

## Film as representational art: Classical perspectives

### 1 Introduction

Roger Scruton's core sceptical argument against film as a non-derivative representational art form seems to be: (1) by virtue of its essential photographic nature film consists in causal-mechanical recordings of presentations of actuality; (2) representational art requires (a) the intentional realisation of articulated meaning or thought, (b) achieved by creatively controlling details of image-rendering while respecting essential properties of the medium; therefore, (3) film cannot be itself an independent form of representational art, (since (1) precludes (2) a and b). Therefore (4) films are no more than photographic recordings of dramatic representations. Any aesthetically relevant aesthetic features of the film derive from the dramatic representation it is a recording of.

The argument rests on medium-essentialist assumptions; i.e. the view that each art medium is distinguishable by, and should remain true to, its own unique and distinctive essential nature or properties. On this view, creativity demonstrates fidelity to the medium's essential nature. This presupposes the exercise of *artistic freedom* in relation the medium's artistic affordances and depends on *intentional control over aesthetically relevant details* in the rendering of a work.

This paper will relate key aspects of the classical film theory debate between cinematic realism and formativism to concerns underlying Scruton's core sceptical argument and

broader negative critique of cinema. An art form may be viewed as representational if it possesses the ability to communicate thoughts about its subject-matter. Proposals by classical film formativists Hugo Munsterberg and Rudolph Arnheim on how this might be achieved are remarkably similar to those of more contemporary theorists. Both have advocated methodological anti-realism in the employment of film's technical affordances. Classical cinematic realism, in stark contrast, eschewed methodological anti-realism.

The objectives of this paper are to revisit aspects of the classical debate to expose the underlying complexity of the challenges confronting those who wish to vindicate film as representational art; and, in evaluating attempts to overcome the sceptical view, to question the emphasis placed on methodological anti-realism. That is, the issue of whether deliberately cinematically realist films can be vindicated as representational art is of particular interest, though it cannot be fully addressed or answered here.

## **2 Film as representational art: a preliminary view**

Nicholas Wolterstorff<sup>1</sup> has given a fundamentally intellectualist account of art representation. In this respect it shares some but not all of Scruton's assumptions. To produce an artistic representation an artist intentionally acts on an artefact according to certain ideas or a 'plan' in order to causally produce a *rendering* of some figures, objects, or features in a medium. Given contextual conditions and assumptions, these renderings *count as* or are taken to be *representations* by viewers.<sup>2</sup> Wolterstorff describes this process as "world projection". The artist through world projection presents to an audience a state of affairs for their consideration.

A world projection as artefact can also be an object of aesthetic appreciation. This goes beyond perceptual apprehension and intellectual comprehension of the projected states of affairs. In aesthetic consideration one is not concerned primarily with the properties and relations of those state of affairs that make up the projected world, but with the *way* the representation has been formally rendered, as reflecting the thoughts and imagination, sensitivity and skill, of the artist.

To project a fictional world by *presenting states of affairs for consideration*, those states of affairs must have some *semblance of actuality*, or verisimilitude, in order to engage audience attention and give them something definite to consider. The *content* of representational art traditionally has had genuine value or meaning for an audience, and not been merely a matter of personal expression.

It is because art worlds generally are true to reality in indefinitely large numbers of respects that artworks have the potential for illuminating us and confirming in us the knowledge we already have.<sup>3</sup>

...we are confronted with the obvious fact that the artist is not merely projecting a world which has caught his private fancy, but a world true in significant respects to what his community believes to be real and important.<sup>4</sup>

Wolterstorff did not perceive a problem in film's being a representational art-form. The camera could be viewed as an instrument for producing a 'rendering' of things. The resultant artefacts could be used for representing things.<sup>5</sup> The screenwriter produces a film-script or screenplay which, as a visual conceptualisation of a story or plot is like a project or plan for a

film. The director uses his own imagination to further concretise the ideas of the screenwriter.<sup>6</sup> The director *creates* the fictional film by *photographically rendering* some actors in fulfilment of these ideas, and in turn, by creating the film he *produces a representation* of characters. It is not actors who appear in the completed film, but characters.

Wolterstorff assumes what is ‘rendered’ in a film need not be identical with what is ‘represented’.<sup>7</sup> He criticises cinematic realist André Bazin for claiming film satisfies humans’ deepest obsession with realism because it is produced by rendering or copying something *mechanically*.<sup>8</sup> Wolterstorff claims Bazin misses the point because the means of rendering has little to do with realism in the sense relevant to aesthetics, which is the sense relevant to representational art. There are non-realistic as well as realistic films:

The realism or non-realism of films inheres in its representational dimension, not in its representational dimensions.<sup>9</sup>

A similar point is made by Berys Gaut in charging Roger Scruton and Rudolph Arnheim with conflating two separate issues in the sceptical challenge: the ‘causal challenge’ and the ‘reproduction challenge’.<sup>10</sup> It may be however that it is Wolterstorff who misses Bazin’s point.

### **3 Scruton’s scepticism: Photography**

Scruton's three critical claims are that (i) photography is "fictionally incompetent"; (ii) the reasons for its fictional incompetence are closely related to inability to support the kind of viewer-"disinterestedness" necessary for taking an aesthetic attitude to an art representation; (iii) photography cannot be a vehicle for expression or communication of articulate thought.

To appreciate an art representation one must be able to view it as the way it is *because* it embodies and articulates the artist's intentions and determinate thoughts. Representational intentions succeed when the appearance created leads the audience to recognise the subject (object represented) as *how* the artist 'sees it' or imagines it. Aesthetic interest lies in understanding and appreciating the skilful and imaginative *way* the artist has achieved this. This is not possible for a photograph. The photograph looks the way it does because it is the result of a natural causal recording process.

On Scruton's intellectualised, non-functional, account of art representation, it is not enough that an audience see and recognise an object in an artefact. It is a question of *how* that came to be possible. Artistic expressions are essentially intentional rational expressions. A representation must more than 'just happen' to represent something as a result of natural causes. The representational thought must be *intrinsic to* the production of the aesthetic artefact, not just a property of a process of which the artefact is a part. (585)

Intentionally produced representational artefacts exhibit properties of 'intentional non-existence'. This is related to "fictional competence". A painting can represent a subject *as* something even where the subject does not exist; or the subject exists but does not look as it appears in the painting. Capacity to exhibit intentional non-existence is crucial for being able

to adopt the aesthetic stance toward a work. Painting's capacity for representation of fictional objects allows the presentation of scenes and characters which audiences can contemplate and explore, allowing practical attitudes to remain disengaged. In either fictional or non-fictional representation, one can appreciate the visual appearance as an expression or communication of the artist's thoughts or intentions, while remaining indifferent to and detached from the reality of the subject matter. (585)

Photography by contrast is "fictionally incompetent" and not characterizable in terms of intentional non-existence. A photograph cannot exist without its object existing; and photo images unavoidably to a large degree resemble the object's appearance. A photograph cannot represent a fictional entity. It may be of a real entity which has been staged, dressed up, or associated with familiar signs or symbols to 'denote' a fictional entity; but these 'representational' actions occur prior to or after taking the shot and are attributable to the photographer (or model), not the photographic medium itself. Once choices of subject, lens, camera position, light source, etc; are made, a photograph itself is always the result of a causal process originating in a real object as subject-matter. And this influences how viewers experience it.

