Returning to Growth
Lessons from previous cycles in Australia’s wine industry

Kym Anderson

March 2015

© Kym Anderson
WINE ECONOMICS RESEARCH CENTRE

The Wine Economics Research Centre was established in 2010 by the School of Economics and the Wine 2030 Research Network of the University of Adelaide, having been previously a program in the University's Centre for International Economic Studies.

The Centre's purpose is to promote and foster its growing research strength in the area of wine economics research, and to complement the University's long-established strength in viticulture and oenology.

The key objectives for the Wine Economics Research Centre are to:
- publish wine economics research outputs and disseminate them to academia, industry and government
- contribute to economics journals, wine industry journals and related publications
- promote collaboration and sharing of information, statistics and analyses between industry, government agencies and research institutions
- sponsor wine economics seminars, workshops and conferences and contribute to other grape and wine events

Contact details:
Wine Economics Research Centre
School of Economics
University of Adelaide
SA 5005 AUSTRALIA
Email: wine-econ@adelaide.edu.au

Centre publications can be downloaded at: www.adelaide.edu.au/wine-econ/
Returning to Growth

Lessons from previous cycles in Australia’s wine industry

Kym Anderson
Wine Economics Research Centre
University of Adelaide
kym.anderson@adelaide.edu.au

March 2015

Returning to Growth

Lessons from previous cycles in Australia’s wine industry

Kym Anderson

The *Strategy 2025* document, developed by a few visionary leaders in the mid-1990s to expand the Australian wine industry (AWF 1995), attracted more investment funds than was ever imagined. A key consequence was that Australia led the way for New World wine exporters to ride the late-20th century globalization wave, transforming many of the world’s wine markets and securing Australia’s place as a serious player in the most-rapidly growing of those markets.

Then a perfect storm of shocks hit the Australian industry: a decade-long, mining-induced appreciation of the Australian dollar, a multi-year drought with severe consequences for the availability and cost of irrigation water, rapid wine export expansion by competitor countries, the global financial crisis that began in 2008, and the launch of an austerity and anti-corruption drive in 2012 by a new Chinese Government that effectively curtailed government-funded banqueting and gifting of wine.

This coincidence of shocks brought to a halt what had been the fifth boom since the 1840s in Australia’s wine industry development.

What can we learn from earlier booms about how to return the industry to a growth trajectory that is sustainable and less vulnerable to yet another slump?

*Past trends and cycles*

Australia’s wine industry expanded throughout most of the past 17 decades, but around that very long-run trend have been five distinct cycles in vine area and wine production (Table 1).

The latest boom in plantings is the biggest of the five by far in absolute terms and in number of years, but in proportional terms it is only moderate by historical standards (Figures 1 and 2).

Each expansion of the bearing area of vineyards, when placed on a per capita basis, was very rapid; but in each case it was followed by a longer period of per capita decline (Figure 3).

---

1 All figures in this document are taken from Anderson (2015).
Those sharp increases and subsequent longer slumps or declines are also evident when the vine area is shown relative to the country’s total crop area. That indicator has fluctuated around a declining long-run trend since the end of the 19th century (Figure 4).

Even so, wine production per capita and per dollar of overall GDP have trended upwards (Figures 3 and 4). This opposite trend to vine area is due to increasing yields per hectare, thanks to an expanding share of vines being irrigated and more grapes being used for wine rather than other uses.

As for domestic demand, wine was only a small part of alcohol consumption prior to 1970 (Figure 5). Its per capita consumption grew slower than income up to the 1950s, but it has trended upwards at a faster rate than income since then (Figure 6).

Only two of the four previous booms involved the industry becoming more outward-focused: the period just prior to the 1890s, and the post-World War I period prior to the depression of the early 1930s (columns 6 and 12 of Table 1). Both of those export-intensive cycles were partly induced, however, by government support policies that led to surplus production. Those exports were thus more a means of disposing of a surplus than a source of sustainable growth.

The other two booms, 1855-71 and 1967-75, were driven almost entirely by domestic demand growth, generated by rapid immigration and income growth.

Prior to the 1890s, when its exports were dominated by wool and gold, Australia had been a net importer of wine; but thereafter the volume of wine exports exceeded imports every year except during 1976-86 when mining exports boomed once again (Figure 7). Wine imports into Australia always have been higher priced than its exports, however, since a non-trivial share is sparkling wine from Champagne. In value terms Australia was a net importer of wine also in half of the first 14 years of Federation (when the average price of imports was more than six times that of exports) and in 1973-75 (Anderson 2015, Table 15).

National wine production at the start of the 20th century was three times its 1880 level. As it had grown faster than domestic demand, one-sixth of the newly federated country’s wine production was being exported (as bulk full-bodied reds), albeit at low fob prices.

Following World War I the vine area expanded rapidly, encouraged by the subsidized settlement on farms of ex-servicemen, particularly in the newly developed Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area of NSW and along the Murray River. Annual output of wine more than doubled in the decade to 1925, leading to a glut especially of Doradillo grapes whose price fell by two-thirds in 1924.

The Australian Government decided to further assist producers in the newly planted areas by offering assistance in the form of a volumetric bounty on fortified wine exports. The export bounty almost doubled the price received by producers, which dampened domestic fortified wine sales at the same time as boosting production and exports of fortified wines.

Then in its June 1925 budget, the British Government introduced, by way of thanks for war contributions, tariff preferences for wines from the British Empire that effectively halved the duty paid by Australia in that market. Like the export bounty, the UK import duty was volumetric rather than ad valorem, thereby discriminating in favour of low-quality wines; and
the UK preference was four times as great for fortified as for still wine, further depressing the incentive to produce quality still wines.

The industry continued to be assisted also during the interwar and early post-WWII period by import tariffs on wine and brandy, a sales tax of 15% on imported but not domestically produced wine, excise taxes on beer and spirits but not on wine, and a lower excise tax on brandy than on other spirits.

