Australian Tax Research Foundation}, year = {1988}, author = {Wallschutzky, I. G.}, address = {Sydney}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Wall:84, author = {Wallschutzky, I. G.}, title = {Possible causes of tax evasion}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1984}, volume = {5}, pages = {371-384}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{WaDi:01, author = {Wallsten, T. S. and Diederich, A.}, title = {Understanding Pooled Subjective Probability Estimates}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {2001}, volume = {41}, pages = {1-18}, key = {statistics} } @BOOK{Walr:54, title = {Elements of Pure Economics}, publisher = {Allen and Unwin}, year = {1954}, author = {Walras, L.}, address = {London}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Wan:07, author = {Wan, G.}, title = {Understanding Regional Poverty and Inequality Trends in China: Methodological Issues and Empirical Findings}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2007}, volume = {53}, pages = {25-34}, abstract = {This paper focuses on methodological and empirical issues in analyzing regional poverty and inequality trends in China. It provides a time profile of China’s regional inequality, outlines the latest development in inequality decomposition techniques, introduces six papers in this special issue of the Review, and finally offers suggestions for future research.}, key = {income inequality: empirical}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{WaLuCh:07, author = {Wan, G. and Lu, M. and Chen, Z.}, title = {Globalization and Regional Income Inequality: Empirical Evidence from within China}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2007}, volume = {53}, pages = {35-59}, abstract = {China’s recent accession to the WTO is expected to accelerate its integration into the world economy, which aggravates concerns over the impact of globalization on the already rising inter-region income inequality in China. This paper discusses China’s globalization process and estimates an income generating function, incorporating trade and FDI variables. It then applies the newly developed Shapley value decomposition technique to quantify the contributions of globalization, along with other variables, to regional inequality. It is found that: (a) globalization constitutes a positive and substantial share of regional inequality and the share rises over time; (b) domestic capital, however, emerges as the largest contributor to regional inequality; (c) economic reform characterized by privatization exerts an increasingly significant impact on regional inequality; and (d) the relative contributions of education, location, urbanization and dependency ratio to regional inequality have been declining.}, key = {income inequality: empirical}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{WaZh:05, author = {Wan,G. and Zhou,Z.}, title = {Income Inequality in Rural China: Regression-based Decomposition Using Household Data}, journal = {Review of Development Economics}, year = {2005}, volume = {9}, pages = {107-120}, abstract = {A considerable literature exists on the measurement of income inequalityin China and its increasing trend. Much less is known about the drivingforces of this trend and their quantitative contributions. Conventionaldecompositions, by factor components or by population subgroups, provideonly limited information on the determinants of income inequality. Thispaper represents an early attempt to apply the regression-based decompositionframework to the study of inequality accounting in rural China, using household-leveldata. It is found that geography has been the dominant factor but is becomingless important in explaining total inequality. Capital input emerges asa most significant determinant of income inequality. Farming structureis more important than labor and other inputs in contributing to incomeinequality across households.}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @TECHREPORT{Wan:02, author = {Wan, G. H.}, title = {Regression-based Inequality Decomposition: Pitfalls and a Solution Procedure}, institution = {World Institute for Development Economics Research}, year = {2002}, number = {2002/101}, abstract = {This paper explores pitfalls in regression-based inequality decompositions. A simple procedure is developed for rectifying these pitfalls. The procedure does not impose any restrictions on the underlying regression model and it can be applied to any inequality measure(s). Once combined with conventional decomposition methods or the Shapley value approach of Shorrocks (1999), what is being proposed becomes a most general and powerful framework for regression-based inequality decomposition. Empirical examples are provided to demonstrate the use of the procedure, and to contrast our results with those based on recent developments of Fields and Yoo (2000) and Morduch and Sicular (2002).}, key = {inequality decomposition}, owner = {Frank}, timestamp = {2008.09.07}, url = {http://62.237.131.23/publications/dps/dps2002/dp2002-101.pdf} } @ARTICLE{WaMaRu:91, author = {Wand, M. P. and Marron, J. S. and Ruppert, D.}, title = {transformations in density estimation}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1991}, volume = {86}, pages = {343-361}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Wane:01, author = {Wane, W.}, title = {The Optimal Income Tax When Poverty is a Public 'Bad'}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {82}, pages = {271-299}, abstract = {Poverty is considered as an aggregate negative externality that may affectpeople differently depending on their aversion to poverty. If society ison average averse to poverty, then the optimal income tax schedule displaysnegative marginal tax rates at least for the less skilled individuals.Negative marginal tax rates play the role of a Pigouvian earnings subsidyand foster the supply of labor of poor individuals. The no-distortion atthe endpoints result which is therefore violated can be restored once thefocus is shifted from individual to social distortions.}, key = {optimal taxation} } @ARTICLE{Wang1990, author = {Wang, L. F. S.}, title = {Tax Evasion and Monopoly Output Decisions with Endogenous Probability of Detection}, journal = {Public Finance Quarterly}, year = {1990}, volume = {18}, pages = {480-487}, key = {Tax compliance - firms}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Wang:90, author = {Wang, L. F. S.}, title = {Tax Evasion and Monopoly Output Decisions with Endogenous Probability ofDetection}, journal = {Public Finance Quarterly}, year = {1990}, volume = {18}, pages = {480-487}, key = {Tax compliance - firms} } @ARTICLE{WaCo:88, author = {Wang, L. F. S. and Conant, J. L.}, title = {Corporate Tax Evasion and Output Decisions of the Uncertain Monopolist}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1988}, volume = {41}, pages = {579-81}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{WaWe:98, author = {Wang, Ruqu and Weiss, Andrew}, title = {Probation, layoffs and wage-tenure profiles: a sorting explanation}, journal = {Labour Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {5}, pages = {359-383}, number = {3}, key = {wages} } @ARTICLE{WaYo:98, author = {Wang, Shaun S. and Young, Virginia R.}, title = {Ordering risks: Expected utility theory versus {Y}aari's dual theory ofrisk}, journal = {Insurance: Mathematics and Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {22}, pages = {145-161}, number = {2}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{WaKa:00, author = {Wang, Y. and Kai-{Y}uen, T.}, title = {Polarization Orderings and New Classes of Polarization Indices}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2000}, volume = {2}, pages = {349-363}, key = {polarisation}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.14} } @ARTICLE{WaTs:00PO, author = {Wang, Y.-Q. and Tsui, K.-Y.}, title = {Polarization orderings and new classes of polarization indices}, journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory}, year = {2000}, volume = {2}, pages = {349-363}, key = {polarisation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.04.25} } @ARTICLE{Warr:82, author = {Warr, P.}, title = {Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private Charity}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1982}, volume = {19}, pages = {131-138}, key = {Redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Warr1983, author = {Warr, Peter G.}, title = {The private provision of a pure public good is independent of the distribution of income}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1983}, volume = {13}, pages = {207-211}, key = {public goods}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Warr:83, author = {Warr, Peter G.}, title = {The private provision of a pure public good is independent of the distributionof income}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1983}, volume = {13}, pages = {207-211}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{Wats:00, author = {Watson, D.}, title = {In Search of the Poor}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {2000}, volume = {21}, pages = {495-515}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Wats:85, author = {Watson, H.}, title = {Tax evasion and labor markets}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1985}, volume = {27}, pages = {235-246}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{Watt:68, author = {Watts, H. W.}, title = {An economic definition of poverty}, booktitle = {Understanding Poverty}, publisher = {Basic Books}, year = {1968}, editor = {Moynihan, D. P.}, chapter = {11}, pages = {316-329}, address = {New York}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Watt:67, author = {Watts, H. W.}, title = {The iso-prop index: an approach to the determination of differential povertyincome thresholds}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1967}, volume = {2}, pages = {3-18}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Watts1967, author = {Watts, H. W.}, title = {The iso-prop index: an approach to the determination of differential poverty income thresholds}, journal = {Journal of Human Resources}, year = {1967}, volume = {2}, pages = {3-18}, key = {POVERTY}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Waud1988, author = {Waud, R. N.}, title = {Tax aversion, optimal tax rates, and indexation}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1988}, volume = {43}, pages = {310-325}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Waud:88, author = {Waud, R. N.}, title = {Tax aversion, optimal tax rates and indexation}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1988}, volume = {43}, pages = {310-325}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{Weat:49, title = {A First Course in Mathematical Statistics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1949}, author = {Weatherburn, C. E.}, address = {London}, edition = {2nd}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Webe:98, author = {Weber, Christian E.}, title = {A note on {L}agrange multipliers with several binding constraints}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1998}, volume = {59}, pages = {71-75}, number = {1}, key = {mathematics} } @ARTICLE{WeHs:98, author = {Weber, E. U. and Hsee, C.}, title = {Cross-Cultural Differences in Risk Perception, but Cross-Cultural Similarities in Attitudes towards Perceived Risk}, journal = {Management Science}, year = {1998}, volume = {44}, pages = {1205-1217}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.04.20} } @ARTICLE{Weber1997, author = {Weber, Elke U. and Kirsner, Britt}, title = {Reasons for rank-dependent utility evaluation}, journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty}, year = {1997}, volume = {14}, pages = {41-61}, key = {uncertainty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Webe:75, author = {Max Weber}, title = {Marginal Utility Theory and "The Fundemental Law of Psychophysics}, journal = {Social Science Quarterly}, year = {1975}, volume = {56}, pages = {21-36}, number = {1}, key = {Utility, preference} } @ARTICLE{Weber2001, author = {Weber, Roberto A.}, title = {Behavior and Learning in the Dirty Faces Game}, journal = {Experimental Economics}, year = {2001}, volume = {4}, pages = {229--242}, number = {3}, owner = {rbayer01}, timestamp = {2006.12.22} } @ARTICLE{Webl:87, author = {Webley, P.}, title = {Audit probabilities and tax evasion in a business simulation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1987}, volume = {25}, pages = {267-270}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{WeHa:86, author = {Webley, P. and Halstead, S.}, title = {Tax Evasion on the Micro: Significant Simulations or Expedient Experiments?}, journal = {The Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {1}, pages = {87-100}, key = {tax evasion} } @INPROCEEDINGS{WeMoAm:85, author = {Webley, P. and Morris, I. and Amstutz, F.}, title = {Tax Evasion During a Small Business Simulation}, year = {1985}, organization = {Economic Psychology, Proceedings of the Tenth IAREP Annual Colloquium}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{Webley1991, title = {Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1991}, author = {Webley, P. and Robben, H. and Elffers, H. and Hessing , K.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{WeRoElHe:91, author = {Webley, P. and Robben, H. and Elffers, H. and Hessing , K.}, title = {Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach}, year = {1991}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {tax evasion}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} } @ARTICLE{WeRoMo:88, author = {Webley, P. and Robben, H. S. J. and Morris, I.}, title = {Social comparison, attitudes and tax evasion in a shop simulation}, journal = {Social Behaviour}, year = {1988}, volume = {3}, pages = {219-228}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{WePoFr:84, title = {Schattenwirtschaft}, publisher = {Vahlen}, year = {1984}, author = {Weck, H., Pommerehne, W. W. and Frey, B. S.}, address = {Munich}, key = {underground} } @TECHREPORT{WHPo:88, author = {Weck-Hanneman, H. and Pommerehne, W. W.}, title = {Steuerbelastung, {F}inanzkontrolle und {S}teuerhinterziehung: eine empirische{A}nalyse}, year = {1988}, type = {mimeo}, key = {tax evasion} } @INCOLLECTION{WeFr:85, author = {Weck-Hannemann, H. and Frey, B. S.}, title = {Measuring the Shadow Economy: the case of {S}witzerland}, booktitle = {The Economics of the Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1985}, editor = {Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A.}, address = {Berlin, Germany}, key = {underground} } @BOOK{Wedd:74, title = {Poverty inequality and class structure}, publisher = {Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press}, year = {1974}, author = {Wedderburn, D.