To be appreciated as an art representation one must be able to take an interest in the artefact for its own sake without concern for the reality of the object (subject –matter). This is possible insofar as a representational work can carry a reference to a subject without standing as its surrogate. A sort of psychological space exists for appreciating the representation. (591) That space does not exist for viewers of a photograph. Viewers treat the image as a way to its object. Most spectators were not there, where the camera was, so from viewing a photograph

they *gain information* about what the object would have looked like had they been there.(588) Photography thus appeals primarily to the “interested” attitudes of curiosity and desire for knowledge about the actual subject.

Some photographers have tried to turn photographs into art representations. They attempted to

break the causal chain by which the photographer is imprisoned, to impose a human intention between subject and appearance so that the subject can be both defined by that intention and seen in terms of it .(549)

But these efforts are deemed to be either feeble failures or self-defeating because they breach norms of medium-essentialism.

Techniques of photo-montage were used by the surrealists and futurists.... Here our interest in the result can be entirely indifferent to the existence and nature of the original subject. But that is precisely because the photographic figures have been so cut up and rearranged in the final product that it could not be said in any normal sense to be a *photograph* of its subject.(594)

To take an interest in a representational artwork as a representation one seeks to understand the *details* of the work in terms of the artist’s communicative intentions and ideas. (592-3)

To communicate a definite thought a visual image must be “properly articulate”. That is, (a) the medium allows for communication of the thought through the image alone, and, (b) the spectator can see and understand the image in terms of the process of thought it expresses.

Proper articulation presupposes creative control over details in the rendering of the work.

However, the photographic medium lacks this affordance. Scruton concludes visual details in a photograph reveal little of the photographer's specific thoughts or intentions.

Scruton's arguments are largely persuasive that photographs do not meet criteria for representational art according to his criterion, though I will not defend that conclusion here<sup>11</sup>. Many of those who have tried to refute his arguments advert to expressive, formalist-aesthetic, or functionalist considerations. But Scruton never denies one could take some kind of aesthetic interest in photography, just that we cannot take an interest in it as an art representation. My concern will not be to refute Scruton on photography, but to question the extension of the argument to film, although with some of his conclusions there I also have a degree of sympathy.

#### **4 Scruton's critique of cinema.**

Film can at best 'extend' or 'embellish' an existing dramatic representation, Scruton claims. But even there, its contribution does more harm than good. On the one hand by virtue of the 'realism' inherent in photographic material it detracts viewers' attention from aesthetic properties of the dramatic representation. On the other hand the medium most naturally gravitates to material that gratifies but does not intellectually exercise or edify audiences. On both counts, cinema's effect is to trivialise and degrade human development of and engagement with dramatic art.

Scruton sees film as a comparatively weak representational form<sup>12</sup>. Plays are multiply-realizable; they exist as dramatic representations independent of productions. Different stage



productions can be compared and contrasted. Clear constraints and conventions have emerged as a result. Theatre-goers are thus not at a loss for ‘aesthetic criteria’ in advance of seeing a play. But film is different. The process of production *creates* the cinematic representation. There is no independent *cinematic* representation which can be a source of multiple ‘productions’. Each film prototype is a distinct one-off performance, which fixes all its details. Hence each film must be viewed, understood, and aesthetically evaluated on its own merits. ‘Features of interpretation’ cannot be distinguished in advance from ‘features of action’. And viewers are easily overwhelmed and transfixed by the film’s objective visual content. So even when a director endeavours to articulate thoughts cinematically and direct viewers’ attention to relevant details, the plethora of details in the photographic material makes the task difficult.<sup>13</sup>

Gaut suggests that even if you granted a film artist less scope for control than a stage director over details relevant to interpretation, this could be a sign of film’s superiority. Lack of clear criteria of relevance or interpretive features may contribute to the richness of the representation, permitting multiple meanings and interpretations as viewers respond to different features.<sup>14</sup> This is an interesting comment because it echoes similar claims made by André Bazin in proposing the moral superiority of cinematically realist films over formativist-dominated films. But both Bazin and Gaut have to contend with Scruton’s supposition that the realism inherent in the photographic medium, the plenitude of being which transfixes viewers’ attention, makes viewers’ mental distance needed for the aesthetic attitude difficult to maintain.

Expressionistic formativist directors attempt to control screen images through camera-work and montage. By doing so they shape viewer experience in ways that diminish exposure to richness otherwise inherent in photographic material. Scruton dismisses formativist efforts to articulate meanings, provide comment, and guide viewers' attention to representationally relevant elements.<sup>15</sup> He thinks they introduce visual irrelevancies *vis a vis* the basic dramatic action while expecting viewers to ignore them as irrelevancies. Non-expressionistic or cinematically realist directors on the other hand, simply ignore the problem altogether; but this does not make it go away. Scruton implies that cinematically realist films leave viewers to wallow in overwhelming visual experience, unaided in the task of aesthetic understanding or evaluation. (599)

In Sergei Eisenstein's *Battleship Potemkin* visual metaphor is achieved through three quick successive shots of a stone lion with eyes closed at the top of the Odessa steps, then with eyes open, finally standing with open mouth, apparently roaring. This sequence follows fast on images of imperial power crumbling from opening cannon shots on the Opera House from the rebel seamen on Potemkin. By using these lion shots in the whole context of the film Eisenstein comments on the impotence of the oppressive imperial establishment against the rising noble power of the people stirred to anger. The audience is startled into having this specific thought, as intended by Eisenstein. However these shots have different sources and are spliced together to create a false appearance of reality. The montage severs links between photographic images and their subjects; replacing the 'causal relation between image and subject...by an intentional one'.(601) So Scruton admits that Eisenstein succeeded here in properly articulated meaning, but complains that the sequence is not a photographically unitary one anchored in the objects themselves; rather it amounts to a distortion and disruption of photographic reality. (602)

Scruton dismissed as essentially “un-photographic” photographers’ attempts to create meaning by replacing causality with intention through montage and pastiche. Does he suppose it would be similarly “unfilmic” or “uncinematic” for a film-maker to do the equivalent? Film it may be argued is a complex medium that is more than a photograph. Film’s formative tools may be construed as *part of or integral to* its essential nature. If the cinematic device of editing is included in film’s ‘essential nature’ then breaking causal-referential links inherent in basic photographic shots to construct “unreal” sequences by means of montage need not offend against medium-essentialist norms. This is the tack that classical film formativists took.