The import tax on wine was non-trivial, generating a rate of industry assistance that was above the average for other manufactures and twice the average for the agricultural sector. That helps explain both the low share of imported wine in domestic consumption and the relatively low overall level of wine consumption up to the mid-1960s.

With returns to winemakers falling from the late 1920s, a vine-pull scheme by the South Australian Government was introduced in 1936. That contributed to two-thirds of the Coonawarra region’s vines being uprooted. Meanwhile, in Victoria’s Yarra Valley, farmers began turning to dairying; and in the Hunter Valley of New South Wales, the area of vines was eventually halved. Hence the total vine area in Australia grew very little over the third cycle, and it was five decades before the annual volume of wine exports achieved in the late 1930s (artificially boosted to build stocks in Britain for the foreshadowed war) was again reached.

The export assistance in the interwar period was a mixed blessing at best: being confined to fortified wines it undermined the growing British and continental European interest in Australian dry table wines that had been slowly building up over the previous few decades; and, by being volumetric rather than *ad valorem*, the trade measures dampened the incentive to produce higher-quality wines.

In 1947 Britain raised its tariff on fortified wines five-fold (and kept it very high until the end of the 1950s) and the Australian government removed its wine export bounty. Britain hiked its tariff on fortified wines again in the late 1960s, and in 1973 it joined the European Economic Community which allowed duty-free access to wines from the other EEC members.

The area of vines and wine production grew only slowly from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s, and wine exports were flat. The Korean War-induced wool price boom and then subsidies to other farm products meant sheep, wheat, milk and tobacco production appealed more to farmers than winegrapes. As well, tighter import restrictions on other manufactured goods boosted the import-competing industrial sector, while the removal in the early 1960s of a ban on iron ore exports triggered a boom in mining exploration, both of which indirectly dampened producer incentives in other sectors including wine.

The 50% rise in wine consumption in the 1960s was helped by a one-third increase in real income per capita, by brand advertising and generic promotion domestically, by the influx of wine-preferring immigrants from southern Europe, and by many more young Australians travelling to Europe once cheap airfares for under-26-year-olds were introduced. (A symptom of the influence of southern Europeans on Australian preferences was the gradual transformation of non-alcoholic beverage consumption from 3 kgs of tea and 0.4 kgs of coffee per year in the early 1950s to 0.8 kgs of tea and 2.4 kgs of coffee by the late 1990s.)
A mining boom at home and spikes in energy raw material and food prices internationally in 1973-74 and again in 1979-80 reduced the competitiveness of Australia’s producers of other tradables including wine. Wine exports remained flat from the mid-1960s to mid-1980s, wine exports to the UK shrunk by nine-tenths, and the value of wine imports exceeded that of exports during 1973-86. Grape and wine prices also remained low, particularly for reds.

A subsequent surge in demand for premium red wines stimulated an expansion in their production from the late 1960s. This was followed by an equally sudden surge in domestic consumer interest in premium white wines from the mid-1970s, which was followed in turn by a renewed interest in reds in the following cycle. Varietal bearing areas followed that pattern, with an inevitable lag (Figure 8).

During this and the previous cycle the share of fortified wines in domestic sales shrank, from more than half to just 7%. In vineyards, premium table wine varieties, which were less than 20% of the area up to the mid-1960s, represented 40% by the mid-1970s.


This period also saw the commercial development of the 2- to 4-litre cask, or ‘wine in a box’, which added hugely to domestic demand at the lower end of the market. Between 1978 and 1984 the volume of white wine sold in Australia in a plastic bag inside a box rose from 33 to 152 ML per year, while bottled red and white wine sales fell by one-quarter, from 73 to 55 ML.

Neither of the surges in production in the two decades to the mid-1980s, of first red and then white table wines, was export-driven. The industry continued to be internationally uncompetitive and dependent on import restrictions on dried vine fruit, wine and brandy.

In 1984 the Government introduced a 10% wholesale sales tax on wine, and raised it to 20% two years later. That, plus the perceived over-supply situation especially in reds in the mid-1980s, meant the prospects for grapegrowers and winemakers looked bleak. It seemed inconceivable to many observers at that time that another boom was about to begin, so the South Australian and Federal governments co-financed a vine-pull scheme in 1985-86.

**The current cycle, beginning in 1986**

The most-recent boom began in 1986 with a steady increase in exports to take advantage of the historically low value of the Australian dollar, which was due to a sharp fall in prices of Australia’s coal, grain and other primary export products.

The export expansion was so large as to raise wine’s share of total merchandise exports above the 0.9% record set in 1932, peaking in 2004 at 2.3%, just as mineral exports were taking off.

The wholesale value of Australian wine sales doubled between 1984-86 and 1992-94, and both the domestic consumer price and the export price of Australian wine grew by around 50% over that period. Those price changes stimulated vine plantings, wine production and
wine exports, and slowed the growth in domestic sales of Australian wine (as did another increase in the wholesale sales tax on wine from 1993).

Grapegrowers were the main beneficiaries of the initial increase in Australian wine prices. The average price received for winegrapes was three times higher in 1999 than at the start of that decade, even though the export price rose only 60% (Figure 9).

While this fifth boom was largely market-driven, it was also influenced by changes in government interventions. The steady reduction in manufacturing protection and in assistance to some other agricultural industries, that began in 1972 and accelerated through the 1980s and 1990s, paralleled and thus offset the reductions in nominal rates of assistance to grape and wine producers (Figure 10).

The imposition from 1984 of the wholesale sales tax on wine dampened domestic sales but encouraged exporting, while the government’s vine-pull scheme in the mid-1980s led to the loss of some valuable old vines but the replacement of others with more-profitable varieties.

By way of consolation for raising the wholesale sales tax again in 1993, the government assisted new plantings of vines by providing for accelerated depreciation of vineyard construction costs, which contributed to the trebling of the vineyard area during the boom.