}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Wees:90, author = {Weesie, J.}, title = {Participation in Voluntary Organizations and Group Size}, journal = {Rationality and Society}, year = {1990}, volume = {2}, pages = {35-66}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{Weic:04, author = {Weichenrieder, Alfons J.}, title = {Second Degree Price Discrimination and Natural Monopoly}, journal = {Bulletin of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, volume = {56}, pages = {189-200}, number = {2}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{WeHeEl:86, author = {Weigel, R. H., Hessing, D. J. and Elffers, W.}, title = {Tax evasion research: a critical appraisal and theoretical model}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1986}, volume = {8}, pages = {215-235}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Weim:94, author = {Weimann, J.}, title = {Individual behaviour in a free riding experiment}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1994}, volume = {54}, pages = {185-200}, key = {economic psychology} } @TECHREPORT{Wein:96, author = {Weinberg, D. H.}, title = {A brief look at {US} postwar income inequality}, institution = {Census Bureau}, year = {1996}, type = {Current Population Reports: Household Economic Studies}, number = {P60-191}, address = {Washington DC}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @INCOLLECTION{Weis:97, author = {Weis,Y.}, title = {The formation and dissolution of families: Why marry? Who marries whom?and what happens upon marriage and divorce}, booktitle = {Handbook of Population and Family Economics}, publisher = {North Holland, Amsterdam}, year = {1997}, editor = {Rosenzweig, M. R. and Stark, O.}, pages = {81-123}, key = {population economics} } @TECHREPORT{Weis:07AW, author = {Weisbach, David}, title = {A Welfarist Approach to Disabilities}, institution = {University of Chicago Law School}, year = {2007}, abstract = {This paper uses the tools of optimal tax theory to examine policy toward individuals with disabilities from a welfarist perspective. Policy toward the disabled depends on how a given disability affects welfare. Under reasonable assumptions, redistribution toward individuals with disabilities is desirable, but the extent and form depends on a variety of factors. If disabilities are observable, adjustments to the income tax schedule should be preferred. If disabilities are not observable, commodity taxes or in-kind provision of certain goods (such as accommodations) may be desirable to solve screening problems. In this case, inefficient over-supply of these goods is likely to be optimal. Finally, to the extent needs of the disabled are public goods, supply of such goods may be desirable (even if disabilities are observable).}, key = {Welfare}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @TECHREPORT{Weis:07WD, author = {Weisbach, D.A.}, title = {What Does Happiness Research Tell Us about Taxation?}, institution = {University of Chicago Law school}, year = {2007}, type = {Working paper}, number = {342}, abstract = {This paper analyzes the consequences of the findings from research into self-reported well being or happiness for taxation. It primarily considers two findings: that happiness depends on status as well as income, and that individuals may adapt to disability, exhibiting relatively small losses in happiness from disabilities. In each case, it examines how adding these concerns to standard tax models changes the results and then compares the empirical findings of the happiness literature to see whether they provide the type of data needed to parameterize the models. In both cases, the theoretical models ask for different types of data than the happiness studies emphasize. The paper also looks at Robert Frank’s arguments for a progressive consumption tax based on the findings of the happiness research. It finds that these claims are not supported by the current findings.}, key = {taxation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{WeHa:68, author = {Weisbrod, B. A. and Hansen, W. L.}, title = {An Income-Net Worth Approach to Measuring Economic Welfare}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1968}, volume = {58}, pages = {1315-1329.}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Weis:76, author = {Weiss, L.}, title = {The desirability of cheating incentives and randomness in the optimal incometax}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1976}, volume = {84}, pages = {1343-1352}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Weiss1976, author = {Weiss, L.}, title = {The desirability of cheating incentives and randomness in the optimal income tax}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1976}, volume = {84}, pages = {1343-1352}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Weis:72, author = {Weiss, Y.}, title = {The Risk Element in Occupational and Educational Choices}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1972}, volume = {80}, pages = {1203-1213}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Weit:92, author = {Weitzman, M.}, title = {On Diversity}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1992}, volume = {107}, pages = {363-405}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.16} } @ARTICLE{Weit:00, author = {Weitzman, M. L.}, title = {An `economics proof' of the supporting hyperplane theorem}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {1-6}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Weit:98OT, author = {Weitzman, Martin L.}, title = {On the welfare significance of national product under interest-rate uncertainty}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {1581-1594}, number = {8}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Weit:98TN, author = {Weitzman, Martin L.}, title = {The {N}oah's ark problem}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1998}, volume = {66}, pages = {1279-1298}, number = {6}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Weit:77, author = {Weitzmann, M. L.}, title = {Is the Price System or Rationing More Effective in Getting a Commodity toThose Who Need It Most?}, journal = {Bell Journal of Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {8}, pages = {517-524}, key = {consumption} } @ARTICLE{Weitzmann1977, author = {Weitzmann, M. L.}, title = {Is the Price System or Rationing More Effective in Getting a Commodity to Those Who Need It Most?}, journal = {Bell Journal of Economics}, year = {1977}, volume = {8}, pages = {517-524}, key = {consumption}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Welc:99, author = {Welch, F.}, title = {In Defense of Inequality}, journal = {American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Eleventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association)}, year = {1999}, volume = {89}, pages = {1-17}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @INCOLLECTION{Weln:03, author = {Welniak, E. J.}, title = {Measuring Household Income Inequality Using the {CPS}}, booktitle = {Special Studies in Federal Tax Statistics 2003.}, publisher = {Statistics of Income Directorate, Inland Revenue Service}, year = {2003}, editor = {Dalton, J. and Kilss, B.}, address = {Washington DC}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.10} } @INCOLLECTION{WeRi:97, author = {Welsh, A. H. and Richardson, A. M.}, title = {Approaches to the Robust Estimation of Mixed Models}, booktitle = {Handbook of Statistics}, publisher = {Elsevier Science B.V.}, year = {1997}, editor = {Maddala, G. S. and Rao, C. R.}, volume = {15}, chapter = {13}, pages = {343-384}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {statistics} } @INCOLLECTION{Wenk:99, author = {Wenke, M.}, title = {Time Use, Sustainable Consumption and Environmental Protection Measuresof Private Households - Some Aspects of Combining National Accounts andTime Use Data}, booktitle = {Time Use - Research Data and Policy}, publisher = {NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft}, year = {1999}, editor = {Merz, J. and Ehling, M.}, pages = {179-194}, address = {Baden Baden}, key = {time use} } @ARTICLE{WeTa:04, author = {Wenzel,M. and Taylor,N.}, title = {An experimental evaluation of tax-reporting schedules: a case of evidence-basedtax administration}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {2785-2799}, abstract = {In an experiment in collaboration with the Australian Taxation Office (ATO),rental property schedules (RPS) were sent to taxpayers for them to itemizetheir deductions and return the RPS to the ATO. The intervention significantlyreduced deductions compared to taxpayers who did not have to return theRPS, taxpayers who received only an information letter, and a no-contactcontrol group- regardless of a cooperative versus deterring letter toneand first-time versus second-time participation of taxpayers. The studysheds light on the mechanisms underlying the effects of tax-reporting schedulesand highlights the importance of systematic experimental fieldwork in evaluatingregulatory strategies.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Wert:79, author = {Wertz, K.}, title = {Allocation by and output of a tax administering agency}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1979}, volume = {32}, pages = {143-157}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{West:88, author = {West, K.D.}, title = {The insensitivity of consumption to news about income}, journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics}, year = {1988}, volume = {21}, pages = {17-33}, abstract = {This paper uses a variance bounds test to see whether consumption is too sensitive to news about income to be consistent with a standard permanent income model, under the maintained hypothesis that income has a unit root. It is found that, if anything, consumption is less sensitive than the model would predict. This implication is robust to the representative consumer having private information about his future income that the econometrician does not have, to wealth shocks, and to transitory consumption. This suggests the importance in future research on the model of allowing for factors that tend to make consumption smooth.}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.08.23} } @INCOLLECTION{Weym:94, author = {Weymark, J.}, title = {Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem with alternative {P}areto principle}, booktitle = {Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Springer}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {welfare} } @INCOLLECTION{Weym:91, author = {Weymark, J.}, title = {A reconsideration of the {H}arsanyi-{S}en debate on utilitarianism}, booktitle = {Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press, Cambridge}, year = {1991}, editor = {Elster, J. and Roemer, J. E.}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Weym:95, author = {Weymark, J.}, title = {Further remarks on {H}arsanyi's social aggregation theorem and the weak{P}areto principle}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1995}, volume = {12}, pages = {87-92}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Weymark1995, author = {Weymark, J.}, title = {Further remarks on {H}arsanyi's social aggregation theorem and the weak {P}areto principle}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1995}, volume = {12}, pages = {87-92}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Weym:93, author = {Weymark, J.}, title = {{H}arsanyi's social aggregation theorem and the weak {P}areto principle}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1993}, volume = {10}, pages = {209-221}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Weym:98, author = {Weymark, John A.}, title = {Welfarism on economic domains}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1998}, volume = {36}, pages = {251-268}, number = {3}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Weym:81, author = {Weymark, J. A.}, title = {Generalized {G}ini inequality indices}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1981}, volume = {1}, pages = {409-430}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{WhZh:04, author = {Whalley,J. and Zhang,S.}, title = {Inequality change in China and (HUKOU) Labour mobility restrictions}, institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research}, year = {2004}, abstract = {We analyze the Hukou system of permanent registration in China which manybelieve has supported growing relative inequality over the last 20 yearsby restraining labour migration both between the countryside and urbanareas and between regions and cities. Our aim is to inject economic modellinginto the debate on sources of inequality in China which thus far has beenlargely statistical. We first use a model with homogeneous labour in whichwage inequality across various geographical divides in China is supportedsolely by quantity based migration restrictions (urban -- rural areas,rich -- poor regions, eastern coastal -- central and western (noncoastal)zones, eastern and central -- western development zones, eastern -- central-- western zones, more disaggregated 6 regional classifications, and anall 31 provincal classification). We calibrate this model to base casedata and when we remove migration restrictions all wage and most incomeinequality disappears. Results from this model structure point to a significantrole for Hukou restrictions in supporting inequality in China, and showhow economic rather than statistical modelling can be used to decomposeinequality change. We then modify the model to capture labour efficiencydifferences across regions, calibrating the modified model to estimatesof both national and regional Gini coefficients. Removal of migration barriersis again inequality improving but now less so. Finally, we present a furthermodel extension in which urban house price rises retard rural - urban migration.The impacts of removing of migration restrictions on inequality are smaller,but are still significant.}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{WhMa:06, author = {Whelan, C. T. and Ma{\^i}tre, B.