The final weapon in Scruton’s anti-cinema arsenal derives from concerns about the purpose of art. Regardless of *necessary* limitations entailed by film’s intrinsic causal nature, he argued most commercial films are also *contingently* anti-art. Cinematic realisations naturally fascinate people. The ‘directness’ and immediacy of the photographic medium can affect without the intermediary of thought. Commercial cinema uses this fascination to appeal to the ‘lower’ uses of imagination while obviating the need for serious cognitive engagement. Versions of reality are standardly presented where wishful thinking is rewarded and its implications not confronted. Cinema’s photographic capacities create seemingly familiar worlds superficially like our own in visual details; ‘beguiling’ us into accepting the reality of these worlds and overlooking what is “banal, grotesque, or vulgar” in what they contain.

(603)

My sympathies are somewhat with Scruton here. Such films do not just fail to be art themselves, but undermine basic capacities for development of true aesthetic sensibility and

aesthetic thoughtfulness. Dramatic art should seek to be realistic in a deeper, non-illusory, more substantial way. Dramatic art *should* lead us back to an understanding of reality. And it should do so by engaging in autonomous mental activity on the part of viewers. Classical film formativists and film realists both thought so too. But they approached this task in quite different ways. I will try in a preliminary way to make the perhaps counter-intuitive case that classical film realism in some respects meets the requirements of art more convincingly than formativism.

## 5 Classical film Formativism

Film formativists Hugo Münsterberg<sup>16</sup> and Rudolph Arnheim<sup>17</sup> thought that in order for film to be representational art photographic material must be differentiated from the material of nature from which it was causally derived. Both agree that if by virtue of its photographic nature film “blandly imitated whatever stood before the camera” then it would be *mere imitation simpliciter* of a kind that could not be art.<sup>18</sup> Since the material from which film is causally derived possesses objective spatio-temporal-kinetic properties, cinematic productions must deviate from or resist and disrupt these properties. Montage-created meanings and anti-realist cinematic methodologies, at both the recording and structural-representational level, are required to subjectively transform the objectivity otherwise inherent in photographic material.

André Bazin<sup>19</sup> described film formativists as directors who place “faith in the image” rather than reality’. It is film making that embraces all that can be ‘added to’ the photographic image in terms of plastics (composition of shots, makeup, lights, staging, camera lens and

position) and editing or montage (sequential arrangement of images.) Dudley Andrew<sup>20</sup> distinguished realist from formativist tendencies along three dimensions: perception, meaning, and 'visible effort'. 'Perception' concerns the nature of viewers' visual-auditory experience in watching a film. For formativists this should be non-naturalistic. 'Meaning' is a matter of how film images and/or sequences of images have significance for film viewers. For formativists this should be primarily by constructivist and structuralist means rather than causal-referential means. 'Visible effort' alludes to the extent to which the processes whereby the film-maker has made meaning available in the film are hidden from or made manifest or even salient for the viewer. For formativists it is imperative that editing is salient in order to draw viewer's attention to the conveyance of director's meanings and distance viewers from a direct engagement with photographic reality.

The most important unit for formativist *meaning* is the constructed 'screen image', not the basic photographic camera-shot image. Camera-shot natural meaning is causally-referentially-indexically determined. Director-imposed abstract meanings however are achieved both through plastics of composition and image juxtapositions. Camera-shot images combined into larger film structures establish screen contents that deviate from what would otherwise be naturally determined camera-shot content and sequencings. "The meaning is not in the image, it is in the shadow of the image projected by montage onto the field of consciousness of the spectator".<sup>21</sup> In films dominated by formativist techniques events are no longer 'given' to the viewer, but 'alluded to' through director-controlled interpretations.<sup>22</sup> Formativist screen images are deciphered by viewers in terms of motivations of the film-maker, rather than seen primarily as images of real objects.

Munsterberg assumed the purpose of representational art was to provide a subjective transformation of the world in a way that pleases and satisfies viewers. Film must utilize all its formativist affordances to override the objectively realist tendencies inherent in its photographic material. Cinematic devices were viewed as ‘externalisations’ or ‘objectifications’ of specific human psychological processes. Close-ups, parallel editing, slow motion, choice of lens, etc: all could be utilized to project subjective mental states. Munsterberg’s anti-realism particularly emphasised cinematic disruption of objective spatio-temporal categories. The unity of the film as a whole could be secured by its being produced so that it appears as though synthesised by a perceiving understanding mind. Film should tell us

....a human story by overcoming the forms of the outer world, namely space, time, and causality, by adjusting the events to the forms of the inner world, namely attention, memory, imagination, and emotion.<sup>23</sup>

Arnheim held that the purpose of art is to help viewers *understand the true nature or essence of things*.<sup>24</sup> To this end film makers must exploit cinematic characteristics in ways that deviate from a naturalistic perceptual cinematic experience.<sup>25</sup> Film makers should “suppress the filmic process of representations [by drawing attention to limitations and deviances of the photographic image compared to reality] in favour of the artistic process of expression”.<sup>26</sup> Moreover film directors should make their organising principles salient to the viewer so that they are aware that they are viewing an art-work. Arnheim welcomed classical film images’ limitations: lack of colour, sound, and panoramic vision. Greater technical capacity for verisimilitude he feared would undermine the medium’s potential to be a representational art form. Films would increasingly become transparent photographic recordings of dramatic

representations. Viewers' cinematic experiences would be not very distinguishable from those of theatre spectatorship, and film would be reduced to a derivative art-form.

Arnheim was not so extreme in his methodological anti-realism as Munsterberg. Formativist techniques should be rejected if they disorient and distract viewers. This would interfere with the expressivist aim of communicating a deeper vision of some essential human reality.