That huge expansion in vineyard plantings inevitably led to a surge in winegrape production three or so years later. Stocks of wine ready for sale trebled in the ten years to 2005.

Meanwhile, several New World suppliers had begun to emulate the Australian export-led experience, leading to a growth spurt in their wine exports just a few years behind Australia’s. As well, several Old World suppliers and Argentina and Chile were expanding their exports because of declining domestic consumption.

Thus Australian exporters began to face increasing competition just as the historically low value of the Australian dollar began its unprecedented 12-year rise (of 75% in trade-weighted real terms) after 2001.

The AUD appreciation contributed greatly to the subsequent decline in the AUD price of Australia’s wine exports.

While the volume of those exports continued to expand each year until 2007 before stabilizing, their value plummeted as the AUD continued to rise in the wake of the massive mining investment boom.

The decline in wine export prices saw a parallel (and hence proportionately larger) decline in winegrape prices after 2001, yet the bearing area of grapes continued to rise for another seven years. By 2011 the average winegrape price had returned to the same nominal level as in 1989 (Figure 9).

Domestic consumers benefitted from these developments: the retail price index for wine grew far less than the overall consumer price index every year of the past ten. That was despite the increased consumption of higher-priced imported wines, which grew dramatically from the turn of the century thanks to the AUD appreciation (from 3% to 15% in volume and from 5%
A direct consequence of the wine and grape price collapse was that both vineyard and winery asset prices plummeted after 2007, with some vineyards selling for no more than unimproved land value. The collapse in asset values was partly because banks lost interest in financing the industry, and partly because listed corporations sought to shed their least-productive vineyard and winery assets to boost the rates of reported return on their remaining capital.

**Was the optimism at the start of the 5th cycle warranted?**

The latest boom differs from the earlier booms in several important respects that justified new optimism. First, it was overwhelmingly export-oriented, in contrast with the first and fourth booms. Second, it was mostly market-driven. This was not unlike the first two booms, but in contrast to the third (inter-war) boom that evaporated once government export assistance measures were withdrawn. Third, the quality of wine output improved hugely relative to the cost of production and its price. Fourth, the aging of the population and the rapid growth in incomes in high and middle-income countries, at least up to the 2008 financial crisis, was boosting demand, as was the global spread of wine supermarketing.

As well, those contemplating new investments in Australia’s wine industry at the end of the 20th century could be excused for not anticipating the rapidity with which other New World suppliers copied Australia’s export-led growth model. Nor could those investors have anticipated the combination of an unprecedented 12-year rise from 2001 in the value of the AUD, the global financial crisis from 2008 which reduced wine demand and weakened the US dollar, Euro and Pound Sterling, and a long and widespread drought that stimulated major policy reforms affecting irrigation water availability and pricing.

**How exceptional was the latest export growth spurt?**

Certainly the latest boom raised the annual volume and value of wine exports and the share of wine production exported to levels far exceeding previous Australian records (Figures 3 and 7), and the length of this boom (21 years) is 50% longer than the first export boom in the late 19th century globalization wave and twice as long as the inter-war boom (Table 1).

However, compared with wine export growth of other countries, the boom is not particularly exceptional. All other New World wine-producing countries grew the US$ value of their wine exports faster than Australia in the first decade of this century, and they have been converging rapidly on Australia since 2008 (Figure 11).

Also, the rising export propensity of Australia’s wine industry has been matched by that of other goods-producing industries (Figure 12). Certainly the mining boom partly explains the rapid rise for other goods, but all industries are being swept up in the current wave of globalization.

Together these trends mean that Australia’s comparative advantage in wine has slipped substantially since the start of the new millennium. This is indicated by the share of wine in national merchandise exports divided by wine’s share of global exports. For Australia, that index peaked at 15 in 2003 (when it was exceeded only by Moldova and Georgia) before
falling to only one-quarter of that by 2013. As shown in Figure 13, that places Australia now also below New Zealand, Chile, France, Portugal, Italy and Spain.

What did R&D and generic marketing contribute?

One of the hallmarks of the export-oriented success of Australia’s wine industry since the 1980s has been the very considerable degree of collaboration among its firms, including through levying themselves and attracting matching government funds for investments in research and development (R&D) and generic promotion.

The extent of R&D investment was modest relative to value added when compared with other industries, yet the number of research papers on viticulture and oenology generated per litre of wine produced was very high compared with other wine-producing countries.

Studies have found that the portfolio of GWRDC research projects has yielded benefit/cost ratios ranging from 7:1 to more than ten times that level.

The industry has engaged in generic promotion of exports since the late 1920s (and it added generic marketing in the domestic market from the mid-1960s). Initially the focus was on broadly promoting ‘Brand Australia’, but since 2007 the campaign became more refined with an explicit objective of encouraging consumers to ‘trade up’ to progressively higher prices. The strategy has been supplemented by regional promotion campaigns, funded by regional producer levies.

However, the budget for these generic promotion efforts is trivial relative to the value of national production and the extent of expenditure by European competitors. In 2011-12, for example, Australia’s expenditure on generic promotion was barely 0.7 cents per litre of wine produced. That same year, Bordeaux alone spent 3.3 cents per litre. The European Union supplements regional and national promotion expenditures of its member states, and during 2009-13 it provided 522 million Euros for wine promotion, the equivalent to 0.6 Australian cents per litre of EU wine produced. Moreover, despite the many misappropriations that have been uncovered, that EU promotion expenditure is to be raised to 1156 million Euros for the period 2014-18 (European Court of Auditors 2014). That is around 1.3 cents per litre, or double the rate recently spent in Australia – and that is just the supplement from Brussels, which adds to what will be spent by national governments and EU wine regions themselves.

How does Australia’s vine area and wine production compare with the rest of the world’s?