}, title = {Comparing poverty and deprivation dynamics: {I}ssues of reliability and validity}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2006}, volume = {4}, pages = {303-323}, abstract = {In this paper we seek to establish if earlier findings relating to the relationship between income poverty persistence and deprivation persistence could be due to a failure to take measurement error into account. To address this question, we apply a model of dynamics incorporating structural and error components. Our analysis shows a general similarity between latent poverty and deprivation dynamics. In both cases we substantially over-estimate the probability of exiting from poverty or deprivation. We observe a striking similarity across dimensions for both observed and latent outcomes. In both cases levels of poverty and deprivation persistence are higher for the latent case. However, there is no evidence that earlier results relating to the differences in the determinants of poverty and deprivation persistence are a consequence of differential patterns of reliability. Taking measurement error into account seems more likely to accentuate rather than diminish the contrasts highlighted by earlier research. Since longitudinal differences relating to poverty and deprivation cannot be accounted for by measurement error, it seems that we must accept that we are confronted with issues relating to validity rather than reliability. Even where we measure these dimensions over reasonable periods of time and allow for measurement error, they continue to tap relatively distinct phenomenon. Thus, if measures of persistent poverty are to constitute an important component of EU social indicators, a strong case can be made for including parallel measures of deprivation persistence and continuing to explore the relationship between them.}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2006.12.13} } @ARTICLE{Whit:07, author = {Whitaker,R.B.}, title = {Three Perspectives on Government Run Lotteries: State Lotteries and Agency Costs: Hidden Costs to Nonparticipants}, journal = {American Journal of Economics and Sociology}, year = {2007}, volume = {66}, pages = {533-544}, number = {3}, month = {July}, abstract = {Some nonparticipants support lotteries because they expect the lottery will shift a portion of their tax burden to participants. The principal-agent model suggests that lotteries will result in an above normal increase in state expenditures. This paper finds that 77 percent of net lottery proceeds are utilized for above normal spending increases, suggesting that tax benefits to nonparticipants are greatly diminished.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @ARTICLE{Whit:80, author = {White, H.}, title = {A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a directtest for heteroscedasticity}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1980}, pages = {817-838}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{White1980, author = {White, H.}, title = {A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroscedasticity}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1980}, pages = {817-838}, key = {econometrics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{WiWa:04, author = {Wigger,B. and Wartha,U.}, title = {Vertical tax externalities and the composition of public spending in a federation}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2004}, volume = {84}, pages = {357-361}, abstract = {Dividing tax power between different levels of government in a federationis shown to lead not only to overtaxation but also distorts the compositionof state and federal public spending.}, key = {taxation} } @INCOLLECTION{Wild:98, author = {Wildasin, David E.}, title = {Factor mobility, risk, inequality and redistribution}, booktitle = {Topics in Public Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Pines, David and Sadka, Efraim and Zilcha, Itzhak}, chapter = {14}, pages = {314-339}, key = {redistribution} } @ARTICLE{WiWi:98, author = {Wildasin, David E. and Wilson, John Douglas}, title = {Risky local tax bases: risk-pooling vs. rent-capture}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {69}, pages = {229-247}, number = {2}, key = {public economics} } @BOOK{Wile:74, title = {Income Distribution, East and West}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1974}, author = {Wiles, P. J. D.}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{WiMa:71, author = {Wiles, P. J. D. and Markowski, S.}, title = {Income Distribution under communism and capitalism}, journal = {Soviet Studies}, year = {1971}, volume = {22}, pages = {344-369,485-511}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @INCOLLECTION{Wile:87, author = {Wiles, P. J. de la F.}, title = {The second economy, its definitional problems}, booktitle = {Consequences and Perspectives: Different Economic Systems}, publisher = {Gower}, year = {1987}, editor = {Alessandrini, S. and Dallago, B.}, address = {Aldershot}, key = {underground} } @ARTICLE{Wifl:96, author = {Wilfling, B.}, title = {The {L}orenz-ordering of generalized beta-{II} income distributions}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1996}, volume = {71}, pages = {381-388}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Wilfling1996, author = {Wilfling, Bernd}, title = {The {L}orenz-ordering of generalized beta-II income distributions}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1996}, volume = {71}, pages = {381-388}, key = {distributions}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{WiKr:93, author = {Wilfling, B. and Kr{\"a}mer, W.}, title = {The {L}orenz-ordering of {S}ingh-{M}addala income distributions}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1993}, volume = {43}, pages = {53-57}, key = {distributions} } @ARTICLE{Wilh:96, author = {Wilhelm, M. O.}, title = {Bequest behavior and the effect of heirs' earnings: Testing the altruisticmodel of bequests}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1996}, volume = {86}, pages = {874-892}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Wilhelm1996, author = {Wilhelm, M. O.}, title = {Bequest behavior and the effect of heirs' earnings: Testing the altruistic model of bequests}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1996}, volume = {86}, pages = {874-892}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{WiPi:06, author = {Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K.}, title = {Income Inequality and Population Health: A Review and Explanation of Evidence}, journal = {Social Science and Medicine}, year = {2006}, volume = {62}, pages = {1768-1784}, abstract = {Whether or not the scale of a society’s income is a determinant of population health is still regarded as a controversial issue. We decided to review the evidence and see if we could find a consistent interpretation of both the positive and negative findings. We identified 168 analyses in 155 papers reporting research findings on the association between income distribution and population health, and classified them according to how far their findings supported the hypothesis that greater income differences are associated with lower standards of population health. Analyses in which all adjusted associations between greater income equality and higher standards of population health were statistically significant and positive were classified as ‘‘wholly supportive’’; if none were significant and positive they were classified as ‘‘unsupportive’’; and if some but not all were significant and supportive they were classified as ‘‘partially supportive’’. Of those classified as either wholly supportive or unsupportive, a large majority (70 per cent) suggest that health is less good in societies where income differences are bigger. There were substantial differences in the proportion of supportive findings according to whether was measured in large or small areas. We suggest that the studies of income are more supportive in large areas because in that context income serves as a measure of the scale of social stratification, or how hierarchical a society is. We suggest three explanations for the unsupportive findings reported by a minority of studies. First, many studies measured in areas too small to reflect the scale of social class differences in a society; second, a number of studies controlled for factors which, rather than being genuine confounders, are likely either to mediate between class and health or to be other reflections of the scale of social stratification; and third, the international relationship was temporarily lost (in all but the youngest age groups) during the decade from the mid-1980s when income differences were widening particularly rapidly in a number of countries. We finish by discussing possible objections to our interpretation of the findings.}, key = {health}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.15} } @INCOLLECTION{Wilk:94, author = {Wilkinson, R. G.}, title = {Health, redistribution and growth}, booktitle = {Paying for Inequality: The Economic Cost of Social Injustice}, publisher = {Rivers Oram Press}, year = {1994}, editor = {Glyn, A. and Miliband, D.}, address = {London}, key = {health} } @INCOLLECTION{Wilk:86, author = {Wilkinson, R. G.}, title = {Income distribution and infant mortality}, booktitle = {Class and Health: Research and Longitudinal Data}, publisher = {Tavistock, London}, year = {1986}, editor = {Wilkinson, R. G.}, key = {health} } @ARTICLE{Wilk:92, author = {Wilkinson, R. G.}, title = {Income distribution and life expectancy}, journal = {British Medical Journal}, year = {1992}, volume = {304}, pages = {165-168}, key = {health} } @BOOK{Wilk:62, title = {Mathematical Statistics}, publisher = {John Wiley}, year = {1962}, author = {Wilks, S. S.}, address = {New York}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{WiDo:06, author = {Williams, R. and Doessel, D. P.}, title = {Measuring inequality: tools and an illustration}, journal = {International Journal for Equity in Health}, year = {2006}, volume = {5}, pages = {1-8}, abstract = {Background: This paper examines an aspect of the problem of measuring inequality in health services. The measures that are commonly applied can be misleading because such measures obscure the difficulty in obtaining a complete ranking of distributions. The nature of the social welfare function underlying these measures is important. The overall object is to demonstrate that varying implications for the welfare of society result from inequality measures. Method: Various tools for measuring a distribution are applied to some illustrative data on four distributions about mental health services. Although these data refer to this one aspect of health, the exercise is of broader relevance than mental health. The summary measures of dispersion conventionally used in empirical work are applied to the data here, such as the standard deviation, the coefficient of variation, the relative mean deviation and the Gini coefficient. Other, less commonly used measures also are applied, such as Theil's Index of Entropy, Atkinson's Measure (using two differing assumptions about the inequality aversion parameter). Lorenz curves are also drawn for these distributions. Results: Distributions are shown to have differing rankings (in terms of which is more equal than another), depending on which measure is applied. Conclusion: The scope and content of the literature from the past decade about health inequalities and inequities suggest that the economic literature from the past 100 years about inequality and inequity may have been overlooked, generally speaking, in the health inequalities and inequity literature. An understanding of economic theory and economic method, partly introduced in this article, is helpful in analysing health inequality and inequity.}, key = {Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{Will:76, author = {Willig, R. D.}, title = {Consumer's surplus without apology}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1976}, volume = {66}, pages = {589-597}, number = {4}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Will:81, author = {Willing, R. D.}, title = {Social welfare dominance}, journal = {American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings}, year = {1981}, volume = {71}, pages = {200-4}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{WiZi:99, author = {Willinger, M. and Ziegelmeyer, A.}, title = {Framing and Cooperation in Public Good Games}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {65}, pages = {323-328}, key = {Public goods} } @INCOLLECTION{Will:86, author = {Willis, R. J.}, title = {Wage Determinants: A Survey and Reinterpretation of Human Capital EarningsFunctions}, booktitle = {Handbook of Labor Economics}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {1986}, editor = {Ashenfelter, O. C. and Layard, P. R. G.}, volume = {1}, chapter = {10}, address = {Amsterdam}, key = {labour} } @BOOK{Wils:66, title = {Equality}, publisher = {Hutchinson}, year = {1966}, author = {Wilson, J.}, address = {London}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Wils:98, author = {Wilson, John Douglas}, title = {Imperfect solutions to the musical-suburbs problem}, booktitle = {Topics in Public Economics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1998}, editor = {Pines, David and Sadka, Efraim and Zilcha, Itzhak}, chapter = {9}, pages = {197-219}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{WiWi:04, author = {Wilson, John Douglas and Wildasin, David E.}, title = {Capital tax competition: bane or boon}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {1065-1091}, abstract = {This paper reviews potential advantages and disadvantages of capital taxcompetition. Tax competition may introduce, mitigate, or exacerbate inefficienciesin both the private sector and the public sector. In different models,tax competition may either limit or increase public expenditures and taxeson mobile factors, with differing welfare consequences. We also discussthe implications of tax competition for redistributive policies and forpolicies dealing with risk, and we identify some of the possible empiricalimplications of tax competition.}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Wind:95, author = {Windmeijer, F.}, title = {Goodness-of-fit measures in binary choice models}, journal = {Econometric Reviews}, year = {1995}, volume = {14}, pages = {101-116}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{WiHe:98, author = {Winer, Stanley and Hettich, Walter}, title = {What is missed if we leave out collective choice in the analysis of taxation}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1998}, volume = {51}, number = {2}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{WiCh:99, author = {Wing-Keung, W. and Chi-Kwong, L.}, title = {A Note on Convex Stochastic Dominance}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {62}, pages = {293-3000}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{WiZi:95, author = {Winkelmann, R. and Zimmermann, K. F.}, title = {Recent developments in count-data modelling: theory and application}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {1995}, volume = {9}, pages = {1-24}, key = {econometrics} } @ARTICLE{WiHa:99, author = {Wirch, Julia Lynn and Hardy, Mary R.