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Mr Sinad Treewanchai

Telephone +61 8 8313 6024
Position PhD Candidate
Email sinad.treewanchai@adelaide.edu.au
Fax +61 8 8223 1460
Building Nexus 10 Tower
Floor/Room 4 38
Campus North Terrace
Org Unit Economics, School of

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Biography/ Background

Education:

BA (Economics), Thammasat University, Thailand

MA (Economics), Thammasat University, Thailand

Contact:

Email: sinad.treewanchai@adelaide.edu.au

 

Research Interests

Macroeconomics, Public Finance, Human Capital, and Schooling

Research in Progress

Neighbourhoods and Competition between Public and Private Schools:

This paper provides a theoretical model with tuition-free, income-tax-financed, residency-required public schools, and competitive, tuition-financed private schools. Under some assumptions, in equilibrium there are a strict sorting in school qualities in both public and private sectors, and a student sorting with stratification by income and ability. In the public sector, better neighbourhood school qualities come with higher housing prices. In the private sector, all schools have higher qualities than the public ones. Moreover, private school households live in neighbourhoods with lowest housing prices because the tie between public school quality and residential requirement is irrelevant and no other utility can be obtained from living in a specific neighbourhood. There is no mixing of public and private school households except in the lowest housing price neighbourhoods.  

 

A Theoretical Analysis of Price Subsidisation for Private Education Households:

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of price subsidisation for private education households. A simple model of public and private education is developed in which public education services financed by property taxes of a jurisdiction is determined by majority voting of the residents and the unit price of education from private providers is higher than the public one. The result indicates that private alternatives not only eliminate residential requirement for high-spending education but also reduces the rent premium in housing prices. Laissez-faire equilibrium in which public and private education coexist is not efficient, only Tiebout equilibrium is. Under some assumptions, a unit price subsidy, financed by income taxes, to private education households can be a Pareto improvement policy. The multiple jurisdiction model with both public and private sectors and the analysis of unit price subsidisation are the main contribution of this paper. 

 

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Entry last updated: Thursday, 4 Oct 2012

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