The vine intensity of cropping has a wide range globally. Italy’s share of crop area under vines was the highest in the world at 25% in the early 1960s. It had fallen to 15% by 1980-84 and to 8% by 2000-04, by which time Portugal had taken the lead at 12%. Spain is next at 7% in recent years. France and several other European countries are in the 3-4% range, the level that New Zealand recently reached, but the only other New World country above that is Chile, which recently shot up to 10%.

Australia, by contrast, has never had more than 0.35% of its crop area under vine, and has had less than half that for most years since the 1840s. Already China is approaching that intensity, averaging 0.33% in 2010-11. This suggests suitable cropping land has not been the
binding constraint on Australia’s wine industry development. Even in the two most vine-intensive States (South Australia and now Tasmania) the share of crop area under vine is just a little above 1%.

A broader indicator that goes beyond the farm sector to economy-wide productive capability is wine production relative to overall GDP. In the 19th century, the four main West European countries produced more than 60 kl of wine per real US million dollars of GDP. The range for those countries was still 15-35 kl in the late 1950s, but it had fallen below 5 kl by the early 1990s and to 3-4 kl by 2008. Australia was always below 2 kl in the 19th century and less than 3 kl in the 20th century before peaking in 2004 at 3.1 kl, close to the Old World’s current average.

An important contributor to the sales of wine in any market is the rate at which consumers are discouraged via an excise or import tax. Apart from briefly in 1971-73 and until the imposition of a wholesale sales tax from August 1984, the only taxes on wine consumption in Australia had been a tariff and a sales tax on imports. Beer and spirits consumption, by contrast, has always been subject to very heavy customs and excise taxation. Prior to the mid-1980s the Australian wine industry thus benefited from that tax regime, both directly via a protective taxes on wine imports and indirectly via heavier taxation of alcoholic beverage substitutes in the domestic market.

Between 1984 and 1999, however, a wine sales tax applied, and at an increasing rate until it was replaced in 2000 by the Wine Equalization Tax. Australia’s rate of wine consumer taxation is now high by OECD standards, and especially by the standards of significant wine-exporting countries (Figure 14). That is especially true at higher price points, because Australia’s consumer wine tax is unusual in being ad valorem (a percentage of the wholesale price) rather than volumetric (in cents per litre of alcohol).

**Why such a sharp decline in profits and yet sluggish disinvestment in the past decade?**

In 2014, 84% of the industry’s producers in Australia were not covering even their variable costs of production that year (which was even worse than the 77% survey finding for 2012 – see WFA 2014). That contrasts markedly with the situation in the United States, where for the past six years producers have had not only positive but relatively rosey financial results (Silicon Valley Bank 2015, Figures 19 and 20). In New Zealand, too, all but the smallest category of producers have been operating with healthy profits in all years since 2006, apart from a dip for some in 2010 (Deloitte and NZW 2014).

While some of those differences are due to real exchange rate changes (Anderson and Wittwer 2013a,b), the volume of winegrape production in Australia has not diminished over the past ten years despite the halving of its average winegrape price. This is understandable: because every producers’ investment involved large up-front sunk costs in assets that have no alternative use, they hang on in the hope that the downturn is only temporary or that others are exiting to speed adjustment.

Another reason for slow adjustment is that a large proportion of vigneron in regions near cities earn the majority of their income from other sources and continue to enjoy the lifestyle of being a part-time vigneron even when profits are low or negative.
Also, there are plenty of producers who continue to have access to credit or other funds even when the wine industry is depressed. Those that are in a position to purchase others’ assets at low prices at such times are then in a stronger financial position as and when the industry returns to profitability.

Inevitably, though, the vineyard bearing area begins to shrink. Between 2008 and 2013 it fell by one-fifth, and there’s been a further net reduction since then. A similar if more gradual fall in the vine area per capita occurred with the more-gradual mining boom of the 1970s/early 1980s, which was followed by a decade in which the vine area per capita hardly changed (Figure 3).

In retrospect, was the industry helped or hurt by protectionism?

While the Australian Federation began by eliminating barriers to interstate trade at the start of the 20th century, it replaced them with tariffs to restrict imports from abroad. The aim was mainly to encourage domestic manufacturing, but from the outset some import-competing agricultural industries also succeeded in securing such protection.

Dried vine fruit was one of the first farm products to get such protection, and from 1904 to 1939 that caused the price of grapes to average about 50% above what they otherwise would have been. The extent of that support dropped during the two decades following World War II, but was still double that for other farm industries, and it rose again during the 4th wine cycle (1967-86) to three to four times that for agriculture as a whole.

Winemakers also have been protected by import tariffs, and at considerable rates in earlier decades but at just 5% in recent years (and zero for New Zealand wines).

Estimates of the wine nominal rate of assistance (NRA) averaged 23% during the 3rd wine cycle (1950-67), the same as for other manufacturing. During the 4th cycle (1967-86) the wine NRA averaged 32%, almost double the average for all other manufacturing of 17%.

Both those NRA averages have since diminished and both are now less than 4% (Figure 10). But prior to the 1980s wine import tariffs were virtually prohibitive, with imports rarely accounting for more than 2% of domestic consumption during the 3rd and 4th cycles (Figure 7).

The extent of support for the agricultural sector as a whole peaked in 1971, just before the Whitlam Labor Government was elected the next year and began dismantling farm support programs. In 1973 all import tariffs were cut overnight by one-quarter, reducing manufacturing protection to that extent. Then the Hawke Labor Government floated the AUD in December 1983 and introduced major microeconomic reforms including programs to phase out import tariffs and quotas and production and export subsidies by the new millennium.

In short, throughout all but the last years of the 20th century, manufacturing has been protected and the agricultural sector as a whole strongly discriminated against by Australia’s trade-related policies. Yet within that broad picture, grape and wine producers received relatively favourable treatment throughout the last century.
Since protectionism in general leads to an inefficient allocation of the nation’s resources, is taxing of consumers, and inhibits innovation and productivity growth, the same could be argued about supports for Australia’s wine industry. By discouraging imports and raising wine prices, consumers drank less wine and were less aware than they would have been of the wide range of qualities and varieties of wines and brandies available elsewhere. Those policies, together with the assistance to fortified wine exports in the interwar period, also lowered the incentive for producers to raise their productivity and specialize in the wines in which they were most competitive globally. It was only when those policies were phased out from the mid-1980s that the wine industry became far more dynamic, innovative, and internationally competitive – notwithstanding the recent slump.