}, title = {A synthesis of risk measures for capital adequacy}, journal = {Insurance: Mathematics and Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {25}, pages = {337-347}, abstract = {We discuss the concept of the risk measure as an expectation using a probabilitydistortion, and classify the standard risk measures according to theirassociated distortion functions. Using two examples, we explore the featuresof the different measures.}, key = {risk} } @ARTICLE{Wirl:98, author = {Wirl, Franz}, title = {Socio-economic typologies of bureaucratic corruption and implications}, journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, number = {2}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Wirt:79, author = {Wirtz, K. L.}, title = {The measurement of inequality: Comment}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1979}, volume = {69}, pages = {670-672}, number = {9}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Wise:98, title = {Frontiers in the Economics of Aging}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, year = {1998}, author = {David A. Wise}, key = {population economics} } @TECHREPORT{Wito:05, author = {Witoelar, Firman}, title = {Inter-household Allocations within Extended Family: Evidence from the Indonesia Family Life Survey}, institution = {Economic Growth Center, Yale University}, year = {2005}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {912}, key = {consumption}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.03.25} } @ARTICLE{WiTa:87, author = {Witte, A. D. and Tauchen, H. V.}, title = {Tax Compliance Research: Models, Data and Methods}, journal = {Proceedings of the NTI/TIA}, year = {1987}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Witte2001, author = {Witte, A. D. and Witt, R.}, title = {What We Spend and What We Get: Public and Private Provision of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2001}, volume = {22}, pages = {1-40}, key = {Crime}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{WiWi:01, author = {Witte, A. D. and Witt, R.}, title = {What We Spend and What We Get: Public and Private Provision of Crime Preventionand Criminal Justice}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {2001}, volume = {22}, pages = {1-40}, key = {Crime} } @INCOLLECTION{WiWo:83, author = {Witte, A. D. and Woodbury, D. F.}, title = {What we know about the factors affecting compliance with the tax laws}, booktitle = {Income Tax Compliance}, publisher = {American Bar Association}, year = {1983}, editor = {Sawicki, P}, address = {Chicago}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Witte1985, author = {Witte, A. D. and Woodbury, D. F.}, title = {The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax Compliance: The Case of the {US} Individual Income Tax}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1985}, volume = {38}, pages = {1-13}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{WiWo:85, author = {Witte, A. D. and Woodbury, D. F.}, title = {The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax Compliance: The Caseof the {US} Individual Income Tax}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1985}, volume = {38}, pages = {1-13}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Witz:96, author = {Witztum, Amos}, title = {Fairness and Justice in Smith's Economic System}, institution = {Centre for the Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences,LSE}, year = {1996}, type = {Discussion Paper Series}, number = {DP 24/96}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{WoKa:98, author = {Woittiez, Isolde and Kapteyn, Arie}, title = {Social interactions and habit formation in a model of female labour supply}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {70}, pages = {185-205}, key = {labour} } @ARTICLE{Wola:94, author = {Wolak,F.}, title = {An Econometric Analysis of the Asymmetric Information, Regulator-UtilityInteraction}, journal = {Annales d'Economie et de Statistiques}, year = {1994}, volume = {34}, pages = {13-69}, abstract = {This paper presents procedures for estimating the parameters of a regulatedfirm's production function which explicitly model the impact of the privateinformation possessed by utility in the regulatory process. The paper derivesthe optimal regulatory outcome for two cases: (1) the utility's privateinformation is observable by the regulator and (2) only the distributionof the private information is observable the regulator. Given a parametricform for the utility's production function, these optimal regulatory outcomesyield structural econometric models which can be estimated to recover theparameters of the regulated firm's production function. These models areestimated for the Class A california water utility industry, and the parameterestimates obtained are compared to those obtained from applying conventionalcost-function estimation procedures. This estimation procedure recoversthe parameters of the utility's production function as well as an estimateof the distribution function of the utility's private information parameter.Using a non-nested hypothesis testing procedure we find that the secondprivate information model provides a superior description of the observedlevel of costs and output. The estimatese from these models are then suedto compute the increased production cost and output reduction which resultfrom the utility's superior private information about its production process.We find noticeable, but not overwhelming, percentange cost increases introducedby this private information in the regulatory process. The major effectis the welfare loos to consumers from the reduction in output producedunder asymmetric information versus symmetric information}, key = {industry} } @ARTICLE{Wold:35, author = {Wold, H.}, title = {A study on the mean difference, concentration curve and concentration ratio}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1935}, volume = {12}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{WoWh:57, author = {Wold, H. O. A. and Whittle, P.}, title = {A model explaining the {P}areto distribution of wealth}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1957}, volume = {25}, pages = {591-595}, key = {wealth} } @INCOLLECTION{Wolf:99JL, author = {Wolf, E.}, title = {Joint Labour Supply Decisions of Couples}, booktitle = {Time Use - Research, Data and Policy}, publisher = {NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft}, year = {1999}, editor = {Merz, J. and Ehling, M.}, pages = {269-291}, address = {Baden Baden.}, key = {time use} } @TECHREPORT{Wolf, author = {Wolff,E.}, title = {Impact of Bequests on the Distribution of Wealth}, abstract = {The paper explores three issues. First, how has the distribution of wealthchanged over time in the United States? Second, how does the United Statescompare to other developed countries in terms of wealth inequality? Third,to what extent have bequests contributed to the growing inequality of wealthin the United States?}, key = {wealth} } @INCOLLECTION{Wolf:85, author = {Wolff, E. N.}, title = {The disappearance of domestic servants and the underground economy}, booktitle = {The Economics of the Shadow Economy}, publisher = {Springer Verlag}, year = {1985}, editor = {Gaertner, W. and Wenig, A.}, address = {Berlin, Germany}, key = {underground} } @BOOK{Wolf:95, title = {Top Heavy: A study of the Increasing inequality of wealth in {A}merica}, publisher = {20th Century Fund Press, New York}, year = {1995}, author = {Wolff, E. N.}, key = {wealth} } @BOOK{Wolf:87, title = {Internnational Comparisons of the Distribution of Household Wealth}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1987}, author = {Wolff, E. N.}, address = {Washington}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{WoZa:09, author = {Wolff, E. N. and Zacharias, A.}, title = {Household Wealth and the Measurement of Economic Well-Being in the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Journal of Economic Inequality}, year = {2009}, number = {447}, month = {May}, abstract = {The standard official measure of household economic well-being in the United States is gross money income. The general consensus is that such measures are limited because they ignore other crucial determinants of well-being. We modify the standard measure to account for one such determinant: household wealth. We then analyze the level and distribution of economic well-being in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s, using the standard measure and a measure that differs from the standard in that income from wealth is calculated as the sum of lifetime annuity from nonhome wealth and imputed rental-equivalent for owner-occupied homes. Our findings indicate that the level and distribution of economic well-being is substantially altered when money income is adjusted for wealth. Over the 1989–2000 period, median wellbeing appears to increase faster when these adjustments are made than when standard money income is used. This adjustment also widens the income gap between African Americans and whites, but increases the relative well-being of the elderly. Adding imputed rent and annuities from household wealth to household income considerably increases measured inequality and the share of income from wealth in inequality. However, both measures show about the same rise in inequality over the period. Our results contradict the assertion that the “working rich” have replaced the rentiers at the top of the economic ladder.}, address = {The Levy Economics Institute P.O. Box 5000 Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000}, institution = {The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College}, key = {wealth}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07}, type = {Working Paper}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/a285467074215027/} } @ARTICLE{WoZa:07, author = {Wolff, E. N. and Zacharias, A.}, title = {The Distributional Consequences of Government Spending and Taxation in the {U.S.}, 1989 and 2000}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2007}, volume = {53}, pages = {692-715}, abstract = {We assess the effects of government expenditures and taxation on household economic well-being in the United States in 1989 and 2000. Net government expenditure is estimated as the difference between government expenditures incurred on behalf of the household sector—transfers and public consumption—and the taxes paid by that sector. We incorporate the estimates of net government expenditures into a wealth-adjusted measure of income. We find that overall inequality in our income measure is considerably reduced by net government expenditures. Results from decomposition analysis show that the inequality-reducing effect of net government expenditures owed more to expenditures than to taxes.}, key = {Taxation}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @TECHREPORT{WoZa:06, author = {Wolff, E. N. and Zacharias, A.}, title = {Household Wealth and the Measurement of Economic Well-Being in the United States}, institution = {The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College}, year = {2006}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {447}, address = {The Levy Economics Institute P.O. Box 5000 Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000}, month = {May}, abstract = {The standard official measure of household economic well-being in the United States is gross money income. The general consensus is that such measures are limited because they ignore other crucial determinants of well-being. We modify the standard measure to account for one such determinant: household wealth. We then analyze the level and distribution of economic well-being in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s, using the standard measure and a measure that differs from the standard in that income from wealth is calculated as the sum of lifetime annuity from nonhome wealth and imputed rental-equivalent for owner-occupied homes. Our findings indicate that the level and distribution of economic well-being is substantially altered when money income is adjusted for wealth. Over the 1989–2000 period, median wellbeing appears to increase faster when these adjustments are made than when standard money income is used. This adjustment also widens the income gap between African Americans and whites, but increases the relative well-being of the elderly. Adding imputed rent and annuities from household wealth to household income considerably increases measured inequality and the share of income from wealth in inequality. However, both measures show about the same rise in inequality over the period. Our results contradict the assertion that the “working rich” have replaced the rentiers at the top of the economic ladder.}, key = {wealth}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.04.07} } @ARTICLE{Wolf:97, author = {Wolfson, M. C.}, title = {Divergent inequalities: theory and empirical results}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1997}, volume = {43}, pages = {401-421}, key = {polarisation}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.04.25} } @ARTICLE{Wolf:94, author = {Wolfson, M. C.}, title = {Conceptual issues in normative measurement - when inequalities diverge}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1994}, volume = {84}, pages = {353-358}, number = {5}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Wolf:86, author = {Wolfson, M. C.}, title = {Stasis amid change: income inequality in Canada}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1986}, volume = {32}, pages = {337-371}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @BOOK{Wolf:99TI, title = {Topics in Microeconomics}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1999}, author = {Wolfstetter, E.}, address = {Cambridge}, key = {micro} } @TECHREPORT{Wols:07, author = {Wolswijk,G.}, title = {Short- and Long-Run Tax Elasticities: The Case of the Netherlands}, institution = {ECB}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {763}, abstract = {This paper provides estimates for the base elasticities of Dutch taxes, paying particular attention to differences between short-and long-term elasticities, and allowing for asymmetric adjustment. Estimates are presented for five tax categories for the period 1970-2005, after making appropriate corrections for effects of discretionary tax measures. The empirical results indicate that short-term elasticities often are lower than long-term ones, notably when taxes are subdued. Consequently, shocks to tax revenues tend to be aggravated by the dynamics of short-term elasticities. Ignoring differences between short- and long-term elasticities contributes to revenue 'surprises' and an incorrect assessment of the fiscal stance.