While lifelike portrayals of a temporal sequence of events can be cut apart and spliced together, and viewpoint and space and time infinitely varied, Arnheim maintained

All this is possible....without apparent interventions into the realistic nature of the procedures.<sup>27</sup>

## **6 Contemporary views**

Arnheim focused on anti-realism at the reproductive or representational level through expressive exploitation of those properties of the medium by means of which a film deviates from ordinary experience of reality. Berys Gaut and others have criticised Arnheim's emphasis on the medium's reproductive *limitations*, some of which were, contingently, fixed at that time. Arnheim was insufficiently aware, Gaut supposes, both that sound and colour could be embraced as new *capacities* for expressive purposes. Moreover, any capacity or limitation can be used for expressive purposes only if it is a variable and not fixed feature, and its deviation is against a presupposed 'norm'.

Gaut believes Arnheim overlooked expressive potential at the recording-presentational level because he held a purely causal conception of photographic recording which assumed the camera-shot image would always be an exact likeness of its object. Gaut, and more recently Catharine Abell,<sup>28</sup> argue in effect that ‘fictional competence’ and conveyance of thought are possible directly, at the presentational-recording level. That is, by choice of camera lens, camera position, camera movement, etc. photographic images *as causally recorded* do not have to resemble their subjects (object photographed).

Noël Carroll<sup>29</sup> criticised formativist pursuit of methodological representational anti-realism as arising from a confusion between two aspects of the sceptical argument: the claim that because of its causal photographic nature film cannot be representational art; and the claim that insofar as it provides mechanical photographic recordings of dramatic representations, film can only be a derivative art-form.

In the course of argumentation, some theorists, notably Munsterberg, seem to lose track of the fact that they are confronting two logically distinct arguments....Munsterberg at times stresses the difference between film and theatre in contexts that seems to assume that this difference has something to do with film’s divergence from reality.<sup>30</sup>

Scruton claims any cinematic representation of a dramatic representation, insofar as it manifests representational aesthetic properties, derives those properties from the primary representations (narrative, drama) themselves. Scruton assumed representational aesthetic properties cannot arise from film’s own recording nature because at its heart is a causal relation that ensures verisimilitude with what is before the camera. What is before the camera



in fictional films are actors representing the actions, thoughts, and emotions of dramatic or narrative characters. The mere fact that a film director in producing a rendering of a dramatic representation has cinematic tools available that permit viewers' better or slightly different access to what is going on before the camera beyond and in ways other than what would be available to spectators in a theatre is not itself sufficient to refute Scruton. Abell recognises this. In her application to film of an intentionalist theory of pictorial depiction distinguishing primary and secondary depiction, she makes the crucial requirement that use of cinematic techniques to convey thoughts and intentions regarding primary subject-matter must be *directly* achieved, without affecting the way primary subjects are represented, to refute Scruton. (284)

In a photographic representation of a dramatic representation it is not actors who are primarily depicted. While an actor may possess properties that make them a suitable means for representing a certain primary (narrative or dramatic) subject, the particular actor used is only one contingently possible means amongst others. Thus representation of the primary subject is contingently causally but not intentionally dependent on rendering the secondary subject. Some utilisations of cinematic techniques for expressive purposes affect the way secondarily depicted subjects (actors) are represented. They provide viewers with a more immediate or engaging access to secondary subjects. (E.g. slow motion to see the movements or expressions of actors in more detail.) It is only cinematic techniques which convey thoughts in relation to primarily intended subject matter *directly*, without affecting representation of secondarily depicted subjects that count toward refuting Scruton.

Many of the sorts of techniques Abell has in mind – use of upward angle shots<sup>31</sup>, close ups and fishbowl lens, camera movement and viewpoint – etc. are those to which Gaut earlier drew attention. Causal mechanical instrumentality, on this view, does not exclude expressiveness at the recording level. On the other hand Scruton admitted as much. His claim was that such expressiveness falls short of the ‘properly articulated’ thought that representational art required. Moreover instances of these sorts of technique as often as not distract from or are irrelevant appreciation of the the primary dramatic representation.

## **7 The aesthetic attitude and the paradox of formativism.**

Classical film formativists shared Scruton’s view that the aesthetic attitude requires conditions conducive to a certain kind of mental state. Classical film formativists saw methodological anti-realism as essential to these conditions. Film’s photographic verisimilitude, if not actively interfered with, would present an obstacle to adopting the aesthetic attitude. Scruton viewed formativist attempts through montage or anti-realist techniques to overcome the ontological plenitude and attraction of objective reality in order to embody and convey articulate thoughts in an attention-drawing way, as likely to psychologically overwhelm and imaginatively stifle viewers. Viewers are thereby distanced psychologically and their aesthetic engagement with the dramatic representation impoverished accordingly.

One might argue that Scruton unjustifiably generalises from the most excessive, banal, or laboured forms of montage in films. But fundamentally, what appears to be at issue is the psychological effect of what might be termed the allure of “the illusion of realism”. Carroll’s

claim that classical film formativists failed to distinguish the argument that film cannot be representational art and the argument that since film cannot be a non-derivative art form, may be misplaced. So too may Gaut's charge that Scruton, and Arnheim, conflate the causal challenge from the reproduction challenge. What formativists perceived the need to do was disrupt the allure of the illusion of realism inherent in both film's fundamental recording nature and the representational level, on the assumption that a variant of the illusion of realism already existed in the established dramatic arts.

Traditionally, theatre sought to present dramatic events to theatre-goers in ways similar to the way they would experience those events if present and observing them in reality. In other words, the established 'norm' at the representational level for the dramatic arts was life-likeness or verisimilitude. The mechanical instrumentality of photography meant visual verisimilitude was the norm of film as a recording medium. Photographing dramas according to these norms would only amplify the illusion of realism. This was the classical formativists' fundamental worry. But in attempting to overcome this problem they encountered another difficulty. An art work must be available to the aesthetic attitude. Mental freedom entailed by commonly endorsed accounts of the aesthetic attitude may be undermined by the highly salient and directive expressive montage seen as solution to the first problem.