**Regional developments from the late 20th century**

The Australian wine industry’s export-led growth and quality upgrading since the 1980s has added remarkable wealth and vitality to many rural regions of Australia. It has also altered the characteristics of grape and wine production in those various regions. Since 2003 some have increased their share of the national vineyard a lot (Coonawarra, Adelaide Hills, Riverina) while others have seen their share fall a lot (most notably the Murray Darling region of Victoria).

For convenience the regions have been classified into three climatic zones. The country’s hot zones accounted for 48% of the country’s wine grape area in 2001, 46% in 2006, and 42% in 2012. Another 42% of the area comprises warm zones.

The cool regions, such as the Adelaide Hills, Tasmania, Mornington Peninsula and Yarra Valley, accounted for 12% of the bearing area in 2006. However, they have expanded their plantings by two-fifths over the first decade of this century, and by 2012 comprised 15% of the national area.

Tasmania is the coolest region. Its share of the national wine grape area was less than 0.2% in 1990, but it rose to 0.5% in 2001 and 0.8% by 2012. With less than 1% of Tasmania’s crop area devoted to vineyards, it still has enormous potential to expand, should climate change encourage more growers to move to higher latitudes.

Climate change and a preference swing toward finer wines is also encouraging growers to move to higher altitudes such as in the Adelaide Hills: by 2008, 30% of that region’s crop land was under vines, up from virtually zero in the early 1970s.

Certainly yields per hectare typically are lower and more variable in cooler regions, but higher prices compensate more or less for that: in 2008 the cool-region average price was one-quarter above that for warm regions and almost three times above that for hot regions. Prices were lower in 2013 than a decade earlier in virtually all but the premium cool-climate regions, and the proportional fall was especially largest in the four large hot regions.

**Which regions have adjusted most since the latest downturn?**

Between 2001 and 2008, Australia’s cool and warm regions had the highest rates of vine area expansion. Cool-climate regions of other countries also expanded in the first decade of this century: in the US, the vine area increased 55% in Sonoma County of California, 108% in
Oregon State, and 158% in Washington State, while New Zealand’s area grew 220%. Presumably a similar force was at work in all three New World countries, namely, an increasing appreciation for finer wines as incomes and familiarity with wine grew locally and abroad.

By 2012, however, when Australia had almost 21,000 fewer hectares than in 2008, every State except Tasmania had seen its area shrink. The shrinkage was least in South Australia (a 1% drop to 70,000 ha) and greatest in Victoria (a one-third drop to 24,700 ha, all but 4% of which was in its hot irrigated regions). Western Australia had a one-fifth drop to 10,300 ha, and New South Wales had a one-tenth drop to 38,300 ha.

Almost none of the falls in vine area were in cool climate regions, and the 9% drop in warm regions was only half as large as the 19% drop in hot regions.

Within each of the climatic regions the change was far from uniform though. Eight cool-climate regions shrunk, offsetting smaller gains in ten other cool regions. In the hot regions, Riverina and Lower Murray had gains but they only slightly offset the losses, which were largest in the big irrigated regions along the rest of the Murray River.

As for the warm regions, the biggest vineyard losses in New South Wales were in the Hunter Valley, Mudgee and Cowra with only a slight offset in Orange; in South Australia the regions of Langhorne Creek and Currency Creek had the largest losses.

These adjustments suggest that while climate change may have driven part of that adjustment, some was also the result of having planted in less-suitable places or with less than optimal varieties during the immediately preceding boom period.

The lack of area reduction in regions near cities probably reflects the fact that many small producers there are enjoying the lifestyle of being a vigneron, and are willing to finance that indulgence with off-farm income or assets acquired elsewhere.

The rebate on the Wine Equalization Tax of 29% on the first $1.7 million of sales each year also has helped small wineries to stay in business.

**Rapid changes in the mix of varieties and their country of origin since the 1950s**

The varietal distinctiveness of Australia vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and the varietal differentiation between regions within the country, are far less than for other countries. This pattern has become even more pronounced since 2000.

Associated with a dramatic change in the varietal mix in Australia’s vineyards is a change in the country of origin of the varieties being made into wine. In the 1950s Spanish varieties made up about half of Australia’s area, and French varieties one-fifth. Today, French varieties account for all but one-tenth of the area and Spanish varieties comprise less than 3% (Figure 15).

Much publicity has been attached to the increased plantings of so-called emerging or alternative varieties that are diversifying Australia’s vineyards. Of those varieties not in the world’s top-20 list and which have expanded from less than 200 hectares in Australia in
2000, there are ten whose areas have grown significantly since then. But in aggregate those ten raised their share of Australia’s total winegrape area between 2001 and 2010 by only 1.7%.

The eight varieties whose area in Australia expanded most over the first decade of this century are, apart from Viognier, all in the top 20 globally. The share for Shiraz alone rose 6 percentage points over that decade, while Chardonnay’s rose 5 points and the shares of Sauvignon Blanc and Pinot Gris each rose 2 points.

Not surprisingly, emerging varieties are being displayed on wine labels as soon as possible by producers seeking to differentiate themselves in novel ways. Eleven of the emerging varieties are among the 35 most-frequently mentioned varieties on Australian bottles sold – even though those 11 varieties in aggregate accounted for only 1.4% of the value of Australia’s winegrape production in 2012.

Despite this flurry of new varieties appearing on wine labels, the increase in varietal diversity of Australia’s vineyards observed between 1956 and 1984 had reversed considerably by 2012, when there were just 25 varieties that had shares of national area and production greater than 0.2%.