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2007.08.13} } @BOOK{Wood:94, title = {North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {1994}, author = {Wood, Adrian}, address = {Oxford}, key = {international} } @ARTICLE{WoRo:99, author = {Woojin, L. and Roemer, J. E.}, title = {Inequality and Redistribution Revisited}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1999}, volume = {65}, pages = {339-346}, key = {Redistribution} } @ARTICLE{Wool:99, author = {Wooldridge, J. M.}, title = {Asymptotic Properties of Weighted M-Estimators for Variable ProbabilitySamples}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {1385-1406}, key = {Statistics} } @ARTICLE{Wooldridge1999, author = {Wooldridge, J. M.}, title = {Asymptotic Properties of Weighted M-Estimators for Variable Probability Samples}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1999}, volume = {67}, pages = {1385-1406}, key = {Statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{WB:07, title = {Agriculture for Development: world development report 2008}, publisher = {The World Bank and Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, author = {{World Bank}}, address = {New York}, key = {poverty}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.25}, url = {http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/EXTWDR2008/0,,contentMDK:21410054~menuPK:3149676~pagePK:64167689~piPK:64167673~theSitePK:2795143,00.html} } @BOOK{WB:06, title = {Development and the Next Generation: world development report 2007}, publisher = {The World Bank and Oxford University Press}, year = {2006}, author = {{World Bank}}, address = {New York}, key = {poverty}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.25}, url = {http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/EXTWDR2007/0,,contentMDK:21055591~menuPK:1489854~pagePK:64167689~piPK:64167673~theSitePK:1489834,00.html} } @BOOK{WB:05, title = {Equity and Development: world development report 2006}, publisher = {The World Bank and Oxford University Press}, year = {2005}, author = {{World Bank}}, address = {New York}, key = {poverty}, url = {http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/EXTWDR2006/0,,contentMDK:20586898~pagePK:64167689~piPK:64167673~theSitePK:477642,00.html?} } @BOOK{WB:04, title = {A Better Investment Climate for Everyone: world development report 2005}, publisher = {The World Bank and Oxford University Press}, year = {2004}, author = {{World Bank}}, address = {New York}, key = {poverty}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.25}, url = {http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/Resources/complete_report.pdf} } @BOOK{WB:00, title = {Attacking Poverty: world development report 2000/2001}, publisher = {The World Bank and Oxford University Press}, year = {2000}, author = {{World Bank}}, key = {Poverty} } @INBOOK{WB:00a, chapter = {Chapter 1: The Nature and Evolutionof Poverty}, title = {World Development Report 2000/2001}, publisher = {The World Bank and Oxford University Press}, year = {2000}, author = {{World Bank}}, key = {poverty} } @INBOOK{WB:00c, chapter = {Chapter 3}, title = {Growth, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {World Bank.}, year = {2000}, author = {{World Bank}} } @BOOK{WoBa:90, title = {World Development Report}, publisher = {The World Bank and Oxford University Press}, year = {1990}, author = {{World Bank}}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{WorldBank1990, title = {World Development Report}, year = {1990}, author = {{World Bank}}, key = {poverty}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Wrig:96, author = {Wright, Randall}, title = {Taxes, redistribution and growth}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {62}, pages = {327-338}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Wrig:86, author = {Wright, R.}, title = {The redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {31}, pages = {377-399}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Wrig:04, author = {Wright, S.}, title = {Measures Of Stock Market Value And Returns For The {U.S.} Nonfinancial CorporateSector, 1900–2002}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2004}, volume = {50}, pages = {561-584}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Wright2004, author = {Wright, S.}, title = {Measures Of Stock Market Value And Returns For The {U.S.} Nonfinancial Corporate Sector, 1900-2002}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2004}, volume = {50}, pages = {561-584}, key = {wealth}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{WuSaSt:08, author = {Wu, X. and Savvides, A. and Stengos, T.}, title = {The Global Joint Distribution of Income and Health}, institution = {Texas A\&M University}, year = {2008}, type = {Working Paper}, abstract = {We investigate the evolution of global welfare in two dimensions: income per capita and life expectancy. First, we estimate the marginal distributions of income and life ex- pectancy separately. More importantly, in contrast to previous univariate approaches, we consider income and life expectancy jointly and estimate their bivariate global dis- tribution for 137 countries during 1970 - 2000. We reach several conclusions: the global joint distribution has evolved from a bimodal into a unimodal one, the evolution of the health distribution has preceded that of income, global inequality and poverty has decreased over time and the evolution of the global distribution has been welfare im- proving. Our decomposition of overall welfare indicates that global inequality would be underestimated if within-country inequality is not taken into account. Moreover, global inequality and poverty would be substantially underestimated if the dependence between the income and health distributions is ignored.}, key = {distribution}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.10.01} } @ARTICLE{Warn:03, author = {W{\"a}rneryd, K.}, title = {Information in Conflicts}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2003}, volume = {110}, pages = {121-136}, key = {information}, owner = {kog1}, timestamp = {2006.06.13} } @ARTICLE{WaWa:82, author = {W{\"a}rneryd, K. E. and Walerud, B.}, title = {Taxes and economic behaviour - some interview data on tax evasion in {S}weden}, journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}, year = {1982}, volume = {2}, pages = {187-211}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{X1999, author = {Labandeira X and Labeaga J. M.}, title = {Combining Input-Output Analysis and Micro-Simulation to Assess the Effects of Carbon Taxation on Spanish Households}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {305-320}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{LaLa:99, author = {Labandeira X. and Labeaga J. M.}, title = {Combining Input-Output Analysis and Micro-Simulation to Assess the Effectsof Carbon Taxation on Spanish Households}, journal = {Fiscal Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {305-320}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{Xu:95, author = {Xu, K.}, title = {Statistical {I}nference for the {S}horrocks-{S}en {I}ndex of {P}overty {I}ntensity}, institution = {Department of Economics, Dalhousie University}, year = {1995}, type = {Mimeo}, address = {Halifax, Nova Scotia, Cananda}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{XuOs:99, author = {Xu, Kuan and Osberg, Lars}, title = {An Anatomy of the {S}en and {S}en-{S}horrocks-{T}hon Indices: MultiplicativeDecomposability and Its Subgroup Decompositions}, institution = {Department of Economics, Dalhousie University}, year = {1999}, type = {Working Paper}, address = {Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 3J5 CANADA}, comment = {Mailto:Lars.Osberg@Dal.Ca}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{XuOs:98, author = {Xu, K. and Osberg, L.}, title = {A Distribution-Free Test for Deprivation Dominance}, journal = {Econometrics Reviews}, year = {1998}, volume = {17}, pages = {415-429}, number = {4}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Yaar:69, author = {Yaari, M.}, title = {Some Remarks on Measures of Risk Aversion and on their Uses}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1969}, volume = {1}, pages = {315-329}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{YaBa:84, author = {Yaari, M. and Bar-Hillel, M.}, title = {On dividing justly}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1984}, volume = {1}, pages = {1-24}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Yaar:88, author = {Yaari, M. E.}, title = {A controversial proposal concerning inequality measurement}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1988}, volume = {44}, pages = {381-397}, number = {4}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Yaar:87, author = {Yaari, M. E.}, title = {The dual theory of choice under risk}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1987}, volume = {55}, pages = {99-115}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Yaar:64, author = {Yaari, M. E.}, title = {On the consumer's lifetime allocation process}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1964}, volume = {5}, pages = {304-317}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Yabl:04, author = {Yablon,C.}, title = {The Meaning of Probability Judgments: An Essay on the Use and Misuse ofBehavioral Economics}, journal = {University of Illinois Law Review}, year = {2004}, pages = {101-164}, abstract = {In this essay, Professor Yablon challenges the assumption that behavioralheuristics-such as the availability heuristic-constitute "biases" thatnecessarily lead to errors in probability judgments. He notes that thereare many different concepts of probability and, in many contexts, no agreed-uponmethod for determining the correctness of inconsistent probability judgments.Yet many legal academics and policymakers ignore these complex aspectsof probability theory, assuming that statistical or frequentist probabilitiesare always to be preferred over subjective judgments of probability. ProfessorYablon argues that choosing between frequentist and subjective approachesto probability judgments in policymaking can only be done with great sensitivityto context and the quality of the information available. He provides examplesof current policy debates where statistical probability is to be preferred,such as environmental protection, others where subjective probability judgmentsare preferable, such as settlement of litigation, and a third importantcategory, including products liability, where neither approach is clearlysuperior.}, institution = {Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Yaka:03, author = {Yakita, A.}, title = {Taxation and Growth with Overlapping Generations}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87, (3-4)}, pages = {467-487}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Yaki:00, author = {Yakita, A.}, title = {Capital taxation, {T}obin's $q$ and overlapping generations}, journal = {The Japanese Economic Review}, year = {2000}, volume = {51}, pages = {111-129}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Yama:90, author = {Yamada, M.}, title = {An analysis of optimal tax evasion with tax evasion}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1990}, volume = {45}, pages = {470-490}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Yamada1990, author = {Yamada, M.}, title = {An anlysis of optimal tax evasion with tax evasion}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1990}, volume = {45}, pages = {470-490}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{YaSa:86, author = {Yamagishi, T. and Sato, K.}, title = {Motivational bases of the public goods problem}, journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology}, year = {1986}, volume = {50}, pages = {67-73}, key = {economic psychology} } @ARTICLE{Yama:00, author = {Yamarik, S.}, title = {Can tax policy help explain state-level macroeconomic growth?}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2000}, volume = {68}, pages = {211-215}, key = {growth} } @ARTICLE{Yang:08, author = {Yang, Dean}, title = {Can Enforcement Backfire? Crime Displacement in the Context of Customs Reform in the Philippines}, journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics}, year = {2008}, volume = {90}, pages = {1 - 14}, abstract = {Increased enforcement can displace crime to alternative lawbreaking methods. This paper examines a customs reform in the Philippines that raised enforcement against a specific method of avoiding import duties. Increased enforcement applied only to shipments from some countries, so shipments from other countries serve as a control group. Increased enforcement reduced the targeted duty-avoidance method, but caused substantial displacement to an alternative method. The hypothesis of zero change in total duty avoidance cannot be rejected. Displacement was greater for products with higher tariff rates and import volumes, consistent with the existence of fixed costs of switching to alternative duty-avoidance methods.}, key = {Crime}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{Yani:99, author = {Yaniv, G.}, title = {Tax Evasion, Risky Laundering and Optimal Deterrence Policy}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {27-38}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Yaniv1999, author = {Yaniv, G.}, title = {Tax Evasion, Risky Laundering, and Optimal Deterrence Policy}, journal = {International Tax and Public Finance}, year = {1999}, volume = {6}, pages = {27-38}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Yani:96, author = {Yaniv, G.}, title = {Tax Evasion and Monopoly Output Decisions: Note}, journal = {Public Finance Quarterly}, year = {1996}, volume = {24}, pages = {501-5}, key = {Tax compliance - firms} } @ARTICLE{Yani:95, author = {Yaniv, G.}, title = {A Note on the Tax-Evading Firm}, journal = {National Tax Journal}, year = {1995}, volume = {68}, pages = {113-20}, key = {Tax compliance - firms} } @ARTICLE{Yani:90, author = {Yaniv, G.}, title = {On the interpretation of the income effect in tax evasion models}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1990}, volume = {45}, pages = {335-339}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Yani:88, author = {Yaniv, G.}, title = {Withholding and non-withheld tax evasion}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1988}, volume = {35}, pages = {183-204}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Yani:86, author = {Yaniv, G.}, title = {Fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1986}, volume = {30}, pages = {369-383}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Yank:84, author = {{Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Inc. }}, title = {Survey of Taxpayer Attitudes}, year = {1984}, address = {Washington}, key = {taxation}, publisher = {IRS} } @ARTICLE{YaZhHa:04, author = {Yao,S. and Zhang,Z. and Hanmer,L.