Film's which do not deviate from the standard norm of photographic verisimilitude at either the recording or representational levels embrace some version of the "illusion of reality". In appreciating an art object aesthetically one's contemplation of it must be initially detached from all pragmatic and theoretical interests. A dramatic representation is itself an art object,

and thus can be subject of aesthetic appreciation. Insofar as a film's underlying dramatic representation exemplified a theatrical "illusion of reality", the effects of this on the viewer would be greatly amplified by the photographic medium, unless measures were actively taken to overcome those effects. Viewers would have "interested" attitudes in the subject-matter for its own sake. Thus what lay at the heart of both establishing film as an art from per se, and comparatively distinguishing cinematic representations of dramatic works from theatre productions, was the same perceived need: to disrupt the illusion of realism.<sup>32</sup>

A *cinematic* film according to Arnheim would be one *not* in the "theatrical mode". He assumed theatre-goers observe a play on a stationary stage from a single fixed frontal perspective, and that dramatic productions present actions in real space, obeying objective laws of nature, in a fairly realistic, temporally forward-moving narrative, with limited setting changes. Thus events are presented in much the same way they would be witnessed in real life. A film in the theatrical mode would cinematically replicate these sorts of things. By contrast, a *cinematic* film would manifest mobility of observer – with sequences of shots taken from a variety of perspectives and distances, including but exceeding non-frontal, with events shown successively or simultaneously in split screen mode; including long shots and close ups; (as functions of both camera positioning and editing); presenting image sequences within relatively unconfined space and spaces much larger than a conventional stage, allowing numerous changes of location and temporal order, engaging in forward and backward leaps in time. Objectively, the camera might be construed as an "external observer" of events which occur in physical space before the lens. However, what the viewer sees when they attend to the screen is not restricted to events in physical space in the world of the film. The viewer sees what may be the perceptions, thoughts, and dreams of a character in the world of the film or of an unidentified subject.

Film by virtue of its photographic nature seems enslaved to photo-representational content. Thus photography cannot help being about life, and by itself cannot help giving us the surface levels of appearance. Moreover, the camera feels and expresses nothing. Munsterberg and Arnheim saw montage *and* anti-realist cinematic methodologies as the only way to achieve “significant form” within the inescapable context of a photo-representational medium. It afforded a way to introduce the necessary distance for “disinterested” contemplation of art. ‘Significant form’ was thus identified with form where the subjectivity of representation had priority over objective representational content and form. Paradoxically, following this approach gives rise to a kind of viewer experience which conflicted in other respects with the aesthetic attitude.

Kant stands behind aesthetic formalism and Schopenhauer. Carroll identified both Kantian and Schopenhauerian influences in Munsterberg’s conception of art.<sup>33</sup> Kant grounds the aesthetic attitude in a mental stance to a particular object which regards the object in a state of practical disengagement.<sup>34</sup> The key point is that by virtue of ‘disinterestedly’ contemplating the form of the object for its own sake some sort of harmonising occurs between the pure forms of understanding and sensibility *as mental faculties per se*. Mental faculties unbound from their normal lawful functioning in practical or theoretical judgment permit imaginative free play in relation to the object, thereby refreshing the mind as a whole. It is from the spontaneity of this free action that the feeling of aesthetic pleasure arises.

According to Kant, determinate concept application in practical or theoretical thought about objects is lawfully governed by categories of understanding. Laws of understanding in their structure mirror causal-ontological laws of objective nature. Theoretical and practical

cognition of a particular object seeks to bring perception of the object into a causal spatio-temporal ordering on the basis of general properties and relations as they obtain in objective reality. This is the very kind of ordering Munsterberg insisted it was the film artist's task to 'overcome'. Realistic films, he seemed to think, would displace the aesthetic stance by giving apparently unmediated access to photographed reality which would engage the curiosity and information-seeking mental states of viewers. Thought processes would be lawfully governed by the ontology of the photographic objects.

We could speculatively reconstruct a "Kantian" version of a Munsterberg's view along the following lines: (1) the *aesthetic attitude* arises from a harmonising of faculties and imaginative free play only possible when an object is reflectively contemplated in a lawfully unbound way; (2) "interested" practical or theoretical engagement with an object involves thoughts where determinate concepts are applied to percepts according to rules of mind; (3) rules of mind in some sense mirror laws or rules governing nature objectively; (4) screen content of realistic films formally mirror the causal and spatio-temporal lawful categories of objective nature; thus, (5) screen content of realist films give rise to practically interested thoughts about photographed objects, therefore, (6) mental responses to realist films would displace conditions necessary for the aesthetic attitude.

The step from (4) to (5) is of course highly dubious. It is not clear that cinematic realist films could not be aesthetically appreciated for their own sake. It is also doubtful that Kant's own broader views on representational art would support the step from (4) to (5).

Kant emphasises that while the audience must become conscious that an artefact is a work of art rather than nature, the ‘purposiveness’ in its form must seem as free from all constraint of chosen rules *as if it were a product of mere nature*.

Even though the purposiveness in a product of fine art is intentional, it must still not seem intentional; i.e., fine art must have the look of nature even though we are conscious of it as art.<sup>35</sup>

If an art-work appears to be following rules or organising principles in an obvious, laboured, or painstaking way, then it is not really art.<sup>36</sup> All fictional film-makers follow *some* rules of composition and editing in photographically rendering dramatic representations. However, it is *prima facie* cinematically realist films that would appear to the viewer most natural, uncontrived, and “effortless” to viewers in their production.

Munsterberg’s insistence that salient methodological anti-realism is necessary for the aesthetic attitude may thus be at odds with the mental freedom associated with the aesthetic attitude. Appreciating *any* representational work as a representation cannot, on an intellectualist account of representation, preclude application of determinate concepts. We seek to understand the representation according to the artist’s intentions. In cinematically realist films content and form mirror that which is objectively present in the real world. Concrete familiar things are photographically revealed in familiar ways. Yet viewers are dislocated from that world. They view the film in cinema screenings in a dark encapsulated world where they are primed for contemplation and detached from normal practical concerns. The very familiarity of the structure and form of a realist film, in this context, frees the mind to roam over the photographic representation and extract meaning, beauty, or ‘significant form’ at will, just as it could if one were reflecting on nature itself. By contrast, formativist films that are heavily structured and shaped by a director aiming to control viewers’

perception, thoughts, and emotional response, give little space for mental freedom. Viewers' minds will be 'bound' by formativist meaning and not afforded opportunity for much imaginative free play.

## **8 Cinematic realism as a representational art form**

Dominic Lopes has proposed<sup>37</sup> that when one looks at a photograph of a subject, the photograph is 'transparent' to the subject, and one actually sees the subject itself. But seeing a subject in a photograph is not identical to seeing it in life. For a start, the subject (photographed object) is not (usually) present. Furthermore, the subject is being viewed in isolation from a normal life context in which it might be encountered. We see both the subject, and the photographic record of the subject. So we are conscious we are looking at the thing through a photographic record of the thing. [*Cf.* also Kendall Walton<sup>38</sup>.] Thus one's mental attitudes need not be governed by practical interests. One has no self-consciousness in looking. One can look in an uninhibited way. The seeing is fresh. Lopes mentions 'clear seeing' and 'transformative seeing'. One can look and see things it would be difficult to look at in life. One can see things in objects one may have overlooked in life. These ideas to anyone with any familiarity with classical film theory resonate with the views of two major cinematic realists, André Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer.