**The decline in Australia’s varietal distinctiveness**

The Varietal Similarity Index or VSI between Australia and the world rose by more than one-third between 2000 and 2010 to 0.62, indicating a substantial drift in Australia’s varietal mix toward the world aggregate mix over that decade.

Meanwhile, the average of the VSIs for all other countries is much lower and it hardly changed between 2000 and 2010, at 0.35. In other words, Australia was much less distinct than the average country in its varietal mix in 2000, and its distinctiveness became even less so by 2010.

Since France is the country whose varietal mix is most similar to the world mix, this means in effect that Australia has become more like France: the two countries had a VSI of 0.47 in 2000 and 0.58 in 2010.

A key reason for Australia’s varietal mix becoming more like the global mix has to do with Syrah. The popularity which Australia brought to Syrah in the 1990s has led to many other countries expanding their plantings of this variety.

In 1990 there were 35,000 bearing hectares, making it 35th in area ranking of all winegrape varieties globally. But by 2000 there were 102,000 hectares, and by 2010 that had risen to 186,000, bringing Syrah to the 6th position on that global ladder and less than one-third below the areas of the two now-most-widespread varieties, namely Cabernet Sauvignon and Merlot. Over the decade to 2010, the Syrah area grew more than either Cabernet or Merlot – in fact only Tempranillo expanded faster globally.

Certainly Australia contributed to that expanding area of Syrah, but expansion was even greater in France and Spain. Australia is no longer as globally dominant in this variety: its
share of the global Syrah area has dropped from 29% in 2000 to 23% in 2010, even though Syrah increased its share of Australia’s own vineyards over that decade, from 22% to 28%.

Varietal differences between regions within Australia are more muted than is the case within other countries, despite the very large differences in growing conditions across Australia.

Of the three most-similar regions in the world to each of Australia’s 94 regions in 2010, less than 7% were non-Australian regions. In New Zealand, by contrast, more than two-thirds of the three most-similar regions to each of its ten regions were in other countries.

It is true that some regions in Australia have managed to pull away from the pack and so are more differentiated from the national mix now than in 2000. However, a little over one-fifth of Australia’s 74 regions, comprising 40% of the national winegrape area in 2010, changed their varietal mix hardly at all over that decade.

*Increasing varietal quality differences within Australia*

Given that different varieties grow better in some regions than others, and that consumer tastes change over time, it is not surprising that there is also considerable dispersion in the national average prices by variety.

In 2001 the difference between the lowest and highest average varietal prices was more than six-fold, and it shrunk very little by 2010 despite the two-fifths fall in the nominal average price for all varieties.

The ranking from lowest- to highest-priced varieties changed a lot over that decade though, reflecting the fact that the mixes of varieties in all three climate zones in Australia have altered considerably.

*Varietal prices and summer ripening temperatures*

In the Northern Hemisphere it is common to observe an inverted U-shape relationship between the price of winegrapes and the temperature during the summer ripening period. Across Australia’s regions, by contrast, that relationship tends to be only negative for observed temperatures (Figure 16).

As the number of cool-climate regions expands that relationship in future years may become a little more like Europe’s, but that tendency may be offset by the facts that Australia’s climate continues to warm and the summer mean temperatures are becoming higher and are bringing forward the harvest dates.

The current pattern of lower prices in warmer regions is likely to mean that climate change will lower Australia’s average winegrape price, unless vigneron switches to Southern European varieties more suited to our relatively warm climate or raise the share of winegrape production in cooler regions.

*What are the market prospects for the rest of this decade?*
The Australian wine industry is not alone in feeling challenged during the past few years. Common contributors include the following:

- a chronic oversupply of winegrapes and wine in the European Union,
- retail concentration of supermarkets, with the largest developing their own labels by buying bulk wine,
- tight regulatory environments for wine distribution in such settings as Ontario, many of the US states and Scandinavia,
- the global financial crisis from 2008,
- expanding supplies in emerging markets such as China,
- consumer health and environmental concerns,
- anti-alcohol campaigns by health and road safety lobbyists, and
- great uncertainties resulting from climate change and associated policy responses.

Australian producers have had to deal also with such things as:

- a high-valued currency that has made Australian wines less competitive,
- large stocks of unsold wine (thanks to the rapidity of vineyard expansion),
- a fashion swing against Australian wine especially in the UK and US,
- a fashion swing in Australia toward New Zealand’s Sauvignon Blanc, and
- major reforms to irrigation water institutions and policies.

Symptoms of those difficulties for the Australian industry include large declines in winery profits, the cut in winegrape prices particularly in the hot irrigation areas, one in every five dollars of domestic wine purchases are on imports (compared with just one in 20 at the start of the millennium), and almost three-fifths of Australia’s wine exports in 2014 being in bulk containers (compared with one-seventh during 1996-2003).

Climate change also is likely to be a bigger challenge for Australia than for many other wine-producing countries. The majority of Australia’s winegrapes are produced in the hot irrigated regions around the Murray and Murrumbidgee Rivers. Those regions are becoming warmer and drier, and have seen a slowdown in river flows. There is also an increasing demand from the community for a larger share of those reduced river volumes to be saved for environmental flows and urban uses, so there will be less scope in the future for irrigation to compensate for reduced precipitation.

The quality of the main international winegrape varieties currently grown in the hot regions deteriorates as the growing temperature rises, so producers are having to go to the expense of searching for and planting or grafting more-suitable alternative varieties. By contrast, global warming will improve winegrape quality in the more-temperate parts of Europe.

Daunting though the above list of challenges looks, some of those adverse developments are only short term. Also, there are several positive signs emerging. One is the cautious optimism of economic recovery that is showing up in the United States and parts of the recessed economies of Europe.