}, title = {Growing inequality and poverty in China}, journal = {China Economic Review}, year = {2004}, volume = {15}, pages = {145-163}, abstract = {China has achieved high economic growth for over 20 years but still hasa sizeable number of people living in poverty. Using large household surveydata, this paper attempts to present a comprehensive picture and identifythe main determinants of poverty in both the urban and rural sectors. Itconcludes that despite rising urban poverty in recent years, rural povertyis still predominant in China. The slow progress in reducing poverty hasbeen caused by rising inequality, particularly the urban-rural divide andinterregional inequality. In sharp contrast to the government’s optimismin poverty reduction, this paper shows that poverty in China is still seriousand has become increasingly more difficult to reduce. Although China mayeasily meet the international development target of reducing poverty byhalf from 1990 to 2015, the battle against poverty is far from over, evenby 2015.}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Yate:92, title = {Risk-Taking {B}ehavior}, publisher = {John Wiley Ltd}, year = {1992}, author = {Yates, J. Frank}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Yilm:99, author = {Yilmaz, Kamil}, title = {Optimal export taxes in a multicountry framework}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {60}, pages = {439-465}, key = {international} } @INCOLLECTION{Yitz:94OT, author = {Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {On the progressivity of commodity Taxation}, booktitle = {Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichhorn, W.}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Yitz:02, author = {Yitzhaki,S.}, title = {Do we need a separate poverty measurement?}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2002}, volume = {18}, pages = {61-85}, abstract = {The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is to illustrate that a povertyindex can be derived from a decomposition of an appropriate inequalityindex. The advantage of decomposing an inequality index is that the decompositionsupplies additional information that is useful for poverty measurement.The second purpose is to illustrate the kind of policy analysis that canbe performed with a decomposed inequality index by decomposing the Ginicoefficient into Sen’s poverty index and other components. The methodologysuggests an answer to the following question: Assume that a tax has beenimposed on an expenditure item or an income source, what will be the impacton the components of the inequality index? The analysis is performed withdata from Romania. D 2002}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Yitz:98, author = {Yitzhaki, Shlomo}, title = {More than a dozen alternative ways of spelling {G}ini}, journal = {Research on Economic Inequality}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, pages = {13-30}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Yitz:96, author = {Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {On using linear regressions in welfare economics}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1996}, volume = {14}, pages = {478-486}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Yitz:94ED, author = {Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Economic distance and overlapping distributions}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {1994}, volume = {61}, pages = {147-159}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Yitz:93, author = {Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {More than a Dozen ways to Spell {G}ini}, institution = {The Hebrew University of Jerusalem}, year = {1993}, type = {mimeo}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Yitz:91, author = {Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Calculating jackknife variance estimators for parameters of the {G}ini method}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {1991}, volume = {9}, pages = {235-238}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Yitz:87, author = {Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {On the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion}, journal = {Public Finance Quarterly}, year = {1987}, volume = {15}, pages = {123-137}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Yitz:83, author = {Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {On an extension of the {G}ini inequality index}, journal = {International Economic Review}, year = {1983}, volume = {24}, pages = {617-628}, number = {10}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Yitz:82RD, author = {Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Relative deprivation and economic welfare}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1982}, volume = {17}, pages = {99-114}, number = {1}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Yitz:82SD, author = {Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Stochastic dominance, mean variance and {G}ini's mean difference}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1982}, pages = {178-185}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Yitz:80, author = {Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Relative deprivation and the {G}ini coefficient: reply}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1980}, volume = {95}, pages = {575-6}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Yitz:79, author = {Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Relative deprivation and the {G}ini coefficient}, journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1979}, volume = {93}, pages = {321-324}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Yitz:74, author = {Yitzhaki, S.}, title = {Income tax evasion: a note}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1974}, volume = {3}, pages = {201-202}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{YiLe:91, author = {Yitzhaki, S. and Lerman, R.}, title = {Income stratification and income inequality}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {1991}, volume = {37}, pages = {313-329}, number = {9}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{YiOl:91, author = {Yitzhaki, Shlomo and Olkin, Ingram}, title = {Concentration Indices and Concentration Curves}, booktitle = {Stochastic Orders and Decisions under Risk}, publisher = {Institute of Mathematical Statistics: Lecture-Notes Monograph Series}, year = {1991}, editor = {Mosler, Karl and Scarsini, Marco}, volume = {19}, pages = {380-392}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{YiOl:88, author = {Yitzhaki, S. and Olkin, I.}, title = {Concentration curves}, institution = {The Hebrew University of Jerusalem}, year = {1988}, type = {working paper}, number = {179}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{YiVa:89, author = {Yitzhaki, S. and Vakneen, Y.}, title = {On the shadow price of a tax inspector}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1989}, volume = {44}, pages = {492-505}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Ynte:33, author = {Yntema, D. B.}, title = {Measures of the inequality in the personal distribution of wealth and income}, journal = {Journal of the American Statistical Association}, year = {1933}, volume = {28}, pages = {423-433}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Yoon:04, author = {Yoon, Gawon}, title = {On the existence of expected utility with {CRRA} under {STUR}}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {2004}, volume = {83}, pages = {219-224}, abstract = {This note shows that in a standard framework for choice under uncertainty,expected utility fails to exist with constant relative risk aversion [CRRA],when the endowment follows a stochastic unit root [STUR] process.}, key = {risk} } @TECHREPORT{Yosh:91, author = {Yoshida, T.}, title = {Social welfare rankings on income distributions: alternative views of efficiency preference}, institution = {Osaka University}, year = {1991}, type = {Discussion Paper}, number = {10}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Yosh:83, author = {Yoshida, T.}, title = {The {L}orenz partial ordering and {L}erner's probabilistic egalitarianism}, journal = {Economic Studies Quarterly}, year = {1983}, volume = {34}, pages = {225-230}, number = {12}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Yosh:77, author = {Yoshida, T.}, title = {The necessary and sufficient condition for additive separability of incomeinequality measures}, journal = {Economic Studies Quarterly}, year = {1977}, volume = {28}, pages = {160-163}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Yoshida1977, author = {Yoshida, T.}, title = {The necessary and sufficient condition for additive separability of income inequality measures}, journal = {Economic Studies Quarterly}, year = {1977}, volume = {28}, pages = {160-163}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Yosh:98, author = {Yoshihara, Naoki}, title = {Characterizations of the public and private ownership solutions}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1998}, volume = {35}, pages = {165-184}, number = {2}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{Youn:17, author = {Young, A. A.}, title = {Do the Statistics of the Concentration of Wealth in the {U}nited {S}tates Mean What They are Commonly Supposed to Mean?}, journal = {Journal of The American Statistical Association}, year = {1917}, volume = {15}, pages = {471-484.}, key = {wealth} } @ARTICLE{Youn:99, author = {Young, H. P.}, title = {Cost allocation, demand revelation and core implementation}, journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences}, year = {1999}, volume = {36}, pages = {213-228}, number = {3}, key = {micro} } @BOOK{Youn:98IS, title = {Individual strategy and social structure: an evolutionary theory of institutions}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Young, H. P.}, address = {Princeton, New Jersey}, key = {political economy} } @ARTICLE{Youn:98SN, author = {Young, H. P.}, title = {Social norms and economic welfare}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {1998}, volume = {42}, pages = {821-830}, number = {3-5}, key = {social custom} } @ARTICLE{Youn:95, author = {Young, H. P.}, title = {Optimal Voting Rules}, journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives}, year = {1995}, volume = {9}, pages = {51-64}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Youn:94EI, title = {Equity in Theory and in Practice}, publisher = {Princeton University Press}, year = {1994}, author = {Young, H. P.}, address = {Princeton, New Jersey}, key = {equity} } @ARTICLE{Youn:90, author = {Young, H. P.}, title = {Progressive taxation and equal sacrifice}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1990}, volume = {80}, pages = {253-266}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Young1990, author = {Young, H. P.}, title = {Progressive taxation and equal sacrifice}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1990}, volume = {70}, pages = {253-266}, key = {public economics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Youn:88, author = {Young, H. P.}, title = {Distributive justice in taxation}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1988}, volume = {44}, pages = {321-325}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Youn:87OD, author = {Young, H. P.}, title = {On dividing an amount according to individual claims or liabilities}, journal = {Mathematics of Operations Research}, year = {1987}, volume = {12}, pages = {398-414}, abstract = {A basic principle of distributive justice states that, if an allocationamong a group of individuals is fair, then it should be perceived as fairwhen restricted to each subgroup of individuals. This 'consistency' principleapplies in particular to methods for allocating taxes among citizens accordingto their ability to pay. Every consistent, continuous taxation method optimizesan additively separable objective function. Optimal allocations may becomputed a simple Lagrange multiplier technique. Similar results hold forallocating assets among creditors according to their claims. The techniquesare illustrated by constructing an objective function for a bankruptcymethod from the Babylonian Talmud.}, key = {claims} } @ARTICLE{Youn:87PT, author = {Young, H. P.}, title = {Progressive taxation and the equal sacrifice principle}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {1987}, volume = {32}, pages = {203-212}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Youn:75, author = {Young, H. P.}, title = {Social Choice Scoring Functions}, journal = {SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics}, year = {1975}, volume = {28}, pages = {824-838}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Youn:74AA, author = {Young, H. P.}, title = {An Axiomatization of {B}orda's Rule}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {1974}, volume = {9}, pages = {43-52}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{YuLuZh:07, author = {Yu, Lerong and Luo, Renfu and Zhan, Linxiu}, title = {Decomposing Income Inequality and Policy Implications in Rural {C}hina}, journal = {China and World Economy}, year = {2007}, volume = {15}, pages = {44 - 58}, abstract = {Using village data from samples covering 6 provinces, 36 counties and 216 townships, the income inequalities within and between townships in rural China are assessed. The Theil index and the mean logarithmic deviation methods enable us to test income inequality at the township level, and to decompose it into intra-regional and inter-regional at county and provincial levels. In the present paper, we also decompose income inequalities between and within the nationally designated poor counties (NDPC). The results show that approximately two-thirds of the income inequality in rural China would be eliminated if measures and policies were targeted at the county level. This study also confirms the rationale that China’s poverty alleviation strategy of focusing on poor counties based on the inequalities between NDPC and non-NDPC accounts for the most inter-province inequality.}, key = {Income Inequality}, keywords = {decomposition, income inequality, rural China}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @BOOK{YuKe:50, title = {An Introduction to The Theory of Statistics}, publisher = {Griffin}, year = {1950}, author = {Yule, G. U. and Kendall, M. G.}, address = {London}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{YuLi:90, author = {Yun-Peng,C. and Ruey-Ling, C.}, title = {The Subsidence of Preference Reversals in Simplified and Marketlike ExperimentalSettings: A Note}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1990}, volume = {80}, pages = {902-911}, month = {September}, key = {Experiments} } @INCOLLECTION{ZaPiPi:80, author = {Zabalza, A. and Pissarides, C. A. and Piachaud, D.