Applying Scruton's concept of the ideal photograph to film, the kind of film that comes closest to respecting film's essential nature would be CCTV footage. This would vindicate Scruton's claim that realism based in mechanical instrumentality generates only curiosity and information-seeking in response. However one cannot avoid the representational context and



purpose of cinema. The essential nature of cinematic film cannot be isolated from its existence as a deliberately rendered artefact intended to be screened for spectators in cinemas for entertainment, pleasure, consideration, and evaluation. Any film's coming into existence with these purposes in mind is always constructively informed by subjective intelligence and the point of view of a film-maker, whether it exhibit realist or formativist tendencies. Cinematically realist films are not devoid of subjective illumination or intelligence, in the way CCTV footage is. It is just that realist films express that subjective vision in quite a different way to formativist films.

Formativist film-makers subvert and distort the spatio-temporal integrity of photographic reality, overriding recorded reality for the sake of articulating definite subjective ideas or facilitating viewers' mental distance necessary for the aesthetic attitude. However cinematic realists seek some way to identify their subjective vision *with* photographic reality. Artistic vision and conveyance or expression of thoughts about primarily intended subjects are not properly articulated and manifested discretely and intermittently throughout the film. Rather, vision is manifested in the film as a whole. It emerges from a work which exemplifies the vision where camera work serves the purpose of visually elaborating what is already present in the photographic material. And it emerges in a manner which has a distinctive tone and conveys a distinctive feeling or attitude.

Kracauer and Bazin espoused a realism *of process* more than of subject-matter or style, though characteristic cinematic features of style came to be associated with film realism. Tools typically include: composition in depth; deep focus; long takes with motionless camera; concomitant reliance on *mise-en-scène* over montage; some irregular panning for impressions of spontaneity, etc.<sup>39</sup> Fundamentally, realism of process is about establishing a

cinematic perceptual experience for viewers that possesses psychological verisimilitude - the very thing film formativists were committed to disrupting for the sake of art. Editing is largely invisible and used sparingly.

Classical Hollywood sought perceptual verisimilitude also, but only in pursuit of a superficial illusion of realism. Their aim was to make films correspond to standard patterns of experience in ways meeting familiar genre requirements. Editing, extensively used but increasingly 'invisible' to the viewer, followed a director's psychological, perceptual, interpretive, and spatio-temporal breakdown of a story, presented as 'reality'. As a result, a film was naturally 'read' in only one way: dictated by the director on the basis of rules of genre. Ambiguity of meaning was eliminated. But Bazin's and Kracauer's realist ideal rejects the illusory realism of Hollywood.

According to Bazin, true aesthetic representational realism arises from the need to give significant expression to the world, both concretely and in its essence. True realism depends on combining and balancing concern for the symbolic representation of "spiritual realities" with the pursuit of resemblance.<sup>40</sup> Desire to immortalise the identity of an object leads to mechanical attempts at complete verisimilitude. Bazin believed this need lies deep in human nature and cultures. Photography decisively satisfies that need.<sup>41</sup> But Bazin did not conclude from this that film was reduced to mere mechanical copying of reality devoid of aesthetic value. Rather, the quality of realism inherent in photography is the beginning of and inspiration for cinematic art as an expressive art form. The proper balance between constraints of realist objectivity and the spiritual concerns of subjective imagination means

the latter must not overcome the former; nor the former be unaffected by the latter.

Cinematically realist film can achieve this balance in a uniquely effective way.

Bazin believed

... the world has a sense.. it speaks to us an ambiguous language if we take care to attend to it, if we silence our own desire to make that world signify what we want...<sup>42</sup>

He assumes a phenomenological ontological approach to reality.<sup>43 44 45</sup> Perceivers can grasp and understand the contents of the world through an investigation of the way things present themselves to consciousness. To discover what a thing is, to grasp its being, is to give a lucid description of its appearance to consciousness.<sup>46</sup> Film by virtue of its photographic nature is perfectly suited to do this, so long as it respects the fundamentals of photographic reality.

Three interrelated stands run through Bazin's realism: (i) the objectivity of the photographic process; (ii) the moral inferiority of montage over the spatial realism of the realist aesthetic; and, (iii) psychological genesis of the urge for realism in cinema. I shall comment briefly on each of these in turn.<sup>47</sup>

Cinema is seen by Bazin as *objectivity in time*. Objects are not just preserved in an instant like insects in amber, but images of things are images of their *duration and change*<sup>48</sup>. The 'power' and 'potency' of the photographic image arises from the transparency of photography and its psychological effects on human beings. Photography, as Lopes suggests, allows the realities of things to be 'laid bare' to consciousness. Nothing stands between our *seeing* and the reality of things as they are. In no other art medium is this possible. Humans easily become blinded by accumulated familiar ways of viewing the world. Only the

“impassive” and “neutral” photographic lens can strip objects of the piled-up preconceptions and ‘spiritual dust and grime’ with which our eyes look at them.<sup>49</sup> And it is through this power and potency that love enters. Only the camera can present this stripped down object – in “virginal purity” - to our attention and love.

[The] photograph allows us...to admire in reproduction something that our eyes alone could not have taught us to love....<sup>50</sup>

Rather than mechanical instrumentality precluding the possibility of adopting the aesthetic attitude to a cinematic work as an artwork, it is the basis of aesthetic appreciation of the camera-projected world. The neutrality of the photographic image is based in mechanical instrumentality. It is because of this neutrality that the photographic image can arouse and illumine an audience. To give full effect to this power, spatio-temporal unity of photographic reality must not be sacrificed for the sake of montage-created meanings or subjectivist impositions.

Cinematic realism refuses to pursue the formativist course of montage-created meaning and methodological anti-realism. Bazin considered this difference a source not only of aesthetic, but also of moral, superiority. Just as in life one must discern for oneself the meaning of events, so too in films characterised by cinematic realism. Deep focus camera shots and structural realism leave scope for ambiguity and mental freedom. Realist-representational films engage the active mental attention of non-passive viewers in non-directive ways, at the same time leaving space for the imaginative free play over the forms of the photographically revealed world, giving rise to aesthetic pleasure and other emotions.<sup>51</sup>

The moral individual seeks to attune their moral sensibilities to better discern the true significance of events. In real life, more often than not, ambiguity is present. Insofar as we base decisions on moral reading of events and situations, we may sometimes get it wrong. Through this we learn which kinds of overlooked factors we need to pay more attention to. Thus humans acquire practical wisdom in part by cultivating powers and sensibilities for the interpretation of real situations. Works of art that provide all the answers through formativist interventions, or that are pre-packaged in mundane, stereo-typical, easy to digest ways, or appeal merely to imagination and fantasy, as in Hollywood movies, will be of little or no assistance to the cultivation of moral-aesthetic sensibility. The worst commercial films, such as those Scruton scathingly criticises, actively undermine viewers' moral-aesthetic sensibility.