A second encouraging sign was the substantial take-up of the European Union’s offer to pay winegrape growers to grub up vines during 2009-11. There has also been some grubbing out of unprofitable vineyards in the hot irrigated areas of California in recent years, as well as in Australia.
Third, expected demographic changes in the United States over the next two decades suggests
wine consumption there will grow considerably faster than overall population.

Fourth, the Asian market is growing steadily. Not only is its population expected to rise by
700 million people by 2030, but its share of global income (ignoring Japan) is expected to
double, to around 23%. Already the middle classes in those emerging economies are
importing both popular and fine wines – and at above-average prices. During 2011-14, the
average unit value of wine exports to all East Asian countries from Australia averaged $6.40
per litre, compared with less than $2.20 to all other destinations; and even for exports to
China (by far the biggest Asian wine market), the average price was more than $5.70.

Australia’s export prospects depend very much on exchange rate movements. With the recent
devaluation of the AUD, those prospects are looking much brighter, and wine imports into
Australia will be less competitive (Anderson and Wittwer 2013a,c).

It needs to be kept in mind, though, that Australia’s per capita income growth may slow and
possibly decline with the mining investment boom coming to an end, which will dampen
domestic demand growth.

**What about the varietal mix in Australia’s various regions?**

Australia’s mix of winegrape varieties is not very different from the rest of the world’s and,
since 2000, it has become even less differentiated. Whether that is a good thing commercially
is unclear, especially for Australia’s hottest regions. Do Australian producers benefit enough
by emulating France’s varietal mix to offset any economic downsides, for example from
being less differentiated from the world mix, or from growing varieties that are less than ideal
for the terroir of Australia’s various regions?

Even though there are very large differences in growing conditions and especially climates
across Australia, cross-regional varietal differences within Australia are much less than is the
case within other countries. Perhaps this is a consequence of producers finding it easier to
market well known ‘international’ (mostly French) varieties than trying to differentiate their
offering and region with less-familiar varieties.

The current homogeniety suggests there is plenty of scope to explore alternative varieties in
the various regions of Australia as grapegrowers consider ways to adapt to climate changes.
Australia’s various regions to date have made only a little headway in diversifying their
vineyards, despite much discussion of alternative or emerging varieties over the past decade.

**Institutional and policy reforms to boost growth**

Recovery from the Australian wine industry’s immediate difficulties won’t be easy, and may
not be as quick as the resurgence from the slump preceding the export-led take-off in the mid-
1980s, as major adjustments will be required by many participants. However, to the extent
there is a willingness to continue to invest for the long term (rather than just focusing on quarterly returns to shareholders), and if the earlier spirit of collaboration and unity within the industry can be re-invigorated, a return to at least normal levels of profitability should be possible before long.

One adjustment already under way is in marketing. The earlier emphasis in generic marketing on ‘Brand Australia’, of providing sunshine in a bottle, has switched to a marketing strategy that places far more emphasis on higher-quality wines and on regional and even single-vineyard characteristics.

An even stronger focus on building and promoting the country’s fine wine offering will be needed going forward, given the increasing competition from lower-wage Southern Hemisphere countries in the popular premium category. Chile may have already surpassed Australia in offering the world the best value wine in that category, so the emphasis needs to switch to make the world aware Australia also offers excellent value for money with its finer wines.

Getting that message across in not only Australia’s traditional markets but also in Asia will require a larger budget than AGWA’s predecessor organizations have had in the past, especially given the commitment by the European Union to more than double its generic promotion expenditure over the next five years.

As for the R&D portfolio, the returns from such investments have been very high in the past. Returns in the next two decades are likely to be even higher, bearing in mind marketplace changes and long-term uncertainties such as climate change, water and other environmental policy reforms, and prospective alcohol tax changes at home and abroad.

Wine consumer tax policy reform could contribute to the transition to higher-quality wine production. If Australia were to switch from an ad valorem to a volumetric tax, that would encourage the transition to finer wines while weakening the case by anti-alcohol lobbies and the beer and spirits producers for a higher rate of tax on wine. Such a switch would make it easier for small fine-wine producers to sell all their production on the domestic market, thereby avoiding the high fixed costs of breaking into new export markets. True, there is the risk that any change to the method of taxing wine consumers will be accompanied by a hike in the rate of taxation, so that will need to be countered by strengthening the argument that, since moderate wine consumption can have positive health and social externalities, its tax rate should be below that on other alcohols.

Some lessons from history

To conclude, lessons from the past that are pertinent to the industry’s current opportunities and challenges are laid out here as dot-point responses to a series of questions.

Why did the industry grow so slowly during most of the 20th century?

- The creation of the Australian Federation led to the removal of inter-colonial trade barriers which assisted the South Australian wine industry greatly, but at the expense of wine producers in other mainland states.
• However, from Federation to the 1970s Australia adopted a highly interventionist set of trade and industry policies that protected producers from international competition and slowed innovation and hence domestic productivity and income growth.

• The grape industry was one of the first agricultural industries to successfully lobby for such assistance, and wine imports also were subject to high taxes. That meant both grape growing and wine making were sheltered from the cool winds of international competition for many decades. That assistance was also an offset to the negative effects on production costs of high protection to other industries.

• In the interwar years the industry was also distorted by policies that assisted exporters, but in a very discriminating way that favoured low-quality fortified wine exports to Britain.

**How important were macroeconomic conditions to the industry’s cycles?**

• Very: Australia suffered three severe economic depressions (in the early 1840s, early 1890s, and early 1930s) which dampened both domestic demand for wine and the availability of finance to help producers weather those downturns.

• Also, the Global Financial Crisis from 2008 and associated changes in exchange rates dampened demand for Australian wine on both sides of the North Atlantic.

**How important were the fortunes of other sectors of the Australian economy to the industry’s development?**

• Very: the gold rushes in the 1850s and 1890s (and the copper boom in South Australia in the 1840s) had generally positive effects because they brought permanent immigrants and capital from abroad which grew the domestic demand for wine.