}, title = {Social security, life-cycle saving and retirement}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the {C}olston Symposium}, publisher = {Colston Research Society}, year = {1980}, address = {London}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Zagi:83, author = {Zagier, D.}, title = {Inequalities for the {G}ini coefficent of composite population}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1983}, volume = {12}, pages = {103-118}, number = {10}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Zagi:82, author = {Zagier, D.}, title = {On the decomposability of the {G}ini coefficient and other indices of inequality}, institution = {Institut f{\"u}r Gesellschafts-und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universit{\"a}t Bonn}, year = {1982}, type = {Discussion Paper}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{ZaBu:05, author = {Zaidi,A. and Burchardt,T.}, title = {Comparing Incomes when needs differ: Equivalization for the extra costsof disability in the U.K.}, journal = {Review of Income and Wealth}, year = {2005}, volume = {51}, pages = {89-114}, abstract = {Equivalization of incomes for household composition is accepted practicewhen measuring poverty but other variations in needs are rarely acknowledged.This paper uses data from two U.K. household surveys to quantify the extracosts of living associated with disability. The extra costs of disabilityare derived by comparing the "standard of living" of households with andwithout disabled members at a given income, having controlled for othersources of variation. Logit and ordered logit regressions are used to estimatethe relationship between a range of standard of living indicators, income,and disability. The extra costs of disability derived are substantial andrise with severity of disability. Unadjusted incomes significantly understatethe problem of low income amongst disabled people, and thereby in the populationas a whole.}, key = {household} } @BOOK{Zaja:96, title = {Political Economy of Fairness}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, year = {1996}, author = {Zajac, Edward E.}, address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Zamb:08, author = {Zambrano, E.}, title = {Expected utility inequalities: theory and applications}, journal = {Economic Theory}, year = {2008}, volume = {36}, pages = {147-158}, abstract = {Suppose we know the utility function of a risk averse decision maker who values a risky prospect X at a price CE. Based on this information alone I develop upper bounds for the tails of the probabilistic belief about X of the decision maker. In the paper I also illustrate how to use these expected utility bounds in a variety of applications,which include the estimation of riskmeasures from observed data, option valuation, and the study of credit risk.}, key = {risk}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @ARTICLE{Zame:89, author = {von Zameck, W.}, title = {Tax evasion and tax revenue loss: Another elaboration of the {P}eacock-{S}hawapproach}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1989}, volume = {44}, pages = {308-315}, key = {tax evasion} } @ARTICLE{Zameck1989, author = {von Zameck, W.}, title = {Tax evasion and tax revenue loss: Another elaboration of the {P}eacock-{S}haw approach}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1989}, volume = {44}, pages = {308-315}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Zana:90, author = {Zanardi, G.}, title = {Constituent of the mean deviations and of the mean difference and concentrationscheme}, booktitle = {Income and Wealth Distribution, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1990}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Zenga, M.}, pages = {128-148}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{ZaGu:98, author = {Zandvakil, S. and Gustafsson, B.}, title = {Dynamics of Income Inequality in Sweden}, journal = {Journal of Income Distribution}, year = {1998}, volume = {8}, pages = {189-206}, key = {inequality} } @INCOLLECTION{Zand:94, author = {Zandvakili, Sourushe}, title = {International Comparison of household inequalities based on microdata withdecompositions}, booktitle = {Aspects of Distribution of Wealth and Income}, publisher = {The Macmillan Press Ltd}, year = {1994}, editor = {Papadimitriou, Dimitri B.}, chapter = {5}, pages = {80-100}, key = {income distribution:empirical} } @ARTICLE{Zand:00, author = {Zandvakili, S.}, title = {Dynamics of Earnings Inequality Among Female-Headed Households in the {U}nited{S}tates}, journal = {Journal of Socioeconomics}, year = {2000}, volume = {29}, pages = {73-89}, key = {mobility} } @ARTICLE{Zandvakili2000, author = {Zandvakili, S.}, title = {Dynamics of Earnings Inequality Among Female-Headed Households in the {U}nited {S}tates}, journal = {Journal of Socioeconomics}, year = {2000}, volume = {29}, pages = {73-89}, key = {mobility}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Zeld:89, author = {Stephen P. Zeldes}, title = {Optimal Consumption with Stochastic Income: Deviations from Certainty Equivalence}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, year = {1989}, volume = {104}, pages = {275-298}, number = {2}, key = {consumption} } @INCOLLECTION{Zenga1990, author = {Zenga, M.}, title = {Concentration curves and concentration indexes derived from them}, booktitle = {Income and Wealth Distribution, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1990}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Zenga, M.}, pages = {94-110}, address = {Heidelberg}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Zeng:89, author = {Zenga, M.}, title = {Concentration Curves and Concentration Indexes Derived From Them}, booktitle = {Income and Wealth Distribution, Inequality and Poverty}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1989}, editor = {Dagum, C. and Zenga, M.}, pages = {149-170}, address = {New York}, key = {welfare} } @ARTICLE{Zeng:86, author = {Zenga, M.}, title = {On the normalization, the invariance to the population replication and additivedecomposition in the (I S a T) class of inequality measures}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1986}, volume = {44}, pages = {131-151}, key = {inequality decomposition} } @ARTICLE{Zenga1986, author = {Zenga, M.}, title = {On the normalization, the invariance to the population replication and additive decomposition in the (I S a T) class of inequality measures}, journal = {Metron}, year = {1986}, volume = {44}, pages = {131-151}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{Zeng:84, author = {Zenga, M.}, title = {Proposta per un Indice di Concentrazione Basato sui Rapporti fra Quantilidi Popolazione e Quantili di Reddito}, journal = {Giornale degli Economisti ed Annali di Economia}, year = {1984}, volume = {43}, pages = {301-326}, number = {5-6}, key = {welfare} } @TECHREPORT{Zeng:97, author = {Zenginobuz, Unal}, title = {No-Government Equilibrium and Choosing Taxing Schemes in a Public Good Economy}, institution = {Institute of Social Sciences, Bogazici University}, year = {1997}, type = {Research Paper}, number = {ISS EC 97-08}, address = {Istanbul}, month = {September}, key = {public goods} } @ARTICLE{ZhWa:08, author = {Zhang, J. and Wang, X.}, title = {Robust normal reference bandwidth for kernel density estimation}, journal = {Statistica Neerlandica}, year = {2008}, volume = {forthcoming}, pages = {..}, abstract = {Bandwidth selection is the main problem of kernel density estimation, the most popular method of density estimation. The classical normal reference bandwidth usually oversmoothes the density estimate. The existing hi-tech bandwidths have computational problems (even may not exist) and are not robust against outliers in the sample. A highly robust normal reference bandwidth is proposed, which adapts to different types of densities. Keywords and Phrases: biased cross-validation, least squares cross-validation, mean integrated squared error, outliers.}, key = {statistics}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.03.24} } @TECHREPORT{ZhZh:07, author = {Zhang, Michael and Zhu, Feng, Shuaizhang}, title = {Group Size and Incentive to Contribute: A Natural Experiment at Chinese Wikipedia}, institution = {NET Institute}, year = {2007}, type = {Working Paper}, number = {22}, abstract = {The literature of private provision of public goods suggests that incentive to contribute is inversely related to group size. This paper empirically tests this relationship using field data from Chinese Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia. We exploit an exogenous reduction in group size as a result of the blocking of Wikipedia in mainland China and examine whether individual contributions increase after the block as predicted in the literature. Our result indicates the opposite: individual contribution of unaffected contributors decreases by 42% on average as a result of the block. We attribute the cause to social effects: contributors care about the number of beneficiaries of their contributions. We build a simple model to illustrate how social effects and group size affect individual incentive to contribute. Consistent with our model prediction, we find that the more a contributor values social recognition, the greater the reduction in her contributions after the block. A series of robustness checks appear to support our explanation.}, key = {Charitable Giving}, keywords = {incentive to contribute; group size; public goods; social effects}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{ZhOg:04, author = {Zhang, Q. and Ogaki, M.}, title = {Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion, Risk Sharing, and the Permanent Income Hypothesis}, journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics}, year = {2004}, volume = {22}, pages = {421-430}, key = {risk}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.02.15} } @ARTICLE{Zhan:98, author = {Zhang, X.}, title = {Modeling economic transition: A two-tier price Computable General Equilibriummodel of the {C}hinese economy}, journal = {Journal of Policy Modeling}, year = {1998}, volume = {20}, pages = {483-511}, key = {micro} } @ARTICLE{ZhFaZhHu:04, author = {Zhang,X. and Fan,S. and Zhang,L. and Huang,J.}, title = {Local governance and public goods provision in rural China}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2004}, volume = {88}, pages = {2857-2871}, abstract = {In developing countries, identifying the most effective community-levelgovernance mode is a key issue in rural development; therefore, empiricalevaluation of these different modes is desperately needed. Since the 1980s,tens of thousands of villages in rural China have held local governmentelections, providing a good opportunity to investigate the effect of democratizationon the level of public goods provision. Using a recent village survey conductedover a significant period of time, this article compares two differentgovernance modes. It finds that elections affect little on the size ofrevenue but significantly shift the distribution of taxation from individualsto enterprises if possible. However, privatization has made taxation orlevies on rural enterprises more difficult. It also shows that electionsand power sharing are conducive to improve the allocation of public expenditures.}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{Zhen:07IO, author = {Zheng, Bulong}, title = {Inequality orderings and unit consistency}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {2007}, volume = {29}, pages = {515 - 538}, abstract = {The paper examines the implications of the newly proposed unit consistency axiom for partial inequality orderings. We first show that some intermediate Lorenz dominance conditions violate the axiom. We then characterize a class of intermediate Lorenz orderings and demonstrate that the only unit-consistent member is the one related to Krtscha (Models and measurement of welfare and inequality. Springer, Heidelberg, 1994)’s intermediate notion of inequality which has recently been investigated by Zoli (A surplus sharing approach to themeasurement of inequality. Discussion paper no. 98/25, University of York, 1998; Logic, game, theory and social choice. Tilburg University Press, Tilburg, 1999) and Yoshida (Soc Choice Welf 24:557–574, 2005). Finally, we provide a general characterization for unit-consistent Lorenz orderings and the Krtscha-type dominance again turns out to be the only one that is intermediate and unit-consistent.}, key = {Income Inequality}, owner = {Filippos Petroulakis}, timestamp = {2008.04.11} } @ARTICLE{Zhen:07UC, author = {Zheng, B.}, title = {Unit-consistent decomposable inequality measures}, journal = {Economica}, year = {2007}, volume = {74}, pages = {97-111}, number = {293}, abstract = {This paper introduces a new axiom-the unit consistency axiom-into inequality measurement. This new axiom requires the ordinal inequality rankings (rather than the cardinal indices) to be unaffected when incomes are expressed in different units. I argue that unit consistency is an indispensable axiom for the measurement of income inequality. When unit consistency is combined with decomposability, I show that the unit-consistent decomposable class of inequality measures is a two-parameter extension of the one-parameter generalized entropy class. The extended class accommodates a variety of value judgments and includes different types of inequality measures.}, key = {inequality}, keywords = {INTERMEDIATE INEQUALITY; POPULATION SUBGROUPS; INCOME INEQUALITY; WELFARE} } @ARTICLE{Zhen:01, author = {Zheng, B.}, title = {Statistical Inference for Poverty Measures with Relative Poverty Lines}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2001}, volume = {101}, pages = {337-356}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Zhen:00MD, author = {Zheng, B.}, title = {Minimum Distribution-Sensitivity, Poverty Aversion, and Poverty Orderings}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, year = {2000}, volume = {95}, pages = {116-137}, key = {Poverty}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2006.01.22} } @ARTICLE{Zhen:00PO, author = {Zheng, B.