Renaissance painting which mechanically pursued a more complete verisimilitude through newly discovered laws of perspective, lost sight of the spiritual meanings inherent in reality and became occupied merely with reproducing copies of the appearances of reality<sup>52</sup>. While representational art seeks the *truth* of things, paintings as slavish copies of reality are in fact a kind of lie: their "illusion of reality" merely tricks the eye and mind. Necessarily so, because no matter how exact a copy of reality a painting appears to be it has been mediated by the subjectivity of the artist, thus must in some way be contaminated by that subjectivity.

The photographic image by contrast embodies truth, not deception, Bazin maintained, because the reality of the subject itself is somehow contained in the very existence of the photographic image. *Because* it is not subjectively mediated, the photographic image is an authentic trace of the reality of an object. In photographically laying the world bare before the viewer's eyes a realist film therefore in effect puts viewers, psychologically, in touch with the

reality of the object itself. A photograph gives a physical trace of the object itself in much the way a death mask is a trace of the visage of a person. The power of the death mask to affect is far greater than the equivalent image modelled in clay. Similarly, knowing the camera image is totally *unmediated* by subjective human consciousness, Bazin believes, likewise profoundly affects the viewer.<sup>53</sup> The emotions with which we respond are those appropriate to the reality of the subject itself. Is Scruton right then that in cinematically realist films viewers engage with the subject-matter itself and not with the film as an art-representation?

Bazin turns to Italian neo-realism<sup>54</sup> to fill out his concept of the aesthetic value of cinematically realist films.

Neo-realism knows only immanence. It is from appearance only, the simple appearance of being and of the world, that it knows how to deduce the ideas that it unearths.....<sup>55</sup>

The assemblage of the film must never add anything to the existing reality.<sup>56</sup>

Neo-realist film-makers sought to aesthetically convey some humanist idea by seeking real exemplars of the ideas it sought to convey. Material is selected that is naturally apt to the idea, and the film is shot and composed in a manner yielding cinematic experience that is as naturalistic as possible. Meanings inherent in the idea are allowed to unfold themselves through the display of photographic material. This requires remaining true to the spatio-temporal integrity of photographic reality. Skill and imagination are required on the director's part to visualise the best way to do this.

Simplification, authenticity, and familiarity are key factors. Acting, montage, and other cinematic techniques must not be permitted to obscure the unfolding and revealing of meaning inherent in photographed reality itself. Even where events are staged for the camera, the secondary depictive or representational labour of actors is diminished, and the selective and compositional and cinematographical labour of the film director becomes pre-eminent.

Thus acting in neo-realist films is typically naturalistic, with preference for non-professional actors who naturally embody person-type traits the film requires. There will not be a lot of complex dialogue. Filming will take place as much as possible in commonplace real-life settings even though this limits scope for plastic compositions.<sup>57</sup> The structure of the narrative will, proportionally, respect the actual duration of the real events depicted. The cuts that the logic of the story requires will be ‘descriptive’ - bringing out the real properties of something more fully in a concrete, visual way – and not an interpretive comment on what is going on. Where things are not shown, this corresponds to life, where we do not know everything.<sup>58</sup>

Vittorio de Sica’s *Ladri di Biciclette* (*Bicycle thieves*) is offered as a near pure example of neo-realism. It balances subjective vision of spiritual realities with photographic and structural verisimilitude. Screen time proportionally tracks real (spatio-temporally objective) time: a man and his son walk the streets, through sunshine and rain, looking for the man’s stolen bicycle. As human beings we understand immediately the significance of events. Familiarity with Italian social conditions at the end of the Second World War is not necessary. The film in a simple way brings us immediately into contact with a universal

reality: unfair loss of a hard fought for chance to through having a job raise one's family from the deprivations of poverty.

This outcome is achieved without introducing “properly articulate” meanings through the device of montage. The affective and expressive visual poetry of the film derives from the archetypal embodiment of the father-son relation as the two move together through their familiar world, with little shown outwardly yet their connexion manifestly profound. *Mise-en-scene* is complex while not drawing cinematic attention to itself. The film is meticulously elaborated and put together, as Bazin observes, but gives the illusion of chance as we experience chance in life. There are no slick pre-analyses driving stereotypical genre-driven editing patterns. Rather things are depicted as though they just appear to happen, which just as easily might not have happened. Or do not happen though they very nearly did, where that change or would have altered everything in the primarily projected world. Just as in life.<sup>59</sup>

There is not one image that is not charged with meaning, that does not drive home into the mind the sharp end of an unforgettable moral truth; and not one that to this end is false to the ontological ambiguity of reality. Not one gesture, not one incident, not a single object in the film is given prior significance derived from the ideology of the director.<sup>60</sup>

The humanity in the audience responds to the humanity in the cinematic depiction because ‘the film’ does not get in the way. In the film much remains uncertain; but this is true to reality also. We do not know if the man will have work next week; we do not know what will be the effect on the boy, of the events he has witnessed. Viewing *Ladri di Biciclette* affords a clarification and confirmation of our moral natures without providing a detailed



analysis or investigation. It is the job of novelists and playwrights to explore the full range of human psychological complexity and motivation in great detail. They are well-equipped to convey propositional meanings and embody articulate thoughts that can be intellectually apprehended by audiences. It may be this range of human behaviour and motivation is beyond the scope of cinematic realism. Successful realist-representational film art may always depend on universal themes conveyable through particular exemplars effective on the basis of commonly shared human social and emotional experience.

Scruton seems to make the representational scope and method of the novel or play the model for all representational art. He requires discrete 'properly articulate' meanings to be rationally embedded in and recoverable from discrete aspects of an art work. Formativist film-makers accept the challenge and seek to achieve these goals through montage, plastics, and other anti-realist cinematic devices. But imposed artificial meanings deny viewers opportunity to seek and reflect and discover truths for themselves. If an important purpose of art is to bring us back to a deeper engagement with reality or the moral essences of things, in a way with which we can freely and imaginatively engage, cinematic realism, not formativism, may be the best way to achieve this. But whether we can definitively say neo-realism is a paradigm for non-derivative *representational* art is a question which must be left to another occasion.