• The ban on iron ore exports from the 1930s to the 1960s delayed the start of a mining boom in response to Japan’s industrialization, which benefitted wine and other tradable industries relatively but meant the economy grew less rapidly than it might have up to the 1960s.

• The latest two mining booms, in the 1970s/early 1980s and especially in the first dozen years of the present century, contrasted with the 19th century mining booms in that they attracted few extra permanent residents and were financed mostly by footloose overseas capital. Being export-demand driven, those mining booms involved large real exchange rate appreciations followed by large and faster depreciations. Since the wine industry was far more open to international competition in the past two decades than it had been throughout most of the 20th century, those exchange rate gyrations had a major impact on the wine industry’s current cycle: they contributed positively to the start of its boom, negatively at its end, and potentially positively again if the AUD remains at its current low level for some years to come.

**How did successful investors in the wine industry behave in past cycles?**

• Cycles are inevitable for perennial crop industries, so canny investors with finance and market outlets have bought assets in slumps, giving them a reasonable return on those low-priced assets and readying them for take-off in the next boom when they can sell those assets at higher prices and lower their capital base to concentrate on brand investment.

**What can be done to shorten the current slump and reduce the amplitude of future cycles?**

• The industry as a whole needs to invest more in at least three areas: generic promotion; technical, policy and market research; and timely data on industry
developments needed for pertinent analysis. Considerable scope remains for collaborating better on these and other issues, and for improving the quality of evidence-based advocacy on the industry’s behalf.

- Governments need to keep out of grape and wine markets and confine their activities to generating public goods and overcoming market failures such as the free-rider problem that leads to under-investment in generic promotion and R&D.

References


European Court of Auditors (2014), ‘Is the EU Investment and Promotion Support to the Wine Sector Well Managed and Are its Results on the Competitiveness of EU Wines Demonstrated?’, Special Report No. 9, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the EU.


Table 1: Timing of booms and plateaus in the Australian wine industry’s development, 1843 to 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vintages:</th>
<th>Boom/plateau/cycle</th>
<th>No. of years</th>
<th>Vine area</th>
<th>Wine prod’n</th>
<th>Wine export volume</th>
<th>Vine area per cap</th>
<th>Vine area/total crop area</th>
<th>Vine prod’n per cap</th>
<th>Wine prod’n per real $GDP</th>
<th>Wine exports per capita</th>
<th>Share (%) of wine prod’n exported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1855 to 1871</td>
<td>1st boom</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871 to 1882</td>
<td>1st plateau</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>-8.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1855 to 1882</strong></td>
<td><strong>1st cycle</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882 to 1896</td>
<td>2nd boom</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896 to 1915</td>
<td>2nd plateau</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1882 to 1915</strong></td>
<td><strong>2nd cycle</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915 to 1925</td>
<td>3rd boom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925 to 1967</td>
<td>3rd plateau</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1915 to 1967</strong></td>
<td><strong>3rd cycle</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 to 1975</td>
<td>4th boom</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 to 1986</td>
<td>4th plateau</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1967 to 1986</strong></td>
<td><strong>4th cycle</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>-1.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>-1.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 to 2007</td>
<td>5th boom</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 to 2???</td>
<td>5th plateau</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average boom</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average plateau</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>-2.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>-4.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>-2.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>-1.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average cycle</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1843 to 2013** | **170**           | **2.8**      | **4.3**   | **5.0**    | **0.6**            | **-0.1**         | **2.2**                  | **0.8**             | **3.1**                  | **12.9**               |

*a* 160-year from 1854 to 2013 inclusive.  
*b* 57-year from 1854 to 2010 inclusive.  
*c* 2007-2013

Source: Anderson (2015, Table 1)
Figure 1: Bearing area of vineyards, Australia and South Australia, 1843 to 2013 (ha)
(a) Regular scale

(b) Log-linear scale
Figure 2: Wine production, Australia and South Australia, 1843 to 2013 (kl)
(a) Regular scale
(b) Log-linear scale
Figure 3: Indexes of vine area, wine production, and wine exports, per capita, 1843 to 2013 (2007 = 100)

Figure 4: Vine area as a percent of total crop area, and wine production per $ of real GDP, 1843 to 2013 (2007 = 100)
Figure 5: Shares of wine, beer and spirits in alcohol consumption, 1843 to 2013 (% alcohol, 3-year moving average)

Figure 6: Wine consumption and real GDP, per capita, 1860 to 2013 (log-linear scale, polynomial fitted lines)
Figure 7: Exports as % of wine production and imports as % of apparent wine consumption, 1843 to 2013 (% , 3-year moving average)

Figure 8: Shares of winegrape bearing area, by variety, 1956 to 2012 (% , 3-year moving average)
Figure 9: Average AUD price of winegrapes and of exports, and vine bearing area, 1986 to 2014

Figure 10: Nominal rates of assistance to grape growing, wine making, all agriculture, and all manufacturing, 1904 to 2013 (%)
Figure 11: Value of wine exports, Australia and other New World countries, 1998 to 2014 (US$ million)

Figure 12: Share of wine production exported, and exports as a % of value added for all Australian merchandise, 1856 to 2013 (%, 5-year moving average around year shown)
Figure 13: Wine comparative advantage index, a 1961 to 2013
(a) main Old World countries, 1961 to 2011 b

(b) main New World countries, 1961 to 2013

---

a Index is the share of wine in national merchandise exports divided by wine’s share of global exports.

b Georgia and Moldova are not shown: their indexes were 43 and 100 in 2000-04 and 14 and 42 in 2010-11.
Figure 14: Ad valorem consumer tax equivalent of excise in commercial premium wines, various countries, 2012 and 2014 (%)

Figure 15: Shares of winegrape bearing area, by varietal country of origin, 1956 to 2012 (%)
Figure 16: Winegrape price and mean January temperature, select varieties, 2006 (AUD/t)

(a) Key red varieties

(b) Key white varieties