}, title = {Poverty orderings}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {2000}, volume = {14}, pages = {427-466}, owner = {faybisov}, timestamp = {2007.07.04} } @ARTICLE{Zhen:99, author = {Zheng, Buhong}, title = {On the power of poverty orderings}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1999}, volume = {16}, note = {forthcoming}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Zhen:98, author = {Zheng, Buhong}, title = {Poverty orderings: a graphical illustration}, institution = {Department of Economics, University of Colorado}, year = {1998}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Zhen:97AP, author = {Zheng, Buhong}, title = {Aggregate poverty measures}, journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys}, year = {1997}, volume = {11}, pages = {123-162}, number = {2}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Zhen:97SI, author = {Zheng, Buhong}, title = {Statistical inferences for testing marginal rank and (Generalized) {L}orenzdominances}, institution = {Department of Economics, University of Colorado at Denver}, year = {1997}, type = {working paper}, number = {9707}, note = {forthcoming Southern Economic Journal}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Zhen:96OT, author = {Zheng, Buhong}, title = {On the Power of Poverty Orderings}, institution = {Department of Economics, University of Colorado at Denver}, year = {1996}, month = {July}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Zhen:96SI, author = {Zheng, Buhong}, title = {Statistical Inferences for Testing marginal changes in {L}orenz and {G}eneralized{L}orenz Curves}, institution = {Department of Economics, University of Colorado at Denver}, year = {1996}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{Zhen:94, author = {Zheng, Buhong}, title = {Can a poverty index be both relative and absolute?}, journal = {Econometrica}, year = {1994}, volume = {62}, pages = {1453-1458}, number = {6}, month = {November}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Zhen:93, author = {Zheng, B.}, title = {An axiomatic characterization of the Watts index}, journal = {Economics Letters}, year = {1993}, volume = {42}, pages = {81-86}, key = {poverty} } @TECHREPORT{Zheng&&, author = {Zheng, Buhong and Cushing, Brian J.}, title = {Statistical inferences for testing inequality indices with dependent samples}, institution = {Department of Economics, University of Colorado}, year = {\&\&}, journal = __, key = {statistics}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @ARTICLE{ZhCu:01, author = {Zheng, Buhong and Cushing, Brian J.}, title = {Statistical inferences for testing inequality indices with dependent samples}, journal = {Journal of Econometrics}, year = {2001}, pages = {315-335}, number = {101}, key = {statistics} } @TECHREPORT{ZhCu:96, author = {Zheng, Buhong and Cushing, Brian J.}, title = {Large Sample Statistical Inferences for Testing Marginal Changes in InequalityIndices}, institution = {University of Colorado at Denver}, year = {1996}, type = {Working Paper}, key = {statistics} } @ARTICLE{ZhCuCh:95, author = {Zheng, B. and Cushing, B. J. and Chow, K. V.}, title = {Statistical Tests of Changes in {US} Poverty, 1975 to 1990}, journal = {Southern Economic Journal}, year = {1995}, volume = {62}, pages = {334-347}, key = {poverty} } @ARTICLE{Zhou:99, author = {Zhou, Lin}, title = {Subjective probability theory with continuous acts}, journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {32}, pages = {121-130}, key = {uncertainty} } @ARTICLE{Zhur:00, author = {Zhuravskaya, E. V.}, title = {Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Federalism, {R}ussian Style}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2000}, volume = {76}, pages = {337-368}, key = {Local public goods} } @ARTICLE{Zilc:03, author = {Zilcha, I.}, title = {Intergenerational Transfers, Production and Income Distribution}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {489-513}, key = {public economics} } @ARTICLE{ZiKn:99, author = {Ziliak, James P. and Kniesner, Thomas K.}, title = {Estimating Life cycle labor supply tax effects}, journal = {Journal of Political Economy}, year = {1999}, volume = {107}, number = {2}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{Zimm:92, author = {Zimmerman, D.}, title = {Regression Toward Mediocrity in Economic Stature}, journal = {American Economic Review}, year = {1992}, volume = {82}, pages = {409-429}, key = {household} } @ARTICLE{ZiCa:03, author = {Zimmerman, F. J. and Carter, M. R.}, title = {Asset smoothing, consumption smoothing and the reproduction of inequality under risk and subsistence constraints}, journal = {Journal of Development Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {71}, pages = {233-260}, abstract = {A growing literature asks whether low-wealth agents can accumulate assets over time or whether they are trapped in poverty. This paper develops a stochastic dynamic programming model with endogenous asset price risk to explore savings and portfolio decisions in a resourcepoor environment characterized by risk and subsistence constraints. Optimal portfolio strategies are found to bifurcate, despite divisible assets and fully rational agents. Wealthier agents acquire a higher-yielding portfolio and pursue conventional consumption smoothing. Poorer agents acquire a less remunerative portfolio and pursue asset smoothing, rather than consumption smoothing. Assetbased risk coping thus results in positive correlation between initial wealth and portfolio rate of return.}, owner = {Cowell}, timestamp = {2008.02.15} } @ARTICLE{Zimp:08, author = {Zimper, A.}, title = {Revisiting Independence and Stochastic Dominance for Compound Lotteries}, journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, abstract = {We establish mathematical equivalence between independence of irrelevant alternatives and monotonicity with respect to first order stochastic dominance. This formal equivalence result between the two principles is obtained under two key conditions. Firstly, for all natural numbers m, each principle is defined on the domain of compound lotteries with compoundness level m. Secondly, the standard concept of reduction of compound lotteries applies.}, key = {normative theory}, owner = {zhangz3}, timestamp = {2008.07.14} } @BOOK{Zipf:49, title = {Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort}, publisher = {Addison-Wesley}, year = {1949}, author = {Zipf, G. K.}, address = {Reading, Mass}, key = {Distributions} } @ARTICLE{ZiStWeFa:00, author = {Zizzo, D. J. and Stolarz;Fantino, S. and Wen, J. and Fantino, E.}, title = {A Violation of the Monotonicity Axiom: Experimental Evidence on the ConjunctionFallacy}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2000}, volume = {41,3}, pages = {263-276}, key = {Experiments} } @ARTICLE{Zizzo2000, author = {Zizzo, D. J. and Stolarz;Fantino, S. and Wen, J. and Fantino, E.}, title = {A Violation of the Monotonicity Axiom: Experimental Evidence on the Conjunction Fallacy}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization}, year = {2000}, volume = {41,3}, pages = {263-276}, key = {Experiments}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @INCOLLECTION{Zoli:99AG, author = {Zoli, C.}, title = {A Generalized Version of the Inequality Equivalence Criterion: A SurplusSharing Characterization, Complete and Partial Orderings}, booktitle = {Game Theory and Social Choice}, publisher = {Tilburg University Press}, year = {1999}, editor = {{De S}wart}, address = {Tilburg}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Zoli:99IG, author = {Zoli, C.}, title = {Intersecting generalized {L}orenz curves and the {G}ini index}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1999}, volume = {16}, pages = {183-196}, abstract = {As is well known, the use of the Gini coefficient in comparisons is inconsistentwith an utilitarian approach. This paper analyzes the Gini coefficient'snormative significance in welfare comparisons evaluating income distributionsaccording to Yaari dual social welfare function. When generalized Lorenzcurves cross once, the Gini coefficient is decisive in determining welfarerankings if we strengthen the Principle of Transfers applying a Positionalversion of the Principle of Transfer Sensitivity. This result can alsobe extended to the case of multiple crossings.}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Zoli1998a, author = {Zoli, C.}, title = {Intersecting generalized {L}orenz curves and the {G}ini index}, journal = {Social Choice and Welfare}, year = {1998}, note = {forthcoming}, key = {inequality}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{Zoli:98AS, author = {Claudio Zoli}, title = {A Surplus Sharing Approach to the Measurement of Inequality}, institution = {University of York}, year = {1998}, address = {York, U.K.}, month = {December}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Zoli:96, author = {Zoli, C.}, title = {Intersecting generalized {L}orenz curves and the {G}ini index}, institution = {Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Universit{\`a} di Bologna}, year = {1996}, type = {Mimeo}, address = {Piazza Scaravilli 2, Bologna}, key = {inequality} } @TECHREPORT{Zubi:85, author = {Zubiri, I.}, title = {Income Inequality as a Predictor of Welfare Inequality}, institution = {Universidad de Pa\'{\i}s {V}asco}, year = {1985}, type = {SEED}, number = {40}, note = {Instituto de Economia P{\'u}blica}, key = {inequality} } @ARTICLE{Zues:98, author = {Zuesse, Eric}, title = {An hypothesis regarding pricing of black-market goods}, journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization}, year = {1998}, volume = {34}, pages = {499-504}, number = {3}, key = {tax evasion} } @TECHREPORT{Zweifel1985, author = {Zweifel, P. and Pommerehne, W. W.}, title = {On Preaching Water and Drinking Wine: An Analysis of Voting on Tax Amnesty and Under-Reporting of Income}, institution = {University of Z\"urich}, year = {1985}, type = {mimeo}, address = {Z\"urich, Switzerland}, key = {tax evasion}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @TECHREPORT{ZwPo:85, author = {Zweifel, P. and Pommerehne, W. W.}, title = {On Preaching Water and Drinking Wine: An Analysis of Voting on Tax Amnestyand Under-Reporting of Income}, institution = {University of Z{\"u}rich}, year = {1985}, type = {mimeo}, address = {Z{\"u}rich, Switzerland}, key = {tax evasion} } @BOOK{AtPi:07, title = {Top Incomes over the 20th Century: A contrast between continental {E}uropean and {E}nglish-speaking countries}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, editor = {Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T.}, address = {Oxford}, key = {income distribution:empirical}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.08.27} } @BOOK{BeLe:08, title = {Advances on Income Inequality and Concentration Measure}, publisher = {Routledge Frontiers of Political Economy}, year = {2008}, editor = {Betti,Gianni and Lemmi,Achille}, owner = {administrator}, timestamp = {2008.10.03} } @BOOK{CoMH:98, title = {New theories in growth and development}, publisher = {MacMillan Press Ltd}, year = {1998}, editor = {Coricelli, Fabrizio and Di Matteo, Massimo and Hahn, Frank}, key = {growth} } @BOOK{CoDa:97, title = {Child Poverty and deprivation in the industrialized countries 1945-1995}, publisher = {Clarendon Press, Oxford}, year = {1997}, editor = {Cornia, Giovanni Andrea and Danziger, Sheldon}, key = {poverty} } @BOOK{Eich:94, title = {Models and Measurement of Inequality}, publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, year = {1994}, editor = {Eichorn, W}, address = {Berlin}, key = {inequality} } @BOOK{Fiel:05, title = {Macroeconomic Policy in the Franc Zone}, publisher = {Palgrace Macmillan}, year = {2005}, editor = {Fielding, D.}, pages = {213}, series = {Studies in Development Economics and POlicy}, address = {UNU World Institute For Development Economics Research Katajanokanlaituri 6B, FIN-00160 Helsinki Finland}, note = {General Editor: Anthony Shorrocks}, key = {macro}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.03.22} } @BOOK{GoGuPa:97, title = {Changing patterns in the distribution of economic welfare: An internationalperspective}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1997}, editor = {Gottschalk, Peter and Gustafsson, Bj{\"o}rn and Palmer, Edward}, key = {welfare} } @BOOK{Gottschalk1997, title = {Changing patterns in the distribution of economic welfare: An international perspective}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1997}, editor = {Gottschalk, Peter and Gustafsson, Bj{\"o}rn and Palmer, Edward}, key = {welfare}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2008.10.10} } @BOOK{InBaDiHaLu:04, title = {Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-cultural Sourcebook based on the 1999-2002 Values Surveys}, publisher = {Siglo Veinteiuno}, year = {2004}, editor = {Inglehart, R. and Basáñez, M. and Díez-Medrano, J. and Halman, L. and Luijkx, L.}, address = {Mexico}, key = {utility, preference}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2007.07.30} } @BOOK{LaGl:94, title = {Cost Benefit Analysis}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1994}, editor = {Layard, P. R. G. and Glaister, S.}, address = {Cambridge}, edition = {2nd}, key = {cost-benefit analysis}, owner = {Admin}, timestamp = {2008.09.25} } @BOOK{NaBe:97, title = {Uncertainty: Models and Measures}, publisher = {Akademie Verlag}, year = {1997}, editor = {Natke, H. Gunther and Ben-Haim, Yakov}, volume = {99}, series = {Mathematical Research}, key = {uncertainty} } @BOOK{Olaf:61, title = {Justice and Social Policy}, publisher = {Prentice-Hall}, year = {1961}, editor = {Olafson, F. A.}, address = {Englewood Cliffs, N.J.}, key = {social justice} } @BOOK{PlSm:08, title = {Hanbook of Experimental Results}, publisher = {North Holland}, year = {2008}, editor = {Charles R. Plott and Smith, Vernon L.}, volume = {1}, edition = {1st}, owner = {a1100971}, timestamp = {2009.01.23} } @BOOK{RoSt:05, title = {Meta-Regression Analysis: Issues of Pulication Bias in Economics}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing}, year = {2005}, editor = {Roberts, C. J. and Stanley, T. D.}, pages = {242}, note = {First published as a special issue of Journal of Economic Surveys (19:3), 2005}, key = {regression}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.03.22} } @BOOK{ShHo:04, title = {Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: Prospects for Pro-{P}oor Economic Development}, publisher = {OUP}, year = {2004}, editor = {Shorrocks, A. and van der Hoeven, R.}, pages = {283}, series = {UNU-WIDER Studies in Development Economics}, key = {poverty}, owner = {teytelbo}, timestamp = {2007.03.22} } @BOOK{Slem:94, title = {Tax Progressivity and Income Inequality}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1994}, editor = {Slemrod, Joel B.}, key = {taxation} } @TECHREPORT{Klev:95, title = {Labour supply responses to Swedish tax reforms 1985-1992}, institution = {National institute of economic research}, year = {1995}, type = {Tax reform evaluation report}, number = {11}, address = {Stockholm}, key = {taxation} } @ARTICLE{PaNa:88, title = {Excise tax evasion: a welfare cum crime-theoretic analysis}, journal = {Public Finance}, year = {1988}, volume = {43}, pages = {248-260}, key = {tax evasion} }