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<sup>1</sup> Wolterstorff, Nicholas.(1980) *Works and Worlds of Art*. Oxford: Clarendon Press

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*; p x-xi, 17

<sup>3</sup> Wolterstorff, *op cit*; 357

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*; 358

<sup>5</sup> Wolterstorff *op cit*; 20

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*; 93-94

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*; p 20

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- <sup>8</sup> Bazin, A. (1967) “The ontology of the photographic image”. *What is cinema?* Berkeley: University of California Press.
- <sup>9</sup> Wolterstorff, *op cit*; p 20.
- <sup>10</sup> Gaut, B. (2002) “Cinematic art”. *JAAC* 60 4. P 306
- <sup>11</sup> Berys Gaut (*ibid*) provides arguments against Scruton’s conclusions on photography.
- <sup>12</sup> We shall follow Scruton in speaking of cinematic or film ‘representations’, even though he has just argued that film strictly speaking cannot be representation in the art relevant sense.
- <sup>13</sup> Scruton could be at least partly answered by appeal to either genre theory or auteur theory. Knowledge of rules and conventions of film genre can guide and inform viewers’ experience; likewise, appreciation based on recognising the cinematic imprint of an auteur’s “signature”. Viewers need not be entirely at a loss.
- <sup>14</sup> Gaut (2002) *ibid*; 302
- <sup>15</sup> Most attempts at screen symbolism according to Scruton are ‘vague, portentous, and psychologically remote’. (600) Imagination is stifled by reliance on concepts or ideas that are overly ‘concretised’ visually and photographically. (601) In most cases filmic devices do not photographically ‘comment’ at all, but just create photographic effects which distract viewers’ from what is typically the mediocrity of ‘meanings’ in cinema.
- <sup>16</sup> Munsterberg, Hugo. (1970) *The Film: A psychological study*. (1916) New York: Dover Publications
- <sup>17</sup> Arnheim, Rudolph. (1997) *Film essays and criticism*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. [Most of the essays on film theory in this volume were originally written in the 1930s.]
- <sup>18</sup> Carroll, Noël. (1988a) “Film/mind analogies: The case of Hugo Münsterberg”. *JAAC* 489 - 499
- <sup>19</sup> Bazin, A (2004) “Evolution of the language of cinema”, *What is cinema?* (1967) Reprinted in Braudy, Leo & Marshall Cohen (eds.) *Film theory and criticism*. 6<sup>th</sup> Edition. Oxford University Press
- <sup>20</sup> Andrew, Dudley. (1984) *Concepts in film theory*. Oxford University Press
- <sup>21</sup> Andrew (1984) *op cit*; 44
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>23</sup> Carroll, (1988) *op cit*.
- <sup>24</sup> Andrew, (1976) *The major film theories*. Oxford University Press. And, (1984) *Concepts in film theory*
- <sup>25</sup> Andrew (1976) 38
- <sup>26</sup> Andrew *ibid*; 31
- <sup>27</sup> Arnheim, Rudolph. “For the first time”. (1931) *Film essays and criticism*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. [Trans. Brenda Benthien.] . (1977)
- <sup>28</sup> Abell, C. (2010) “Film as representational art.” *BJA* 50 3 273 -286
- <sup>29</sup> Carroll, Noël. (1988b) *Philosophical problems of classical film theory*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>31</sup> The low angle shot of Kane in *Citizen Kane* for example, which makes him appear proportionally larger than his surroundings, conveys the thought of menace.
- <sup>32</sup> Munsterberg’s and Arnheim’s suppositions about theatre are historically contingent and imaginatively limited. Arnheim feared increased capacity for verisimilitude in film; i.e. sound and colour: “Since every artistic creation demands that distance from reality which Progress is trying to remove!....nothing will be left to the film camera but...the mechanical, life-like reproduction of art or non-art which is set up and acted out in the studio”.)
- <sup>33</sup> Carroll. (1988a)

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- <sup>34</sup> See for example the account of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* in *Philosophers on art: From Kant to the postmodernists*, ed. Christopher Kul-Want. [New York: Columbia University Press. (1983)]
- <sup>35</sup> Kant *ibid*; §45
- <sup>36</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>37</sup> Lopes, D. (2003) "The aesthetics of photographic transparency". *Mind* 112 447
- <sup>38</sup> Walton, K. (1984) "Transparent pictures: On the nature of photographic realism." *Critical Inquiry* 11 2 246-272
- <sup>39</sup> Bazin, A. 'Evolution of the language of cinema', in *What is cinema?* (1967) Braudy, Leo & Marshall Cohen (eds). (2004) *Film theory and criticism*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. Oxford University Press. p 48
- <sup>40</sup> Bazin "The ontology of the photographic image".
- <sup>41</sup> Friday, J. (2005) "André Bazin's ontology of photographic and film imagery. *JAAC* 63 4 339-350. P 342
- <sup>42</sup> Andrew (1976) p 169
- <sup>43</sup> Carroll, N. (1988) *op cit*; p 119-120
- <sup>44</sup> Andrew, D. (1976) "André Bazin". Friday, J. (2005)
- <sup>45</sup> Friday, J. *Ibid*.
- <sup>46</sup> Andrew (1976) p 340
- <sup>47</sup> Carroll (1988b) p 119-120
- <sup>48</sup> Bazin, A. "The ontology of the photographic image", *op cit*; 169
- <sup>49</sup> *Ibid*;
- <sup>50</sup> Bazin, A. "De Sica: Metteur en Scène," *op cit*; 170
- <sup>51</sup> Andrews, (1976) *op cit*; 'Bazin'. p 49
- <sup>52</sup> Bazin, *op cit*.
- <sup>53</sup> Jonathan Friday identifies two senses in which Bazin's theory of realism is essentially psychological. First, it provides a first-order psychological account of the significance of photography in terms of human responsiveness to the kind of material sign a photograph is. Second, it posits an underlying human need that is in part responsible for the first-order psychological responsiveness to photography.
- <sup>54</sup> A term applied to Zavattini, de Sica, De Santis, and even Visconti, by Bazin.
- <sup>55</sup> Bazin, "De Sica: Metteur en Scène"; *op op cit*; 174
- <sup>56</sup> *Ibid*; 175
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibid*; 174
- <sup>58</sup> It does not follow Bazin thinks that all film using non-actors, real settings, or based on news items, are better than traditional melodramas or spectacles. Likewise some films count as cinematically realist that do not immediately strike one as such because of their professional actors, costumes, expensive settings. Neo-realism may not always or ever exist in a pure state and may be combined with other aesthetic tendencies.
- <sup>59</sup> Bazin, "De Sica: Metteur en Scène"; *op cit*; 176
- <sup>60</sup> *Ibid*;